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Abstract
This thesis analyses the emergence, development and political significance of the Ukrainian Green 
Movement - Zelenyi Svit - and the Green Party of Ukraine - Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy (PZU) - in 
the Soviet/post-Soviet context of political change. The emergence of the Ukrainian Greens is 
studied in relation to Soviet eco-culture, rooted in pre-Revolutionary thinking on the environment 
and which continued to exist as a sub-culture during the Soviet period. It is argued that this eco- 
culture not only contributed to the emergence of the Ukrainian Green Movement, but that it also 
provided it with a theoretical framework and with already experienced activists. However, having 
not only a positive impact on the emergence of the movement, this current of thought also 
facilitated Zelenyi Svifs  split into two groups in December 1994. All the same, this thesis suggests 
that eco-culture may play a significant role in creating awareness of the environment in Ukraine, 
as it is not perceived with the same amount of scepticism and suspicion as 'imported' thinking on 
the environment generated in the West. Besides, there is an enormous interest in Ukraine in the 
past. The Greens could benefit from this interest by highlighting the environmental traditions of 
the past, while combining them with contemporary international environmental thought, rather 
than focusing entirely on the latter.
The study of Zelenyi Svit and PZU  more generally is combined with an in-depth analysis of 
the campaign against expansion of the South-Ukrainian Energy Complex, conducted by the 
Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir starting in 1988 and continuing to this day. This thesis covers the 
period 1988 to 1994. Research on Zelenyi Svit and PZU  was conducted through in-depth 
interviewing, observation, archival research and a survey of several Ukrainian newspapers during 
three field-trips to Ukraine. A survey was also conducted among district and regional groups of 
Zelenyi Svit in June 1994. This thesis represents the first attempt at studying the Ukrainian Greens 
in-depth. Most of the sources and information appearing in Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and 
Seven are therefore new.
Some attention is also given to the similarities/differences between the Ukrainian Greens and 
similar movements in the West. It is argued that although in some respects similar to the latter in 
that they opposed the existing economic and political system of their country (i.e. the USSR) as 
being anti-environmental from relatively early on in their campaign, there were also similarities 
with Green Movements in developed countries, which tend to campaign for the livelihood o f their 
local communities and thus the very existence of their people. In Ukraine, the Chernobyl accident, 
nuclear power and extensive chemical pollution were seen as threats not only to the country's 
environment but also to the very existence of the people inhabiting this environment. Thus, to the 
Greens their campaigns were not only aimed at reducing pollution, but were also presented as a 
struggle for survival.
Although the emphasis o f this thesis is on the emergence o f and internal developments within 
Zelenyi Svit and PZU, the interaction between the two and on their campaigns, considerable 
attention is also given to the Ukrainian Communist Party and its changing attitude towards the 
environment in general and nuclear power in particular. The relationship between the CPU and 
the Greens is also studied in-depth. By referring extensively to correspondence between the CPU 
and the CPSU now available in the Ukrainian State Archives for Public Movements and not yet 
published, it is argued that the CPU relatively shortly after the Chernobyl accident started to voice 
its concern over and opposition to the CPSU's plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine, 
providing a number o f arguments for not doing so. It is commonly argued that the Greens 
successfully pressurised the CPU and the CPSU into making concessions on the nuclear power 
issue. In reality, the situation was far more complex: although the CPU could not openly side 
with the Greens and did not want to be seen as 'giving in' to too many of their demands, it was able 
to exploit widespread support for the Greens to support its requests vis-à-vis 'Moscow'. Thus, it 
seems more plausible to conclude that the two benefited mutually from one another.
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to study political actors in the Soviet/post-Soviet context o f political 
change and to assess their impact on political decision-making within this context. I will focus on 
Ukraine and look at the emergence, development and political significance of the Green 
Movement of Ukraine, Zelenyi Svit (Green World) and of the Ukrainian Green Party, Partiia 
Zelenykh Ukrainy (PZU).
Ukraine has been chosen as the geographical focus of the thesis for a number o f reasons. 
Firstly, it is the third largest of the former Soviet republics, with a territoiy and population the size 
of France. Ukraine’s geographical and strategic location makes it a particularly important country 
to Western Europe. Its efforts to join Europe and its potential role as a bridge-builder between the 
former East and the West are in themselves reasons good enough to start a study of the area.
Secondly, for a long time Ukraine was considered to be one o f the most conservative of the 
former Soviet republics. Political reform was introduced much more reluctantly and with greater 
difficulty than was the case in for instance the Baltic Republics. As such, research on Ukrainian 
politics is important for comparative purposes. Unlike the Baltic States, which were the most 
focused upon immediately prior to and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of Ukraine has 
been a part o f the Soviet Union almost from its veiy beginning. The Western parts o f Ukraine, 
however, were incorporated into the Soviet Union only in 1939. Unlike the rest of the countiy, the 
Western areas have been considerably influenced by Western Europe - a substantial proportion of 
the population is Catholic - and they also have a democratic tradition - albeit a short one. Ukraine 
is thus also interesting as it provides us with an opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis 
within one single territorial unit.
Thirdly, Ukraine has been chosen as the focus of this thesis is ‘green politics’. Chernobyl is 
located in Ukraine, and although Belorussia suffered the most from the nuclear fall-out in the 
aftermath of the accident in 1986, Ukraine was also badly affected. Altogether there are five 
nuclear power stations on Ukrainian soil and these have been (and still are) a source o f dispute 
since the Chernobyl accident. Further, Ukraine accounted for not only 25% of the Soviet Union’s 
industry output, but also 25% of its total pollution. Moreover, Ukraine was also affected by 
transboundary pollution emanating primarily from Poland and the former Czechoslovakia. 
Extensive pollution o f the air, rivers and soil was beginning to take its toll by the late 1980s and 
issues such as nuclear safety and the environment ranked high on the Ukrainian political agenda 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Finally, Zelenyi Svit was among the very first independent political movements to emerge not 
only in Ukraine, but also in the foimer Soviet Union. The environment was at least initially
11
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3considered a relatively harmless (i.e. non-political) issue and environmentalists were keen on 
stressing that the movements/groups they set up were non-political and as such posed no threat to 
the CPSU. It soon became clear, however, that the environment and politics were inextricably 
linked with one another, and as the boundaries of glasnost and démocratisation were pushed out 
further and further, the Green Movements, not only in Ukraine but also in the other former Soviet 
republics, became more and more politicised. By linking environmental pollution to people’s 
health, the Greens, headed by well-known figures such as the writers Serhii Plachynda and lurii 
Shcherbak, succeeded in mobilising the public behind their cause and achieved substantial 
concessions from the Ukrainian authorities, particularly in the period 1988-1990. Members and 
sympathisers of Zelenyi Svit were elected to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 and 
also to local and district councils throughout Ukraine in 1990. What was more, in 1991 the second 
leader of Zelenyi Svit, lurii Shcherbak, was appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment. A
year later, he was sent to Israel as Ukrainian ambassador. His predecessor as leader o f Zelenyi
Svit, Leontyi Sanduliak, was appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Romania the same year. Thus,
the Greens were able to influence the Ukrainian political process both through ad-hoc activities
and through established political channels.
Comparative studies are popular among observers of Green politics’. Although some 
.attention is given to the differences/similarities between the Ukrainian Green Movement and
similar movements in Western Europe, the emphasis is on the former. I have consciously chosen a 
.very detailed approach, studying Zelenyi Svit and PZU  in depth, as their history has not yet been
«
written. It is my view that we need a solid understanding of the Ukrainian Greens themselves 
before we can endeavour to make a proper cross-countiy analysis. To do both in one thesis is 
unfortunately not possible due to limited space, budget and time constraints. Due to an enormous 
amount of previously unpublished and until recently non-accessible information, the length o f this 
thesis is above average. In my view this is justifiable as very little has so far been published on the
Ukrainian Green Movement and it is therefore not possible to refer the reader to books and articles 
providing him/her with a background to the topic covered in this thesis. Moreover, the few works 
that have so far appeared on the subject are to some extent misleading as they do not cover the 
topic in depth and are not backed up with factual evidence^.
Outline o f Hypothesis/Presentation of Chapters 
In Chapter One I try to develop a framework within which to explain and study the emergence of 
the Ukrainian Greens. I first look at their emergence within the context of Gorbachev’s political
‘ For an overview, see Philip D. Lowe and Wolfgang Riidig, ‘Review Article: Political Ecology and the 
Social Sciences - the State of the Art’, British Journal o f  Political Science, vol. 16, pp. 513-50.
 ^See Chapter Three for details.
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reforms but argue that this in itself is not sufficient to explain their emergence. I then look at 
political participation and the environment prior to 1985, arguing that the student dntzhiny 
(student nature guards) and members of the creative intelligentsia, who opposed environmentally 
harmful objects prior to glasnost and démocratisation, paved the way for and took an active part in 
setting up green movements not only in Ukraine, but also in other Soviet republics during 1986 
and 1987. Whereas the Soviet doctrine at this time can be condensed as follows: ‘Nature is 
merely a tool to serve the purposes o f Man’, an alternative current of thought (Man is an intrinsic 
part of Nature and Nature has intrinsic value), whose roots can be traced back to pre- 
Revolutionary Russia and Ukraine, existed as a sub-culture during the Soviet pre-Gorbachev era, 
providing a philosophical framework and the skills needed to establish a Green Movement. Thus, 
the emergence of the Greens was not simply a spontaneous reaction to glasnost and 
démocratisation, but the result o f a long process that can be traced back to the pre-Soviet period. I 
also argue that this ‘eco-culture’, as I have chosen to call it, influenced the arguments used by the 
Greens in their campaigns to save the Ukrainian environment and have an important role to play in 
the Greens’ future work. Combining this ‘eco-culture’ with green thinking on the environment as 
developed in the West might prove a more fruitful approach than blindly adopting Western 
theoretical frameworks while ignoring the rich philosophical, cultural and religious environmental 
legacy o f the Slavs.
In Chapter Two I first try to identify the reasons why the Soviet Union suffered such 
extensive environmental problems - in spite of strict legislation to reduce pollution to a minimum 
and arguments to the effect that for ideological reasons the Soviet system was by far more 
environmental than that of the capitalist West. I then look at environmental reform under 
Gorbachev and assess its significance. Finally, I look at environmental problems in Ukraine and 
the link between pollution and health, as well as policy changes that took place in this area during 
the late 1980s/early 1990s. The position of the CPU is examined with materials from the 
Ukrainian State Archives for Public Movements, and I also make extensive use of the transcript of 
the environmental session of the Ukrainian Parliament, which took place in February 1990.
Chapters Three and Four account for the emergence and development o f Zelenyi Svit, from 
1987, when it was founded, until December 1994 when it effectively split into two movements. 
Firstly, I look at the emergence o f the Green Movement, linking this process to the concept o f Slav 
eco-culture, arguing that there are two currents o f thought within the Movement; one ‘Ukrainian’, 
which seeks inspiration from Ukrainian/Russian science, literature and culture, and one smaller, 
‘globaiist’, which is more preoccupied with the international green movement and its political 
framework. These two currents clashed on numerous occasions, eventually facilitating the split of 
the movement. Considerable attention is also given to the interaction between the greens and the
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framework within which the Ukrainian Greens operate, has shaped their agenda and made it in 
some respects different from that of the West European Greens. A close examination o f the 
Greens and the issue o f Ukrainian independence is conducted to show that while different, the
14
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3CPU and the development o f this relationship over time. As the thesis includes a case-study of the
campaign against the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex, the emphasis of this chapter is on internal |
'S'developments within Zelenyi Svit. The following topics are covered: membership composition, 3 1
ri
policies, strategy, public support, political representation, discord within the movement, links to f
the international green movement and Zelenyi Svit's political impact.
3
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The emergence and development of the Green Paity is analysed in relation to general 
developments in Zelenyi Svit in Chapter Five. At its first congress in October 1989, Zelenyi Svit 
passed a resolution stating its intent to set up a Green Party once this became politically possible.
In February 1990 the CPSU changed article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, thus opening up 
opportunities for political parties other than the CPSU. The Green Party of Ukraine was founded 
in April 1990 as the ‘political wing’ of Zelenyi Svit. As the green movement was composed of 
people of very different political beliefs, however, disagreement soon arose as to what exactly 
should be the relationship between the two. Special emphasis is therefore given to the relationship 
between the movement and the party. I also look at the history, theoretical framework, policies if 
and strategies, resources and political significance of the Green Party. The chapter also addresses 
the mobilisation potential and public support o f the Green Party, political representation and its 
relationship to other political parties. Finally, I try to place the Green Party in the Ukrainian
political landscape, arguing that the Party has failed to utilise its potential due to a lack o f clarity f
Mon political issues and due to poor leadership.
Chapters Six and Seven focus on the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex (Nikolaev oblast) and 
.the campaign organised by the green movement in the region to prevent further expansion o f this 
station. I look at how the Greens mobilised broad public support against such expansion, how they | |  
developed arguments against it and alternatives to it and how they interacted with the relevant |
political decision makers at a local, regional, Ukrainian and (prior to the collapse of the USSR in |
December 1991) Soviet level, with an emphasis on relations between the CPU and the Greens and 
on relations between Greens in Nikolaev oblast and in Kiev. I also look at how general political 
and economic change in the USSR/Ukraine affected the campaign and the way in which it was 
conducted.
Chapter Eight relates the emergence and the significance o f the Ukrainian Greens to those in 
Western Europe. I first look at the theoretical framework of Zelenyi Svit!PZU, contrasting this to 3 f
green political thought in the West. Although there are similarities, there are also differences.
These differences, shaped in part by Slav ‘eco-culture’, as well as the very different political I
i
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Ukrainian Greens are still committed to the international green device of ‘act locally, think 
globally’.
A second issue addressed in this chapter is Inglehart’s concept of post-material value change 
and its relevance as a means by which to explain the emergence of green movements/parties in the 
Ukrainian case. I argue that this concept is not very useful as an explanation in the case of the 
former USSR. However, there are also significant similarities between Greens in the West and 
Ukraine (educational level of members, types and means of campaigning), making it difficult to 
liken the emergence o f the green movement in Ukraine to that of similar movements in developing 
countries - although the aspect of suiwival has very much in common with third world movements. 
Whereas in the latter case locals sometimes organise campaigns to protect their livelihood (forest, 
land, etc.), in the Ukrainian case the Greens are fighting against the degeneration o f an entire 
nation, caused by radiation and chemical pollution of the drinking water, air, soil and food 
products to a level where genetic defects on a large scale are feared.
Green activists are highly educated and initially, like Greens in the West, many of them 
opposed the dominant political doctrine (‘state socialism’ in the USSR, ‘capitalism’ in the West) 
as being anti-environmental. In that sense also Zelenyi Svit Was an ‘alternative’ movement. But 
whereas the Green Movement in the West emerged gradually in response to growing disillusion 
with the existing political/economic system and the pollution it generated, in the USSR it emerged 
spontaneously - as a mass movement - uniting a less homogeneous group of people, not all of 
whom shared the same commitment to alternative thinking as was the case in the West.
Finally, in Chapter Nine, I discuss the significance of Slav eco-culture in shaping the 
Ukrainian Green Movement. I specifically look at how arguments used in the campaign against 
further expansion of the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex were linked to this concept and how this 
made the campaign different from similar campaigns undertaken by greens in Western Europe. 
Similarly, I look at the significance of eco-culture in fuelling the conflict between members of the 
Green Party and Zelenyi Svit, the argument being that the latter are more committed to this concept 
than the former.
I ask whether or not the Ukrainian Green Movement has a future, given serious conflicts 
within the movement and given the political and economic situation in Ukraine at the present time. 
Prior to the declaration of Ukrainian independence the Greens argued that once independence had 
been established, adequate measures to protect the environment could be taken. However, recent 
political decisions indicate that concern for the environment has been replaced by the need to 
assert Ukrainian independence. Thus a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors 
passed by the Ukrainian parliament in September 1990 was overturned by presidential decree in 
March 1994 on the grounds that Ukraine needed nuclear power to avoid dependence on Russia in
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1991, very difficult to mobilise. A number o f possible scenarios regarding the future of the greens
the energy sector. Similarly, despite protests from Greens, a decision was made in late 1994 to 
allow for the construction of an oil terminal not far from Odessa. Due to financial hardship and 
growing disillusionment with politics generally, the public is now, unlike what was the case before
:
are identified with this in mind, as is the potential role o f eco-culture and assistance from the 
Greens in the West for each one of these.
;
The research for this thesis was carried out during three field trips to Ukraine in 1991 (August), 
1992 (June-August) and 1994 (March- June). Information about the emergence and development 
o f Zelenyi Svit and PZU  were obtained through extensive interviewing o f and numerous 
conversations and discussions with key members of the movement/party as well as from Zelenyi 
Svi f s  archives. I also rely on hand-written accounts of Zelenyi SvitiPZU  meetings supplied by
individual members. During my visits to Ukraine I was allowed to sit in on internal meetings of
'
Zelenyi Svit/PZU  and also accompanied a group of PZU  supporters from Kiev to Zakarpatia in 
April 1994. Liubov Karavanska, a member o f PZU, made it to the second round of the 
parliamentary elections in the Irshava district, and Kiev Greens went there to conduct a short pre­
election campaign and also to observe the elections themselves. During the spring of 1994 I was 
able to access CPU documents on the Greens and on nuclear power in Ukraine in the Ukrainian 
Archives of Public Movements (Kiev), which shed new light on the CPU’s attitude towards the 
Greens and also revealed substantial opposition within CPU towards plans to expand nuclear 
power on Ukrainian territoiy. I was actively encouraged to access and photocopy as many 
documents as possible - an ‘agitator’ was even provided for this purpose - as the archives were 
short o f funding!
Most o f the information used for this thesis was collected in Kiev and through extensive 
interviewing of Kiev activists. Although I was able to talk to activists from the various regions
I
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during organisational meetings o f Zelenyi Svit and PZU  in Kiev, a questionnaire was distributed to 
all the regional groups in June 1994. Although the sample of my survey was rather small (see 
appendix for details) thus preventing me from generalising too much, it is still valid as expressing 
the opinion of regional leaders on a number of issues. It is particularly important to know how 
Greens in the regions think about various issues, as Zelenyi Svit defines itself as a grassroots
I
movement. I have also benefited from SSEES’ collection of Ukrainian newspapers and journals 
. .and from the Ukrainian Press Agency’s collection of press releases and newspapers from Ukraine,
which Taras Kuzio gave me access to in 1991. Martin Dewhirst took out a subscription of Ukraine i
II;Today (Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Liberty in Munich), which gave me access to j |
transcripts from Ukrainian radio/TV as well as other relevant information. &
The case-study on the campaign against expansion of the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex in
,Nikolaev oblast was carried out in June 1994. Extensive talks with members of the Nikolaev
.:.;3
■ioblast Green Movement and with Viktor Bilodid of luzhnoukrainsk were combined with archival 
work and access to Anatolii Zolotukhin’s personal archive and correspondence. The Nikolaev 
oblast state archives have a substantial collection of materials (letters, petitions, fact sheets, reports 
and newspaper cuttings) on this campaign donated to it by Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir, and in the Kiev | î
State Archives for Public Movements I came across CPU documents and reports on the L
luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex that complemented the former. Staff of the Nikolaev newspaper : K
Radianske Pribuzhzhia were also very helpful in providing me with newspaper cuttings, as were |
the staff o f the Nikolaev State Library. Ala Korzheva, a reporter at the oblast TV station, kindly 
allowed me to watch reports she had made on the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex, and Viktor 
Bilodid showed me the areas in luzhnoukrainsk that would have been flooded had plans to expand |3
the Energy Complex gone ahead.
In my thesis I have done one in-depth case study of the campaign against expansion of the
".■SBluzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex. Similar campaigns were conducted by Greens against 
expansion o f the Rivne, Khmelnitskyi and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power stations. A massive
■ f .campaign to prevent the Crimean nuclear power station on the Kerch Peninsula from being 
completed and attached to the power grid was also organised by the Crimean Greens, and the Kiev
Greens together with locals in Chyhyryn prevented the Chyhyryn nuclear power station from being 
built. Whereas I would have liked to conduct a comparative study of all these campaigns, this was 
simply not feasible due to a limited budget and time constraints.
The advantage of doing one in-depth case study, however, in my opinion outweighs its
limitations. A large amount of archival materials on nuclear power is available in the Ukrainian
State Archives on Public Movements (Kiev), and studying it allowed me to gain a better
■ ".S'-understanding of how the nuclear issue developed and how it was handled by the CPU in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. It is commonly argued that the Green Movement influenced 
and shaped the CPU’s stand on this issue. Official documents from the time, however, reveal that 
the situation was much more complex. The CPU’s opposition to further expansion o f nuclear 
power in Ukraine emerged gradually before Zelenyi Svit was founded in December 1987, and it 
seems that the CPU then used Zelenyi Sv i f s  and the public’s concern to justify its own position, 
which became increasingly radicalised vis-à-vis the CPSU during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
On the eve of his death in 1989 Shcherbitskii is even alleged to have apologised for allowing the 1 
May Day parade to go ahead following the accident at Chernobyl. As will be seen in Chapter Six,
fIthe views of CPSU officials and Greens clearly coincided on the issue of the luzhnoukrainsk
Ukraine, based on archival research in Kiev, was presented at a seminar at CICERO, Oslo, as part 
o f a job interview in January 1996.
Energy Complex from the very beginning of this campaign.
In the summer of 1991 I carried out a three month research trip to the Baltic States, Russia, 
Belorussia, Ukraine and Moldavia for the Ecological Studies Institute (London), for whom 1 was 
working as a Soviet Consultant at the time. This not only greatly enhanced my understanding of 
the ins and outs of the Soviet system, but allowed me to gain insight into environmental issues also L 
in areas of the Soviet Union other than Ukraine. During this trip I had meetings and talks with 
members o f the green movements, members of parliaments and officials of the
Ministries/Departments on the Environment in each of these republics.
An article called The Ukrainian Green Movement: Nationalist or Internationalist? derived 
from Chapter Eight of this thesis was published by Avebury Studies in Green Research in 
Perspectives on the Environment 2. in 1995. Parts of Chapters One (introduction on the Greens) ; |
and Two (Soviet Environmental Policies) form part of a report written for the Ecological Studies 
Institute (A Report on a Trip to the Soviet Union. London 1992) and a paper on nuclear safety in
f
As can be seen below, I have not translated quotes in Russian and Ukrainian into English.
This has been done deliberately, to avoid any inaccuracies in translation and to give the reader a 
chance to see the original wording of the documents quoted. Aadne Aasland created precedent on 
this issue in 1994, when he submitted a thesis with quotes in Russian left untranslated. I have 
made extensive use of quotes, rather than summaries, to highlight the original sources maximally. 
Ukrainian/Russian names, names o f journals/newspapers and places referred to in the main text 
have been transliterated for consistency. I have used the Library o f Congress transliteration ,31?
scheme, with the omission of diacritics for both Russian and Ukrainian. Geographical areas 
known abroad by their Russian names (e.g. Kiev instead of Kyiv, Dniepr instead of Dnipro) or 
English names (e.g. South Bug instead of Ukrainian: Pivdennyi Buh and Russian: luzhnii Bug) 
are referred to by their Russian/English names. As regards footnotes, first references are written 
out in full. Where the same source is referred to more than once, only the author’s name, year of ::xpublication and page number(s) are listed.
Funding for this thesis was obtained from the Norwegian Student Bank, the ORS Scheme 
(1991/92, 1992/93) and Glasgow University [(the Glasgow Postgraduate Award (1992/93)]. The I
1994 field trip to Ukraine was funded with a grant from BASEES and support from the Politics 
Department of Glasgow University.
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1 Political Participation in the USSR and the Emergence of 
Independent Green Movements
1.0 Introduction
The emergence o f Green groups and movements in the former Soviet Union is largely referred to 
as a phenomenon of the late 1980s. Even though voices critical of Soviet environmental policies - 
or rather the lack of such policies - can be traced back to the 1920s', these united only a handful of 
individuals and were in most cases loose constellations, not organised groups. The type of 
movements and groups that started to emerge from 1986 and onwards was unprecedented.
At the time of their emergence, no proper framework existed within which to analyse them. 
A number o f different approaches were therefore chosen by researchers in the field. Some 
political scientists have chosen to apply Western models of political science as a tool enabling 
them to get a better understanding of the new groups; thus Fish (1991) for instance, related the 
emergence of informal groups to theories of civil society. Others, such as Pye (1990) have 
elaborated theories of political change to explain the changes that took place in the Soviet Union 
after Gorbachev came to power, culminating in the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Yet others 
[White (1991), Sakwa (1990), Hosking/Aves/Duncan (1992)], rather than approaching their 
subject through theoretical models, have explained the emergence o f informal groups in general in 
the former Soviet Union with reference to political and economic developments under Gorbachev. 
Studies focusing more specifically on the Greens in the former Soviet Union [lanitskii (1990, 
1991, 1992% 1992% 1994), Dawson (1990, 1995)] tend to explain the emergence and/or 
development of such groups within the context of sociological models developed outwith the 
former USSR and for the study of similar movements in the West.
In my view, although the general political and economic changes that took place in the Soviet 
Union following Gorbachev’s ascent to power explain how it became possible to set up 
independent political groups such as the Greens, a more thorough understanding o f the factors 
underlying their emergence can be found only by looking to the past. Whereas Gorbachev’s 
policies of glasnost and démocratisation triggered the formation of Green independent movements, 
the people initiating these movements had in most cases been working actively on environmental 
issues prior to Gorbachev. Some had participated in the student druzhiny (Nature Guards) for
 ^ See d yraac  Bauiiep (Yniiep), BKOJioma n C obctckoh Poœmh . Apxunejiar CBn5o;iu: 3anoDe;»mKH m 
oxpaaa npHpojLi (MocKaa: Ilporpecc, iMp l) for a detailed history of environmental activism in the 
USSR in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Nature protection, others (writers and scientists) had been involved in the loosely organised 
campaign to protect Lake Baikal and/or the more tightly structured campaign against plans to 
redirect the flow of the Siberian rivers to the South, which culminated in this controversial project 
being abandoned by the Soviet Government in February 1986. These people - already possessing 
the knowledge and organisational skills required to successfully set up Green groups, many of 
whom were also well known and respected among the Soviet population - not only added weight 
and credibility to the emerging groups and movements, but were also highly successful in 
mobilising the population behind the demands raised by them.
Soviet official thinking on the environment, as will be seen below, was rooted in the idea that 
Nature was there for the benefit of Man - to serve Man, so to speak - and had no intrinsic value in 
itself. Those people who were actively trying to protect the environment prior to Gorbachev, 
however, did not share this view. Often their views on the environment were shaped by the ideas 
of pre-Revolutionary thinkers, scientists, writers and philosophers as well as Slav cultural and
attempts at creating awareness of and imbuing people with respect for the environment - which, in 
turn, holds the clue to the future of the Greens themselves.
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religious traditions, which I have chosen to refer to as ‘eco-culture’ and which during the Soviet
'
period co-existed with the official doctrine as a sub-culture. Thus, once it became possible to 
establish independent Green movements, not only were their founders and key activists 
experienced ‘campaigners’ and/or well-known public figures; they also already had a theoretical 
framework within which to operate.
Below, I will first outline the emergence of key Green groups and movements in the former 
Soviet Union, relating this to Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and démocratisation. I will then 
look at political participation on the environment in the Soviet Union prior to the emergence of 
Gorbachev, arguing that whereas political participation in the USSR more generally took place 
within carefully set and narrow limits, a higher degree of autonomy and less stringent limits were 
in place for the ‘environmentalists’. Finally, I will present my hypothesis with regard to ‘eco- 
culture’, arguing that ‘eco-culture’ is not only helpful for understanding the emergence and
development o f the Ukrainian Greens; it also has an important role to play in the Greens’ future
'ki;
1.1 The Emergence of Green Groups and Movements under Gorbachev 
(1986-88)
Although Gorbachev’s policies o f perestroika and uskorenie (acceleration) were primarily aimed 
at improving the state of the economy in the USSR% they provided people with opportunities for 
more active participation in Soviet political life. In order for the economy to be successfully 
reformed, constructive criticism of flaws in the economic system were encouraged. Glasnost 
(openness) and demokratisatsiia (démocratisation were encouraged to gain the support of the 
intelligentsia, and after some time informal groups in support o f perestroika began to appear, their 
aim being to discuss how best to improve the performance of the Soviet economy and to support 
Gorbachev’s policies of reform.
Whereas the emphasis was initially on the economy, it soon became clear that many other 
spheres of life, including the state of the environment, were directly linked to and affected by the 
ailing Soviet economic system. Moreover, Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and démocratisation 
soon gained a momentum of their own, gradually expanding and redefining the boundaries within 
which they were conducted and the issues which could be addressed.
The first informal Green groups came into being during 1986. Most o f them consisted of only 
a handful people and were concerned with the cultural as well as the material/physical local 
environment. In Moscow, for instance, a group emerged to save a 300-year-old oak tree on 
Prospekt Kalinina from being uprooted. Other groups were set up to protect and restore historical- 
cultural monuments and buildings. In Leningrad a Council fo r  Cultural Ecology (Sovet po 
ekologii kultury) emerged towards the end of 1986, as did the group Spasenie (Salvation). In 
Ukraine, the Culturological Club and other similar groups were established in early 1987 (see 
Chapter Three). Such groups appeared also in other republics.
Possibly the oldest of these groups, Vizes Aizsargs Klub (VAK), emerged in Latvia in 1980. 
Initially, VAK united people restoring architectural monuments, predominantly old and abandoned 
churches. Once the churches had been repaired, guitar conceits and other entertainment were 
organised in their premises. In 1984 KfÆ joined forces with the Centre to Protect Monuments. 
Members of the latter were studying Latvian folklore and forgotten and banned writers and 
gradually expanded its activities to include also environmental issues^. What VAK and similar 
groups elsewhere had in common was that they were conservationist rather than political and as 
such did not pose a direct threat to the official authorities. To a great extent the leaders o f these
 ^Âse Berit Grgdeland, An Assessment of the Political Significance of Gorbachev's Leadership. M.Phil 
dissertation, Glasgow, 1990.
 ^HncTHTyT MaccoBLix nojiHTMHecKHX 4BMXceHMH, BKOJiorHMecKMe opranH3auHH na TePDHTODHH 5biBntern 
CCCP. CnnaBoquHK. (MocKBa: Hs^aTentcrBO ’’PAY-Ilpecc”, 1992), c. 52.
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groups stressed that in no way were they to be considered political groups. With the emergence of 
glasnost they were viewed as a good example of how constructive groups should operate. They 
were therefore allowed to operate relatively freely.
Gradually, however, the culturological groups started to get politicised and new, more radical 
groups, emerged. The Leningrad City Soviet's decision to pull down the Hotel Angleterre just off 
St. Isaak's Square on 16-18 March 1987 caused one of the first confrontations between official 
authorities and Greens. Spasenie, which emerged in 1986 following efforts to prevent the house of 
the Russian poet A. Delvig from being torn down, took an active part in organising pickets and 
meetings to save Hotel Angleterre from demolition. One of Russia's most famous poets, Sergei 
Esenin, committed suicide in the hotel in the 1920s, and it was thus considered by many to be a 
building o f national significance. It is also interesting to note that Esenin belonged to the so-called 
'countryside' writers, of whose poetry Nature and the link between Nature and Man was the central 
theme. These meetings were attended by several hundred people and were given extensive TV 
coverage.
Two political events that took place in 1986 contributed to the radicalisation of the Green 
Movement. In the winter of that year the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR issued a decree suspending the river-reversai project which had been adopted in 1982. The 
idea o f the project was to turn the flow of several Siberian rivers from the North to the South and 
use the water to irrigate the dry lands of Soviet Central Asia, increasing agricultural and cotton 
production there. A large number of Soviet writers and scientists had campaigned fiercely against 
this project, and the suspension of it no doubt greatly boosted their morale. Moreover, it signalled 
a change in official policies towards people critical of decisions on the environment. Earlier 
loosely organised campaigns such as the one to save Lake Baikal - although visible to the public - 
did not succeed in having official decisions overturned. The river-reversal ‘campaign’ turned this 
trend, indicating that given valid arguments and perseverance, environmental campaigns could be 
successful. Not surprisingly, therefore, scientists and writers who fought against the river reversal 
project decided to formally join forces. The association Ekologiia i Mir (Ecology and Peace) 
which was set up in Moscow in 1987 under the leadership of Sergei Zalygin'', emerged at the 
initiative o f people involved in this campaign.
The second incident, possibly even more crucial than that of the river-reversal project, was 
the accident at Chernobyl which took place on 26 April, 1986. The accident, and all the secrecy 
with which it was surrounded, demonstrated clearly the need for more glasnost - not only on the 
environment, but in Soviet society as such. Besides, the authority o f the Communist Party 
received a serious blow, due to its inability to protect its people against such disasters and its
" Sergei Zalygin was a well-known writer and also editor o f the literary journal Novyi Mir.
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failure to take the measures required to minimise the impact of the accident on the population 
living in contaminated areas, as well as on the environment. The accident also highlighted the 
helplessness o f individual republics faced with environmental disasters inflicted upon them by 
‘Moscow’ through industrial and energy policies upon which they could exert only minimal 
influence.
Related to this, the importance of environmental protection was stressed officially in the 
aftermath o f the Chernobyl accident (see Chapter Two). Novoe myshlenie (new thinking) in Soviet 
foreign policy came to be a major component of perestroika. Soviet doctrine changed from 
‘mutual coexistence’ to ’mutual interdependence’. On a number of occasions Gorbachev referred 
to environmental problems together with the struggle for disarmament - both global issues which 
illustrated interdependence and which could be solved only through international co-operation.
Finally, as a result of glasnost, statistical materials which had earlier been classified started to 
appear in scientific journals and the general press. Access to medical data made it possible to 
estimate the impact of pollution on health, and a large number of articles on concrete sources of 
pollution and the danger they posed to people's health appeared in newspapers all over the Soviet 
Union. People generally became more aware of problems of pollution and the dangers they posed 
not only to the environment in which they were living but also to themselves. Larger, umbrella 
movements, co-ordinating the efforts o f numerous local and regional groups, emerged in most 
republics during 1987. These movements were for the reasons given above and also due to 
people’s rapidly emerging interest in politics more generally, highly successful in appealing to 
ordinary people for support. Significant campaigns to prevent further environmental destruction 
and to improve the state o f the environment were undertaken in most of the Soviet republics 
during the late 1980s. Although most o f the groups organising these campaigns claimed to be 
non-political, it very soon became clear that ecology and politics were inextricably linked.
A series of industrial and energy-generating projects was initiated in the Soviet republics in 
and after 1986. In Latvia, plans were made to build a hydroelectric power station on the Daugava 
River running through the capital, Riga. If  built, considerable areas of arable land would be 
flooded and several villages would have to be abandoned. VAK organised a petition to halt such 
plans and in the autumn of 1986 managed to collect 30,000 signatures. The Greens also succeeded 
in winning the Latvian authorities over to their side and the project was eventually abandoned^.
 ^Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, Peter J.S. Duncan, The Road to Post-Commun ism. Independent 
Political Movements in the Soviet Union. 1985-1991 (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 
1992),
p. 10.
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The real break-through of the Latvian Green Movement came a year later, in 1987, when VAK
■activists organised several demonstrations in Riga against the construction of a metro . The first 
demonstration was banned by the authorities, but a march through the old city still took place. 
This issue united people, and VAK was formally set up as the Latvian Green Movement in Riga in 
the autumn of 1987. Among the initiators of the Green Movement were two journalists, one of 
whom was Dainis Ivans, later to become vice-president of Latvia. He was elected the first 
president of VAK. VAK was shortly afteiwards officially registered, as one of the first NGOs in 
Latvia. Attempts to prevent the Riga metro from being built continued throughout the first months 
of 1988. A big meeting attended by some 5,000 people was organised on 3 May that year and 
shortly after, the project was cancelled^.
The metro issue became to the Latvians an issue of national significance, as building the 
metro would not only cause economic and social problems - in addition to spoiling the appearance 
of the old city - but also unwelcome demographic changes - an estimated 200,000 people would 
have to be brought in from other republics to do the construction work. The issue was therefore 
also picked up by the National Front, which was founded in the autumn of 1987 and probably 
inspired its environmental programme. A large number of Greens were involved in setting up the
oPopular Front .
During 1988 VAK successfully organised and carried out several other campaigns - against 
the Sloka pulp and paper combine, which was polluting the holiday resort o f lurmala, and against 
nuclear energy. VAK also organised pickets o f militaiy installations; in 1990 such a picket took 
place in the Saldus region, where an old cemetery was being used as a testing site for bombs and 
where graves were being destroyed as a result^. Local groups were set up in Ventspils to 
campaign against a huge ammonia combine and in Vidzeme to protect the area along the Gauia
river. Environmentalists in Liepaia also founded a Green group to address local environmental 
problems.
In Lithuania, two major Green groups formed in Vilnius (Zhemina) and Kaunas (Atgaja) 
respectively during 1988. In early August 1988 representatives of both movements met, and it 
was decided to set up a Lithuanian Green Movement. The Kaunas group, like VAK, emerged as a 
culturological group. In the early years (1986-88) Atgaja put all its efforts into protecting the Holy 
Gertruda Catholic Church (17th century). It also restored and opened a museum in an 18th century
Valdis Abols, Environmental Problems and the Environmental Movement in Latvia. VAK America Open
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house which had once belonged to a famous Lithuanian linguist. By 1988 the focus of attention 
changed towards more environmental issues, and a survey of the river Neris was carried out to 
establish the state of the environment and monuments along the river. Starting this year, Atgaja 
took part in annual campaigns to save the Baltic Sea, and in the early autumn of 1989 it 
successfully campaigned against military installations. Together with Zhemina, Atgaja succeeded 
in preventing three blocks of the Kaishiadorsk hydro nuclear power station from being built (1988- 
89), and shortly afterwards the two groups successfully campaigned against expansion of the 
Ignalina nuclear power station"'.
Ziemina was established by scientists from the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences’ Ecological 
Institute. Aware of the extent of environmental damage in Lithuania, they decided to set up a
Monuments o f  Old Estonia, in late 1986. This group was, however, banned as several dissidents
10
movement which would tackle environmental problems such as the Ignalina nuclear power station 
and the Baltic Sea. Its first meeting took place in late 1987 and environmental problems and 
possible solutions were discussed at length. Shortly afterwards, on 11 February 1988, Ziemina 
was registered under the auspices of the Komsomol and the Academy of Sciences, and on 1 May 
1988 the movement’s statute and programme were endorsed at its first congress. Within less than 
a year, Ziemina had established itself as a political force in Lithuania.
The Lithuanian Green Movement gained overwhelming support from the general public in its 
struggle to prevent further expansion and to improve the safety of the Ignalina nuclear power 
station. Although Ziemina had among its ranks nuclear physicists such as Zigmas Vaisvila, 
gathering information about Ignalina proved difficult as most of the infonnation was classified. In
addition, newspapers were wary of printing such information supplied by the Greens, fearing 
repercussions for leaking classified information. As a result, Ziemina eventually set up two 
laboratories with help from abroad, so that official information could be verified. The movement 
called for an international commission to be set up to examine the station, as according to 
scientists it was unsafe and there were indications that the surrounding environment was suffering 
from radioactivity. Although the demand for an international commission was unsuccessful, plans 
to construct a third nuclear reactor were cancelled, a number of improvements were made, and one 
reactor was finally closed down. Military issues were also addressed by the Lithuanian Greens, 
who in July 1990 organised the first peace march in the country, calling for disarmament and the
I
closure of Soviet military bases on Lithuanian territory. In addition, the movement set up an Eco-
centre to compile a database on the state o f the environment in Lithuania.
The first Green group to emerge on Estonian territory was the Society fo r  the Protection o f
M
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joined its ranks". The Estonian Green Movement was initiated in early 1987, following an 
announcement from Moscow in February that year to the effect that a new deposit o f phosphorite 
was to be opened for excavation in 1997-98 . The opening o f the new deposit would increase 
phosphorite mining considerably and was likely to cause extensive environmental damage. North- 
East Estonia accounted for nearly the entire phosphorite deposits of the USSR. Immediately after 
the announcement Estonian journalists confronted representatives of the company in charge of 
excavation and Estonian authorities with the information disseminated from the Soviet capital.
Once confirmed, these plans caused an emotional response among Estonians: were these plans go 
ahead, Estonia’s best pastures would be lost and the level of the groundwater was expected to drop ; .
by up to 100 meters. In addition there was the danger that Estonia might be polluted by fertilisers, S%
heavy metals and radioactive substances. Air pollution would surge, due to large emissions o f | |
sulphur dioxide, and the largest lake in Estonia, Lake Peipsi, and the Baltic Sea were likely to be 
affected. If the project went ahead, it would also cause a large increase in the number o f Russian §■
worker immigrants in the already Russian dominated North-East.
The annual meeting of the Writers’ Union in November 1986 provided the starting point for
.the campaign against phosphorite mining in Estonia. The issue was brought to the attention of 
Gorbachev during his visit to the republic in February 1987. However, on 25 February 1987 the I
head of the all-union geochemical institute, lurii Jampol, announced on Estonian TV that mining
was about to start and that it would be extensive. In the following weeks Estonian newspapers 
carried numerous articles against mining. The journalists were supported by lawyers claiming that 
mining conflicted with the Estonian constitution. The Estonian Academy of Sciences opposed 
mining as it found the preliminary research inadequate. Even the Komsomol opposed Moscow on 
this issue. A flow of protests followed during the next few months. Eventually the Estonian
"
Government had to succumb to public pressure and came down against the project'^.
In Moldavia there was no such issue of national significance behind which the people of the 
republic could unite, although extensive use of pesticides and herbicides in Moldavia’s agriculture 
was having severe effects on people’s health and on the state o f the environment. The Moldavian 
Green Movement - Aktsiunda Verde - however, dates back to 1983, when a group known as Green 
Action was established under the auspices of the Moldavian Journalists’ Union in Kishinev. 
Initially this group consisted of some 30 intellectuals who appealed to the public through petitions i
and articles in the Moldavian cultural press and alerted the authorities to the environmental 
degradation that was taking place in the republic. The group was especially concerned with the V
I
Ibl4* p. 137.
For a detailed report on such mining, see Ulo Ignats, Ett hot mot livsmiljon i Estland och Qstersjon. 
Goteborg: M.H. Publishing, 1988).
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growing pollution of the rivers Dniestr and Prut, which had become a much debated issue at the 
time. In November 1988, the group rearranged itself and appeared as Avia. The group continued 
to call for change in what was called ‘forced industrialisation’ and the ‘indiscriminate 
chemicalisation of agriculture’, as well as in access to basic data on the state of the environment in 
Moldavia.
In 1989 Avia held its inaugural conference and six months later it was officially registered.
By this time the Green Movement was gathering pace. The Greens had now been joined by 
Moldavia’s cultural and scientific establishment, strongly critical of the government’s perceived 
failure to address the republic’s ecological problems. The Movement was also co-operating 
closely with the Moldavian Democratic Movement in Support o f  Perestr'oika and the Alexei
Mateevici Cultural Club.
■■■In early 1989 the Green Movement tried to establish itself as a public organisation by calling 
.a constitutive conference in Kishinev on 25 February, which was sponsored by the Moldavian 
W riters’ Union, film-makers and journalists. At the last minute, journalists withdrew their 
sponsorship following pressure from the authorities. Despite this, some 200 active supporters 
turned up at the meetings, along with a Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary,
■ .i-'T.;Vladislav Semenov, and a Kishinev city official, who declared the meeting illegal. The movement
was informed that a meeting could be authorised at a later date if they changed the composition of 
their steering committee and joined the government- controlled society for the protection of 
Nature. Finally, the conference was forced to adjourn. The movement did, however, continue its 
work. A Public Committee to Save the Prut River was established, headed by Valeriu Ropot o f the
14Biochemistiy Institute o f the Moldavian Academy of Sciences .
In December 1989, riF/T participated in a meeting held in Moscow by USSR Goskompriroda 
for the leaders o f informal Green organisations where the leader o f the Society insisted that it was 
imperative for A VIA and the official Society fo r  Environmental Protection (MOOP) to join forces. 
Moldavia could not afford to have two Green movements, he argued. By co-ordinating their 
efforts to improve the state of the environment in the republic, the Greens could actually be more 
effective. The government was thinking o f closing the Society down on the grounds that it was 
inefficient, and rumours circulated to the effect that its finances would be confiscated. The merger 
was therefore considered by many to be of considerable significance. The two groups worked on 
the merger for some months and in November 1990, AVIA and the Moldavian Society fo r  
Environmental Protection reappeared as Aktsiunda Verde - the Moldavian Green Movement. Not 
everybody was happy with this arrangement. In particular FM supporters were sceptical, fearing
:
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that a merge would discredit this group and turn it into a part of the establishment. Supporters of 
the merger, on the other hand, argued that whereas the Society had premises, equipment and 
money, AVIA enjoyed widespread popular support. A merger was therefore likely to strengthen.
rather than weaken, the Green Movement'^.
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies requested the USSR Procurator General and the Belorussian
In Belarussia the foundation of the Green movement was made in 1986 when people
concerned with the high level of chemical pollution in Minsk launched a series of protests. Many
of these people found their way into the National Front, which from the very beginning had a
strong commitment to environmental issues in general and Chernobyl in particular. After some
time those people most concerned with environmental issues left the Front to set up a separate
Green movement. During 1988 several Green initiative groups were formed in various parts of
Belorussia. One of these was based in Minsk and headed by the writer Vasil lakavenka. Another
was organised by the Architects’ Union of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. The Belorussian
Writers’ Union and Minsk State University were also involved in the preparations, and in 1989 the
founding conference of the Belorussian Ecological Union (BBS) took place in Minsk. Vasil
lakavenka was elected BBS’s first president. At the BBS Inaugural Congress, which took place in
Minsk in July 1989, he was replaced by Boris Zavitskii, professor of Homel University and from
.1990 a deputy of the Belorussian parliament. A committee to help children who had fallen ill 
from nuclear fall-out after the Chernobyl accident - Children o f  Chernobyl - was also established.
Unlike Greens in the Baltic States, the Belorussian Greens failed to unite behind an issue of
.national significance. As pointed out to the author by Irina Holetska, a Minsk activist, whereas 
Chernobyl was one of the major issues on the agenda of the Belorussian Popular Front, it was not 
given the same significance by BBS. The movement insisted instead on adopting a broader 
approach to the environment since, after the Chernobyl accident, many other aspects of 
environmental protection were being neglected. Another reason for this, claimed Holetska, was 
Zavitskii’s evasive attitude towards Chernobyl. This might seem incomprehensible to an outsider, 
as Zavitskii was himself from the Homel district, which was seriously affected by radioactive fall­
out from Chernobyl. While in Minsk it was pointed out to me that Zavitskii adopted a cautious 
approach towards the Belorussian authorities as he was a paify member and as a communist was 
subject to party discipline'^. Zavitskii’s alleged refusal to let BBS activists commemorate the 
Chernobyl accident together with the National Front in 1990, for instance, caused considerable 
dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of BBS, and the order was disobeyed by Minsk
Ï
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Procurator General to begin criminal proceedings against those responsible for exposing the 
people of Belorussia to nuclear fall-out from Chernobyl. Their anger was not just directed at 
republican leaders. There was also a growing sense that Moscow had betrayed Belorussia. Not 
only had Moscow actively covered up the accident; ministerial bureaucrats in Moscow had also 
ignored or rejected the findings o f Belorussia scientists" alarmed by their findings. Although 
BES activists did do quite a lot of work on Chernobyl, BES failed to unite those concerned with 
the effects of Chernobyl.
Without the backing of a strong movement uniting the efforts of the 90 or so Chernobyl 
societies and groups that emerged in Belorussia following the accident in 1986, and with a public 
reluctant to take part in those actions initiated by BES, these scientists and activists had limited 
scope for influence. Activists frequently expressed the view that the Ukrainian Greens were in a 
much better position not only as they were better organised, but also as Ukrainian authorities had 
adopted a more critical approach towards Moscow than did the Belorussian ones.
In Armenia an ecological group - Goiabaikar (Struggle for Survival) emerged in 1987, out of
concern with chemical pollution in the republic. On 17 October 1987, a demonstration directed
against chemical enterprises and plans to build a nuclear power station took place in Erevan and
gathered some 2,000 people. Banners reading ‘Save Armenia from chemical and radioactive
genocide!’ were carried by some of those present at the meeting. A petition later sent to the USSR
18Supreme Soviet carried some 1,500 signatures . In Februaiy 1988 Greens demonstrated against a 
chemical enterprise in Abovian, and in December 1989 a picket of the Nairit chemical combine 
was organised. Half a year later, this combine was closed down'^. The Greens also campaigned
20
against the Medzamor nuclear power station, not far from Erevan. This nuclear power station was 
closed down in 1988, following the Armenian earthquake, which caused worries regarding its 
abilities to withstand an earthquake^". The Armenian Green Movement later became involved in 
the Nagorno Karabakh movement and its leader, Kh. Stamboltsian, at one point conducted a 
hunger strike in support of the people of Nagorno Karabakh .
"  One of these was Volkov, a former high-ranking officer of the Soviet Army, who in the immediate
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident was involved in drafting maps showing the exact concentrations of 
radioactivity in the most affected parts o f Belorussiasia. These findings were simply filed by the 
Ministry of Defense and those people who had been involved were forbidden to speak about their 
findings. Volkov, who was later elected a member of the Belorussiasian parliament from Pinsk, and 
who was working actively through the parliament’s Chernobyl committee, was, when I talked with him 
in 1991, busy trying to organise a factory that could produce clean baby food in his home district.
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The Georgian Green Movement (the Ecological Association under the Auspices of the 
Rustaveli Society) appeared in April 1988 under the leadership of Grigol Tumanishvili, a professor 
and corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. By the autumn of 1988 the 
movement had successfully campaigned against the construction of the Caucasus mountain 
railway and prevented the construction o f the Khudon high-altitude dam. It also succeeded in 
preventing a cascade of artificial dams on the river Enguri and the construction of a water 
reservoir in Kakhetia. The Georgian Greens also opposed tree felling on Georgia’s mountains, 
particularly in Svanetia^^. Whereas the Armenian Green Movement succeeded in uniting the 
people behind two issues of national significance - namely that of the Nairit chemical combine and 
the Metsamor nuclear power station^^ - it appears that the Georgians failed to unite around tlie 
environment as an issue. Other issues, such as giving Georgian status as the national language of 
the republic and the future status of Georgia itself within the Soviet Union, were considered more 
important.
In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, the dying Aral Sea and the issue of nuclear testing in 
Semipalatinsk, on the border with Russia (Omsk district) proved a powerful incentive for the 
establishment of a Green Movement. From the very beginning several Central Asian writers took 
an active part in this process: Chingiz Aitmatov, a Kirgiz by birth and an ardent supporter of 
perestroika, in the novel Plakha and other works depicted traditional Central-Asian life, in which 
people lived in harmony with Nature. This life style was then contrasted with Soviet life and its 
impact on the environment and Man. In November 1987 a Kazakh poet, Mukhtar Shakhanov^'', 
initiated a Committee on the Aral Sea, which was established by the Kazakh W riters’ Union. The 
following year this committee expanded its activities to include also Balkhash and environmental 
problems in Kazakhstan more generally. The Aral Sea Committee was set up with the blessing of 
the authorities. This manifested itself in its membership, approximately 100 of whom were high- 
ranking officials. Following an accident at Dzhamalkum in 1988 and Shakhanov’s sharp criticism
22 Ibid.. p. 38.
The reason why the Armenian Green Movement so early on expressed views highly critical o f all-union 
authorities may also be explained in historical terms. Throughout history the Armenians have been 
attacked and fought wars frequently with the Azeris, Turks and others. In 1915 and 1916, for instance, 
the Turks killed some 1 million people in what became known as the ‘Armenian genocide’ [for details 
see Eojibiuan CoBeTCKaa BHUUKJionejHa (1950), 2-oe H3æ, t. 1, c. 65. For a more thorough analysis, 
see The Armenian Genocide (München: Institut fur Armenische Fragen, 1987), vol. 1 and 2 .] , and 
there is a strong sense of Armenia as a victim among Armenians. Thus, they could easily see the 
symbolism in chemical pollution imposed on Armenia from ‘Moscow’ and destroying people’s health, 
and also the potential dangers posed by the Metsamor nuclear power station should an earthquake 
occur, and perceive them as yet another threat to the existence of the Armenian people.
Shakhanov visited Glasgow in 1990 and gave a talk at ISEES on Kazakhstan. During his visit I was able 
to discuss the fate of the Aral Sea with him. In 1989 Shakhanov was elected a USSR People’s Deputy.
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o f the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry o f Melioration and the oblast soviet, these officials I
abandoned the committee and demanded that it be dissolved. fi
$Around this time another Kazakh poet, Olzhas Suleimenov, the Chairman of the Kazakh k|-
W riters’ Union and from 1989 a USSR People’s Deputy, initiated the Nevada-Semipalatinsk 
Movement, which called for the dismantling of all nuclear testing facilities on the territory of I®
Kazakhstan. The pretext for Suleimenov’s initiative was an emission of radioactive substances 
during nuclear testing in February 1989. Two days later a meeting attended by some 2,000 people 
took place on the premises of the Writers’ Union, and less than two weeks later the group had been f
registered by the Almaty executive committee. The Movement collected signatures against further 
testing and also organised a conference on the effect of nuclear testing on people living in the |
Semipalatinsk area. Following intensive campaigning, President Nursultan Nazarbaev closed ®
down the Semipalatinsk testing site in 1991. The movement has in later years received 
considerable financial support from the Kazakh Peace Committee^^.
In Russia several environmental movements and groups emerged in response to numerous
■ IIproblems of local, regional and national significance. Some of these movements claimed to be all- 
union (and after the collapse of the USSR - all-republican), aspiring to co-ordinate the efforts of 
similar groups throughout Russia and also in other (ex)-Soviet republics. As seen above, in 1987 
scientists and experts involved in the campaign against the Siberian and European Rivers 
Diversion Project between 1983 and 1986 set up one of Russia’s most well-known environmental ®kfi'Vgroups, Ekologiia i Mir (Ecology and Peace), which from the very beginning received the support 
o f the Soviet Peace Committee, and the publicity around which inspired similar movements not 
only in Russia but also elsewhere, including Ukraine (see Chapter Three). ®
Ekologiia i M r ’s first chairman, Sergei Zalygin, a writer and the editor-in-chief o f Novyi Mir ®IIand other members, primarily from the USSR Academy of Sciences (A. lablokov, G. Golitsyn, M. | |
Lemeshev) were all well-known and respected public figures in the Soviet Union, and several of 
them were elected USSR People’s Deputies in 1989. S
Among the issues covered by Ekologiia i Mir were not only Russian ones, such as the Volga-
!#Chograi canal and the Bashkir water reservoir; its scientists were also involved in campaigns 
against the Volga-Don 2 canal and the Danube-Dniepr canal. These projects were eventually 
stopped due to pressure from members of the association. In 1988 Ekologiia i Mir members 
conducted a Joint expedition of writers and scientists to the Aral Sea (Aral-88). A conference on
. .ecology and agriculture also took place the same year, the materials of which were published and 
used as the basis for a report from the Russian Supreme Soviet’s Committee on the Environment.
■ I
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In 1990 a conference on the findings of an independent environmental impact assessment of the 
Leningrad dike took place, and Ekologiia i Mir also organised an impact assessment o f the Katun 
valley water project and the Tehri dam project. The former project was abandoned by the Russian 
Supreme Soviet’s Ecological Committee, following the presentation o f Ekologiia i M ir’s findings.
Another key movement was (and is) the all-Russian Socio-Ecological Union (SES), which 
unites 148 Russian Green groups, as well as similar groups in other former Soviet republics^^. 
Unlike Ekologiia i Mir, whose major activity is environmental impact assessments and other 
scientific work, SES is more of a grassroots movement. Although SES members undertake 
scientific work, too, the emphasis is on active campaigning and lobbying o f the authorities. There 
are close links between SES and Ekologiia i Mir; Svet Zabelin, the leader of the former, has for a 
long time acted as assistant to Professor lablokov, President Eltsin’s adviser on the environment.
iS'E'iS'was officially established in Moscow on 24-26 December 1988 by university people who 
had been active in the students’ ecological movement; the druzhiny (Nature guards), since they 
emerged in the early 1960s (for details, see below). The initiative to set up the new union was 
taken at the third meeting of graduate Nature guard members in the Caucasus on 6 August 1987, 
and became known to people during the spring o f 1988 when, together with the druzhina 
movement, it engaged in a public discussion o f the yet to be published draft resolution by the 
CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on ‘Measures to Accelerate the 
Development of Hydro-Energy in the Soviet Union between the Year 1990 and the Year 2000’. 
The resolution announced the construction of more than 90 large hydroelectric power stations in 
Siberia, the Far East and other regions and met with fierce opposition in Green circles.
SES has been and still is involved in numerous activities. It organised an all-union protest 
against the construction of the Volga-Chograi canal (activists from more than 100 towns 
participated), organised a campaign against the construction of vitamin factories (BVK) and also 
established a committee to provide information for the environmental impact assessment of the 
Katun Hydroelectric Power Station project. SES has also set up a working group to address the 
web of problems connected to the nuclear energy complex in the former USSR. Furthermore, it 
has established a commission to analyse the network of Nature reserves (together with the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection) and started work on an information programme and the 
making o f equipment to monitor the state of the environment, SES has concluded an agreement 
with the publishing house Progress on a publication called Ecofact which will appear annually, 
containing information on the state of the environment in Russia.
The SES Centre for Co-ordination and Information provided the Environment Committee of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet with regular information on the environment. SES also lobbied for
“  Ib id , pp. 25-26.
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legislation and programmes related to the environment. The Green World Club and the Nature 
Guard in Kazan organised the first historical-ecological camp, an expedition for school children 
near the Volga. SES has also been involved with campaigning against five huge petrochemical 
complexes in Western Siberia (Tinmen region: Tobolsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Surgut, Novy Urengoy, 
Uvat) and has been involved in campaigning against similar projects in the Tengiz reservoir in the 
Gurev region of Kazakhstan.
Finally, in Ukraine Zelenyi Svit (Green World) was initiated by writers, scientists and young 
activists concerned with Chernobyl and nuclear power as well as extensive industrial pollution in 
the republic. As this movement is analysed in detail in Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven, 
I will not dwell on this movement here, suffice it to say that the Greens in Ukraine, like Greens in 
the Baltics, Armenia and Kazakhstan, succeeded in uniting people behind an issue o f national 
significance, namely that of nuclear power, and were successful in stopping plans to expand the 
capacity of the nuclear power stations in luzhnoukrainsk, Rivne, Klimelnitskyi, Zaporizhzhia and 
Chernobyl. They also campaigned against plans to build a nuclear power station at Chyhyryn and 
succeeded in closing down the Crimean nuclear power station on the Kerch peninsula before its 
Number One reactor was attached to the power grid. Similarly, they managed to have plans to 
build nuclear thermal power stations in Odessa and Kharkiv abandoned.
Above 1 have given a rough outline of the emergence and major achievements of key Green 
movements in several of the former Soviet republics. It is of course impossible to do justice to 
these movements and to numerous other movements in the former Soviet republics on just a few 
pages^^. It is still possible, however, to make some generalisations regarding the emergence of the 
Greens across the USSR: whereas the earliest movements that were set up in 1986 were primarily 
concerned with ecology and culture, political changes in 1987 and 1988 radicalised society and 
facilitated the emergence o f Green groups with political agendas advocating policies very different 
from those o f the Soviet authorities. Below I will look at the predecessors of these groups.
1.2 Political Participation and Environmental Issues in the USSR.
During the Cold War the totalitarian model was considered the most appropriate for the study of 
the USSR. The Soviet Union was considered a static society in which political decisions were 
made by the Communist Party only, and where the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium as
Readers are refeiTed to the following works for a more general analysis o f these groups: lanitskii (1990, 
1991, 1992% 1992^,1994), Ziegler (1990), Marples (1991), Institute o f Political Mass Movements 
(1992), Gr0deland (1992), Murray & Feshbach (1992), Pryde (1992), Massey Stewart (1992), Dawson 
(1990, 1995), Feshbach (1995) and Manning (1995).
well as the Soviet Council of Ministers simply paid lip-service to the CPSU. Supporters of the 
authoritarian model claimed that to the extent mass political participation in the USSR did serve a 
purpose, it served to legitimise the policies of the CPSU and to demonstrate to the outer world the 
regime’s ability to mobilise large masses of the population in support of the regime^^. Thus, 
political participation in the USSR was not ‘real’, but rather ‘coerced’:
Communist governments are mobilisation regimes. Such forms of 
political involvement as are open to the public are controlled and 
manipulated from above - that is, by the Communist Paity. Within this 
kind of setting, the individual loses his autonomy, and participation much 
of its meaning. The latter is reduced to ceremonial or support functions, 
where citizens ‘take paid’ by expressing support for the government by 
marching in parades, by working hard in development projects, by 
participating in yotith groups organized by the government, or by voting 
in ceremonial elections^^.
In the early 1960s, however, the approach of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian system 
gradually started to give way to more complex approaches. Not only was the definition of 
political participation presupposed by the authoritarian model questioned^", but it also became 
increasingly popular among Western scholars to talk about interest groups in Soviet politics.
Jeffrey W.Hahn. Soviet Grassroots. Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: Tauris, 
1988), p. 30. This view was expressed by Sharlet, who argued that political participation in general and 
in elections in particular merely served the pui-pose of legitimising the CPSU and its policies. In this 
sense political participation was meaningless to the ordinary citizen, in that it was just a ritual that had 
to be conducted and no political impact, in that it did not influence political decisions. Schultz 
contested this idea, claiming that one should not put too much emphasis on elections. In the Soviet 
Union government decisions affected a much wider range of public activities than was the case in the 
West. Implementing decisions was thus of vital importance politically. The high proportion of 
decisions taken but not implemented in the USSR could therefore be taken as an indication not only of 
these decisions being unrealistic, but also to some extent as an indication of opposition to the regime. 
For a more thorough discussion of authoritarianism, see H. Gordon Skilling & Franklyn Griffiths. 
Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 3-7.
A more in-depth discussion of ‘totalitarianism’ and the study of the Soviet Union can be found in T.H. 
Rigby, The Changing Soviet System. Mono-Organisational Socialism from its origins to Gorbachev’s 
Restructuring (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1990), Chap.6: “ ‘Totalitarianism’ and Change in 
Communist Systems’, pp. 130-154. For an overview, see also A. C. Janos, Social Science.
Communism and the Dynamics of Political Change. World Politics, vol. 44, no. 1, October 1991, pp. 
81-110.
Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, Political Participation, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.) - 
Handbook of Political Science (Reading [Massachussets], London: Addison-Wesley, 1975), IV, p. 2.
Those Sovietologists opposed to the authoritarian model claimed that political participation in the USSR 
was qualitatively different from that o f other societies. Comparing the function of political 
participaiton in Western democracies with that in Communist states was thus not very fruitful as, rather 
than identify possible channels of influence for the ordinary Soviet citizen, specialists dismissed the 
possibility of people influencing politics altogether. A basic difference between Western and Soviet- 
type societies, it was suggested, was that whereas, in the former, participation was primarily associated 
with the ‘input’ process - to use the terminology of Easton - in Soviet-type societies people were more 
likely to have a say on the ‘output’ (i.e. implementation) process. Some scholars also disputed the view 
that voters in democratic societies necessarily influence politics by voting in elections
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According to Almond and Coleman^' the aggregation and articulation of different interests 
did take place within the framework of the CPSU, and scholars such as Gordon Skilling (1971),
Linden (1963)^^, Rigby (1962)^^, Aspaturiai®'', Allison (Cuba crisis)^^ and Valenta^^ (the Soviet
1976 published two studies of Soviet grassroots participation, challenging the view that the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979), to mention but a few, 
identified several interest groups - i.e. loose constellations of people and organisations sharing the 
same goals - in the political decision making process of the USSR: each defending and promoting 
its own views and interests. As pointed out by Gordon Skilling, ‘under IClirushchev a new 
element, in the form of a greatly expanded participation in decision-making by experts and 
specialists in their respective fields, made itself evident’^^ . Whereas many Sovietologists held the 
view that ‘mass as differentiated from elite participation in Communist systems tends to be more
relevant for the policy-implementation process, for the outputs rather than the inputs o f the 
political systems’^^ , these studies indicated that decisions were preceded by some kind of debate. 
This view was backed up by other scholars, stressing social change (especially demographic 
change) in the Soviet polity, urging sovietologists to bear in mind that a new, relatively large 
segment of highly educated people had developed by the 1960s and that the Brezhnev regime 
considered scientific knowledge important in the decision-making process, thus allowing scientists 
some scope for influencing this process by providing the premises for it.
Whereas Aspaturian, Allison and Valenta concentrated on decisions made at the central level 
and identified policy actors such as the Military-Industrial Complex (MIK), the domestic policy 
decision makers and the foreign policy decision makers, Jerry Hougl®^ and Richard Little''" in
It
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[Donald Schulz and Jan S. Adams (eds,). Political Participation in Communist Systems (Elmsford, 
N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1989), p. 3 )].
Almond and Coleman, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics, vol. IX (April
1957), pp. 40-41, referred to in Skilling & Griffiths (1971), p. 8.
Carl Linden, ‘Klirushchev and the Party Battle’. Problems of Communism, vol. XII, no. 5 (September-
October 1963), pp. 27-35.
Rigby, ‘How Strong is the Leader?’. Problems o f Communism, vol. XI (September-October 1962), pp. 1-8. 
Vernon V. Aspaturian, The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy: A Study o f Soviet Federalism in the 
Service of Soviet Foreign Policy (Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984).
Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Crisis’. American Political Science Review, no. 3, 
1969, pp. 689-718.
Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia. 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore, London: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1991).
Gordon Skilling & Griffiths (1971) , p. 10.
Robert S. Sharlet, Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing 
Political Participation, in Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (ed.), Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: 
Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand Me Nally &Co, 1969), p. 247.
Jen-y Hough, ‘Political Participation in the Soviet Union’. Soviet Studies, vol. 28, no, 1 January 1976, pp.
3-20.
D. Richard Little, ‘Mass Political Participation in the US and USSR: A Conceptual Analysis’. 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1976, pp. 437-60.
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system was not very responsive to public opinion and also questioning the notion that political 
participation in the USSR was confined to the ‘out-put'"’ process only:
While we do not really know how effective this involvement is in terms 
of its actual impact on political decisions, there is growing evidence that 
the system is far more responsive to citizen demands today than it was 20 
years ago, certainly it is more responsive than it was in the late Stalin 
era"*^ .
Hough and Hahn criticised earlier works written on this issue for being rooted in a formalist- 
legal approach and for not being backed up by empirical evidence. As a matter of fact those few 
empirical studies which had been conducted, indicated that political participation in the USSR was 
a much more complex process than originally thought''^. They also questioned the basic 
assumptions of the authoritarian model that the communist system was not responsive to citizens’ 
demands, that there was no basis for individual initiative in communist political life and that the 
idea of individual efficacy as a defining characteristic for political participation was irrelevant to 
the USSR. Sharlet, on the other hand, pointed out that political participation in the USSR was 
qualitatively different from that in the West, and that rather than discard it as undemocratic, it 
ought to be studied in its own right"''.
Lamport (1990) identified five types of political participation in the USSR:
1) Elections - This was the major formal political activity in the former Soviet Union. More than one 
million deputies were elected in central and local elections. In addition, a large number of people were also 
mobilised to take actively part in the election process (agitators, election commissions, etc.)
2) Party membership - Almost 10% of the adult Soviet population were members of the CPSU. Party 
membership was a key to opportunities for advancement at work and thus also a key mechanism for control 
over managers and administrators. Further, it provided an ideological and material link between the working 
class and the regime. Also it provided a large number of activists to manage the primary party organisations 
and to supervise and contribute to all Soviet social organisations.
3) Control organs - Durmg the Brezhnev era a number of control bodies mn by the people were set up. The 
idea behind these bodies was for the people to control higher administrative organs so as to prevent abuse of 
power. The People’s Control Committees, which were introduced in 1965, had as their main function to 
investigate inefficiency and waste. In 1980 a total o f 10 million people participated in these committees, 7, 
667 of whom were full-time officers. Volunteer Courts and the people’s militsia {druzhiny) also served the 
purpose of public control. Comrade Courts were located at workplaces and in residential areas. By 1980 
there were 2.6 million residential committees in the Soviet Union.
See Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots. Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: 
1988), chap. 2: ‘The Study of Political Participation in Communist Countries’, pp. 26-43. This view 
was also propagated by Schultz. See Schulz/Adams (1981), p. 17.
Jerry Hough (1976), p. 11. See also Jerry Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 4: ‘Political Participation in the Soviet Union’, pp. 109-24. 
'’^ See for instance Theodore Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979).
Sharlet (1969), p. 247.
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4) Petitioning - There were two major channels for petition; through the Party and through the press. In 
1978 the CPSU Central Committee set up a Letters’ Department to deal with complaints and suggestions 
made by party members and/or other Soviet citizens. Similar departments were established in the 
newspapers. Some letters appeared in print, whereas others were sent to other instances for 
reference/comments'^^.
5) Social organisations - A number of social organisations were established in various areas of life. The 
trade union was perhaps the biggest, but also cultural societies were established. The social organisations 
were characterised by a high degree of control from above and hardly ever contested decisions made from 
above. According to Lampert, mass membership of social and voluntary organisations ‘allowed for the co­
optation and reward of loyal citizens, but criticism from below had become a toothless affah*, as the 
nomenklatura gained an unprecedented degree of security under the Brezhnev leadership. The political and 
administrative elite was beyond criticism. Political participation through social organisations was guided 
participation, since it kept all social initiative in the hands of the leadership and encouraged a spreading 
apathy and cynicism about official values''*'.
Although there was no earlier Green Movement similar to the one that emerged in the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s, it is possible to identify individuals representing not necessarily 
themselves only, but also a certain profession or interest group speaking up for the protection of 
the environment. The majority of these critical voices started to make themselves heard from the 
second half of the 1960s, but as shown in the section below, as early as the 1940s people critical of 
the policies on forestry protection voiced their concerns, and, according to Troepolskii, villagers 
already in the 1930s protested at the grandiose hydroelectric power plant schemes and the negative 
effect they had on rural life"^. Below, I will look at public participation in relation to the 
environment.
1.2.1 Voluntary Societies"  ^and Environmental Groups
Social or voluntary societies, as they were referred to in the former Soviet Union existed already 
before the revolution. Numerous other societies emerged in the immediate aftermath o f the 
revolution"^. After 1917 societies that did not actively oppose the Party, and whose activities were
:î17
For a detailed study of petitions and letters to the Soviet Press, see Stephen Wliite, ‘Political
Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party. State and Press’. Political Studies, XXXI, 1983, 
pp. 43-60.
For an outline of the major social organisations in the USSR, see 4-A. KepHMOB, F.B. MaJibueo, H.fl.
HjibMiicKMH. üeMOKpaTHsaiiHfl coneTCKoro ofiiiiecina (MocKBa: Mmcjil, 1989). 
r . TiX)enojibCKHH, ' 0  pexax. noHBax h npoSjieM'. Hobuh Mpp, no. 1, 1965, c. 188. 
üobpoBOJihHiiie o5meci’Ba.
OjiLiuancKMH, HethopMajibi: r p v n n o n o fl nooTpeT b H irrepLepe (MocKBa: BeAaiorMKa, 1990), c  10. 
According to A. Gromov and O. Kusin [ A.B. PpoMOB, O.C. Kycnn, Hedioniviajibi. Kro ecTb k to 7  
(MocKBa: MbiCJib, 1990). c. 11-17] those societies, clubs and associations that were established in 
Russia prior to the revolution were characterised by voluntary participation, and most o f them had a 
limited number of members, often with the same professional background. In contrast, most groups
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not directly political were accepted. However, as the banned Russian political parties (the Cadets, 
the Esery and the Mensheviks) tried to exert political influence via some of these societies, the 
Party at its 12th Party Conference in 1922 decided to take a firmer stand on such societies. On 3 
August 1922 a decree was issued on the registration of societies and unions ‘not seeking economic 
gain’ and on the surveillance of them. Although the decree significantly increased the level of 
control over the societies, as well as limited their scope of activities, there were still 4,480 
voluntary societies on 1 January 1928. Most of these societies had their own newspapers or 
journals. However, due to infighting in the Communist Party, the collectivisation campaign and, 
as a result, the harsh centralisation of power in the Soviet Union, the development of the societies 
was further limited. Finally, Stalin’s view on a united leadership undermined the position of the 
societies even more.
In 1932 a decree^" on voluntary societies and unions was endorsed. The decree made it clear 
that voluntary societies and unions had to actively support the Communist Party through their 
activities:
4o6poBOJibHLie o flm ecrB a  n  nx coi03bi, inunmcb opraiiMsanmiMM  
oSm ecrBeiiiiQ H  caM OAeaTeab iiocrn Tpy^fluiHxcfi wacc ro p o ^ a  h 
jiepCBiiM, craBîiT CBoen sam 'ieH  axTU B iioe yM acrne b
coLiHaaMCTHtiecKOM crpoHTejibCTBe Coiosa CCP, a  Tax^xe co;jieHcrBHe 
yx iien J ie im io  o6op on b i ci'panbi'%
O f particular importance to environmental groups, as will be seen below, was a paragraph in 
the decree that ordered social movements conducting scientific work to base such work on the 
Marxist-Leninist method^^. Further, all groups for children and youth required a go-ahead from 
the the Komsomol (art. 5). All societies were required to establish close links with the soviets, 
enterprises, sovkhozy and kolkhozy, trade unions and other public organisations as well as 
educational establishments (art. 6). Within a month from the day o f their foundation, the relevant 
state body had to endorse the new society. State bodies received wide-ranging powers according 
to the law; whether or not the society was endorsed depended on its expediency, statute and 
personal composition - state bodies had the power to expel members o f the initiative group of
formed after the revolution, such as the society to fight illiteracy, literary clubs, etc. were primarily 
aimed at including the masses in building a socialist society.
no.rioîKeiiHe 0 iioSpOBOJibHbix oftuiecTBax n hx coiosax. rioCTanoB.ieriHe BHHK m CHK o t 10 miojui 
1932 r. For the full text o f this decree, see ConnajibHO-BKOJioraiiecKHH Coi03, Ben iiama :3CH3Hb. 
CfloniiMK crareA CounajibBo-BKOJinrmieeKaa Coio3a (MocKBa: M34aTejibcrBO npoMexeH, 1990), c. 
31-36.
Ibid.. p. 31.
To jump ahead a bit, this meant that biologists active in the all-union Society for the Protection of Nature 
would have to follow Lysenko and Prezent’s ideas, which took hold of Soviet biology and genetics 
during the 1930s.
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whom they did not approve (art. 12). Once a society had been registered, it was under constant 
supervision and control of the state body under whose auspices it had been registered (art. 17). 
The state body had unlimited access to all documents and meetings of the society and could also 
give the society instructions and orders. The societies, on the other hand, had to account for their 
activities to the state bodies by which they had been registered. Should the activities of a society 
not be to the liking o f the latter, they could dissolve the societies altogether. The decree further 
limited the scope of activities acceptable to the regime and in practice meant that the state took 
control over the societies^^. Most o f the societies - especially during the Brezhnev era - thus were 
active in the social-cultural sphere, which was less prone to be regulated by the Paity. The decree 
was still in use in 1990.
A book on the Démocratisation of Soviet society, published by the Academy of Social 
Sciences o f the CPSU Central Committee in 1989^", defined public organisations as follows^^:
Fig. 1.1 Public Organisations in the USSR
KOCC: BUCLuaa (popivia obmecTBeiino-
nojiHTHiiecKOM opraiiHsauHH, aapo nojiHTHBecKOH 
CHcieMU, pyKOBO^amaa h naFipaBJiaioiJuaa cnaa  
coBeTCKoro oSmecina.
A. ObmecrBenHbie opranH3auHH h cotosw:
MaccoBbie oSmecTBeinio-noJiMTHaecKHe
opraiiHsauHM: n|XKl)C0i03, komcomoji,
KoonepaTHBHwe opraHHsauHH
-  Ao6poBo.FibHb!e oSmeci'Ba^^
-TBopqecKHe coio3bi.
B. Opraiibi MaccoBbix oÔuteCTBeinibix itBMxœHMH. 
B. Opraiibi oGinecrBeiiHOH caMOAeareabuocin: 
caMo^eai'ejiLUbie opranu Haceaeiina
caM04eaTejibHbie opraiibi rpymBbix
KOJiaeKTHBOB.
-  obmeCTBeiiiibie opraiibi n komhcchm b
CooeTax iiapoAHbix Aeny'raTOB, aiinapaTe
rocy^apcrBeiiiioro ynpaBJieiina
-  oGinecTBeiiiibie coBexbi npn xyjibrypiio-
npocBeTHTejibiibix n MeimnmicKHx yqjiexciieiiHax.
r. HeiliopMajibiibie oOieAniieiiHa.
B.H. CepreeB, ' 3aKonojaTejibcrBO o aoGnoBoabHbix oSmeCTBax: Baena. ceroaiia. saBTpa'. in 4-A. 
KepMMOB (pe/i.). HoBoe noanTHaecKoe Mbinuieune b nnoiiecce jieM0KpaTH3auHH (MocKsa: Hayxa, 
1990), c, 42.
4-A. KepMMOB, r.B. MaabueB, H.D. HabMiicKMM, TleMOXpaTusauHa coBeTcxoro oRiiieoTBa {Mocxca; 
Mbicjib, 1989).
Ibid.. p. 179.
These were defined as follow s: ' II04 aoSpoBOJibiibiM oSmeCTBOM oGbiaiio noHUMaioT ociiOBaiiiibiH na 
MiiAMBM^yaabiioM mjih KOJiJiexTHBiioM qjieiiCTBe bh.4 oSmecTBeiiiibix opraiiMsanMM, BK.moqaioinMM b 
ce6a obueAMneHMa (oSmecrBa, coiosm obuiecTB, accouHaiiMM), cosmaaeMbie b ueaax y40B.aeTBopeiiMa 
MHoroo6pa3Hbix JiH'iiibix M obmecrneHiibix MiiTepecon, pasBHTMa noaHTMaecxoH axTHBiioCTH m 
caMOiieaTeJibiioci'H Tpy^auiMxca, BOBaeaeiiMa mx b pasjiMaiibie (popMbi couHajibiioH îxhsiim, xyjibTypbi, 
uayanoe m TexiiHaecxoe TBopaecrBO, oSopoiiy cipaiibi h yxpenJieuHe coTpya.nMMecrna m jipy>ic6bi c 
Hapo^aMH 3apy6exciibix cipan '. Ibid., pp. 197.
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As regarded the function o f the societies, this was defined as follows:
HiiTepecon o5be4uneiiHbix hmm ipyAinuMxcii, o 5  ycu.rieuHH 
rpax iia iicK oft mmuHaTHBbi h orueTcrBeiiHocrM coBercxHX .iio a en ^ l
The Societies for Nature Protection - VOOP
be activated:
Ibid.. p . 178.
According to Dr. P. Florenskii, the pre-revolutionary environmentalists were inspired by the Pushkin 
lyceum and also by the Brotherhood of St. Petersburg University at the end o f the 1880s. The latter
BbinoJinaa cbom (jiyuKunn, Bce ofiuiecrnennbie oprauMsaunn npnaBaubi 
BiiocMTb Bce 6o.tibuiMM BKJiaA B ocyinecrBaetiHe no.iHTHKH napTHH. 
3a5oTHTbca o nanOonee noanoM Bbtpa»:euHH n nponeaeiiHM b :3CH3Ub
Ï
As seen above. Nature protection societies existed on the territory of the (former) Soviet Union 
prior to the 1917 r e v o l u t io n ^ S o m e  of these continued to exist also in the aftermath of the 
revolution, others disappeared and yet others emerged^". Most of the older societies had a limited 
membership, consisting mainly of biologists, zoologists and other experts in the field. In late 
March 1923, however, an all-Russian conference on the Study of Natural Production Forces 
concluded that for environmental protection efforts to become effective, the general public had to
i
flpn o5 luhphoh TeppHTopuH Pocchh npoBeAenne ^axTuaecKOH oxpanbi 
npnpo4u lie M04C6T Sbixb ocymecTBaeiio b cxoabKO—UHby f^c cepbeaiiOM 
MacuiTabe Sea uiMpoKoro npuBaeqeiuni k coaiiaTcabHOMy yqacrnio 
Bcex caoeB naceaeiimi.
.
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.A year later, in 1924, the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (Vserossiiskoe 
obshchestvo okhrany prirody - VOOP) was set up to unite scientists and members o f the public 
concerned with the state of the environment. According to VOOFs statute, it would 'develop 
seientific questions, spread information and raise interest among the general public on
environmental issues'^". The society was long headed by V.Komarov and V. Vinogradov, both 
well-known academicians. During the 1920s and 1930s, VOOP provided assistance on the rational
sought unity (edinenie) with Nature and with the people and later initiated the Cadet Party. It was the
members of this Brotherhood, first o f all Vladimir Vernadskii, who developed the idea of the Biosphere 
and later also the Noosphere as the Biosphere, under the control o f the enlightened, humanist intellect 
o f Man. See J1.B. EropoBa (pe^J, 3 ko- otkjthk 8 (Mockbü: Mojio^aii raapjtHfl, 1990), c. 27-28.
For a summary of these societies and groups, see Philip R. Pryde, Environmental Management in the 
Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 248-49.
‘^’ A.r. TapiiaBCKMH, Oxpana npHoojbt n oOiuecrBenHbte opraHHsauHH: nnanoBb ie Bonpocf.i. {MocxBa: 
Hayxa, 1990), c. 9. Among VOOPs major tasks were the organisation o f public meetings and debates, 
excursions, laboratories, field stations, museums, libraries, congresses and university courses. VOOP 
also took part in monitoring environmental changes and the implementation of conservation laws, and 
was also involved with drafting new legislation (Pryde, p. 248, referring to Weiner (1988), pp. 47, 263).
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use of Nature resources and conducted a series of practical activities directed towards the 
protection of Nature. Among these were developing programmes for sustainable agriculture and 
the Greening of Soviet cities and villages. The major contribution of VOOP in this period, 
however, was the establishment of several zapovedniki (Nature reseiwes).
Initially VOOP’s membership was relatively small. In the early 30s this changed and the 
stress was now on mass participation (through mass membership). A new statute, approved in 
1933, started a process o f formalisation within VOOP that was to culminate in the mid 1960s^'. 
From 1933/34 collective membership was introduced and, as a result, several official organisations 
joined the society, eroding the relative independence the society had so far enjoyed. VOOP 
became financially dependent upon the establishment, receiving subsidies from governmental 
agencies and public institutions and also started to take part in the activities of the environmental 
sections of official institutions such as the Russian State Planning Committee, the State Committee 
on the Environment and the All-Union Congress of Botanists, Zoologists and Hunters. Similar 
societies emerged in the other Soviet republics from the mid-1940s until the end of the 1960s. The 
societies were given different names and their tasks differed slightly from republic to republic.
The Ukrainian Society for the Protection o f Nature (Ukrainske Tovarystvo Okhorony Prirody 
- UTOP) was founded in April 1945 by scientists, representatives of the Komsomol and the 
Ukrainian Ministry o f Education^^. UTOP was described in the following way:
O Sm eC Toa iiBJiaioTCfl MaccoBbiMH oOmecrBeiiiiLiMH oprdHMsaumiMH, u e j it  
KOTOpLix :iaK.mo'iaeTCfl b OKasauHH aKTHBHoro co^eHCTBHii 
MeponpHflTHflM napTHH h npaBHTe.riLcrBa no o x p a n e , pauMonajibiiOMy 
M cno/ib30Baimio n nocnpoH3Bo/icn'B.y npupoABbix 6oraT C iB ^ \
As for its tasks,
B yKpaHHCKGH CCP oSuiecrBo oxpanii iipupo^bi ocyinecFBJuieT 
oSmecrBeiBibiH KonTpoab sa co5jiio4eiiHeM npHpoiiooxpaniioro 
3aK0ii04aTeJTbCTBa neioea oOmeci’BeiiHbix nncneKTopon, npana m 
oSasannocTH Koropux onpe^eaaioTcii flojio^cenueM o6 oOmecTBeniioM 
KOHTpojie oSmecTBa, yTBepxaaewbiM npesHAwyMOM i^ ecnyOjiHKaiicKoro 
coBBTa yKpaniicKoro oSmecrBa oxpaiibi npnpoÆbi^ '*.
Units of the Societies were set up at all enterprises, factories, kolkhozy and sovkhozy, as well 
as in other institutions, and soon the All-Union Society for Environmental Protection (VOOP) had
For a detailed study of the early histoiy of VOOP, see /lyniac Bafinep (1991). 
^^TapnaBCKMH (1990), c. 16.
p. 17. 
Ibid.. p. 33.
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some 60 million members, of whom 40 million belonged to the Russian Society^^. In comparison, 
UTOP had 19 million members (total population of Ukraine: 52 million) - in Donetsk oblast 
every third citizen turned out to be a member of UTOP, but most of these were members only on 
paper. As it turned out, even those directly harming the environment were often members of 
VOOP, paying their membership fees regularly. Much of the Society's efforts was linked with the 
collection o f membership fees. Fees were simply deducted from people's salaries without their 
permission - hence the large membership figure^^.
The increase in membership figures was accompanied by a continuous growth in VOOP's 
apparatus and a formalisation of its tasks. There was a shift from working on its own initiative 
towards following public directives in setting and conducting its activities. Whereas the Societies 
were initially headed by well-known scientists, this changed in 1955, when, as Weiner puts it, 
'VOOP became colonialised by Communist bureaucrats...(This) ended almost three decades of 
spirited resistance of the Society to Stalin's attempts to effect a "great transformation of Nature" 
and to quash all forms of citizen autonomy and initiative'. Representatives of state organs took 
over not only centrally, but also at the local level; at various times the Society was headed by the 
chairmen of the Presidiums of the republican Supreme Soviets, CPSU Central Committee 
secretaries, deputy ministers of the Council of Ministers and other high-ranking party and public 
officials . The awarding of the Order of the Red Banner to VOOP in 1974 at its 50th anniversary 
underlined the Society's status as an official public organisation.
From being a relatively autonomous society, VOOP now aimed at 'actively support(ing) the 
activities o f the party and the government on the protection and the rational use of natural riches'. 
The Russian Law on the Environment instructed the RSFSR Gosplan and the various ministries 
and departments to involve VOOP in the assessment of plans for the use and transformation of 
Nature as well as large construction projects, affecting the protection of Nature. To assist with this 
task, some 1,000 academicians, doctors and candidates of science were attached to the Society, 
Although the Society did succeed in affecting legislation on the environment, the effect o f this 
legislation was, as will be seen in Chapter Two, more or less non-existent.
The new leadership o f VOOP was badly regarded by long-time members of VOOP, who 
opposed the take-over of the Society, In 1957 one such member, Vsevolod Lakoshchenkov, in a 
letter to Viacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin accused the new leadership of corruption and 
abuse o f power. Although the matter was looked into by Literaturnaia gazeta, no measures were 
taken and shortly after, Lakoshchenkov was expelled from the Society.
'^^C.r. MaKeBHH, A.A. BaKyjinii, Oxpana nnnnoinj (MocKBa: BO ArponpoMMB^ax, 1991), c. 116.
Marshall I. Goldman, ‘Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Growth of Environmentalism and Its
Consequences’, in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, David E. Powell (eds.), Soviet Social Problems 
(Westview Press, 1991), p. 40.
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Although official apparachiks took over the day-to-day running of VOOP, old members of the 
Society created history by succeeding in having Mikhail Bochkarev - head of the Russian 
Republic's Main Administration for the Timber Industry and President of VOOP - removed as
President - for poaching! This incident is thoroughly described by Weiner^^, but deserves some 
closer attention here due to .its political implications. The incident took place on 22 August 1964, 
when Professor Vladimir Geptner - Professor at Moscow State University, a field zoologist and 
also a VOOP 'citizen's inspector for Nature protection' - was having an outing on the Oka River in 
Riazan' oblast’ together with his family. Spotting two fishing boats fishing illegally with a home- 
made drift net (drift nets were banned from all Soviet rivers), Geptner approached the boat and 
found that one of the three fishermen was Mikhail Bochkarev. When approached by Geptner, 
Bochkarev allegedly said that he had permission to fish. Such permission had been given orally 
by a fishing inspector, whose name Bochkarev did not know. Geptner, however, ordered
met to discuss the incident. Both Geptner and Bochkarev testified at the meeting - Bochkarev
Douglas Weiner, ‘Three Men in a Boat: The All-Russian Society for the Protection o f Nature tVOOP) in
the Early 1960s’. The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, vol. 20, nos. 2-3, 1993, pp. 195-212.
Bochkarev to pull in the net, which the latter did. Geptner also made sure he photographed the 
incident and sent a legal complaint to the Riazan oblast fishing inspectorate.
On 13 October 1964 the party fraction of the Presidium of the Executive Council of VOOP
Iclaiming his innocence. Apparently he had been on a business trip and at one point decided to go 
.swimming in the Oka river. On the shore he met some fishermen, who claimed they had 
permission to fish and out of curiosity Bochkarev decided to go with them. When approached by 
Geptner, Bochkarev claimed to have said 'there is permission to fish' rather than 'I have permission 
to fish'. Requesting to see the permit, Bochkarev found that there was none. At this stage he 
allegedly instructed the fishermen to inform the Fishing Inspection. Other members of the 
Presidium claimed that it simply was not possible that Bochkarev had been fishing illegally. 
Geptner was accused of running a personal vendetta against Bochkarev, and some of those present 
also expressed concern that the incident might damage the Society. Evidence, in the form of two 
letters from the Fishing Inspectorate, was produced to prove Bochkarev's innocence. According to 
these letters, a local - Andrei Frolkov - was responsible for the illegal fishing. His net had been 
confiscated and civil punishment had been meted out. Geptner, however, had kept the copy of the 
Fishing Directorate' s response to his letter of 22 August in which the Inspectorate denied that
Bochkarev had been given oral permission to fish and acknowledging that an investigation had
'been started upon receiving Geptner's complaint. The party fraction eventually ruled that 
Bochkarev, being 'excessively trusting', had been caught in an act o f 'accidental' unlawful fishing.
The full Presidium, which met shortly afterwards, endorsed the ruling by the party fraction,
-----------------------------------
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blaming Bochkarev for 'carelessness' and criticising Geptner for failing to turn evidence of the 
incident over to the Presidium and go through the normal channels.
The story would probably have ended here had not Geptner decided to proceed with the case.
that Bochkarev was actually holding the net. How could this be if he had ordered Frolkov to stop 
fishing? He ended his letter urging that the Fishing Directorate 'certainly (cannot) accept those
J/.
Geptner, who had been very outspoken in the 1950s when Soviet biologists clashed with A.
Malinovskii, the all-Union Nature protection chairman, responsible for the first liquidation of
Soviet Nature reserves in 1951, contacted Krokodil, which on 10 January 1965 ran a satirical
article exposing Bochkarev as a poacher. The text exposed to the full the bureaucracy of VOOP.
Emotions were mixed within the Society following KrokodiVs revelations. Some accused Geptner
of betrayal, whereas others were worried about the effect the story might have on the Society.
Several letters critical of Bochkarev appeared in Literaturnaia gazeta ('Nature and us'). A member
of VOOP's presidium, Vladimir Chivilikhm, revealed that Bochkarev was responsible for putting
an end to an idealistic attempt in 1957-60 to manage the cedar forests of the Altai region in Siberia
(Kedrograd). Another long-time member of VOOP, sitting on the Society's Council, wrote that
Bochkarev had been the only member o f the Council to 'categorically reject' a proposal that a 
. .ministry-level State Committee for Nature Protection be established in Russia, as had been the 
case in the other Soviet republics. As it turned out, Bochkarev also had a very poor conservation 
record in forestry. A letter signed by members of VOOP and printed in Literaturnaia gazeta, thus 
concluded that 'Under these circumstances the only correct course o f action acceptable to broad 
public opinion is to remove comrade Bochkarev as president and to publish that decision in the 
press'. Reforms were required within VOOP so as to turn it into 'an authentic defender o f natural 
resources in the interests of both the present and future generations'. Other letters pointed out that
the 'operational style of the society had changed', that its activities were characterised by a
'bureaucratic flavour' and that there was 'a tendency to be cut off from scientific public opinion'.
'Scientists well known for their scientific activism in conservation continue this work in complete 
.isolation from the Society and it is precisely these folks that created the Society to begin with. The 
initiative for the break began with the society and not with these scientists'. Others appealed to
,'Soviet democracy'.
On 24 February 1965 the Presidium of VOOP once again convened. Its first vice president,
Nikolai Ovsiannikov, presided over the meeting. It was decided that VOOP would stick to 
Bochkarev's version of events. However, some action had to be taken, and two members o f the 
oversight commission of the Central Executive Council, V. Zharikov (president) and A. Kasparson 
(vice-president), demanded that an extraordinary session o f the Central Executive Council be
,called to settle the issue. Meanwhile Geptner wrote a letter to the Fishing Inspector pointing out
:;i'
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kinds of “conclusions” that exculpate Bochkarev’ and that the identity o f the other six poachers 
involved be revealed and proper punishment distributed. Geptner won the support o f the Moscow 
State University druzhina (see below), which at a two-day conference held on 15-16 March 1965 
was shown 10 photographs of Bochkarev. The Riazan Fishing Inspectorate was condemned for 
dishonourable complicity and Bochkarev was condemned for 'gross abuses o f his social role’, for 
'amoral' actions and 'a contemptuous attitude towards those who gave him a position of trust'. The 
incident was finally brought to an end on 20 July 1965 when the VOOP Central Executive 
Committee gathered in Moscow for a plenary meeting. Acting president N. Ovsiannikov - deputy 
leader of VOOP and First Deputy Minister o f the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water 
Management o f the RSFSR - announced that Bochkarev had 'resigned' on 13 April 1965. 
Ovsiannikov was unanimously elected as VOOP's new president.
Following the Bochkarev affair, however, VOOP started to more actively interact with state 
organs and became increasingly formalised. Goldman is very negative in his assessment of the 
Society, arguing that '...the Society for the Protection of Nature tended to focus more on providing 
outings for its members than on halting or preventing pollution. In fact it is hard to find any 
instance where it sought to prevent, much less succeeded in preventing, any industrial pollution. 
The society simply did not seiwe as a gadfly or watchdog the way environmental groups do in the 
outside world'^^. At the VIII Congress of VOOP’s Central Committee in 1986, this was 
acknowledged by the delegates:
rioKa, K coîKajieiimo, sa orpoMHtiMH nvKfpaiviH namux 
nponaraiiÆHCTCKHX noKasaTeJieu KpoiOTca nopoH (popiviaJiLiiLie hjih, 
xyace..., iipocro iie cym ecm yiom ne coGsiTna h (liaKxw'^ .^
In late 1986/early 1987 the Belorussian Society followed suit, arguing that
..MaccoBOH xapaKxep o6mecrBeiiHOH ox|)aHM npHpoAu peinnx 
npo5ji6My aKOJiormiecKoro BoaiHxaiiHa rpa^ctan, ofiecneMHX hx 
BOBJie'ienue b npOBeienue npaKXMHCCKHX npnpowoxpannux  
MeponprnixuH m xcm cawbiM siiaHHTeabHO oSaeranx rocyAapcxBemiwM 
opranaM BLinojiiieiiHe axon pafioxw. MaccoBOcrb oSmeCTceiinoH 
ripwpoiiooxpaHHOM opranHsauHM pacciViaxpHBaJiacb, bhahmo, kuk 
iiaHÔojiee pannonajibiibiH nyxb k y.riy‘iiiieHHio nojioJKeiiMB b oGaacrn 
oxpaiibi npnpG/ibi™.
Goldman (1991), p. 40. 
^^ TapnaBCKHH (1991), c. 19. 
"°Ibl4, p. 37.
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However, not all aspects of VOOFs activities were criticised. S. Freedman, for instance, held 
the view that the Society played a pivotal role in putting the environment on the political agenda in 
the USSR:
OrpoMnaa s a c iy r a  o 6 mecTBa cocroa.TO b tom , mtg ”o iig  iiepBGe 
naqajiG b to  jie.iG, jig TGro. kük 3aiiieBean.qHCb rGcyAapcnîeiuibie 
opranH3auMH, n 04e.ia.fiG iia 3Tgm (IipGirre HcropmiecKH vitiorG j i i n  
xaKOH Ma.nenbKGH GpraiiHsauHU, c  kpgxgtiiwm h q iejtci’BaMM. 
([laKi'HtiecKH npn GXcyrcxBHH annapaxa”. (Ono) npaKxnaecKH 
ejimiCTBenHbiM jiGdpGBGJibHbiM Gd'bejmneaMeM. saiiHviaBLUHMCJi 
npGnaraipiGH ujten Gxpanbi npMpojibf*.
Tarnavskii pointed out the impact of the Society at the local and regional level:
Heafasa iie oSpaxH ib BHMMaiine iia tg, bxg mugtog ripMpojiGOXpaniibie 
Mepbi, ocGSeiiiiG na Mecrax, npejinpHiiHMatGTca aMuib no HUHnnaxHBe h 
ycHaHBMH qaeuGB pecnyÔJiHKancKHX oSu iecxo, K oropue ofibaino 
paÔGxaiox B xecBGM KonxaKxe c  aoa)KnocrnbiMM JiMuaMH^ .^
A quarter o f the poachers caught hunting illegally in the Russian Republic, for instance, were 
caught by public inspectors organised by VOOP. Considerable results were also achieved by the 
Ukrainian Society . In 1981, encouraged by the public, three oblast newspapers, Kyivska pravda, 
Vinnytska pravda and Cherkaska pravda, organised an expedition along the river Ros together 
with Kiev UTOP. The latter provided transport and equipment. The aim o f the expedition was to 
study the ecological situation of the river and the results o f the study were published by the papers. 
Following the expedition it was proposed to create an inter-oblast committee on Ros as well as a 
specialised organisation which could produce cleansing facilities. A system of sanctions for 
violating the rules for water protective areas was also initiated. Thanks to the expedition, argued a 
member of UTOP, Volodymyr Boreiko, 207 hectares of land were planted and another 184 
hectares drained, along the river in the southern part of Kiev oblast. Moreover, the Belotserkov 
production trust, producing tyres and rubber-asbestos products, considerably reduced emissions of 
oil-products into the river. The expedition also provoked a great response from the general public 
- letters appearing on the pages of the above-mentioned newspapers requested information 
regarding measures taken, information about new incidents of the unenvironmental use of the 
water in Ros and also suggested new themes for the future.
UTOP put much effort into recreating the old tradition o f making artificial nests for the white 
stork. Between 1985 and 1987 the Kiev oblast branch of UTOP, the student druzhina o f Kiev
Ibid... p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 24.
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1University and the Department of Zoology of Kiev University conducted a campaign under the 
name 'Leleka' in Kiev oblast. People were encouraged to build artificial nests to save the stork 
from extinction, and more than 100 articles on the issue were published. Participation in the event 
was high, and Kiev oblast UTOP received more than 120 letters from people who had either heard 
about or taken part in the campaign^^. This led UTOP to believe that co-operation with 
newspapers, scientists, workers in Nature protection bodies, teachers and youth was particularly 
important. UTOP also encouraged the revival of national traditions in its efforts to save threatened 
species of animals and birds from extinction and took part in organising annual campaigns to
protect rare birds. An important element of such campaigns was the
...Bo36yjK/ienHii poManTnqecKoro n in ep eca  ic HcqesaiomMM bhjbivi. c  
ero  noMombio npHB.ne<ienHB oSmecrBeiiiiocrM k oxpane pe/tKHx 
JKHBOTHLlx’'^ .
This was done by publishing elements of national culture, such as national habits, traditions, 
beliefs and superstitions. UTOP also revived Ukrainian legends, stories, proverbs, sayings, 
rumours, symbols and heraldiy^^. The Slavs were neutrally oriented towards birds o f prey
I
>•generally and positively inclined towards eagles and falcons in particular. In the 1930s and 1950s, 
however, a campaign to shoot such birds was undertaken, which
n o H T H  r i o j in o c r b io  n e p e q e p K i i y j ia  jK H B iu ee  b i ia j io j ie  iieH T p a .n b iio  
r io .n o 2 C H T ejibH oe O T u o m e n n e  k  x n m n b iM  iiTM itaM , h  s iia q M T e j ib ito  
c r io c o O c x B O B a j ia  s a i i e c e n H i o  p a j ia  bhjiob n a  c r p a u H U b i K p a c n o H  K i iu r n .  
B b iJ in  sa S b iT b i M H o rn e  no.no:»cHTe.FTbHbie 'rpajiM UHH, n p n iv ie i'b i, oO b iM an  
n o  OTHOujenHK) k  n ep n a x b iM  x n in iiH K a M , h  n a o o O o p o T , noHBHJiHCb 
OTpnnaTejibHbie^ .^
As a result, old traditions deseiwed to be revived, while at the same time introducing new 
ones.
■g
BooOiue, iiapojiHaa iipaBCTBeiniocib ocerjia 6buia ryMaiiita. HejiapoM 
paiibLue na YKpanne CBHTajiM, aro BcaKaa nruna caivia no ce5e  
Gearpeuina, BcneacrBbie aero ona x o a h t  O o c o io ’ ’ . B naaajie aimjinaTbix 
roixoB B crpane uinpoKO npoBOJin/iMCb LUKOJibHbie 3Ko.aornaecioie 
npasjniHKM (cy66oTHHKM). (A lso  w idespread w ere) A,enb f i t h u  h /(eiib
.aeca, nanpaBJieHUbie na oxpany h BOcnponsBOACi’BO jkhbothofo n-----------------------
A poll revealed that 80% had heard about the campaign from newspapers; 49% of these through regional 
newspapers, 15% through city and oblast newspapers, 3% from republican newspapers, 7% from oblast 
radio, 3% from TV and 6% from fact sheets put in their mailboxes.
BjiaitHMHp BopefiKO, YKPaHncKoe OOmecTBo Oxnanbi flpHpojhi. (Knen, Tnn. yPCflC, 1987), c. 20.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ib id , p. 23.
Ib id , p. 24.
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revealed also that within the press there were reform elements, that, given the proper conditions, 
might come to their assistance':
79
51
-
pacrMTejibnoro MHpa. K co:»:aJienM(o, ohh iipaKTHaecKH Mcaesan k 
KOHuy 70bix rojiOB. Hx n o ry 6 n a  jiyx  lUTaMnoBaiinocrM, $opMajiM:ma. 
npenpaTMB jiercKHe npasjiiiHKH x p y m  b iioKyMJiMByio oGflsaiiiroCTb’ ®.
■'I
In Lviv national elements were introduced in UTOPs activities as early as 1983 with very
good results. Four thousand people took part in UTOPs 'zelena tolochka' (Green mill) festival that
year. VOOPs greatest achievement was, in Weiner's view, however, not environmental but rather
political; the Bochkarev case 'was a virtually unique episode in Soviet history. “Public opinion”
.emanating from outside Party ranks and supported by the press, evidently acting on its own 
authority, successfully forced the removal o f a sitting bureaucratic head o f state or state-sponsored
79institution' . Besides, the State Forestry Committee was a very important ministry. How was this 
possible?
Weiner argued that people following Khrushchev's removal in mid-October 1964 were under 
the impression that Brezhnev and Kosygin would continue his policies of liberalisation. 
Moreover, Lysenko was removed in the late autumn of 1964 and calls made for the rehabilitation 
of classical genetics. This, in Weiner's view, emboldened reform elements in the press {Krokodil, 
Komsomolskaia pravda, Literaturnaia gazeta) and the druzhinniki at Moscow State University.
Rather than continuing in KJirushchev's path, however, Brezhnev put an abrupt end to cultural and 
environmental 'liberalism'. Literaturnaia gazeta's 'Nature and Us' column, which had been active 
both on Baikal and on Bochkarev, was closed down, and the apparachiks gained a solid hold of 
VOOP. As for the conservation movement itself, although it lost out in the short term, it gained in 
the long term. As argued by Weiner, 'a band of elite biologists and followers in educated society 
and the student population came to realise that they were almost unique in representing a truly 
autonomous, cohesive, self-actualised movement o f a portion of the citizenry in opposition to 
central economic policies pursued by the regime'. Moreover, the Bochkarev affair facilitated 'a 
gradual growth of insight by conservation activists into the real workings of the system and the 
game-like quality of Soviet justice, where, to legitimise the embezzlement, corruption and black 
marketeering that was so indispensable for the maintainance of economic performance and 
delivery of products, another set of bureaucrats - themselves dialectically dependent on this 
corruption to justify their jobs - provided the theater of investigation and auditing. The incident ■;T:
Î
The experiences of the 1950s and the early 1960s proved to be a 
university for conservationists in the praxis of activism. Faced with the
IbidL,p. 32.
Weiner (1993), p. 209.
expropriation by the regime of their society, VOOP activists found 
alternative, safe institutional protection in the Moscow Society of 
Naturalists, immune from direct regime pressure or interest, and then 
used those bases to expand their influence into the crucial student 
community in 1958-60. They learned to use the press and to exploit the 
moral victory of Bochkarev's resignation as a central element o f activist 
folklore: memory of that symbolic victory was passed down as late as 
the 1980s! From leading politicians such as N. Vorontsov and Aleksei 
lablokov to thousands of local-level activist-graduates of student 
brigades, the lessons of the 1950s and 1960s percolated throughout 
Soviet society. The failure of Soviet bureaucrats to look at what was 
happening at the margins of their society ultimately contributed to their 
undoing®*’.
Although highly bureaucratised and formalised, VOOP conducted concrete environmental 
work among Soviet youth. Numerous ‘Green patrols’ were set up at schools to teach school 
children how to plant greenery and take care of trees and shrubs. Members of these patrols also 
collected herbs and seeds and learnt to set up nests for birds. Similarly, ‘blue patrols’, aimed at 
monitoring Soviet rivers and lakes, were set up under the auspices of VOOP. These patrols were 
fighting poachers and measuring the water quality in Soviet rivers and lakes. Environmental 
education was also provided through the so-called Young Nature Lovers’ Movement and in the 
Pioneer Camps^^
MO/Pand K luB Z
Two other societies also played an important role following the formalisation of VOOP in the 
1930s. Many VOOP veterans, well-known Soviet biologists, ‘migrated to the shelter of the less 
exposed Moscow Society of Naturalists (MOIPy^^. This society was founded in 1805 and was 
Russia’s oldest scientific society. As for the significance of this society in the Soviet period, 
Weiner concludes as follows:
From that redoubt these older activists nurtured an emerging student 
movement, the druzhiny po okhrane prirody (student Nature protection 
brigades), which soon expanded from Moscow and Tartu state 
universities to over one hundred institutions of higher learning by the 
1970s. Additionally, MOIP and its Commission on Nature Protection 
was instiumental in organising a series of conferences aimed at restoring 
the once impressive network of Nature reserves, now almost entirely 
parcelled out to collective farms and state logging plantations, to their 
original purposes. Finally, MOIP took the lead in the struggle against
Ibid.. pp. 211-12.
Alexander Arbatov, Sergei Bogolyubov, Leonid Sobolev, Ecology (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1989), pp. 78-79.
Weiner (1993), p. 195.
52
but of all the points on his project, only the idea o f creating a youth group survived. Zavadovskii
Nikolai Vorontsov, who in 1989 became the first non-party member o f the Soviet government
(DjTopencKHH, IJJyMOBa (1990), c. 730. 
i b i d ,  p. 731.
biology tsar Trofim Denisovich Lysenko and his 'Michurinist biology' 
with a battery of courageous essays, book reviews and public seminars.
,Another society, which also served as an inspiration to the student druzhiny, was the Circle of 
Young Biologists of the Zoo (Kruzhok iunykh biologov zooparka - KIuBZJ, established by the 
biologist and scientist P. Manteifel in 1924. The initiative to set up a youth group was made by 
the director of Moscow zoo and Professor at the Moscow State University, M. Zavadovskii. He
wanted to turn the zoo into a scientific-educational establishment and use it as a base on which to
enlighten the general public. M. Zavadovskii elaborated a project by which to achieve this aim,
was defamed during the campaign against the USSR’s geneticists, headed by Lysenko, and his 
works were banned^^. This society nurtured future biologists and opposed the ideas of Lysenko.
As a result, some of its members perished in the 1930s. However, the society flourished and was 
described by the Russian phenologist A. Strizhev as the ‘nesting ground of our country’s 
biologists’. Not only the USSR’s leading biologists, but also well-known writers and journalists 
had at one point been members of KIuBZ and Florenskii and Shumova were full of praise for it:
B ACTCKOM KpyaCKe CJlOXM/iai KOJUieKTHB ejlHHOMblUlJiemiHKOB CO 
CBOMMH AeMOKpaTHBecKHMH crpyKTypawH, caMoynpaBJiaeMOcrtEO, 
npeeMCTBeiiHocrbio noKOJieiiMH, x y r  obiKonajiHCb npHimuribi 
iipaBCTBemiocFH, TpaAHUHH jipyacbbi, cosjia im e 64Hiici’Ba c  npupojioH h 
iieo6 xo4 HiviocTH Be’iiioro jinajiora c  uefi. Bo-nbiiaii loiiaTCKaii 5KH3iib 
ObiJia 5KHB0H aabTepnaTHBOH cy x o f i OiopoKparasHpoBaiinoH uiKOJie,
XHpeBUJHM nHOHepcKOH H KOMCoMOJibCKOH opraHH3anMflM. Gyjiyqn 
CaMH B iieTCFBC M iOIiOCTl'M BJieuaMH 3 T 0 r0  UiyMIlOrO MOJlOJlOrO
coobmecTBa, jio ch x  nop qyBCTByeM, b to  em e rorjia npwcaniyjiH  
BepHOCTH B iipyxcSe n Bepnociu npupo4e®'\
■
.Later, when the children who joined KIuBZ became students, they, together with the VOOP’s 
youth group, headed by P. Smolin became involved with more concrete activities (see below). I
when he was appointed USSR Minister o f the Environment, was also a former member of KluBZ. 1%
s
 ________
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The Student Nature Guards— - POP
As will be seen in Chapter Two, renewed attention was given to the environment under 
Klirushohev's rule, and several laws to protect the environment were passed during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. The combination of political liberalisation and increased awareness on 
environmental issues (as will be seen below, economists started arguing in favour of costs to be 
applied to the use of Nature resources, and writers, such as Leonov, had even in Stalin’s day 
started to speak out against the destruction of the country's forests, rivers and villages) made it 
possible to set up groups focusing on this issue:
K aK  To.ribKO 9K0.iorHMecKaa iipod.'ieM a cra.ia o c o sn a n a r b c j i  
0 ([)MUMaabii0 H o S m e c r B e m io c r b io  (a ? r o  n p o M so iu a o  b n e p n o j i  
" o 'n en eJ iH ” 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 6 4  rr.), " n a p rn a  m npaBHTaobCTBo” npejinpniniJTH  
pfi4  u ia r o B  n o  ycM .aenH io  K o irrp o a a  :ia q a c r b io  n ap ym e iiM H  
3 Ko.îîorHqecKM X c r a ïu ia p r o B  { n p e ^ a e  B ce r o  c o  CTopo iibi qacrm b ix  
r p a a v ia n ) .  B bu ia  jierajiH SO B ana h  o b m e c x B e n n a a  aKTUBH ocrb. 
i ia n p a B J ien n a a  npOTHB s t h x  nap ym e iiH M , n o  i ie  sa T p a rH B a io m a a  
noJ iH THqecKHx acneKXOB .
Unlike other groups and associations existing in the USSR, the druzhiny appeared 'from 
below' at the initiative of people engaged in Nature conservation and concerned with the 
deteriorating state o f the Soviet environment. In the spring of 1958 students and staff from Tartu 
University, the Estonian Academy of Agriculture and Tartu Medical Institute set up a so-called 
kruzhok po okhrane prirody to address environmental issues and activise young people in the 
protection of the environment. Two years later, on 13 December 1960, Zhenia Slavskii, Slava 
Konchin and Valia Lapin of MGUs biological faculty initiated a similar group there and this group 
became the first university druzhina in the USSR^^. Initially, druzhiny were set up at the faculties 
o f natural sciences throughout the USSR, and later others followed suit^^.
In Ukraine the first druzhina was set up by the biological faculty of Odessa University in 
early 1965 at the initiative of students and a natural historian. Professor I. Puzanov. Later groups 
emerged also at Kharkiv and Kiev Universities and at Kharkiv Pedagogical Institute. The Kiev
4 0 0 ;  Coio3 OSmecrBeHHbix 4o6poBoabHbix CaMOiienrejTbHbix OpraiiMsauHH h OObejiniieiiHH 
MoaoaeTKH”.
Hiicrnxyx MaccoBbix noBMXHqecKHx ^BuacenHH. (1992)., c. 5.
3K00XKJ1UKH (8) (MocKBa: Moaojiaji niap4M/i, 1990), c. 29. The pretext for setting up the first druzhina 
was the passing of the Russian Law on Environmental Protection in 1960. For thorough accounts of the 
druzhiny, see Tarnavskii (1991), Florenskii/Shumova (1990), pp. 731-33 and Arbatov, Bogolyubov, 
Sobolev (1989), pp. 29-30.
Mncrnxyx MaccoBbix noaMXHqecKHX 4Bn:»ceiiHH (1992”), c.5.
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group was organised in the spring o f 1969 by the dean of the biological faculty, A. Korneev^'^. In 
Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk biology students and students of the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture 
initiated similar groups^^.
The student Nature guards expanded, despite the backlash on the environmental front during 
Brezhnev's rule, under the auspices of VOOP - which they were entitled to join as collective 
members^% and between 1968 to 1972, from being a few loosely connected informal unions, the 
druzhiny were transformed into a system covering all the Soviet republics^^. New groups 
continued to emerge well into the 1980s. By 1972 there were some 40 druzhiny in the USSR, and 
the number of druzhiny grew steadily, from 1 in 1960 to 121 in 1987:
Table /. 1 Number o f  druzhiny in the USSR^^
1960 1970 1978 1985 1987
1 11 57 96 121
The major direction of their activities in the early 1970s was the struggle against poachers. 
The police started setting up brigades to help it enforce law and order. Among these brigades were 
‘Christmas-tree brigades’ aimed at preventing the illegal felling o f trees. Students o f MGU’s 
Faculty o f Biology joined these brigades and were so successful that - having caught high-ranking 
police officials and members of the nomenklatura - the Moscow oblast office o f the Ministry of 
the Interior issued a decree banning student patrols from the city’s railway stations^'^. The 
Moscow student druzhina also organised raids on the Kliazma and Volga rivers and similar raids 
were organised in other parts of the country^^.
According to an estimate made by E. Schwarts of the Socio-Ecological Union, every tenth 
poacher turned out to be a party, soviet or the Komsomol official. Another 10% were militiamen, 
criminal investigators, local KGB men and procurators^^. Not surprisingly, therefore, the activities 
o f the druzhiny were not always supported by local authorities, environmental protection bodies
Ojier JlHCTonaji, KneBCKaa ropoacKaa omanHsauHa YTOH. ÜPVTKHna blixojut n neua. Jlavnear 
nneiviMH KOMCOMoaa YKioannbi hm. H. Octoobckofo -jipv>KHiia oxpanu rmnpojibi ’’JleitHiiCKHH Jioson" 
KHCBCKoro rocvyiaDcrBenHoro viiHBencHTeTa mm. T.F. IIIeBMeiiKO. (Khcb.; Tun. YPCIIC, 1989).
Oaer Jlucronaji (YKpanncKoe oOmecrBO oxpaiibi npupojibi), Opnooiiv oxpainiioT Mojiojibie. Hs oribna 
nafioTbi CTViieiiMecKHX nDMPOiiooximiinbix jidvtkhii pecnvSanKH. (Knec: PeKJiawa. 1986).
TapiiancKHH (1990), c. 61.
^^ HlICTMTyT MaCCOObIX nOaHTHHeCKMX JIBMJKeHMH (1992), c.5.
4-B. OabiuaucKHH, Heibopiviaay: Tp vnnoB on  nooTner b HiiTenbene (MocKua: IlejiaromKa, 1990), c  
67.
Skootkjthkh 09901 c. 29.
B.n. (DaopeiiCKHH, P.A. UlyMOBa (1990), c. 732.
*’®E.A. lilBapn, Ben iiama acuaiib (MocKBa: npoMeren, 1990), p. 21,26.
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and the leadership of the institutions where the students were studying. Pressure 'from above'
07often made life difficult for many groups . The struggle against poachers was also fraught with
subordinate to the Youth Council o f MGU ), the relative autonomy of the groups and the 
concrete activities they conducted appealed to the liberal-minded scientific intelligentsia, for 
whom, following Khrushchev's thaw, the environmental movement became a refuge, 'in the first 
instance for the youth, which within DOP and VOOP's inspections found an opportunity to serve 
society on the outside of public (state) structures, in relatively autonomous and not very 
bureaucratised g r o u p s ' T h e  ethical principle of the movement - 'Our task is ecology (Nashe 
delo - ekologiia) excluded the politicisation of the group and probably also contributed to its 
relative autonomy.
DOP's first all-union seminar took place in Moscow on 21-27 Sept. 1972 and was attended 
by 28 delegations from 22 different cities. The seminar adopted a loose structure giving full self- 
rule to the local groups. The choice of activities was made locally, rather than centrally, and it was V|
up to the local groups themselves to plan these activities. Permanent contact was maintained with
dangers for those involved - forest and river inspectors were on several occasions injured and in
some instances even killed by poachers caught in the act. Between 1970 and 1972 four
druzhinniki were killed during raids^^.
In the course of the 1970s, the druzhiny were mainly preoccupied with the struggle against
poachers. Starting in 1974^^ they also voiced restraint against the most glaring examples of
.industrial expansion. As pointed out in its statute, DOP was a strictly voluntary organisation and 
unlike the officially sanctioned VOOP did not aim at mass-membership. The emphasis was on 
commitment rather than numbers and on individual responsibility and individual participation. 
Responsibility for Nature became a personal, rather than a collective, issue for the citizen, and this 
was reflected in the device of DOP: 'if not I, then who?'^^^
Although formally the druzhiny were subordinated to the Komsomol at the institution within 
which it operated, as well as to the local chapter of VOOP (in Moscow, the druzhina was also
I
other groups, and participation in xntQr-druzhiny programmes and actions was decided locally, 
taking into consideration the interests o f the group's members as well as the group's capacity and
3
Ï
Î
^^TapnaBCKMH (1990), c. 62.
^^HHCTMTyx MaccoBWX noaMTHBeCKHx aBHxceuMM (1992), c. 15. Florenskii and Shumova (1990) claim that 
three people were killed. These were Viktor Voloshin, Viktor Moiseenko and Evgenii Semukhin (p. 
733).
^^TapnaBCKHH (1990), c. 60.
(DjiopencKHH, P.A. (1990), c. 733.
TapnaBCKHH (1990), c. 61.
HiicFMTyT MaccoBtix noaHTM'iecKMX üDHXcenHH (1992), c. 5.
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expertise’^ .^ The formal structure of DOP matched the principle of local autonomy. An all-union
conference met no less than once every two years to confirm the statute and other movement 
documents, set the membership rules, endorse and exclude members (membership of DOP was 
collective - i.e. groups, rather than individuals were taken in as members) and, finally, to elect the 
Soviet, DOP's executive-representative body. Decisions made by the Conference and the Soviet 
were not compulsory for the local groups’ "^*. Locally, the druzhiny were headed by a commander
(komandir), who precided over a staff (shtab), which set the tasks of the group. Raids were headed 
by a commissar (komissar).
In Ukraine, each druzhina was headed by a general meeting (obshchee sobranie), which was 
called by the staff (shtab). The general meeting could make decisions if more than 50% of the 
members of the druzhina were present. The general meeting listened to the commander’s 
(komandir) account, assessed the work of the staff and made decisions regarding the future work
of the druzhina. Moreover, it elected the staff and the commander and also provided full 
membership to candidate members. The staff, on the other hand, organised the practical work of 
the druzhina, represented DOP in official institutions and took care of the druzhina's 
correspondence and finances. The meetings of the staff were headed by the commander’
From the early 1970s seminars and conferences were arranged every 1-2 years. In addition to 
poaching and environmental protection, DOP also indulged in scientific work (see below). In 
1976 a seminar was called in Kirov. At the seminar, the first complex programme for the struggle 
against poaching as a social phenomenon was discussed. This programme was known as 
‘VystreF(Shot). Students taking part in raids against poachers were given lectures and 
information on social psychology, legislation, criminology and operative work by ministries and 
state committees in charge of executing legislation on poaching, as well as by VOOP, the various 
inspectorates, police and the Procurator's office. In 1976 and 1977 mXer-druzhina programmes I
aimed at catching poachers, such as 'El' - Fur tree - (against illegal felling of Christmas trees), '
Vystrel' and 'Fauna' , to mention but a few, were carried out. In the late 1970s a Co-ordinating 
.Council, to ease the interaction of local groups participating in these programmes, was established.
Sviatoslav Zabelin, then commander o f the MGU druzhina and currently leader of the Socio- 
Ecological Union, was elected the first president of this soviet. DOP as a movement reached its
"’' m L c .  15.
KneBCKaii oOjiacriiafl oprauMsannn yKpaHiicKoro oOineciBa oxpanu npnpoaw. KneBCKHH 
rocyjiapcTBeiiHbiH yiiHBepcuTeT hm. T. T. LUeBqeiiKO. Koop4HiiauHOHHO MeT04MiiecKMH coBer 
CT'y4eiiqecKHX 4pyxcHn no oxpane npnpo4bi npH ripe3H4MyMe ¥ 0 0 0 . Khobckhh o6kom KOMCOMOJia, 
O pranH3auHfl h paSoxa crvaenaecKHX jldvxchh no oxpane npHPOJibi. (MexojiHMecKHe 
peKOMeitjauHH). (KneB: fopxHnorpaijiMa, 1985) c. 6.
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peak between 1972 and 1979, when high-profile activists such as Nikolai Kraev, S. Mukhachev 
(Kazan) and D. Kavtoradze were active in the movement.
By the beginning of the 1980s, DOP found itself in a critical s i t u a t i o n ' I t s  membership 
started to drop, and elements of formalism were emerging within some local groups. In many 
educational institutions, local groups existed only in reports of the Komsomol or as semi-formal 
organisations. With the turn of the decade, argued Schwarts, a new generation of leaders, who in 
exchange for a business trip abroad were ready to play the tune of YCL officials, was replacing the 
older and firmly committed leaders'*’^ . This was, however, not the case everywhere - in Ukraine, 
for instance, the druzhiny were very active during the early 1980s. Kliarkiv had a very active 
druzhina, and the Kiev University druzhina (named 'Leninskii dozor'), which had gone through a 
series of active and not so active periods since its beginning in 1969, became more high-profile 
from 1983 onwards, when it was joined by activists such as S. Motornyi, A. Kostiuk, V. 
Domoshlinets, T. Fedorik, V. Flryshchenko and V. Brinikh. The Kiev group developed and 
became the all-union co-ordinator of Tribune' - a programme aimed at increasing awareness of 
environmental problems among the general public - and 'Fauna' - a programme to save endangered 
plants from extinction. Moreover, the Kiev druzhina was co-ordinating 'Vystrel' - the campaign 
against poachers - within Ukraine”' .^ In 1985 there were three druzhiny in Kiev - the University 
druzhina, as well as one at the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture and one at the Belotserkov 
Institute o f Agriculture’’^ .^
Volodymyr Boreiko, an active member of UTOP, claimed that a reason for the success o f the 
Ukrainian druzhiny could be attributed to UTOP's presidium, which in December 1983 created a 
coordinating-methodoiogical council to unite the efforts of druzhiny, environmental groups and 
individuals involved in Nature protection. Previously these groups had been somewhat 
disorganised. The new council served as a forum for the exchange o f experience, the organisation 
and conducting o f common tasks as well as providing assistance to recently created druzhiny. 
Finally, the council spread information about the achievements and activities of new groups, thus 
making them known to a wider audience. Thanks to the efforts of the council, claimed Boreiko, 
six new student druzhiny were created in the course o f one year. During 1986 action groups were 
set up in Ki'ivyi Rih and Voroshilovhrad pedagogical institutes as well as at the Faculty of 
Geography at Kiev University. Whereas initially the druzhiny were set up predominantly by
’“^HuCTMTyT MaCCOBblX nOJlHTHHeCKHX (1992), c. 15.
Ulnapu (1990), p. 22.
JlMcronaji (1989).
OpraHHsanufl u nadoxa c r v i i e i iq e c K H x  jp v :aeH H  no oxpane npupojbi (1985), c. 3.
58
biologists, by the mid 1980s chemists, mechanical engineers and other professions were following 
suit. By the end of 1986 there were 26 student druzhiny throughout U kraine"’’.
The Ukrainian druzhiny also focused their activities on fighting poachers. Campaigns against 
the illegal felling and sale of Christmas trees (‘operation El’) and the sale o f wild spring flowers 
(’operation 'Pervotsvet') enjoyed considerable success and were planned and executed under the 
auspices of UTOP. The Kharkiv druzhiny had been conducting such campaigns since the second 
half of the 1970s, carrying out raids in fur plantations in Kliarkiv and Merefiansk forestry sites. 
The Kiev university druzhina was also taking an active part in the campaign. During operation 'El' 
druzhiniki in Kiev patrolled suburban trains and also two or three G AI (traffic police) posts on the 
outskirts of Kiev, checking cars and if they came across any felled Christmas trees, also permits 
for felling. If permission had not been given, the trees were confiscated and fines issued. These 
fines, however, were dismally low (10 rubles or less), so even though a significant number of 
poachers were exposed (some days up to 50 poachers were caught) and trees were confiscated 
(during 10 days in December 1988, 699 fur and pine trees were confiscated), this did not in itself 
automatically bring a reduction in illegal tree felling. The druzhiniki therefore reached the 
conclusion that for their work to have a real impact, people needed to be properly informed of the 
harm such felling was causing to the Ukrainian forests. In Kharkiv and Kiev exliibitions and 
campaigns to promote fur bouquets and winter bouquets of fir twigs as alternatives to real 
Christmas trees were thus undertaken - allegedly with some success, polls from Kliarkiv indicated 
that some 50% o f the citizens were in favour o f such alternatives, following intensive campaigning 
from the Kliarkiv druzhina^ ’ *.
From 1985 the Kiev druzhina tried to involve the press directly in operation 'El'. The 
editorial boards of Moloda hvardia was approached and its editor T. Maikov requested to take part 
in that year's raid. Together they organised a round-table attended by UTOP, the oblast and city 
inspectorates for environmental protection, the militsia, Ukrainian Ministry of Trade, the Kiev city 
committee of the Komsomol, the oblast forestiy directorate and the druzhina from the Ukrainian 
Academy of Agriculture. Shortly after this round-table an operational staff for operation 'El' was 
created by the Kiev city inspectorate for environmental protection. Kiev oblispolkom and Kiev 
gorispolkom issued an order on additional measures to protect coniferous forests before the new 
year, and the recycling of Christmas trees for use in the furniture industry was initiated and 
undertaken by 'Kievtara', a local furniture manufacturer and the press was printing information and 
feed-back received from the public to the campaign. Most of the hard work for this campaign was 
conducted by the druzhiny and it marked the birth of a new system: 'newspaper-student druzhina'.
no
i l l
JlncTonaji (1986). 
Ibid.
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In acknowledgement of the need to gain the support of the media, druzhinniki from Vinnytsia 
pedagogical institute and Donetsk University underwent courses at the faculties of journalism. 
Close contacts were also established between the druzhinniki of Vinnytsia and the oblast 
newspaper the Komsomolskoe plemia, which started covering every raid undertaken by the 
druzhinniki"^. Thus,
O fj.iajia iom eû tiouLiMH ijjhpgkhmh BOSMOJKnocrrBMM BejieuMfi 
npMpOAOOxpauiiOH nponaranjiM.-.no icaKAcmy KpHTM'iecKOM.y 
BbicrryrLieiiHio iioSuBaTbCB orBeTa...iiaanuo pasBurne oprauHaaTopcKoPi 
(})yHKUHH neaaTH: 6.aaro4apa nojwepjKKe oS inecrB e iiiiocrn.
MOJiojieacnaa rasera m3 aru rarop a h nponara iuH cra njjeBparM.nacL b 
aKTHBiioro M aBTopHTeTBoro opraiiMsaropa ejioqiiOH KaMnannn"®.
As for operation 'Pervotsvet' (Primrose), raids were organised at the markets, railway stations, 
metro stations and pedestrian tunnels to prevent the sale of illegally gathered spring flowers. 
Some of these flowers were included in the Red book. In Kiev the sale of all wild plants was 
banned, and in Odessa oblast there were restrictions on the sale of rare medical herbs found in the 
countiyside. The druzhinniki also carried out such campaigns with good results: in the spring of 
1987, for instance, a salesman from Chernihiv had 450 bouquets of glades confiscated, and during 
1985 more than 10,000 flowers were confiscated. In Lviv, druzhinniki from the Biological Faculty 
of Lviv University confiscated more than 5,000 bouquets of snowbells, lilies of the valley and 
crocuses. Although Boreika claimed that as a result of their work, the sale o f spring flowers was 
considerably reduced in some cities""*, once again the fines were very small thus not really 
encouraging poachers to stop their activities.
Towards the end of 1985 DOP together with Komsomolskoe znamia organised a round-table 
attended by various ministries, departments, botanists and members of the druzhiny in Kiev, 
Kharkiv and Donetsk to discuss the issue o f how to secure a real reduction in the collection of 
spring flowers. The participants reached the conclusion that more emphasis must be put on 
prophylactic measures during operation 'Pervotsvet'. Acknowledging this, the druzhiny the same 
year developed a concept for how to improve environmental propaganda among the population. 
This concept, included in the programme 'Tribuna', was later endorsed by DOP, and a nation-wide 
awareness campaign started shortly after. As part of the campaign, the Ukrainian newspaper 
Moloda hvardia started up a special eco-page in its newspaper* *^ .
'" j b j d
113 Ibid.
"^JlwcTonaii (1989).
’"ibid.
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Numerous raids against poachers hunting or fishing illegally were also organised; during 
1985, for instance, 400 raids took place. Some of these were aimed against pollution in 
agriculture. Altogether 300 charge-sheets were written, more than 700 illegal fishing nets were 
confiscated and a republican campaign against poaching organised, in which the druzhinniki made 
TV and radio appearances, gave a series of public lectures, and published a large number of letters 
and articles in the local, regional and republican press to draw people's attention to the problem. 
The following year some 70 raids were organised and conducted by groups of 6-10 people under 
the leadership of the commander. These groups caught 350 poachers and confiscated 15 weapons 
and 70 fishing nets. One hundred and forty reports of illegal fishing and hunting were handed over 
to the hunting and fishing inspectorates"^.
As the struggle against poachers hunting illegally was fraught with dangers for those taking 
part in the raids, each druzhinnik had to have some training prior to being allowed on a team. 
Such instruction included the use of arms, hunting and fishing rules, how to recognise equipment 
used by poachers, boating, photography, how to write protocols, how to check documents, etc. 
Further, all druzhiny conducting raids were obliged to establish and maintain regular contact with 
the environmental inspectorate, VOOP and the police. Raids had to be cleared with these bodies 
beforehand (equipment for the raids was often provided by local branches of VOOP), and to secure 
the safety of those students taking part in the raids, it was recommended that the group be 
accompanied by a representative of the police or environmental inspectorate.
The groups normally consisted of from four to six people, and the leader of the group was 
obliged to carry an inspector’s uniform, whereas his assistants carried certification and red arm­
bands. A clear division of tasks was rehearsed before the raid started, and politeness during 
encounters with poachers was a must. Most raids were carried out in the autumn before the first 
snow fell and immediately before the hunting season started. Druzhinniki were instructed never to 
show fear, as this could put their lives in danger during encounters with threatening poachers, nor 
to give in to psychological pressure. As pointed out in a booklef^^ containing recommendations 
and instructions to guide the druzhiny in their work, the poachers often tried to exert psychological 
pressure on the members o f the raid, naming their friends and acquaintances holding high posts, 
whom they would complain to about the activities of the druzhiny^^^.
" ^ J lM c r o n a j i  ( 1 9 8 6 ).
MunucrepcTBO Bbicuiero h cpe/inero cneuHajibiioro ofipasoBannn PODCR BaiuiCHpcKHfi 
rocy;j,aix:rBenHbiH ynuBepcurer hmchh 40-jTeTHn OKTnbpii. CBOjuiaii Apyxcniia no oxpane npupojibi 
BACCP. BpaKonbencTBo: PeKOMeniauMH crvaeiniecKHM Jinv>tcHnaM no oxnane nnunoiibi juin Gonifibi 
c finaKoiibepcrnoivi. (¥$&: 1987).c. 13-14. 
r ocympcTBennbiM KOMmex YCCP no oxpane npnpoiibi. MnnucxepcxBo Jiecnoro xosîihctbü YCCP. 
MHHHCxepci'BO Bnyxpenribix 4eji YCCP. PecnySjiHKancKMH conex yKpaMUCKoro ofiinecxBa
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From the early 1980s onwards, raids to expose irregularities in agriculture became 
increasingly common, and recommendations as to how to conduct these raids were provided by 
the Ukrainian UTOP. Such raids could be carried out at any time on farms and food factories to
reveal careless storage of fertilisers and chemicals, emissions of polluting substances into rivers 
and lakes, etc.), and no special knowledge was required. Neither was special equipment, since 
violations could be detected visually and the sites were accessible to everyone. Druzhinniki were 
encouraged to look out for violations during expeditions against poachers and special expeditions 
along rivers. Information could also be gathered from regional newspapers, UTOP, and from 
buses and suburban trains. These instructions, compared with similar instructions to be applied 
against poachers, were not very thorough, thus indicating that agricultural pollution was not to be a 
priority issue of UTOP^
Poaching was not the only activity of the Ukrainian druzhiny. The Kliarkiv Pedagogical
Institute druzhina, for instance, early on took an interest in working with school children to spread 
awareness of and fondness for Nature at an early age. A school 'sector' and later also a
kindergarten 'sector' were organised by this druzhina and the emphasis was on practical work, such
as teaching the children to make houses for birds, how to grow and collect medical herbs and also 
to enable them to take part in operation 'Pervotsvet'.
Druzhinniki from Donetsk State University focused on research, discovering and studying the 
habitat of rare animals and birds. The Donetsk druzhina took part in setting up two ornithological 
game reserves - the Krivokossk estuary and Martinenkovo marshes, where the biggest flocks of 
grey heron in Donetsk oblast were found. They also examined some unknown caves and
I
geological outcrops. The druzhina of Zaporizhzhia Institute of Industry, on the other hand, was 
more concerned with curtailing industrial pollution, elaborating a special manual enabling them to 
establish the efficiency of air and water cleansing facilities and providing a plan of action.
Boreiko claimed that from the early to mid 1980s there was a tendency towards more
.differentiation and variety in the work of the Ukrainian student druzhiny. Complex programmes
such as 'Fauna', 'Vystrel', 'Tribuna' and 'Rekreatsiia', combining scientific and propaganda work
with the capacity of each individual druzhina, was becoming increasingly common, and the end 
.aim of'Fauna', which the Donetsk druzhina was taking an active part in, also had a concrete result, 
in that it aimed towards the creation of new game presei*ves*^”.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
oxoTHMKOB H pi>i6ojioBOB, Arm cjivxceSiioro nojiL3QBanHfi. MeTOJiHqecKoe nocoRne no 5oDb5e c 
OpaKOHbepcrBOM. (K h cb : 1987).
‘ QnrdiiH3auHii h  nadma c rv a e u q ec K M x  / id v jk h h  no oxnane npnixuibi (1985).
‘^ J^lHCTonaji (1986).
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Acknowledging the success of the druzhiny and also the increasing emphasis on 
environmental policies in official Soviet policies, the Komsomol at its XIX Congress announced its 
intention to take participate actively in this work:
A o j i r  KOMcoMOJibCKMX o p r d iiH sa u H H  -  - B o c i iH r a u H e  x o sa M C K o r o  
o r n o m e i iM f l  h jiioSbh  k  p o j in o H  n p u p o j ie .  H n a iO M  i i e . i e  C B oe M e c r o  
4 0 .q)K nb i iia f iT H  m n n o u e p c K H e  " se J ie n b ie ” u  ’’r o . i y f b i e ” n a x p y j iM . u
lU K o a b n b ie  a e c H H q e c r B a , n  c r y a e n q e c K u e  n p u p o i i o o x p a u u b i e  JipyiacM iUji, 
H M O J iojibie y q e i ib ie .  ^ e p e s  iiecK O J ibK O  a e x  c e r o j u u im u H e  c r y j i e n x b i  
c r a i i y x  npoH SBOjiCTBeH UH KaM u, x o s a e B a M H  n p u p o i i i ib ix  i^ e c y p c o B  n a m e n  
c i p a i ib i .  O o ^ x o M y  r a x  n a x o i o ,  x r o 6 b i  e u i e  b B y s a x  o u h  n o .n y iM a u
s a i c a a x y ,  n e o S x o j iH M b iü  o & b e v i suanM M  m i i o c r a x o a i ib m  o r ib i i  n o
o x p a n e  n p K p o j ib i, a  r a a a n o e  - n p o n u ic n n c b  y 5 e » : 4 e i u i o c r b i o  b
n e o S x o j iH M o c i'H  3 a i im m a x b  ee. O p H p o j iy  o x p a iu n o x  M o a o j i u e " ’ .
The Ukrainian Komsomol also committed itself to actively promote a more careful attitude 
towards the environment and praised the druzhiny for the considerable place they occupied in the 
'Communist upbringing o f youth' as well as in the education of future specialists*^^. However, 
whereas the Komsomol did not make any concrete suggestions as to how its aim would be 
achieved, DOP's statute very clearly spelled out concrete measures to be taken towards this end:
PemeiiHe aKxyajibHbix npoS/ieM oxpanbi npnpoAbi h OKpy^caiomen 
cjD04bi M BocnHxaiiMe na ocnoBe npaKXHMecKon npH poaooxpannon  
jiejixeJibHocxH cneuHanHcroB-ripaKXHKOB, cnocoSnb ix j^emaxb xaxH e  
n[X)6jieMbi”..."rjiaBnbiM...aBaaercii npaKxnaecKaa npnpojiooxpannaa  
deaxejibnocrb. 4 a a  nero iiCAonycrHMo ripeapauieiiHe axon imdoxbi n 
MojiHoe pasBaeaeim e h jih  nojiHXH’iecKyio npHManxy (hs ManH([)ecia 
4BH4cenHfl 4 0 0 ) .  Ocnonnbie nanpaB.FienHa: BbiaaenHe,
niJoeK'rHpoBanHe h  oprannsauHa oxpanaeMbix npHpojiHbix xeppHxopHH, 
oxpana BanoBejtuHKOB h wecx nepecra xpacnofi pbi5bi, 6opb5a c  
6paKonbe|xrrBOM. seM em noe npoeKXHpoBaiiHe. oxpana w ajiux pex, 
6opb6a c  npoMbiuiJieniibiMH cejibCKOxosHHcxBeimbiMH sarpîisneiiHBMM, 
3K0jiornqecKaa nponara iwa
The work o f the druzhiny had to be co-ordinated with the university the Komsomol group as 
well as with UTOf *^"*. As seen above, UTOP and VOOP were increasingly characterised by 
formalisation and bureaucratisation from the late 1960s onwards. However, as pointed out by 
Oleksii Kabyka, the previous commander of the Kiev University druzhina, not everybody in 
UTOP was a bureaucrat. Some of them tried to do something and sometimes funded expeditions
" ’ ihiA
O p r a i iH s a u H f l  h n a f i o x a  cxvjienqecKHX jov:acM H  n o  o x n a n e  n p H p o j iu  (1985). 
’^^HncxHxyx iv ia cco B b ix  n ojiH X H 'iecK H X  jiBH X cenH H  (1992), c. 15.
O nratiH sauH n h n a S o x a  crvjiein iecK H x ;iDvacHH n o  o x p a n e  npupn/ibi (1985), c. 4 .
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dissolved themselves, whereas others joined the new groups as collective members (e.g.: the Kiev 
druzhina in Ukraine joined Zelenyi Svit as a collective member in 1989). This contributed to the
64
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to far-away places such as Kamchatka. Trade unions and the Komsomol, on the other hand, 
provided the groups with boats, binoculars and other equipment to allow them to carry out the 
raids
Following the establishment of informal environmental organisations, some druzhiny
3-gradual reduction in membership numbers, and by mid-1991 there were some 5,000 druzhinniki 
working within 156 groups throughout the Soviet Union. Most of these were students, but there
were also graduates from institutes of higher education, and schoolchildren were active within the
,126movement . I
Although, as noted above, DOP - despite its relative autonomy - did not escape elements of 
formalisation, most environmentalists make a positive assessment of DOP as a movement. As
pointed out in the RAU report, the
I
$
PoMaHTHKa 4 0 r io B  KoirrpacrnpoBam  c "ynopmoqeuuocxL io"
”pa3BMToro counajiHSMa”, jiasajia BosMoacnoorb B{)CMeiiuoro Sercraa h3 
BceoxBaTLiBaiomen HujiycxpMajibFioH CHcreivibi. B t o  :^e BpeMfi 
rocyjiapcrrBO noayqujio B03Mo:«:iiocrb KaiiajinsMpoBaTb sxy 
oSmecTBemiyio aKTHBiiocTb b uyxcHOM eivty iianpaBJienMn. Teiu ue 
Mciiee uaKonaeune oiibixa HHorHxyuHoiiajTMSHpoBaBiioro 
npHpo400xpaiiiioro 4Bu:aceHHa bobbojihjio nocxeneinio npHxojinxb k 
BbiBojiy 0 ueB03M0:KH0CXM pcuiaxb Macujxafiiibie aKonornaecKne 
npoSjieMbi B paMKax o^ MUHajibiibix cxpytcxyp. Bxoiviy ocoBiianMiQ 
cnoco0CTBOBajio n pesKoe iiapacxanne aKOJiormiecKHx npo6jieivi bo  
BTopoH noJiOBHiie 70-x - naaajie 80-x rr. flonbiXKa cnpaBHxbcn c 
3X0U BoauoH iiapyuienMH, BbiSBainibix oGxeKXMBBbiMU aKonoMMaecKHMM 
n couuajibHbiMM npHaHiiaMM, ’’rpexawH cuoreMu", npnaejia k pocry 
MHCJia cxo.riKiioBeHHH upHpojiooxpaiinoro ABuxceuna c cJiHaxe.nbUbiMH 
SBeubiiMH cMcreMbi -naMHuaa ox qnuoBHbix SpaKoiibepoB h Kouaaa 
MMiiHcrepci'BaMH c  MUHUMaxHBOH ”nepe6pocKH ceBepubix [jeK'V
Schwarts argued similarly, stressing that the druzhiny, and to a lesser extent, clubs o f bards 
(Vysotskii, Rozenbaum, Okudzhava, Dolskii) remained practically the only informal organisations 
which managed to retain their original c h a r a c t e r * ‘The movement o f druzhiny managed to 
siu-vive during the Brezhnev period by basing its work on embryos of the legal state brought about 
by Khrushchev's thaw or, to be more precise, on by-laws adopted at that time on different 
inspectorates on Nature preservation. Some druzhiny, however, had to struggle with 'corrupt and
Interview with Oleksii Kabyka, August 1992.
HucxMxyx MaccoBbix nojiHXMqecKHX 4Bu:*:eHHH (1992), c. 15. 
IMA, pp. 5-6.
UlBapu (1990), c. 22.
■ ■ cf:': a
:s
■ ■actually impotent ministerial Nature protection departments and also representatives from official 
societies for Nature conservation {VOOP), 'which are modal and completely dependent upon the 
party'
Although the issues addressed by the druzhiny were relatively 'harmless', in that they focused
on Nature conservation and poaching rather than on environmental problems whose impact on the
Soviet Union was far more serious, the druzhiny were operating highly successfully within the
rather limited number of areas/issues they were allowed to address. The most significant legacy of
the druzhiny, however, was not so much the record it left behind on Nature conseiwation, but
.rather the role it played in facilitating the current environmental movement in many of the Soviet 
republics.
The druzhiny provided budding scientists with a base for meeting and talking about the 
environment, and it is interesting to note that many of the present-day environmental groups in the 
former Soviet Union are run by former druzhiny-nztWisis or have a substantial proportion of them 
amongst their ranks. One such, Svet Zabelin, the leader of the Socio-Ecological Union, enjoys 
high respect amongst Greens in a number of republics, and the prominent writer Zalygin has given 
a positive assessment of Zabelin's activities.
Support for the druzhiny dropped substantially after Gorbachev came to power. This was a 
result o f prominent leaders leaving the druzhiny as it became possible to set up different-style 
movements. The loss of members was also caused by changing priorities. As more information
129
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on the state of the environment in the USSR became accessible, the hunt for poachers was no
longer so important. Setting an alternative agenda was considered more urgent and, as a result, 
purely environmental groups were formed.
From 1985, various ecological and ecological-political groups and organisations started 
emerging on the basis of DOP. DOP also kept in close contact with other informal environmental 
groups emerging independently of the druzhiny. In Moscow, Svet Zabelin and other members of 
the Moscow University druzhina used their links with environmentalists throughout the Soviet 
Union to set up the Socio-Ecological Union in August 1987 - uniting informal environmental 
groups in several of the Soviet republics. In Ukraine, the Kiev druzhina Zelenyi Svit as its
'Youth Wing', and Oleksii Kabyka, its last commander, later joined Greenpeace Ukraine as a 
campaigner. Volodymyr Boreiko, a previous druzhinnik and UTOP activist, besides working 
actively within Zelenyi Svit also for a while worked in the State Committee for Environmental 
Protection and the Rational Use o f Nature Resources. Towards the end of 1989, the druzhina and 
Zelenoe miloserdie together with the newspaper the Komsomolskii prozhektor organised the first 
Ukrainian (republican) raid to measure nitrates in food products. Special indicators were obtained
  —  -------------------------Ibid.. p. 21.
i
from ecologists in Moldavia, and reports were handed in to the sanitary station. Together with 
another informal group, Nebaiduzhi, the druzhina took an active part in lurii Shcherbak's election 
campaign to the Congress of People's Deputies, putting up posters and spreading information to 
the general public'^”. The druzhinniki were able to draw on their knowledge of and interaction 
with official structures in charge of environmental protection and conservation, as well as on their 
connections with the press to successfully organise environmental campaigns as soon as this 
became politically possible following the start of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and 
démocratisation.
1.2.2 The Scientists
The Conservation Movement (the Biologists)
As pointed out above, in the 1920s and 1930s the pre-revolutionary scientific establishment called 
for the establishment of zapovedniki (nature reserves)*^*. Later, when Stalin initiated their 
elimination, these scientists argued fiercely against such a policy. Douglas Weiner has provided a 
thorough account of this struggle, which I have summarised below.
Whereas during the second half of the 19th century, Russian and Ukrainian scientists, writers 
and philosophers argued that Nature consisted of several interconnected elements - the Biosphere - 
at the beginning o f the 20th centuiy and after the Russian revolution, many leading Russian 
ecologists/biologists propagated a completely opposite view, namely that Nature was made up of 
closed self-regulating communities that had two distinctive features: firstly, a total, holistic
interdependence could be observed between its components, and secondly, such communities 
tended to reach a state of equilibrium*'*^. Developed in the 1890s, this concept of 'biocenoses' 
formed the basis of another concept - the 'étalon' - developed by the Russian zoologist Grigorii 
Kozhevnikov in 1908, and used to justify the creation of zapovedniki:
The zapovedniki...(would be) dedicated to the study of the biocenoses, or 
ecological communities, which they were intended to incorporate. In 
addition to serving as centers for ecological research, zapovedniki were 
to serve as etalony, or models of 'healthy', 'primordial' Nature. Because 
economic activities required the alteration of virgin Nature, causing
130 JlncronajF (1989).
"  * VOOP and KIuBZ took an active part in efforts to set up and later protect the zapovedniki, but as the 
‘campaign’ was primarily undertaken by biologists as ‘experts’, I have chosen to address this issue 
separately from the above sections on VOOP and KIuBZ.
"^Weiner (1990), pp. 1-2.
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'pathological' changes, Kozhevnikov argued that society needed to know 
how to reverse that process and recreate a natural equilibrium, as an 
antidote to a potentially fatal dose of progress. The pristine zapovednik- 
etalon could serve as a reference point, preserving parcels of healthy 
Nature as models for the rehabilitation of degraded lands. Moreover, on 
the basis of then knowledge about the ecological carrying capacities of 
different types of biocenoses, ecologists could offer useful expert advise 
on appropriate land use and other questions of economic development'’”
The concept of the 'étalon' was in itself controversial and was early on attacked by other 
scholars as being misleading or even directly harmful. Yet the idea was persistently defended 
until the late 1970s. Weiner in a paper to the Harrogate Conference (July 1990) sought to explain 
why this was the case and reached the conclusion that 'this ecological belief was embraced in good 
part because it provided a scientific rationale for a conservation program hostile to rapid 
development and supportive o f wilderness preservation. In particular, such a programme was 
aimed at providing tangible and symbolic islands of autonomy from the state - under the control of 
the scientific community - while at the same time it propounded the view that scientists, because 
of their ecological expertise, should play a central role in economic planning and resource 
management'*^"*.
Whereas the number of zapovedniki increased during the 1920s, in the mid-1930s the 
People's Commissariat of Agriculture aimded at having them tiansferred into its own zapovedniki 
department on the grounds that the former were pursuing ‘science for science’s sake’. The 
zapovedniki of the Commissariat 'pursued the more narrowly utilitarian goals of maximising the 
propagation of selected, economically valuable species of wild animals'*^^. Isai Prezent, dean at 
the Faculties of Biology of Moscow and Leningrad Universities and also a staunch supporter of T. 
Lysenko, criticised the zapovedniki on political grounds, arguing that they were 'leading a counter­
revolutionary resistance to such key economic programmes as collectivisation and acclimatisation 
(introduction of exotic animals and plants) under the cover of scientific argument'*^^. Further, 
'holistic ecological doctrines that asserted limits to humans' ability safely to transform Nature were 
now to be regarded not only as flawed, but as doctrines devised by the 'class enemies' of Soviet 
socialism'*'*^. As a result, work in this area was stopped and scientists involved were arrested.
Although new zapovedniki were created during the 1930s and until the early 1950s, the aim 
of these changed and they were used as the 'basis for the very radical transformation of Nature
Ibid... pp. 2-3. 
IMA, pp. 1-2. 
" 'M i ,  p. 3. 
" 'M i  
Ibid.. p. 4.
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their establishment originally had sought to p r e v e n t ' ' B i o t e c h n i c s ' ,  aimed at creating more 
economically beneficial plants and animals, became the norm, and the conservation movement
{VOOP) had its membership reduced from 15,000 in 1932 to only 2,553 by 1939*^’’. 'By the late
1930s and 1940s the great transformation of Nature was simply accepted as a given, with no
-attempt at theoretical justification'. Theorists such as Ramenskii and Stsanchinskii criticised the
zapovedniki) territory. Eleven million hectares of this land would be transferred to the Ministry of 
Timber Industry and to state farms, as 'those institutions would be able to exploit the areas more 
intensively than his own small agency'*"*”. In return, the Main Administration would be upgraded
concept of biocenosis as inadequate. In the view of the latter, 'migratory animals and birds
participate in multiple systems precluding absolute closure'. The political climate during the 
second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s, however, prevented any proper discussion of the
issue.
Vasilii Makarov, the deputy director of the Main Administration fo r  Zapovedniki, had been 
responsible for the expansion of the zapovedniki. Aleksander Malinovskii - former leader of the 
State Forest Inspectorate - who was appointed leader of the Main Administration in the late 1940s 
-, however, put forward a proposal to eliminate 85% of the Soviet Union's protected (i.e.
to an all-Union State Committee, presiding over the remaining 28 zapovedniki*"**. Despite 
opposition from the biological community, these changes were passed on 29 August 1951, 
followed by 'mass dismissals of the old ecologist-activists' and threatening the very existence of 
the 'ecologist-conservation activist tradition'.
However, the scientific community mobilised all its efforts to recover at least some of the
'■N"'f-
: g
f lzapovedniki. On 28 March 1952 a Commission for Zapovedniki was created by the Presidium of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences. Through this Commission, the defenders of the zapovedniki 
tried to challenge the decision made in 1951. A year later, organisational changes occurred in the 
structures responsible for the running o f the zapovedniki. The recently created State Committee 
was downgraded to the Main Administration fo r  Zapovedniki and Hunting (Glavpriroda) by the 
USSR Ministry of Agriculture and Supplies. Further, 18 of the remaining 28 zapovedniki were 
subordinated to the USSR Academy of Sciences* Following Stalin's death and the first attacks 
on Lysenko, the conservation activists, temporarily silenced under Stalin, mobilised their efforts 
and in May 1954 called a conference on zapovedniki. The conference, which took place in 
Moscow, was organised by the Moscow Society for Naturalists, the Geographical Society, the All-
Ibl4, 
Ibl4, p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
"* Ibid., p. 8. 
" ' i m ,
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Russian Conservation Society (VOOP), the USSR Academy of Sciences and Glavpriroda. 
Demands were made for the return of the zapovediiiki to 'fundamental ecological research' and the 
meeting was described by observers as 'an arena of uncompromising struggle by scientific public
opinion for the restoration of the zapovedniki '...the old academic ethos, emphasising the right of'scientists to be able to determine their fundamental research agendas independent o f state 
meddling, had lost little of its former vigour despite the prior two decades of intermittent pressure 
and terror'
.Four months later, the USSR Academy of Sciences reorganised its commission into a
Ibid.! p. 10. 
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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Conservation Commission, which elaborated a programme for the restoration and expansion o f the 
zapovedniki. This programme was presented in 1957 and, based on this plan, the number of 
zapovedniki increased from 40 in 1952 to 93 by 1961 - under the auspices of Glavokhota‘^ ‘^ . The 
struggle between those who wanted the zapovedniki to operate as etalony and those who wanted to 
make them available for research not only of a preservationist, but also economic character, 
however, continued; the USSR Agriculture Ministry's Glavpriroda once again tried to incorporate 
these zapovedniki into its own network. In the end, however, the zapovedniki remained under the 
auspices of Glavokhota.
Weiner has identified three reasons for why the étalon principle (see above) was defended so 
eagerly by conservationists in the USSR for so long; firstly, it 'enabled them to present themselves 
as the only true guardians of the ecological health o f the country on the basis o f their expertise in 
the arcane matters' . Secondly, 'it gave them a network of research bases and a certain degree of 
professional autonomy', and thirdly, 'it offered powerful scientific justifications both for an anti­
industrial stance and for the preservation of pockets o f “pristine” Nature - islands o f diversity 
(including aesthetic diversity) in a sea of sameness'.
In Weiner’s view, 'it is no accident that in the late 1920s, ecological arguments were 
mobilised against collectivisation and construction of grandiose hydroelectric projects, and that 
then, as now, many conseiwationists were in the front lines of the struggle to preserve the cultural 
and architectural heritage of Russia as well. Zapovedniki provided a different model of Nature - 
and o f life - from that of Soviet reality and constituted tangible islands of inner emigration and 
professional autonomy. As long as no better means were available to promote these values, the 
étalon concept retained its hold on the mind of Soviet biologists and their allies. It was even able 
to survive the Prezent-Lysenko episode, and got a second wind during the thaw and the peaking of 
Soviet interest into the Biosphere Reseiwes Program.
Ibid., p. 9.
i
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The lesson to be learnt from this ‘campaign’ was that 'where the Soviet experience emerges as 
distinctive is that ecology there also became a standard-bearer for science and academe generally 
in their common struggle with an intrusive and repressive state...(This struggle) can only be 
understood in the protracted struggle of the Soviet Union's creative intellectual elite for autonomy 
and a restoration of its 'rightful' status in the running of the nation's affairs'
Poaching and recreation did, however, pose a threat to the 'untouched' state of the 
zapovedniki - so although the scientists had won the struggle regarding their status, this state was 
gradually being eroded by ministerial and other interests - as pointed out by the Russian artist 
Mikhail Zotov^"^ ,^ at the beginning of the 1960s the Zhiguly zapovednik in the Volga basin had its 
status overturned as ministerial interests wanted to use it for commercial purposes. Other 
zapovedniki suffered a similar fate.
However, people stood up for the zapovedniki - exercising independent political participation 
and sowing the early seeds o f the informal Green movements that were later to appear. Mikhail 
Zotov, for instance, in a newspaper article described his own, lonely struggle to save the 
Zhigulevski heights from destruction in the early 1960s. Despite the warnings of friends and 
acquaintances, Zotov wrote and distributed a letter entitled 'Zhtob vnuki nas ne kliali' (So that our 
grandchildren will not curse us) and sent this to local, oblast and central newspapers. He either 
received no reply or his letters were passed on to the editorial boards o f the Kuibyshev obkom 
newspapers. Eventually, the obkom got tired of receiving Zotov's letters and called the editor of 
the Toliatti newspaper Za kommmizm, A. Takhautdinov, with the following order:
Bbi30BMTe doTOBa M cKavKHxe 6My, M'lo nncaTL on MOîKeT, bot nycrt 
M nHuiex 0 xo|}oiiJHX Bemax, xor/i,a ero m nySjiMKOBari, 6yayx!
Henero eiviy CMOxpexb na vKnryjiax, m  eute CKBOSb sepiibie o k^h!
Zotov allegedly replied to this proposition by arguing that as long as such misdeeds were 
carried out he would not be able to write about 'good' things and questioned the editor's 
‘grazhdanstvennosf, arguing that
Ka^yibiH ;tenb -  aro noBbie h HOBbie KycKM KpacHBenuiHX Mecx 
^ H ryjien , npeBpamennbix b meSeiibf Ecjw b oSkomc sacejin nanoxbi, 
jih6o Bparn Poccmh, xo Bbi-xo!...
The struggle continued, and the editor eventually - despite instructions from the obkom, - 
printed Zotov's letter on 6 July 1966. The response was veiy favourable to Zotov - people
I b id , pp. 3 6 -3 7 .
PyccKüH MbicJib, 2 2 .5 .1 9 8 7 , c. 5 -7 .
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I■iysupported his views and Zhiguli had its status as zapovednik partly restored at least on paper - 
although, following official reassurances that the Mochutov mountains and lablonii ravine would 
be saved 'for future generations', exploitation of these areas as well as in the village of Bogatyr 
continued.
Although the result of Zotov's campaign was limited, it was politically significant in that it 
showed that an ordinary citizen, with the help of a newspaper and public opinion, was able to exert 
independent political pressure despite numerous obstacles for them to do so. Although, as shown 
below, Brezhnev restricted the debate on the environment, the experience it gave the 'activists'
proved useful when they continued the struggle for the environment once Gorbachev initiated his 
policies of'glasnost' and 'demokratizatsiia'.
1
The Economists
In 1974 Ivan Voigyes, in his book ‘Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe’, wrote that some of the younger economists and city planners had begun to question the 
utility of headlong industrialisation. Furthermore, ‘primitive ecological interest group 
articulation’ had ‘begun to be noticeable...within the Soviet economic elite’ 
Hohman/SeidenstrecherWajna have identified some of these economists:’...prominent economists 
like N. Fedorenko, a Member of the Academy of Sciences and Director o f the Central Economic- 
Mathematical Institute of the Academy, and A. Birman, Doctor o f Economic Sciences and 
Professor...’ took part in the debate on the e n v i r o n m e n t O n  the other hand Mnatsakanian has 
argued that even at the end of the 1970s professors still maintained ‘that ecological crisis in the 
planned and regulated socialist economy is impossible’ However, as pointed out by Gofman 
and Fedorenko:
;ï'-
•A
...OT/ieJibiiLie npe^craBHTeJiH sKonoMHMecKOH iiayKM b 60-x m 
nocJie;tyioinHX r o ^ a x  HeoiiiiOKpaTHo B b icrynajin b rnuinry npupo iibi. B 
UEMH, iianpHMep, 6buia cosv ia iia nepuaii b c ip a n e  n a G o p a io p m i  
3K0H0MMKM npHpoAonoJibSGBaHMii. Kpoiwe T oro, 34ecb ;*:e BosimKJia 
HAen pa3pa6oTKM KoMnjieKcnoH nporpaMMW iiayMHO-'rexHH iiecKoro 
n p o r |)ecca , coA ep»:aBu ieH  Kpyniibin p asaeji no npHpoiionojibsoBaHH io n  
o x p a iie  o K p y x a io m eH  cpeiibi.
"U
Ivan Voigyes (ed.), Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York, 
Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 6.
Hans Hermann Hohmann, Gertraud Seidenstecher, Thomas Vajna, IJmweltschutz und okonomisches 
System in Osteuropa (Stuttgart, Berlin, Koln, Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1973), s. 29.
Ruben Mnatsakanian, Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics (Edinburgh: Centre for 
Human Ecology, 1992), p. viii.
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Q ie - ia i io  6bu io  iieM a.io. Ho aujioko ne Bce noB oe iipHnHMa.nocb 
ii.iaiiOBO-xo3flHCTBeniibiMH opranaMH c  BocroproM , Maine saxeu a .iacb  
M iiorojieTimn nonoKHTa c noAroroBJieiBibiMM [leicoMenjiauHnMM h 
npoeKTBMH M6T04HK, 6bIJlH H npilMbie KOlI#MKTbl. BcC 3T0 HOTOMy, 
MTO B iiMx coAepîKajTHCb iipeAJioîKeiiHfl BBecTH n jia r y  3a pecy[x:b i, a  
3T0 npOTHBOpeMHJlO KaiJOIiaM nO.MMTMMeCKOfi 31C0H0MHH, yTBe|)}KAaBllIHM 
5ecn.rraTH0CTb npnpo/B ibix p ecyp coB  icaïc nesbiÔJievibiH m icoii
C0UHaJlH3Ma^^'.
The idea that enterprises should pay for their use of Nature resources to optimise plans from 
an environmental point of view emerged as early as at the end of the 1950s/early 1960s. Research 
on linear programming was carried out by the USSR Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Economy. 
The thrust of this research was that all parts used in production must be valued according to their 
contribution in the increase of the criteria o f optimisation o f the economic system, evaluated at one 
given moment. A category of optimal or objectively conditioned prices, introduced to Soviet 
economic science by Academician L. V. Kantorovich, who was awarded the Nobel price in 
economics for his ideas, took 20 years to gain acceptance in the USSR*^^.
The Writers
Rural life and closeness to Nature in sharp contrast to the morally decadent urban life had been set 
up as an ideal by a number of Russian writers. Tolstoi, for instance, propagated this view in his 
short stoiy Tri smerti (Three Deaths) and his essay Q tom (About that). Similar views can be seen 
in the works of Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Dostoevskii and Chekhov, to mention but a few.
Immediately after the revolution, the main task was to mould the New Man, to help to build a 
communist society in the Soviet Union. To help to achieve this goal, the concept o f socialist 
realism was introduced into Soviet art and literature. Writings should reflect people’s enthusiasm 
for developing the country, for setting up factories and producing steel and bricks. A large number 
o f so-called production novels appeared. To the extent that Nature played a part in these novels, it 
was as a challenge/obstacle to Man which in the end was overcome
During and after the Second World War patriotic feelings were prevalent in the Soviet 
population, and, as noted by Brown, ‘the emotional attraction for Russians o f the "Motherland" 
was sufficiently strong for Stalin to find it expedient to reinstate the word and concept of
K. ro(j)M an, H. (De^opeiiKO, 'SKOiiOMMMecKaa B a iiim a  npnpov ib f. K o m m yu m ct, n o . 5, 1989, c. 33. 
Ibid., p. 33.
See for instance 0. HaftKOBCKaa, ‘OpHPOiia h  Bpeivtfl’. H obu m  M ap, no. 10, 1965, c. 202.
72
Motherland’ The words narod (people, nation), rodina (Motherland) and priroda (Nature) all 
have the same etymological root in the Russian language. By letting people speak about the 
Rodina. Stalin thus made it easier to use other words of similar origin - thus giving people 
concerned with the state of the environment some leeway for bringing up the topic.
It was in this context that during the years 1950-53 Leonid Leonov wrote his famous novel 
Russkii les (The Russian Forest). The book consists of several ‘stories’/themes, the central one 
being the fate of not only the Russian, but also of the Soviet forests after the October Revolution. 
Although several legislative and control measures to protect the Russian forests from over-felling 
had been taken as early as during the reign of Peter the Great, the forests provided Russia with 
hard currency from the West and were severely overused even before the revolution. Several 
Russian writers, among them Pushkin, Turgenev, and even Dostoevskii, who in his Dnevnik 
pisatelia (Diary o f a Writer), called for measures to be taken against the destruction of the Russian 
forests. Particularly vociferous was Tolstoi in Anna Karenina^^ .^ However, the writers, together 
with specialists in forestry, wrote and argued to little avail.
The abuse of Russian forests continued during the Soviet industrialisation programme, even 
though an edict signed by Lenin and Sverdlov on 27 May 1918 called for the principle of the 
continuous rehabilitation of forested areas, i.e., new planting at the same pace as felling. In the 
1930s this principle was branded as a ‘bourgeois idea’ and viewed as an obstacle to the 
implementation of the 5-year plans. However, supporters of the forests continued to write and 
argue their case.
The discussion between the pro- and anti-foresters flared up again in 1946 in polemics in two 
scientific journals Les and Lesnaia promyshlennost^^^, Leonov, who was approached by the pro­
forest grouping the following year, published the article V zashehitu druga fin the Defence o f a 
Friend), which was his first publication in defence of the forests. His views were further developed 
in Russkii les. The defence of forestiy (the forest) in Russkii les is developed in a lecture 
presented to his students by Professor Vikhrov. Harjan has summarised it as follows: ‘it is a 
technical, highly specialised discourse on forests as well as a historical account. The lecture raises 
ethical and moral problems’:
The Forest was our home, and perhaps no other element o f Nature has 
set so strong a stamp upon the morals and manners of our ancestors. The 
tree is raw material fit for immediate use, and any piece of sharpened 
iron set on a handle converted it into a valuable item of primitive 
existence. A better way of expressing its role is to say that the forest
Archie Brown, ‘Introduction’, p. 7, in Archie Brown & Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change
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in Communist States ( London: Macmillan, 1977).
Harjan (1979), p. 168.
See B. M hbh jihxm ii (p cA ), O JleiiOHBe {MocKBa: CoBpeMeiiiiHK, 1979). c. 12-14.
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on ideas originally developed by the Russian foresters Turskii and Bolotov. Their ideas were 
firmly rooted in the Russian tradition of reverence for the forests (see above), which can be 
summarised as follows:
HcciapM noabsoBaiiHe Taurou noAHHniuiocb iienucaiibiM, no n 
nenoKOJieSMMbiM saKonaM, napyuienne KOTopux JKecroKO xapaaocb. 
H hk to ne nocMCJi 6bi uiMuiKooaTb, tommtl KMBHuy, py6nTb, Sparb 
3B6pji, SHTb nxHuy 603 BejioMa cejibCKoro cxom  b  npHnocejiKOSbix
Harjan (1979), p. 173. 
p. 175.
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7
greeted the Russian at his birth and attended him through all the stages of | |
his life " with the cradle of the infant and the first boots, with the nut and 
the wild strawberry, with the peg-top, the steam-bath switch and the 
balalaika, the splinter that did service for a lamp in the peasant’s hut, and 
the painted shaft-bows at weddings, with the wild honey and the beaver, 
the flsheiman’s boat and the naval barque, the mushroom and incense, 
the staff of the wanderer, the coffin hollowed out of a log, and lastly, the 
wooden cross on the grave decorated with fir b r a n c h e s y g
•S
Professor Vikhrov stresses the function of the forest as a producer of oxygen and condemns 
its destruction not only in pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union but also in the West. In #
the end, however, he is optimistic:
SBut we have all the prior experience of history to tell us that the bright 
thousand-named hero of folk legend always conquered the monster who 
lay guarding the source of human happiness’^ ®. "1
This led Harjan to conclude that ‘the novel is deeply rooted in Russian history and 
culture’ Russkii les ‘paved the way for the literature of the 60s and the 70s, for so-called 
“village-prose”, combining the lyrical memory of Russia’s past with a presentation of burning 
moral and ecological (my underlining) issues of the day’
In the early 1960s, the writer V.A. Chivilikhin initiated an experiment which was given the |
name ‘Kedrograd’. Whereas the emphasis in the late 195Os/early 1960s was on organised mass 
enthusiasm for BAM, the virgin lands in Kazakhstan and ‘constructions of the century’, an |
alternative in the form of individualised and small groups - the so-called desanty - also emerged at 7
this time, propagating sustainable development of the country’s natural resources. y
A student at Leningrad Academy of Forestry put forward a theoretical alternative to the 
unrestricted felling of cedar trees in Siberia which was initiated in the late 1920s and 1930s, and 
which continued during the Second World War. He based his ideas o f sustainable cedar forestry
I
""lM 4,p. 180. f
' "ibid..
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Ky^poBHMKax M.iH 6opax, iiaBGMiio 3aKpen.neuiii.ix na Flerpovi M.nH 
HBaiio.M H MX noTOMKaMH. JlyKatuKHH 5op, 6op oci'HKa TaHiia -  
TaHHCKMH, BncapHoiiOB 6op -  jioiueiauaa ao iiac TonoiiMMMKa 
TaeîKHoro y x jra a a  chS hpckoh  5KH3hm^^ '.
These ideas contrasted sharply with the Communists’ attitude towards the forest:
Jlec Poccmh c m i ie r  pasMem ioH m pasMeiiJinuoM .uoiieroM . OariKa 
KopaarMH pySHJi a e c  -  nycTHTL napoB03, y  KOToporo ocra iioB K a b 
KOMMyiie. BacMJiMH TySaHOB h3 (Iimjilmu "KoMMyiiHcr” n a a n a  a e c  -  
ocBeTMTL GapaKM H KOMMyiiaaKH, K yaa CKyMMan c o n ia m ib ix  M3 m36 
K peci’baii. B CTpaLUHbie roab i B eaH K oro r o a o a a  BMecre c  nepiioM  
pyccKMH a e c  peKOH noxeK  3a pySeîK . P g k o h  -  b SyKBaabiibiM  
CMbicae caoB a  -  n o  pexaM  MoaenbiM cnaaBKOw'^^.
In 1960 graduates from the Academy went to Gornyi Altai, to the village of logach, where 
they were given a large piece o f land for their experiment. Through the writings of Chivilikhin 
and by word of mouth, young enthusiasts from all across the Soviet Union heard about Kedrograd 
and went there to join the Leningraders. From the very beginning, however, the initative met with 
fierce opposition from the administrative apparatus, and in its third year it came to an end. 
Research from this period, however, survived and inspired a similar experiment on sustainability 
in the deserts of Tajikistan in the mid"1980s*^^.
In 1965 another Soviet writer and publicist, G. Troepolskii, published an article in defence of 
the environment in the literary journal Novyi mir. Under the heading Dnevnik pisatelia (Diary of a 
Writer), he wrote ‘O rekakh. pochvakh i problemakh’ (On the Rivers, Soil and Problems). His 
concern is with the diversion of rivers that started in the Soviet Union in the second half o f the 
1930s. Troepolskii writes that he was approached by Izvestiia to write about the campaign to save 
the Tikhaia Sosna river (Voronezh oblast) from being completely drained. The campaign, which 
resulted in more than 200 signatures on a letter sent to various bureaucratic offices, was started by 
the local historian Valentin Ivanov. Troepolskii, in support o f the villagers’ demands, makes 
literary and historic references to justify the existence of the river; 150 years ago the poet and 
Decembrist Ryleev mentioned Tikhaia Sosna in a poem. And it was at the mouth o f this river that 
Peter the Great met Mazepa*^" .^ The importance o f the river in rural life is also stressed - in other 
words, traditional ways of interacting with Nature are being set up as an ideal.
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The same references to the past are made by the ‘village-writers’ in their works**^ .^ Valentin 
Rasputin, one of the central writers in this tradition, depicts peasants living in close interaction 
with Nature. There is an ‘untrennbare Einheit von Mensch und Natur’ in Rasputin’s works. ‘Die 
Menschen fiihlen sich organisch eingebunden in die sie umgebenden Naturvorgange, in der 
ewigen Kieislauf von Werden und Vergehen, der sichtbar vor ihren Augen verlauft'^^* .^ Two of his 
works. Farewell to Matera (Proshchanie s Materoi) and Conflagration (Pozhar), deal with 
environmental destruction in particular.
The theme of the former novella is the flooding of an island on the Angara River in 
connection with the building of a hydroelectric dam. This happened frequently as a result o f the 
electrification of the Soviet Union. According to Wust, the flooding o f the village and the land 
that the village people had cultivated for generations and the destruction of the cemetery where 
their ancestors were buried are for the villagers ‘nicht nur ein Abschied von der gewohnten 
Umgebung, von der mit Erinnerungen und Traditioneii behafteten Erde der Vater, der Trailer und 
Schmerz hervorruft, sondern er zerreisst den inneren Lebenszusammenhang der Helden und 
scheidet sie ab von dem geistigen und moralischen Fundament ihres Lebens’*^ .^
Whereas Rasputin focuses on the impact of environmental destruction on people, other 
‘village-writers’ like Abramov, Astafev, Belov, Mozhaev and Zalygin focus more explicitly on the 
concrete reasons for environmental destruction. Similarly, the film director Nikita Mikhalkov in 
his film Sibiriada (1979), also dealing with the flooding of a village in Siberia, pays considerable 
attention to the political aspects of the decision.
The dispute about Lake B a i k a l w h i c h  reached a peak in the late 1960s also attracted the 
attention of Soviet writers, amongst whom was Rasputin. The appeals made to save the lake 
continued the tradition of emotional references to the history and culture of the Russian people. 
Similar action was taken by Soviet writers against the River Reversal P r o j e c t ^ t h e  Volga
For an analysis o f the Russian village writers, see Stephen K. Carter, Russian Nationalism. Yesterday. 
Today. Tomorrow (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), Chapter 7: T h e  Brezhnev Years II: “The 
Countryside Writers”’, pp. 89-102.
See Renate Schaper, Die Prosa V.G. Rasputins. (München: Verlag Otto Sagner in Kommission, 1985), 
Darstellung und Funktion der Natur. pp. 142-162.
Heide Wust, Tradition und Innovation in der Sowjetmssischen Dorfprosa der sechziger und siebziger 
Jahre: zu Funktion. Darstellung und Gehalt des dorlichen Heiden bei Vasilij Suksin und Valentin 
Rasputin (München: O. Sagner, 1984).
For an in-depth study of the controversy around Lake Baikal, see Craig ZumBrunnen, T h e  Lake Baikal 
Controversy: A Serious Water Pollution Threat or a Turning Point in Soviet Environmental 
Consciousness’, pp. 80-122, in Voigyes (1974).This issue is also covered in Marshall I.Goldman, 
Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union. The Spoils o f Progress (Cambridge, MA.,London: MIT 
Press, 1972), chap. 6: The Pollution of Lake Baikal, pp. 177-210.
See Nicolai N. Petro, ‘The Project o f the Century’: A Case Study o f Russian National Dissent’. Studies in 
Comparative Communism, vol. XX, nos 3/4, Autumn/Winter 1987, pp. 234-52. The ‘campaign’ agamst the 
river reversal project started in July 1982, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, when tln ee Russian 
writers, Zalygin, Rasputin and Belov, questioned its necessity and environmental soundness and culminated
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Chograi Canal, the building of hydro-electric power stations along the Dniepr River (see Chapter 
Three) and the Danube-Dniepr Canal (see Chapter Three). Ukrainian writers such as Serhiy 
Plachynda and Oles Honchar were actively involved in the campaigns against the latter two.
.Writers have traditionally had an educational and socialising function in Russian and 
Ukrainian society. It has been widely documented that this function was maintained under the 
Soviet regime. Scientists can reach only a few readers through their specialist journals and 
conferences. Writers and cinema directors (cf. Mikhalkov - Sibiriada and the film version of
Proshchanie s Materoi) can reach many more, not only through their fiction and films, but also in 
their ocherki on more specific issues. So although some authors like Rasputin complained that
writers did not know enough, they were still fairly successful in making people aware o f the 
environment (cf. letters from kolkhoz-farmers and students to Leonov). What was more, they 
could write between the lines more easily than could scientists, and thus find a way through the 
censorship.
In many cases issues relating to the environment were put on the agenda after writers had 
dealt with them in fiction or prose, when attempts at putting these same issues on the agenda had 
been made earlier but failed (cf. Troepolskii). Once a writer had addressed an issue it probably 
became easier for others to discuss it and for scientists to support or reject the writer’s views (cf. 
debate between scientists and writers in the aftermath of Russkii les). Marshall Goldman has 
argued that protests like the one over Baikal ‘are, of necessity, protests by one government agency 
against the actions of another government agency’ Whereas disputes at the top level over 
environmental issues - although caused by other concerns - may make it easier for e.g. writers to 
publish on the issue, there is no reason to believe that the handful of writers did not genuinely 
want to protect Baikal and were not genuinely patriotic in doing so. The fact that so-called public 
committees in some cases emerged to protect specific areas/Nature objects from pollution can be 
taken in support of this view: starting in the second half of the 1960s, public committees, groups
1
and sections emerged to fight harmful enterprises by either having them closed altogether or 
having them restructured. The first public committee was set up in 1967 to protect Lake Baikal, 
and its membership consisted primarily of members of the creative intelligentsia. The Committee 
was headed by the Russian writer Valentin R a s p u t i n ^ T h e  struggle to save Baikal has been well 
documented elsewhere, suffice it here to say that due to the campaign conducted by this committee 
and arguments put forward by scientists, in 1986 the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU
,Central Committee passed a resolution on the protection and the rational use o f Nature resources
on 14 A ugust 1986, when the project was abandoned [see lOpHft TepiiHMeiiKO, 3eMJui. 9KOJiormi. 
nepecrpoHKa (Mockbu: Knura, 1989], c. 26.
See Goldman (1972), p. 185.
A.B. TpoMon, O.C. Kyann, HedioPMajiLi. Ktq eci'b kto? (MocKna; Mwcjib, 1990), c. 94.
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in the Baikal Basin, which envisaged the instalment of cleansing facilities at all enterprises in this 
basin. Similarly, groups of people joining forces with Soviet writers succeeded in collecting 
hundreds of thousands of signatures against the river reversal project, which, as seen above, was
^ ' 1
i
i
also cancelled in 1986.
!The Relationship between Writers and Experts
Experts (i.e. scientists) actively took part in the debates on the environment in the USSR. In the 
case o f Lake Baikal, for instance, Galyzii - head of the Limniological Institute at Baikal - was a 
key actor. He managed to supply data that were incompatible with those referred to by paily and 
state officials in favour of the two cellulose plants at Baikal^^^. In connection with the writing of 
Leonov’s novel Russkii les, information about the forests and about forest conservation prior to 
the revolution was supplied by pro-forest experts - as a matter of fact, Leonov was approached by 
scientists urging him to write on the forest issue, as people would listen to a writer of his high 
Standing.
Zalygin has, however, expressed severe criticism against scientists for not doing enough to 
protect the e n v i r o n m e n t H e  has argued that in many cases the writers were alone in their fight 
to save the environment. Rasputin has argued s i m i l a r l y ' F u r t h e r mo r e ,  he argued that the I
writers basically became involved in the hydroelectric power plant construction project issue due 
to what they saw, not due to what they were told by scientists.
Based on materials available on the scientists’ role in protecting the environment it is clear 
that there were two groups of scientists, the pro-environmentalists and the pro-deve 1 opmentalists. 
Often their views clashed seriously, as was the case in the aftermath o f Russkii les. The novel was 
discussed by writers and scientists at a conference in the Writers’ Union o f the USSR in 1954 and
was heavily criticised by some as being anti-socialist'^^.
It might very well be, though, that it was not always a question o f scientists being passive, but
rather a question of them not being heard. Troepolskii, for instance, refers to frustrated scientists
who warned that the consequences of the gigantic hydroelectric power stations on the environment
had not been sufficiently examined and that their objections were not taken into a c c o u n t ^ A n d
even if their views were heard, in most cases they could be debated relatively freely only in the
--------------------------------------------
Thane Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chap. 3: 
‘Environmental Issues rise to Official Legitimacy’.
See for istance Cepreft 3ajibirnH. ‘PaavMHbin coio3 c npupojioflk Haw cmpeMeiuiMK, no. 1, 1987, c. 113-
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See BajieiiTHH PaciiyTHii, ‘B noHCKax nvaciiOH Linépyk Haw coBpemewwK, no. 1, 1987, c. 138-39.
'^^B. Hhbhjihxhh (1979), g 12-14.
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specialised scientific press - which meant that facts were less available to the general public. 
Besides, much information regarding the environment was stamped confidential and as such could 
not be used as counter arguments in cases of environmental destruction.
It is also important to note that, as mentioned above, although some scientists came out 
against a project they considered harmful to the environment, this does not mean that the 
motivation of their defiance was necessarily environmental. Agriculture interests opposed energy 
interests because the latter made it increasingly difficult to reach plan targets. Similarly, financial 
interests probably came out against some of the most costly projects for economic reasons. In 
su in, therefore, they can be regarded as supportive of the environment.
If  one looks at the period as a whole contacts between scientists and writers in particular have 
become more frequent, and we have reason to believe that the successful halt to the river-diversion 
project was to a great extent a result of the close co-operation between scientists and writers - 
where scientists provided the facts and the writers made these facts easily accessible. One 
should,on the other hand, not forget that this case was special, in that it threatened to change the 
climate of the northern hemisphere and consequently resulted in pressure from the international 
community on the Soviet Union to have the project reversed. This pressure might in the end have 
facilitated the change in attitude of the Soviet leadership, together with the fact that the project 
would have been very costly. Given the poor shape of the Soviet economy in 1986 when the 
project was suspended, this could have provided just as much an incentive for the Soviet Union to 
halt the project as did purely environmental concerns - although in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
accident it is not unreasonable to assume that such considerations also played a role.
1.2.4 The Thinkers on the Environment
Although officially, as will be seen in Chapter Two, the Soviet Union claimed that environmental 
problems were a phenomenon of Western capitalist countries and that Nature was there for Man to 
use, without having intrinsic value in itself, during the 1960s and 1970s some Soviet philosophers 
and thinkers started questioning this view'^^. A discussion took place on two fronts; on the one 
hand, biologists discussed the relationship between Man and Nature, trying to assess whether 
Man's actions were harmful to the environment. On the other hand, theorists, historians, 
geographers and others tried to determine whether or not environmental problems were a cultural, 
rather than a political-economic, phenomenon.
I will address pre-Revolutionary thinking on the Environment in 2.3: Was there a Soviet Eco-Culture? - 
see below.
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follows:
I
s ;
-i
,The Biologists.
The biologists clashed over values. S, Schwarts, co-founder of Ekologiia (Ecology) - a journal 
covering environmental and conservation issues - had already in the 1950s criticised the 
'conservationists' (see above) and in the early 1970s became a spokesman for drawing a clear line 
between conservation on the one hand, and ecology, on the other. Ecology, in his view, had a role 
to play in addressing current environmental problems, but only on 'scientific grounds', not 
influenced by idealist thinking and values. Schwarts very much opposed the values of the 
'conservationists', arguing in 1974 that 'their assertions are illegitimate...discussions about the 
'exhaustion of Nature'...'sow doubt about the powers of Man...There is a wise aphorism: 'a
resource deficit is simply...a deficit of k n o w l e d g e ' F o r  Schwarts, the aim was to find some way 
to 'direct natural processes', and on this ground he propagated a general theory o f ecological 
engineering, rather than seeking to re-create some kind of harmony in Nature. Man was in the 
process of transforming the world, and this process needed to be conducted with the needs of Man 
in mind. Establishing these needs and setting the tasks of science were therefore political, rather 
than scientific, issues, he argued'
This view was strongly contested by a conservation activist, writer and member of VOOP,
Boris Riabinin, who disagreed with Schwarts's view that pre-human 'pristine' wild Nature no 
longer existed. A second point of contention was that the value of ecosystems had to be calculated 
in the context o f its use-value to human society rather than by 'some abstract principle o f diversity 
and harmony''®^. Schwarts had many supporters - the Head of the Ministry of Agriculture's 
Glavpriroda, A. Borodin, and O. Gusev, for instance, accused the conservationists of 'losing their 
objectivity' and 'idealising Nature'. Their theory of 'natural equilibrium' was described as the
'philosophical equivalent of a Divine Plan'. Discussing the role of the predators, Gusev argued as
77
The crux is this, that with the elimmation of predators their place will be 
taken by other factors of selection, including human beings, whom the 
entire course of evolution on Earth prepared for a decisive role in the 
evolution of the Biosphere'^ \
Schwarts spoke at length of the 'fated role for humans as the new chiefs o f evolution', arguing 
that all species would come under the management and stewardship of humans and that 'this is
—
7:'Weiner (1990), p. 14. ;% im ,p .i5 .
Ibul, p. 16.
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worldview Nature is not only something outside of us, but it forms
:V:; '/
nothing to fear (as) Nature in the future would be better suited to human aspirations and needs'. 
Riabinin, on the other hand, claimed that 'industrialisation and urbanisation were leading to the 
'impoverishment o f Nature'. His understanding of'impoverishment' differed greatly from that of 
Schwarts, who responded that one could not talk about impoverishment in an aesthetic, ethical or 
emotional sense, but only in the 'quantifiable, professional sense', i.e. reduced biological 
productivity. Riabinin's response came in the form of a warning that 'blind faith in science is one 
of the modern varieties of ignorance'. He dismissed Schwarts’s argument on the grounds that 
'there must not and cannot be easy and quick solutions'. Schwarts, on the other hand, retorted that 
the 'alarmists' slogan 'Back to Nature' was not only 'reactionary', but also 'anti-scientific' as 'Man 
cannot return to the caves'
From the mid-1970s the idea of bioscenosis came under heavy criticism - also among those 
who had until then supported the idea - and alternatives such as 'Biosphere studies' and 'island bio­
geography' attracted more and more research. V. Vernadskii’s idea about the Biosphere as a single 
system rose to prominence in the 1960s when ecological problems reached the global l e v e l A  
supporter o f the concept of the Biosphere, Nikolai Reimers, argued that 'one can benefit through 
reshaping Nature in some region o f the Biosphere only by losing out in another area'. With regard 
to ecological engineering, Reimers was critical, seeing this as the source of many of the USSR's 
current ecological p r o b l e m s R e i m e r s  could therefore describe the transformation of the 
Biosphere into the technosphere as a 'folly'*
The island bio-geographers, of whom lablokov was a propagator, rejected the idea o f closed 
off eco-systems, studying instead 'those conditions which affected the viability of populations of 
individual species living in a particular area, considered an i s l a n d ' R e c r e a t i o n a l  geography also 
took off as people living in the cities started visiting the zapovedniki for recreational purposes and 
encouraging the creation of 'national parks' to be accessible not only to scientists but also to the 
broader public. Calls for diversity and acceptance that Nature also had aesthetic value were made 
by Reimers and also Feliks Shtilmark in the latter half o f the 1970s. The Russian botanist and U
I
Î
conservation leader Valerian Taliev made similar calls: 7I
The Virgin forest, the unplowed virgin steppe attracts the contemporary 
mature individual not only with the prospect of clean air, wide open 
spaces and freedom from the confines of everyday life. They are also
sources of experiences of a higher order. They speak to us!...For our '7
'®"lM4,p. 19. T
For a more thorough outline of Vernadskii’s ideas, cf. Chapter Seven.
Weiner (1990), p. 23.
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together with us an integral whole; we ourselves are only a small unit 
within the one great organism of Nature. To learn how to peneti'ate to 
this unity, to feel around oneself the beating of the unbroken pulse of 
life, means to create a positive foundation for spiritual development, to 
incorporate into the developing soul a powerful counterweight to the 
narrow practical T, and to develop the ability to appreciate the world in 
an artistic and aesthetic way** .^
The Philosophers
As pointed out by DeBardeleben, 'official Soviet doctrine does not claim to have resolved all 
scientific and theoretical problems, but rather to provide a methodology (dialectical materialism) 
and a perspective (the interests of the working population) for their analysis...Reading Marx, 
Engels and Lenin provides no ready-made solutions to the approaching environmental crisis. 
Many Soviet scholars are strikingly aware of this theoretical lacuna in the ecological area and have 
set themselves the task of addressing the ethical, scientific, and practical problems that have 
arisen'
Whereas Western thinkers blame the ecological crisis on Western culture and religion, 
officially Soviet authorities have argued that environmental problems are a phenomenon of 
capitalist societies. To the extent such problems existed in the USSR, this was blamed as a left­
over from capitalism, which would eventually be eradicated. Some Soviet philosophers did, 
however, - albeit cautiously - contest this view in journals such as Voprosy filosofii, Priroda and 
the weekly Literaturnaia gazeta. Lynn White sees ‘Western culture, which regards Nature as an 
instrument to serve human ends, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition from which it emanates that 
holds that Nature is in opposition to humanity, thus sanctioning human mastery o f it' - as the root 
of the problem; 'marxism, at least as practised in the Soviet Union, is firmly entrenched in this 
anthropocentric Western cultural tradition'. A similar view is propagated by John Passmore, 
arguing that 'whatever the claims o f Marx and Engels, the Soviet Union certainly has shared, in 
this respect, the ideology o f capitalism...in its ignorant and greedy concern with short-term 
benefits at the expense of Nature'*^^.
As culture in Marxist-Leninist thinking is considered an epiphenomenon, 'reflecting 
underlying material forces', most Soviet theorists rejected the cultural hypothesis on the grounds 
that the explanation for environmental problems had to be sought at a deeper (i.e. the economic) 
level and also on the grounds that religion was subordinate to the material forces o f history*
*^  ^Ibid., p. 30.
Joan DeBardeleben, ‘Optimists and Pessimists: The Ecology Debate in the USSR’, in Canadian Slavonic 
Papers, vol. XXVI, nos 2-3, June/Sept. 1984, p. 127. 
p. 129.
*^°Ibid.,p. 131.
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Some scholars, such as the biologist/geneticist lurii Rychkov, the historian A. Arutiunov and G. 
Tsaregorodtsev, however, expressed themselves more favourably regarding the cultural 
hypothesis, thus implying that 'a common source for ecological problems in the capitalist and
Rychkov, while contending that in the Western European/Euro-American culture Man is 
perceived as the 'crown of creation' and 'development...has always proceeded on the principle of 
denying equilibrium with the environment', argued that the impact o f these two elements ('the 
surging of the economy, science and culture’ and the 'situation we are discussing as catastrophe' - 
i.e. the environmental crisis) is not a phenomenon of capitalism per se, but rather of the culture 
prevailing in these countries. His warning to the effect that the USSR may also be confronted with 
an environmental crisis of the same scale is by DeBardeleben interpreted as an acknowledgement 
that the Soviet/East European culture is similar to that of the West:
USSR and also that the socialist experience indicated that 'a more harmonious society-Nature
socialist worlds (exists) and (that there is) a common need for a fundamental transformation of 
values'*^*.
I
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However, developed counti'ies with a socialist societal organization may 
find themselves facing a similar ecological crisis if the scientific basis 
and philosophical interpretation of the relationship between Nature and 7
society lag behind the rate of cultural-economic development'^^.
■
Although Rychkov retorted to official rhetoric arguing that the time margin was greater in the
relationship' might be created, between the lines he implied 'the lack of a comprehensive approach ’ 7
in socialist countries (“trial and error”); a similarity in cultural type between socialist and 
capitalist countries; and the predominant role played by culture. In addition he clearly 
(suggested) the need for a new philosophical interpretation of the Nature-society relationship''^^.
Similar views were expressed by S. Arutiunov, suggesting that 'ritual-prestige' consumption 
was responsible for large, potentially unlimited, expenditures of energy and material, 'the rapid
growth of which has become one of the direct causes of crisis phenomena in the environment'.
Because prestige was a necessary component of a fulfilling human life, society had to find ways ,«7
of fulfilling this need that were labour-intensive and did not involve the 'wasting' of Nature which 
was so characteristic of virtually all past and present societies. Arutiunov therefore advocated 
ethnic studies ‘to discover which cultural patterns are ecologically sound. The future requires ■' ;;;;7
::U
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Ibid.
Ib K , p. 132. IS3
Having analysed the writings of several Soviet scientists, philosophers and writers addressing 
the issue of the environment in the 1970s, DeBardeleben reaches the following conclusion:
extensive and irreversible'^^.
i
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human self-knowledge, rather than continued concentration on rebuilding and adapting Nature to 
human ends'
G. Tsaregorodtsev went even further, advocating that the 'mastery of Nature' mentality should 
be replaced by that of a 'return to Nature', 'because of the deleterious effects of pollution on human 
health’. Such challenges to the ‘mastery of Nature' mentality were understandably politically 
weak in the USSR, but by some they were viewed as dangerously widespread. For example, the 
scientists M. Rutkevich and S. Shvarts complained that these 'pessimists' appeal to emotion, they 
set their attention 'only on the undesirable changes in living Nature, and they have already drawn 
broad conclusions from them'. Thus, argues DeBardeleben, ‘while such attacks may be directed 
against a wide range of environmental advocates, they reflect alarm over the extensive support for
195a more cautious attitude towards Nature transformation'
The clear consensus among most scientists is that the self-regulating 
process of Nature must be protected and optimized, assuring a condition 
of dynamic equilibrium. In other words, temporary or minimal 
disequilibria are necessary for change, but not to the point where Nature's 
cyclical processes of self-regulation are irreparably damaged. Human 
beings should not consider themselves above Nature, but part o f it, 
regulating it to increase its productivity, its capacity for self-regeneration, 
and its internally balanced biological cycles. In fact, however, ever more 
Soviet scholars fear that damage done to the environment is already
As seen above, Shvarts held the view that Man should use Nature for his own ends. Shvaids,
.together with Kalesnik and Davitaia, were “ecological optimists”: 'Shvarts gives particular
importance to a high level of productivity in Nature and asserts that human influence on the 
environment can already be positively assessed, since an increased level of energy exchange in the 
ecosystem may accelerate the evolutionary process. Likewise, Kalesnik and Davitaia argue that 
pollution of the environment (specifically, Lake Baikal) is necessaiy up to a point, for it 'helps
insure the flowering of life and, through it, helps purify the environment itself
The 'ecologically cautions' scholars, such as Novik, Rychkov, Kamshilov and Zharikov, 
however, contested these views. 'Zharikov specifically warned that 'in these conditions it is better 
to be overcautious in determining objects o f Nature protection and to include as great an amount
____________________________
■'"ibisL 
i m ,  p. 133.
*""lhMx,pp. 137-38.
'''’ Ibid, p. 139.
,
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ever broader Biosphere orientation, and his thinking is drawn to 
“biocentrism"...Biospherocentrism assumes an orientation of human activity and thinking in 
directions that consider his interests both as subject and as object, as Man and Nature'^^'. Man and
Ibid., pp. 139-40. 
Weiner (1990), p. 25. 
’" 'Ib id ,  p. 26.
Ibid.. pp. 26-27.
Ib id , p. 27.
as possible'. Likewise, Novik advocated the exploitation of energy sources such as solar power,
.wind, and ocean waves that did not disturb the ecosystem, and he warned against activities with 
unknown long-term consequences; for example he questioned the advantages of electric cars, 
pointing out that their impact on the electric field of the city had not yet been assessed. Like 
Rychkov and Tsaregorodtsev, Novik also questioned the genetic adaptability of human beings. 
Echoing their sentiments, Medunin proceeds to an unusually critical analysis of the potential
dangers of nuclear power'
In the 1980s, the aesthetic value of Nature also became a theme for Soviet philosophers, led 
by Ivan Frolov, the editor of the CPSU's ideological journal Kommunist, and Viktor Los of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy The two contended that as society got 
more and more urbanised, the 'aesthetic attraction o f Nature increases in importance'. Following
from this 'it would be a mistake to conceive of the Biosphere merely as a source of resources or a
200“disposer” of wastes' . It was therefore necessary to 'reintegrate both aesthetics and values into 
our way of relating to the world and ...into our science!'. Nature was not inexhaustible and the 
assumption that Man had a right, or even a chance to, dominate Nature was questioned by the two 
philosophers.
As argued by them, 'under the influence of the crisis Nature o f the developing socio- 
ecological situation Man is gradually moving away from the illusion o f anthropocentrism and 
rejecting the traditional hegemonistic relationship to Nature. His thinking has ceased to limit itself 
to notions centring around needs and designs of him and him alone. His activity is acquiring an
■
Nature, argued Frolov and Los, 'are both parts of a single, dialectically interactive whole. We act
on “Nature” both as subject and object; when we alter our environment, we often create 
dislocation and dangers for ourselves'^^^.
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Bush (1974), p. 25.
Ziegler (1987), p. 37.
cf. TpoenojiLCKHH (1965), ZumBrunnen (1974).
1.2.5 The People
ï have now identified and discussed the role of some environmentalists so far as it can be 
discerned from the debates on environmental issues in the USSR. The question now is: how 
much support did they enjoy among the population at large? It is of course next to impossible to 
measure support in quantitative terms, as no published accessible survey materials exist in this 
area prior to 1985. Bush (1974), addressing public attitudes towards the environment, argues that 
‘most Russians (and other national groups in the USSR) are at best apathetic (holding the view
I
that) the Earth is big enough to take care of everyone...From time immortal, the inhabitants of
Russia have been accustomed to thinking that the expanse of their homeland is infinite and that its
riches are inexhaustible’. Bush also justified his view by referring to contemporary Soviet society,
glorifying ‘heroic engineers, prospectors and tractor drivers’ and portraying the environment as an
obstacle to industrialisation that had to be conquered^^^. Ziegler (1987) was somewhat more 
.cautious: ‘we can little but speculate about the general attitude of the Soviet public towards
environmental matters, for survey data on environmental perceptions are not systematically 
collected, or at least not disseminated. Nor do environmental (independent) groups exist, through 
which average citizens could voice their concerns and d e m a n d s T h e  reason for this was that 
active participation in pro-environmental actions was unlikely to be sanctioned. Therefore, the 
chances that people would organise demonstrations were also slight.
We do, however, know that people who were directly affected by decisions made at a high 
Party/State level did protest^'^^. Often this was done through the writing and signing of 
petitions/collective letters, which were then sent to newspapers, party organisations, ministries and 
the like. Letters were also written to writers when issues had been raised by them (e.g. Leonov’s 
Russkii les) and could as such be used in support of the writers’ views (cf. the meeting of Writers’ 
Union in 1954 - Leonov cited letters from the public in support of his view when defending himself
against pro-development scientists). In the cases of Tikhaia Sosna (Troepolskii) and (the nature
reseiwe Zhiguly (Zotov) we also know that the campaigns to save Tikhaia Sosna and Zhiguly were
initiated by locals and received substantial support from the public.
The campaign to save the Tikhaia Sosna was moreover carried out by a person whose special
interest was local history, and who had on his own even created a local museum devoted to the
history of his village. Given also that the people in the village had taken action to prevent the river 
.from diying out in the 1930s and that they were not successful in doing so, it seems as though the 
issue of values (the interrelationship between River and Man) and the historic importance of the
I
I-I
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river had been central in facilitating the protest, although it can of course not be excluded that the 
kolkhoz leadership was involved in the protest as well, as draining the river would be detrimental 
to its interests.
It is also possible that people had to a certain extent able to exert some influence through 
voting. Leonov, for instance, was elected a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet after the 
publication o f Russkii les, and Zalygin, together with other writers, used their positions as deputies 
of the Russian Supreme Soviet to launch the campaign against the river-diversion project. We do 
not, however, have enough evidence to generalise from these two incidents. We still do not know 
tc what extent discussions between candidates for parliamentary elections and, later, deputies of 
the Parliament and their voters addressed environmental issues and, if they did, to what extent 
deputies were able to speak up successfully in favour of the environment.
The great popularity of writers like Sholokhov, Leonov, Rasputin and Astafev does however 
indicate that people were imbued with a love for Nature in part through reading their works, as 
well as through the works of the great Russian writers before them. It is my view that a few 
writers thus helped pave the ground for the modern Green movement that came into existence as a 
result of glasnost and perestroika^^*^.
1.2.6 ‘Environmental Interest Group’
Some sovietologists^*^’ (e.g. Ziegler) have takei 
to support the view that the Soviet Union was essentially a corporatist state. This view was
ietologists’*^ n the existence of ‘interest groups’ in Soviet politics
Ziegler (1987) does not rule out that the writers might have influenced people’s thinking on 
environmental issues: ‘writers may exert considerable influence over public opinion by publishing plays, 
novels, short stories, or poems that contain environmental messages’ (p. 69).
Two other writers on the Soviet environment, DeBardeleben and lanitskii talk about pro-environmental 
constellations: DeBardeleben makes use of a continuum with pro-environment at the one end and pro­
development at the other. At the former end she places the following actors: agencies with more ‘pure’ 
environmental regulatory functions, scientists and experts, the cultural intelligentsia (journalists and 
writers) and dissident environmental groups. At the other end we find industrial enterprises and their 
responsible ministries, the party and government, whereas other actors, such as agencies with Nature 
use and protection functions, local party and state officials, the public at large and official conservation 
groups, are somewhere in between. She also distinguishes between more powerful and less powerful 
levels, the pro-development actors being more powerful than the pro-environment actors. This 
approach in my view resembles reality in the former USSR much more closely than the notion of state 
corporatism applied by Ziegler, although DeBardeleben’s model is somewhat misleading in that it 
classifies scientists, experts and the cultural intelligentsia as ‘pro-environment’, although members of 
these groups could be found accross the line. Similarly, agencies with more ‘pure’ environmental 
regulatory functions were not necessarily pro-environment. This was clearly demonstrated by 
Volodymyr Boreiko, a member of Zelenyi Svit and a former employee of the Ukrainian 
Derzhkompriroda, which was set up in the 1960s (for details, see Chapters Two and Three). lanitskii, 
on the other hand, has developed what he calls ‘a system of guideposts o f the activity of social 
subjects’, consisting of four quadrants grouped along two axes, the first representing a continuum with 
an orientation towards people (Nature conservation) at the one end and orientation towards production
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outlined in some detail by Charles Ziegler in his well-known work ‘Soviet Environmental 
Policies’’*^ .^ His argument was rooted in the debate - albeit limited - that did take place on Soviet 
environmental policies, or rather the lack of such policies, particularly from the late 1960s 
onwards. Ziegler concluded that ‘the interest representation process in Soviet environmental 
policy (was) accurately depicted by the state corporatist model’, his main argument being that
Orientation toward people (nature conservation)
Orientation toward 
conserving existing 
situation
i II
III IV
Orientation toward 
social change
Orientation toward production ior its own sake
.7
Attention to the issue of environmental protection did not develop as a 
result of interest group initiatives. It emerged out o f the overall 
economic and political context of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Official campaigns promoting conservation to maximize economic 
p'owth and efficiency legitimized discussion of broader ‘environmental’ 
issues by specialists concerned about environmental degradation. The 
range of proposals advanced was nominally related to the narrow 
conservationist goals o f the leadership, but in many cases bold
______________________________________________________________________________ -----
for its own sake at the other. The second continuum has got orientation towards conserving the existing 
situation at the one end and orientation towards social change at the other:
Quadrant 3 represents the administrative-command system and quadrant 1 the ecologists/environmentalists. 
For the former, Nature is ‘only a means for securing the existence of the system, whereas for the latter it 
is an object to be protected and reproduced’. Further, for the administrative-command system human 
relations are ‘organisational’ in that they are rooted in hierarchical subordination and role interaction. 
The ecologists, on the other hand, adhere to values such as altruism and concern for ‘outsiders’, such as 
neighbours and future generations. A series o f other qualities distinguishing the two are also identified 
in lanitskii’s work. Quadrant II is made up o f the ‘workers’, whereas the forth quadrant consists o f 
‘inhabitants’. People can simultaneously belong to both quadrants in their different roles. As a rule, 
however, the former tend to be rationalists and technocrats, whereas the latter take measures to protect 
and reproduce the environment which the former use as a means of production. Thus, their values are 
different. People belonging to the former group are primarily employed in industries or are rural 
immigrants, whereas the latter tend to be children, young people and mothers, invalids and pensioners, 
as well as people occupied in the service sector, education and culture. lanitskii’s model is also usefiil 
as a starting point, although, as will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven, reality is somewhat more 
complex. Suffice it to say that workers’ collectives actively and successfully took part in gathering 
signatures and writing letters against the expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex and also 
in other environmental campaigns in Ukraine during the late 1980s. It is also difficult for a number of 
reasons,to place scientific institutions opposed to nuclear power into lanitskii’s classification scheme.
Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental Policy in the USSR (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987).
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individuals moved beyond these functional parameters to suggest 
innovative approaches to environmental questions^'''’.
As seen above, though, specialists concerned with the state of the environment in the USSR 
voiced their alternative views as early as the 1920s - and precisely because industrialisation and 
official thinking on the environment from the late 1920s clashed with their values and ideas, not 
because such views were encouraged by the party. Moreover, ‘environmentalists’ were able to 
exploit Stalin’s focus on the Motherland during and immediately after the Second World War to 
speak up for the environment (see below). As will be seen in Chapter Two, although the Soviet 
authorities introduced far-reaching legislation on the environment, this did not in itself express a 
committment to environmental values but seemed to be more an extension of the idea that socialist 
society was superior to capitalist society in all spheres - including the environment. Klirushchev’s 
policies of ploughing the virgin lands o f Kazakhstan and his giant maize planting scheme did 
enormous damage to the environment, and harmful industrialisation continued. Brezhnev, on the 
other hand, following the outcry over Lake Baikal, took steps to curb environmental debates in the 
press (cf. Zotov - above), and attempts by enterprise managers to reduce pollution at their 
enterprises by installing pollution-cleansing facilities were in some cases branded ‘anti-socialist’ 
(cf. Chapter Two). Thus, it seems somewhat misleading to attribute the debate on the environment 
to the Communist Party.
As regards the notion of state corporations, it presupposes segments consisting o f not only 
policy actors but also o f ‘ordinary people’ organised at a lower level and linked with each other. 
In the case of those concerned with the environment, one would thus have to establish some kind 
of a pro-environmental segment including pro-environmentalist units within the bureaucratic 
apparatus, pro-environmentalists within the Communist Party, writers, scientists, economists - also 
including the officially sanctioned Societies for Nature Protection and university druzhiny that 
started emerging in the 1960s and whose major concern was to identify and punish poachers.
Although in many respects the concerns of these groups were identical, there is no evidence 
that they co-ordinated their activities. Furthermore, it seems that the motivations for taking part in 
the environmental ‘debate’ were qualitatively different. Whereas a few writers, scientists and 
enthusiasts took part in the discussions primarily due to their convictions on the interaction 
between Man and Nature based on age-old values and ethical norms, what may be referred to as 
‘agricultural interests’ opposed the ‘energy section’ probably not so much out of a concern for the 
environment as such, but more because the flooding of agricultural land in connection with the 
construction of hydro-electric power stations reduced the level of arable land and thus made it
Ibi&,pp. 73-74.
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more difficult to keep up with steadily increasing plan-targets. Some economists - although, it 
should be stressed, a few of them were genuinely committed to the environment - were probably 
motivated primarily by the potential costs of projects that would incidentally also be damaging to 
the environment rather than environmental damage in itself^ **^ . And as seen above, some 
philosophers writing on the environment were concerned with finding a theoretical solution to the 
existence of environmental problems in socialist society, as this clashed with the views held by 
Marx and to some extent also Engels - and not with pollution being a bad thing in itself.
Further, a corporatist segment presupposes the existence of special bodies or agencies whose 
major task it is to represent a certain interest. Although a number of Soviet ministries and 
departments did have offices for environmental protection, no separate all-union Ministiy or 
Department of Environmental Protection existed prior to the coming to power of Gorbachev. 
Paradoxically, as will be seen in Chapter Two, the polluters themselves were also in charge of 
protecting the environment. There is no reason to believe that the view prevalent in the 1930s - 
first we industrialise, then we can think about the environment - was less prevalent in the power 
structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The veiy existence of taut plans can in itself be taken as proof o f 
disregard for the environment, as rapid economic growth outweighed concern for the environment. 
Installing expensive pollution reducing devices at enterprises would be extremely costly, as 
funding would have to be earmarked for research into that area. Buying equipment from Western 
countries, on the other hand, was ruled out until the early 1980s as the official view that there were 
no environmental problems in the Soviet Union was prevalent in official Soviet writings (cf. 
Chapter Two).
It therefore seems more likely that, although there were ‘groupings’ involved in protecting the 
environment, they were by no means united, and the motivations they had for lobbying for the 
protection of the environment differed widely. Nonetheless, writers, some scientists, the 
university druzhiny and various other societies consistently favoured an alternative approach to the 
environment and were, through the experience they gained through their environmental activities, 
well-equipped and well-trained to set up Green political movements once this became politically 
feasible. As many of them had prior to their environmental activities already established 
themselves as well-known and respected public figures in their own right, people trusted them as 
leaders of the emerging Green groups and listened to their appeals on behalf of the environment. 
Thus, embryos o f a Green movement, created before Gorbachev’s ascendance to power, developed 
over a relatively short period of time into nation-wide Green movements succeeding in 
overturning environmentally harmful decisions made by the Soviet authorities.
See for instance Goldman (1972), Chap. 2: ‘The Economic and Political Propensity to Pollute - Reality’, 
pp. 43-76.
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As seen above, environmentalists stood their ground during the Soviet period, even though 
their activities were fraught with numerous set-backs and limitations. Were public activities in the 
area of the environment thus more ‘radical’ than in other areas of Soviet life? Weiner, referring to 
the zapovedniki movement, claimed at a lecture at the Kennan Institute on 22 February 1996 that 
‘while by no means anti-Soviet or a centre of opposition, the community of Soviet-era ecologists 
acted repeatedly to influence Soviet policy on issues of Nature protection’. This view was 
disputed by Valery Soyfer, professor at the George Mason University, who argued that ‘the actions 
of these individuals cannot be interpreted as an expression of independence - other explanations 
for their behaviour must exist’.
The explanation put foiward by Soyfer was that ‘rumours of the declining popularity of 
Lysenko and his “scientific” justifications for despoiling the environment were widespread in 
party circles by early 1947. These rumors were proven in March 1948 when lurii Zhdanov, 
Chairman of the Scientific Division of the Central Committee, delivered a lecture criticizing 
Lysenko to propagandists from all over the Soviet Union...rather than reflecting true independence 
(the ecologists’ criticisms) merely echoed views supported by the party’, Soyfer was also highly 
sceptical of the Nature druzhiny, arguing that ‘one of their main activities was to camp in the 
woods at Christmas time and make sure nobody cut down Christmas trees’ *^ \
Whereas it is true that criticism of Lysenko voiced by the Greens coincided with a centrally 
orchestrated campaign against Lysenko, it is also equally true that some Soviet biologists opposed 
Lysenko’s ideas from the very beginning and undertook a well-organised campaign to protect the 
zapovedniki while Lysenko was still in Stalin’s good books. Further, the example of how 
Bochkarev lost his position within VOOP and the fact that the druzhinniki were not only highly 
successful in catching poachers but that there were also casualties indicates that the 
environmentalists were not merely paying lip-service to official policies, but had defended values 
and ideas of their own. Whether or not the activities of the environmentalists can be labelled ‘acts 
o f independence’ is a different matter and, in my view, not the major issue. O f more importance is 
the impact expressions of opposition towards official environmental policies prior to Gorbachev 
had on informal Green movements that started to emerge as a result of glasnost and 
démocratisation.
The environment provides an interesting approach to the study o f interest articulation in a 
Soviet political context for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, as argued above, the 
environment is a potentially explosive issue. As seen in the aftermath o f the Chernobyl accident, 
it can indirectly serve as an instrument by which to question the legitimacy o f a regime, while on
Joseph Dresen, Soviet-Bra Ecologists: Beginnings of a Civil Society? Meeting. Kennan Institute fo r  
Advanced Russian Studies, vol. XIII, no. 13, 1996.
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the other hand it can serve a legitimising purpose. Writers like Leonov and Sholokhov, for 
instance, continually linked the concept of Nature (Priroda) with the Motherland (Rodina) and the 
Nation (Narod). Calling for the protection of Nature thus became an act of patriotism. Stalin 
allowed and encouraged Russian/Soviet patriotism prior to, during and immediately after the 
Second World War, to unite people against an outside threat and to discourage them from turning 
to the enemy for help in toppling the Soviet regime.
Furthermore, and maybe all the more paradoxically, letting people voice their concerns on the 
environment could serve a useful purpose for the Party. In the case of the building of hydro­
electric dams, for instance, this was no doubt a priority issue for the Soviet regime. By letting 
people who would be affected by flooding or drainage speak their mind, the impression could 
easily be created that the bureaucrats were the bad ones and that the Party, which gave people the 
opportunity to speak their mind, was not necessarily to blame. In other words, anger could be 
channelled in a different and not so potentially dangerous direction. Although there were limits to 
the environmental debate, such a debate - as long as it did not challenge the authority o f the Party - 
was allowed to take place relatively freely.
Prominent dissidents did argue the case of the environment in samizdat publications - 
environmental problems, for instance, were mentioned as one of the issues that ought to be given 
priority in an appeal made by Sakharov, Turchin and Zh. Medvedev^*^ to the Communist Party in 
1970 and Khronika tekushchikh sobytii published a detailed study of environmental pollution in the 
USSR in the 1970s. Still, it was not amongst the most important issues of the dissident movement. 
An explanation for this is to be found in the thrust of the debate on the environment itself. 
Dissidents speaking up on behalf o f the environment were not very likely to be heard. Besides, it 
was an issue less politically ‘dangerous’ than, for instance, human rights - the major focus o f the 
dissidents. The issue of the environment, unlike many other issues, however, had the ‘advantage’ 
that it affected a relatively large number o f people directly (cf. flooding and drainage). The 
mixture of values and direct interests (cf. Rasputin: Proshchanie s Materoi) therefore made it 
easier to mobilise people.
Troepolskii in his article about Tikhaia Sosna mentioned a petition signed by more than 100 
people in the nearby villages. Petitions were often used to protest about decisions which had a 
negative effect on the environment^'^. Stephen White has argued that Soviet people were less
Bush (1974), p. 28: Bush notes that ‘growing attention is being devoted to environmental disruption...in 
samizdat writings’. As examples he refers to Sakharov’s Progress. Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom. 
Sakharov, Turchin and Medvedev, Appeal to the Soviet Leadership. Maksimov, Seven Days of Creation and 
Khronika tekushchikh sobitii, in 1974 available at Radio Liberty in Munich (see Bush for reference 
numbers).
TpoenoHLCKMH (1965).
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Stephen Fish^'^ gives an explanation for this in a review of socialist and Soviet thinking on
I
likely to suffer sanctions by signing a joint petition than they were by writing a letter of 
controversial content only on behalf o f themselves’ '"'. What was more, the involvement of famous 
writers, speaking up on other people's behalf (Troepolskii - Tikhaia Sosna, Sholokhov - the river 
Don, Rasputin - Lake Baikal, Zalygin - the river-diversion project), probably to some extent 
seiwed to encourage involvement. Surely, if famous writers could talk about the environment, then 
ordinary people could do the same?
Below, I will look at the values which those actively propagating environmental issues 
adhered to and which, in my view, were also adopted as the framework of the current Green 
movements in the Slav regions of the former USSR today,
s
1.3 Soviet Eco-Culture as a Complementary Factor by which to Explain the 
Emergence of the Greens
Above I have tried to explain the emergence of the Green Movement and later also o f the Green 
Parties in the former USSR by linking them to a number of events taking place in the country after 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985. However, are the factors mentioned above sufficient in 
themselves to explain the emergence o f the Greens, or should we seek more deep-rooted
explanations?
The Soviet sociologist lanitskii has argued that Soviet sociology had no tools (i.e., no 
theoretical framework, no concepts) with which to explain the emergence of informal movements 
such as the Greens:
Unfortunately our sociology has proven to be practically without its own 
tools in the face of the burgeoning field of civic initiatives and protest 
actions: there exists no developed conception of collective action under 
socialism, particularly a theory of new mass movements^
the question of associations. Karl Marx, he argues, opposed the very notion of associations
because the ‘universality of the proletariat’ was to be found in its ‘capacity to transcend the realm
of particularistic “interest” and to unite state and society’. Therefore Marx did not simply neglect 
■
Stephen White, ‘Political Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party. State and Press'. Political 
Studies, vol. XXXI, pp. 43-60.
O.N. lanitskii. ‘The Environmental Movement'. Soviet Sociology, November/December 1990, pp. 39-40. 
Steven Fish, ‘The Emergence of Independent Associations and the Transformation of Russian Political 
Society‘, The Journal o f Communist Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, September 1991, pp. 299-334.
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issues such as individuality, free association and self-organisation, but produced a negative 
critique of ‘civil society’. Marx’s views were challenged by Eduard Bernstein, who argued that 
the ‘diversity of interests in a complex society was inevitable and even desirable’. Associations 
such as independent trade unions, political parties, productive associations and co-operative retail 
shops were ‘essential and permanent building blocks of socialist society’. Bernstein warned that 
attempts at destroying civil society ‘engendered a dangerous authoritarian impulse’. However, he 
received little support among other socialists for these views.
The Russian socialists endorsed Marx’s ideas, and Lenin argued that since the division 
between state and society was simply meaningless in post-revolutionary society, there was no need 
for associations. By Fish he is described as having been ‘generally contemptuous of particularistic 
aspirations o f social groups’. Even Bukharin, who held divergent views on economic issues, was 
against the idea of (independent) associations, although he did not object to the creation of 
organisations per se:
Bukharin favoured ‘an unprecedented flourishing of possible 
organizations of the working class and the labouring masses’ involving 
‘all kinds of workers’ and peasants’ organizations, press correspondents, 
and voluntary societies and associations’. Yet he held the view that these 
formations, ‘together with Soviet power, in fact, form a single system 
which embraces, enlightens and reforms the broad strata of toilers’^ ’^.
Although Lenin opposed the formation of associations and took steps during to secure the 
party’s control over political life in addition to expanding and deepening Soviet power in rural 
areas, he was not against the development of peasant co-operatives ‘as an evolutionary alternative 
to sudden imposition of revolutionary power in the countryside’. He also ‘countenanced exchange 
and market societies only indirectly subject to state control’. Thus, the Soviet socialists in the 
1920s seemed to follow a middle path between Marx’s rejection of associations and Bernstein’s 
wholehearted support of them. The organisations that emerged at this time were looked upon as 
‘intermediary in the sense that they were largely self-constituted, if not fully self-governing, 
allowed for some organised social initiative “from below” and lay outside the formal structure of 
the state’. These organisations served the purpose of acting as a ‘link’ between state and society 
as well as a means by which the peasant masses could overcome their isolation.
Lenin’s rather pragmatic approach quickly came to an end with Stalin’s ascent to power 
following Lenin’s death. Fish has summarised Stalin’s approach to associations as follows: 
‘destruction of non-state social activity of every type (was to Stalin) crucial - indeed the crucial -
' '" lb i4 ,  p. 300.
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..................................................................Associations (see above) and the 1936 Constitution the principles of intermediation and free
revolutionary imperative of the Soviet state’. With the introduction of the 1932 Law on
Ib K , p. 302.
Hosking, Aves, Duncan (1992), pp. 2-3.
In Ukraine, Levko Lukianenko, one of the founders of the Helsinki movement, became the leader o f the 
Ukrainian Republican Party. RUKH’s leader, Viacheslav Chomovil, is also a former dissident, as are 
Stepan Khmara (Conservative Republican Paity) and others. The father of Volodymyr Tykhyi, a 
prominent member of Zelenyi Svit in its early days, died in Siberia where he was sent for his dissident 
activities.
lanitskii. (1990), p. 30.
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Ïassociation vanished, in Fish’s view, and from 1953 to 1985 a ‘purely statist theory and practice on questions o f associations persisted’. The 1977 Constitution made it clear that all organised 
activity must conform with the goals of the state. Thus, during Brezhnev’s rule permissible
organised activities equalled activities taking place within the confines of state institutions^’ .^
A somewhat different interpretation is offered by Geoffrey A. Hosking^’ ,^ who holds the view 
that Stalin’s 1936 Constitution actually lay the foundation for ‘civil society’ by guaranteeing - 
albe't only at a formal level - numerous civil freedoms. These freedoms were referred to by 
dissidents against whom the Soviet authorities pressed charges o f unauthorised behaviour. 
Together with the Soviet Union’s ratification o f the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 and the human rights section o f the agreement on European Security and Co-operation in 
1975, the Stalin Constitution provided dissidents with an incentive to set up human rights groups 
and also conduct other independent activities. Although they were cut off from society at large 
and were severely punished for their activities, many of these people (particularly in Ukraine) 
were later to become key figures in setting up political movements and parties under 
perestroika^^”. lanitskii, while in his early works suggesting that one turn to Western sociology for 
tools with which to analyse the birth of the Greens^^’, in later works makes use o f his own models, 
based on the Soviet ‘experience’.
While agreeing that Western sociological models such as mobilisation and resource theory 
might be of some use in approaching the subject, it is my view that the history, culture and 
political and economic structures o f the former Soviet Union were so different that this in itself 
justifies an alternative approach. I hold the opinion that one should seek the explanation for the 
emergence o f the Green Movements in particular and informal groups more generally in Soviet 
society itself - prior to the coming to power of Gorbachev, even prior to the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as a state. Such an approach can then be complemented by/contrasted with studies 
applying theories used to explain similar phenomena in a Western political context.
I have decided to approach my topic through the study o f what will be referred to as ‘Soviet 
ecological culture’. By ‘Soviet ecological culture’ I mean the set o f beliefs, attitudes and values
■ <
I
held by the Soviet population about ecology, as well as actions taken by the Soviet people to 
protect the ecological environment. This ecological culture is an integral part of the wider Soviet 
political culture, which can be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the 
political system is located^^^.
It is often claimed that the reason why the level of environmental destruction and pollution 
was so high in the Soviet Union, is that people lacked awareness of the importance of 
environmental protection^^^. If this was the case, however, then it is difficult to explain various
loosely organised campaigns to protect the Russian forests, to protect Lake Baikal, and later to 
have the river-reversal project cancelled - given that Marxist-Leninist ideology generally holds
central place in not only Russian but Slav culture^^"’. Both the Orthodox Church and Russian 
literature have stressed the close relationship between Man and Nature, viewing the former as an 
integral part of the latter. Nature thus has value not only as something for people to use in order to 
improve their lives. It has intrinsic value, i.e., is valuable in its own right.
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that problems of pollution occur only in capitalist societies. Traditionally, Nature has had a
Socialism, on the contrary, has stressed that Nature, like labour, is merely an input into the
I
process of production. In capitalist societies both Nature and labour are exploited by capitalists 
whose only aim is to enrich themselves. As there is no fundamental antagonism in communist or 
even socialist society, by definition there can also be no pollution. However, the rapid 
industrialisation that took place in the Soviet Union under the first 5-year plan and the stress on 
increased production which provided the thrust for consecutive 5-year plans completely 
disregarded the environment.
Stephen White in his book on Soviet Political Culture argues that
Insofar as the Soviet regime has been successful in shaping the belief 
system of the Soviet peoples, especially the Russians, and to a 
considerably lesser degree that of the non-Russian republics, this has 
been largely due to the high degree of compatibility between traditional 
Russian beliefs and practices and important Bolshevik goals^^ .^
: |
The definition I use is a modification of ‘political culture’ as used by Stephen White (1979), p. I: 
‘Political culture may be defined as the attitudional and behavioural matrix within which the political 
system is located’.
Such a view was expressed by several members of the Ukrainian Green Movement - cf. Chapter Three.
For more details on this issue, see M. 3a5ujiHii, P vcckmm iiapojt. Ero ofibmaM. ofimuiLi. iipeaaiiun, 
cveoepmi m noa^ua (MocKoa: CoBMecriioe cooexcKo-Kaua i^CKoe npeytfipHarHe ’’Kimra npHiiTUion”, 
1990), B. I. Hary.FiLKO (xep.), KvJibTvna i  noSvr Hace.rieiiiu! ytcDaïriu {Km ï b : JIubiÆ 1993), 
A m htpo  A htohobhm, yKpalHCbKa KVJiBTvpa (KmI b: JluSiii. 1993).
White (1979), p. 36.
.As will be shown below, however, as far as fundamental views and beliefs on M an’s relation 
to Nature are concerned, socialist views constituted a major break with traditional Russian values. 
Brown has argued that ‘values are more resistant to change than are attitudes and even some 
important political beliefs...values are not subject to falsification'^^*^. The countryside has 
traditionally been portrayed as the preserver of traditional moral values^^^. Only 15 per cent of the 
Russian population lived in towns in 1913, according to the census, and a large proportion of the 
urban population retained close links with the countryside and its rural economy^^®. The situation 
was not very different in Ukraine, although Ukrainian peasants, unlike their Russian counterparts.
tended to own their own land rather than belong to collectives such as the Russian By the
time the Communist Party came to power in 1917, it thus seems reasonable to argue that traditional 
values relating to Man’s relation to Nature were strong.
However, collectivisation and rapid industrialisation aimed at changing the socio-economic
structure of the Soviet Union - combined with socialisation to create the New Man (novyi 
chelovek), clashed with these traditionally held beliefs and values. As will be shown in Chapter 
Two, the Communist Party did adopt a number of laws and issue decrees on Nature conservation 
in the first years of its tenure. Similar laws and decrees were passed throughout the 60s and the 
70s - also regarding pollution. These laws and decrees were frequently referred to by the pro­
environmentalists, but were in most cases disregarded by the Soviet leadership and industrial 
managers.
Some people were no doubt influenced by the reckless attitude to the environment shown by 
the Communist Party. Also, as hardly any information existed on pollution and the link between 
pollution and health - and as there was high social mobility in the Soviet Union from the 
countryside into the towns o f people who had minimal knowledge o f such things as pollution, and 
in general were almost illiterate, awareness o f pollution and its effects was bound to be low. I still 
think that the old values regarding Nature and Environment survived, although to a large extent in
Archie Brown, ‘Ideology and Political Culture’, in Seweryn Bialer (ed.)., Politics. Society and 
Nationality inside Gorbachev’s Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 24.
It has also been argued that the mir in Russia (see Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture. From 
Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 77-86 
and Stephen White (1979), pp. 56-58, served an environmental purpose: the mir facilitated the 
sustainable use of the land through crop rotation, respect for the environment (reinforced by the 
authority of the Church and its teachings on the relationship between Man and Nature - fused with 
national traditions ) and a sense o f community and communal responsibility for the land. Moreover, 
the limits of the mir counteracted the endlessness of the Russian plains and the idea that Russia’s 
resources were abundant and inexhaustible [ See HnKOJian Bep^neB, H c t o k h  h  cmi.icji nvccKoro 
KOMMVHHBMa (MocKBa: Hayxa, 1990), c  8].
White (1979), p. 55.
''"ibiT^p. 57.
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a subdued way, and that these values - as reflected not only in Russian but also in Soviet literature 
- laid the foundations for the Green Movement that emerged in the latter half of the 1980s.
The leadership of the Green Movement and to some extent also of the Green Party stresses 
the importance of ecological education and has singled it out as one of their priority issues. It is 
being argued that it is difficult to change old attitudes and beliefs inculcated into the older 
generations and that it will be possible to change policies towards the environment only when 
people become more aware of the dangers they are faced with. Surveys on the environment, 
however, indicate that the Green Parties are held in high regard by a relatively large percentage of 
the former Soviet population. In Ukraine, for instance, the Green Party has scored high in opinion 
polls^^”, preceded only by one or two parties. Moreover, the Green Movements are highly valued 
by many people as movements not only talking about, but actually doing something for, the 
common good. Finally, polls also show that the environmental issue is the one issue which needs 
to be solved urgently^^’.
Whereas the Green Movement initially enjoyed widespread practical support in the Soviet 
population, it has now become increasingly difficult to make people take an active part in its 
activities. Moreover, Greens complain that factory workers sometimes adopt a hostile attitude to 
them on the grounds that the Greens call for the closing of enterprises and factories considered 
dangerous to the environment. This has been taken by some observers of Soviet environmental
■ |
policies as evidence of support for the view that there is no ecological culture in the former Soviet 
.Union.
It is my opinion, however, that the situation is much more complex. People can have 
fundamental opinions on the positive value of the environment, but when they face a choice 
between losing their job and - to take the argument to its logical extreme - starving to death in the 
immediate future, or dying from pollution in the distant future, most would go for option one. The 
lack o f active support of the Greens might also reflect a more deep-rooted lack o f faith in the 
political system in which the Green Movement and the Green Paiiy operate - as well as in the 
Green Party and-politics in general. Turn-out at elections to the republican parliaments have fallen 
considerably over the last few years - during by-elections in Ukraine for the Ukrainian Parliament 
in 1993 the turn-out in Kiev was not higher than 8%! During parliamentary elections in 1994 the 
Greens fared badly and several deputies of local and regional parliaments failed to be re-elected in 
the June 1994 local elections^^^. However, their poor showing in these elections is not only a 
reflection of weak party organization at the local level, limited means for conducting a successful
!
s
See Chapters Three and Four.
See Chapter Three.
See Chapter Three.
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USSR Goskomstat (the USSR State Committee on Statistics) in 1990 and 1991^^  ^ produced the 
following figures:
campaign and the absence of a coherent party program, but also a result of a general polarisation 
of Ukrainian society^^^. The results ought, however, not to be taken as proof that the Ukrainian 
people is not concerned with environmental issues. In order to gain a proper understanding of the 
problems the Greens face at present, and also to make more general statements about their political 
sustainability, we need to know more about ecological culture. Although ecological culture is not 
the focus of this thesis, I will therefore give it some attention in this chapter.
In my view, two factors are important in explaining the emergence of the Green Movement. 
The existence of semi-official movements and well-known and respected individuals speaking up 
on behalf of the environment, the existence of a theoretical framework elaborated prior to the 
Russian revolution, from which these movements and individuals derived their values, together 
with the extent of environmental damage in the USSR and its impact on people’s health are all 
important factors in this respect. On the other hand, we need to know more about attitudes 
towards the environment.
.For people to become interested in the environment, and also to take an active part in politics
to facilitate the improvement of the environment, they must be conscious of the problems related 
to the environment and the importance of participation. In the Soviet Union attitudes amongst the 
population to the environment become all the more important as a factor by which to explain the 
Green Movement’s emergence, as political participation prior to 1987 did not necessarily have a 
political impact. Also, propagating views different from the general political line of the CPSU 
could result in a number of sanctions against the individual in question. Given the right 
circumstances, however, these views could manifest themselves through political participation and 
thus influence (alternative) political decisions.
Opinion polls conducted in the USSR during the late 1980s and early 1990s indicate a high
level o f awareness of and concern about the environment^^'’. A nation-wide survey conducted by
' Ï
Cf. Marko Bojcun, ‘The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994’. Enrope-Asia Studies, 
vol. 47, no. 2, 1995, pp. 229-49.
^  For more survey data, see Chapter Three.
Data from this survey are presented by J.P. Cole in Environmental Pollution in the Former USSR in the 
Late 1980s (Nottingham: University of Nottingham Department of Geography, Working Paper 19, 
December 1992), pp. 9-19.
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Table 1.2 Views on the Environment in the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics o f  the form er USSR (in %)
Republic
bad
City
don’t
know
Republic
bad
don’t
know
Air
bad
getting
worse
W ater
bad
getting
worse
USSR 54 18 43 43 81 66 73 62
RSFSR 54 17 37 50 81 65 73 65
U kraine 55 24 57 34 78 76 71 69
L ithuania 41 . 10 32 19 88 49 86 52
Latvia 40 6 46 15 75 47 72 60
Estonia 53 6 37 22 81 48 76 53
Georgia 77 7 59 29 87 55 71 27
A zerbaijan 75 9 56 33 85 65 86 28
A rm enia 79 4 69 22 89 72 56 34
Uzbekistan 48 21 35 47 80 58 70 42
K irgizstan 45 13 33 35 81 56 63 47
Tadzhikistan 31 29 25 56 72 49 63 19
T urkm enia 44 13 21 64 50 47 52 26
K azakhstan 53 26 41 48 83 68 68 55
Belorussia 64 8 72 17 88 72 81 56
M oldavia 52 6 49 17 88 63 85 59
Source: Goskomstat (1991), Cols. 1-4. pp. 9-11; Cols. 5,7, pp. 29-44; Cols. 6,8, pp. 163-70 in Cole (1992)
As seen from the table, Ukraine and Belorussia score high. This can be explained by the 
Chernobyl accident in particular - which affected Belorussia especially badly - and, for Ukraine, 
also by serious environmental pollution in general (see Chapter Two). A further break-down of 
Ukrainian cities also revealed high levels o f concern with the state o f the environment:
Table 1.3 Views on the Environment in 9 Ukrainian cities (in %)
City Republic Air W ater
bad bad bad bad
don’t don’t don’t don’t
know know know know
K harkiv 44 31 53 36 78 75 70 74
Lozovaia 20 31 39 46 66 58 74 56
Vinnytsia 64 27 72 23 87 83 91 68
Kyiv 64 23 63 28 87 80 78 72
Bilotsirkiv 42 31 45 40 71 77 70 63
Lviv 57 25 66 29 85 81 80 69
Simferopol 10 42 50 43 30 89 29 63
Mykolaiv 52 8 64 20 91 69 90 73
Odessa 57 22 60 26 79 85 84 58
Source; Goskomstat (1991), Cols. 1-4, pp. 12-28; Cols. 5,7, pp. 45-145; Cols. 6,8, pp. 171-204 in Cole 
(1992)
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information, combined with easier access to a political system which was now open to alternative
I■-
Although Cole (1992) calls for a careful interpretation of these data^^”, and although they are
contradictory in that in areas where concern for the environment is around 50%, these figures are 
much higher as far as water and air quality are concerned, they still indicate that there was concern 
for the environment in the USSR. Other polls conducted at approximately the same time support 
this view. Thus, in a survey conducted by VTsIOM  in 1989, concern for the environment came 
fourth on a list of the most pressing concerns, after shortage of consumer goods and food products 
and the widespread use of bribes. When asked to single out the most serious problem in the 
USSR, pollution was preceded only by the housing problem and low wages/high prices. When 
asked which problem must be solved first, the environment climbed to the top of the list, with a 
score of 87 percent^^^.
While most of these surveys do not reveal how the respondent’s awareness was created, 
interviews with leaders o f the Green Movement of Ukraine, as well as the questionnaire circulated 
for this thesis, reveal that most activists were familiar with works written by Russian and 
Ukrainian writers on the issue, campaigns in which the writers were involved and also the ideas of 
Russian and Soviet scientists such as Vladimir Vernadskii - ideas based on alternative values from :those of the Soviet regime^^^. Ukrainian/Russian culture and ‘environmental’ traditions^^^ also
inspired some, whereas others^'*” were influenced by West European Green Movements. Besides,
it was the literary journals - at least initially - that provided people with information on the 
.environment:
In the eai'ly part of the last decade, it was primarily the literary journals 
that aroused public awareness of the callous lack of foresight and 
concern for other consumers and interests evidenced by ministries, 
administrations, and local officials, but of late (1974) the cause has been 
taken up by many of the nation’s daily newspapers. '^*'.
In my view, and as will be shown in Chapter Three, awareness on the environment - at least 
among Green activists - did not come about solely as a result of increased information due to 
glasnost and more opportunities for (independent) political participation. The availability of such
Ibid.. p. 11.
A. CoroMOUOB, A. TojtLcrbixJO iiaiunx 3a6orax‘. KoMMyimcr, no. 9, 1989, c. 74-75.
See Chapter Three for details.
Volodymyr Boreiko tried to revive old Ukrainian traditions in the work of the Greens, whereas Anatolii 
Zolotukhin, an ethnic Russian and the leader of the Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir, as a former member of 
the Soviet Culture Fund and cuixently the leader of the Pushkin Club in Nikolaev, argued that all the 
great Russian writers were ‘environmentalists’.
See Chapters Three and Four.
Bush (1974), p. 17.
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views, triggered people into action. However, as my survey and interviews indicate, a majority of 
the Green activists were well aware of the environment before such opportunities emerged.
Did people genuinely believe that environmental problems were a product of capitalism and 
consequently non-existent in socialist political systems, or did they acknowledge that the problem 
existed also in their own country? Did they share the official view that Nature existed for Man - as 
a means by which to improve life? Or did they on the contrary view Man as an organic part of 
Nature, Nature thus having intrinsic value? Did people consider environmental pollution morally 
unacceptable, or could it be justified as a means by which to facilitate a morally higher good - the 
creation of a communist society and equality for everyone?
It is particularly difficult to measure public opinion on environmental issues in the Soviet 
Union before 1985 due to a number of flaws in the sociological research conducted^'’^ . Further, no 
proper sociological research was done into this area until vei-y recently. The first comprehensive 
analysis dealing with the topic appeared only in 1990 '^’^ . Ecological culture, or the lack o f it, is 
however of vital importance when explaining the emergence and support of the Green Movement 
and also when trying to assess its sustainability. It is my belief that it is possible to establish a 
rough picture o f beliefs and attitudes towards the environment by examining the role o f Nature as 
depicted in Russian/Soviet literature and philosophy, Slav culture, Orthodox Christianity and 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Nature has traditionally played a central part in the life o f the Slav people - through religion 
and through customs and traditions emanating from its animist, heathen beliefs (as will be shown 
below). Further, Nature was given much attention by Russian writers and poets o f the last century. 
Russian and Ukrainian thinkers have also centred on the link between Man and Nature in their 
works. The view of Nature offered by Marxism-Leninism differed substantially from the one 
prevalent in the Slav countries prior to the revolution.
The question of whether the campaign to create the New Soviet Man managed to destroy the 
old ecological culture, or to what extent it tried to co-opt the traditional Russian love for Nature 
and thus for its Motherland into the new political culture is very important. I will try to find out to 
what extent arguments rooted in pre-Revolutionary traditions were used by ‘environmental 
activists’ prior to the emergence on the Green Movement and to what extent Greens belonging to 
the perestroika era used this old Green culture in arguing their case to the Soviet people.
For an outline of such flaws in Soviet surveys from the late 1980s, see John P. Willeiton and Lee 
Sigehnan, ‘Public Opinon Research in the USSR: Opportunities and Pitfalls’. The Journal o f  
Communist Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 224-32. Such flaws can also be found in earlier 
surveys conducted.
lO.n. O^ceroB, E.B. fluK o iiopoua, SKOJiormiecKUM MMnvjii.c npodjteivty (fmpMHuoBaiiMB 
3KO.riorMBecKOM KVJibTVDbi MOJiQjiftxcH (MocKBa: M ojio;iaii rBapAHil, 1990).
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1.3.1 Was there an Eco-Culture in the USSR?
During the second half of the 19th century a frame of mind referred to as Russian Cosmism 
emerged in Russia. Among its adherents were famous Russian philosophers and writers such as 
Vladimir Solovev, Nikolai Fedorov, Petr Florenskii, Nikolai Losskii, Lev Tolstoi and Fedor 
Dostoevskii, to mention but a few. In the words of academician Nikita Moiseev, Cosmism was 
popular among a wide circle of Russian democrats, and its major idea was as follows:
TeaoBeK  -  cocra B u a a  uacrb IlpupoALi; H eiO Beica u f lp u p o ity  iie  
o n e/iyeT  npoTHBonocraBJuiTL ^ p y r  i ip y r y , a  paccMarpHBaTb h x  n a a o  b 
eiiHHci'Be; Me.aoBeK u Bce, b to  e r o  0Kpy:*:aeT, -  a r o  MacrHuii 
e^H iioro, B cejien u oft. M b 3Tom KO iireKcre n e tu k  y x  Ba^Kiio t o ,  a ro  
y  oiBiHX 3T0 B or, a A p yrn x  -  B cejie im aa . OoaroMy iie  ciyBaPino,
MTO K TeqeiBuo pyccK oro KocMH3Ma 6jim 3kh Miiorue
ecTecTBOHcnbiTaTejiH m yqenbie (K. U h o j ik o b c k h h , Æ M em e.aeeB, H.
CeMCHOB H
Out of this thinking came the idea that contradictions were bound to emerge between Intellect 
and Nature and that Man had a responsibility to solve these contradictions before they became so 
great that they would bring mankind to catastrophe. To achieve this purpose a qualitatively new 
type of morality was required, as was some kind o f legal ‘world order’:
■ ,; |
HoBbiM npüBonopjwoK u iioBafi Mopajibnaa oaiOBa BeaoBeaecKoro 
oSmecTBa -  iieodxoAHMbie ycjioBua Aa/ibueniuero pasBuimi 
UHBHJiHsauHH, Bcero seJioBeHecKoro po^a. H iianbojiee apKO 06 aroM 
CKaaaji, BepojiTiio, (I). /IocroeBCKMH^ '*\
3Dostoevskii, like many of his contemporaries, was waiy o f modern society (i.e. growing 
technologies and urbanisation) and saw that a moral crisis was drawing closer. To counteract this 
crisis, a new morality was required, based on respect towards fellow Men as well as Nature and 
also on interaction between different nations. Nikolai Fedorov’s warning about civilised society 
sounds amazingly similar to warnings raised by today’s environmentalists - in the West as well as 
in the East:
1
Mtok, Mup Mjier k Koimy, a BejiOBCK CBoeu AeareabiiocTbio ;iaxce 
cnocodcrByeï iipudauxcenHio Kouua, u5o uHBnansauHa 
sKcnjiyaTHpyiourafl, a ue BoccraHaBaHBaioma>i, ne Moxcex uMcrb Hiioro 
peayabTara, KpoMe ycicopenHfl Kouua '^* .^
I
■7-
r .n . AKceiiOB (cocraDHTeab), BaajMMUP BepuaacKHH. vKMaiieonucaHue. Hadpamibie rpvyibi.
BocnoMHuaiiHfl coDPeMe»HHKOB. CvxcaeiiMB hotomkob. (MocKBa: CoBpeMeiiUHK, 1993), c. 9. 
Ibid.. p. 10.
(I)e;iopOB, H. Cob. M„ 1982. c. 301, in ibid.. p. 10.
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Rather than seeking to rule Nature, from which nothing good would result, Man should strive 
towards the co-evolution of the Biosphere and Man - co-evolution meaning mutual development 
rather than subordination. New knowledge but also new morals were prerequisites for this aim. 
Unlike some contemporary Western thinkers on the environment, who hold the view that Man is in 
some respects Nature’s worse enemy, the Cosmists saw no antagonism between Man and Nature 
as such:
...Mbicib, coBtiauHe -  Taxa a Me iipMuaAaexciioCTb ripupo^bi, icaic h 
”3Be:rtbi. rajiaKTMKa, MHicpofibi. KawHH...” '^*’ .
In Moiseev’s view the Cosmists’ idea that everything was inter-linked facilitated a close 
relationship between science and philosophy in Russia at the time. I. Sechenova, for instance, 
argued that Man had to be studied not only through his physical properties and ideas, but also in 
relation to the natural environment of which he was an integral part. Similarly, V. Dokuchaev, 
through his studies of the soil, concluded that it was the one element which united the entire 
Biosphere into one entity. Vernadskii, by using the concept of the Noosphere, united the study of 
inanimate matter, animate substances, Man and society, at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Through the study of geo-chemistiy, Vernadskii became one o f the first scientists to realise that 
the surface o f the Earth, its landscapes, the chemistry of the oceans and the structure of the 
atmosphere, facilitated life on Earth. As the Earth was a cosmic creation, so, argued Vernadskii, 
was life. Life, in his view, was not accidental, but was a closely linked result of evolution. Thus,
% M 3H b  -  " 6 y $ e |X )M "  M e x c a y  k o c m o c o m  h  " K o a ib iM ”, t o  e c r b  
ne:acMBbiM, B e m e c r e o M  3eiviJiH , 6 y # p o M ,  c n o c o 6 n b iM  .H c n o j ib so B a T b  
KO CM M BecK yio a f i e p r a i o  n p e o S p a s o B a i iH a  lu ia i i e T a p i i o ix i  B e m e c T B a .  
TaKM M  o 6 p a 3 0 M , m u s u b  cT a iioB M T cn  K a i a a n s a T o p o M  iq x i u e c c a
|)a3BMTHBp'*Î48
By developing a new science, namely that o f biogeochemistry, Vernadskii explored the 
history of the development of the Biosphere, i.e. the interaction between the inanimate and the 
animate on the Earth’s surface. Cosmos and the Earth were, in Vernadskii’s view
...Eauiiaa cH crcM a, b KOTopou )KM3Hb, xcMBoe Bem eciBO  cB asbm aer b 
e a u n o e  ne.rioe npoueccb i, npoTCKaiomne »a 3eM.ne, c  npoueccaw H  
KOCMMBecKoro npoMCxoacaeuMB^ '*''.
'^’’ AKceiiOB (1993), c. 10-11. 
Ibid.. p. 12.
Ibid.. p. 13.
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As a result of these processes, Man - the carrier of the intellect - emerged, speeding up those 
processes taking place on Earth in many different ways. Through biogeochemistry, Vernadskii 
tried to find an answer to the question of what Man’s place in the general planetaiy development 
was. He reached the following answer:
...BosaeHci'DHe 4eaoDeKa na oK pyxaiom yio Rpupoiiy pacrer cro.ih 
dijcrpo, BTo lie sa ropavin to iipeMii. Koraa on niDeoparurcii n 
ociioBnyio reo.iorooGpasyiomyio cn.iy. M, icaK c.ieacrBue, on 
iieodxoaHMO ao.iacen Gyacr ripMiniTb na cefiii oTBercrnennocrb :ia 
Gyayniee pasBHTue OpHpoabi. PasBHTue orpyacaiomefl cpeabi m 
o5uiecrna caeJiaioTCJi iiepaspbiBiibiMM. Bnoaiiepa nepenaer o a n a x a u  b 
ciliepy pasyMa -  b noociliepy. O ixiMsoHaeT iieaH K oe o b T e a u n e n n e . b 
pesyabTaTe KOToporo pasBHTue n.aaneTbi oae-fiaeTca nanpaB.riennbiM -  
nanpaBJieinibiM CH.noH PasyMa^^”.
As pointed out by Ihor Dzeverin^^’, and also by Moiseev, the term ‘Noosphere’ was open to 
interpretation. Thus, some scientists came to regard the shift from the Biosphere towards the 
Noosphere simply as Man’s gradual ‘mastering’ of Nature. In Moiseev’s view, however, such an 
understanding of the Noosphere was alien to the thinking of Vernadskii:
B. BepnaacKHH iie pas nncaa o to m , b to  coraacoBannoe c OpHpoaoH 
pasBHTHe obutecFBa, orBeTcmeiinocrb m :ia flpnpoay. n sa ee byaym ee  
noTpebyioT cneuHaawioH opraiiusauHH obuiecrBa, cosaaimii 
cneuuaabiibix crpyKTyp, KOTopbie byayT cnocobnbi obeaiennTb 310 
coBMecnuoe coraacoBaiiiioe pasBHTwe. SnanuT, noocijiepa -  310 Taicoe 
cocroflHHe bnoc^epbi, Koraa ee pasBnrne npoM Cxoanr  
ueaenanpnaaenno. Koraa PasyM HMeer BosMoacuocrb iianpanaaTb 
pasBHTHe bnocfliepbi n Mirrepecax HeaoBCKa, ero byaymero^^^.
Ibid.. p. 13.
251
Ibid.. p. 14.
There were of course also thinkers in the West concerned with the relationship between Man and Nature
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Why did Russian scientists, writers and philosophers hold such advanced views on the 
relationship between Man and Nature at the end of the last century, when in Western societies 
scientists were very much into development and progress?^^^
In my view, the answer is largely to be found in the Slav culture and Russian Orthodoxy, 
which both endorsed the idea o f a harmonious relationship between Man and Nature. I will
explain this in greater detail below. Also of importance, in my view, is the influence of 
Slavophilism in Russian thinking. For many Russian philosophers. Nature constituted an
____________________________
M.H. Jl3€BepMU, KoHuenuHB Hoocdiepbi n ueicoTODbte saKOiiOMepimcTM ariHMOpdiosa. Undated paper 
given to me by the author in Kiev, May 1994.
However, they did not develop their ideas into a coherent system anywhere near that of Vernadskii.
important element, serving as a key factor distinguishing the Slavophiles from the so-called 
Westerners. The Slavophiles tended to idealise Russian rural life and Russian Orthodoxy, and 
their philosophy was fused with a naturalistic attachment to the land. Their counterparts, the 
Westerners, favoured progress and industrialisation according to the Western model and detested 
what they considered to be the backwardness of Russia. Vernadskii’s greatness is that he pointed 
out the limits to human progress, while yet not discarding progress per se, thus building a bridge 
between Slavophilism and ‘Westernism’. I
Slav Orthodoxy—
In Slav cultures the relationship between the nation (the ethnic group and the land on which it 
lives) and Nature is closely linked, not only emotionally as reflected in their literatures and 
cultural traditions - but also etymologically. It is interesting to note that the words in Russian for 
Motherland, People (nation) and Nature all have the same etymological root, namely rod, which 
can be translated as birth, origin: rodina, narod and priroda. The equivalent in the Ukrainian
ylanguage is rid/rod, which can be translated as lineage, descent and/or origin. Ridni krai (one’snative land, motherland), narid/narod and priroda in Ukrainian correspond to the Russian words
-
quoted above. In addition, the Ukrainian word for family/kin is rodyna. This link finds its
.expression in the following quote by the Russian writer, Mikhail Prishvin: hub it rodinu, znachit 
berech prirodu! (To love the Motherland is to protect Nature!)^^^.
Also the Orthodox Church emphasises the close relationship between Man and Nature to a 
much greater extent than the Protestant and Catholic churches do^^ .^ In his standard work on the 
Orthodox Church, Sergius Bulgakov (1935) has expressed this relationship as follows:
-------------------------------------------
Throughout Ukraine, with the exception of Western Ukraine (minus Bukovina), where the Greek-Catholic 
(Ukrainian Autocephalous Church) was the major denomination, the main faith was Orthodoxy (see
C.B. foJiGBKO (niaB. pe4-), KvjibTVPa 1 nobvT nacejieima yKpamn (Kh ïb : J ln b i^ . 1993), c. 243, 
Quoted in OxceroB, HMKOuopoBa (1991), c. 146.
As pointed out by Weiner (1988), ‘Eastern Orthodoxy did not encourage mastery over Nature as
Î
protestant Christianity did in Western Europe’ ( pp. 6-7). Lynn White’s work entitled Man’s Dominion 
and the Judaeo-Christian Heritage echoes the view that (Protestant) Christianity has had a negative 
effect on the environment: ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis are to be located in the Judaic 
and Christian doctrine of creation. More specifically, they lie in the belief that Man was made in God’s 
image and shares in God’s transcendence of Nature, and that the whole natural order was created for the 
sake of humanity’ (pp. 20-21). This view has later been contested by some Protestant priests, who have 
endeavoured to revive rituals of the church linked to the cycles of Nature, such as thanksgiving and 
others. As for the Catholic Church, Catholic environmentalists often argue that the first Catholic 
environmentalist can be traced back to the Holy St. Francis of Assisi. More recently, the pope included 
Nature conservation as part of his message for Lent, the 40-day period before Easter traditionally used 
by Roman Catholics for reflection and penance: ‘the Bible allows people to use Nature, but demands 
that it be done carefully. The scripture acknowledges humans’ ‘privileged position’ on the Earth, but 
this is not authority to lord over It, even less to devastate it’. The pope called for ‘a profound lesson to 
respect the environment’, arguing that ‘among the negative outcomes of this culture of domination is a
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The Holy Spirit is extended by the Church over all Nature. The destiny 
of Nature is allied to that of Man; coirupted because of Man, she awaits 
with him her healing. Our Lord, having taken on himself the humanity, 
has joined his life to all of Nature. He walked on this Earth, he looked at 
its flowers and its plants, its birds, its fish, its animals. He ate of its 
fruits, he was baptized in the water o f Jordan, he walked on its waters, he 
rested in the womb of the Earth, and there is nothing in all his creation 
(outside of evil and sin) which remains to his humanity. So the Church 
blesses all creation..
More recent writings on Slav Orthodoxy support the view expressed by Bulgakov 61 years 
ago. Foma Kliopko, for instance, in his work on the founding principles of Orthodoxy argues, 
quoting the Bible, that people should
...OrpeMHTbcii nojiioÔMTb H cru iiy , n o j iio d m ’b i ip y r  ^ p y ra  h uce  
TDopeiiMe Boxcbe, noroM y 4to  oho ’’x o p o u io  oecbMa” (Birr. 1 .3  l F \
Orthodoxy rejects the dualism found in Protestantism and Catholicism:
B npaBocjiaBiioM xpucT H aucrne u e  c y m e c r B y e r  ^yanuBivia, m o  ’’j iy x ” h 
”u e 6 e c a ” -  A oSpo, a  "MaTepua” h "seMJia” -  sxio. Bor jiio6ht Bce 
Cbo6 TBopeuMe oeHiiOH ji!o6oB bio...B ce Bofom coTBopeunoe; i ie S e c a ,  
scMJHi, pacrenH fl, xcuBOTUbie h caw  qenoBeK -  4 o 6 p o  se j io  (T.e. 
coBepmeuHO, S e s  HS-baiiHa) h npe^uasnaM eno acnxb BoxcecrBeuub iM  
’AbixauHew 3KH3HH”, upH oS iua iicb Ero ueTBapiiOMV GbiTuio (Blit. 1.30,
Rooted in the pantheist relationship between God and all creation o f Russian Orthodoxy, 
Foma Kliopko advocates Man’s stewardship over Nature, based on harmony and respect:
distorted use of Nature that disfigures its (i.e. Nature’s) face and jeopardizes its equilibrium. And it 
does not slow even with the threat o f ecological disaster’. According to the pope, ‘the teaching is to use 
but not to abuse and utilize things in a sympathetic but not egotistical way - seeing that the rewards are 
not just for now but for the future’ (Associated Press, 17:19 EST VOlOO: ‘Pope: don’t abuse Nature’, 
found on CompuServe’s daily newsbulletin). The pope’s message, however, fails to mention that 
Nature has intrinsic value and an intrinsic right not to be destroyed. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the Orthodox Church in general, and, as will be seen below, Russian Orthodoxy in 
particular, had a more respectful attitude towards Nature than did its Protestant and Catholic 
counterparts - although there were (and are) o f course both Protestant and Catholic individuals who 
from their reading of the Bible reach the conclusion that it calls for human ‘stewardship’ rather than 
domination of Nature. Here, however, we are more interested in how the Church as a whole related to 
the Envhonment through its doctrine.
Sergius Bulgakov, The Orthodox Church (London: The Centenary Press, 1935), pp. 157-58. Bulgakov 
expanded on this: ‘One portrait o f the Orthodox office must be noted particularly - that is the cosmic 
quality. It is addressed not only to the human soul but to all creation, and it sanctifies the latter. This 
sanctification of the elements of Nature and of different objects expresses the idea that the sanctifying 
action of the Holy Spirit is extended by the Church over all Nature’.
^^®ripoT. (DoMa XoHKO, OcBOBbi nnaBocjiaBHfl (Bunuiioc, 1991), c. 8.
Ibid., p. 31.
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In Slav religion, the cult o f the tree had a central place;
or Internationalist?’ in Elworthy, Anderson, Coates, Stephens, Stroll (eds.) - Perspectives on the 
Environment?. (Aldershot: Avebury Studies in Green Research, 1995), p. 83.
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Ecau Bor fiB-aaeTca B:iaitbiKOH u Tbophom, upaBiimuM bcom
MHp03itaimeM, t o  h .hojih, coTBopeniibie no Ero o6 pa3y u now G u io , S
;toji:^nbi ynpaBJuiTb bcom MupOM. Ecjiu Bor y'i'Bep:^;iaeT Cnoto BJiacrb
ne ynierenMeM, no MUJiocepaueM h cjiyjKeiiMevi, t o  h Ero rnapu |-
ÆOJi^HW nocrynaxb raK :^e. H, iiaKOiien, eca u  Bor Bcenia
c y u t e c T B y e T  b Bennou 5kh3hh. nuK orm  ne y v iu p a a ,  no ncenta
ii[)e6 biBafl B coBepmennoH rapMOiiHu co  bcc.m TBoiienneM, ro u .noiiH
SbinM co3jiaiibi BeanoH xchshm b tom  M e  rapMonuqnoM o 5 niennH c
B o r o M  H BŒM M u p o B iia n u eM  ( m y  u n d e r l i n i n g ) ^ ^ .
The pantheism of the Orthodox Church matched that of pre-Christian Slav culture^”’, the |;i 
essence o f which was 3
f
■:i
...O ityxoTBopenue bcch npupoAU -  3eM.BM, BOitw, orin i, iioquranue IpacTenuH h xchbotiiux, npoimmiBinuecB n Buae anuMUBMa, ([leTuinuBMa H ^pyrux (j)opM nepBoSbiTBOH pejiuruM, CBOMCTBennux bccm iiafxiiiaM 
na onpejieneniibix # 3 a x  nx oSuiecrBennoro pasBHTMfl^ ®^ .
Not surprisingly, therefore, as will be seen below, features o f Russian popular pagan belieft 
can still be found in Slav Orthodoxy^*^^. The cult of the Saints, which occupies a significant place 
in the Orthodox Church, also has an ‘eco-culturaf side to it. The Saints are considered to be 
M an’s friends, praying with him and protecting not only Man, but also the cattle from wild
'.S'animals (the Holy Vlas and Modest). Horses are protected by Saint Georgiy, whereas Kuzma and 
Demian care for the hens, and farmers can turn to the Holy Ilia for rain, thus securing a good |  
harvest^^'^. In village churches these Saints are often portrayed on icons. Further, a tradition of 
blessing fields, trees and cattle has survived.
Finally, the close relationship between religion and Nature is reflected in a large number of 
religious feasts celebrated by the Slav Orthodox Church, directly linked with the cycles o f Nature.
These are observed not only in the countryside, but also by churches in big cities like Kiev. Best g'
known is ‘Troitsa’ (Trinity), celebrated on the seventh Sunday after Easter and marking the
%beginning of spring.
Ibid.. p. 37.
MHTponojfHT iJiap ioH, AoxPHCTHBHCbKi B io v B a n n a  V K Pa incbK oro i ia p o iv  (KneB: A K U io iiei^e  
TOBapucTBO OSepern, 1994), c. 13.
^*^r.A. Ho30Ba, ilsbiqecTBO b npaBocjiaPHH (MocKBa: HB^arejibCTBO Hayxa, 1975), c. 7. 3
Ibid. As an example, Nosova refers to the cult o f ‘Mother Earth’ (mat zemli). Metropolitan Ilarion 
argues that ‘dvoeverie’ is deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian faith. Such features can be found in the 
Ukrainian language, and he cites numerous examples (pp. 315-16). Moreover, in Northern Ukraine the 
icons are often referred to as gods and the iconostas as ‘bozhnik’ (p. 319).
Ho30Ba (1975), c. 78, referred to in Âse Berit Gr^deland, ‘The Ukrainian Green Movement: Nationalist
i
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Der Baumkult bei den Slaven gab eine Vorstellung von Lebens-, 
Schicksals- und Schutzbaum, der mit dem Leben und Gedühen einer 
menschlichen Gemeinschaft, einer Familie oder eines Dorfes, In 
Verbindung gebracht wird '^* .^
Similarly, Harjan argues that ‘the forest has always been part of Russian life, Russian 
character and Russian civilisation. The forest is there at Man’s birth and accompanies him to the 
grave’^^ .^ As pointed out above, the Orthodox Church adopted the Slav cult of the tree by 
introducing the blessing o f trees^” .^ An ancient oak, killed by the Chernobyl accident but still 
standing, became a symbol of Chernobyl for many people (pictures of this oak were circulated in 
the aftermath of the accident) and, as seen in the previous section, an issue of great concern to pre- 
Revolutionary writers as well as to Leonid Leonov, was the excessive felling o f trees in (Soviet) 
Russia.
Russian Literature
It is not possible to do justice to Russian/Ukrainian writers and the role of Nature in their writings 
on just a few pages. As Ukrainian writers are dealt with at length in Chapter Eight, I will focus 
here on key Russian writers, well-known and widely read throughout the (former) Soviet Union. 
The Ukrainian landscape, however, was often portrayed not only by Ukrainian, but also by 
Russian writers due to its beauty:
Die Ukraine (an erster Stelle die Poltavaer Landschaft) wird in der 
russischen, uki'ainischen und polnischer Literatur des 18. und 19.
Jahrhunderts immer wieder als ein schones und Idyllisches Land 
gepriesen, als das Land der Lieder und der üppig-schônen Natur. Auch 
in der Dichtung Skorovodas leben die Erlnnerungen an diese schone ILandschaft fbrt“ ®. ■ f
Gogol - himself a Ukrainian by birth - for instance, vividly portrayed Ukrainian scenery and 
Ukrainian rural life in ‘Evenings on a Farmstead near Dikanka’
The description of Nature and of Russian folklore features frequently in the works of Russian 
writers and poets during the 18th and 19th centuries. It was customary for children from well-off
SIWilhelm Lettbauer, Russische Literaturgeschichte. (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1958), p. 76: ‘P er 
Baumkult bei den Slaven’.
"“ FIarjan(1979), p. 173.
Big trees, especially the oak, beech and linden, were held in reverence by the Slavs as the Gods loved 
these trees and lived in them. A series of rituals were observed in front o f the holy trees during the year
[MHTponojiHT Ijiap io ii (1993), c. 53] .
Dmitri Tschizewskij, Skorovoda - Dichter. D enker. Mystiker (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag - Harvard 
Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 18, 1974), p. 12.
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backgrounds to have nannies from the countryside during childhood, and Pushkin, for instance, 
learnt about Russian traditions and folklore from his nanny Arina Rodionovna. Nature, to Russian 
poets and writers did not simply act as background to a more important plot, but was very often 
the major element of the story/poem. This is particularly clear in Fedor Tiutchev’s poem Ne to. 
chto mnite vy. priroda (Nature is not what it seems to you), written in 1836;
H e TO, HTO MHMTe BLi, n p u p om :
H e c.qenoK, u e  G esjiym u u n  auK  -  
B  uen  e c i ’b x y u ia , b iieu  e c r t  cBo6o./ia,
B new ecrb  JiioSoBb, b iieu  ecrb
Rural life and closeness to Nature, contrasted to the morally decadent urban life, has been set 
up as an ideal by a number of Russian and also Ukrainian writers. Tolstoi, especially in his late 
life, went so far as to abandon and denounce the upper-class life he had until then lived, stating 
that the ‘good life’ removes Man from Nature and makes him fear death. The link between Man 
and Nature thus needed to be restored. For this to happen, Man must return to the simple life of 
the countryside, where life is viewed as a cycle, interacting with death (birth-ripening- 
decay/decline-death). Tolstoi denounced all his previous writings and started writing educational 
pamphlets and short stories advocating various moral principles'^”. Societies were later founded 
both in Russia and abroad (especially Canada) by Tolstoi’s adherents, who tried to live in harmony
with Nature and in accordance with Tolstoi’s teachings. Tolstoi himself adopted a simple life­
style, wearing Russian peasant clothes and tilling the land.
Dostoevskii also criticised ‘progress’ and the implications it had for human morals and the 
environment:
P a i  qejioBeqecTBO orpeueT ca norojioB iio  ot B ora  (a a Bepio, m io aroT  
riepno ii naj)a.aae.abuo reojiornqecKMM nepnoAaM CBepuiHTcn), ro caMO 
co0o io ...naA aeT  o ce  npe^Kuee ivinpoBosapeUMe u , raaB uoe , Bca u pexcuaa  
iipaBCrBeiiuoci'b, n uacryuH T u ce uoBoe. JIioah coB O K ynarca. UToSbi
BBB'Ib 01' ÏKM3UH BC6, BTO Olia MOaCCF 4aTb, 110 Hen[3eMeHH0 ilJia
caac i'ba n  p a w c r n  b o;uiom  TOJibKO 34euiiieM  w npe. fteJiOBCK 
BOBBejinuMTca 4yxoM  S oxcecK ofi, TUTaunaecKOH ro p ^ o c r n , h  aoHTca 
Me.TOBeKo-6or. E xceu acu o  no6e3K 4a ii y ^ ee  6 e3  rp au n u  n p n p o a y  Bo.rieio 
CBoeio H iiayKOH, qe.BoueK tcm  cawbiM e^K eaaciio 0y4O T ou ty m a rb
uacjiajK^euM e cro.ub B ucoK oe, »ito o iio  3aivieuHT eiviy u ce  yu oB a im a  
uacjia4C4enHH iiedec iib ix . Bchkm h yB uaer, >rro ou  cM epre ii necb, 063  
BocKpeceubB, h  npHMer cMeprb rop40 h  c u o k o h u o , k u k  0 o r ...H o  tu k  
KaK BBMiiy saKOpeuejioH rjiynocTH  qeuoBeuecKOH a ro , n o ^ ca j iy n , erne  
M B Tbicaqy j ic t  u e  y c r p o n r c a , t o  BcaKOMy, cos iia iom eM y y x c e  h
H . T io T u e B , C T H xoT B O D e iiH a  (M o cK B a : X y ^ o a c e C T B e u H a a  J in r e p a T y p a ,  1985), c  148. The p o e m  i s  
g i v e n  in  full o n  pp. 148-49.
GeirKjetsaa, Dostojevskij og Tolstoj: Essays fOslo: Gyldendal, 1977).270
10
broke up and Esenin returned to Russia. Disillusioned with the new society emerging in the 
aftermath of the revolution and its emphasis on industrialisation and development, Esenin finally 
committed suicide in 1925. His popularity, however, continued. Even today people gather 
regularly at his grave at the Vagankovskoe cemetery in Moscow to recite and discuss his poetry.
1.4 Conclusion
writers, on the other hand, could reach a much wider audience and could present environmental
Dostoevskii as quoted in P.K. BajiaHAnn, TlDMDom. anquncrb. KVJihTvptP. in M.ft. JleMCUieB (peju) -  
gKOUornqecKafl aubTeniiaTUBa (MocKBa: flporpecc, 1990), cc. 19-20.
1
■renepb M cm iiy . no3Bo;iMTe.ibno ycrpoM Tca coB ep u ie im o kbk  e u y  
yro4HG. na liOBbix uaqaaax^^'.
Chekhov, too, looks at the relationship between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ world. In Vishnevyi
sad (the Cherry Orchard) this is not only reflected in the opposites of countryside vs. town, but 
also symbolised by the cherry orchard - which is eventually chopped down by the merchant 
Lopatin who buys it from its previous owners ~ a victim of progress like the main characters in Tri 
sestry (Three Sisters), who dream about Moscow but never succeed in going back there. Although
.
this is interpreted by many critics as the old intelligentsia’s failure to adapt to the changing times, 
the destruction o f the cherry orchard (environmental destruction) shows the negative coin of 
‘progress’.
The tradition of portraying Man as an organic component o f Nature was immensely popular
in Russia at the beginning o f this century, and continued during the early years of the USSR. The 
most famous representative of the so-called derevenshchiki was Sergei Esenin. He grew up in the
■ : ■;Riazan district and dressed in peasant clothes cited poetry in the literary salons of St. 
Petersburg/Petrograd and Moscow with great success. Esenin, however, found it veiy difficult to
adapt to the life o f ‘developed society’. At the beginning o f the 1920s he married the famous 
American dancer Isadora Duncan and went to live with her in the United States. The marriage
S
I
Above, I have outlined pre-Revolutionaiy thought on the environment in Russian philosophy, 
science, religion and literature. There seems to be a clear line between such thought and the views 
propagated by some of the ‘environmentalists’ during the Soviet era. However, scientists, the 
druzhiny and other alternative groups addressing environmental issues had a small following. The
issues in a comprehensible manner to the non-specialist. Moreover, they were regarded as the 
‘conscious of the people’ by many (see Chapter Three) and their word thus carried considerable
1
1
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weight. The public’s response to their ‘campaigns’ is in itself an indication that they were being
heard. It is therefore not surprising that Soviet literature in the 1980s has been described as ‘the 
single most influential variety of Soviet cultural and intellectual production. Indeed, literature is
arrived at by the party and government’^^ .^ Similar conclusions were reached by the VTsIOM 
researchers, who based on the results of their survey ‘On our Concerns’, concluded that
often the source that produces material for television and the cinema, more so in the USSR than 
elsewhere...Literature serves as a transmission belt to ordinary citizens for policy decisions already
O b inecrB e iiH oe M iienne naxoA urcH  no ii B.iMBiiMeM n p eccu , TejieBM/tennn. 
pa4M0, BBiro M4yiHHX B p o o r  aBM^KGBUü B FiaiuMxy oKpyxcaioL iieH  
cpeiibi, Ti’o , ecre crB en n o , c n o c o S c r B y e r  n p o u eccy  ’’BBpocaeiiHB"
3K o.aoruqecK oro cosuanH B nace.qeiiHa^''^
Ozhegov and Nikonorova asked their respondents to rank a list of themes relating to the
environment according to preference. Some 27.2 percent chose ‘the problem of Man and Nature
in Literature and Art’. Another 27.8 percent chose ‘Ecological Problems in a Religious Outlook
on the World’^^ '^ . As many as 56 percent of those who discussed literature and art with their
friends and acquaintances said that the environment would come up as an issue in these
.discussions. When asked where they obtained information about the state of the environment in 
the USSR, 14 percent answered that ‘well-known Soviet scientists, writers and artists’ were the 
most important factor shaping their attitude towards the environment (putting it in fourth place out 
of a total of 14)^^ .^ Although there is no other survey data to compare these figures to, they do in 
themselves indicate that those writers and scientists who stood up for the environment (see section 
two) were successful in spreading their views and arousing awareness of environmental issues - 
although such awareness did not materialise in active public participation in environmental work 
until after Gorbachev came to power.
As seen in section one, writers and scientists were instrumental in setting up Green groups in 
several of the former Soviet republics, and they quickly gained a large following. In this thesis I 
will try to establish to what extent ‘eco-culture’ was of importance in establishing the Ukrainian 
Green Movement and if it influenced its theoretical framework. I will also discuss the significance 
o f Slav eco-culture in the campaign undertaken by the Nikolaev Greens to save the South Buh
   ...........
p. 61.
A. CoroMOHOB, A. To.ricrrbix‘CouHOJiorHqer.Koe odospenne. Q iiamux 3a5oTax‘. KoMMynHcr, No. 9, 
1989,0.75.
^^ ‘*10.0. OxceroB, E.B. HnKOiiopoBa (1990), c. 40.
Ibid.. p. 137.
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river. My hypothesis will be that eco-culture did play a part in this process and that Zelenyi Svit 
and PZU  might benefit more from actively using elements of this eco-culture together with the 
general principles of the international Green movement, rather than trying to copy the framework 
and style of similar movements and parties in Western Europe.
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2 Soviet Environmental Policies
2.0 Introduction
In order to explain the emergence of not only the Ukrainian Green Movement, but also the Soviet 
Green Movement more generally, it is not sufficient to examine concepts like 'political 
participation' and 'ecological culture' alone. We also need a more thorough understanding of the 
extent of environmental damage and the policies conducted by Soviet official authorities in the 
area of the environment at the time. It is also useful for our purposes to take a closer look at the 
relationship between the political centre, 'Moscow', and the republics (in this case Ukraine), given 
that an argument often used by the Greens was that pollution had been imposed upon the republics 
by the all-union capital.
In this chapter I first look at Marxist-Leninist thinking on the environment and the way in 
which Soviet authorities used quotes from Marx, Engels and Lenin in support o f the view that 
environmental problems were predominantly a phenomenon of capitalist societies. I then ask why 
- despite the official position that there were no serious environmental problems in the USSR and 
despite environmental legislation in no way inferior to that of Western countries - the Soviet 
environment fared so badly. I have adopted a broad approach, paying special attention to the 
Soviet economic and political system - the framework, so to speak, within which Soviet 
environmental policies were conducted.
I then proceed to examine Gorbachev's new thinking in the sphere of the environment and 
assess new legislation and structural changes introduced during his tenure. These changes are 
linked to the general political and economic changes introduced during Gorbachev's leadership. 
Considerable attention is also given to the changing relationship between ‘Moscow’ and the 
republics (with an emphasis on Ukraine) in the sphere of the environment in the late 1980s/early 
1990s. As will be seen below, changes in this area took place in parallel with more general 
political and economic changes.
I look at the state o f the environment in Ukraine, its implications on health and 
institutional/policy changes introduced after 1985 to improve the environment in the republic. 
Finally, I try to assess the impact of the environment as an issue on relations between ‘Moscow’ 
and Kiev at the official level by the help o f a transcript of the environmental session of the 
Verkhovna Rada in February 1990.
2.1 Environmental Problems in the USSR (1917-85)
As seen in the previous chapter, opposition to official thinking on the environment and its 
implications was expressed from early on by Soviet writers, scientists and the country's cultural
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establishment. Characteristic of such opposition, however, was that it was limited to a handful of 
individuals and, for the most part, took place on the pages of scientific journals not easily 
accessible to a wider audience. Moreover, such opposition did not question the legitimacy of the 
Soviet regime per se. Officially, Soviet authorities claimed that there were either only a few, or 
no, environmental problems in the USSR.
2.1.1 Ideology and the Environment
Although, as will be seen below, Soviet officials frequently referred to Marx, Engels and Lenin to 
back up their view that the Soviet system was more favourable to the environment than were 
capitalist countries, neither Mai*x, Engels or Lenin developed a coherent theoretical approach 
towards the environment. As pointed out by DeBardeleben^ ‘if Marx and Lenin spoke to our 
concerns about the environment, they did so indirectly, through their general theories and through 
the assumptions and concepts underlying them - through assumptions about scarcity, about the 
potential of science and technology, and through analysis of capitalist oveiproduction or of the 
international division of labor. Possible interpretations o f Marx’s, Engels’, or Lenin’s ecological 
views are therefore just about as diverse and divergent as are possible interpretations of their 
theories in general’^ . Thus, ‘the writings of neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin prepared the present 
leaders of the Soviet bloc for the possibility that environmental pollution and depletion of natural 
resources might themselves become global processes, threatening both socialist and capitalist 
society alike and placing in question the prospect of universal material abundance in a non- 
exploitative world economic system’ .^ For this reason, quotations on the environment taken from 
the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin must be used with care and seen in their proper context.
Goldman reached much the same conclusion as DeBardeleben, having read Marx, Engels 
and Lenin: Tt is hard to provide an objective answer (to what they had to say about pollution). 
The three were so prolific that if the scholar digs deep enough, he is bound to find something that 
appears relevant to today's concerns. The only difficulty is determining exactly how relevant such 
citations were at the time. After all, when they wrote, the sharing of social wealth and the fruits of 
economic development were the matters that were most important to them'^ .^ Ziegler attributed 
this to the time at which their works appeared: ‘Mai*x and Engels were attempting first and 
foremost to change the injustices of society, of man’s inhumanity to man, rather than man’s 
inhumanity to nature’ .^
 ^ Joan DeBardeleben, The Environment and Marxism-Leninism (Boulder and London; Westview Press, 
1985). 
p. 10.
 ^M L , p. 3.
^ihidp. 12.
 ^ Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental PoHcv in the USSR (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987).
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Goldman and Ziegler do, however, draw different conclusions from this. Goldman, on the 
one hand, illustrates the dilemma of using quotes out of context by citing Marx, who said that 
'Even a whole society, a nation, or even all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are 
not the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and like boni patres 
familias, they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition' (Marx 
1959b, p. 762). Marx also argued that if the soil is properly treated, its productivity increases all 
the time (Marx 1959b, p. 762). However, '...all of this is offered in the context o f a long 
discussion of how land rent is determined and has little to do with ecology or conservation. In 
other words, Marx is saying that if the earth is not maintained, rent values will fall. This would 
hardly qualify him for membership in the Sierra Club or Friends of the Earth'. This was also the 
case with other isolated and out-of-context remarks.
Ziegler, on the other hand, argued that ‘Marxism attempts throughout to explain the 
consequences of human interaction with the natural environment’:
Marx viewed humankind’s historical relationship to nature as curvilinear.
Prior to the evolution of human beings into producers, they existed in 
simple harmony with the environment, like any wild animal. The 
development of human productive capacities sthnulated a variety of 
social systems which forced humankind further and further from the 
original state of interdependence with nature. This separation reached its 
apogee under capitalism, when humanity was totally alienated from 
nature, just as humans were alienated from themselves as producing 
beings. They might use the land and its resources, but the system of 
private ownership dictated that people-nature relationships would 
necessarily be exploitative. According to Marx, the system o f private 
ownership of inanimate objects originated with the expropriation of land 
during the feudal period. Private property was the basis o f estranged 
labor, and estranged labor alienated people from themselves and from 
nature^.
To illustrate his point, Ziegler quoted Marx:
Nature is man’s inorganic body - nature is, insofar as it is not itself the 
human body. Man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with 
which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That 
man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that 
nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.
In estranging from man (I)  nature and (2) himself, his own active 
functions, his life-activity, estranged labor estranges the species from 
man. It turns for him the life o f the species into a means of individual 
life.
Estranged labor turns...man’s species being, both nature and spiritual 
species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual 
existence. It estianges man’s own body from him as it does external
Ibid.. p. 9.
■<s:nature and his spiritual essence, his human being.
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Communism...is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and 
nature, and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife 
between existence and essence, between objectification and self- 
confirmation, between fteedom and necessity, between the individual and 
the species^,
Goldman and Ziegler did, however, agree that Engels was more concerned than Marx with 
and also elaborated a more consistent position on, the state of the environment. Engels’s position 
was elaborated in Dialectics o f  Nature and in Outlines o f  a Critique o f  Political Economy. Like
7 lb i± , pp. 9-10. 
8 M L , p. 12.
Marx, Engels was concerned with production in his works. The dialectics of nature ‘involves the
struggle and symbiosis of plants, animals, and social classes in their environments...Human effort
(is) distinct in that it (rises) above the animal struggle for existence to the struggle for production, 
_Under socialism humans (can) pursue this struggle rationally, since the irrational social 
contradictions of a class society would be eliminated’ .^ There were, however, limits to what Man 
could do:
Let us not, however, be very hopeful about our human conquest over 
nature. For each such victory, nature manages to take her revenge. Each 
of these victories, it is true, has in the first place the consequences on 
which we counted. But in the second and third phase (secondary and 
tertiary effects) there aie quite different, unforeseen effects which only 
too often cancel out the significance of the first...
The people who in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor, and elsewhere 
destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that they 
were laying the basis for the present devastated condition of these 
countries, by removing along with the forest, the collecting centres and 
reservoirs o f moisture. When, on the southern slopes o f the mountains, 
the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests so carefully cherished on 
the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were 
thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of 
the year, with the effect that these would be able to pour still more furious 
flood torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons...Thus at every step 
we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror 
over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature - but that we, 
with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and 
that our masteiy of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over 
all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws 
(Engels 1940, pp. 291-292; Engels 1955, pp. 140-41.)
Although it is interesting to discuss whether or not Marx, Lenin and Engels had an 
environmental element in their writings, of more relevance to our purpose is how quotations from 
their works were used in Soviet official writings to support the view that socialist societies, by 
definition, either had no environmental problems at all, or at least had significantly less pollution 
than capitalist societies.
___________
■I.
117
The official Soviet doctrine on the environm ent - in any case to the outside world^ - w as that 
environm ental problem s w ere a feature o f  capitalist societies only, due to the antagonism  betw een 
the interests o f  capital and the overall interests o f  society. W ith references to Lenin, it w as argued 
that
CouHajTMSM c era oSmecTBenuoH coScrB eiu iocibio iia ciie^criBa 
npoH3B04CTBa, naaiJOBLiM xapaKxejxiM xosaucrBa m ryMaHHCi'HsecKOH 
cHcrcMOH o5iuecTBeiiHLix nejiefi co i^ aer  iiauGoJiee b.iaronpuBTnwe
BG3M0ÎKH0CTM M yCJlOBHH 4.BÎI paSyMlIOrO H pa'IHTeJTbliOrO OTlIOlUeUMB K
npu|X)4e, paLiMOiiaabiforo Hcno.ribsoBaHHîi ee {lecypcoB. 
uejieiianpaBJieuiioro h SaaronpHîiTuoro 4.111 qeaoBeKa npeo5pa30BaiiHii 
c[De4bi ero oÔHTaiiHii. ripM|X)4a couMa.riH3Ma ucK.moqaeT anxaronHSM 
MCîK4y ueaiiMM npoH3B04CTBa h coxpaiieiiHeM Kaqecroa OKpyxcaïoîiceH 
qeJioBeKa qie4bi. 3xo, pasyMeerca, iie 03naqaex, btg ripeMMymecxBa 
CGUMajiH3Ma B c$e|)e npupG4GnG.rib3GBanuji pea.rin3yioTcii caMH cg5 gh ,
063 UpuaGaceUMB yCHJlHH Blie BCBKGH SaBHCHMGCl'H GT KBKHX 0bl TG 
BH 0bIJlG BIiyxpeirnHX n  BlieUIHMX KGlIKpeXHblX MCTGpriMeCKHX,
3K0HGMHqeCKHX H nOJlMTMMeCKHX <|)aKTG|X)B H G0CrOllTeJlbCTB^®.
In  capitalist societies, on the o ther hand, the anarchy o f  cap ita list production as w ell as the 
drive for profit and colonialism  led d irectly  to  ecological problems^*.
Lenin  had, how ever, adm itted tha t the  advantages o f  socialism  in th is sphere w ere not being 
fu lly  realised  by them selves. To som e extent, socialist societies also depended on ex ternal and 
in ternal specific historical, econom ic and political factors and circum stances. The im pact o f  such 
factors, how ever, w ould  be less than  in cap italist societies as ’any conflicts betw een society  and 
nature are determ ined according to  the interests o f  Society and thus all its m em bers'. The Soviet 
ph ilosopher I.T. Frolov therefore argued as follow s:
flocKOJibKy aKOJTGrHqecKHH KpH3HC îiBjmercfl iipGp04C4enneM 
KanuTajiHcrmecKorG Mupa, -  4JUI ycTpaueiiHJi 9KGJ[GrM'iecKGH yrposbi 
II6G0XG4MMG cymecrB6nuG nepecrpoHTb KaimxajiucixBiecKyio CHaeMy...B 
cxpauax, r4e cym ecxB yer G0mecTBeHiiaii CG0CTBenHGCTb iia cpe4cxBa 
npoM3B04CTBa, y x y 4 LU6BMe GKpy4caiGmeû cpe4 bi mo4C6t 0bixb tgjibkg  
CJiyqaHiibiM jiBJieimeM^^.
O fficial Soviet w ritings during the 1970s and 1980s quoted M arx  and E ngels in support o f  
the v iew  that ecological problem s w ere problem s inherent in cap ita list societies only. M arx  - 
arguing that there w as only one real science, nam ely that o f  history  - suggested tha t h isto ry  could
 ^ It is common to distinguish between an official doctrine for 'external' use - i.e. towards the international 
community - and a modified 'internal' doctrine, for the Soviet Union, in Soviet politics. 
ripo0jieMa oKpvKaiorneH cpe/tbi n mhpgbgh 3Kohgmhk6 m Meamvnapoaiibix GTHGUieuMflX {Mockbü, 
"MbicJtb", 1976), c. 164.
11 See for instance Apq IIa44HBrrGH, ‘3icojiomqecKMe npo0Ji6Mbi BocxogHoro 0jioKa‘. npo6.m\fu 
BocTomoR Enponbi, no. 17-18, 1986, c. 97.
1^  Ibid.. p. 97.
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be grouped into the history of nature and the history of Man. Both these sides of histoi-y were 
linked to one another; as long as Man existed the history of Nature and the history o f Man would 
mutually condition each other^^. Man was in a position to rule over Nature and in reality extend 
his rule over it, while at the same time remaining an integral part of it. But this rule was of a 
particular nature; it could not be based on Man's tyranny in his relationship with Nature. As 
pointed out by Engels,
B e e  n a m e rociioiiCTBo u a a  new (r.e. npHi30A0ü) c o c r o u r  b to m , h to  mli,
B OTJiMMMe or B cex A p yrn x cym ecrB , yivieeM no3naBaTb ee saKonw m 
iipaBHJibHO MX npHMeiuiTb.
B  Mbi, B caMOM Æe.ae, c  Ka:^#iM juicm iiayuaeMcn Bce Go.iee  
npaBM-Fibiio noitHMaib e e  saKOiiH h no3uaBaTb kbk 6o.aee 6.riH3KHe, rax 
M 6o.riee OTiia;ieMUbie nocJieAcrBHîi iiam ero axiMBiioro BMeiiiaTejibcrBa b 
e e  ecrecTBeHiibiH x o æ  O coS e iino co  uiseMeiiH orpoMiiux ycnexon  
eCTecrB03HaiiHa b nameM croaeiMM Mbi craiioBMMca n ee Ro.aee h 5o.Tee 
ciiocobiibiMH K TOMy, 4To5bi yMCTb yMHTbiBaTb Taxiace M So.aee  
oTAaJieuiibie ecrecrBeiiubie nocjieACTBHa no xpaAneH Mepe iiauGo.iee  
o6bi‘iiibix H3 naniMx aeAmBMM b oG m cru  npoH3Bo;iCTBa h reiM caMbiM 
rocnoiicTBOBaTb najt hhmm. A  bom b GoabineH Mej e^ a ro  cra iiex  
(liaxTOM, TOM B SoJibLueH Mepe aiOiiM cnoBa GyiiyT ne TOJibxo 
'tyBCTDonaTb, h o  h cosiiaBarb CBoe e^HucrBO c npHpoAOM...^"^
Adapting Marx's and Engels's theory to Russian conditions, Lenin also paid some attention 
to the relationship between Man and Nature, arguing that
riotca Mbi n e  snaoM saxon a  npupo/ibi, on , cymecTBya h AeHcrnya 
rioMHMo, Bue n a u iero  nosnauMfl, ^ e n a e r  n a c  paSaMM ’’cjienoH  
neo6xo.ziMMOCTM". Pas mu y 3na.au 3 t o t  3aKon, ^eucrB y iom uM  (xax  
Tbicnau p as noaropaji M apxc) iiesaDHCMMO o r  n a m eu  no;iu  u  or  
nau iero cosnanua, -  mu rocno^a npupOAU^^.
Frolov, in line with these theoretical premises, argued that the contemporary Marxist- 
Leninist concept of the interaction between Man and Nature
Î...Y T B ep ^ K jiaeT  n o s u u H u  p a s y M u o r o  p e a a u s M a , o c n o B U B a e r c a  n a  
nonHManHH couHaabiioro n p o u c x o K a e n u a  u c y m n o c r u  a K o a o r u a e c K o u  
n p o b a e M U  u  b h a h t  n o a r o M y  p e a a u i u e  n y x u  ee p e m e n u a  b K O M n a e x c e  
( j iy n a a M e H T a a b H u x  c o u u a a b H u x  u  x y a u r y p i i u x  u s M e n e n u u ,  
B K a io 'ia io iu H x  n a y a n o -T e x H U M e c K U H  n p o r p e c c ^ ^ .
K. Mapxc H (I). Bnreabc, CoaHnenua. (MocKBa: FocyaapcTBennoe us/iarejibcrBo BoauTuaecKOu
JIuTeixiTypbi, 1 9 5 5 ) , t . 3, c. 19.
^4 iM d L , T. 2 0 ,  c .  4 9 6 .
B.M., J l e n u n ,  f l o a n o e  c o 5 p a i i u e  c o a u n e n u M  (M oC K Ba: F o c y a a p c r B e n n o e  u s a a T e a b c i 'B O  f lo a u T u a e c K O H
JluiepaTypu, 1961), t .  18, c. 198. 
i^ ^ H n a n  ( D p o a o o ,  T m o a c a e r  a u  m hdv a K o a o r u a e c K H U  K p u 3 u c ? ‘ . Ilp a im , 16.8.1974 (n .p .) .
4«;
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Whereas on a theoretical level environmental problems in socialist societies were not 
discarded outright, at a political level Soviet officials in the early 1970s on some occasions 
claimed that the Soviet socialist system had brought an end to pollution altogether. As pointed out 
by Goldman, 'pollution was seen as a natural consequence of capitalist greed, and since there was 
no such thing as private ownership o f the means of production in the Soviet Union, there was no 
such thing as pollution. The way to abolish the private- and social-cost dichotomy was to do away 
with social costs'*'^. 'The tolerance, if not adulation, of private greed makes it all but certain that 
industrialists will pursue their own interests without regard for the public good. Since it is 
unlikely to increase their profits, most businessmen and their stockholders are thought to oppose
expenditures for pollution control. If by chance a state-owned institution in the Soviet Union is
caught polluting, Soviet authorities usually explain it away as a legacy o f the capitalist system or a 
consequence o f the destruction suffered in World War II. Supposedly, it will be only a matter of 
time before the inexorable logic and the institutions of public ownership induce the Soviet 
manager to act in a more selfless, less destructive m a n n e r E n v i r o n m e n t a l  problems in the 
former USSR were also sometimes referred to as a ‘knock-on effect’ from capitalist countries, 
caused not only by transboundary pollution (i.e. export of pollution to the former USSR by 
capitalist countries surrounding it) but also by the arms race, which tied up resources that could 
otherwise have been used to address environmental problems^^.
Although this was the official Soviet position on the environment towards the outside world 
for several decades, signs that at least on the domestic scene the situation was changing appeared 
in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Brezhnev in his speech on the 50th anniversary of the Russian 
revolution in 1967, for instance, although not admitting that there was an environmental problem 
in the USSR, did stress the need for protecting the environment. And he refrained from referring 
to environmental protection as a feature of capitalist societies only:
bypuLiH pocr nayxu h tcx u m k h  iieaaer ocofieiiHO aKTyajibiio neniiyio 
ripobaeMy oTHomeiiMu Me^yiy 'lejionexoM h npHix)40H. Eme nepobie
couHaJiMCTbi cquTajiM, qro Ba:»enoH qeprou oOmecrna Sy^ym ero aeuTCfi
cfijiMxceHMe qeaoBGKa c  npupowH. C rex nop npoiujm Bexa.
floCTpOHB HOBOe ofilHeCTBO, Mbi BOnJlOTHJIH B !*:H3IIb MHOroe M3 T oro, 0  
qeM MorjiM .riMiiib MeMxarb npe^meCTBeHiiHXH iiayMnoro couHajiM3Ma.
Ho npH po^a n e  yxpaxMJia Ann n a c  cb o ch  orpoM iioH uen iiocrH  m x a x  
nepBOHCTOMHHx MaxepHajibiibix S a a r , h  x a x  neH ca ixaeM bm  Mcxom iHx 
34opoBb«. iDUAOcrH, ju o 6 b h  X 5XM31IH M ayxoBHOFO OoraxcTBa x a :« 4 o r o  
qe.noBexa.
0 6 o  BC6M 3T0M xoMexcfl nanoMHHTL, BToSbi noA’iepxiiyxb, xax Baxoio 
Oepenb npMpoiiy, oxpanaxb h npHyMiiojKaxb ee fioraxcxBa. XosiiHcxoe, 
paqMxeawioe Hcnoab30BanHe ecxecxBeniibix pecypcoB, saboxa o seMjie, o
Marshall I. Goldman, ‘Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Growth of Environmentalism and Its
Consequences*, in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor and David E. Powell (eds.). Soviet Social 
Problems (Westview Press, 1991), p. 39
DeBardeleben (1985), pp. 50-51.
120
.lece, o  jiexax m mmctom Bos^yxe, o pacrHreabuoM h %HB0TH0M \m\)e 
-  Bce 3T0 name K|X)Biioe KO.M.viyiiMcrM'iecKoe aeao. Mbi 4oa>Kiii.i
coxiJanHTb M yxpacHTb iiamy 3eMaio aaii nbineuiiiHX h SyAyiUHX 
noKoaenHH c o b c t c k h x  aioaeA.
Hew [xi3yMnee mu 6y4eM HcnoaiaoBarb boraTcraa npHpo4bi. mbm 
SoabmHx ycnexoB üoSbioTca npoMbimaeiiiiocTb, ceabCKoe x o b b h c tb o ,  
nayxa, qeM Bbiuie craneT npoM3B04HTeabnocrb obmecrBeiiHoro xpyaa, 
Ï 6M Sorane, xpame h Kyai.xypnee by^ex }XH3Bb coBercKMx aioaeA^^.
At the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976 it was announced that environmental protection would 
be a priority issue for the Soviet Communist Party in the years to come. Once again, however, no 
specific mention was made of environmental problems in the USSR - rather, it was the global 
implications o f environmental pollution that caught the attention of the Central Committee’s 
address to the Congress:
y^xe cero4iifl ^ocraxoqtio Basxifu m axxyaabiiu xaxue raobaabiiue 
npob.rieMbi, xax cupbeeaa M.aM ^iieprexHHecxan, auxBu^auHfl naubo.nee 
onacBux h pacnpocxpaiiennbix sabojiCBanHH h oxpana oxpyjxaiomeH  
cpe4bi. ocBoeiiHe xoQMOca u HcnojibsoBaiiHe jiecypcoB MnpoBoro 
oxeana. B nepcnexxHoe oiin b y jy x  oxa3UBaxb Bce bojiee saMexnoe 
BJiMBHHe Ha »:H3Hb xavK^oro Ha|X)4a, iia bcio CHcreMy MexviyaapoAUHx 
oxiiomenHH. Hama cxpaiia, xax n apyrne cxpaiiu couHajinsMa, iie 
MOîxex cxoaxb b cxopoiie ox pemeiiMa axux npobjieM, saxparHBaiomux 
MHxepecbi Dcero qe-aoBeaeaBa^f
Since the beginning of the 1970s a large number of books addressing environmental 
problems in the USSR have been written by Western scholars. These include Fox (1971), Pryde 
(1972), Goldman (1972), Volgyes (1974), Singleton (1976), Shabad and Mote (1977), Jackson 
(1978), DeBardeleben (1985), Ziegler (1987), Jancar (1987), Weiner (1988), Turnbull (1991), 
Pryde (1991), Murray & Feshbach (1992), John Massey Stewart (ed.) (1992) and Feshbach (1995). 
A critical assessment of the state of the environment in the Soviet Union was written by Zeev 
Wolfson under the pseudonym Boris Komarov in 1978 and sent to the West, where it was 
published the same year. Similarly, several works emerged in the USSR on issues such as 
environmental management (Blagosklonov, Inozemtsev and Tikhomirov, 1967; Vorontsov and 
Kliaritonova; 1977, Milanova and Ryabchikov, 1979; Nikitin and Novikov, 1986) and 
environmental law and theory (Frolov, 1983, Gerasimov, 1983, Kolbasov 1983, 1987, Astanin and 
Blagosklonov, 1983, Maksakovsky, 1983 and others). These works cover early environmental 
problems in the Soviet Union such as Lake Baikal (1960s), the Aral Sea and others. By 
scrutinising official sources and relying on first-hand experience (Komarov), the authors o f these 
works were able to demonstrate that environmental problems in the USSR were not only
20J1.H. BpexciicB, JJetiHHCKHM xvDcoM . Pegu h craxb n . x. 2 (MocxBa: HojiHXHS^ax, 1970), c. 103-104. 
MaxepnajTbi XXV cbesiia KHCC (Mocxsa: HojiMTMS^ax, 1976), c. 56.
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,significant, but also that the scale of these problems was more serious than indicated in official y 
statements and writings.
For reasons of space and also as this thesis focuses on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Green
Movement rather than on the Soviet Union and Soviet environmental problems, I will merely look 
at the source of environmental problems in the Soviet Union and why measures to address the 
deteriorating environment did not work as intended. This is important for the following, as a f
major argument used by the Ukrainian Green Movement was that as the Soviet economic and 
political system with its strong centralisation was inherently 'unenvironmentaf, no real 
improvement o f the Ukrainian environment could take place before these structures were 
demolished and replaced with a decentralised structure. The reader is referred to the works above 
for a more general treatment of Soviet environmental problems.
2.1.2 The Soviet Economic System and the Environment
As pointed out by the Russian economist Lemeshev^^, the Soviet economy emphasised economic 
growth. Initially this emphasis was justified in terms of catching up with the capitalist West. As 
the world's first socialist country, surrounded by hostile capitalist societies, the USSR had to create 
its own, separate industrial basis. Thus 'the industrial drive was largely prompted by the need to 
strengthen (the USSR's) defence capability and to assure its economic independence from the 
external world, and primarily from German and Japanese militarism. Having rather limited 
material and financial resources, scientific and technical personnel, the USSR was compelled to 
use the same cheap and nature-despoiling industrial technologies as the capitalist c o u n t r i e s ' ^ 3  The 
rapid industrialisation was accompanied by the slogan 'let’s overtake and outstrip the capitalist 
countries in industrial p r o d u c t io n E n v i r o n m e n ta l  concerns not surprisingly therefore
■S'Did not constitute a major concern during the Stalinist period. Far from y
it. Stalin’s program of rapid, forced industrialisation defined progress
almost exclusively in terms of quantitative economic indicators that had
to be achieved in the least possible time. These demands created a
mindset that was, at best, indifferent to the conservation o f natural
resources and the preservation of the environment. The canons of
Stalinist Orthodoxy formulated in the 1930s glorified socialism's ability 
to radically remould the natural environment. In literature and the arts,
socialist realism dictated an extreme anthropocentric approach toward the F
relationship between mankind and the environment. Extraordinarily 
wasteful projects, such as the White Sea-Baltic Canal, were undertaken at 
the personal whim of the great dictator. All other considerations were y.:
-'i
-------------------------------------------
Mikhail Lemeshev*, Bureaucrats in Power - Ecological Collapse (Moscow. Progress Publishers. 1990). À
p. 57.
^3 Ibid.. p. 49. T
24 p. 50.
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subordinate to the pre-eminent goal of fulfilling and over fulfilling the 
monthly, yearly, and five-year plans^^.
This policy paid off in terms of industrial output: As seen from the tables below, economic 
growth was substantial during the 1920s and 1930s. Lemeshev noted that such growth was 
achieved extensively, by increasing the number o f low-paid workers. Agricultural production fell 
considerably in the first half of the 1930s as a result of forced collectivisation and also due to 
migration from the countryside to the cities.
Table 2.1 Growth o f  Industrial and Agricultural Production in the USSR in the 1920s (%)
1913 1920 1925 1928
Industria l production 100 22 73 132
A gricultural production 100 67 112 124
Source: Lemeshev (1990), p. 50.
Table 2,2 Economic Growth (in %) in the USSR in the 1930s (1928=1)
Indicators 1932 1937 1940
New fixed assets pu t into use 4.2 5.4 7.5
Industria l production 2.0 4.5 6.5
L abour productivity in industry 1.3 2.4 3.1
A gricultural production 0.9 1.1 1.3
L abour productivity in agriculture 1.1 1.6 1.7
Source: Lemeshev, (1990), p. 51.
Thus, Lemeshev noted.
With all this high-pressure growth of Soviet industry and with the nation's 
limited resources, industrial enterprises were built with total disregard for 
ecological requirements. Actually no such requirements were officially 
spelled out, much less made mandatory. Most o f the technologies used in 
those days were cheap, waste-producing and contaminating the 
environment over large areas. Industrial operations were carried out on a 
comparatively small scale, whereas any ecological information at public 
disposal in those days was very limited. Therefore the giant smokestacks 
towering over factories and plants, and the long plumes of belching 
smoke were presented as symbols o f progress and technical might^^.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, a large share of the USSR's factories, 
enterprises, coal mines, cities and towns were destroyed and nobody had time for nature 
conservation and environmental protection when the priority was to rebuild what had been 
destroyed as quickly as possible:
Forests were cut where they could be obtained easier, without any 
mechanised facilities - along railways and on river banks. Hundreds upon
23 Ziegler (1986), pp. 3-4. 
26 Lemeshev (1990*), p. 52.
I
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hundreds of plants and factories were built with high-waste and even 
ecologically dangerous production technologies. And all that was done 
for industrial growth, for creating the 'foundation' of our future well- 
behig27.
The problem was compounded by a rigid interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of 
preemptive growth of the means o f production over the growth of consumer goods as a mandatory 
prerequisite for extended reproduction interpreted by Soviet planners and economists to the effect 
that this was an absolute 'must'. Thus, in the period 1928 to 1940, production o f means of 
production (division 'A' industries) grew 10 times over, whereas production of consumer goods 
(division 'B' industries) increased by 4.2 times. From 1940 to 1987 the gap between production of 
the means of production and o f consumer goods increased, leading to a shortage o f consumer 
goods. Whereas consumer goods accounted for 2/5 of the total production in 1940, this share had 
fallen to less than 1/4 by 1987. The development of heavy industry was accompanied by a 
growing anthropogenic pressure upon nature, as the growth of heavy industries was linked with 
increased use o f natural resources and, due to poor technologies, also with increased pollution^*. 
The emphasis on extensive economic growth meant that socio-economic and ecological concerns 
became secondary to production and the introduction of the so-called 'residual' principle resulted 
in funds and technology for nature protection being allocated only after all other expenses had 
been covered^^.
Taut plans, stressing extensive, rather than intensive, economic growth, did not allow much 
space for innovation in general, and the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in 
particular^o. What was more, the Soviet Union did not have an industry keeping up with the latest 
inventions in the area and producing up-to-date equipment for the country's enterprises and 
factories. The plans required annual increases in output - the allocation o f resources for long-term 
research and production of environmental technologies thus suffered, as the installation o f such 
equipment in the counti^'s heavy industiy - much of which was 40-50 years old and very harmful 
to the environment - would require a halt in production of production equipment, steel and coal on 
which the Soviet economy depended heavily.
s
27 Ibid, p. 53.
Ibid, p. 56.
29 Ibid, p. 42.
36 Alec Nove has identified seven factors discouraging innovation at Soviet enterprises: Firstly, innovation 
would disrupt production, which would in turn interrupt plan-fulfillment, upon which the employees’ 
income depended. Secondly, risk was not rewarded in the Soviet economic system and all innovation 
carries a certain risk. Thirdly, plans incorporating innovation would be as difficult to fulfill as plans not 
including innovation - with the added disadvantage of containing risk. Fourthly, even if the plan was 
not formally adjusted to take innovation into account, plan targets were likely to be increased or norms 
for payments into incentive funds likely to be reduced. Fifthly, as plan-fulfillment was itself standing 
in the way of improved quality (and thus innovation), it would be difficult to obtain quality input for 
equipment designed to make production more efficient. Sixthly, innovation was seldom rewarded and 
finally, the producer had little control over his own production. See Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic
System. Third Edition (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986), pp. 161-62.
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Pryde pointed out that Marxism in some cases - although ‘implicit development priorities’ 
were generally of more importance for nature resource conservation than ideology - was acting as 
a break on nature conservation. This seemed to be the case regarding ‘the assumption that 
improper natural resource exploitation is the result of the capitalist mode o f production, and that a 
socialist economy necessarily pursues the wisest possible use of natural resources’. Certain 
elements of Marxism, combined with rapid industrialisation, were not well suited to preventing 
environmental problems. Moreover, ‘Marxist ideology very definitely suggests that 
"technological" solutions exist to all environmental problems...’3f
A related issue linked not only with the extensive growth strategy but also with ideology, 
was the allocation of free natural resources to Soviet industry. As pointed out by Gofman and 
F e d o r e n k o 3 2 ,  whereas various productive resources and consumer goods (blaga) were priced in the 
USSR, an exemption had been made for natural resources. This could be explained, as
K oiieq iio , n a^ o npnsuaTb HCKJiio’iHTejibiiyio cjio^ xiiocrb  iipnpoAULix 
boraTC i’B x a x  o b x e x x a  o n e u x n , no o c e  5xe 3T0 n e m a a n o e . Fm a n o e  
-  B iienoHHMaHHM o n a a io c r e H , T an m n xca  b "becnJiaTnocrM ” npnpoÆ iw x  
IDecypcoB, caM oro sn a a en u a  pauHonaaMsauHH ripH po4onojib30Baim n x a x  
$ a x T o p a  noBbnneiïHii s^HlæxTMBnocTM o b in e c r a e n n o r o  npoHSBOACi’Ba h 
y.ayqiu6HHfl x a q ecfB a  î x h s i i h  qej[0Dexa33.
Although Soviet economists had called for the pricing of natural resources as early as in the 
1950s (see Chapter One), they were not instructed to work out a methodology and take practical 
measures towards this end until 1972. The negative impact access to free resources had on the 
environment, though, seemed obvious:
0  xaxHX axoHOMHqecxMx crnM yaax x iipHpoAocbepeîxenH io mojkct 
iibiiie math peqb, ecjiH luiaxa sa  HcnoabSOBanMe jiecubix borarcTB  
c o cra n a a eT  ce flq a c  b cpeAneM npuM epno oahii pybJib n p a c q e r e  na 
rexxap jiea ib ix seiviejib, njiara 3a bo Ay mx noBepxnocrnbix h noAseivmbix 
MCToqnHXOB "  OAiia xon eu x a  3a xyboM exp pacxoAyeivtoH BOAbi, a 
ce.qbcxoxo3BMcrBennbie, ropoAcxMe sewAH. noAa Aaa opocM'reAbiibix 
nyîKA, HcnoAbsoBauMe oxpyA ca iom eu cpeAU aah pasMemenHfl BpeAnux 
OTXOAOB Hbine Boobme becnaao ib i aaa npeAnpMflTHH?34
Goldman reached the same conclusion, having examined the role of external costs in 
socialist economies:
3* Philip R. Pryde, Conservation in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 
136, 165, referred to in Joan DeBardeleben (1985), p. 16.
32 K. Fo$M au. H. (DeAopeuxo, ‘3xonoMHqecxaa saujHTa nPHDOJbt*. in KoMMynM(7i\no. 5, 1989.
33 Ibid.. p. 33.
34 i m ,  p. 34.
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Because the state in a socialist society owns all the means of production, 
sooner or later the state must bear all the social costs. Thus, in theory, 
there should be no such thing in the USSR as pushing social costs onto 
someone else. Despite the difficulty of assigning responsibility to each 
factory for its precise social costs, it should be in the interest of the USSR 
to make each factoiy pay for the social costs it generates. If each factory 
was held accountable for both the direct and social costs of its operations, 
much of the pollution would be treated within the confines of the plant 
before it could be pushed onto the population as a whole...In practice,
however, almost no effort is made in the USSR to assign such social 
costs. Consequently, the Russian factory manager has no economic 
incentive to clean up his pollution himself. In fact, the difficulty of 
dealing with externalities is actually compounded in a country like the 
USSR. This is because the environmental authorities must contend not 
only with the uncertain consequences of technology and the lack of 
precise cost measurements that exist in non socialist countries but also 
with Mai-xist ideology. It would be very difficult ideologically for the 
Russians to impose a charge on air and water^ .^ ' :ï,;;:|îI
2.1.3 The Administrative Command System and the Environment
The lack of concern for the environment was partly caused and partly enhanced by the Soviet 
administrative-command system, which Lemeshev labelled 'the enemy of nature'. Lemeshev 
blamed the environmental disruption in the USSR upon the 'emergence, rapid diffusion and 
subsequent consolidation of the sectoral, departmental, bureaucratic methods of administration of 
the social and economic development of the country'. Whereas the Soviet Constitution declared 
(art. 2) that 'all power in the USSR belongs to the people'36 the people's power exercised through 
the soviets had gradually been replaced by the power of ministries and departments, with the result 
that by the 1980s real power was in the hands of the executive bodies o f state, such as the USSR 
Council of Ministers, the ministries and departments of the union, union-republican and republican 
competence, as well as other governmental departments. This metamorphosis had come about as a 
result of the deformation of property relations in Soviet society:
...In its article 10 (the Soviet Constitution says) that 'The foundation of 
the economic system of the USSR is socialist ownership of the means of 
production in the form of state property (belonging to all the people), and 
collective farm-and-co-operative property'. It is precisely this foundation
i36 Marshall I. Goldman (1972), pp. 46-47.
36 Article 2 of the Soviet Constitution read as follows: All power in the USSR belongs to the people. The 
people exercise state power through the Soviets of People's Deputies, which constitute the political 
foundation of the USSR. All other state bodies are under the control of, and accountable to, the Soviets 
of People's Deputies. See KoncTHTvuHa CCCP m paanMTHe copeTCKoro :mKonoAarejiLcma (MocKoa; 
lOpHAuqecKaa JiHTepatypa, 1983), c. 20. The Soviet Constitution also contained a paragraph on 
environmental protection (art. 18), which read as follows: ‘B UTepecax nacrojimero h Ôy^yinux 
noKOAeiiHH Q CCCP npuHUMaioTCA neo5xoAHMLie Mepi.i aaîi oxpanbi m nayquo obocHOPanHoro 
pauMOHanbHoro McnoAbaoBanua scmam h ee iicAp, boahwx pecypcoB, pacTUTeAbnoro m AcuoOTHoro 
MHpa, AAA coxpaneHHA b qwcrore BOBAyxa m boau, oSecneqenHA BocnpoHSBOACi'Ba npwpoAHbix 
601HTCTB H yAyqmeimn OKpyuiaiomeû qeAOBexa cpcAbf Ilbid.. c. 31).
I
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that was loosened and undermined. At a plenary meeting of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU, in January 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev gave an 
exhaustive evaluation of the abnormal situation that had taken shape in 
our country. This is what he said; 'Special mention should be made of 4
socialist property. The control of who is really in charge of it, and how, 
has seriously weakened. Socialist property has often been eroded by 
parochialism and departmentalism. Gradually a situation has emerged 
where socialist property no longer belongs to anybody. Property no
37 Lemeshev (1990), p. 266.
I
longer 'costs' anything, it has no real owner either, and has in many cases 
been used for extracting unearned i n c o m e ' 3 7 .
l|
How had this shift of power taken place, and how come it had been sustained for so long?
The reason, argued Lemeshev, was to be found in the Soviet Constitution, which had effectively
made the USSR Council of Ministers both the executive and the administrative body of state 
authority (art. 128). Further, according to article 131 of the Constitution the Council o f Ministers
was given the right to decide all questions o f state authority. Thus the Soviet government, 
supported by a system of ministries and departments, was running the national economy, working
out short-term and long-term plans for economic and social development and taking measures for
their implementation. The ministries and departments had obtained the right to control financial 
.and material resources (capital investments, production assets and raw materials) and, as a result, |
'all these resources, which de jure  belong to all the people, to the whole nation, have actually 
become the property of ministries and departments which run them as their full masters, at their 
discretion and in their own narrowly departmental interests'.
Due to the taut plans (see above), which emphasised output and external economic growth, 
the ministries and departments asked for more and more resources to enhance the performance of 
the industries under their authority and also to compensate for the artificial shortage of all goods 
manufactured by Soviet industry. Supplying agencies, on the other hand, were in a position to cut 
a request for resources, but not to go against it, due to the plan - the targets of which had to be i  
fulfilled by law. Thus, a process of excessive use of natural resources causing waste and pollution 
was embarked upon, in which
I
I
Most of the resources are 'wangled' by those of the ministries and 
departments which promise the most, especially those that succeed in 
ramming a decision through the Central Committee of the CPSU and the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR on speeding up and expanding the 
development of their respective industries. Much assistance in this 
struggle for obtaining free natural resources by sectoral departments 
comes from relevant sectoral subdivisions in the State Planning 
Committee of the USSR, at the Council of Ministers of the USSR and at 
the Central Committee of the CPSU. The tighter the like-minded officials 
of the different departments close ranks, the more chance they have of
success. To get a sweeping plan through means larger investments, more y
material resources, more workers, greater wage funds and bonus 
allocations, also more foreign currency, greater prestige and benefits.
4
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Thus public and national interests are replaced by departmental and 
personal mercenary interests^®.
To illustrate his point, Lemeshev showed the tremendous expansion that had taken place of 
the bureaucratic apparatus from 1917 and up until 1986: In 1917, immediately after the formation 
o f the RSFSR, there were 10 all-union people's commissariats. By 1936, the number had risen to 
18, in 1956 there were 52 and in 1979, 64 ministries of all-union competence. Fifty-five of these, 
in addition to some multi-sectoral committees, were situated in Moscow. If state bodies for the 
administration of spheres other than industry were added to this figure (64 ministries), 115 all- 
union governmental departments could be identified! In addition, every Soviet republic had on 
average 30 ministries, 15 state committees and 20 other departments of republican competence. In 
1986 the USSR had some 650,000 independent administrative bodies (state administration, 
economic and social affairs). Each administrative body controlled about four enterprises and 
organisations. The combined staff of all these administrative bodies was 32.6 million people (2.5 
workers and engineers per administrator. In industry and on the state farms the figure was 1.5 per 
one official, and in the construction industry the figure was even lower!).
As the Soviets of People's Deputies had no access to natural resources, they were in effect 
deprived of real economic power and became dependent on the very ministries and departments in 
theory subordinate to them, as the latter controlled the resources and were therefore masters not 
only in their respective industries, but indeed in all parts of the country where they conducted their 
economic activity^^. With regard to the use o f natural resources, the following situation was 
identified by Gofman and Fedorenko:
...PacTOMHTeALHoe npupoAonoAbsoBauHe -  a i o  lie  TOAbxo CAeAcrrBue, n o  
M ycAOBue, McroqiiMK cyuieci'BOBaimii u , ecAM yroA u o , 
3KM3liecn 0 C0 6 lI0 CFH aAMMIIHCTpaTHBHO-KOiVianAIiOH CHCreMLI
xo3flHCTBOBaiiMfl. H ecuocoG iiaA  npoSyAHTL rary aioa6h k TBopaecrBy,
K cosA a iiH io M HCOAL30BanHio iiOBoro B i ia y x e  h TexiiMKe, 
aAMMIIMCTpaTMBHaa CHCT6Ma MOACCT AOÔMBaTbCA 3K0II0MHAeCK0r0 pocFa  
TGABKO aKCFencHBHUM By'FeM BOBAeAeuHA B oS m ecF B e iiu oe
np0H3B0ACFBG BCG SOALUierO KOAHAeCTBa IlOBLIX M HGBI.1X peCypCGB, 
nj^ ejKAC Bcero bbatlix y npupoAW. 3i'a cHCFeivia Moacex cymecFBOBaTb 
AHUJb paspyiuaA eAoa ah lie Bce, naKGn.aeiiiioe npeAbiAymMMM 
nOKGAeilHAMH -  lie TGAbKO AIOAGH, 110 M BCerO ^HBOFO. Olia 
Bopoi^aeF Ao:«uyio AHAeiuMy: hah aKoiiGMHuecKoe pasBHTHe, hah
coxpaiienHe npHpoAbi -  rpei'bero ne Aano^ o.
38 Ibid., pp. 269-70.
39 por examples, see ibid.. pp. 270-94. Further examples can be found in Chapters Five, Six and Seven of
this thesis.
4 6  F o i l iM a n , (D eA o p en K O  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  c .  3 1 .
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2.1.4 Legislation on the Environment and its Implementation
Although the Soviet Union officially until the early 1970s claimed that there were either no, or 
only minor, environmental problems in the country and that such problems were a feature of 
capitalist societies, writers on the environment took great pride in the fact that environmental 
legislation had been passed as early as 1917. Thus a book on the issue argued that
B CoBercKOM Coio3e...c nepBwx act cymecrBOBaiiHA imreiicHuno 
pasBHBaeTca upmxiAooxpaiiMxeAwioe aaKonoAareAbcrBO [rax, S uah 
npHHATbi: iiexpei ”0  seMAe” (1917r.); Aexpex ”0  couuaAHsauHH seM.in”
(1918r.); iio c r a i iO B A e H H e  B lfM K  ”0  c o i iH a A H c r H ' ie c x o M
3 e M .a e y c r p o H c r B e  h  o  w e i i a x  n e i^ e x o A a  x  c o u H a A H c r M A e c x o M y  
3eM .aeA eA M io” (1919r.); A e x p e i  ”0  .a e c a x ” (1918r.); A cx p er  ”0  i ie A p a x  
3eMAH” {1920r.) h A p y r u e ] .  3 r o  pasBH TM e b iia q a .r ie  f b iA o  t c c u o  
C B im i io  c  M M eiievi B.H. J le iiM iia , x o T o p w H  n p o ito H A  r .n y b o x y io  
3a m iT e p e co B a n H O C T b  b ycra iiü B .A e iiM M  n a y i i i o  o S o c i iO B a i i i io r o  
n ix iB o n o p A A x a  b acac H cnoA bB O B aH m i n p u jx iA H b ix  yr in oB H H  aaa iia |)O A a .
B. H. JleiiHH npHiiHMaA axTHB iioe yA a cru e  b noAroTOBxe Bcex  
Bbimeiia3BauMbix A ex p e io B  m noCTanoBAeiiHH, a  A exjier  "O seMAe" 6lia  
MM AHAEio noAroTOBAeit H npGAAOAceu lia paccMOTpeuHe c iæ baa  
CoB6TOb4*,
Goldman has questioned Lenin's commitment to environmental protection, backing up his 
position with references to Zile (1970). Although several laws of a conseiwationist nature were 
passed under Lenin, it is veiy difficult to prove whether he was himself initiating these laws or just 
acting as an automatic approver. Thus, as 'Lenin's signature was affixed to all laws and 
decrees...this is (today) taken as proof that these were Lenin's laws. Undoubtedly some of them 
were; but logically the bulk of them originated at lower levels (Zile 1970a, pp. 11,21,22,24).42'. 
Moreover, Lenin also signed laws and regulations counteracting environmental legislation. As 
pointed out by Zile, Lenin approved the wholesale destruction of many forests to provide needed 
supplies of fuel and timber for export. This led Goldman to the conclusion that 'as long as 
conservation did not stand in the way of economic need, it was a laudable goal. Unfortunately, the 
definition of economic need is not rigidly fixed, and therefore it was shaped to meet the 
convenience of the parties involved even if it came at the expense o f nature. Furthermore, in an 
era o f political and economic unrest, conservation regulations, along with almost all laws at the 
time, were ignored as often as they were honored'43. Finally, as a factor that seemed to support 
this view, Goldman noted that, until the mid 1960s, no reference was made to Lenin in the debate 
on the environment^**.
" i
42 Goldman (1972), p. 27.
43 Ibid.. p. 16.
4 4 jb ii ,  p. 18.
45 MÛ» p. 15.
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From Lenin’s death in 1924 until the mid-1950s very few laws were passed on the 
environment. O f those that were passed, one resolution was issued on fishing; a law establishing 
sanitary protection zones around drinking reservoirs was also passed, as was a regulation for 
health r e s o r t s * * ^ ,  in October 1948 a scheme for the creation of eight tree shelter belts in areas 
suffering from draught and erosion was endorsed, but none of these seemed to be observed. Of 
greater importance was a resolution on air pollution passed a year later, in 1949, by the USSR 
Council of Ministers. The resolution created the Chief Administration for Sanitary 
Epidemiological Supervision, which in the following decades was responsible for monitoring 
emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere, following its creation, an improvement in 
the quality of urban air did take place:
The ah pollution resolution in 1949 was the first hint that environmental 
questions would eventually have to be taken seriously. Because of the 
rapid rate of industrial growth, such a transformation was only a matter of 
time. Nevertheless, almost another decade passed before legislative 
concern took on serious proportions (Kolbasov, 1965, p. 213). Even 
then, however, the typical response to repeated assaults on the countiy's 
natural resources was to pass another law, a phenomenon not unique to 
the USSR. As a result, beginning on June 7, 1957, with the passage of 
the law 'For the Protection of Nature' in the Republic of Estonia, until 
Khrushchev's ouster in the fall of 1964, enough laws on the environment 
were passed to satisfy the most insatiable lawyer. By March 26, 1963, all 
fifteen Soviet republics had laws 'For the Protection of Nature' on their 
books...If one were to judge purely on the basis of the number of relevant 
laws and decrees that had been issued, it would be Khrushchev..., not 
Lenin, who would be memorialized as the father-guardian of conservation 
in the USSR46.
Between 1956 and 1960 some 19 decrees on conservation and 10 articles in the Criminal 
Code on conservationist matters were adopted in the Russian Federation alone (Zile, 1970b, p. 5). 
As pointed out by Goldman, though, initially the emphasis was on laws on the use and protection 
o f certain types of natural resources, rather than on laws covering all resources (p. 28), Thus, a 
law 'For the Protection of Nature' issued in 1960 by the Parliament of the RSFSR was fairly vague, 
identifying those resources that would be controlled and ordering all enterprises and factories to 
install purification equipment, as it would be illegal to discharge untreated sewage into the 
atmosphere or the republic's rivers^^;
The plethora of Soviet laws passed in the late 1950s and in the 1960s 
demonstrates that the accepted approach to the solution of environmental 
disruption in the USSR seemed to be, if the first law does not work, pass
46 Ibid.. pp. 28-29.
47 IM l, pp. 29-30. 
47
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another one. Often it seemed as if the second law differed only slightly, 
if at all, from the original one already on the statute books^ ,^
By the late 1960s, however, voices critical of the way these laws were implemented started 
to make themselves heard. Thus, for instance, in 1967 lurii Efremov argued in Literaturnaia 
gazeta that there was a need for an all-union law on the environment, as local measures tended to 
be overridden by Moscow:
4aAce crpOAcaHLUMe h3 Mecrubix 3au|)eT0B Aencmeuubi auinb n 
orpauHAeuiioM oGteMe. Mx cnoco6na napa.fiHsoiîaTb h CKpownaa 
GTpac.iieBan HHcrpyKUHH, ecAH ona H3Aana b MocKBe. Box noACMy 
paspaSoxxa eAunoxG G5mecGi03HorG saxGiia 06 oxpaiie npHjwtbi 
CTanoBHXcfl BaîKitoH 3aAaqeH49
Not until 1972 was the first step made towards an all-union law on the environment. In 
September that year the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree 'On Measures for the Further 
Improvement of Nature Conservation and the Rational Use of Natural Resources', in which 
environmental protection was referred to as an integral part of the national economy. The decree 
also revealed that there were problems with the implementation of previous legislation on the 
environment:
Ha MHOFMX nijeAnpmixHflx h b pipie ro|X)AOB oxcyxcrByioi’ 
iieoSxoAHMbie coopysfceuMfl no o'lHCXKe ciGMiibix boa. MeAAeuiio HAer 
MX crrpoHxe.Bbci’BO, a cpeACXBa, BbiAemieMbie iia axM neuM.
HcnoAb3yioxcH lie no.miGcxbiG. He obecne'iHnaeTCfi xaxAce AOAAcuaa 
oAMcxxa npGMbiuiAeFfiibix BbifipocoB B axMoaliepy, neAocraxoAiio 
iipoM3BOAMXcfl FasGOAMCXHbix M nbiAey.AaBAMBaioiUMX ycrpGMcrn m
ycxaiiGBOK^^
Starting in 1972, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed 
resolutions on the strengthening of environmental protection almost every year, and resolutions 
were passed on the protection of Baikal, the Volga basin and the Urals, the Azov and Black Seas, 
the Baltic Sea, Lake Ladoga, industrial cities in the Kuzbass and Donbass as well as Moscow, 
Leningrad and the Arctic Coast^*. From 1975 onwards, environmental protection measures were 
spelled out in the annual and five-year plans, thus earmarking funds to prevent pollution. This was 
done to encourage enterprises and factories to install pollution reducing devices, as the policy of
48 Ibid, p. 31.
49 J ln T ep a T yp im si ra æ ra , 13.9.1967, quoted in W. Von Schlippe, ‘Problems of Ecology in the Soviet
Union’. Journal o f Russian Studies, no. 45, 1983, p. 3.
56 CoB&rcKaji PoccMn, 21.9.1972. quoted in Ibid.
5* Mmxama K  JleMeineB^, ‘Pa3DVUJHxeAbnaa nocrvnb ’vcKoneiiMfl’. in M.fl. JlcMeuieB (06m. |>eA.), 
gKQAOFHAecKan aabxepiiaxMBa (MocKBa: Hporpecc, 1990), c . 199-200.
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encouraging them to use money from their basic investment funds for pollution control devices 
had proved highly unsuccessful^.
The new Soviet Constitution passed in 1977 contained several references to the 
environment, and in June 1980, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed several laws regarding the 
rational use of natural resources and the protection of the environment. Finally, in June 1985 the 
USSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolution 'On the Observance of the Requirements of the 
Legislation on the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Use o f Natural Resources’. This 
resolution was issued as the laws passed during the 1970s and 1980s remained on paper only:
MHHMcrepCTBa h  BeAOMcrBa h x  nonpocry Hn iopupoBaAH, ccb iA aaa, na 
iiexBaxK y cpeA crn, a  r.riaBiioe -  iia ’’xcejieA ny io” HeoOxoAHMOcrb 
BbinoAiienHfl naanoB .raoGoM neiiOH.
This resolution marked the first step towards environmental reform, as people's health would be 
given priority in the future development of the Soviet economy:
UpH pemefiMH npoOaeM pasBMTHii na[X)AHoro xosA Hcrna ncxoAHTb hb 
npMopHTeTa oxpanb i 3AopoBbfl iia c r o a m e r o  h O yA ym ux noKOJieiiMfi 
COBeTCKMX AIOAefi, C03AaHH3I HaHAyqiUHX yCAOBMM AAII MX 3KH3HM, 
iiaueAMTb na 3xo  Hayuiio-TexiiHMecKMH riporpecc, oOecneqMTb nepexoA  
na pecypcocO epera iom M e TexiiOAorHM, iiaM Sojiee n o a n o  m G epeacuo  
Hcnoab30BaTb npMpoAiibie OoraxCTBa, noay'ieHHbie M3 hmx cbipbe, 
MaxepMaabi m npoAyxuM io^^.
Thus,
F ipM opM TeT 3A opoB bA  M O a a r o B o a y A M B  n a c e a e n H a  b  q x iB iien M M  c 
A pyruM M  n eaflM M  n p u p o A o n o a b sO B a H M fl m o x p a i ib i  npupoAbi o s a a q a e T ,  
A'l’o  H M K aK oe M cn oab S O B a ifH e n p u p o A H b ix  jB e c y p c o B , xaK H M  6 b i  o n o  bm  
5 b ia O  BbU^OAHblM C 3K0110M HqeCKOH TOAKH BpeilH A , 116 M0AC6T
ocymecTBanTbCfl, ecjiM oiio BaeACT aa coS om peaabiiyio yrposy acmsiih, 
3AopoBbio M ôaaronoayAMiG aioA6H. 3 tot npMiiuMn GpraiiMAecxM
BbiTexaer m3 oOmeH ryMaiiMCTMAecKOM KoimenuMU cGUMaaM3ivia.
CGraaciiG kgtopom couMaaM3M npeAcraBaiieT coGom xaxGM tmb
GSmecroa, e kgtopom bcc cymee noAAMiieiiG MirrepecaM iiapoAa, see 
Ae.AaeTca aab AeaoBeKa m bg mma AeaoBexa^**.
The protection of the environment under socialism was viewed as a ‘prophylactic guarantee 
o f healthcare'! And, clearly expressing Marxist-Leninist sentiments, 'nature would be exploited in 
such a way that it would be improved for future generations'.
62 Ziegler (1986), p. 5.
63 Ibid., p. 200.
64 p. 35.
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Although numerous laws regarding the environment were passed by the USSR Supreme 
Soviet from the late 1950s onwards, emissions of harmful substances into the air and waters of the 
Soviet Union increased in parallel with the introduction of new laws. Goldman (1972) argued that 
increasing pollution could not be explained by a lack of legal provisions to combat pollution, as 
there had been a heavy reliance on legal restraint and good intentions. In fact, eager to prove the 
supremacy of socialist environmental legislation to that of capitalist legislation, the USSR as the 
first country in the world introduced maximum permissible levels of harmful substances in the air 
and also adopted stricter limits for emissions of pollutants into the air and waters than most other 
countries, including the United States^^, As it turned out, however, many of these limits were 
simply impossible to observe and thus contributed to the many violations of Soviet environmental 
legislation. As will be seen below, the emphasis on economic growth in the Soviet Union also had 
to take much of the blame for enterprises' and factories' disregard for environmental legislation. 
Finally, there was no unified administrative body to secure the implementation of environmental 
legislation and execute sanctions against those failing to comply.
Economic Reasons
Although Soviet legislation entailed provisions allowing for serious offenders to be prosecuted, in 
practice, emissions of harmful pollutants into the air and water normally resulted in nothing more 
than a fine - normally this fine was from 5 to 50 rubles. In more serious cases it was raised to 100 
rubles. Thus, the size of the fine did not in itself serve as a deterrent to the country's most 
polluting enterprises and factories. Besides, fines were not paid by individuals but by the 
enterprise fund. Funds earmarked for the payment of fines were often included in the financial 
plan o f the enterprises at the beginning of the year, so that instead of temporarily stopping 
production to install or repair pollution control facilities, the enterprises could immediately pay the 
fine and continue production. The enterprises themselves suffered no financial loss from this 
practice, as money were allocated for this purpose from the central ministries. Why did such a 
practice come about?
As seen above, failure to fulfil the plan had serious consequences not only for the enterprise 
or factory in question, but also for the local authorities in the area where it was located and for the 
ministiy or department to which it was subordinated. Failure to reach one's plan targets was not 
only a criminal offence - the five year and annual plans were passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet 
as laws - but also resulted in the loss of bonuses and high salary premiums, which affected the 
enterprise/factory leadership as well as all its workers directly. Premiums were paid only if  plan 
targets had been 100% fulfilled. Bonuses were increased progressively with the size of output. 
Pollution control was a non-productive expense, which usually resulted neither in increased
55 Goldman (1972), pp. 23-24.
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production nor in increased profit for the enterprise/factory - on the contrary, as production either 
had to be temporarily reduced or stopped altogether while pollution reducing devices were 
installed, such measures were likely to interrupt the enterprise's ability to fulfil its plan targets.
Although Soviet legislation on the environment allowed for the closure o f enterprises and 
factories which refused to install proper treatment facilities, this measure was used sparingly, as 
'the product of the factory is very necessaiy and the plan cannot be disrupted'. The reason for this
set up centrally. The money allocated to these funds, however, was seldom used in full, and there 
was a reluctance among directors of Soviet enterprises to request such funds. When such funds
4'::4
was the strong centralisation of the Soviet economy, which facilitated the construction of large
enterprises producing one or two items for the entire Soviet Union. Consequently, if such an 
enterprise was closed down, not only would the item(s) it produced disappear from the shelves of
-shops throughout the country, but worse - if the enterprise was producing some key product used 
by several other enterprises in their production, then closing the enterprise would trigger a domino 
effect, making plan-targets not only impossible to fulfil at one, but at several enterprises. Closures 
were only carried out when the physical health of Soviet citizens had been directly affected^^.
In an effort to reduce pollution in Soviet industi-y, special funds for pollution control were
were requested, it was often viewed in negative terms by the ministries and departments in charge 
of the enterprise in question. An example from Ukraine illustrates this situation very well. The 
director of the Makeevka factoiy in the Donbass wanted to install a water treatment facility at his 
factory and requested funds for this purpose. The Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, 
however, accused him of having the wrong attitude towards state funds. By the time the money 
finally arrived, the Makeevka factory had already caused considerable damage to the local
environment^^.
As for local authorities, they were not in a position to oppose local polluting enterprises and 
factories for two reasons. Firstly, until January 1962 and also later fees collected for the violation 
of environmental legislation were channelled into the local budgets and in some cases used to 
fund local hospitals and other facilities. Secondly, local government officials had a personal 
interest in having local enterprises meet their plan targets, as 'the most important criterion for any 
government official who seeks promotion or recognition is how much his production has increased 
in his region, not to what extent his rivers have been cleaned up this year. It follows that few 
government officials are likely to be particularly sympathetic to those who threaten the attainment 
of new production records. As Zile puts it, this is one of the hazards of being both the police and 
the policed’ (Zile, 1970a, p. 9)68. Finally, challenging polluting enterprises was a complicated
affair, in which local authorities had to seek recourse to higher party organs and/or the responsible
66 IM4, p. 37.
57 Ibid.,p. 69.
68 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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ministry69. Such efforts could easily be branded as undermining plan-fulfilment and could have 
some repercussions for those involved.
According to Lemeshev, none of the resolutions issued on particular areas from 1972 
onwards, nor any of the laws on environmental protection adapted during the 1970s and 1980s, 
was implemented. The ministries and departments simply ignored them, arguing that there was a 
lack o f resourses and, more importantly, that the plan had to be fulfilled no matter what the cost^o.
Ideological Reasons
Beskrovnykh (1990) holds the view that a major reason for the poor state of the environment in the 
USSR can be found in the introduction of Marxist ideas into Soviet biology. The idéologisation of 
the country’s biology in the 1930s had a negative effect on the environment for the following 
reason:
H A e o a o P H 3 a u H fl O n o n o r u M  b re roA L i npM Be.na k  (|)o p M H p o B a n H io  
njieAejiLHO HAecaornsHpoBaiinoH reopHH m npaKTuxe onpeAeaenmi 
crreneiiM onacnoci'H o t x o a o b  npoHSBOAcrna Ann OKpyAcaromefi cpeAW n  
seaoBeKa b uen. Teopna ara, ecreCTBenno, npoTHBoriOCTaBJiajiaa, 
sanaAHOH h oSxnBJumacb saBoenaiiHeM couMaanaMa. HeBepoamo, no 
3xa TeopMfl, iieMsSeTKHO BCAyipaa k ncrpeOjieiiHio s k h b o p o  b 
opyAcaiomeH cpeae, a o a c h j i b  iie t o j i l k o  nensMenennOH h  iie T[X)HyTOH 
KpHTHKawH, no ceroAHii flBJiaeTCH ’’iiayquLiivj” ocnoBanHeM Aejia oxpaiiu  
npH[)OAU M nac b nen^*.
Two axioms derived from this theory and practice proved particularly harmful to the 
environment and to people's health, in Beskrovnykh's view. Firstly, the notion that the danger or 
lack of danger of any substance could be established only in an experimental manner, i.e. by 
exposing animals to these substances (materialist and scientific). Thus:
Ms 3'roH axcMOMLi BbiTexaeT gaho G'leiib oaAciioe ajib n a c  cneA crBue: 
o n a  naAHCTO oTM eraex Bce Miibie, xpoM e onpeA eju iew bix b a 
KcnepMMeirre, n o x a sa ie a M  iieSaaponoayA H ii cpeA u a a a  AejiOBexa, AaAce 
TaKwe OAeBMAiibie, kak p o c r  .saSojieBaeM ociH  m CMepTiiocrH n aceA en m i 
n o cj ie  n a q a a a  9KcnjiyaTauHH ropo hah  hhopo npeAnpHAXHii h 
CBAsan iib ix c  ep o  AeATeabiiocrrbio ToxcHAecKHx BbiSpocoB^^.
69 DeBardeleben (1985), p. 69.
66 JTcMeujeB (1990), c. 200.
6* Bhktop BecxpGBHbiX, ‘gxojiopHAecKHH xnH3HC B CCCP. OpHAHiibi. CAejCTBHA. O g m c k  Bbixo/ia’ .
F pam  158, 1990, c. 245.
62 Ibid.. pp. 245-46.
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As an example, Beskrovnykh referred to the vitamin-proteine combine at Kirishi in 
Leningrad oblast, where following its opening in 1975 people started falling seriously ill with 
allergies. However, as it could not be proven experimentally that there was a connection between 
pollution emanating from the enterprise and people's deteriorating health, and as no proper 
methodology had been elaborated for working with statistics, the enterprise manager could sleep I f
quietly. |
A second axiom was that various substances become dangerous only after they reach a 
certain threshold; if below this threshold, they are completely harmless. The threshold | |
Beskrovnykh was talking about was the so-called maximum permissible consentrations - PDK:
fB CÜMOM Aejie, xoMy, xpovie cneuMaaMcroB, BUAna pasiinua wemiy,
CKdAceM, 3 MJiH 7 r W ?  3 x0 Muoro m.fim Ma.io? E c m  "Miioro”. to  j I
Aero ’’wH oro”? B e m e m m  -  a a . M iioro, b AaimoM ca y A a e  b 300 pa.) J |
S o a b u ie  iieKOH hcxgahoh bcahahiiu. Ho b cxan b K o ace pas ®
Boapaci'aer o n a a io c ii? . Toace b 300 pas? KoireA iio ace i ie r  -  bo 
MHoro pas SojTbiue. II
'3;::...HonaxHe "AonycTHMon" H4K, T.e. ’’SesonaciioPi”, nocxeneiiHo, no
iie H sd e a c H O  CMecxHJiGCb n a  n p a K T H x e  b  c x o p o n y  ’’A oriyci'M M OM ”, r .e . I
" p a sp eu ien H G H ”. h  x e n e p b  y a c e  O Txpb iTO  C A B H raeT cn  b a i o S y i o  c x o p o n y ,
B 3aBHCMM0CXH O’l' CfipOCa OCHOBHOrO n0Ab30Baxe.Ab)I nOHflXMeiVI -  
nijeAnpnaxMn, sarpasuaioinero GxpyacaiGuiyio cpeay^3_
■f
As 'the most rigid' norms in the world were simply not implementable, a practice o f using -îl''temporary' norms, not listed in any reference book, and not accessible to the general population, 
emerged. Besides, measurements were bound to be inadequate, as they were made outside the 
sanitary zone of an enterprise, and not close to its source, as was common practice elsewhere. The 
implications of such a practice were seen in the case of Chernobyl:
:
J' ;
Okgag 600 xbiciiA Ae.A0Bex nponum Aepes ocoSyio 3Guy Mepiiofibuifl.
Ohm xaM ue oxauxuah -  3anMMaAHCb BaAciieHmefi AAA nac paGoxou.
Tenepb b x h  c g x i i h  x u c a a  Goaiaim h  GA eiib c e p b e s n o ,  M i io x H e  y A c e  y m A H  
M3 ACH3HH. H o  CneUMaAHCXbl-paAMOJTOrM H e IiaXOAAX y HMX 
sa G o A eB a n M H , C B A sa iinb ix  c  oS A y A e iiM e M . Hemsn naxojiHTb -  h x
n a u M e iix b i lie im G paA M  A o s y  Bbiiue A on ycxH M O H . A ’’A o n y cx H M O H ”, x a x  
H3BecTOG , AG x a x a c x p o ( [ ) b i  G b ia a  A o s a  25 B3P, bo npewA x a x a c x p o ^ b i  
o u a  c  a e r x o H  p y x M  H j ib M iia  m m p g m  B b ip o cA a  a o  75, x e n e p b  
G c x a iio B M a a c b  i ia  35 B3P. IIFor comparison, the analogous figure for Germany was three ber. The use of maximum
permissible concentrations by the countiy's enterprises was also highly controversial. In the case !;
-of Lake Ladoga in Russia, for instance, enterprises were allowed to emit any substance into the
S
lake as long as the quantities did not exceed the maximum permissible level. Consequently, the 
water in the lake was considered 'safe'. Thus, concluded Beskrovnykh,
.
...Ecjih Mbi pacTBopHM B cTaxane BOAbi 3-4 Aecarxa pa3Hbix h a o b ,
KoimeiiTpauHfl xaACAom m  Koropbix ne c.ahiukom onaaia, to craxaa
3T 0T  MOAOIO 6 g3 BpCAB BblBMTb...^**
Beskrovnykh was also highly sceptical about the way in which the maximum permissible 
levels were deduced, as this was done by the very ministries that produced the pollution (see 
below). Their institutes and laboratories developed, passed and changed the permissible levels 
whenever this was required, and the way in which this was done was far from acceptable:
OnpeAe.tuiiOT, xax y ace 6bi.no cxasano, axcnepMMeirra.nbBO m na 
peAxoci'b GecxHTpocrno. Bepyr AioAcuiiy .naGopaTopiibix xpbic h  b  
nenenHe 4 - x  MecaueB, a xenepb, c pasBuxneM ManeMaxHXH - ,  Mecim 
Abiuiax 3XH xpbicbi B03A.yxoM c AoGaBXOH AAa H, ecjiH ne noAbixaiox, 
ne oGnapyACHBatox npu ncxpbixHu cxojib-riHGo 3HanHxe.nbHbix 
iTOBpeACAeiiMH opraiioB, xo naHAennyio xonuenxpanmo yMeiibiuaiox aaa  
naAeAcnoCTH b  10 pa3 m oGbABAAiox GesonacnOH m b  vamoefca.
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Thus, the major problem was not inadequate legislation and regulations in themselves, but
■i'.Vthe very way in which permissible levels were determined and the way they were frequently 
adjusted to each individual enterprise to allow for excess pollution to continue. There was also a 
disregard for safety and pollution within the decision-making bodies with authority over the 
environment. This could be traced back to the use of official slogans such as Michurin’s 'we 
should not wait for bounties from nature. Our task is to take them from nature’ (nam ne nado 
zhdat milostei ot prirody. Bziat ikh u nee - nasha zadacha) and the notion that the Soviet Union 
was so vast that pollution posed no serious threat.
;Administrative Reasons
Prior to Gorbachev's environmental reforms in early 1988, a wide range of ministries and 
departments were responsible for the protection and rational use of natural resources. These were
USSR Gosagroprom, USSR Gosleskhoz, USSR Minvodkhoz, USSR Minrybkhoz, USSR 
Goskomgidromet, USSR Minzdrav, USSR Mingeo, USSR Gosgortekhnadzor and Gai MVD 
USSR. These bodies were primarily responsible for the control of the environment^^.
____________________________
64 Ibid.. p. 249.
65 r ocyAapcrBeiHibiM xoMHxex CCCP no oxpa iie  npHpoAw, CocxcA im e nPHPOAiioH qpeAbi b CCCP b 1988
roAV {MocKBa: JlecnaA npoMbiuiAenuocrb, 1990), c. 140-41 .
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Most of these ministries and departments, however, were not only given the task of I
controlling the state of the environment, but were also major users of natural resources. Thus, to 
give an example, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture was not only the major user of agricultural 
land, but at the same time exerted state control over the activities of all land-users^^. Similarly, 
the Ministry of Fisheries was in charge of both the harvesting of fish according to plan directives,
■'f'iand of the conservation of commercial and recreational fish stocks. The State Committee for
IS immense '69
Forestry regulated both the cutting and the replanting of forests, and all other aspects of timber 
procurement^?. Not surprisingly, therefore, the environment came out as the major loser. The ffi
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources was in charge o f controlling water and soil |
pollution, while at the same time funding big water construction projects such as the river 
diversion project stopped in 1986, and monitored serious sources o f ecological disruptions^. 
Environmental planning was conducted by a number of state committees, the major one being the A
State Committee for Science and Technology. The responsibilities o f these state committees 
often overlapped, and as pointed out by Pryde, 'given that Soviet bureaucracies jealously guard 
their own empires, the potential for counter-productive squabbling and lack of co-operative efforts
:
From the late 1960s, state committees on the protection of the environment and the rational |  
use of natural resources were set up in all the European republics o f the USSR with the exception 
o f the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, Derzhkompriroda emerged in 1967. According to the 
assistant to the chairman of this committee, Serhii Mykhailiv, the committee was not very efficient 
and achieved little in its first 20 years of existence. This, he claimed, was very much due to 
pressure from the USSR and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers, seeking to implement the country's 
annual and 5-year plans. Derzhkompriroda did, however, help stabilise the situation, co­
ordinating the efforts of some 10 ministries and departments also endowed with environmental 
functions. Following the accident at Chernobyl in 1986, Derzhkompriroda was strengthened with |  
the employment of additional specialists. However, these did not approach the environment in an 
integrated way, focusing instead entirely on water, soil or air?6.
In 1978, in an attempt to streamline the apparatus responsible for the protection and the 
rational use of natural resources, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers ■ï?passed a resolution upgrading the Hydrometeorological Service o f the Ministry of Health to an 
independent State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control?*. The new
I:,;
-------------------------------------------  j66 Ibid.. p. 141.
6? Philip R. Pryde, Environmental Management in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 9.
68 Joan DeBardeleben, ‘The New Politics in the USSR: the Case of the Environm enf. in John Massey
Stewart (ed.), The Soviet Environment. Problems. Policies. Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 68-69.
69 Pryde (1991), p. 9.
?6 Interview with Serhiy Mikhailov, Kiev, August 1991.
?* Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental Protection in the Soviet Union (Berlin: Wissehschaftszentrum Berlin 
fiir sozialfbrschung - Forschungsschwerpunkt Umweltpolitik HUG, 1986), p. 5.
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not have the financial resources, legal authority, or political support of the Party to combat 
pollution effectively'?^. Administrative changes proved just as ineffective as the large number of 
laws and regulations passed throughout the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s:
OniiT nocjieAHHX 20 aex, KOTOpwe Gliah peKopAHbiMH no KOJiMAecrny
Thus, following the Chernobyl accident, and with Gorbachev's glasnost revealing the true 
picture of ecological damage done to the Soviet environment over the previous 70 years, the need 
for real environmental reform became'more pressing.
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.committee, headed by Dr lurii Izrael, was made responsible for monitoring the quality of air and
water throughout the USSR, with a special emphasis on critical areas. Moreover,
Goskomgidromet would inspect enterprises and construction sites, as well as assessing the degree
of compliance with environmental regulations and standards. Those enterprises that did not
comply with these could be permanently or temporarily shut down. However, upgrading the
hydrometeorological service proved insufficient, partly for the reasons mentioned above, partly as
the new committee focused primarily on controlling water and air pollution (not soil pollution,
radioactive pollution, chemical waste disposal, etc.). Finally, Gidromet was given only limited
*enforcement powers - most o f these functions were retained by the ministries and departments 
causing the pollution in the first instance^^.
Signalling increasing concern with the state of the environment in the USSR, a department 
for environmental protection was created within the USSR Gosplan in 1981. Further, a 
Commission on Environmental Protection was established under the auspices of the USSR 
Council o f Ministers the same year. However, neither of these was given proper enforcement
,powers, and no significant improvement could be observed following their creation?3. Ziegler 
(1990), points out that 'agencies specifically charged with environmental protection missions did
'33' 3": '% 3
Î
aAMHHHcrpaïMBHbix Mep, HanpaBAeniiwx na yAyAineuHe 
npMpoAori0Ab30BaHHA, a raxAce pexopAHbiMH no xoAH'iecTBy peajibiinx 
M noTenuHajibno cospeniiinx axoAornqecxHx npoGacM, noxasaA, m to  a  
TOT MexafiH3M ne MOAcei Gbrrb TOAbxo aAMHUHcrpaTHBHO- 
ynpaBAenqecxMM. 3x0 a o a a c c h  Gsixb ni^ eACAe ncero axonoMMHecxHH 
MexaHH3M. yKecrxaa aAMnnncxpaxMBno-KOManAHan iTerAaMenxauHn 
AOJiAcna Gbixb sawenena peniaMeuxanneH iiopMaxHBiioH (axonoMwiecxoH 
M axoAorMwecKOH), xoxopaa npHAacr caMocxoaxeabnocxb b c c m  
MepapxHMecKHM crpyxxypaM n h o s b o a m t  h m  ynec ix MnorooGpasne 
wecrHbix npHpoAHbix h xosîiHCTBeniibix ycAOBHH? .^
?2 Piyde (1991), p. 9.
?3 Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental Policy and Politics under Gorbachev (Paper presented at the Fourth 
World Congress o f Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, England, 21-26 July 1990), p. 13.
'^ 4 Ibid» p. 13.
?5 B.n.KapaKHn, A.C. LUeHnrays, K h o b o m v  nDHDOiionoAbsoBanMio’. in M. JleiviemeB (im ), 
gKoaorm iecxan ajibxepnaxHBa (MocxBa: Hporpecc, 1990), c. 638.
2.2 Environmental Reform under Gorbachev (1985-91)
2.2.1 Changes in Ideology
Gorbachev mentioned the need to improve the state of the environment already in 1979. In a 
speech on scientific and technical progress, he stated that the scientific-technical revolution and 
the intensive utilisation o f natural resources would make the problem of environmental protection 
ever more relevant?^.
Following his appointment as CPSU General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev on a 
number of occasions also brought up the issue of environmental protection. This was, however, 
done in fairly general terms - in the sense that Gorbachev acknowledged the existing problems and 
the need to solve them. And he fell short o f offering concrete solutions. In some cases, he even 
resorted to the old paraphrase that 'we do have problems, but we have introduced certain measures 
to do away with them and we will soon reach our goals'. At the 26th Party Congress in Februai-y 
1986, for example, Gorbachev said that ‘ahead o f us stands the important issue of environmental 
protection and the rational use of nature's resources. Socialism, with its planned organisation of 
production and humanitarian world view, is capable o f bringing harmony into the relationship 
between society and the environment. We are already implementing a number of measures in this 
direction, we are releasing significant means and have achieved quite a few results already’??.
The Chernobyl accident, Gorbachev's thinking in Soviet foreign policy and the introduction 
o f glasnost as a means by which to facilitate economic reform highlighted attention on 
environmental problems. In foreign policy Soviet doctrine changed from one of mutual 
coexistence to that of mutual interdependence. On a number of occasions, Gorbachev referred to 
environmental problems together with the struggle for disarmament - both global issues that could 
be solved only through international co-operation. The thrust o f Gorbachev's new thinking in 
Soviet foreign policy was that we live in a world o f interdependence. The possibility o f a nuclear 
war or the depletion of the world's natural resources due to intensive industrial production threaten 
mankind with possible extinction. These 'threats' can be liquidated only through joint efforts, and 
consequently, they call for international co-operation rather than competition (class 
struggle),because the major aim of capitalist as well as socialist states is survival. The nuclear 
accident at Chernobyl served as an illustration to this dilemma, as the radioactive fall-out affected 
most countries in Europe, demonstrating how vulnerable countries are to pollution emanating from 
beyond their borders.
The Chernobyl accident and the secrecy by which it was accompanied also clearly 
demonstrated the need for improving structures responsible for the environment - not only at an
? 6  M.C. r opGaMCB, H36pantibie nexin h  crarLu. t o m  1 (MocKBa: HsAareaLCTBo noAMTnaecKon JiHTeimryphi, 
1987), c. 222.
??M.C. r opfiaaeB (1987), t o m  3. c. 230.
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all-union level, but even more so in the republics. In most cases pollution in the republics 
emanated from all-union enterprises run by Moscow, upon which the former had no or vei-y little 
influence. Decisions were made above people's heads, and the lack o f official statistics, 
particularly health data, made it very difficult for the republics to decide to what extent pollution 
had had a negative effect on people's health.
The need for environmental reform was also brought to the surface by the debate on 
economic reform. The Stalinist command-administrative economic system aimed at maximising 
economic growth. By stressing quantity (output), hardly any room was left for quality 
(innovation), thus encouraging inefficient use of natural resources, resulting in waste and 
pollution. The centralist character of the Soviet economy further aggravated the environmental 
costs of industrial production.
Gorbachev's policy of economic 'acceleration' (uskorenie) also had an environmental side 
attached to it. The State Programme on the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Use of 
Natural Resources which was adopted in 1990 stressed this link between the economy and the state 
of the environment. According to the programme, the economic and social development of a 
countiy was to a large extent connected to the state of the environment and the level of utilisation 
of natural resources. Therefore, questions regarding environmental protection and the use of 
natural resources were given priority. The economic loss due to environmental pollution in the 
Soviet Union was estimated at some 200 million roubles for 1989?8.
As a way out, Gorbachev suggested economic, legal and educational measures. lie  called 
for a long-term (perspective) program on the environment and stressed the need to implement 
already existing programs and plans. Local authorities should actively take part in this process.
2.2.2 Structural Change
To facilitate the implementation o f a new environmental policy, structural changes were required. 
In July 1986, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree announcing that all union republics would establish 
their own state committees for the protection of the environment and the rational use o f natural 
resources. These state committees were to be in charge o f environmental protection in the 
republics, something that had previously been shared by a number of different bodies. However, 
as the organisational structures did not change at the all-union level, and as a large percentage of 
republican industries was controlled by all-union ministries showing little concern for the 
environment, nothing much changed.
?8 HauMonaAbHbiH AOKaaj o cocrominH nunnoAHon cœau d CCCP. Coei\ no. 12, 1990, c. 21-23, 41-43 
and 55-71.
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.Gorbachev admitted that central ministries did not always consider the environmental 
impact of their activities. Calls for a unified body to be put in charge of environmental protection 
and the rational use of natural resources had been made since the 1970s, and acknowledging this 
demand, Gosgidromet (the State Committee on Meteorology) in late 1987 dropped 'and the 
environment' from its title and returned to its previous function as a scientific organisation?^. To 
strengthen and streamline the apparatus in charge of protecting the environment, a USSR State 
Committee on the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources {USSR 
Goskomprirodd) was set up in January 1988. The new committee's Moscow office had a staff of 
around 400. Staff was recruited from other ministries and departments. Whereas the Moscow 
office would be in charge of elaborating policies, the implementation of environmental regulations 
and legislation would be through parallel committees in the union republics, oblasts and at local 
levels86.
The tasks and responsibilities of Goskompriroda were outlined in the Decree on Radical 
Perestroika in the Field of Environmental Protection in the Country issued by the CPSU Central 
Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Supreme Soviet on 7 January 1988. 
According to the resolution, the new committee would be responsible for comprehensive 
environmental protection activities, environmental monitoring, long-term environmental planning, 
the elaboration o f norms and standards for the use o f natural resources and emissions o f pollutants, 
and the overseeing of the design, location and construction o f environmentally sensitive facilities. 
Moreover, Goskompriroda would issue waste-disposal permits, manage nature preserves 
endangered species and control hunting, as well as promoting ecological education and being 
responsible for international co-operation and co-ordination. These functions would be passed 
over to the new committee by the myriad of ministries and departments which had so far been in 
charge of these tasks**.
S’
4 ’
Two councils - the Public Council and the Scientific-Technical Council - were attached to 
Goskompriroda in an advisory capacity. The former, which had 100-150 members covering a 
broad range of backgrounds, was responsible for maintaining links with the public and also 
making recommendations to the committee. Meeting twice a year, a bureau was established (some 
30 members) to manage its day-to-day activities. Six members of the bureau were deputies of the 
USSR Congress of People's Deputies, thus providing a direct link to parliament. Several working 
commissions were set up within the framework of the Public Council. The Scientific Council was 
smaller, consisting of 30 members, and sent recommendations to the committee on issues of 
scientific significance.
The chairman of Goskompriroda had a board, consisting of five divisions, to support his 
work. The five divisions covered issues such as the economics and organisation o f nature use,
?9 Pryde (1991), p. 10. 
86 Ziegler (1990), p. 13. 
8* Pryde, (1991), p. 11.
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science and ecological normatives, monitoring, management of the propagation of ecological 
knowledge and, finally, environmental impact assessments^?.
Fedor Morgan, former Party First Secretary of the Poltava district in Ukraine and a soil 
conservation expert, was appointed the first chairman of the committee. This appointment was %criticised by some, as Morgan was perceived as an apparachik, not thought sufficiently devoted to 
real reform. Morgan had, however, conducted an experiment in Poltava making use of tilling 
methods more friendly to the soil, and on numerous occasions expressed the view that Soviet 
agriculture needed a major overhaul in the way it managed the land. Fedor Morgan was given the 
task of setting up the new committee and developing a long-term programme on the state of the 
Soviet environment^^. In August 1989 Morgan was replaced by Nikolai Vorontsov, a biologist 
and former director of the Academy of Sciences' Far Eastern Institute of Biology and Soils. From |.:Vi1988 he was chief scientist at the Koltsov Institute of Evolution Biology. Vorontsov became the 
first non-party member to chair a state committee. In March 1989 Vorontsov was elected a -vlmember o f the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on a platform of 'Diversity and Stability'. 
Vorontov called for not only biological, but also cultural and ethnic diversity8**. Goskompriroda 
was given ministerial status in 1991.
The January 1988 decree, establishing Goskompriroda, stated that the issue of 3 |
environmental protection would in the future be one of the most important in Soviet political life.
It stressed that the final aim of issuing the decree was not only to protect natural resources, but |
also to improve the state of the Soviet environment. Somewhat later, in 1990, a Long-Term State 
Programme on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use o f  Natural Resources in the USSR 
gave an outline of priority tasks up to the year 2005 necessary to stabilise and eventually improve i;
the state of the environment in the Soviet Union. It also envisaged a more rational and non­
impoverishing use of natural resources to secure the balanced and stable socio-economic 
development of the country. The programme called for a total investment in this area of between 
240 and 335 billion rubles in the coming years.
The programme signalled a shift in Soviet economic policies from extensive towards 
intensive growth. For instance, the extraction of raw materials was to be stabilised at the 1990 
level. Economisation would be introduced in Soviet energy policies, and the expansion of power- 
generating facilities would be stopped as of 1995. New measures of resource conservation and 
low-waste technologies would be introduced at Soviet enterprises. Further, the programme 
announced the creation of a unified system of environmental legislation, standards and norms for ?
industrial activities and the environment in the country. State 'environmental impact assessments'
,1
I
82 DeBardeleben (1992), p. 70. I
83 Âse B. Gr0deland, (1992), p. 9.
84 Ziegler (1990), pp. 13, 14. |
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would in the future be conducted on ail new industrial projects in order to assess the soundness of 
the project from the point of view of the environment®^
Expanding on the 1988 decree, the state programme included a list o f measures to be 
worked out and implemented by Goskompriroda. The State Committee was given the right to ban 
the construction, reconstruction and expansion of any enterprise or project failing to obtain a 
positive environmental impact assessment. It could levy fines for violations of legislation on the 
environment, and in more severe cases, it could initiate legal action against individuals and 
enterprises, requiring a halt in production. Goskompriroda was also to collect payments for the 
use o f natural resources.
Section 5 of the state programme on the environment gave an outline of the means available 'ito Goskompriroda in fulfilling the targets of the programme. These were (1) environmental 
legislation, (2) norms, (3) economic instrume 
state control and (6) environmental education.
nts, (4) state environmental impact assessments, (5)
Environmental Legislation
According to the programme, a number of laws would be drafted during 1990. Such laws included 
the USSR Law on Environmental Protection, the USSR Law on Territories of Particular 
Protection, the USSR Law on the Protection and the Rational Use o f Vegetation, and the USSR 
Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safety. Legislative work was to be continued in 
the period 1991-95. Existing legal acts would be revised and in some cases replaced with new 
laws. Legal responsibility for concealing information about environmental disasters, as well as 
responsibility for accidents with an environmental impact, would be defined. Finally, punishment 
for failing to comply with environmental legislation would be made more severe.
Norms
One of Goskompriroda's major tasks was to develop a unified system of scientifically based norms
to create a framework for the regulation of environmental protection activities and the rational use
of natural resources. This work would be conducted in close co-operation with central economic
bodies and research institutions. By 1993 basic norms would be elaborated on the basis of the
.revision of already existing norms. Local and regional branches of Goskompriroda would in 
addition develop regional norms for maximum permissible emissions, noise limits, etc.® .^ Finally, 
indicators of environmental capacity would be developed in order to establish maximum
i'
technological strain, the impact o f extraction of natural resources on other factors, which , if
increased, could cause permanent changes to the environment.
rocvjiapcTBRHHafl nnorpaMMa oxnanbi oKPv^Kaiomeü cpejy h pauMonajiLnoro ucnojimonaHHn 
ripHrxMiibix pecvpcoB CCCP iia 199U1995 roau n iia nepcneKXHBv jo  2005 rami. (flpoeK'r), 
npaBHTeMCTBeimbiii BecTHMK. 4oae. 1989 (n.d.).
®6ihi4,p. 10.
Economie Means
_A system of payments and fines was foreseen to facilitate structural reform of the Soviet Union's 
economy based on saving natural resources, introducing low-waste technologies and increasing 
efficiency. The introduction of payments for the use of natural resources should also stimulate 
environmental protection activities at enterprises. Qualitative, rather than quantitative, growth was 
to be the norm.
The system would include (a) payment for the right to use natural resources, (b) payment for 
the extraction and the protection o f natural resources, (c) compensation for the removal of natural 
resources from ordinary use or the worsening o f their quality, caused by the activities of a certain 
enterprise, (d) payments for emissions o f polluting substances into the environment, (e) fines and 
other economic sanctions for violating rules and norms for the rational use of natural resources, 
and (f) preferential terms for taxing enterprise income.
Payment for the use of natural resources would be decided in accordance with the 
requirements of the USSR Law on Local Self-Government and the Local Economy and also in 
other legal acts of the union, union-republics and autonomous republics. The payments for the 
extraction and protection of natural resources were established on the basis of necessary expenses
3to fulfil all-union, republican and local programmes on nature protection and the rational use o f 
natural resources, and of implementing a system of control and monitoring of the state of the 
environment. The size of these payments was set in accordance with republican laws. The size of 
payments for emissions within the established limits was determined on the basis of what it would 
cost to reduce the damage caused to the environment as calculated by republican and local 
environmental protection programmes.
Money collected as payment for the use of natural resources, fines for polluting the 
environment and non-rational use of natural resources and other violations o f environmental
..;v*legislation were included in local budget and non-budget funds. Tax incentives would be used for 
enterprises installing devices to reduce pollution and for enterprises producing equipment for 
monitoring the environment.
Various state and regional/local funds would be established during the 1990s to make use of 
fines and payments collected from enterprises for pollution for the mis-use of natural resources.
The use o f these means was to be controlled by USSR Goskompriroda and the republican/regional
committees. The territorial funds would be formed by payments for emissions, fines, the income 
from the production o f environmentally friendly devices, subsidies from budgets, local taxes.
voluntaiy contributions and interest on credits granted to improve the state of the environment. 
The distribution o f money from the territorial funds between local, republican and all-union 
budgets was to be conducted through agreements. The territorial funds would be used to fund the 
establishment and reconstruction of regional environmental installations, on means to improve the 
state of the environment and the use o f natural resources, and on the funding of enterprise outlays 
to reduce their emissions in accordance with the tasks of the programme.
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A fund for environmental security was to be formed through special taxes on 
environmentally hazardous technologies and dangerous installations, the insurance of natural 
resources and objects in case of loss due to accidents and natural catastrophes, and also 
centralisation of a part of amortisation assignments on environmental objects. This fund would be 
used to finance the surveying, alleviation and elimination of natural disasters and accidents and to 
secure economic assistance for individual republics and regions to solve environmental tasks.
The republics were to be in charge of funding and implementing projects of environmental 
protection and the rational use of natural resources, whereas the all-union organs would implement 
scientific programmes and work of all-union importance, and implement national programmes and 
programmes connected to the fulfilment of international agreements. Major environmental 
activities of all-union and international importance (Chernobyl, the Aral Sea and others) would be 
funded primarily from Moscow. Central funds were allocated after a competition of projects and 
were channelled to republican/local environmental protection bodies®^.
State Environmental impact Assessments
Any plan to open an enterprise or make changes in production at an enterprise could not be 
realised until it had been 'cleared' by a state environmental impact assessment, which was 
conducted by Goskompriroda. The experts in this department assessed the aim and the necessity 
of the proposed project, the means by which it could be implemented, alternatives to the project, 
the character and level of interaction on the environment, including possible accidents, 
possibilities of reducing negative impact on the environment, etc. The assessments made were 
available to the general public. In many cases plans were referred back to their makers for 
requested changes. Once changed, the environmental experts were obliged to reassess the project.
state Control
State control over the environment and the rational use of natural resources was conducted by the 
Soviets of People's Deputies and organs with special powers. The major task of the State Control 
on the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources was to keep an eye on the activities 
o f ministries, state committees and institutions, enterprises, organisations, etc., independently of 
departmental subordination. The idea was that such control would reveal violations of 
environmental legislation, norms and rules on the rational use o f natural resources, and secure the 
‘perfection’ of forms and methods of state control. It would also predict regional, inter-republican 
and international environmental conflicts.
The former USSR Supreme Soviet as well as the Supreme Soviets of the now independent
republics had their own committees on the environment. During the elections to the USSR 
Congress of People's Deputies (March 1989), most o f the candidates had a green platform. A large 
proportion of them were elected as a result of their commitment to environmental reform, or
®^ Ibid. p. 11.
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rather, it became impossible to be elected without one. The same trend was observed during
■I'
elections to the republican Congresses of People's Deputies.
On 24 May 1989, immediately prior to the opening of the first Congress o f People's 
Deputies, the weekly newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta published an appeal, 'The Fatherland in 
Environmental Danger', signed by a number of leading writers and scientists and addressed to the 
Congress. It urged the deputies actively to work to improve the state of the Soviet environment. 
A group of deputies followed up the appeal by urging the Congress to endorse as one of its 
resolutions a Declaration on the Environmental State of the USSR. Such a resolution was not 
endorsed, but the Congress passed the document on to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Still, 
environmental issues were focused upon during the sitting of the Congress. According to Aleksei 
lablokov, every third deputy mentioned the environment in his/her speech and even the Prime 
Minister called for a 'greener' government.
The Committee on Environmental Issues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources 
(Komitet po voprosam ekologii i ratsionalnogo ispolzovaniia prirodnykh resursov) was created at 
the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. K.S. Salykov from Karakalpakia was elected its 
president. The Committee had 50 members and was thus the biggest of a total of 22 committees 
and commissions. Twenty five of its members were also members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 
the other 25 were people's deputies. lablokov, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact 
that some 20 specialists on the environment were not included in the Committee. As the character 
o f environmental problems varied greatly, nine subcommittees were established.
During the first session o f the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Committee tried to put the
environmental state of the USSR on the agenda on a number of occasions. Only at the second
.session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, however, was the environment tabled for discussion, and it 
was not among the priority issues. On 27 November 1989 a resolution on the 'urgent measures to 
improve the state of the environment in the country' was endorsed. lablokov labelled this 
resolution a 'big, step forward on a matter o f principal importance' to solving the problems of the 
environment as far as legislative powers were concerned. The resolution introduced concepts such 
as 'environmental passportisation of enterprise, objects and territories', 'environmental maps', 
'environmental protection prosecutor's office', 'environmental violation o f legislation', etc. for the 
first time. The USSR Council of Ministers was ordered to give the assistance required to 
environmental disaster areas and to develop instructions on how to stimulate economically the use 
o f environmentally safe technologies. It also listed the most seriously damaged territories and 
contained a list of priority issues to be sorted out by 1995 (see above).
At the Second Congress of the USSR People's Deputies in December 1989 a standing 
environmental group of deputies (EDG - Ekologicheskaia Deputatskaia Gruppa) was formed. At 
the end of 1990 it had some 260 members. By the beginning o f 1991, lablokov concluded that it 
had not been as active as one would have expected. This, he said, was to a large extent caused by 
the lack of technical equipment. After it was established in 1989, the Committee on the
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environment took an active part in the activities of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and 
the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, it was criticised by many, including Sergei Zalygin, for not 
being active enough. Its leader, K. Zalykov, was also accused of incompetence. lablokov, on the 
other hand, was more positive about the results achieved, although he admitted that there had been 
many obstacles.
Already in the first months of its existence, the Committee established itself as a 'disturbing' 
element within the Parliament. During the discussion on candidates to the Council of Ministers 
(each candidate first had to be endorsed by all the committees and commissions before they could 
be suggested to the USSR Supreme Soviet) eight out of 55 were not approved, four of them 
rejected by the Committee on the Environment on environmental grounds. Informally, it refused 
to accept several possible candidates for the post of president of USSR Goskompriroda. It also 
took an active part in finding a suitable new chairman. Nikolai Vorontsov was eventually 
endorsed for this post.
During the debate on the state budget for 1990, the Committee consulted a number of 
experts on the 'environmentability' of the proposed project. The Committee found that if endorsed, 
the USSR would pollute more in 1990 than it had done in 1985. The Committee was therefore 
unable to endorse the budget. However, as only two other committees agreed with it, it was 
overruled.
As for legislation, the Committee on the Environment succeeded in including environmental 
requirements in a number of laws. For example, the Committee introduced a ban on 
environmentally dangerous technology obtained from abroad. It also introduced and frequently 
made use o f so-called parliamentaiy hearings. These were chaired by the subcommittees. All 
members of the Committee were allowed to attend these. In addition, any people's deputy as well 
as experts from outside the parliament were free to join. The first hearing was held in the summer 
o f 1989 by the subcommittee on nuclear ecology, and it dealt with the nuclear accident in the 
South Urals in 1957.
In March 1990 Gorbachev set up a Presidential Council. Two Soviet writers and ardent 
defenders of the environment, Valentin Rasputin and Chingiz Aitmatov, were appointed to the 
council, and Ziegler (1990) expressed hopes that they might be able to influence the country's 
environmental policies through the Council®®.
2.2.3 The Union-Republics and the Environment
Gorbachev's strong global commitment to environmental issues was reflected in his attitude to the 
republics' demands for economic autonomy. From the point o f view o f the republics, the only way 
in which local environmental problems could be overcome would be for the republics themselves
®® Ziegler (1990), p. 14.
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to control the use of natural resources situated on their territories. Gorbachev, on the other hand, 
considered it impossible to solve environmental problems in the republics without the involvement 
of all-union organs. This, as 'ecological problems in our time demand complex solutions, and not 
only within the framework of separate countries, but in the framework of continents, even the 
world as such'. Gorbachev thus refuted the argument used by Greens and other political groupings 
in the republics opting for independence: namely that independence (and hence a republic’s 
control over its natural resources and industries located on its territory) was the only solution to 
solving the serious environmental problems of the Soviet republics. Success in the field of the 
environment could, in Gorbachev's opinion, be reached only 'when central organs of nature 
protection together with organs of people's power and self-governing bodies locally as well as the 
broad public pull together'. The possibility of the republics taking control of their own resources 
was ruled out, as this would also give them a monopoly over 'unique natural resources' and, in 
turn, 'would lead to a differentiation in living standards'. However, political developments in the 
former USSR paved the way for economic autonomy (Baltic states, 1989) and eventually political 
sovereignty and independence.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of laws and regulations on the environment 
were adopted. A long-term State Programme on Environmental Protection and the Rational 
Utilisation of Natural Resources of the USSR for the 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-95) and for the 
Period up to the Year 2005 was adopted in the late 1980s and, together with the USSR Supreme 
Soviet's Regulation On Urgent Measures for the Normalisation o f the Ecological Situation in the 
Countiy. adopted on 27 November 1989, formed the basis of Soviet environmental policies.
To strengthen the implementation of these policies, the USSR State Committee on the 
Environment {Goskompriroda) was given ministerial status in June 1991. Paradoxically, though, 
as attempts were made centrally at strengthening the powers of Goskompriroda (after June 1991, 
Minpriroda), the republics chose to establish direct links between environmental authorities on 
their territories so as to avoid interference from Moscow.
An Interrepublican Agreement on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use o f Natural 
Resources had been adopted in early 1991, and the republics agreed to co-ordinate their efforts 
through an Interrepublican Ecological Soviet, which had come into existence in late 1990 on the 
initiative o f the Environmental Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As for relations between 
the republics and the USSR Ministry of Environmental Protection, Minister Nikolai Vorontsov 
during an official visit to Britain in late November 1991 at a meeting with this author stated that 
although the USSR was disintegrating, the environmental problems of the USSR remained. 
Environmental disasters like Chernobyl, the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, just to mention a few, 
affected a number of republics. Vorontsov's idea was therefore that the Ministry could mediate 
between the republics on how to deal with these problems. In the event o f a dispute, the USSR 
Ministry could also conduct ecological impact assessments of industrial projects bound to affect a 
number of republics. The republics, however, preferred to address these problems directly
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amongst themselves. A series of bilateral agreements on the environment were adopted during 
1991, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIS members - with the exception of Ukraine 
- signed a CIS Agreement on Environmental Protection and the Use of Natural Resources on 8 
February 1992.
The CIS Agreement closely resembled the Interrepublican Agreement and envisaged the co­
ordination o f environmental policies through the Interrepublican Ecological Council. An 
Ecological Fund was set up to finance clean-up projects affecting more than one republic. No CIS 
implementing bodies were established. Decisions made by the Council were to be carried out by 
the Departments and Ministries of Environmental Protection of the CIS republics. During 1991 
and early 1992, the new states concluded a series of bilateral agreements on environmental 
protection. Laws on the environment were also drafted and adopted by each state at this time.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the CIS was considered by many 
people to be a negative development from the point of view of the environment. The priority of 
the republics at the time was to consolidate their independence. Environmental issues, it was 
argued, would be addressed once independence had been secured. In this sense the break-up of the 
USSR was bad news as far as the environment was concerned. However, smaller territorial units 
would undoubtedly make environmental management easier. The greatest problem the new states 
were faced with, also from the viewpoint of the environment, was the constant shortage o f hard 
currency with which to obtain equipment required to modernise industries and install pollution- 
reducing devices at existing industrial plants.
2.2.4 Assessment of Gorbachev's Environmental Reforms
As seen above, a number of measures were implemented to improve the state of the environment 
in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's leadership. However, pollution in the USSR increased at 
the same time. The national income of the USSR from 1985 to 1988 increased by 8.5%, while the 
loss of natural resources, pollution of nature and nature destruction over the same period went up 
from 16 to 80% - even though more money was allocated for environmental protection in this 
period. In 1985 the Soviet government allocated 2.5 billion rubles for this purpose. In 1988 3.1 
billion rubles were spent on environmental protection.
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Table 2.3 Environmental Pollution in the USSR^^
Loss and pollution 1985 1988 1988 in % com pared to 1985
water collection from sources (bill. Hi3) 329.8 333.7 101
loss of water during transportation (bill. *^^) 43.6 50.6 116
emissions of polluted water (bill, 15.9 28.6 180
including into Baikal (mill. "^^) 124 191 154
into Ladoga (mill. "^^) 271 392 145
Loss of gas during transportation (bill. "^^) 12.9 15.1 117
arable land suffering from erosion (mill, ha) 133 133 164
Source: Lemeshev (1990^), p. 201,
Below, I will endeavour to identify some of the reasons why Gorbachev's environmental 
reforms did not work.
Administrative Changes
In an interview with Planovoe khoziaistvo in early 1989 Fedor Morgun stated that 'so far, 
{G oskom priroda 'structure and working bodies are (still) being formed, so it has not yet managed 
to launch active work'. He expressed similar ideas later, arguing that 'the agency is still in the 
process of completing its structural outlines, recruiting personnel. Actual environmental work has 
not yet begun'^^. A similar view was expressed by Morgan's predecessor, the biologist Nikolai 
Vorontsov, who also had problems with organising the new committee. In an interview with 
Who's Who in the Soviet Government (Moscow; Novosti, 1990), he admitted that the 'agency (is) 
still in the throes o f organisation. Major improvements in the environment cannot be expected in 
the immediate future'^f A factor contributing to what might be called 'administrative stalemate' 
was the lack of clarity with regard to Goskompriroda's authority and also with regard to which 
divisions and departments currently under the auspices of other ministries, departments and state 
committees would be transferred to the new committee. Thus, as pointed out by Karakin and 
Sheingaus:
(2 r o a a  nocjie cosjianH fi focKOM npHpo^u) bo bccx Kjmax h  odjiaci'nx 
BOSHMKJia ojam m ra xce KapTuna; jibBHnaa AOJia aneprwH TpaTUTca 
lia c n o p n , B KOTopbie BT iiruBaioTca h Bbicmue c # p b i ,  K axaa  qacib m  
KaKMx Be40MCTB nepe^acTca hjih KUKaa ne nejjeiiaercfl TocKOMnpupoae,
HTO nepe^aeTca, Kaxue noMemeuMa u k u k h g  <I)0H4bi nepeaaiotca, r.e.
Table taken from M.R. Jleivieuien (1990). c. 201. 
90 Ziegler (1990), p. 13.
9* Refeired to in ibid.. p. 14.
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Bce oriflTb npeDpaTM.iocb b opraimBauMoiiHbie M rpbi..3ry H^eio Ka^uiLiu 
I’paKTyeT no CBoeviy. m cero ^ n a  BOBUHKaer onacH ocrb , n ro  Mbi 
noayMMM erne o iiiio  bc/iom ctbo, erne o itnu araxc K o inpojia^^.
As an example, they referred to Primorrybvod - the Primorsk regional branch of Minryb (the 
Ministry of Fisheries)’s inspectorate - which eventually allocated 10% of its inspection corps to U
the Primorsk territorial committee for nature protection, instructing it to control the quality of used t |
water resources in the same way as it did. After the creation of Goskompriroda, monitoring 
continued to be conducted by several entities (for instance, Sanepidemstantsiia - the 
Epidemiological Service of the USSR Ministry of Health, monitoring industrial pollution as it 
related to health and during the 1980s primarily in charge of water quality, whereas Gosgidromet 
conducted monitoring of air quality), thus making the creation of a unified data-base difficult^^.
Moreover, as Goskompriroda was subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers, it was 
consistently outvoted by other ministries'^, Goskompriroda might have benefited from direct ■ |  
subordination to the Soviet Parliament. In some republics local branches of Goskompriroda were 
faced with dual subordination. On the one hand they were subordinate to the Ministry/Committee 
centrally. On the other, they were to a considerable extent dependent on local government for 
funding to cover salaries and administrative costs. In cases o f disagreement between local 
government and central environmental authorities, the local government usually had the upper 
hand. In other cases, local environmental protection bodies were faced with difficulties executing 
environmental policies, as the USSR Council of Ministers wanted to increase environmentally 
harmful production to maximise hard-currency earnings. This problem was reported in Tinmen 
oblast, where large areas in the Mari autonomous republic were suffering from oil pollution, but 
where efforts to modernise equipment (pipes for transport) were opposed by the USSR Council of 
Ministers, which demanded increased output of oil.
Similar situations were reported elsewhere: in order to maximise hard-currency earnings or 
meet the targets of goszakaz, enterprises were forced to produce at full capacity. Installing 
pollution-reducing devices would require a slow-down in production which simply could not be 
afforded. Officials in the Department of Environmental Protection in Latvia in interviews during 
1991 also concluded that environmental protection was at the bottom of government priorities.
Similar concerns were expressed by officials in Lithuania and Moldova^^.
Another problem was identified by Lemeshev, who argued that Goskompriroda was given 
very modest functions and authority. Moreover, its resources were very limited^^. 
Goskompriroda also had problems in finding well-qualified people to work in the new committee. 7---------------------------  I92 RapaKHH, lU eH H rayc (1990), c . 637.
93 Pryde (1991), p. 11.
94im4
95 Such views were expressed in conversations I had and interviews I took with officials in these republics
during the summer of 1991 as a consultant for the Ecological Studies Institute (London).
96 M.II. JleM eu ieB (1990), c. 2 0 0 .
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A related problem was the centralised character of Goskompriroda's inspection service;
97 Gr0deland (1992), pp. 15,16, A similar situation was expressed by the ministries and state departments in 
the Baltic States, Moldova, Belorussia and Russia, also visited in 1991.
9® Ibid., p. 16.
99 KapaKHii, LUenurayc (1990), c. 638.
lurii Shcherbak, in 1991 appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, argued that the staff of 
his ministry was largely composed of people who had previously worked in other ministries.
These were professional bureaucrats, unable to think untraditionally and to some extent still loyal 
to their previous employers. The problem was compounded by the fact that the government 
resisted attempts at getting rid of them. Further, scholars were as reluctant to become bureaucrats 
as were highly educated and qualified members of the Green Movement. There was also a 
shortage of qualified environmental scientists. Only recently had this type of education been 
introduced and courses to re-educate ministerial staff were very often unsatisfactory. As many 
units were understaffed, it proved very difficult for them to send people to training courses, 
seminars, etc.'Finally, it was difficult to attract well-qualified young people to the ministry, as in 
most cases they preferred to pursue a scientific or professional career. Ministry wages were quite 
low, and so was the status of ministerial posts97.
A lack of and inadequate equipment for monitoring the state of the environment was also a 
big problem. In Lithuania, for example, there was a shortage of laboratory facilities. As a rule the 
environmental district committees did not possess their own equipment, and therefore relied on 
inspectors from Vilnius to assist them. That complicated local inspectors' responsibility for 
conducting unannounced, on-the-spot analyses. In all republics I was told that monitoring was 
restricted by military bases: although inspectors had access to these areas, military personnel were 
reluctant to let them conduct their own tests and instead established their own system of 
monitoring. Lack of computer facilities was a particularly big problem for regional committees. 
Arkhangelsk Goskompriroda, for instance, had only two computers, insufficient even to create a 
proper database. Maintenance of such equipment, where available, also proved to be a problem9®.
Goskompriroda's main function was to control the state o f the environment, not to control 
the use o f natural resources. Thus, although an improvement in the state of the environment had 
been registered at the republican level, it was doubtfi.il whether the creation o f USSR 
Goskompriroda would change much at the all-union level:
J .HecKOJibKG noBfciujaeT a^ iiiieKTMBHOcrb npupo^ooxopoHnofi 
4eiiTejibnocrH, no iipHpo4onojib30BaTe.ribCKaii cuTyauHii, a 
cjieAOBa’rejibHO, h ox]mna npupoAbi Kap^Hiiajibno lie MenaioTca, h6 o  b 
ociioBy 4eflTeabnocTH KOMHieroB noao^cena Koirrpojibiio- 
HiicneKiiHoiinaa pafioTa h ohm ne hm c io t pbiaaroB, arofibi ynpaBJiaib b 
nojinoH wepe npupoaonojibBoaai [Meivi99.
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HjjcneKUMom io--KOHTpo4buaa Rasa 4 e}iTe.ibiiocrM 3Tmx rocKOMHTeron 
BacraBMT h x  BbicraMBarb x e c r x o  neinpa.iHBO Ban iiyio KOMaiuinyio 
CHcreviy ynpaB aeuH a, uro n e  c o o r B e r c r a y e r  im oSihmm npoueca iM  
pasBHTna MeCTiiofj MiinuMaTHBbi H aiM OcroaTeabiioCTH. iiH 
n e o 6 x o 4 HMOCTH B onaabno-reor ixK liH 'iecK oro n o jixoaa  k npoRaeiviaM 
pauH O naab iforo npHpoaonoabBOBanna h  oxpaiiM  npH poabf^o
Economic Changes
Mikhail Lemeshev (1990) holds the view that the major reason why Gorbachev's environmental 
reform failed to work as intended was that it was accompanied by a sharp extensive economic 
growth. A major component in Gorbachev's reform package was economic reform through the 
'acceleration' of economic production. Thus, Nikolai Ryzhkov's speech to the 27th Party Congress 
in February 1986 did not indicate any major changes in the economic structures of the USSR;
B o n p o c  o  rcMnax Bceraa S u n  m o c r a e r c j i oimuM m  ueirrpajibiibix b 
3K0 HGMHiieCK0 H nOJIHTHKe napTHM^^h
Gorbachev's policy of uskorenie ('acceleration') was taken by those in charge of the 
country's economic planning as an endorsement of the policies o f extensive economic growth:
B npaKTHKC naaiiHpoBaiiHn m ynpaBaenufl napo4iibiM xosaHcrnoM 
ci'paTerun ycKopenHa couHaabno-aKOiiOMH'iecKoro paBBUTUii 
Be^ OMCTBaMM noHHMaeTca Tpa^ MimoHno, kuk m b aepnoa .sacroa u 
aKcreiicHBiioro pasBHTua npouBBOjtcrrBa. llonaTHe ycKopeiimi 
counajibHo-aKOHOMHMecKoro ixibbmth}!, no cyuieci'By, BbixoaamnBaeTca.
O l io  n o-npeîK iteM y T paxT yeT ca kbk  noBb iiuenue TewnoB p o c ia  
M aTepuaabHoro npoH3B04CTBa, raaniibiM o6pa30M  cbipba, Matuuii u
o6i3a30BaiiHn*92
Gorbachev's policy of 'acceleration' was highly ‘successful’ in that it produced a four 
percent increase in economic growth between 1986 and 1988.
Ibid.100
6^1 MaTCDuaabi XXVII ciÆBaa KflCC { 0 6  ociiOBHbix nanpaBaeiiuax aKoiioMuqecKoro m couHaabiioro 
pasBHTMfl CCCP iia 1986-1990 ro4bi w na nepuoa 40 2000 roaa), (MocKBa 1986, c. 228), in 
JleivieijjeB (1990), c. 195.
Ibid.
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Table 2.4 Average Annual Growth Rates fo r  the Major Indicators o f  the Socio-Economic Development o f  the 
USSR (in
1981-1985 1986-1988
Industrial production 3.6 4.0
Of these: 3.6 4.0
Group 'A'
Group 'B' 3.9 4.0
Agricultural production 1.0 3.0
Size of cargo freights 0.6 2.6
Capital investments 3.7 7.1
National income 3.2 2.8
Real income of population 1.8 1.4
Source; Lemeshev (1990^), p. 196.
As indicated in Table 2.2, although there was continued economic growth in the USSR from 
1981 to 1988, efficiency of investments dropped by one third between 1986 and 1988. Most of 
the growth registered took place in the extracting and heavy industries, thus facilitating the 
continued (and increased) inefficient use of natural resources and increased pollution. Increased 
investments to reduce the level o f pollution in the country were inefficient, as
...npupojiooxpaiiHbie MeponpHaTUfl opMeiiTHpyiOTcn ua Sopifiy œ  
c.iie4cri3HeM uepauHoiiaabiioro, cyrySo aKCi’eiicMBtioro pocra 
npoM3B04CTi3a, a ne na era HtrreiicMiliKKauMio, TexnuaecKoe 
conepineiicrBOBaHHe m UBMeiienue era npHpo40i3a3pyiuHTe.nbiioH 
crpyKTypbi. A raKaa CTpaTermi b iipmmune GeaiepcneK'i'HBira h iie
M04ceT npuBeCTM K saMeTiioMy o34opoBJieiiHio oKpyxcaioineM cpe^w 104
As Lemeshev saw it, there was only one way in which to improve the state of the 
environment in the USSR; the country’s economic structures had to be changed - at the expense 
of the manufacturing of production means. Moreover, the size of production and the use of natural 
resources such as iron ore, oil, gas, forests, water and ploughed land, had to be reduced. Limited 
material and financial resources should be used not for environmentally dubious works such as the 
construction of nuclear power stations, giant reservoirs and canals, but rather for the introduction 
and use of resource-saving technologies and ecologically clean production. Then,
B ycaoBHHX aKcreiicuBHoro pocra npoH3B04croa, RasMpyiomeroca na 
pecypcoe.viKMx, npMpompaspymafoinux u sarpasinnomux 'rexnojiorHax, 
samna oxpaiibi npupo^bi nepa3[3euiHMa b npununne, xaKue 6bi 5o.fibi.iiHe 
c|3e4ci'Ba iiH nanpaB.fuuiHCb iia ocyiuecmaeiiHe npMpoiioox|xuuibix 
vieixinpMm’MH. Bo.fiee rora, 5e3 MSMeuenHii crpyKTypbi o6meci'Beiinora 
npoMBBOAcrna, Res era HiiTeiicMiliHKUUHH. craSHJiusauHH pocra. a sarew 
coKpameiiHH KoaMMeciBeiiHi.ix ofibeMOB npoH3B04ci'Ba cbipbii h 
npoMe c^yTOMiibix nixuiyKxoB, Res ocBoenHii iDecyix:oc5eperaiomHx.
3KO.BorH‘iecKH MMCTbix 'I’ex iiojiorH H , p o c r  Birrpar rpy/ia na o x p a n y
0^3 Ibid.. p. 196. 
Ibid, p. 201.
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these from the enterprises. In a number of cases, though, enterprises refused to pay their fines, or
195 I b i d . ,  p .  2 0 5 .
196  K a p a K H H , U l e H i i r a y c  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  c .  6 3 7 .
'
n p H p o 4 bi 6yjiev n |)e 4 c r a i3 .i i iT b  n e  m to  w n o e . KaK p e e r  a K o n o u m i e c K o r o  
y m e j iR a  4 . in  n a p o A n o r o  x o s n c r n a  m R . i a r o c o c m a n m i  o 6 n i e c r n a i 9 5 .
Lemeshev's views were echoed by Karakin and Sheingaus, who also saw the problem of
environmental reform in the economic and administrative structures of the USSR. As a matter of
fact, Gorbachev's policies of samofinansirovanie (self-financing) and khozraschet (cost 
accounting) were aggravating the situation;
...B c o n e T a n H H  c  i ie i3 e x o 4 0 M  n ix > H 3 B 0 4 flu tn x  O T p a ca e P i n a  
c a M O ^ H n a n c H p o B a n u e  u  x o s p a c n e r ,  n p u  s a ^ e p ^ o c e  B n e ^ e n u B  n a a r w  3a  
n p u p o a n b i e  p e c y p c b i ,  m r ip u  t o m , b to  B c e - r a K u  n o x a  u ^ o r  o c n a R a e n u e  
(K O J iu n e cT B en n o e  h  K a n e c i ’B eH n o e ) K o n r p o J ib n o r o  a n n a  p a r a ,  m w  m o x co m  
nojiyM M Tb B c r p a n e  n u K  n p u p o 4 0 o x |3 a n n b ix  n p o 6 j i e M i9 6 .
To improve the situation, they recommended the introduction of economic measures 
elaborated actively by Soviet economists from the mid-1950s, such as leasing (rentnyi podkhod) 
and the pricing of natural-resources. A shift away from the strong centralisation of the Soviet 
economic system, towards a more deflated, regional structure, was also required.
Legal Changes
Although the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments in the republics adopted a number of laws 
on the environment, these laws did not, as seen above, produce any significant improvement in the 
environment of the former Soviet Union. Partly the legislators were to blame for this, as the laws 
were insufficient. More seriously, however, existing law enforcement bodies were not granted 
sufficient powers to see to it that the laws were actually implemented. This function was by and 
large carried out by overworked state inspectors working in the ministries/departments of 
environmental protection. They were too few and lacked the equipment necessary to undertake 
their monitoring responsibilities properly. An excessive amount of time was furthermore spent on 
paper-work.
If  breaches of environmental legislation and rules were revealed, action could be taken, 
through a system of fines and payments for emissions exceeding the permissible levels. The 
ministries/departments of environmental protection in the republics were responsible for collecting
were very slow in doing so, or disputed the evidence produced by environmental authorities. In 
such cases the enterprises and/or ministries/departments of environmental protection could turn to
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the arbitration courts for a legal settlement of the dispute. If the breach of legislation was more
severe, the Prosecutor's Office decided whether or not to take legal action. Should the Prosecutor
decide to take such action, an investigation into the case would be organised. Investigation was
. . .closely co-ordinated with the Ministry/Department of Environmental Protection, which supplied 
the former with documents and other information on the case. The relationship between the two 
bodies was outlined in an instruction issued by the USSR's Prosecutor's Office on 11 June 1990.
In 1989 over 500,000 administrative cases of non-compliance with existing legislation and 
regulations on the environment were registered. Compared to the previous year there was a 
reduction in the number of cases. Administrative proceedings were instituted against 479,000 
people, of whom 414,000 were fined. The average fine, however, was only 28 rubles per person.
Investigation was started against some 4,000 poachers for criminal offences. The total sum of
.fines collected in 1989 was 11.4 million rubles. Money collected from enterprises for damages 
caused to the environment totalled 100 million rubles. The total loss due to damages to the 
environment, however, was estimated by Goskompriroda at more than 200 million rubles. To 
some extent this could be explained by cases not being discovered and fines being set too low. 
However, a proper investigation was often not launched, even when the evidence was there.
The June 1990 Instruction issued by the USSR Prosecutor's Office stated that excess 
emissions o f pollutants in most cases had no impact on enterprise activities. Sufficient measures 
were taken only occasionally in response to violations of environmental regulations. The violators 
were rarely put on trial (in some cases the investigation was dropped) because the Prosecutor's 
Office was not provided with the documents it needed. In many cases, however, the Prosecutor's 
Office was itself to blame for this situation, as it was reluctant to prosecute people, even if there 
was enough evidence available to take action. To some extent this was due to a lack o f expertise
on environmental legislation in the Prosecutor's Office, and to understaffing.
The Prosecutor's Office was prevented from taking individuals to court for environmental 
crimes as it had either not been able to obtain materials necessary to conduct a proper investigation 
(they were labelled confidential) or it was politically impossible to organise a trial. This was well 
illustrated in the case of Chernobyl. Immediately after the accident the people in charge of 
operating the nuclear power station were charged and sentenced to long terms in jail. Others, who 
were responsible for flaws in construction of the nuclear power station and inadequacies in the 
clean-up operation and in assessing the extent of the accident, were not investigated for political 
reasons. Only in the early 1990s did such investigations become possible.
In order to improve the situation, the June 1990 instruction called for regular contacts 
between environmental authorities and the Prosecutor's Office, in order to secure a prompt 
exchange of information on a regular basis. Documents regarding violations of environmental 
legislation had to be passed on to the Prosecutor's Office within 10 days of their discovery. If  the 
violation was very serious, copies of the documents were sent to republican environmental 
protection bodies as well as to the republican prosecutor's office. The two organs were obliged to
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plan and carry out joint inspections to see to it that enterprises observed regulations on the 
environment. Furthermore, from June 1990 prosecutors were entitled to consult environmental 
experts in the Ministries/Departments of Environmental Protection on difficult technical matters. 
Environmental authorities, on the other hand, were instructed to provide the Prosecutor's Office 
with general materials on pollution/environmental protection to seiwe an educational purpose. The 
Prosecutors were obliged to inform environmental authorities on measures taken by them. Once a 
year the latter would compile documentation on breaches of environmental legislation for the 
Prosecutor's Office. The Prosecutor's Office was also in charge of controlling the environmental 
authorities and thus seeing to it that their activities were within the framework of the instructions, 
rules and laws within which they operated. This caused some tension between the two.
As seen above, several of the laws passed went much further than previous laws passed in 
an effort to improve the state of the environment in the USSR. This, however, was not the case for 
all the laws. Lemeshev referred to the draft Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy to illustrate this. 
This law, in his view, expressed narrow, departmental interests, ignoring the opinion of the Soviet 
public and also recent international trends. Moreover, it contradicted the Law on Property, 
according to which natural resources, including the soil, water and minerals, were in the 
possession of the republican and local soviets. The draft law proposed that
KoMneTeHUHfl coiobhlix pecnyfijiMK pacnpoCTpaiineTca jihuil iia  
"pery.fiHpoBanHe OTUomenHH, cn a sa in iu x  c ox p a iio fi sw p oB L a h 
MMym ecTBa n a cej ien u a , a TaKJKe sauiMTofi O K pyxca iom eu ci)e;j,i>i o r
B03M02KIIblX IferaTMBIIbIX B034efiCrBHH pa4HaUMH’’197
Whereas the construction and maintenance of all nuclear power stations would be the 
function of all-union bodies, the law postulated that the
JluKBM4auMfl nocjie^ci'BHM iieraTHBHoro BosAefiCTBHa aTOMiiofi 
anepreTHKH ua npupoA y, aKOHOMUKy h  oSmecTBO -  a r o  sa R o ra  
C0IO3HL1X pecnyRjiHK h MecriiLix opraaoB .
As for nuclear safety norms, these would in practice be determined by the very ministries in 
charge of developing nuclear power in the USSR, as they would have to be passed by the Soviet 
Council of Ministers. The draft law in Lemeshev's opinion also contradicted a resolution issued 
by the USSR Supreme Soviet 'On Urgent Measures for the Improvement of the Ecological 
Situation in the Country', which called for wider use of non-departmental and public 
environmental impact assessments. He was also highly sceptical o f article 41 o f the draft law, 
according to which a maximum limit of 500 million rubles was set as compensation from those 
ministries and departments in charge of nuclear power in the USSR should an accident take place.
•97M.fI. JlewemeB (1990), c. 213.
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If  a higher loss was incurred, only the USSR Council of Ministers could raise this limit; the union 
republics would have to take the brunt of any accident 'imposed' on them by Moscow. 
Consequently, there was not only a problem with legislation enforcement, but also with the very 
laws that were passed. As long as the ministries and departments retained their power (and 
monopoly), it would be very difficult to introduce real environmental reform.
2.3 Environmental Reform in the USSR - the Case of Ukraine
As seen above, the 27th Party Congress became the starting point of Gorbachev's 'new thinking’ on 
the environment. In its aftermath this change was reflected in a series of Ukrainian official 
writings. In 1987 Ukrainian Goskompriroda issued a leaflet*98and a longer report• 99 addressing 
environmental issues intended for the general public. Reiterating the words of Gorbachev, the 
leaflet pointed out that one of the most important tasks standing before mankind was how to
A
nojinoro yAOBJieTBOpenwH MaiepuaBbiiLix u Ayxonnbix sanjwcoB 
coBeTCKoro 'lejioBeKa, rapMOiiMBHoro HsaHMOAeucmmi oRmecam h 
ripupoAbd
'protect the valuable living environment and to secure the rational use of the planet's resources'* ^ 9 
Similarly, the Goskompriroda report stated that 'the interaction between Man, Society and Nature,
the protection o f the environment surrounding us all, is one o f the most urgent and topical
problems of our time, which will decide the future of all Mankind'* •*.
Ukraine, like the other Soviet republics, would take all the necessary measures to protect the 
environment:
B YKpaHHCKOH CCP, KaK H BO BceM CoBeTCKOM Cojo.3e, oxpa iia  
iipnpo4bi HBJiaeTCfl ACJioM nepBoci’eneiiHOH rocyaapcrBennoM  Baxoioci'H, 
ona HOCMT Bcenapo4HbiH xapaKTep. C oxpa iieiiue aucroTbi BOAoeMOB h 
B03Ayiuiioro Sacceu iia, naoAopoAua bomb, paciMTejibnoro h ACHBOTiioro 
Mupa, yjiyBinetiue aKOJiormiecKOH oScranoBKH ropoAOB. M iiorue Apyrue 
npoÔJiGMu oxpaiibi npupoAbi peuia iorca b pecnyÔJiMKe u cahiiom  
KOMn.rieKce couMajibiiux h HapoABoxosiiHcrBeniibix saAaa. Hx 
ycnem iioe  peine iiue BBAJieTci! oahmm m3 naAcneHUiux pbBiaroB n
co3AaiiHH nauRojiee 6AaronpnnTHbix yariOBUu aaia MaKCHivia;ibHoro
'Considerable attention' was being paid to this issue in an attempt to streamline the structure 
and organisation of those institutions that were in charge of the environment. Goskompriroda
*98 Oxpaiia npupoAbi b yKpaHiiCKOU CCP. Environment Control in the Ukrainian SSR (Kmcb: ’’PeKAawa”, 
1987).
*99 rocyAapcTBemibiH komutct VKpaHHCKOH CCP no oxpane ripHpoAU, Ox^xnia imupovibt -  saAaaa 
RCp.iiapojiHaa (Kuen: HsAaTCAbCTBO noauTHaecKou AHrepaTypbi yKpauiibi, 1987).
* *9 Oxnana npupoab i b yKPam iCKOfl CCP (1987), c. 3.
*** O x p a n a  npHPoabi -  sa a a a a  BcenapoAHaa (1987), c. 7.
**2 Oxnana nPHPOAbi b yKpauiicKOH CCP. (1987), c. 3.
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adapted a positive approach to the countiy's environmental problems, arguing that the conditions 
needed to make improvements in this area were already in place;
E c t l  »ito Repeab iia seMAC yKpauHCKOH. Ecrb h b c c  neo6xoAMMbie 
ycAOBMA Am peuienHA saaaa oxpaiibi npupoAbi: oSineiiapoAiiaa
coScTDeuiiocrb na ripupoAHbie pecypcbi. riAaiioBbiH xapaKTep ixisBHTHa 
3K0H0MHKH, coAHAnaa iiayqiiaa Rasa, crpeM A enue n a œ A en m i 
pecnyRAMKH coxpaimTb h npuyMnoACMTb npupoA iibie RoraTci'Ba**^.
The official view that socialism, with its planned economy and humanist outlook on the 
world, was better suited than capitalism to successfully address environmental problems, was 
reiterated* Already, considerable achievements had been made in this area: for instance,
measures introduced in the 11th 5-Year Plan to implement complex environmental protection 
programmes had been highly effective. Investments in the area were growing steadily, and the 
results during 1986 were promising. Although industrial production had increased, emissions of 
sewage had been reduced by six percent and harmful emissions into the atmosphere had declined 
by three percent. Moreover, Donetsk, one of the most industrialised cities in the USSR, had been 
declared to be one of the cleanest and greenest industrial cities in the world by UNESCO! * *5
Goskompriroda's report - unlike the leaflet - did, however, acknowledge that the 
environmental situation in certain regions of Ukraine, particularly in heavily industrialised areas, 
remained 'difficult'. Funds earmarked for investments in environmental technologies were not 
utilised in full due to the absence o f such technologies within the USSR or due to a lack of concern 
for the environment at the administrative level o f the enteiprise itself. Moreover, the steadily 
increasing industrial output was also to some extent hampering attempts at improving the 
environment. Problems were also caused by inefficient irrigation systems and extensive pollution 
from transport* *6.
As seen above, the USSR Goskompriroda was established in 1988 to co-ordinate efforts to 
control and improve the state of the environment in the country. In all the republics, however, 
with the exception of the Russian Federation, such committees were set up much earlier. In 
Ukraine, Derzhkompriroda was founded in 1967 to control the observance o f the 'Ukrainian Law 
on the Environment' and other measures taken by the Communist Party and Parliament to protect 
the environment. Besides, the Committee was responsible for co-ordinating such work with other 
ministries and departments. Decisions made by Derzhkompriroda were compulsory for the 
various ministries, departments and enterprises and for the general public itself. Plans to improve 
the state of the environment were coordinated with the Ukrainian Derzhplan and the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences, as well as with the relevant ministries and departments. Derzhkompriroda
**3 Ibid. p . 4.
* *^* Oxnana npuDOAbi -  saaaaa BceHapoA iiaa (1987), c. 3.
**5 Ibid.. pp. 3-4 and Oxnana npHDO^ bi b YKpaMHCKOH CCP 0 9 8 7 1  c. 6. 
*i6jbM, p. 4.
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worked closely with Derzhkomhidromet (Ukrainian Agency for Hydrometeorology and 
Environmental Control) as well as with departments o f the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. 
Derzhkompriroda was, in addition to being responsible for environmental protection and the 
rational use of natural resources, also in charge o f the republic's nature reserves and national parks. 
Finally, the Committee was responsible for educating the general public on these issues through 
the press, radio and television* *7. With the establishment of the USSR Goskompriroda, 
Derzhkompriroda was subordinated to Moscow.
2.3.1 The CPU and the Environment
Although Ukraine thus had not only a structure but also legislation to secure the protection of the 
environment and the rational use of natural resources, Derzhkompriroda, according to Serhyi 
Mihailov - advisor to the Ukrainian Minister o f the Environment - achieved little prior to 
Gorbachev's reforms in 1987/1988. This, he claimed, was due to a combination of a lack of 
professionalism among those heading the Committee, as well as to heavy pressure from the 
Ukrainian Council of Ministers and ministries such as Minrybkhoz and Minvodkhoz^^^. Official 
documents also reveal growing concern with the state of the environment in Ukraine during the 
second half of the 1980s. A report presented to the CPU Central Committee 'On the Required 
Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic' revealed that although a number of 
measures such as increased investments and the introduction of environmental technologies had 
been taken, the ecological situation in Ukraine remained 'very difficult and tense'. In several 
industrial centres and towns emissions into the air and water 'considerably exceeded the maximum 
permissible concentrations’. This situation was further compounded by the Chernobyl accident, 
which caused a ‘serious deterioration of the ecological situation..and the pollution o f a part of the 
republic’s territory with long-lived radionuclides’.
A major reason given for this was the poor implementation o f legal acts to protect the 
environment, such as the ‘Resolution on Additional Measures to Avert the Pollution o f the Air of 
Cities and other Populated Areas and Industrial Centres' (6 December 1984):
...CBoeopeMeHHo w a noAiioM oRbewe b ijecnyRaHKe ne BunoAiieHO 
npaicTH'iecKH iiu o a h o  h3 iimx. He ayncmyeTCfl SAecb m 
KoopAMiiMpyiomefi, nanpaBABiomeu pojiH Oi^esHAHyivia (BepxoBiioro 
CoBeTa), saMecruTeaeû OpeAceAUTeaB CoBMHiia YCCP, a  xaxAce 
Tocnaana YCCP. OcyiuecrBAiieMwe MeponpHBTMii cnaonib n pnAOM 
HOCBT pa3po3ifenHLiH xapaKTep, orpafiHqnBaioTca BeAOMCTBeiiHLiMH 
MHTepecaMH. CaaRo ucnoawyioTca AOcrwAceiiHa Hayqao-TexuMqecKoro 
nporpecca. CoxpanaeTca nopoaifaii npaKTMxa ’’ocraToqiioro” npuiiuHna
**^  Oxnana npupoAM -  saaaqa BceHapoAnaa {1987), c. 18-19 and Oxpaiia npHUOAW b Y kixihhckoh CCP. 
(1987), c. 7.
* *® Interview with Serhii Mikliailov, Kiev, August 1991.
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Bi.uieaeiiHii viaTepHaabiibix m (limiaiicoBbix jiecypcoB na |xia.iM3anMio 
na3[)eBinnx npMpoiiooxpannbix npoRaeM**^.
Although the ministries and departments were much to blame for this, the report admitted 
that some responsibility also had to be taken by the CPU, for failing to secure that the required 
measures were implemented:
HeKOTopbie oSKOMbi, wnorue ropKOvibi m pauKOMbi napruM. nepBHMUbje 
napTHHHbie opranusauuM ne npeATiflBaHioT AOJUKnoro ciipoca k 
pyKOBOAH'reaa.M M unucrepcrB , BeAOMcro, oRTeAHUHenuH h npeAnpm rruü  
3a CBoeBpeMeniioe h noaiioe Bbinoanenue pemenuü OapTHH u 
OpaBUTeabciBa no BonpocaM oxpaitbi OKpyAcaiomeu cpeAW*^^
By May 1988 a number of actions aimed at reducing harmful emissions from Ukrainian 
enterprises had been organised by the public. The report stated that public concern for the 
environment was justified:
B c e  3T0 BbiSbiBaex cnpaBeAAUBoe B03MymenHe TpyAntnHxca, no]30JUKaer 
MX MHoroHHCJienubie AcaaoRbi h  oSpam enH ii b naprMMnwe h  coB ercK ne  
opranb i. a  B IT. ^ ep K a cca x  m K peivienqyre npu B eao  k  BbicrynJienMiiM 
naceaenM B npoTMB 3arpn3nenMB OKpyjKaiOLuen cpCAbi. O TK poBenno  
crpMuaTeAbHbiM c r a a o  OTiiomenMe aioAePi k  crpoHTeabCTBy noBbix,
TexiiHqecKH caoAcnb ix npoHSBOACfB, b n ep n y io  onepeAb aTOMiibix 
oaeKTpocranuHM h XMMMnecKHx npeAnpmiTHH*2i,
The report is interesting reading in that it does not try to push the issue under the carpet, but 
rather provides a frank and seemingly fair analysis of the current state of affairs. The draft 
‘Resolution on the Required Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic', which 
it accompanied, reiterated the views reflected in the report. During 1986 and 1987 3.8 billion 
rubles had been spent on measures to protect the environment. Some 850 million o f these had 
been invested in devices to reduce emissions of harmful substances into the air and water. 
However, the situation remained difficult: the level of air pollution in several towns and cities in 
the Donbass region and Pridneprovie and harmful substances emitted into the Dniepr, Ingulets, 
Samara and North Donets rivers, exceeded legal norms. Another problem was the flooding and 
swamping of agricultural areas and the pollution of ground water used for drinking purposes.
**9 CeKpeTHO. UK KoMnapiHH YKpaHMbi, 0  neoTAOAcubix Meimx no vjivM m euufo aKOJiorMqecKOH 
oRcraHOBKH b  pecnvRaHKe. signed by B. Kachura, I. Mozgovoi, S. Hurenko and V. Kriuchkov and 
found in (Iioiia No 1, onHC No 11, cnpaBO No 1864, apK. 21-25. ApK. 22.
*20 Ibid.. apK. 25.
*2* Ibid.
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Erosion and salinisation o f the ground was a growing problem, as was pollution of waters, rivers 
and water reservoirs. The accident at Chernobyl further complicated the situation*22
It is worth noting that whereas the report submitted to the CPU Central Committee together 
with the draft resolution contained criticism of the party for failing to exert enough pressure on the
ministries and departments involved, no such criticism was raised in the draft resolution:
*22 CeKpeTHO. ripoeKT. O HeoTJTGACHMX MBPax no vjivameiiMio aKOJiomqecKou oRcraiionKH n 
pecnvRjiHKe. signed by V. Shcherbitskii on 20.5.1988 and found in $OHA No. 1, onnc No. 11, cnpauo 
No. 1864, apK. 14-20. Ibid.. apK. 14.
*23 Ibid.
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IM3-3a ReaoTBeTCFBeHHoro OTiioiueiiMB iieKoropbix MunucrepcTB h 
BeAOMCT'B, RecnpHHuuniioCT’H opranoB, iipHaBaiiiibix ocyinecTB.ifiTb 
Koirrpojib 3a cocroanHeM oxpaiibi oKpyAcaioinefi C[)6Abi, iie 
oSeaieBHBaercfi cBoeapeMemioe Bbino.mieiiue Miiorux sajiaiiuH, 
npeAycMOTpeiiiibix nocTaiioBJieiimiMu IfK KflCC u CoBera MuiiucrpoB 
CCCP, UK KoMnapTHH YKpauHbi h Conera MuiincrpoB YCCP no aruM 
BonpocaM*23.
t
The draft resolution contained criticism of other bodies for the failure to adequately address 
environmental problems in the Black Sea and Azov Sea basins: ‘great inertia’ had been revealed 
in the implementation of decisions taken by the Party and the Government in this area; funds 
allocated for this purpose were not being used, and the time schedules set for introducing new 
environmental technologies were not kept. Poor organisation o f environmental measures were 
also observed in the metallurgy, energy and chemical industries, in transport and communal 
services. Considerable amounts of water polluted with mineral fertilisers and pesticides were 
entering the rivers and seas through the irrigation systems, particularly from the rice fields in the 
Crimean and Kherson regions. Not only a lack of concern, but also the ministries' and 
departments' inefficiency were to blame:
HeAocrraTOBHO a<{Kl)eKTHBH0 ocymeCTBJUiiOT K oopAH iiaum o  
npupoAooxpaiiHOH AeiiTejibiioci'H MHiiucrepCTB, b b a g m c t b ,  h c h o j ik o m o b  
MecTHbix CoBCTOB iiapoAHbix A enyraroB , iie  BcerAa CBoeapeMeuMO n  
rjiySoK O  BiiHKaiOT b  cym ecT B o iiaapeB u inx aK oaorm iecK u x ripoRaeM  
IlpesMAMyM, 3aM6CTHTeAH UpeAceAUTem i C oB ora M n iin crp oB  YCCP.
C ep b es iio  iiCAopaRaTbiBaeT b btom buachom A eae Eo c n a a ii  YCCP. He 
iiaujJiH noKa cB oero  wecrra b im R ore n o  03AopoBJienH io OKpyAcaioineu  
cpeAbi M iiorue npo ipcoiosiib ie KOMUTCTbi.
As for CPU officials, some of them also had to take some of the blame, as they
He npeA’flBAaioT bmcokoh Tpe6oBa're.ribiiocrH k pyKOBOAureJuiM 
MMiiHcrrepci'B, BeAOMcrn, oS’eAHiieiiuH n iipeAnprniTuu 3a 
iieyKocHHTeAbHoe Bbinoniienne pemenHH HapruM h HpaBHTenbCTBa no 
BonpocaM oxpaiibi OKpyAcaiomen cpeAbi nexoTopbie oRkomu, ropKOMbi u
pafiKOMbi napTHH, iiepBHqubie iiapTHfiiibie opraiiuAwuMH. B ycjioBUJix 
BoapocuieH saHUTepecoBaiiiioCTH ncex c ioea iiacaieiiHa b y.iyMiiieiiMM 
oxpaiibi oKpyîKaioBiefi ciieAbi OTAejibiibie napTMfiiibie KOMHTexbi. 
McrioAKOMbi Mecriibix CoBeroB uapoAHbix AenyTaioB iie cywejiM 
npaBHJibiio oneiiMTb cjioîKMBiijyioai aKOJiornaecKyio oRcraiiOBKy, 
iianpaBHTb na ee osAopoBJieuMe neoSxoAMMbie cwnbi h cpeAcina, aana.iM 
B 3T0M Ae.ne naccMcnyio no3HUMio...He yAe.ineTCii jiojixcnoro BiiMMaiiMn 
nponaraiiAe npHpoAOOxpainibix anaiiMfi. noBbiniennio aKOJiorHMecKOH 
Ky.wrypbi naceneiiMn.
The resolution ordered the local and regional paity committees, the executive committees of 
the local soviets, ministries, departments and the leadership of enterprises, kolkhozy and sovkhozy 
within 'the shortest time frame' to do away with the situation outlined and to secure the 
unconditional implementation of all tasks sanctioned by the Soviet authorities to improve the state 
of the environment. More importantly, the resolution also linked the environment with the 
economy and sought to increase its significance as an issue:
PacciViaTpHBaTb cBoeBpeMeiiiioe h KOMnjieKcnoe peiiieiiHe aKiyajibHbix 
AKOAornqecKMX npoRjieiw kuk nepBOCTeneiiiiyio saAaay, oSuieiiapoAHoe 
Aeao, HMeiomee Rojibuioe aKOHOMuqecKoe, couuaabnoe h nojiMTmiecKoe
3HaqenMe*24
An investigation was ordered into the delay in construction o f water and dust cleansing 
facilities as well as in the search for labour, material, and financial resources to secure the 
implementation of all environmental measures outlined in the 5 Year Plan by the end of the 5th 
year. The CPU, with this resolution, initiated measures to improve the ecological situation in Kiev 
and other polluted cities such as Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Odessa, 
Dniprodzerzhinsk, Krivyi Rih and Zhdanov. Enterprises were ordered to make proper use of 
pollution-reducing devices already installed, and the ministries and departments were encouraged 
to co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts better. The Ukrainian Academy o f Sciences would in 
the future play a more significant role in finding solutions to Ukraine's environmental problems. 
Local authorities were ordered to take the environment into account when drafting plans for the 
economic and social development o f their regions, and deputies were encouraged to activate the 
public in the solving of environmental problems locally.
Protecting the interests of the environment was to become one of the major tasks o f the 
prosecutor's offices as well as o f the leadership of Ukraine's industries. The Presidium of UTOP 
was ordered to improve its work in spreading awareness of the need to protect the environment.
*24 Ibid. apK . 16.
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HeoRxoAMMo pe3K0 (rep lac in g ”b itojhiom cMHCJie”)  yxcecroMHi'i) 
KOHTix)Ab H Tpe6oijaTe.ribnoCTb B BOB|X)cax ox ixn ib i oK pyAcarou iefi
c|)eAbE
*25 CoBepmemio cexpenio. IlocraiiQBaeiîHe nojiHTRioDo UK KoMnapTHH yKPaMiibi or 17.V.1988 r.
npoTOKoa No. 65. Paragraph 1, in (|)OBA No. 1, onnc No. 11, crip. No. 1863, apK. 2-8.
*26 d)oiiA No. 1, OBMC No. ll,cnp. No. 1864, apK. 35.
*27 UeiiTpajibiibiH KoMHTeT KOCC, K No 0  1693. $OBA No. 1, onnc No. 32, cnp. No. 291, apK. 1-3 
Ibid.. apK. 1.
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As for the CPU Central Committee and local and regional party committees, these were instructed
to strengthen their control over the ministries, departments, enterprises, kolkhozy and sovkhozy to
.secure the implementation of the required measures and the protection of the environment.
Although the resolution was published by Ukrainian central and regional newspapers, it was 
initially stamped 'entirely secret'*25, it was this secrecy that the Greens were, to criticise so 
strongly on the grounds that it was detrimental to improving the state of the environment. Judging 
by comments added and changes make in handwriting by Shcherbitskii on a copy of ‘On the 
Urgent Measures for the Improvement of the Ecological Situation in the Republic’, Shcherbitskii 
was well aware of the deteriorating state of the environment in Ukraine. As an illustration, I will 
present a few of his annotations below. Commenting on the significance of environmental 
problems, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party reiterated the fact that not only 
had these problems attained 'significant public importance', but, moreover, had already worsened. 
As examples he referred to Kremenchuh and Cherkassy, where manifestations o f environmental 
protest had already been recorded. The situation, although some positive results would no doubt 
be recorded in the future, would continue to deteriorate. As a result,
cpeAbi oyKBajibHO oceivi -  m napTMHiibiM, h coiieTCKMM, u 
X03iiHcrneiiiibiM opranaM, oSmecrBennbiM opraiiH3auHiiM*26.
However, despite the need to improve the environment, few results had been recorded by 
January 1989. In a speech to the CPSU Central Committee, Shcherbitskii indirectly accepted the 
party's part of the blame:
HaAO npusnaTb, b to  b pecnyRjiHKe AJiHTe.nbiioe BpeMH iie  y a ej ia j io cb
A o a ^ r io r o  BiiHMaiiHB ocym ecT B .iieiin io  w ep no o x p a iie  OKpyTKaiomefl 
,127
■a..
As a result of this lax attitude, air pollution in several industrial centres and cities had 
reached levels well above those permissible, and river pollution was becoming a considerable 
problem. The accident at Chernobyl had contributed to a serious deterioration of the ecological 
situation in Ukraine, and there seemed to be a link between deteriorating health and pollution in 
the republic:
Î
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.A
rio AajiHUM MMnsApaea YCCP, H apacra ioT HeHiKiieKUMOiiuwe 
3a6ojieDanH a iiaceae iiH fl. oco R e im o  jieTefi, m t o  b  siiaqMTe/ibHOH Me[>e 
o 6 y a io B .n e n o  neyAOB-neTBopHxeabHLiM cocTOfiHHevi oKpyTKaiomew ci^Abi.
For this reason, the question of improving the ecological situation in Ukraine had become a 
priority issue in the social development of the republic, argued Shcherbitskii. Although a number 
o f measures had been taken since the beginning of the 11th 5-Year Plan in 1986, the state of the 
environment remained ‘very difficult and tense’. As the limits of glasndst were widened, the 
serious environmental situation became a source of great concern among Ukraine's population;
...B ycjiOBMflx pacLimpaiomeHCfi naciiocrH  {sic) orpHuaTe.ribHO 
cKa3a.riocb na oRuiecxBemiOM MiieimH no noBOAy Aajibiieuiuero 
pa3BHTMfl aTOMiiou BiiepreiHKH na YKpaune. HsyqeuMe noKasbiBaex. 
qxG Aaa nacropoxcennocru inupoKOH oÔmecrBem iocm ociioBanmi6CTb*28
Shcherbitskii's speech revealed the increasing concern o f the Ukrainian authorities regarding 
the advisability of expanding nuclear power in Ukraine. As pointed out by the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences, 90% of the republic's territory was unfavourable for the construction of 
nuclear power stations and the storage of nuclear waste. Moreover, large areas o f Ukraine's 
Western and Southern territories were prone to earthquakes, measuring up to eight, and in the case 
of the Crimea up to nine points on the Soviet scale. The undesirability o f building more reactors 
on Ukrainian territory was further compounded by the generally limited water resources in the 
republic. Besides, as admitted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, 'Not one of the sites of the 
Ukrainian nuclear power stations fulfilled all points of the “Requirements for the Location of 
Nuclear Power Stations”, passed by the USSR Council of Ministers...’ (see Chapter Six for further 
details).
Shcherbitskii hinted that plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine were continued despite 
the opposition to such plans by Ukrainian institutions on objective grounds:
B 1988 roAy saiiMTepecoBaiiiibie MuiiucrepciBa u BeAOMCTna 
pecnyRjiHKM lie comacoBajin RoabuiMHcrBO xexuHKO-aKOHOMMMecKux 
oRocHCBanHH na pacuinpeime PoBeiicKOH, XMejibiiMUKOH n lO ïK iio- 
YKpaHHCKOH ABC H3-3a MMeK3iiiHxc}i cymecTBeniibix saweMaiinH b 
qaca'H BOAOoRecneuenHa. oxayACAeiimi seweJib, paAuoaKTHBHoro 
3arpa3H6Hua h Apyrux (paxTopoB. Ho axuM Ace npuaniiaM CoBex 
MuHMcxpoB YCCP iianpaBHA b coiosiibie opranbi npocbRy o 
npeKpamenMM cTpoMxeabcxBa HurupuiicKOu ABC.
*2® Ib i4 ,p .2 .
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Western experience showed that by utilising technical innovations and combining this with
129
*39 (Do h a  N o . 1 , o h h c  No. 1 1 ,  c n p . No. 2 1 3 0 ,  apK. 6 .
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Public protests, argued Shcherbitskii, could have been significantly fewer had Soviet 
ministries {Gosplan, GKNT, Gosstroi, Minatomenergo, Minenergo, USSR Academy o f  Sciences, 
Gosatomnadzor, USSR Council o f  Ministers) implemented tasks regarding the construction of
nuclear power stations up to the year 2000 and the modified Soviet Energy Programme. 
Shcherbitskii noted that plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine were directed towards the 
further extensive development of heavy industry in the republic, which, he argued, would 
inevitably lead to the further deterioration of the ecological situation in Ukraine. The CPU, on the 
other hand, favoured structural changes in the Ukrainian economy, which would help to reduce 
pollution in the future:
KoimenuHH pasDHTua gHepreruKM. b t o m  'lucrie h  aroMHoA, no iia iueM y  
MiietiHio, AOAACiia cTjxiMTbcn B TecHOH yBB3Ke c  MSMeiieiiHeM crpyK Typb i 
3K0H0MMKH, KOHKpeTHblMM MepaMH 110 3IieprOC6e])eîKeHMIO, BIieAlieiiMIO 
nporpeccHBHbix T exno.noruu u  BbicoKoailKlieKTHBHbix M arepuaaoB , c  
yqexoM conuajib iib ix u  aKOAormiecKMX ([laKTopoB*^^.
strict rules for the use of natural resources it was possible practically without increasing energy 
production to double the national income. Such a path, rather than the continued construction of 
nuclear power, was favoured by the Ukrainian authorities.
I will return to the issue of nuclear power in subsequent chapters, suffice it here to say that 
there was growing discord between Soviet and Ukrainian authorities on this issue by the end of the 
1980s. As for measures to improve the state of the environment, subsequent reports produced by 
the CPU indicated that little progress was being made - fuelling arguments by Greens that given 
the centralised structure of the USSR both economically and politically, the only way in which the 
environment in Ukraine could be improved, would be for the republic first to gain control over all 
industry located on its territory (95% of such industries were controlled by all-Union ministries 
and departments) as well as over its natural resources.
A resolution passed by the CPU Secretariat on 11 August 1989 ('On the Course of the 
Implementation of the CPU Central Committee's Resolution of 17 May 1988 'On the Necessaiy 
Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic' gave little reason for optimism:
BiA3iiaqHTH, u io  iiesBaAcaioqu iia  ACHKi nosuTUBiti sp y u iem m  b 
o p r a i iu is a n i i  ynpaBJiiiiiifl npnpoAOOXopoHHOio A iflAbiiicrio i  po3B”fl3aiuii 
KoiiKpeTHMX eKOJiori'iHMX npoRjieM, y  n ijioM y m i poR o i'a  b p e c n y S a iu i  
npoBOAHTbca me iiesaAOBiJibiio. OKpcM i saxoA U i  A opyqe iiim , m o  
nepeARaMeiii noCTano iioio U K  K o M iia p r ii Y K p a ï i m  BiA 1 7  TiiaBim 1 9 8 8  
pOKy 3 UbOrO HHTaHmi, SaJIUUiaiOTbCfl HeBHKOHaHHMH*39.
Ibid.. p . 3 .
■ «î
The various ministries and departments as well as the executive committees of the local 
soviets had no understanding of the political importance of environmental protection, and the 
people of Ukraine still did not feel personally responsible for protecting the environment. The 
volume of polluted waters emitted into Ukrainian water reserves remained very high; 516 million 
m3 of untreated waste was emitted annually. Emissions into the air had increased over the 
previous year and the deputy leaders of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers were sharply criticised 
for failing to put pressure on ministries, departments and executive committees to comply with 
existing regulations and legislation. Further, several ministries had failed to utilise funds allocated 
to reduce harmful emissions into the air and water, thus facilitating the further deterioration o f the 
state of Ukraine's environment. In 1988 34.5 million rubles worth of investments were never 
placed, and for the first years of the 11th 5- Year Plan this figure reached 131 million rubles. Plan
targets for the installation of filters at chemical enterprises during 1988 had been fulfilled only by 
47%, and in Poltava, Zaporizhzhia and Odessa only by 9-14%!
Not only the ministries controlling the industries were to blame for this situation:
.
noRiiibHO iiepeRyAOByioTb cb o io  p oS oT y  y  cnpaB i oxopoiiu npupoAH i  
34opoB”fl J110A6H /lepACKOivinpMpoAM YFCP, MiiiicrepcrBO oxopoiiu  
3AopoB”fl YPCP, YKprUpoMeT. KoMireTOM mbjio Biiocurbcn nponosuuiu 
moAO KOMnjieKCHoro Bupiuieiiiia eKOJiorhnux npo6.rieM, o p ra ii isa u il  
panionajibHoro BUKopuciainni i  BùiTBOpeinui npupoAHUx jiecypciB, ne 
npoBOAMTbCJi cHcreMaTuqna poRoia no niABumenuto eKOJiorinnoi 
Ky.tib'rypu fiacejienua.
■îA-The Prosecutor's Office was proving highly inefficient in cases involving legislation on the 
environment, and in some districts (Voroshilovhrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, 
Odessa and Poltava) paid no attention to such cases at all. It was thus understandable that the 
public was getting impatient:
CnoîKHBaubKe oraBJieniia ao npupoau 3 RoKy M iiiicrep ci’B, BiaoMcrB, 
oR”GAnaiib i  nUnnpueMcrB, neyBaacne cranjiemm a o  snepiieiib 
TpyAJiiuux, HexTyBannn rpoMaACbKoro AyMKOio. qucaem ii nopyiueiiini 
iipupoAooxoponHoro saKOnoAaBCTBa BUKAUKaioTb cnpaBeAJiUBe oRypeiinii 
jiioAeu, oAiiaK, tie iie craao ueiiTpoM yoaru napTiunux KOMiTerin i  
op ra iiisau iu .
In the hope that matters would improve, the CPU Secretariat ordered local and regional 
party committees to hold people responsible before the party for failing to implement measures to 
improve the state o f the environment. The requirements demanded from communists in charge of 
enterprises and collective farms had to be raised. Further, the Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry 
of Health were encouraged to take directors of enterprises or collective farms to court for violating 
environmental regulations and legislation.
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While it is true that various ministries and departments were reluctant to introduce measures 
to improve the environment, this did not necessarily stem from a lack of concern for the 
environment per se. As seen above, the emphasis of the annual and five-year plans was on output, 
and as the punishment for failing to meet production targets was much more severe than for failing 
to comply with environmental regulations, the enterprise manager very often had no choice but to 
concentrate on the output side. Moreover, as extensive rather than intensive growth was favoured 
until Gorbachev introduced his economic reforms in the mid 1980s, the Soviet economic system 
was simply unable to produce many of the technologically advanced devices needed to reduce 
harmful emissions in the country's industries. To illustrate this problem, I will take a look at the 
case of the Verkhnedneprovsk starch-producing combine.
The Verkhnedneprovsk starch-producing combine, which was built in 1963, was one of the 
biggest food-producing enterprises in Ukraine. It supplied bakeries and chocolate factories in 
Ukraine, Moscow, Leningrad, Riga and elsewhere with caramel treacle, and all Soviet chemists 
received medical glucose from Verkhnedneprovsk. Maize extract and green syrup were delivered 
to enterprises producing medicine and vitamin factories received maize butter used in baby 
food^^^. In late 1989 letters and articles started to appear in the local press, voicing the concern of 
locals regarding severe pollution not only from this combine but also from others in the area. V. 
Tsikunova, sanitary inspector in the area, revealed that five big combines were causing 
considerable pollution o f the air in Verkhnedneprovsk: 1,363 types o f harmful substances were 
emitted into the atmosphere and only 54% of these emissions were filtered (for the combine the 
figure was as low as 30%). During 1988 some 8,630 tons of harmful substances were emitted. In 
the sanitary zone of the furfural-hydrolysis unit of the combine there were even flats and a 
playground for children. Most of the emissions exceeded the maximum permissible levels. The 
directors of six enterprises had been punished for high emissions, but things did not improve as a 
result, and there was serious concern about the health of the workers at the combine, who fell ill at 
regular intervals. Moreover, the local population was voicing concern for their children's health.
In 1987 the regional parliament had passed a resolution 'On the State and Measures to 
Secure the Environmental Protection of the Water and Air Basins and the Complex Utilisation of 
Natural Resources in the Verkhnedneprovsk region'. By February 1989, however, this resolution 
had yet to be implemented L, Nita, an inspector of the Verkhnedneprovsk inter-regional 
committee for environmental protection, called for the closing of the combine on the grounds that 
agrymus - the waste from the furfural-hydrolysis unit - covered 10 hectares o f land and posed a 
threat to people's health. Over the previous 6-10 years illnesses of the respiratory organs had 
increased 3.5 times. Moreover, it was polluting the ground water in the area and was being spread
See letter No. 10/3562 of 31.12.1989, BepXHeiinenpoBCKHH KpaxMajionaTCMHWH KOMOnuar HMeim 60- 
JiCTMa BeaHKOH OKTaOpbCKon connaancTnaecKOM peitoaiounn flepeoMy cexpem p io IfenTpajibncro 
KoMHTexa KoivinapTHH YKpaHUbi to b . HoauiKO, B.A., r. K hcb , in t|)oaa No. 1, o i ih c  N o. 32, cnp. No. 
243, apK. 67.
3^2 npmiiinpoBCKim KOMyimp, 11.2.1989, c. 2.
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with the wind. Only a minor part of the agrymus was being processed or used. The committee 
had ordered the administration of the combine to find a solution to the problem by January 
1990133 ifi a letter to the local newspaper 24 local residents complained that in Nikolaev Street in 
Dniprovsk village all buildings, trees and surfaces were covered with brown dust and they 
demanded an explanation from the top management of the enterprise. The enterprise directors 
acknowledged and agreed with the concern of the locals and gave their approval when it was 
decided to set up a special commission to examine ways in which to reduce emissions from the 
combine.
In October 1989 the leader of the STK, A. Bukalo, the director of the combine, E. Bondar, 
the secretary of the party committee, A. Chuiko, the chairman of the trade union. I, Fedenko, the 
a p p a r a t c h i k V .  Polynko and the operator N. Khulevskii wrote a letter to the First Secretary of 
the CPU Central Committee, V. Ivashko, presenting him with the situation in Verkhnedneprovsk. 
In the letter they pointed out that in 1963, when the combine was built.
Hcxoiin M3 hbho omMboqiiLix cooSpaxeiiHH iia npoMnjioinaiiKe 
KOMtiMuara nocrpoeii coBepmeimo ne6.narono.riyqHbiH b sKOJiorMMecKon 
OTHOuieiiMM, OTpHuaTejibHO BJiHflioiiiMM iia rexnojiorHio BbipaSoTKH 
llMlUeBOM M Me^ HUHHCKOH rJIIOKOSbl rM.iip0JlH.3I10-(|)yiX{)yp0J]bHLIH 3aB0Æ
Thus, they argued, every year the unused waste was occupying more and more territory, closing in
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on the Dniprodzerzhinsk reservoir, which was the major source of drinking water on the right bank 
of the Dnipropetrovsk region. To make the enterprise environmentally safer, enormous 
investments were required. Besides, nobody in the region was able to utilise the waste. On this 
basis, the following request was made:
ripocHM B a c  co34aTb cn eu n ajib iiy io  kom m cchio, K oropa ii paccMOTpe.aa 
6bi BOSMoaciiocTb saxpbiTH ii n i ) 3  MJiH H.ibicKanHa qje^icn'B h 
noüpiiAqHKa ^.aii e r a  peKoiicrrpyKUHH, a  ra x x ce  crpoM TejibcrBa sa a o a a  
110 nepepaGoTKe e r o  orxo^O B h crp on rea b crB a  iioB oro MMicpopanoiia
AJifl cos^aiiHii caiiMTapnoH soiibi. ;
B criyqae aaxpbiTHa HIU KOJUieKTHB KOMSniiara ripuMer wepbi no 
cooTDerci'ByioiuieMy yBe.iMqeiiMio BbipaSoTKH xpaAne e^ikMUMTiiOM 
HMmeBOM M MeAHUHHCKOH npOiiyKUMH^^ .^
Two months later, in December 1989, the Ministry of Agriculture presented the outcome of 
a close examination of the combine, which had been conducted in co-operation with
,
0 O1W No. 1, OHHC No. 32, cnp. No. 243, apK. 71.
Apparatchik was put down as Polynko’s profession in the letter.
3^5 Letter No. 10/3562 of 31.10.1989, BepxueinienpoBCKHH KpaxMajionaToqiibiM KOMbMna r hmciim 60-JierHH 
BejiHKOH oKTnGpbCKOH couMaaHCTHHecKOM peBOJBOUHH OepooMy cexperapio Uempajibiioro 
KoMHTera KoMnapTHH YKpaHHLi tob. HuauiKO, BA., r. KweB, in (pom No. 1, onuc No. 32, cnp. No. 
243, apK. 68.
I
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Derzhkompriroda, the Verkhnedneprovsk regional executive committee and sanitary station, the 
top executives of the combine and the public. The Commission reached the conclusion that the 
furfural-hydrolysis unit should be closed from 1 January 1991'^^. Thus, it was not always the 
case that the top leadership of polluting enterprises were not environmentally minded, but rather 
that a lack of environmental concern at the time that the most environmentally harmful enterprises 
were built - in addition to the factors listed above - prevented the enterprises from successfully 
implementing measures to reduce harmful emissions into the environment.
2.3.2 State of the Environment
As pointed out above, a number of works on the state of the environment in the USSR have 
appeared in the West since the early 1970s. Less has been written - at least in the West - on the 
state of the environment in Ukraine. David Marples addressed this issue in Perestroika in Ukraine. 
Ecology. Economics and the Workers’ Revolt (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) and
EKOLOS/Zelenyi Svit produced a substantial report on the issue in 1990 {Zelenyi Svit also 
produced a separate report on the military and pollution in 1993), but other than that we have only 
fragmentary information - apart, o f course, from official statistical materials produced by 
Derzhkompriroda and Minzdrav. For reasons of space, I will limit the discussion to Ukraine. 
Moreover, I will not look at environmental protest and the data produced as evidence and counter­
evidence by the various actors taking part in such p r o t e s t s * ^ ^  Rather, I will simply present and 
discuss data gathered from official sources and Ekolos/Zelenyi Svit to illustrate the extent of the 
problem.
The first report on the State o f the Environment produced by USSR Goskompriroda in 1990 
and covering the year 1988^^^ stated that prior to 1987 official, open information on the ecological 
situation and the level of illness in the Soviet population was practically non-existent. Thus, 
Goskompriroda ran into problems gathering the information required for its report, and at the time 
of publication of the report there was still a shortage of contemporary, objective and official 
ecological information. The report did, however, contain an impressive amount o f data. A list o f 
the 68 most polluted cities (air pollution) in the USSR^^s revealed that 16 (i.e. every fourth) were 
situated in Ukraine. Most of these were concentrated in the Donetsk-Pridniestrovie region - the
Ï
Î
FocyjiapcrBeHiiwH arponpoMbimaeiiHyH KoivinTer yKpanucKon CCP. No. 31/49 of 6.12.1989 in reply 
to No 2339/168 of 10.11.1989. UK KoMnaumn yKpaniibi. O nncbMe BepxnejinenpoBCKoro 
KDaxMa.FionaTQqiioro KoiuGnnaTa. in No. 1, onnc No. 32, cnp. No. 243, apx. 75.
For more information, see Marples.(1991).
rocy a^pCTBeiiHbiH kommtct CCCP no oxpane npupo^bi. Cocroanne npnpoinoH cpemi b CCCP n 
1988 roiiv. (MocKBa: ’’JlecHan nixiMbiuiJUieiiHOcri’b", 1990 r.), c. 11.
Some 40 million people lived in these cities, or every fifth city dweller in the USSR. Source: 
fo c K O M C r a T  CCCP. Qxpaiia O K p v ^ K a io n ie n  c n e i ib i n p a u H o n a j ib t io e  H c n o j ib s o B a n H e  n n u D o m ib ix  
n e c v p c o B  b  CCCP. C T a 'in cT H q e cK H H  c G o p n ic . (MocKBa: ’’(Dmiaiicbi m craTM CXM K a", 1 9 8 9  r.), c. 3 1 .
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centre of Ukraine's heavy industry. Moreover, Ukraine's rivers (South Bull, Dniestr, Danube) were 
among the dirtiest in the USSR^^o report compiled by USSR Goskomgidromet (the State 
Committee on Hydrometeorology) in 1990*^ ^^  covered Ukraine in more detail; according to this 
report, concentrations of dust, carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide were higher than the Soviet 
average. Twelve of the cities with the highest excessive emissions of pollutants in the USSR were 
Ukrainian:
Table 2.5 Emission o f  Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities
Source: Goskomgirdomet (1990).
The highest emissions monitored in Ukraine were as follows
Table 2.6 Highest Recorded Levels o f  Major Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities
Substance Cities
dust Kiamatorsk (15 PDK)
sulphur dioxide Lisichansk (4 PDK)
nitrogen dioxide Kramatorsk (17 PDK)
hydrogen sulphide Kommunarsk, Gorlovka, Makeevka (9-11 PDK)
phenol Lisichansk, Donetsk (15 PDK)
carbon bisulphide Cherkassy, Makeevka (4-5 PDK)
fluoric hydrogen Armiansk (10 PDK)
chlorous hydrogen Krasnoperekopsk (25 PDK)
formaldehyde Lutsk (16 PDK)
ammonia Cherkassy (12 PDK)
chlorine Kiev (7 PDK)
Source: Goskomgirdomet (1990).
Î40 IbiT, p. 80.
4^1 rocympcTBeiiHMH KOMHrer CCCP no rMAixtMereopojiorMM. AxajieiviHa nayx CCCP. JlaGoparopua 
MOHHTopnura npHpo^non cpejtw n KJiHMaxa. OGaop cooromina oKpvataiomen npMponHoH cpeiibt n 
CCCP (no M arenuanaM  uaSjnoaeiiMfl 1988-1989 r.l. (MocKua: MocKoucKoe OTAeJieiine
FmipoMeTeoHSiiaTa, 1990 r.) 
p, 38.
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Substance Cities
dust Konstantinovka (5 PDK)
sulphur dioxide Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Rubezhnoe (3-4 PDK)
nitrogen dioxide Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kommunarsk, Chernihiv (2 PDK)
phenol Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Gorlovka, Dniprodzerzhinsk (3-4 PDK)
formaldehyde Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Odessa (7-10 PDK)
fluoric hydrogen Mariupol, Odessa (2 PDK)
ammonia Cherkassy, Dniprodzerzhinsk (3-5 PDK)
carbon bisulphide Cherkassy (3 PDK)
benzapiren Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mariupol (7-8 PDK)
II1
Ï;;;
:
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In August 1990 Derzhkompriroda and the Ukrainian Minzdrav launched an information 
bulletin covering the state of the environment in Ukraine‘43. The Ukrainian government also 
issued a resolution on the publication of ecological information, including data regarding the 
Chernobyl accident and about people's health:
Table 2.7 Air Pollution in Ukrainian Cities, 1990 (See next page)
U
•S
:
%
: : S
Tenepb y%ce tia ociioRaiiuH aroro imiieKinuiioro /lOKyvieiiTa 
MMUMcrepcina, neiioMcina. iiayanue yae^Dex^aeami ne To.ibKO noryr. no 
M o6îi3anbi CHcreMa'i'uqecKH MinjiopMHjxiBaTb napoii yicpaunu o 
B03Æyxe, KOTopuM on ^biniuT. b oGmeA c.io>kiioctm no 30 napaMerpan. 
Bo3r.aaB.n(flioT paSoi’y FocKOMMieT YCCP no aKo.aorMM m 
pauHonanbnoMy npupoAono.ab30BanMio m MunncrepcrBO 
3;ipaBooxpaneiiHfl pecnyGjiuKH.
The report covered air and water pollution, pollution of the soil and radioactive pollution. As for 
air pollution, although emissions had been reduced during 1989 (it was claimed that this had been 
possible due to the use of sanctions - in the course of the year Derzhkompriroda had issued 219 
resolutions to stop production at enterprises that failed to meet environmental standards. 
Moreover, more than 2,000 people had been held administratively responsible for violations of 
these standards), the situation was still grim. The level of air pollution in most Ukrainian cities
exceeded sanitaiy norms and in the 15 most polluted cities in Ukraine, permissible levels of 
emissions were permanently e x c e e d e d ^^ 4 (gee next page):
'I ,
143 FocyAapcrB0HUbiH KOMMTeT yCCP no oxpane npnpo.abi, MMUHcrepcrBo siipaBDoxpaneima YCCP.
MrKtoDMauHoniibiH ôiojiJieTeiih (Kneo, 1990).
1441M 4, pp. 2-3.
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Cities Polluting substance Exceeding PDK bv
Donetsk dust 2.8-2.4
nitrogen dioxide 2.7
phenol 2.3-2.0
ammonia 3.5-3.0
benzapiren S.7-6.5
Odessa dust 2.2
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
phenol 2.3-2.0
fluoric hydrogen 2.6
formaldehyde 7.0
Krivyi Rih dust 2.S-2.4
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
phenol 2.3
ammonia 3.5-3.0
formaldehyde 5.6
benzapiren S.7-6.5
Makeevka dust 4.2
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
phenol 2.3-2.0
benzapiren 2.3-2.0
Slaviansk nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
phenol 3.0
benzapiren 5.7-5.1
Kommunarsk sulphur dioxide 1.4-1.22
carbon oxide 1.3
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
benzapiren 5.7-5.1
Kramatorsk phenol 2.3-2.0
fluoric hydrogen 1.4-1.2
benzapiren 5.7-5.1
Dniprodzerzhinsk dust 2.8-2.4
phenol 1.6-1.3
ammonia 5.2
formaldehyde 4.6-3.0
benzapiren 4.2-2.0
Dnipropetrovsk benzapiren 5.7-5.1
Luhansk fluoric hydrogen 1.6
benzapiren 5.7-5.1
Gorlovka sulphur dioxide 1.4-1.2
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
Zaporizhzhia phenol 6.3
nitrogen dioxide 2.5-2.0
phenol 2.3-2.0
formaldehyde 2.3-2.0
Lisichansk benzapiren 4.2-2.0
ammonia 2.2-2.0
Severodonetsk formaldehyde 6.3
phenol 2.3-2.0
ammonia 2.2-2.0
Mariupol formaldehyde 7.0
phenol 1.3
fluoric hydrogen 2.6
ammonia 2.2-2.0
formaldehyde 4.6-3.0
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Emissions from Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts accounted for 27% and 23% of total 
emissions in Ukraine respectively. Krivyi Rih (1,234,000 tons) and Mariupol (781,000 tons) were 
also badly affected. The major polluters were the energy industry (29.3%) and metallurgy (35%). 
Vehicles were responsible for another 37% of Ukraine's air pollution.
Storage of toxic waste from some 1,500 enterprises, most of which were located in 
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv oblasts, constituted a potential danger to the 
Ukrainian environment as most of the waste, in violation of sanitary norms and rules, was stored at 
inadequate dumps for domestic waste or was simply scattered on the territoi-y of the enterprises, 
often poured into reservoirs, narrow gorges and so on. Special storage sites could usually just take 
one or two types of waste, and several of these still did not comply with existing regulations. 
What was more, Ukraine lacked the technology to process and utilise toxic s u b s t a n c e s * 4 5
Another major pollutant was a g r i c u l t u r e ^ 4 6  Although the use of pesticides had been 
steadily reduced between 1986 and 1989, its use was still high (2.4 kg per hectare in 1989), and 
this, combined with inadequate storage of the pesticides, caused 'great harm' to the environment. 
There was a shortage of storage facilities (only 65% coverage), and a quarter o f these did not 
comply with sanitary and environmental regulations. The situation was particularly serious in 
Khmelnitsky!, Poltava, Kirovohrad and Odessa oblasts - Poltava, by the way, being one of the 
major agricultural regions of Ukraine. Due to high levels of pesticides and heavy metals in the 
soil, as well as poor farming methods, it was becoming increasingly difficult to provide the 
Ukrainian population with 'clean' and high-quality food products. Thus, in Kirovohrad, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Crimea, Zakarpatia, Poltava and Chernihiv oblasts, food products contained 
excessive amounts of various polluting substances. No proper analysis of the soil quality in 
Ukraine's agricultural areas had so far taken place, and this could not but cause concern. However, 
a scheme to chart these areas and implement measures to reduce and control pollution of their soil 
had recently been started and would hopefully help to improve the situation in the future.
As a result of the use of pesticides in the agricultural sector, ground water in 16 o f Ukraine's 
25 oblasts contained levels of pesticides above the maximum permissible levels. The state o f the 
ground water in Nikolaev oblast and Crimea caused particular concern, as 90% contained a 
cocktail of various pesticides. The situation in Kherson, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv and 
Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts was described as 'difficult' in the report. The mixture o f various types o f 
pesticides gave particular cause for concern,as little was still known about their combined effect
on the human o r g a n i s m  4^7
The report revealed only a little information regarding the levels of radioactivity in Ukraine. 
It did, however, claim that levels of caesium-134 and -137 as well as strontium-90 were
( 4 5  I b i d ,  p p .  8-9.
(46 Some 70.3% of Ukraine's territory is used for agriculture. Ukraine accounted for some 25% of the 
USSR's total agricultural production. See VKHiaïiia iia rpaiii eKOJioriMnoi KaTacrpodin. iloDijiiiuK. 
EKOftOC./KaiiaiichKe TOBanucriDo nnuxHabHUKiB Pvxv (Topoirro: 1990.) c. 6.
(47 Ibid.. p p .  11-12.
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comfortably within the permissible levels in the republic's reservoirs and rivers. Excessive levels 
o f radioactivity could be found only in still waters in the Chernobyl area and in the ground water 
of the area of the 'red forest', where the level of strontium-90 was considerable (down to a depth of 
1-1.5 meters). The amount of radio nuclides entering the Kiev reservoir from the river Pripiat' was 
160 curies (caesium-137). The figure for Dniepr was 200 curies. For strontium-90 the figures 
were 210 and 90 curies respectively, which was 1.1 and 2.2 times less than in 1987. Although the 
silt layer at the bottom of the Kiev reservoir contained some 2-2,500 curies of caesium-137, this 
did not constitute any particular danger as the radioactive particles were 'tied' to the silt and thus 
were not spread with the water(48.
Figures from the Ministry of Forestry gave greater cause for concern, as caesium-137 had 
been detected in firewood, mushrooms, berries and medical plants in areas more than 100 km 
away from the Chernobyl nuclear station. Although the levels of radioactivity in the ground were 
within the limits (2-3 curies per square km), the total content of caesium-137 and -134 in plants 
exceeded permissible levels. In areas where the radioactivity was below 2 curies per square km, 
however, people had unrestricted access and were free to collect mushrooms and berries for
consumption (49.
Ekolos and Zelenyi Svit were much more critical in their assessment of the state of the 
Ukrainian environment. Their report, which also looked at the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and Ukraine, revealed that the major polluters in Ukraine were all-union enterprises 
(metallurgy, energy, coal). Levels of pollutants in the air were within the permissible limits in 
only four of Ukraine's 45 biggest cities. In 21 cities air pollution exceeded permissible levels by 
15 times. Twenty-two percent o f the republic's population lived in these areas. Altogether 
Ukrainian enterprises emitted some 17 million tons of hannful substances into the air - the 
equivalent of 300 kg per head(^f
2.3.3 Health and the Environment
Health statistics were, until 1990, hard to obtain in Ukraine. To the extent that such statistics were 
accessible, it was difficult to utilise them due to poor methodology. Following the introduction of 
glasnost, information about the serious environmental situation in the country started appearing on 
the pages of local and regional newspapers with increasing frequency. It did not take long for 
journalists and members o f the public to link pollution with poor health, thus raising the concern 
o f locals, who in turn initiated local campaigns against enterprises and other sites thought to have a 
harmful effect on the environment(5(.
(4^IMd.,p.5.
(49 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
(50 Ibid.. p. 5.
(5( For examples of such writings and campaigns, see Marples.(1991)...
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Although there were good reasons to assume that environmentally harmful establishments 
had a negative impact on people’s health, this was difficult to prove. In early 1990, however, on 
the eve of the 12th (and last) session of the Ukrainian Parliament, which focused on environmental 
issues, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health issued a report, 'The Medical Aspects of the Ecological 
Situation In U k r a i n e ' T h e  preface to this report explicitly stated that there was a correlation 
between pollution and bad health - as a matter o f fact, environmental pollution ranked second as a 
cause o f the deterioration of people's health (after lifestyle).
Fig. 2.1 Number o f  Births pr. 1000 Inhabitants (1970-88)
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source: Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c. 5.
Population growth in Ukraine was three times lower than in the USSR as a whole. As seen 
from table 1, the number of births declined sharply from 1986 - the year of the Chernobyl accident 
- to 1988. Five districts (Vinnytsia, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkassy and Chernihiv) had negative 
population growth,
MaTeniaan m  jinana^maTOl cecil  BepxoBHOi Pa/iu yKpaiiicbKoi PCP. Meauqui aaieKTu 
eKOfloriqnoï CHTvauli b yKPaiiiCLKiü PCP (sGipimx craTMorminux noKasuMKÎB). {Kmïd, 1990).
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Fig. 2.2 Population Growth, 1970-88.
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Source: Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c.9.
Moreover, the average life span for a Ukrainian was six years lower than that in more 
developed countries. The pace o f change in general sickness was up by 35% since 1986 and 
invalidisation had doubled. Pollution in Ukraine had reached a critical level, argued the report; 
one quarter of 190 areas regularly measured for pollutants by Sanepidemstantsiia suffered from 
air-poilution exceeding permissible levels from five to 20 times. More than one third of Ukraine's 
enterprises were not surrounded by sanitary zones and up to a third o f emissions from these 
enterprises were not filtered prior to being emitted into the rivers. Thus, between 20% and 40% of 
Ukrainian rivers were badly polluted. Besides, food products were polluted with pesticides and 
nitrates.
The number of working people becoming invalids (i.e. so ill that they were no longer able to 
work) increased sharply from 18,1% to 36,2% per 100,000 between 1980 and 1988:
":«v
I
I
■I
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Fig. 2.3 Working People becoming Invalids (1970-88
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source: Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c. 16.
There was also a steady (and in some cases sharp) increase for all illnesses covered by the 
report over the period from 1980 to 1990^^3. Temporary loss of working capability due to illness 
rose sharply from 120 to 200 days between 1987 and 1988:
This was the case for cancers (p. 16), untreatable cancers (p. 18), diseases of the lungs (p. 20), asthma (p. 
22), heart attacks (p. 24), other heait diseases (p. 28), strokes (p. 32) and intestinal diseases (p. 36). 
Anemia among children (p. 56) had also become more frequent. Only hepatitis had dropped steadily 
so had kidney problems, although the latter showed a small increase from 1987 to 1988 (last year of 
data).
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Fig. 2.4 Temporary Loss o f  Working Capability due to Illness (1970-88)
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Was pollution to blame for the sharp increase in illnesses recorded by Ukrainian Minzdravl 
A paper presented by a chief expert of the USSR Minzdrav, Dr Zemlianskii, at a meeting o f the 
Presidium of the board o f URO SDF  on 29 June 1990* '^  ^ disclosed information similar to that o f 
Minzdrav's report. From 1988 to 1989 the number of births dropped from 14.5 to 13,3 per 1,000 
inhabitants. With a mortality rate o f 11.6, the population growth was thus only 1.7'^^ (down from 
2.8) per 1,000 people, this was not even enough to secure the simple reproduction of Ukraine’s 
population. Infant mortality, although slightly reduced compared to 1988, was more than twice 
that o f Japan and Sweden and a third above the US. Zemlianskii saw a direct link between his 
findings and the ecological situation in Ukraine:
Q mcroflHHu 3/ioponhfl aercKoro iiacejienna VKHamibi n cnnBM c cositanmeHcn 3KOJtorHMecKOH 
oScianoBKH (cooOmeuMe cneuHa.ibiioro jioBepeiiHoro Bpa'ia C4<D hm. B.H, JleiiHHa -  rmmioro 
cneuHajiHcra MmisApaoa CCCP t . 3eMJiaiicKoro na sace/taimM HpeBM/myMa npaaaeiiHa YPO C4(D 
HM. B.H. JleiiHiia na 29 rnoiia 1990 r.)
Ukraine had the lowest population growth of all the Soviet republics. See EKOJlOCVKanaAa^Ke 
TonapHCTBO npHXHJibHMKiB Pyxy (1990.), c. 4.
ISO
i
B ee 3T0, HecoMiieiino, }iiî.n;ieTCîi (nejicnîMeM B.iMniiHfi KOMruieKca 
IteraTMDHLIK C0UHa:il>H0~3K01!0MHMeCKHX (|)aKTOpOB, C[)eAM Koropux lie 
iiocaeAiuoio ix).ib nrpaer yxyAiueime 3Ko.aorMMecKOH oOcraiioiiKH. B 
noAaujiflioineM SojibmmicrBe pernonoB pecnyÔJiHKM ona npHoSpeTaer 
nopoH xapaKTep iiauMoiiamiioM KaTacrixxpbf
To illustrate his point, Zemlianskii referred to the sharp increase in illnesses in Ukraine over 
the previous 5 years (i.e. from 1985 to 1990). Various types of cancer had increased by 15.6%, 
and the figures for ulcers and intestinal diseases were + 12% and 32% respectively. The increase 
had taken place primarily in Ukraine's industrial centres. In Dniprodzerzhinsk, for instance, 
pathological changes in the blood o f children and grown ups were 2.2-3 times more frequent than 
the Ukrainian average. Similarly, heart diseases and intestinal problems were 3.7 and 2,6 times 
more common. In the town of Rubezhnoe (Luhansk oblast) the situation was even more serious: 
children were falling ill with cancer 6-8 times more often than on average in Ukraine, and in 
Kremenchuh blood diseases were 5-7 times more frequently.
Pollution was not only causing health problems among the Ukrainian population, but also 
posed a threat to reproduction:
Yiace flBHO npocjiejKHoaeTca pjiÆ aKOJiormiecKM sauMCHMbix 
saGoneBaimn y SeiDevieniibix xcenmHH, kopmbihhx waTepen, jieTen 
MJiaAUiHX BospacTOB. Hmcjio cnoHTamibix aSoproB BbipocJio sa 
nocJieAnee 10 jier b 4-6 paa, o5maa aafojieBaeMOCTb ^eren paiiHero 
Boapacra -  b 2 paaa.
T ijc b o jk h t  n aryG iioe  DJiManne npoM biuuieiinbix BiKAiibix (IiaKTopoc iia 
penpoiiyKTM Biiyio (liyiiKUHio xceiimMu. rperb KOTopbix iiyxc^ aeT ca  b 
Me^HUMHCKOH KOpilCKUMM. floyi, BJlHflllHeM KOMBJieKCa XHMMMCCKHX M
(liMaHHecKMX (jiaKTopoB aaMeTHo yxyAiuHJiHCb noKaaarejm 
cnepMaToreiieaa y MyjKBHii. Ho ^aimbiw cnenHajiMcroB qnc.no 
cnocoÔHbix K onjio.40'i'BopeHHio cnepiviaToaoMjiOB cjiH3HJiocb c 70 npon.
B 1966 ro.iiy Jio 30 npon. b 1986 ro;jiy^57
Antipenko of the Kiev Hygienic Centre, some 4,000 kg o f cancerous substances per inhabitant 
were emitted from Mariupol's enterprises. This was equivalent to the exposure o f 180 bar of 
radioactivity over a 30-year period. The figure for Zaporizhzhia was 80 bar. Large areas of 
Ukraine's territoiy were suffering from the combined effect of radiation and chemical pollution.
:
Research into the gene fund of the population in Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol revealed that
the chemical pollution of the environment had reached a 'genetically dangerous level for Man'.
For instance, the number o f spontaneous abortions due to mutations in Zaporizhzhia was five
times that of Simferopol, which had a reasonably clean atmosphere. Moreover, the frequency of 
.infants born with deformities was two times higher. As calculated by Professor Evhenii
I
156 Ibid., p. L
157 IhidL, p. 2 .
181
1;S"
S
following the accident at Chernobyl. In the northern districts, for instance, the soil, in addition to 
radio nuclides, contained lead, chrome, nickel, copper, zirconium, barium and boron (also emitted 
from the nuclear power station). The combined effect of these and the radioactivity 'might 
increase the effect of the radiation''58.
A report elaborated by EKOLOS and Zelenyi Svit based on official writings on the 
environment in the Ukrainian press indicated that 12% of Ukrainian couples were, for reasons of 
severe pollution, unable to reproduce. Ninety-two percent of Ukrainian women worked outside 
the home. Of these, 80% were doing hard physical labour. The difficult ecological and physical 
conditions of their workplaces were causing medical problems during pregnancy: heart diseases 
had doubled, spontaneous abortions were four to six times more frequent and the number of 
mentally handicapped children being born was three times higher than 10 years previously (i.e. 
1980). The number o f children weighing less than 1,500 grams at birth had increased five times. 
In ecological disaster areas such as Zaporizhzhia, Dniprodzerzhinsk, Rubizhne, Kiemenchuh and 
Mariupol two to four times more children than the Ukrainian average were ill at birth, and the 
number of children ill with leukaemia was five to eight times the average for U k r a i n e ^ 59
2.3.4 Verkhovna Rada: Environmental Session, February 1990
As seen above, the environment turned out to be a key issue at the USSR Congress o f People's 
Deputies and at the proceedings o f the Supreme Soviet. In Ukraine the environment took a 
prominent place in the pre-election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada during January and February 
1990. The outgoing parliament, however, did not address this issue at length until its 12th and last 
session on 16-17 February 1990. In addition to the deputies, the Ukrainian deputies of the USSR 
Congress o f People's Deputies, representatives from various ministries and departments, the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and environmental organisations, including Zelenyi Svit, attended 
the extended session. Those present heard Prime Minister Vitalii Masol's speech 'On the 
Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures for its Radical Improvement’ and also 
discussed environmental issues in depth.
Below I will first summarise the major points of Masol's speech and then have a look at the 
various views and concerns expressed by those present at the session. This is o f particular interest 
as not only does it give a wider picture of the state of the environment in Ukraine, but it also 
allows me to shed some light on the changing relationship between Ukraine and 'Moscow', using 
the environment as a test case. As the basis for this section I will use the stenographic account of
the 12th session*60
-------------------*58 Ibid.. p. 3. -
*59 OfiKyMem, ’’BceceiT”, no. 4, 1990, c. 225.
*60 4aeiiamaTaa ceccHii Bepxcunoro Conera yKpaHHCKOfi CCP (o;iHntianiiaTHH coabm), 16-17 (jieBpaaa 
1990 roAa. CTeiiorpaipH'iecKHH OTHer (Khcb: OojiHTHSAaT YKpaHny, 1990 r.).
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tiarpysK a iia  npHpo4 n y io  q ie .iiy , G ujih  w n y m e n i.i  n e4 0 craTKH u 
opraiiHsauHH KOMnaeKciioro McnoabsouaiiHii ripH[X)4iii>iX i^ cy p co B . 
K p afiiie  ocaoxcH H aa cHTyauM io h H apyu iw aa aK oaorM aecK oe  
paBiiOBecHe aoapH a na 9epiio6biabCKOH aTOMiiofi 3aeKTpoc'ranuHH*62
The Ukrainian Government's Position on the Environment
Masol started his speech by admitting that the ecological situation in Ukraine was 'tense' and in 
some regions 'close to catastrophic'. Due to deep concern among Ukrainian deputies as well as the 
population in general, it had been decided to call a special session of the parliament to address the 
issue.
Attempting to explain how the state of the environment had deteriorated so badly in 
Ukraine, Masol identified several factors which had contributed to this result. The most obvious 
factor was the priority given to heavy industries in the republic. Besides, in the post-war years, a 
quick reconstruction of the republic's industries had been required to provide coal, electricity, Ü
metal.s, etc., and the environment had been largely ignored in the process. Lack of innovation, the 
use of old and outdated production techniques and equipment as well as a failure to see the link 
between the economy and the environment were also to blame for the serious situation. Finally, 
much of the USSR's heavy industry was concentrated in Ukraine (although the country covered 
only three percent of the USSR's total territory, it accounted for one fifth of the USSR's 
production). As for many decades environmental data had been kept secret, it was only over the 
last few years that it had become clear how badly affected Ukraine was from environmental 
pollution. The emphasis on gross output (vaft^f) and the monopoly of all-union ministries and : |
departments further aggravated the situation; what was more, the Ukrainian authorities were not 
really in control of industry located on its own territory: 1
Hepe^KO crpoHTejiLCTBO aKOJiorMaecKM opeiinb ix npeanpH iiran  ?/
ocy inecrB J iiiJiocb hmm j iaxce 6 e3  corjiacwfl pecnybjiMKancKHX opniHOB,
6 e3  40J ixcn oro  y u e ia  M ea u b ix  noT peSnocreH  h sK oaornqecK H x
nOCJieAGTBHH.
TaKOBa, KaK roBopaT. MmopmiecKaa n()aB4a. Hm6hho ona 
CBM^eTejibCTByer, mto iia YKpaHne aeaiTHaeTMBMM ÆBHJiacb M|ie3Mepuaii
The time had come to give a thorough assessment of the ecological situation in the country 
and to identify measures by which to improve it. Masol did not look at the state o f the |
environment itself but proceeded to familiarise those present with a list of several measures 
already taken by the government to secure more efficient use of natural resources. With the 
introduction o f so-called environmental impact assessments of all new industrial projects (if these 
were found to be harmful for the environment, the Ministry of Environmental Protection would
____________________________
*61 The emphasis on 'val', or output in the Soviet economy led one writer on the environment, Oleksandr
Hlushko, to rewrite one of the 10 Commandments as follows: Heiuae Bora, Kpiiu nnany, I Ban -  I?
Moro yoco5aenmi na seMJii (OjieKcaiwp TjiymKo. ‘Evirr Mopa’. Birmsua, no, 5, 1991, c. 139).
*62 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
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send them back to the planners to incorporate specifications and changes), the attitude towards 
environmentally harmful objects had radically changed, claimed Masol. Every third project was 
now being returned for 'improvements', and this would no doubt have a positive effect on the 
environment in the future*63,
The Ukrainian government had also stopped construction of the Dniepr-Bug water 
engineering scheme and had abandoned planning of the Danube-Dniepr canal - both thought by 
environmentalists to be hazardous to the environment. Finally, the government had initiated a 
reduction in the number of nuclear reactors to be built in Ukraine and banned the further 
construction of industrial enterprises in the Crimea. Over the last four years some eight billion 
rubles had been spent on measures to improve the state of the environment in Ukraine. Measures 
had been taken to recultivate damaged soil, and air filters and cleansing systems for sewage had 
been installed at a number of enterprises throughout the country. Local integrated environmental 
programmes had been developed in several of Ukraine's most polluted eities, such as 
Dniprodzerzhinsk, Krivyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk oblast and several recreational areas in 
the Crimea. Masol did, however, acknowledge that these measures had been 'far from sufficient' - 
the current ecological situation in Ukraine gave evidence of this. In order to improve the situation, 
time, considerable sums of money and much new technical equipment were required.
A major cause o f concern was severe air pollution: more than 10 million tons o f harmful 
substances were emitted from Ukraine's metallurgy, chemical, petrochemical, coal and energy 
industries, and cities like Mariupol, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Dniprodzerzhinsk, Komunarsk, Krivyi 
Rih and Makeevka were particularly badly affected. Only 30-40% (in the petrochemical industry 
the figure was only 20%) of these industries were fitted with cleansing facilities and air filters; 
moreover, those facilities and filters already in use were low in efficiency. Car traffic was a major 
polluter in many areas of Ukraine, accounting for approximately a third o f the total air pollution 
(in Kiev, Lviv, Poltava and many towns along the Crimean coast the figure reached more than 
70%).
A precondition for doing away with this dismal state of affairs, argued Masol, was to 
develop an ecologically sound strategy for the development o f the Ukrainian economy. The 
development o f heavy industries, for instance, would be effected by restructuring and installing 
modern technologies at already existing facilities. The republic's thermal power stations would 
also be restructured. More important, though, was the need to change people's thinking on the 
environment, imbuing them not only with awareness of the environment but also with a sense of 
responsibility for its protection. Emissions from cars would be reduced in the future by the fitting 
of catalysts and also by the conversion of cars running on petrol to running on gas. An
*63 Although the introduction of'ecological expert assessment' was no doubt an important measure, it did not 
reduce pollution in Ukraine, as the major polluters (heavy industiy in the East of Ukraine and the 
energy sector) emerged at a time before such expert assessments were made. At best such assessments 
would contribute to the stabilisation of environmental pollution in Ukraine, by taking measures to limit 
future emissions of harmful substances into the country's air, soil and water.
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environmental programme covering the period until the year 2005 would be elaborated with the 
intention of reducing emissions into the air.
As for the state of Ukraine's water resources, this was also serious. During 1989 2.5 billion 
m^ of sewage was emitted into Ukraine's rivers and waters. Again the major culprits were the 
metallurgy, coal and chemical industries, in addition to emissions from the agricultural sector and 
domestic waste. The installation of filters and cleansing facilities was proceeding at an 
unacceptably low tempo, and this had contributed to very serious problems for the country's small 
rivers. The Black and Azov seas were in a poor state, and the quality of Ukraine's drinking water 
supplies was deteriorating rapidly. The state o f the soil was causing 'deep concern', and Masol 
admitted that numerous mistakes had been made during the planning and use of the country's 
irrigation systems. As a result, close to 50,000 hectares of arable land had been flooded. The 
Ukrainian government would therefore initiate the reconstruction o f already existing irrigation 
systems and seek to recultivate some 185,000 hectares of damaged land.
The creation of an ecological strategy for the development of Ukraine's economy was 
identified as a key issue by the government. Further, it would seek to reduce construction of new 
resource and energy-intensive enterprises. Environmentally harmful industries would be 
reconstructed, and more money would be earmarked for the installation o f cleansing facilities and 
environmental technologies. Finally, measures would be taken to heighten awareness o f the 
environment amongst Ukraine's industrial managers.
With regard to the victims of the Chernobyl accident, the government would continue to 
evacuate people from the worst affected areas. As of 16 February 1990 some 93,000 people had 
been evacuated, and this work would continue. The government also claimed to have 
implemented a series o f measures to protect the population o f Kiev in the immediate aftermath of 
the accident. Following the accident, scientists predicted that the Dniepr would be affected. 
Thirty-five million people got their drinking water from the Dniepr, and the Ukrainian government 
had immediately taken measures to provide all cites along the river with drinking water from 
ground water sources. The picture painted by Masol regarding the way in which the Ukrainian 
authorities had handled the accident at Chernobyl was very different from that identified by people 
such as Ala laroshinska (a journalist from the north of Ukraine), lurii Shcherbak and others, who 
indicated that Masol’s reassessment o f the ecological situation in the country still underestimated 
the seriousness of the problem.
On the issue of the future development of nuclear power in Ukraine, however, the 
government's position remained firm:
HaiuH no3HUHM 34ecb 'leTKue -  mu crowM sa  MHiiMMajTbiro 
ueofxoÆ H M oe Ko;iM»iecTBO aroM iiu x  peaK Topoo iia yKpanucKOü sew jie .
Hmchuo MCX04B MS 3Toro H onnpaacb na lUMpoKyio noA^epxcKy 
obmeci'BeniiocTM m yqeiiux, C obct Mmhhci’pob YCCP BMecre c UK
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KoMnapTMH YKpaHiibi yitce wGw.iMCb orpauHMenufi pasBMrwa aTovnioH 
3iiepreTHKH n pecny5.qMKe*64
Chernobyl was a special case, but the Ukrainian government was in favour of closing it down and 
would initiate the elaboration of a programme to facilitate this. To compensate for the loss of 
energy the closing of Chernobyl would cause, the government envisaged a combination of energy 
saving, alternative energy resources and more efficient technology at existing thermal power 
stations.
An efficient structure for the management and the control of the environment was an 
important prerequisite for successful environmental reform. In this connection the government 
advocated the reorganisation of Derzhkompriroda, with the creation of similar structures at the 
local and regional levels. An environmental unit had been set up in the governmental 
administration, and the governmental commission on emergencies would incorporate 
environmental issues in its work. Improved environmental legislation as well as economic 
reforms, encouraging the rational use of natural resources through the payment for raw materials 
and fines for harmful emissions, were high on the government's list of required measures, as were 
improved control systems to monitor their implementation. Other measures to be introduced were 
the creation of environmental courts, improved ecological information and research on the 
environment. It was hoped that military conversion would have a positive effect on the state of the 
environment; the government had high hopes for its 'conversion-ecology' programme. Finally, 
measures would be taken to change people's attitudes towards the environment:
Res npeyaejiHMeHMfl moxcho CKasaxi., mto bcji ^ajibiieHinaji ^eaTeJibiiocrrb 
no KopeiiuoH nepecrpouKe 4ena oxpaiibi npuijo^u npocro nenosMo^na 
5 03  rjiySoKOH saH H TepecoBam iocrH  b 3Tom B cero o S m e c iB a , 603  
aKOJiorHsauHM B cero n a m ero  MbiuiJieiiHa, 603 cyiH0CTBemioro 
noBbiui0iiHH ypOBini aKOJiorHqecKOH Kyjib'rypbi (m y  e m p h a s is )  *65,
Criticism of the Government: The Standing Commissions of the Parliament.
The permanent commissions of the Ukrainian parliament also prepared a paper for the deputies. It 
emphasised the impact the serious state of the environment was having on people's health and also 
criticised the government for inconsistency in its environmental policies. Over the previous 10 
years the illness rate in Ukraine had increased by one third and the average life span had been 
reduced by 5-8 years. Population growth in Ukraine was four times lower than the Soviet average 
and
*64jfei4,p. 25.
*65 Ibid.. p. 29.
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Bo.'iee pacnpocrpaiienHbiMM cra.iH xe.iy^oMiio-Kmuequbie, cepAeaiio- 
cocy4MCTbie H iipyrwe 3a5o.aeaanMa iiace:ieiiHn, Koiopbie 
nenoc|)e4CTBeimo caiiaaiibi c ibiHJiiiHevt na oprauH3vi aejioneKa liiieAHbix 
npoMbiui.ieHnbix Bbi6pocoB*66
Violations of environmental legislation and compromises were frequently recorded at the 
local level as local soviets, in the hope that their regions would receive at least some funding for 
the social development of the area, would agree to the construction of environmentally harmful 
projects. This was the case for instance in Dniprodzerzhinsk, where Minmetallurgii and 
Minkhimnefteprom had been given the go-ahead for expanding the capacity of the city's 
met£ llurgical combine and of an enterprise producing electrical machinery, despite the fact that the 
environmental situation in Dniprodzerzhinsk had reached a critical level, Derzhkompriroda, 
Derzhahroprom, Minvodkhoz, Minleskhoz, Minzdrav and other institutions in charge of the 
environment were often just passive onlookers, not making use of their powers to stop 
environmentally harmful projects from going ahead. The government had adopted a double 
standard in regard to the environment, on the one hand issuing laws and regulations to protect the 
environment, on the other hand blatantly violating them:
B Mae npoujjioro r o m  CoBer MHfiHcrix)B YCCP npHHUMaei' 
n o a ’aHOBJieiiMe ”0  neKoropbix Mcpax no yjiyqineiiMio BKOJiorHqecKOH 
oficraiiOBKH B pecny5jTHKe”. M oiuiOBpeMeiino comaiiiaeTCB c  
npe4no4cei!HaMM MnnxMMHeiliTenpoMa o crponTejibCTBe iiOBbix 
MOinnocreH na JlwcHMancKOM ne(})'renepepa6aTbiBaiGureM saBo^e. H aro  
npu Kpaflne ney^OBJieTBopMTejibnOH cmyauMH k bk  b  peruone, tu k  w 
na caMOM sano^e, b npoTHBopeqHe iipHinn'biM nocranoBJienHJiM h 
KaTeropMqecKHM BospaxceimaM cooeTCKHX h npupowoxpa iiH bix  
opranoB oSnacTM. Taicaa nosunm i flpanHTeJibcrBa aBJineTcn 
iienoiuiTnoH*67.
A major reason for the environmental deterioration that was taking place in Ukraine was the 
poor implementation of existing laws and regulations. Few of the annual resolutions 'on the 
improvement of the protection of water resources' passed by the government had, for instance, 
been implemented, and as a result rivers such as the Dniestr, Ros and Desna were degrading by the 
day. Pollution of North Donets, South Bug, Inhulets and Samara had reached 'threatening* levels 
and it could not but cause concern that 50% of the sewage was emitted into the Dniepr - providing 
water to 50 Ukrainian cities, 34 million people, 10,000 enterprises and 1,5 million hectares of 
land. Several times the commissions had demanded from the government that something be done, 
but so far unsuccessfully. Neither was the Prosecutor's office being very helpful, having adopted 
a 'neutral' position on environmental issues. This was particularly worrying as, compared with 
other parts of the USSR, every unit of Ukrainian territory was on average seven times more
*66 ibkL, p. 32. 
*67 IM4, p. 33.
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polluted. Moreover, in 43 cities, in which a third of the republic's population resided, air quality 
was 'very bad'. A precondition for improving the state of the environment would, in the view of 
the parliament, be to subordinate Derzhkompriroda to the Verkhovna Rada instead of to the 
government. Another precondition was to strengthen discipline in the executive bodies at all 
levels and to improve environmental legislation.
The Ukrainian government was also criticised for the way in which it dealt with the 
Chernobyl accident - measures taken had been slow and inadequate, and Ukraine did not have the 
required technology to clean up Pripiat, which posed a real threat to the water quality of the 
Dniepr. The government should lobby all-union organs to secure funding for buying such 
equipment abroad. Moreover, the commissions recommended the immediate closure o f Chernobyl 
and labelled expansion of the Khmelnitskyi and Rivne nuclear power stations 'inadmissible'. The 
experimental reactor in Kiev ought to be closed down.
Eco-Culture as a Precondition for Improving the Environment
Interest among the deputies was enormous - some 80 deputies asked for access to the rostrum - 
and most speeches expressed concern about the state of the environment in various parts of 
Ukraine as well as dismay about the lack of measures being taken to improve the situation. 
Considerable attention was also given to nuclear power. Finally, a number of deputies called for a 
reassessment of the relationship between Man and Nature and for the strengthening of eco-culture 
among the Ukrainian population. V. Kukhar, vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences, made a critical assessment o f the prevailing attitude towards nature in the 
USSR/Ukraine, arguing as follows:
...Mu B iiauiefi ci'paiie h b nameH pecnySjiuKe onosaajiH c ocosiiauHeM 
Toro, BTo qeaoDeK moxcot xchtl m e^McrBOBarb to.îîljco kük 
iieoiT e^MiieMaH cocraBiiaa (aacTb) bccm npupo4bi, mto MC.noBeK 40Jixcen 
KpOTKO M ÔepCîKHO ÜTIlOCMTbCfl K CBOCMy pO^ UOMy BCJlHKOMy 40My,
m a  KOTopoMy -  3eMJia. HenoiiMMariMe h  HniopupoBaHMe aroro 
npHBeaH k TOMy, mto TexHorennaa Aeareabiiocrb craaa 
MoryuiecrBeiiHbiM (liaxTopoM ÔLicrporo usMeneiiMa h  yxyauieam i 
DKOJiorwMecKoro cocTOiiHHa OKpy:*:aiomefi cpe^Li, noAopaaaa ero 
npHix)4nyio CT'a5H.FTbiiocrb, Hacmao apeMU cimTb opan:*:eBbie omkm m 
nepecMOTpcTb iiauiH B:raB4u na neMCMepnaeMocrb npHpoanux 
pecypcoB, 0 cnocoGaocru iiaineH npupoAbi k  caM0BOcnpoH3BO4crBy. o 
Bceraa mhciom B034yxe, npospaMnon BOiie m naoaopoaiioH 
;îeMae...4 ecjiTHJieTMJiMH b pecnySaHKe (jiopMMpoBaaacb crpyicrypa 
oGinecrnenHoro npon3no4CTBa, ociiony KOïopoH cocranjuiioT iiecypco- 
m aiieprocMKMe OTpacan npoMbiinaeiinocrH...yKa3aiinbie crpyKTypu,
TexHOKpaTHB, rMcaiiTOiViauHa m noiiBe^oMcrBemiocib obycaonnan  
MpesDbiMaûHo BbicoK.vK) aiiTponorennyro narpysKy na ripnpoay 
pecnySaHKM kbk b ueaoM, lax h ocoSemio oivieabiiux ee iieruonoB.
3T0My oTpHuareabHOMy npoueccy cnocoFcTBooaaa raxxce iiaim  
iiMSKaa 3KoaornMecKaîi KyabTypa.
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Although access to ecological information had been limited until recently, this did not mean 
that people were not aware of the harmful effect of Ukrainian industry on the environment earlier:
...Ue/ibiM i)fi4 oTpHnaTeabtibix aKo.iormiecKHX nocieaciBHfi naineft 
xoriHHCTDeuHOM AesTeabiiocrH, KOTopbie cefiMac npoimnaucb, yMeitue 
pecnySaHKM npeaycMorpean eme 15-20 acT na:a4. B MacrnocrH. eine 
!3 60-e ro4bi Sbiao aeTKO abicKasano ux neramBiioe mnouieiiHe k 
npoeKTy crpouTeabcma Kacxam iiaenpoBCKHX iî04oxpaiinanui h 
nponi03HpoBaaHCb oTpHuaTejibiibie nocJieacrBHB ero peajiMsaiiuM.
CBMae'reaaMH KOTOpbix mli jmaaeMCH c e r o 4 iu i* 6 8
Ivan Pliushch (Kiev), a high-ranking official of the Ukrainian Communist Party, also 
brought up the issue of eco-culture in his address to parliament. Increasingly often, he argued,
npHX04HTCfl OTneqaTb. noMewy la K  c.nyqHaocb, mto iia iu a , B ocneraa  b 
.a e r e iw a x  h n ec in ix , uBeryinaa yKixmiicKaa 3eMJUi n a x o a u T ca  n 
3anyuieiiH0M  cocroaiiMH, iia npeA eae axoaorH M ecK oro KpnsMca. A 
crapMiiiibiM KweB -  "viaTb rop o40B  p yccK u x”, KOTopbiR eme iie  raic 
aaBHO 6bm  0 4 hhm m3 i ia n b o a e e  3e.rieiibix h MHcrehniHx, y x c e  n o n a a  d 
MMc a o  f ia n 6 o a e e  sarpasireim bix ropo40B  crpaab i*69
Referring to the accident at Chernobyl and the way in which it was handled by the Soviet 
authorities, Pliushch argued that the accident was effectively brought about by short-sighted 
decisions made by Moscow regarding its location. And what was more, the impact of the accident 
was being compounded by Moscow's unwillingness to take responsibility for the clean-up process. 
In order to do away with its environmental problems Ukraine needed more glasnost and 
démocratisation. Economic reform was also needed*70.
A. Matvienko, first secretary of the Ukrainian KomsomoFs Central Committee, was not I
happy with the way some deputies, including Pliushch, tried to identify scapegoats for the 
environmental crisis in Ukraine. In his view, everybody was to blame for the current state of
...%MBeM Tax, HacKOJibKo Mbi Ky/ib'rypiiafl m oSpasoBaiiHaii iiaunn. A 
n03T0My CMMTatO, MTO OimOH M3 rJtaOHLIX npHMHII 3K0J10rMMeCK0r0 
KpM3Hca, B KOTopbiH Mbi BonajiH, jiBJuiCTC)] iiaiue coScrrueuiioe 
4yxoBiioe. MHTejmeKTyajibHoe ySoxcecTBO m riiDeiieSpejKHTejibiioe 
oriiomeiiHe k npupoae. Heo6xo4MMo BosBpameiiHe Kaxcaoro h3 nac k 
HcroKaM uapoaiiOM MyapocTM -  HcropuM, KyjibTypiibiM TpaanuMaM, k 
D03i30XçaenHio 3a6biTbix cea, xyTopoB, axoaorMMecKHX rioceaeriHH. 
Oco5eHiio Baxciio aro aaa MOJioaoro noKoaefma. Ham neo6xo4HMO
*68 Ibid.. p. 42.
*69 Ibid.. p. 50.
pp. 51-53. ^
. . . . . .
HMCTb peCnyS.lMKailCKHH KOACKC 9KOaOrHHeCKOH 3THKH. eilMUbie 
KpMTepMM UHRHaM30BaHII0r0 OTIIOLUeilHfl K npHpoae*^*.
It is interesting that such a high-ranking representative of the Komsomol would advocate a 
revival o f old values and habits as a means by which to raise awareness and protect the 
environment. This view was, as will be seen in Chapter Three, shared by members o f the Green 
Movement, and was a controversial idea also within PZU. Deputy Syntsov of Ivano-Frankivsk 
oblast shared Matvienko's view that a lack of culture was largely to blame for the environmental 
crisis in Ukraine. This crisis, however, was not unique to Ukraine as such, but was much more 
wide-reaching:
flpoS jieM u  9KOJiorHH npupoAW -  arc Macrnua r.MoSajibiiOH aKOJiorwH 
MeJtoBeMecKOH Mopa.au u  KyjibTypbi. Be^i, iieM ajio KaTaKJiusMOB. 
nenpu iiTHOcreu or uanneBaxejibCKoro O T iiom enua k 
npH po4ooxpaiiH TejibiioM y saKOiio^aTeJibCPBy -  3To  pesyjibxaT  iiam eu  
uecoBepuieiiHOH cucreM U  BocnuT anua n a c c a e iiu a , iiu sK oro  yp oo in i 
3KOJToruMecKOH Kyjibxypbi pyKOBO^UTejieu coneTCKux, napruunb ix , 
xosnucT Benub ix opraH usanuu . H c e r o 4 i ia  m u  pacnjiaHUBaeMca sa n a m e  
SecK yjibT ypbe, sa i ia iu y  a^MunHcn’paTMOHO-KOMaimHyio cu creM y  
ynpaD J ieuua 4 a x c e  a ro u  o im o h  c b b to h  cilæ poü oS m ec iB e iiiio H  x u s n u .
({iHsuaecKOH u  Mopajibiiou S o j i l io  m hjijihohob mo^eu, iieucnpaBHMUM 
Bpe/tOM SÆOpOBblO HaUMH*72
Syntsov urged the Prime Minister to exert more control over the deputies, who in his 
opinion often facilitated the spread of ecological 'unculturedness' and vandalism, also in the sphere 
o f protecting the natural and cultural heritage o f Ukraine. In the longer perspective, this lack of 
culture could only be broken by imbuing children with respect for nature and a sense of 
responsibility for it from an early age. Then, as pointed out by T. Luchaninova o f Sumy, ‘to solve 
the ...ecological problems, concrete work is required of those who not only in words, but through 
action love their country (rodina), their region and town where they were bom and grew up’*73.
Chernobyl and the Issue of Nuclear Power
Although the deputies of the Ukrainian Parliament highlighted a wide range of environmental 
issues, the matter causing most concern was Chernobyl and the future o f nuclear power in 
Ukraine. Almost every speech touched on the Chernobyl accident and the implications it had on 
the deputy's region, the worries it caused among the local population due to food contamination 
and its impact on people’s health. Not only independent (i.e. non-party) deputies, but also
*'^ * Ibid.. pp. 134-35. 
I72lbi4, p. 173.
*73 Ibid, p. 284.
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members o f the CPU, the Komsomol and Ukraine's scientific establishment expressed a wish to 
gradually phase out Chernobyl and to prohibit further expansion at the republic's remaining 
nuclear power stations.
From a scientific point of view, V. Kukhar, vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences, argued that although a number of problems regarding the dismantling of big nuclear 
power stations would have to be solved prior to closing down Chernobyl, the Academy held the 
view that it must be closed. Kukhar criticised the Ukrainian authorities for having failed to 
evacuate people from contaminated areas. Although one could discuss various alternatives for the 
contaminated areas, calculations made in offices often did not correspond to the real situation 
locally. As for the funding of the clean-up operation, funds allocated centrally for this purpose 
ought in his view to be handed over to the republic, which in turn ought to establish a body 
coordinated by the Ukrainian Parliament to oversee their use. Finally, on the issue of expanding 
the capacity of the republic's nuclear power stations, the Academy of Sciences recommended no 
further expansion and proposed that future energy needs be covered from natural gas and energy 
conservation*74 g , Paton, the President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, expanded on this:
...Haw iia ^ o  iia YKpauHe noHTu n o  nyTH laK  naswuaeMOM rasoBOH 
naysL i h  crpoHTb BKonoMminbie naporasoDLie 3JieK'rpoci'aimMu, 
npCKpaTHB n a  3to  npeMii crpoHTeJibcrBO utomulix CTanuuH, n oxa  
6 y 4 y T  co3AaHbi ^eHCTBHTejibiio n a a ea o ib ie  n 6e3on acn b ie  coopeM eiuibie  
peaKTopw. Xorejiocb 6hi, amSu uaina ceccna Bb ipasnna cB oe  
OTiioLueiine k aroM y B O n p o c y * 7 5 .
N. Umanets, the director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, on the other hand, argued 
that the station was safe and that there was no reason to close it down. Following the accident, a 
number o f technical improvements had been made, the personnel had been tested and had their 
qualifications improved. More importantly, whereas staff prior to the accident were responsible 
for energy output, they now answered only for safety. Safety control had also been considerably 
improved. From an economic point o f view it would not necessarily be such a good idea to close 
Chernobyl; in 1989, for instance, 9.9% of Ukraine's electricity output was generated there, and the 
station had earned 240 million rubles, 70 million o f which formed a surplus. Twelve percent of 
the surplus had been channelled into the local budget for 1990. The station itself was worth some 
1.2 billion rubles. Should Chernobyl be closed, the site of the station as well as the town of Pripiat 
would become dependent on mazut and electricity from elsewhere. Dismantling the station would 
not only be technically difficult and time-consuming, but also very expensive. Although he 
acknowledged the nuclear lobby's guilt for the accident at Chernobyl, Umanets still advocated the 
continued operation of the Chernobyl nuclear power station:
____________________________
*74 I b id . ,  p .  4 8 .175 Ibid., p. 75.
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*76îbi4,p. 73.
*77 Ihi4, p. 129.
178 See for instance V. Fedorov from Voiynia, ibid.. pp. 78-79 for more details.
ToBapHiUH jtenyTaTu! Mi.i 3iiaeM m, noaepbre. c  5o.ibio omymaeM ira 
ce6e niea oSmecrBeinioro MneiiHii. C 3T0h TpnGyiibi Mbi, aroMuiHKM, 
eme pas npHSiiaeM cboio Bwiiy ne\^A  iiapo40M. H mm, kb k  yMeeM, 
MCKynaeM jry  OMtiy. Xoay, ‘ito6 u  bm siiajiH, mi'O aepes MepiioSbDib
riixDui.riM noMTH B c e  n p ocj ieccH O H a.ib i-aT O M in H K H . Mw m c e r o ^ n a  ire  
HM ceM  O T K asa  b  c j iy M a a x . K o r a a  iiaM  i iy îK n a  iiomouu,. H M e ii i io  3to  
oSCTOBTe.abCTBO no3Bo.TM .ao iiaM  b  4 B a  r o i t a  c(l)OpMM|X)BaTb cra6M .a i.n b iM  
KOBJieKTMB. 7"S
a:IdaKpuTMe fiA3C -  3T0 iie aacniocrb, aro ire iieno.abiioe m.tm iipcjinaMepeiiHoe nacrynaeiiMe na amMiiyio auepreTHKy, 6es KOTopon, no Moeivty r.ayboKOMy y6e>K4enHio, ae[)63 2 0 -2 5  .ler mm BOHiteM b  nojiocy 3nepreTHaecKoro KpH3Mca. HMenno na xaKOH cpoK xaaxM'r y 
nac rasa, k o t o p m h  KcraxH n a w  eme sano.ayaMXb M3 paAonoB KaciiMJi
M.TH ftMajia. npH a'l'OM nocxaBMTb naytexcnocrb aneprocnaSxcenHii b
saBMCMMoci'H OT rexiiHMecKoro c o c f o b i im j i  raaonpoBOiiOB, Koropbie h  
jX33epBHpoBaTb 6eccMbicjienno, rare Kax [^esepa Kopo4Mpyex c raKOH Tice
CKOpOCTblol76.
Î
The Soviet Minister of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Industry, V. Konovalov, also tried 
to convince the deputies that no harm would be done should the nuclear programme continue 
unchanged. Comparing Ukraine to Norway, which produced 2 3 ,0 0 0  kWh o f electricity per person 
per annum, Konovalov argued that people in Ukraine, where the figure was 5 ,8 0 0  kWh per person, 
deserved something better. While holding the view that safety had to be put before expansion of 
nuclear power, the Soviet minister argued that increased electricity output ought to be achieved 
through such an expansion, as nuclear energy was cleaner from an ecological point of view. If  all 
the nuclear power stations in Ukraine were replaced by thermal power stations using coal, in the 
course o f a year they would emit more than 87  million tons of carbon dioxide, 1.3 million tons of
nitrogen dioxide, more than 2.2 million tons o f sulphurous gas and close to 200,000 tons of
volatile ashes, in addition to numerous other chemical substances, including radioactive ones, into 
the a t m o s p h e r e *77 Emissions o f inert radioactive gases from the Ukrainian nuclear power stations 
were allegedly some 100 times lower than the norm, and the IAEA had satisfied itself that safety 
was the priority issue in Ukraine at the moment. Konovalov also addressed the clean-up work at 
Chernobyl, but failed to say anything about the implications of the accident on people's health, 
focusing entirely on the technical details.
,
The deputies, however, were not impressed by Umanets's or Konovalov's speeches - none of 
them advocated the continued operation of Chernobyl and in general concern was also voiced 
about the future of Ukraine's at the other nuclear power stations. The mood at the session reflected 
the frustration among the Ukrainians of inadequate measures being taken in the aftermath of the 
accident, at the slow pace of implementation*78 and also of ‘Moscow’s’ seeming lack of
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understanding for the needs of the locals. Information from Moscow that money gathered 
throughout the USSR and deposited in a Chernobyl fund had been given to the USSR 
Minatomenergo was met with disbelief and anger by a majority of the deputies. Money from this 
fund had been collected among ordinary people and was intended to help the victims o f the 
Chernobyl accident with evacuation, housing, medical care, etc. A telegram from the USSR 
Council o f Ministers on this matter read as follows:
. . . B  CBÎ13H C BOnpOCOM, KOTOpblH B03!1HK y B ü C ,  COOGuiaiO. MTO CoBcr
MHUHcrpoB CCCP B Mio.rie 1987 104a npMiuui iTenieiiHe 0
4onojiimTe.rib[ioM BbweaeiiMM na 1987 ro 4  MH imTOManepro CCCP 213 
MJiii. py5 jieH  iia (])HHancHpoBauHe p a S o r , cBJisaiiiibix c  .TMKBM4anMeA 
n o c / ie4crBHA aoapHM na ^lepiioÔbUîhŒOH A3C, b tom  MMcae 67 M.aii. 
py5.aeA  3a c i e x  iieMcno.rib30iîanHoro iia to bpcmh ocraT K a cpe4crB, 
nocrynHBuiHX na cmct N o  904810 b CocSanKe CCCP. yKaaannbie 
cpe4CTBa no.aiiocTbio wcnojibsoBanbi no na3iiaiienHio*79
Social Justice, or rather the lack of it, was brought up by many deputies addressing the issue 
of Chernobyl. S. Ki’aminskaia of Kharkiv oblast, for instance, drew to the attention o f her fellow 
deputies the fate of the so-called 'liquidators' (the people who took part in the clean-up operation at 
the Chernobyl nuclear station after the accident). At a meeting with members of the Chernobyl 
society, she had been informed that the liquidators were not receiving the benefits to which they 
were entitled. When trying to bring some clarity to the issue of what the liquidators were entitled 
to, Kraminskaia, herself a member of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada, failed to obtain any 
documents that proving their status. The military identification documents, o f soldiers sent to 
Chernobyl stated their rights, referring to a resolution passed by the USSR Council of Ministers, 
but locally few, if any, knew the details of this resolution, nor how to get it implemented. The 
Chernobyl victims were unanimous in their response:
K or4a Mbi Gbuiu iiyTKiibi, nac naiujiH, a  renepb mi>i ripe40CT'aBaenbi 
GiMHM ceGe. Mbi iiHKOMy y^KC iie aepuM -  hm  oGemanHnM 
n p a o H T e ab C T n a , hm  M ecT noH  BJiacTM.
Kraminskaia herself concluded as follows:
npoH30Luaa iiy4 0 BHiuHaa necnpane4 JiHB0 crb. JI104M, Bbino.fiiiHB cnoA 
40Jir nep64 P04H110A m ocraBHB CBoe 34opoBbe tu m ,  y  cren  
paspym enHoro peaK iopa, oKasajiMCb KaK 6bi HeiiyTKiiHMH oSmecrBy*^**
Related to the issue of the 'liquidators' was the health of those living in the contaminated 
areas. I. Lavrukhin (Kiev) made a reference to the 24,000 people who had been evacuated from
*79 IMsL,p. 50.
*80 Ibid., p. 55.
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the Chernobyl area to Kiev (7.000 of these were children). Another 10,000 people living in Kiev 
had taken part in the clean-up operation after the accident. Since the accident 980 children had 
been born to these families, and medical examinations during 1989 showed that the sickness rate 
in this group had doubled in grown-ups and risen 1.5 times in children. Regular examinations 
were also required in the affected territories, but due to a lack of adequate equipment it was 
difficult to organise them. The Fourth directorate of the Republican Centre for the Mother and 
Child, whose task it was to co-ordinate work with children and mothers from the evacuated areas, 
had not yet started to function properly - as a matter of fact it was providing care for children from 
parts of the country that had not been affected by the Chernobyl accident at all. This led 
Lavrukhin to make the following criticism:
Hau iienofu iT iio, noacM y MHHaTOMaiieapro m .leM efiiiwe y a p e x v ie iin a  
T p e i'L ero  RnaBHoro ynpaBJ ieiina M m isiipaBa CCCP iie  n|X)Bo;j,B’r 
aa^ /iexca ixty io  p a S o r y  no o x p a n e  3A0|MBb/i r e x , k t o  u K n e æ  m
rpyAHTCfl c e n n a c  na TA3C, n x  A ereu , a xaK xce G u b u ih x  e e  
pa6oTiiMKOB. Cy i^bSa ne iicH onepoB , ynojie in ib ix  c  '■IA3C. wx ne  
MurepecyeT^^f
The First Secretary o f the Polessia regional party committee (Kiev oblast), B. Priimachenko 
(USSR People's Deputy) told the parliament in an impassioned speech that the frequency of people 
falling ill in the region was on the rise - particularly among children. Close to 2,000 children had 
fallen ill with disorders of the thyroid glands and many were losing their eyesight. Changes were 
also taking place in their blood. Numerous medical commissions had visited the region, and at 
first the locals had put their trust in them. However, they were not drawing any official 
conclusions regarding the inadmissibility of living in contaminated areas, although in talks with 
the parents of ill children they advised them to leave Polissia^^^. Priimachenko urged those 
scientists in charge of making decisions on the issue to take a look at the faces of mothers in 
Polissia and Ivankovo, to see their tears and to feel their pain. For ‘people have lost their faith 
once and for all’. The people o f Polissia were demanding that all families, and in the first instance 
families with children, be evacuated and resettled during 1990 and that each family be provided
Ibid.. p. 97.
1 Another deputy, K. Synik from Dnipropetrovsk, recalled an incident that occurred during preparations 
for the 12th session of the Ukrainian Parliament: ‘Taw xaKXce: j.aBaüTe riopynMM HpeaMAHyMy
Bepxoniioro CoBexa, AaBaüxe nopyBHM npaBHxeabcrBy. A iiama ceccun nn'iero iie xonex 
npHHHMaxb. flowMy? Mbi xce BepxoBuaa Baacrb i:>ecny6jiMKnl Hanpniviep, oxceauxb JBo;ten H3 
rio/iecba. AiieKŒuwp naojioBHB, bu ne AajxHTe coBpaxb, b 1986 roiiy na kommcchm a jiu'fiio 
cKaaaji -  Hoaecbe nam  neMeiiJieHHO oxceaaxb. T orm  Gbiao nsBecxuo, nxo xaw oGcrauoBKa oneiib 
fiaoxaa. Hex, roBopax. By, Bo-nepBbix. yabiGiiyancb, axo, Moa, BooSiue, axo xy ronopHuib. By 
npaB^a, AaeKcanap BaBaoBHM cKasaa, axo Puxckob axoro ne noMepxcwr. A BceM Gbiao usBecxiio, 
4X0 3X0 iiaao Gbiao aeaaxb. Tax Aananxe cero^na o iokohho ceuaac iipuMew petueuHe oG 
oxœaetiHM -  h iieMeaaemioe. YGexAeit: BpaBuxeabcrBO naujiex B03MOxoiocib 3io oaeaaxb,
aGcoaioxno yGexcaen. Toabxo aanauxe nopyauM ewy axo, oGaxceM, m oiio caeaaex’. See ibid.. p. 
176.
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with housing and work elsewhere. Should the authorities fail to fulfil this demand, the locals 
would organise strikes and take other, more extreme, measures. They had the support of the local 
party organisation:
B eab  no n.noTnoCTM pa^M auHonnoro 3arpa3ne im a, x o T o p o e  n iiecKo.nbKO 
pas niDeBbiiuaeT n ee  aoriycruM bie iiopMbi, paH ue inp  n o .a e c c x o e  c  e r o  13 
-TbicaaiibiM n aceae iin eM  -  ejimiCTBeinibiH b p e c n y S a u x e  iiace-neiiiibiH
nyiiKT c  raKOH x p a n n e  oriacnoH  a,aa 3/iopoBba h >kh3hh .mojieH 
paaMauHOiiHOH oGcraiioBKOH. T a x  p asn e n e  MOîxex n am a jDecnyGjinxa 
c  e e  50-MMaaHOHHbiM naceaen u eM  h snanureab iibiM  3X0ii0MHaecxHM  
nOTenunaaoM  nauTH n o sM o x n o cr b  ju ia neM e iiaennoro O T ceaenna
jnoA en, n o  cyabG aw  x o x o p u x  v x ecx o x o  npou iaacb  aepnoG bu ibcxaa
x p a rea n a  h xenepb n p oao.nacaex oxasb inaxb iia a u x  cn o e  naryG iioe  
B Jinan ue.
M cero iin a  n en o iiaxn o , noaeM y b axon  G eae mu ocra.xHCb o iin n , iioaeM y  
Bce MU A0.n:»:nu B unpau innaxb, noaeM y npannxeJibcxBO p ecn y G j in x n  h  
ripaBMxe.abcxBO Coiosa n e CMor.an sa  aex u ije  roaa npHMennxb
xap 4H n aab n u e Mepu n o  coxp an e iiH io  34opoBba n acej ien n a?
...rioaeM y M H imcxepcrBa u nejioMcn'Ba pecnyG auxH  n e x ijenoxcw x cy m G a  
no4Be40Mcri'BeiiHbix um x p y jio n u x  xoJi.rieKXHBOB. p a cn o jio x c en n u x  b 30iie 
x c e c r x o r o  pa^nauM onnoro xon xp ojia?
...Biuecxe co cbohmh uaGupaxenaMU a ocyîx^a io 35- 63pnyio 
xoHuenuHEo, xax anxMryMainiyio, xax xaxyio, xoxoijaa ne UMeex 
40ciaxo4Horo nayanoro oGocnoBanna. Jlio^n cero^na npoaojiaiox 
ne^onepne anxopy axon xonuenuMM xonapuiuy Habnny,
Deputy Budko (First Secretary of Narodichi district CPU Committee) of Zhytomyr oblast 
was also highly sceptical of Bin's concept:
Hama or[xma, xcraiii, -  e^nnciBennaa n mujjc, r^e MniiHcrepciBo 
34paBooxpanenna paspaGoxaao xonuenuHio iipo4CHnannH jno^eH na 
sarpasnennoH xeppnxopHM. A cobccm iie^aBiio, 12 #Bpajia, na ncrpeae 
’’MepiioGuab -  MOAepiiHsauHa mjih JinxnMAauna” saMecrnxeab Habniia 
saaiiMJi, 4X0 xoimenuHa 35 Gap -  ne croabxo MeitHUHiicxaa, cxoabxo 
3XonoMM4ecxaa. Tero xce xoraa cioax .nosynrn, 4xo naXBbiciiiaa 
ueiiiiocrb rocyvtapcxna -  axo acHsiib aejionexa? Bosnnxaer nonpoc 
aencxBua axHX y4enux -  jxisne axo ne npecxynnenMe'ft^t
Narodichi, which had also been seriously affected by the Chernobyl accident, observed a 
'sharp increase' in children’s illnesses - especially of the blood, thyroid glands and breathing 
organs. Most children were also suffering from sharply reduced vision, and the increase of 
cancers was obvious. Local doctors held the view that these illnesses were a direct result of 
radiation. Children had not been evacuated from Narodichi until 7 June (the accident took place 
on 26 April), and by then they had received a critical dose of radiation to their thyroid glands.
183 IbiA,pp. 104, 105.184 1 ^ ,  p. 118.
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Despite recommendations from scientists, the region had not succeeded in growing clean food 
products;
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1
HauGoaee mrpasiieaawMM jiB.ruitOTCfl mo.toko m mbco. C xa^uiBiM
ro40M yoeaHBHBaeTca 3arpfi3neHHOCT'b oBomefi. nosBOJib're cnpocuTb 
BBC, yBaîKacMbie AenyxaTbb iian Mero h bjui Koro mu BupaGaibiBaeM 
ary npoByxumo, na qeft c i’oa ona u/ier? H eyjxe.iu arc Hyjxijo 
Toro, 4To6bi 4eM-T0 BanBTb .iioaeü? 3 i'o aMopaabiio xax co cropoiibi 
I'oro, XTO 40B04HT (IBM naaiB.i, rax n co cropoiibi roro, xro mx 
Bunoaiuier, ro ecrb c iiameHi^s.
IThe health of people in Narodichi had reached a critical level, as was the case also in 
neighbouring Ovruch, Korostensk, Luhinsk and Malinsk regions. Budko had brought with him an 
official document that the doctors o f the regional hospital had handed over to the regional party 
committee. The document stated that, based on medical indicators, 1,698 families were in need of 
immediate evacuation. Budko drew the following conclusion:
yilMTUBaa TO, 4T0 3T0 0(l)HUHa.[lbBUM 40XyMeHT, nOABMCaUBUH
opraiiaMH, oroeqaioutHMH aa aaopOBbe aioaefi m ocoGeimo aeTen, 
opHrHuaa nepe^aio npeacemreabcrByiomeMy, xonnio -  b Hpoxyparypy 
pecnyGjiHKM h eme o/iHy xonmo -  cpe^ci’BaM MaccoBOH MiKjEopMauHH 
4JUI KOinpoaH 3a ero penieaneMi^^
More health statistics were provided by S. Hurenko, Second Secretary of the CPU Central 
Committee. In areas contaminated by the Chernobyl accident, children were receiving a poor diet, 
there were not enough ‘clean’ (i.e. uncontaminated) food-products and there was a shortage of 
vitamins. In Polissia alone some 43% of the children were suffering from swollen thyroid glands 
and 17% from nasopharynx. Twelve percent were ill with intestinal and gastric diseases. In the 
Ivankov region 45% of the children were experiencing changes to the endocrine sy stem 8^7 
Hurenko demanded that radiological tests be conducted on every Ukrainian and that the results be 
published.
Rivne oblast was also affected by the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident. By 
early 1990 some 10% of the population in the oblast had accumulated doses of caesium higher 
than the norm and close to 50% of its territory had been affected. High levels of radioactivity had 
been detected in food products, and the number of people falling ill with stomach problems had 
increased considerably. A high proportion of children and pregnant women were suffering from
anaemia^88
%
8^5 ibRL, pp. 118-119. 
186ll2i4,p. 121.
8^7 Ibid.. p. 151.
8^8 Ibid.. p. 160.
,1
s. Kirilchikova (Kiev) was highly critical of 11 in and suggested that he be stripped o f his 
positions and titles;
jiMiueuMH ero 3Toro BDanna191
^^^IM4,pp. 62-63. 
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Ibid., p. 121.
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The new Minister of Health, lurii Spizhenko, confirmed that Chernobyl had had a direct
.impact on people's health. Approximately one million people were living in radioactive areas -
250,000 o f these were children. During 1986, 5,800 children and 7,000 grown-ups were exposed 
to very high levels of radiation (considered dangerous to their thyroid glands). Some 20,000 
'liquidators' living in Ukraine were in need of constant medical observation. As for the general 
health in the affected areas, Spizhenko said the following:
"ïîf
Bspocjiue M iieTH. npoxHBaioiuHe na pamoaxTMBiio mrpiuiieiiuux  
TeppHTopmix, Go.ieiOT qame, h x  iicnxoiliMsmiecKoe cocroaiine 
y x y4inn.riocb. Aern, KOTopux Kociiy.iocb qepiioe xpbi.no aaapHH, 
SIiaMHTeJlbllO OT.BHHaiOTCa CBOHM nCHXH'ieCKHM COCTOJlHHeM. 4 o  90 
npoueiiTGB onpouieniiLix CBMTaioT. btg y hmx iier Gyjiyiuero. Ha 1000 
4eTeH~xHeB.fiaH -  TG.abKG 2-3 npGueiiTa. H ite XGTe.a 6bi, 4a h npua 
.riM CMGr 6bi cerG4im bctkg onpe4e.riHTb, Kaxaii pG.ab pa4HauMH, a 
xaxaa 4pyrnx acnexTGB aoapHM b 3Thx uBMencuHiix. Ho iTi4ce.ribie 
riGc.ae4crBMa 4.1a 34GpGBbii, b uihpokgm iioimMaifHH aroro anoBa. a ne 
TOJibKG c nG3HUMH nenGcpe4ci'BeHHG pa4HauMO[uioro luimimui J i : m  Mena, 
xax 4Jia Bpana, neocnopMMbd^g
As Ukrainian Minister of Health, Spizhenko did not have any information regarding 
radiation on the territory of the republic's nuclear power stations. Such data were in the hands of 
the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health. This Department ought, in 
Spizhenko's view, to be subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. The situation was 
illustrated clearly by A. Matvienko, a deputy representing the Komsomol, who referred to a very 
commonly asked question at meetings with his electorate in Vinnytsia oblast:
...Mena cnpaujHBaiOT; "HoaeMy ueT peajibiiGfi xapïMiibi paanoaxTHBHoro 
3arpa3neBwa? CnenuajiHCTbi npHe34caiOT, 4eaa i0T .îaMepbi h ... MO.aqaT. 
Ha4o cxasaTb aioaaM npaB4y, xaxon 6bi oiia an Gbiaa”^^ ®.
I
On Bce eme Gcraerca BHue-npe3H4eiiTGM, naaniibiM paanoGMOiioroM 
CTixuibi. f l 6bi.qa omejiOM.qeiia, xoraa npoqwrajia, qro on eme h 
TepoH CGUHajiMCTnqecxGrG T py4a 3a .quxBnaauHio nGCJie4crBHM 
qepHoGbiJibcxoH aBapMH...nG3T0My a nce-raxH npomy nocrauMrb 
BonpGc, qroGbi raamibiM imAUGbMGaorGM a p a n u  on ne 6i,ui, BMue- 
npe3M4eirroM AxaaewHH MeaHumicxHx nayx ne 6bm, h ec-BH on Fepon  
CouMajiHcrHqecxoro Tpy4a, t o  'rroSbi 6bi;i nocraBaen Bonpoc 0
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The chairman of USSR Goskomgidromet, Itirii Izrael, and the vice-president of the USSR 
Academy of Medical Sciences, Leonid Ilin, had both been invited to attend the session, but 
declined the request. Judging by the mood of the deputies, they were probably better off not 
attending.
Also criticised were the Ukrainian authorities and the 'centre' (i.e. Moscow) for failing to 
address the issue of Chernobyl properly. Deputy lavorivskii (Writers Union), a keen campaigner 
for more glasnost on Chernobyl, saw the accident as brought about by 'the energy empire' of all- 
union ministries and departments, 'promising us heaven and golden mountains, but instead 
inflicting upon us the bleeding wound of Chernobyl'. The only way in which Ukraine could avoid 
similar incidents in the future was by becoming truly sovereign, and thus in charge o f its own
As seen above, Prime Minister Masol in his speech to the parliament stressed that the 
Ukrainian government opposed any further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine. This view was 
also endorsed by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol, whose position was outlined 
as follows by deputy A. Matvienko:
UeuTpajibHbiH KoMMi'eT KOMCOMOJia yxpaMiiu noAiiepxcHBaeT
TpeGoBaime o ripexpameann crpOHTeJiLCiBa iiobmx Gjigkob, BaxpbiTHM 
MepuGGbiJibCKOH aroMBGM aaeKTpocTaiiUMn, BbicrynaeT 3a
M0aG4blX CeMGH M3 BCGM 30IlbI KOHTpGJUI
The mood^^"  ^of the deputies was generally in favour of closing the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station - only one deputy, I. Manenkin of D o n e t s k p r o p o s e d  that a commission be established
192 Ibid, p. 114.
193 Ibid., p. 135.
194 See for instance ibid.. p. 89, pp.96-97, p. 117, pp. 160-62, pp. 175-77, pp. 184-85, pp. 192-93, p. 194, for
the arguments used in this connection.
195 Ibid, p. 111.
territory. The Ukrainian deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies had tried to address 
the issue o f Chernobyl, but without much success, as their attempt was being blocked by the 
Soviet Prime Minister, Ryzhkov:
34ecb TGBapnm (Dc a g p g b  roBopMJi o t g m , b t o  napoAiiMe Aeriyrarbi b  
M o c k b g  MGJiqax. He m g jim h m , TGBapnm (DeiiopoB. H a g -b a c c u  cxasa ib  
BUM, BTG yxce na nepooM CbesAe iiapGAUbix AenyraroB m u , 40. 
noABHcajiH 3anpoc x TOBapMiuy PuACXGBy. H yB axa io  aroro 
qejiGBexa. Ho GTBera nHxaxoro iie Gl ijig . Ha b t g p o m  CieBAe 
jJpoiiiHiicxaa npeA.naraeT nGxasaTb xMiiotpMJibM g  TepuGGbiae. Mu 
ciiGBa BHUieM sanpGC PuxcxGBy. OrneTa iiex. Kax xoTMie, rax h 
BocnpMHMMaHTe. R BOcnpHifHMaio 3T0 rax, qro m u  c  grow Gg a o h  
HMXOMy Goabuie ne n ym iu . Mu ocrajiMCb c neio o a m u  na GAMni92.
rGcyAapcTBeniiyiG nporpaMMy cnacenMn bagpgbwi AereH, yToqiienHa cea, 
nyîKAaïoiuHxcfl b rEepeceaeiiHM. Mu -  3a neMeAaennoe orceaeiiHe
193
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to determine whether or not it was necessary to close the station down. M. Malevianik of 
Zakarpatia wanted those people responsible for the accident at Chernobyl to be judged and 
sentenced as a step towards avoiding similar accidents in the futurei96. w ith  regard to Ukraine's 
other nuclear power stations, several deputies expressed concern with plans to expand their 
capacity. I. Zahorulko of Rivne oblast raised the following point;
B CBflBM C 6.BH3KHM pacnO-BOXCeiIMeM PoBCBCKOH H XMe.BbHMUKOH 
aroMiibix 3JieKTpocTaimHH na Pooenmnne cjioAouiacb qpeBBbiqaniio 
nanpa^Kennaa oScranoBKa. ^KuTean nopaxennux TeppuTopun 
o6o3.BHJlHCb, MO.flOAbie CCMbH H XBaJlM(|)MUMpOBannaa MO.flOAeXCb 
BbiasxcaiOT sa npcAe/ibi oSjiaciM n pecny6.(iHKM. Mopajibnoe cocroanue 
naceaeiiMa yxyAunmocb, jiioah ne x e a a io r  mixmrbca, HMexb 
coGcrüeinibiH ckot, nTwny, noBceiViecnio coxpamatoT cbom xosaHci’Ba. 
y  poBenaan h nauiHx coceAeu Mbic.rib OAiia -  neweA-aenno apexpaiHTb 
Aa.ibneHUjee pasBUTue m crpoMTe.BbCTBO A3C. Ec-bm y xoro-TO ecrb 
coMnenne, AauaflTe npoBeAew pe^penAyM. Xopoiuo BbicryriHA t .yt  
MHiiHcrp KoHOBaaoB, no coBcew yMoanaji o5  oTBcrcrBennoci'Hi^?.
As for the Rivne and Khmelnitsky! nuclear power stations, these were causing considerable 
damage to the local environment with their present capacity. The Rivne nuclear power station, for 
example, was emitting 25,000 m^ of contaminated water per day, bringing temperatures up to 30 
degrees Celsius. The existence of Khmelnitskyi nuclear power station had reduced the water level 
in the river Horyn by 40%. Discussions surrounding plans to rebuild the Khrennytske water 
reservoir to serve the Khmelnitskyi nuclear power station with cooling water for its reactor were 
fiercely opposed by the local communities, as this reservoir was considered to be the 'pearl of 
Rivne, Volynia and Lviv oblasts'. A deputy from Volynia also expressed concern regarding the 
Rivne nuclear power station. It was
196 Ibid.. pp. 100-101. 
‘97 IbM.,pp. 160-61. 
‘98 Ibid.. p. 185.
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...Hocrpoeiia ua KapcroBbix no(X)Aax, b ueGaaronpnarBUX 
KAHMaToreorpa([)HBecKHX ycBOBHnx. Corjiacno BbBJOAaM HiicTHTyTOB 
oGmeu h KOMMyiiajTbiioM rurnenbi MniiHcrepcrBa SApaBooxpaiieiiHa 
yCCP, JleBHHrpaACKoro BayBBO-HccBeAOBaremcKoro MiiCTMTyra 
paAwauHOHBOH rurnenbi, b noaeccKOH sone BoautiCKOH oGjiaci'M eme 
AO crpoMTeabCFBa PoBencKOH A3C m BepnoGbUibCKOH aBapnu 
oTMeaaaacb noBbimeiinan MHrpauua u esm i-lS ?  b SBene noBBa-pacreima, 
BTC BCAer K KoimenTpauHH ero b npoAyxrax, b BacniocrH b m ojiok c, b 
9-2 0  pa3 GoAbme b cpaBuemm co cpeAHHMw pecnyGjiHKancKMMM 
BOKasaTeAaMH. 3th npoueccbi njX)AO.B5KaioT y cBOAcmiTbca...Tenepb bcqm 
aciio, BTO PoBencxaa aroMHaa craimwa ne Aoaxciia Gbiaa b 3Tom 
pafloiie pacnoaaraTbca, iio pa3 ona yxce AeHcrByer, t o  neoGxoAMMO 
CAe.BaTb Bce, btoGu aioah, xoTopbie npoxcHBaior b 3one ee BJinaaHa, 
nocroaHHo omymaaH 3a6oTy o CBoefi 5KH3bh k 3AopoBbe‘98.
A deputy from Crimea expressed concern that despite a resolution issued by the Council of 
Ministers to reprofile the Crimean Nuclear Power Station, so far no measures had been taken in 
this direction. An interview with Academician Velikhov printed in Komsomolskoe znamia had 
suggested that the station be converted into a nuclear polygon or a training facility for personnel 
working in nuclear power stations:
Hac 3T0 ne ycrpawBaer. Mu, :MO|)OBaa cn;ia Kphma. njeGyeu 
A0MOHTMponaTb a'l'OMiiuH peaxTop h BUBearn ero, ii.ioTHiiy 
yilHBT02KMTb M ypOBGHb OBCpa AOOeCril AO IiepBHBHOrO, m toGu lie 
noATon.iBTb ce.na, xo.ixo3bi u 3eM.BH...‘99
Crimean scientists had elaborated a project on alternative energy which would utilise energy from 
the sun and the wind. This could be used to generate the amount of energy originally envisaged at 
the Crimean nuclear power station.
A. Nedria was concerned that, while the deputies were worried about the nuclear power 
stations at Rivne and Klimelnitskyi, little had been said about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power 
station:
B AanHUH nepnoA yxce paGoTaer luiTb aiieproGaoxoB aroMHOH 
craHUHH, H iia btom nara'ixe paGoTaer paAOM m TenaoBan ciaiiumi. H 
xaxoH B|DeA ona npniiocHT -  i ih x to  cxa3aa 06 aroM. HoaroMy 
npeAaaraio...3anpeTHTb cipoMTeabCTBO h o b u x  aiieproGaoxoB na YxpaHiie 
H yMetibuiHTb MoiuHOCTb AeHcrByioutHX craHUMH a o  rpex giieproGaoxoB 
OAiioBpeMeiinoro AeHciBHa^^o
General Environmental Problems in Ukraine
Although the focus of the deputies was on nuclear power, other environmental problems were also 
addressed in the course of the session. USSR Minister o f the Environment Nikolai Vorontsov
USSR People's Deputy V. Chelyshev proposed to the session that it ban any further 
construction work on reactor six at Zaporizhzhia until a full ecological expert assessment had been 
conducted. The reactor was due to be connected to the electricity grid in April 1990^91 A similar 
view was expressed by V. Filipenko (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), who wanted the Academy of 
Sciences and Derzhkompriroda to conduct a joint complex scientific and ecological assessment of 
the Zaporizhzhia energy complex (the nuclear power station and the thermal power station) to 
decide whether to expand or to conserve it at its present capacity^92
s
‘99 Ibid, p. 174. 
Ibid, p. 210. 
Ibid, p. 214. 
‘^‘^ IbidL, p. 228.
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East Ukraine
9^3 These cities were Dniprodzerzhinsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Krivyi Rih, Kommunarsk, 
Kiev, Lisichansk, Makeevka, Mariupol, Odessa and Severodonetsk.
204 Ibid, p. 68.
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provided the deputies with a general overview of the state of the environment in Ukraine.
Although covering no more than three percent of the Soviet Union's total territory, between 20 and
25% of the country's total pollution was generated in the republic, primarily from the Left Bank of
the Dniepr and the Dniepr-Donetsk industrial region. Eleven million tons of harmful substances
were emitted into the atmosphere every year - three times less than in the Russian Federation,
whose territory was 30 times that of Ukraine. One in five^os of the Soviet Union's most polluted
cities (air pollution) were located in Ukraine, and the Donetsk-Pridneprovsk region was one of the
most polluted areas in the Soviet Union. Sickness rates in this region were the highest in the
country, and no improvements were expected in the immediate future.
Some 19 km^ of sewage was emitted into Ukraine's rivers and waters annually, and 41% of
this was not filtered or cleaned. Forty percent of the Dniepr's annual water flow was collected for
domestic and industrial use. Although there was a shortage of clean drinking water in Ukraine,
seven percent of its water reserves were used for industrial purposes. Enormous amounts of
.domestic and industrial effluents were emitted uncleansed by big cities such as Zaporizhzhia,
Poltava and Sevastopol. The Black Sea was in a poor state and the Azov Sea on the verge of 
ecological catastrophe. Extremely high levels of pollution by sewage had been detected at cattle- 
breeding complexes and poultry ‘factories’. Ukraine was particularly badly affected, especially 
Kirovohrad, Odessa and Cherkassy oblasts. Large quantities of organic manure were emitted
directly into the rivers causing serious pollution of small rivers and waters. Levels of pesticides, 
nitrites and nitrates in food products were alarmingly high. Large investments were required to 
stabilise and then improve the situation:
Cor.nacuo MupoBUM ouenKaM, a-bh roro, bto6 i,i crpaaa Mor.ria
oSecneBHTb craGnAbHbiH ypoBeiib oxpaiibi oxpyxcaiomeH cpOAbi, A.'ia 
3T0F0 AOJiACHO nanpaBAflïbCfl OT 3 AO 5 npou,. BaaoBoro
iiauHoiiajibiioro npoAyxTa. Ecjih cipana rpaTHT weiiee mcm 3 nix)u. na 
oxpaay npHpoAW, to  3Th Aeitbrn (paxTHBecKu uAyr na iroAAepAcaime 
yAce cyinecrByioiUHX Koinpoabïibix h Apyrnx ripMpoAOoxpaiini.ix
CTpyxTyp. JlniBb b tom cayiae, ecJiH cipaaa rpaTHT iia oxpaay 
npH[X)Abi Bbiuie 5 npou,.. moacho npHcrynuTb k JiHKBUAanHH pauoiioB 
3KOJiorH'iecKoro SeAcrBHn, raKHX, xax TepnoSbuib, h .bh Taxwx 
reppHTOpHH, xax JleBo6ei3eAciiaa yxpauna^^T
Given that most of Ukraine's (heavy) industries were located in the east o f Ukraine, it was not 
surprising that this area was among the issues most frequently addressed by the deputies. In 
Voroshilovhrad oblast the most heavily polluted area was the Lisichansk-Rubezhanskii industrial
I
■region. Lisichansk, Rubezhnoe and Severodonetsk, which were all situated in this area, were on 
the list of the USSR's 68 most heavily polluted cities (1988)295.
Lisichansk was in a critical state, with its many chemical enterprises and close proximity to 
Rubezhnoe and Severodonetsk. Some one million tons of harmful substances were emitted per 
citizen annually. Some 80 different substances had been detected in the air basin over Lisichansk 
and Rubezhnoe, and 20 of these were among the most harmful substances known to human health.
Control measures were inadequate, but the steady decline in people's health clearly indicated that
. I.'::the emissions were having a negative effect. The sickness rate for the area was 20% higher than 
for the oblast as such; illnesses o f the lungs and bronchial asthma were 1.2 times higher, and
people were twice as likely to fall ill from blood-related diseases. Infant mortality was 1.5 times 
higher and the number of deformed babies born was three times higher than for Ukraine as a 
whole. As for cancers, Lisichansk ranked seventh in Ukraine296. In industrial centres such as 
Rubezhnoe, Mariupol, Zaporizhzhia and Krivyi Rih, the number of children born with various 
defects, mutilations and inherited diseases had gone up 2-4 times. Even those children who were 
labelled 'clinically healthy' at birth had disturbances in their hormone balance and immune
.....
systems, which in turn caused a large number of children to fall ill with allergies, cancers, blood 
diseases and asthma. This gave reason for concern, as pointed out by deputy Novitskaia-Usenko 
o f Dnipropetrovsk:
.Bb! TOAbKo noAyMaHxe, a MeAnunae noiiBHAca uoDbiH TepMnii -  
’’npOMblUJAeHHblH CHHAPOM HAOAa", 3U KOTOpbIM CTOHT B GyAyUieM 
HCKaAeMeiiiibifl peGeaoK. Kax bhahm, aonopojxAeaabie ceroAaa 
ABAfllOTCJI CaWblM MyTXHM HHAHXaTOpOM 3KOAorHAecxoro 
aeGAaronoAyqM}i207,
Another major polluter was Dniprodzerzhinsk, emitting some 315,000 tons of harmful 
substances into the atmosphere - the Makeevskii metallurgical combine alone was responsible for 
the emission of 178,000 t o n s (298 Another heavily polluted town in the region, Kommunarsk, was 
on the verge of catastrophe, emitting an average of two tons of harmful substances into the air per 
citizen. The only recreational facility in the area, the Isakov reservoir, had been completely 
destroyed by water from mines being emitted into the reservoir. The number of cancers, stomach 
and intestine problems and other diseases were on the rise299.
In neighbouring Donetsk oblast the situation was equally serious. More than 200 factories 
.and combines were situated in Donetsk city (mining, metallurgical and chemical industries as well 
____________________________
295 Ibid.. p. 57 (deputy Zinkovskii, Voroshilovhrad oblast).
296 Ibid.. pp. 98-99 (deputy Ermakov, Voroshilovhrad oblast).
297 I b i i ,  p. 137.
298 Ibid.. p. 292 (unread speech of deputy Merzlenko, Voroshilovhrad oblast).
299 Ibid.. p. 335 (unread speech of deputy lakimenko, director of the Kommunarsk metallurgical combine,
Voroshilovhrad oblast).
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s2‘9 Ibid.. pp. 108-11 (deputy Manenkin, Donetsk oblast).
2D Ibid.. pp. 114-16.
212 Ibid.. p. 306 (unread speech of deputy V. Filipenko, Dnipropetrovsk oblast). 
212 Ibid,, p. 115.
203
as enterprises producing construction materials), which covered an area of 358 kni2 and had a 
population of 1,149,000 (3,190 inhabitants per square km - the Ukrainian average was 83). Some 
320 kg of harmful substances were emitted per citizen, and levels of dust, phenols, oxides, 
nitrogen and sulphurous anhydride exceeded the maximum permissible levels. The river Kalmiiis, 
providing Donetsk with drinking water, and other rivers and reservoirs in the area were seriously 
polluted by 40 enterprises emitting more than 186,000 m^ of sewage into the river daily - 2,000 m  ^
of which did not comply with sanitary norms. Silt in the river Hruzskaia had been labelled 
'extremely harmful' for people's health. Eight smelting ovens at the Donetsk metallurgical plant.
situated in the very heart of Donetsk, had not been fitted with filters, although a decision to 
reconstruct them had been made as early as in the 1970s. The mines in Donetsk were also causing 
substantial pollution (17 mill, tons of rocks and also considerable radiation)2‘9
Deputy H. Hutovskii from Dnipropetrovsk2D gave the deputies an indication of how serious 
the ecological situation was in his home town by referring to the 'steel heart of the Soviet Union' as 
a 'crematorium' and 'gas chamber'. The Ministry of Metallurgy was the major polluter in the area, 
emitting some 60 million m^ of polluted water and turning the local river Saksahan into a sewer. 
The river Inhulets was being destroyed by water from the mines containing large quantities of 
salts. One of Dnipropetrovsk's major polluters, the Petrovsk enterprise, had used the same blast­
furnace ovens for 36 years (instead of the maximum 25) and the open-hearth furnace ovens for 40 
years (instead of the maximum 20). The enterprise, which was situated in a densely populated part 
of town, was having a negative impact on people's health; for instance, six times more children 
in this area were falling ill with respiratory diseases compared to the relatively clean Zhovten
region, and allergies and blood diseases were 2-3 times more frequent. For the grown-up
population heart diseases and cancers were 1.5-2 times more common2‘2
Krivyi Rih ranked among the highest in terms of emissions o f gas and dust into the 
atmosphere. More than 10,000 of Krivih Rih's citizens lived next to its metallurgical plants and 
combines - the air of the entire region by the luzhnii and Novokrivorozhsk combines was 
permanently polluted. Two regions with 140,000 inhabitants in the close proximity of 
'Krivorozhstal' and a coke and chemical enterprise were also in a serious state and people's 
frustrations were growing;
HeAOBOALCTBO oGuteCTBeHiiocTM ropoAa Bospacraex, nocKOAbKy 
iiHKaKHx GABHroB Ha AyBiiiee ne npeABHAMTca. JIioam noTepaan Bepy 
B n a a n u  h  oGemaiiHB BamnTHTb npnpoAy, noTOMy b to  nnAflT 
noCTO/itifioe M Benpeci'aHHoe ee yimaTOAceitHe na KaxcAOM uiary. Oiih  
craBBT noA coMneime cmiy CoBeTCKon Baacrn, rioroMy b to  OHa ne b 
COCTOIIHHM SaiUHTMTb HX OT SaCHAHH MHUHCrepCPB, OT OTpaBAeBHfl, OT 6oae3neH2D.
;=tv
«
:4:a
^M T e.iM  ropoA a ('ri>e5yeT)...AaTL f'opoAy c r a r y c  ropoA a  
loecnyG.iHKaiiCKoro noAaHiienHJi, iieuiMTeabno ;iaKpbinaTi> a ce  Mopa.abiio 
y cra p eeu jH e iipeAnpnaTMa, C03AaTi> do a cex  G oAbum x ro|)OAax 
He3aBMCHMbie, x o p o u io  ociiam en iib ie  BHeBeAOMcrDeniibie .laGoparopM H, 
pecnyG A H K a iicxyio axo.aorHM ecKyio n p o x y p a T y p y .^ 't
Ukraine, and in the 20-30 year age group, the figure was 4.6 times higher than o f the Ukrainian
average2‘2.
2 ‘4  I b id . . p . 1 1 6 .
215 i b i ^ ,  p p . 1 7 8 - 7 9 .
216  I b i d ,  p . 8 6 .
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V. Popov from Zaporizhzhia oblast gave a depressing account of the ecological situation in
Zaporizhzhia town, which was no better than elsewhere in East Ukraine. Every year 19,677
sources emitted 1,062,000 tons of pollutants into the atmosphere. Harmful substances such as
carbon, nitrogen and sulphur were emitted practically uncleaned, and 49% of the sources had no
cleansing facilities. Sixty percent of Zaporizhzhia's air pollution was caused by Zaporizhstal and
enterprises working under its direction. In terms of air pollution, Zaporizhzhia ranked fourth in
Ukraine and 20th in the USSR. Every day the town of Zaporizhzhia emitted 767,000 m^ of
.industrial/domestic water into the Dniepr. Only 41.8% of this had been properly cleansed. The
.pollution o f the Dniepr as well as the accumulation of radio nuclides in its silt was causing 
particular concern in Zaporizhzhia, as it was one of two Ukrainian cities whose drinking water was 
supplied directly from the Dniepr. The close proximity of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station 
(five reactors) and the Zaporizhzhia DRES (combined hydroelectric and thermal power station)
■ ■ '■ .gave additional cause for concern. The impact this had on health was obvious for anyone to see; 
illnesses among children and grown-ups were 45% and 21% more frequent than on average in
South Ukraine
Environmental problems were rife also in Ukraine's southern oblasts. V. Stadnichenko (Odessa 
oblast) brought up the issue of Lake Sasik, which from being a recreational area was being turned 
into a still-water lake, filled with a cocktail of harmful chemical substances. The fish were dying, 
and the concentration o f harmful substances in the fish was up to 50 or more times above the 
maximum permissible levels. The situation at Lake Sasik, argued Stadnichenko, was indicative of 
the situation in the oblast at large. The Danube-Dniestr irrigation system could only be labelled an 
'ecological d i s a s t e r ' 2 ‘ 6 Lake lalpuh was in the process of dying due to excessive pollution and 
would soon leave 100,000 people o f the Bollhrad region without drinking water. Due to the poor 
water quality in the sea, this region occupied the first place in terms of intestinal diseases.
Deputy V, Plekhanov pointed out that Odessa city was in a 'terrible state'. The lower parts 
of the Dniestr and the Dniestr bay could only be referred to as 'catastrophic', and as a result
;
Odessa's drinking water was so poor that it put not only people's health, but also their lives, in 
danger. Plekhanov moreover warned against the Priport enterprise, which he characterised as a 
'time bomb'. This enterprise could cause a disaster even worse than the accident at Chernobyl and 
should be closed immediately^^.
The Priport enterprise (OTP) and the port of luzhnii had four underground storage facilities, 
each with a capacity of 30,000 tons of concentrated ammonia. According to the enterprise's 
administration, the durability of the walls would be checked once every 10 years. However, in the 
period 1987-89 alone, 70 accidents had taken place at the OTP. As for the dangers, V. Simonenko 
gave the following information:
n p H  aBapuHiiOM pas.BMBe 100 tb ic .  t o h h  aMMHaxa r;iy6m ia  
cMepTeabHOM KoimcHTpauMH cocraBMT 3 0  km. iiopaAcaiouiefi 100 km.
B 30uy nopaAceiiHfl iionaAyT mioiuaAn c  naceaeiiHeM CBBime 4 mjiu.
He.rioBeK. Cpe^a oGHTaaua qeaoBeKa na tore YKpaHJibi Gy/ier 
yimiiTOAcena noanocrbio.
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This was not the only source o f concern, however: in the near future the USSR Ministry of 
Fertilisers was planning to build a complex for the loading of calcium chloride for export, for the 
manufacture of granulated sulphur and also to start dispatching akrilonitrilovie acids. Emissions 
o f various substances were expected to reach 1,800 tons per year. These plans had been finalized 
despite the fact that a complex for the loading of phosphates had for the time being been placed on 
hold after pressure from the public^is
The Black Sea coast was also in a poor state. The Black Sea itself was being destroyed by 
chemical, bacteriological and radioactive pollution, and the layer o f dead water saturated with 
hydrogen sulphide was increasing. Rivers flowing into the Black Sea, such as the Danube, 
Dniestr, Dniepr and South Bug, were being exposed to increasing levels o f pollution, and 
recreational zones along the Black Sea Coast were being closed for swimming during the summer 
due to excessive pollution in the area. The trend could be reversed only if a ban on the
construction of industrial objects closer than 30 km to the coast was introduced. A commission 
that had assessed the state of the environment in the oblast had concluded as follows:
B oGaaCT'H c^opMHpoBajiacb KpHsncnaa moaornqecKaa cHTyauna, 
apeAcraB-riaiomaii yrposy ajih SAOpoobn m ach3iim iiaceAenHa n 
C03AaBuiafl Bo:jMOAcnocTb noiepM yiiHKaabiibix pexpeauMOiinux pecypcon, 
oGecueiiHBaiiHa co3AajiHoro pexpeaunoinioro xo3;incTDa2‘9.
2D Ibid.. p. 215.
2D Ibid.. p. 319 (unread speech by deputy V. Simonenko, Odessa oblast). 
2D Ibid,, pp. 168-69.
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West Ukraine
M. Maievnik from Zakarpatia brought to the attention of his fellow deputies the state of the
.Carpathes, one of Ukraine's major recreational resorts. The Carpathes, he argued, were threatened 
by extinction. Excessive felling of trees, harmful introduction of agriculture on steep slopes, 
numerous high voltage electricity lines and big oil pipes had caused serious erosion of the soil. 
The senseless use of mineral fertilisers and chemicals in farming further aggravated the situation. 
Three wood chemistry combines, all of which were more than 100 years old and which made use
of outdated technologies, were operating without pollution-reducing devices, and as a result a
large number of phenols and formaldehydes were entering the rivers and being emitted into the air.
In Mukachevo a radar station and a military airport were causing concern, as was the excessive
secrecy surrounding them. The river Tisa was being seriously polluted by water containing
mineral fertilisers from Chop railway station - hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of
contaminated water were being emitted into the river annually. A decision by the oblast soviet to
extend the territory of the Carpathian nature reserve by 8,000 hectares was being blocked by
Ukrainian ministries^^o.
Thus, the Carpathians were badly polluted like most other parts of Ukraine. In terms of air
pollution the region ranked 4th in the USSR - emitting 647,700 tons of harmful substances into the
.air in 1988 - or 46.5 tons per km^. The Dniestr, Prut and other rivers in the area annually received 
48 million m^ of inadequately cleansed sewage and 15 million m^ of uncleansed sewage. Wild 
animals living in the Carpathian forests were also polluted; concentrations of lead exceeding the 
maximum permissible levels by 67 times had been found in the internal organs o f wild boars. In 
Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) seriously ill new-born babies were twice as frequent as in 
Ukraine as a whole and new-born babies with abnormalities of various kinds were also common.
Arnold Hammer, who had helped to fund chemical enterprises in Prikarpatia and Kalush, had to 
take the blame for this state of affairs, as enterprises he was not allowed to set up in Western 
countries were simply built in Ukraine instead^^f
In Rivne, a major source of pollution were the Rivne and Klimelnitskyi nuclear power 
stations in addition to radioactive fall-out from the Chernobyl accident (see above). However,
v:::there were also other problems, one of which was toxic waste. As observed by I. Zahorulko, every
year enteiprises in the region produced more than 190 tons of solid and 1,330 tons of liquid highly
toxic waste. Flowever, the oblast did not have any special facilities for storing this waste, and this
was causing concern from an ecological point o f view^^z. According to Severukrgeologiia , Rivne
oblast did not have any suitable land for such a storage facility due to its deep carst layers^zs
Khmelnitskyi oblast, although it did not have any metallurgical, chemical, petrochemical or
other harmful enterprises, was also beginning to see the first signs of environmental catastrophe.
 _
229 Ibid., pp. 100-104.
22‘ Ibid.. pp. 170-74 (speech by V. Sintsov, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast).
222 Ibid., pp. 162-63.
223 Ihid., p. 279.
A ban had been issued on swimming in the river South Buh, as concentrations of various 
chemicals exceeded maximum permissible levels by tens and sometimes hundreds of times. 
Green areas were slowly dying, and the soil was gradually being poisoned with chemicals, losing 
its fertile layer of humus. Seven regional centres in the oblast had no cleansing facilities at alB^^.
Kiev. Central and North Ukraine
Kiev was (and still is) one of Ukraine's most polluted cities. Some 300,000 tons of harmful 
substances were emitted into the atmosphere annually - some 240,000 tons, or 70%, were exhaust 
gas:s from car traffic. Several thermal power stations and smaller boilers also caused substantial 
pollution. As in Rivne, toxic waste was also causing environmental problems in Kiev, due to a 
lack of proper storage facilities. More than 50,000 tons of toxic waste were being produced in the 
capital every year. One of the major areas of concern among the Kiev deputies was how to 
provide the citizens of Kiev with clean drinking water. The city was getting its drinking water 
from the rivers Desna and Dniepr, both of which were in a critical state from an environmental 
point of view. N. Lavrukhin voiced concern that ground water sources providing Kiev with 
drinking water might be contaminated with various pollutants^^s, N. Havrylenko of Lviv oblast, 
revealed that samples of soil from kindergartens and schools in Kiev contained concentrations of 
heavy metals several times above the permissible levels. A similar situation had been identified in 
other Ukrainian cities226.
In Vinnytsia oblast, environmental problems were predominantly caused by the use of 
outdated farming techniques, causing erosion, and the excessive use of pesticides and mineral 
fertilisers. As a result, nitrates (levels exceeding the permissible levels by up to 15%) had been 
found in wells in the countryside. In the hope that something would be done to improve the 
situation, the oblast authorities on numerous occasions had contacted Derzhplan and 
Derzhahroprom, but had so far not been heard. Vinnytsia oblast did not have proper storage 
facilities for mineral fertilisers, and as a result these fertilisers were polluting the soil in the places 
where they were kept and eventually entering the ground water.
In the town of Ladyzhin an enormous thermal hydroelectric power station and various other 
enterprises annually emitted more than 130,000 tons of harmful substances into the atmosphere. 
The town was not self-sufficient in drinking water. In spite of the very difficult environmental 
situation in Ladyzhin, the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minmedprom decided, without 
informing the oblast, that a facility for producing substances to be used in detergents be built by 
the production unit Enzim. Some forty thousand tons o f synthetic cleansing facilities were to be
224 Ibid.. pp. 320-22 (unread speech by deputy L. Skrynchuk, Khmelnitskii oblast).
225 Ibid.. pp. 95-96.
226 Ibid, p. 166.
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produced and in order to comply with this decision the oblast authorities would have to renege on 
its 1990“ 1992 plans 2,250 flats, hospitals, etc. that it intended to build. N. Didyk thus asked
CnpaujHBaeTCîi. a o  k q k h x  nop npanuTe.iLciBo Coiosa G yA cr  
iipoBosmaujaTL .losynr o paciuH|DeiiMH npaa Mecnibix Cob6tob, a 
AeHCTBOBaTL B npoTHBono.BOyKHOM iianpaB.ienHM, HniopHpya vtecniue 
ConeTU iiapoAiibix AeiiyraTon^^z.
As for the Northern oblasts, these were suffering from the same problems as Vinnytsia and 
other predominantly agricultural areas, in addition to radioactive fall-out from Chernobyl.
Relationship between USSR and Ukraine
Several o f the deputies complained that proposals made locally were not 'heard' by the USSR 
Council o f Ministers and various ministries/departments in Moscow. Others expressed anger that 
decisions made locally were overruled by 'Moscow'. The revelation of such incidents fuelled 
demands for 'real' Ukrainian sovereignty, so as to gain control over the republic's industries and 
thus to put the republic's authorities in a position to effectively reduce pollution on its territory. 
Before I look at the discussion on Ukrainian sovereignty that took place at the 12th session of the 
Ukrainian parliament, I will refer to some cases in which local and central interests clashed.
Deputy Pilypenko argued that the issue was not only one of Ukraine vs. the USSR, but also 
one of Man vs. Indifference:
Hacrajia nopa ocranoBHrbCJi, oniiiiiyTbca, Bce xopouio noAC'iH'ra'i'b h
B3BeCMTb H TOAbKO UOTOM UpHIIHMaTb peiUeUMÎI, KAKHM UyiCM JiaM
ABuraTbCA Aajibuie -  k MeAOBexy, k ero uyxcAaM, ero Gjiarococi’omiHio 
MAH npouBeraiiHio AHKTura rex h a h  hh u x  MHiiHcrejxjrB h  BeAOMCTB,
AHK'iaTa GespasAMBHA. Mbi yxce iie moacgm CAyu iarb AeiviarorMMecKHe 
.H03ynrH -  "crpane iiyxceii MeraAA”, "crpaiie iiyAceii yroAb" h TOMy 
noAoGuee, BbiAyMauiibie coiosnbiMM MHiiHcrepcTBaMH. Ha\t iiyAceu 
HeAOBex -  .saopoblih, TBopqecxHH, axTHBitbiH, a raxMM oh Moxcei' GbiTb 
TOAbXO B 3A0p0B0H eCTeCTBeBHOH OXpyACaiOlHeH CpeAe228.
Indifference was exactly the response the Zaporizhzhia city soviet was met with when it put 
forward several proposals to the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy that would reduce pollution from 
the city's enterprises. The city soviet requested from the Ministry that goszakazy (state 
commissions) for its enterprises be set no higher than 80%, so that the remaining 20% could be 
used to improve the social situation - the environment included - in Zaporizhzhia. This request
227 Ibid., p. 275.
228 Ibid,, p. 308.
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Deputy Stezhko (Dnipropetrovsk) in his speech, which was not presented to the session, 
revealed a very similar situation in his oblast:
There were also complaints that all-union ministries such as the Ministry o f Trade and the
'1
&
was ignored, and goszakazy were fixed at 95%, thus leaving the enterprise with only 9% of its 
income for local needs. This, argued Popov, was unacceptable:
Emn Aosyar "Bca BAacrb -  CoBeraM!”. xoropbiA b o t  y>xe b [[jerM H  
pai B HcropHH crpaubi cranoBHTCfl sAoGoAiieBHbiM. jieMCTBH'reAbiio 
peaAH3yeTCfl, t o  3ano|X)AccKHH rop coB er iie a g a a c c ii BbicryruiTb riei)eji 
IVlHHHCl'epCT'BOM .MeTaAAypTHM CCCP B POAM npOCHieAB, a CKOlDee, 
iiaoGopoT. X03ÎIHI1 B ropoAe -  C o b c t , a MMiiMeraA.TyprHH -  
MCBOABHTeAb. FIoA'i’OMy Bcc I’peGoBanHA ropcoBera MmiMeTa.BAyprMM 
AOAAcno npHnaTb k desycioBiioMy Bbino.mienMio229,
YBHTbiBaii, BTO niwyKUHfl, BbinycKaeMaii aaiuHMH npeAnpHATMiiMM. bo 
MHoroM oGecneBHBaeT aKCiiopTiibie nocraBKH crpajibi. mu TpeGyeM o t  
MHHHcrepcA’Ba MCTaAAyprHM CCCP pem u ib npoGaeMy npnoGpeTeiimi 
HMBOpTHoro 3{[)(l)eKTMBHoro oGopyAOBaiBui no OMHCi’Ke ra30B m croM iiux 
BOA, a  TaxAce npHBAC'teHMfl x  ero  MOtrraAcy u pexoiicrpyxuMH  
MeTaAAyprMMecxHX npeAnprniTUH. Mbi npocHM MmiMeTaAAypruio 
CCCP noTOMy, b to  bcji BaAioTa ocraAacb b ueirrpe, a saxon a  o  
M0CTHOM caMoynpaBAeiiMH, xoTopun 6bi b o sb o a h a  hum jDeiuaTb arn  
Bonpocbi caMbiM, noxa iier. B npoTMBiiOM CAyqae m u BuiiyACAeiiu 
GyAeM saxpuBaTb BiDeAnue npou3BOACTBa. Tax x a x  Apyroro riyrw 
cnacTH AioAen y nac hct^^o.
V. Budko expressed dissatisfaction that all-union ministries and departments had a
monopoly on information on the Chernobyl accident and that this information had not been made 
accessible to the Ukrainian authorities:
,
HaAO c:xa3aTb aeT xo, b to  MOiionoAMii iia uiKliopMauMio Gbiaa y 
rocyAapcTBeHiiOH xomhccmm, y co i03iibix BeAOMcra. Hx pyxM b 
ocnoBBOM AepAcaAH x p u u iy  hba qepiioSuAbcxMM x o ta o m . d p y r o e  
AGAO, BTO y pyxoBOACFBa M oryBeu cyBepeimoM  p ecn yS A u xH  ne  
xBUTaAo MyAcecFBa, ByEcroa OTBeTcrBeniiocru nepeA cbohm  napoAOM 
nanoMHHTb o cb o h x  npanax. H ecAH 6 u  n e BbinAeciiyAca raeo a io a 6 h , 
ecAM 6bi n e  cpeA crna M accoBon niuliopManHH, na|X)A nue A enyT a ib i m 
B|X)CTO Becriibie jb o a h , npnA am naM yAaAOCb 5bi a o  9Thx nop  npoGnTb 
c r e n y  OTByACAeima iiauiHX njwGAeM^^f
Ministry of Health were blocking the implementation of resolutions issued on ChernobyF^z, and 
-------------------------------------------229 Ibid., p. 181.
229 Ibid, p. 323.
221 Ibid.. pp. 117-18.
222 Ibid.. p. 215 (this issue was raised by USSR People's Deputy B. Krishevich).
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V. Cherniak had the support of many deputies when he urged the Ukrainian parliament to take 
control over its own territory and its own resources:
...AoAAOia HATH p6Bb 0  AeACPHpOBanHH (IiyilKUMH 116 Cnepxy BUMS, a 
CHH3y  BBepx. H navi fie iruAO a c a u t l ,  rioxa b M o ck b c  a r o  G yA er  
peumTbCfi, a  pem arb  y  ceG ii, 3Aecb. iia Yx|mMne...BepxoBiibiM C oB er  
YCCP np0B 03r.iam aeT  cynepeiiM TeT pecny6AH K n b jjemeiiMM BonpocoB  
pa3MemeiiHii h o b u x  iipom bboactb h paciuHpeiiHii A en crB y iom u x
V101UH0CTen233_
This view was shared by D. Pavlychko, USSR People's Deputy from Ukraine:
...BcnoMHHTb, BTO YxpaMiia -  aro iiesaBMcwMoe, cyBepeimoe 
rocyAapcrBO, a ne npocnrb c npoTAiiyron pyxoH PAe-ro na nanepTAX 
Mockbu235_
The session did, however, reveal that there was some disagreement within the CPU on how 
far to go on the issue of Ukrainian sovereignty. Borys Oliinyk, a Ukrainian writer and poet who 
actively campaigned for the Ukrainian environment at the XIX CPSU Party Conference in 
Moscow in 1988, held the view that only when Ukraine was fully in control o f its own territory 
and resources would it be possible to make any changes for the better in the sphere o f the 
environment:
210
rioKa iiapoA YxpaHHU iie GyACT cyBejDennuM iiaA npnpoAHbiMH 
GoraTcrsaMH pecnyGAHKH. acGmtsca ijaueTHux H3vieneHMM b 
3KO.riorM‘iecKO.\i no-BOAceiiMM na YKpamie neB03MOACHo234.
Another deputy, V. Krishevych, held the view that the time had come for Ukraine to stop 
'begging' Moscow for assistance to solve its environmental, and for that matter, other problems:
■
IStanislav Hurenko, USSR People's Deputy and Second Secretary of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party, in principle endorsed calls for Ukrainian sovereignty, albeit choosing his words 
somewhat more carefully than other deputies: I
H AyMaio. BTO navi caeAycT BUCKasarbca Tax, b i o  m u  b  npmmnne sa 
3X0H0MHB6CXHH M nojiMTHBecxHH cyBepeiiHTeT YxiDauHU B cocraBe 
oGiioB.aennoH (licAepauHH m nopyaaeM iiaiuHM npeeMiinxoM m am  npocHM 
iiaiiiMX npeeMHMxoB. hah OpaBHTeAbcrBO YxpaHnu noAroTOBHTb TaxMe 
npeAAOAceHHA aaa BcenapoAnoro oGcyACAeiiHA236
I
223 Ibid, p. 207. 
234 Ibid.. p. 209.
225 Ibid.. p. 217.
226 Ibid, p. 203.
CBoero cyBepeiiMTeTa237.
Not everybody called for Ukrainian sovereignty. However, the general mood was that of
With regard to Chernobyl, lavorivskii proposed to the parliament that it demand from atl-
...HaiuH jiyiuM iiacroALKo oGvieAeAH. mto no hum b6|)oa moacho aoh th  
K pyaxe Aoepen, 3a xoropwMM y Ate axoAornaecxaa iiponacrb. Ho Bce 
iiamM paaroBopbi, na xaxoM 6bi yiX)Biie ohh lie iiixMOJiAcaancb. m 
AHCxyccMM Gyayr oocraBaxbCB ;mmb pa3roBO[)aMH. ecjiH mu, xoiieaiio, 
lie Hano.3HMM cynepeimTeT, npoBoarjiaujeHHUM c uempa, ijeaauibiM ero 
iiarioAnenHeM. M noBTOMy a xyMaio, bto h lOpnA MnxaHAOBHM, m
UJepGax. m /1,mhtpmh  Bacn.ibeBM'i HaBAbiaxo hmoiot ocHOBaiiHe: xoraa ÿ
MU caMH lie iiaBeACM nopaaox b CBoen cBerAMue-M3Ge. to iihxto  navi 
CBepxy ero ne iianeaeT. H rax, nopa y zee npHciynHTi. x pea.aM:3auHM
increasing impatience with Moscow's wrong (as perceived from Ukraine) or slow decisions on
■ ■■■:
issues regarding the state of the environment in Ukraine. Thus, S. Riabchenko urged Ukraine not 
to wait for the Union to pass a decision on environmental taxes, but to introduce such a tax to 
those enterprises polluting the Ukrainian environment. The money gathered through this tax could 
then be given to the local soviets, which would in turn spend the money on solving ecological 
problems228 s .  Stezhko advocated that Ukraine keep some of the hard-currency earnings of its 
enterprises to improve their 'environmentability':
' Î  
; |
H  B iiom y npeAAOAceiiHC C oB exy  MH iiHcrpoB pecnyG aw xH  nocraBHTb 
B onpoc B C oB exe M n iiH crpoB CCCP: n e  w e iiee  5 0  npou. BajiiOTiibix
nocxyn.rieiiMH b c r p a i iy , x o x o p u e  iia iu a  pecnyG uH xa oGecneaM Baer, 
ocrraBHTb b pecnyG uM xe a a h  sa x y n x H  oGopyAOBauMB h  iipH ria iueiiM a  
MifOCTpaHiiux (jiMpM a a a  MOHTBAca oGopyAOBaiiMA M [DemeiiHa iiaujMx 
sxojiorH A ecxM x npoGaeM. T orA a m o a c h o  ' i t q - t o  p e iu M ib ^ ^ ^ ,
union bodies that they fund those measures required to eliminate the impact o f the Chernobyl
accident240. Deputy A. Nedria urged the deputies not to 'request', 'order' or 'demand' anything 
from the USSR, as they were legislators, not 'beggars'^^f A USSR People's Deputy from Donbass, 
lu. Buiykh, proposed to the session that it pass a set of propositions on the revival of the Donbass 
as a whole. He had put forward the same propositions to the USSR Supreme Soviet, but without 
any success^^z.
The clash of interests between the USSR and Ukraine on the environment was clearly 
reflected in the debate on whether or not to put the all-union scientific centre for radiation
4237 Ibid.. p. 206.
238 Ibid.. p. 219.
239 Ibi4, p. 222.
240 Ibid.. p. 211.
241 Ibid.. p. 210.
242 Ibid, p. 223.
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medicine under Ukrainian jurisdiction. This proposition was put forward by the USSR People's 
Deputy O. Sozinov and endorsed by several of the delegates. S. Riabchenko, for instance, argued 
that the centre be subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health on the following grounds:
Tenepb o BcecoiosnoM uenxpe paAHauHoiiiiOH MCAHUHUbi. HepeAaib ee 
yKpaHHCKOMy...(ann.ioAHCMeirrbi). T ax  TOBapuiuM, a camaio Baum 
anmoAHCMeiiTbi sa noiuiepAcxy npeA/ioAceima nepeaarb BcecoiosubiH 
neinp paAHauHouuoH ueimnHUbi MMimcrepcrny sApaBooxpaueima 
YCCP. H6o ai'HM ueurpoM pyxoBOiiMT M.ibnu, a Bbi c.ibiiua.iM o 
no.uMTMxe M.nbHiia. XoTH ie. htoGw ctiOBa ara iio.HiTHxa
iipoAo.a5xajiacb?243
Ilin was, as seen above, responsible for the highly controversial concept of 35 ber (a person 
could through 70 years of life receive a dose of radiation equal to 35 ber), and some deputies had 
as a result expressed a lack of confidence in him. Some, however, like A. Hordienko from 
Nikolaev, were slightly sceptical. Hordienko defended his position as follows:
HapoAHbiH Aeny raT CCCP Co3hiiob 0 .0 . bucc npeAAOvxeime nocraBHTb 
nepeA flpaBHTeAbcrBOM CCCP nonpoc o nepcAane b pecnyGAHxaucxoe 
noABHueiiHe Bcecoioanoro nayqiioro ueiiTpa ixiAHauHOiiHOH MeAHUHiibi n 
YxpaHUCKoro (pHAnaAa Bcecoiosuoro uay'iuo-HccjreAOBaTeAbcxoro 
HcrHTyra ceAbcxoxo3flHCTBeHnoH paAHoaorHH. OAuaxo, xax H3necruo, 
Bcec0103HbIH ueUTp paAHaHHOHlIOH MCAHUHIlbl riOAMHUeil TpeTbCMy 
ynpaBAeuHK) MnimcrepcTBa 3ApaB00xpaneuHH CCCP. Ero  
AeuTeAbHocTb pacnpocrpaiuieTCii ua nee rpH pecnyGuHXH, xoTopbie 
nocrpaAUAH o r anapHH ua HepuoGbiJibcxoH ABC.
Therefore, this issue ought to be discussed by the Ukrainian government before any 
proposal be put forward to the USSR Council of Ministers^^^. The chairman of the session also 
called for caution, arguing that
...deHCTBHTeAbuo 6bia noAiuiT BaAcubifl nonpoc o Bcecoio3uoM neurpe 
paAHauHOuiioH mcahuhiiu. Kouequo, cOopMyuHpoBaTb b raxoA 
|)6AaxnMM, rax cxasaTb, o6 sxcnpoupHauHH, mi,i ue moacgm. Ecjih sxe 
((lopMyAHponaTb rax, Mbi cMHTaew, uro ueaecooGpanuo HsiiiTb ueirrp c 
noAUHiieuHA AMH h nepcAarb ero MMUMCiepcmy SApaBOOxpaueuHn 
pecuyGaHXH, to , uanepuoe, raxoe iijieAAOAceuMe Gbiao 6biHl)aBHAbHbIM245.
243 Ib id , p. 219.
244 Ibid.. p. 194.
245 Ibid.. p. 220.
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Eventually, however, the session endorsed the need to elaborate legislation stating Ukraine's 
political and economic sovereignty:
CeccHA BepxoBiioro Conera Bi.iCKa3biBaeTca sa iiepBooqepeAiiyio 
neo5xoAMMOCTb paapaSoTKH saxoaoB o rtoAMTmiecKOM u
9K0ii0MHMecKOM cynepeHHTeie yxpanne b cocraBe oGnoBAeanoft 
(jieAepaUMH coBeicicMX pecnyS.-iHK^^A
The Decree on Ecology
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet eventually adopted a decree 'Concerning the Ecological Situation 
in the Republic and Measures for its Radical Improvement'. The decree was, however, 
characterised by vagueness and contained no clear-cut policy on the environment. This was to 
many a disappointment, as the debate proceeding the passing of the decree, was characterised by 
detail and deep concern. A preamble summarised the present state of the Ukrainian environment 
as being 'on the verge of ecological crisis'. Areas particularly badly affected were the Dniepr 
region, Donbass, Krivyi Rih, Northern Crimea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Attention was 
also given to the Chernobyl aecident and its impact on Ukraine. Reiterating the criticism raised by 
Verkhovna Rada's standing commissions towards the Ukrainian Council o f Ministers and various 
all-union ministries and departments, the decree stated the former's lack of persistence and failure 
to make decisions to improve the state of the environment. All-union ministries and departments 
were criticised for failing to comply with environmental legislation, thus aggravating the poor 
state of the environment in the republic.
The decree ordered the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to draft a plan for the economic 
development of Ukraine, taking into consideration the environment. Such a plan would provide 
for a more efficient use o f raw materials, energy and industries affecting Ukraine's water supplies. 
New industries that would not directly benefit the public would be halted in big cities and the 
importance of fulfilling targets to protect the environment would be strengthened in the future. 
So-called 'economic methods' (payment for the use of natural resources, limits on emissions and 
fines for emissions exceeding the limits) would be introduced to encourage enterprises to utilise 
natural resources more efficiently and to become more 'environmental'. A Ukrainian Programme 
for the Rational Use of Natural resources and the Protection of the Environment was to be drafted 
by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the oblast executive committees and the city soviets of 
Kiev and Sevastopol by 1991. Between 1990 and 1991 emissions of harmful substances would be 
reduced to permitted levels (as seen above, emissions exceeding permissible levels were the norm, 
rather than the exception in most parts of the republic). Purification facilities for water would be 
installed in all Ukrainian cities by 1996 and from the year 2000 emitting poisonous substances into
246 I b i d , ,  p .  209.
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the rivers Dniepr, Dniestr, Desna and South Bug, would no longer be permitted. As for 
Chernobyl, urgent evacuations would be completed by 1991. A 'Children of Chernobyl Program' 
to secure the fast evacuation of children under the age of 14 and pregnant women from 
contaminated areas would be set up during 1990. The decree also stated that the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station would be closed down by 1995 and that no new reactors be built at the 
Rivne and Khmelnitskyi nuclear power stations. An experimental reactor run by the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences would be closed down. Derzhahroprom would be put in charge o f providing 
uncontaminated and nutritious food to children and all Ukrainian enterprises and factories would 
be assessed for their impact on the environment by the end of 1991. A number of laws would be 
drafted by 1991, including a Law for the Protection of Nature, a Law on the Protection o f Nature 
Reserves and a Law on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safety.
With regard to the relationship between Ukraine and the USSR, the decree demanded, as 
called for by several deputies attending the 12th session of Verkhovna Rada, that the Ukrainian 
government transfer institutions subordinate to the Third Department of the USSR Ministry of 
Health located in Ukraine to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. Various all- 
union ministries, however, were requested to comply with the decision made by Verkhovna Rada 
and outlined in the decree. The USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, for instance, was 
requested to make available equipment to scrub acid-forming substances from fumes during the 
1991-95 plan, and investment from Moscow would be required to allow the USSR Ministry of 
Ferrous Metallurgy and Coal to cleanse waters high in minerals in Western Donbass and Krivyi 
Rih. The USSR State Construction Committee was urged to make arrangements for the burial of 
toxic waste in Ukraine, and as for Chernobyl, neither Verkhovna Rada nor the Ukrainian :AGovernment had the authority to make decisions regarding the town of Slavutich, housing staff of 
the Chernobyl nuclear power station.
David Marples, in an assessment of the decree, while positive to its aims such as 'educating
the public on the environment', questioned its efficacy. This, he argued, would largely depend on
the future course of economic reform in Ukraine (which areas of the economy would be controlled
by Kiev as opposed to Moscow) and the all-union ministries' and departments' willingness to 
.comply with the tasks set out in the decree. With regard to nuclear power, Ukraine was not really
in a position to make decisions on its future, as the nuclear industry was subordinate to all-union
ministries and departments. Marples also questioned the effectiveness of measures to elevate the
impact o f Chernobyl, as the decree did not establish an overall programme for those areas affected
by nuclear fall-out. Moreover, it was questionable whether Derzhkompriroda would be able to
fulfil the role assigned to it by the decree (that of co-ordinator and major executor of decisions on
the environment) given that its structure was in the process o f being reformed and its general
shortcomings (cf. USSR Goskompriroda above). Marples concluded that 'many of the points
.descend into bureaucratic rhetoric that reduces the program for action to a statement of good
'I"
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intentions that testify only to the fact that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet acknowledges that there is 
a problem with the ecology of U k r a i n e ' 2 4 7 .
During 1991, however, the Ukrainian Parliament issued a resolution 'On the Responsibility 
for the Violation of the Requirements for Radiation Safety (Nuclear Safety), the Preparation, 
Processing and Disposal of Contaminated Food Prodiicts'248 and shortly after, in June 1991, a Law 
on the Protection of the Environment. Below, I will take a closer look at the law and its 
implementation.
2.3.5 The Ukrainian Law on the Protection of the Environment (25 June 
1991)
Slightly more than a year after the 12th session of Verkhovna Rada, the new parliament, elected in 
Mach 1990, passed the Law on the Protection of the Environment, stipulated in the February 1990 
decree249. The law stated that the protection of the environment was an integral part of Ukraine's 
economic and social development. The aim o f the law, as stated in the preamble, would be to
...3GepeAceii[ifl G esa eq u o m  am  ic u y im n n n  acm b oï i  iieACHBOï 
npupoAH iiaBKOAMmiibOro œpcAOBHUta. s a x n c r y  a c h i t a  i  s a o j w b 'a  
naceJ ien in i n i / i  neraTMBiioro BnanBy, syMOBJieiioro BaGpyAuenHîiM 
uaBKOAHUJHboro npnpoAHoro cepeAOBHuia, Aocan ieHHa rapM O H iM uoi Bsa 
sM OA i c y c n iJ ib c n m  i  npnpoAM, o x o p o i iy . p a u io n a j ib u e  BHKopHcramui 
i  BiATBOpeuua npMpoAiiHX p ecy p cio ^ ^ o .
The new law on the environment introduced concepts such as 'ecological standards', 
'normatives' and 'limits' to secure the rational use of natural resources and to limit emissions of 
harmful substances into the environment. 'Normatives' for the use of natural resources and 'limits' 
on emissions would be introduced as guidelines for the enterprises and factories and economic 
mechanisms (payment for the use of natural resources and fines for emissions exceeding the 
limits) were to be introduced in parallel so as to provide them with an economic incentive to 
comply with the new law. Enterprises interested in obtaining and installing pollution-reducing 
devices, would be exempted from various payments while these were installed and bonuses would 
be available for enterprises reducing their emissions. Money obtained from payments and fines
247 David Maiples, Decree on Ecology Adopted in Ukraine (Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, 6.4.1990),
p. 16.
248 Yxas npeaMAHVivia Becxoniioro CoBexa yKpanncKOH CCP o5 OTBeTCTi'BeiniocrH sa nanvinenMe
TpeGoBaiiHH æxcHMa pajiHaunoHHOH Gesonacuocrn. saroTOBKv. nepepaGoTKv h cGmt 
oaAHoaKTHBHoro 3aroa3tieriitbix nDoavKTon nHTaiina. in fJpaBM YKpanmi, 2.2.1991, c. 3,
249 3aKoii YKPalncbKQi ixiAiiiicbKOl cou iajiicrm iH Q i uecnvGjiiKn nno o x o d o h v  iiaBKOJiMumboro
npHDOAiioro cepeAOBHUja (K h x b , bm aubum ut bo  "Yxpaiua", 1991).
259 Ibid., p. 3.
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for pollution would be put into special funds, earmarked for environmental protection purposes to 
be managed by local and regional parliaments, the Ukrainian parliament and the Ukrainian 
Council of Ministers.
Environmental impact assessments would be compulsory for all activities in the areas of 
legislation, investment, administration, economic and other activities, which were related to the 
state of the environment. Construction of enterprises and factories, houses and other objects that 
had not been given a positive assessment would be illegal. The public could initiate alternative, 
public environmental impact assessments, but it would be up to local authorities whether or not to 
take their recommendations into account. The councils of people's deputies, Ukrainian 
Mmpriroda and its local and regional branches were put in charge of the control with the state of 
the environment. Any violation of the Law on the Protection of the Environment would be dealt 
with by the Prosecutor's office. The law - in line with the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty - 
stated that all natural resources on Ukrainian territoiy belonged to the Ukrainian people and would 
be managed by the republic's parliament:
r ip M p o A H i  p e c y p c H  V K p a ln b C K O x  PGP & F m a c i i i c r b io  i ia p o A y  
y K p a x i iM , Î1KHH MUE n p a i io  u a  B O .q o A iu n fl, B U K o p H c r a in u i  ra  
po3nopaAAceHHfl ripMpoAiiMMH GaraTCTBaMM iJecnySaiKH. rioBHOBAaAAfl 
u a p o A y  y x p a x B M  b r a a y s i  o x o p o n n  H aB K O A H u iB b oro n p H p o A u o r o  
cep eA O B M iu a  r a  B H K o p H c r a n u a  npH poA H H X  |3 e c y f x : iB  p e a a i s y E T b c a  n a  
o c u o B i  K o i iC T H T y u ix  Y K im iH C b K O x  PGP AK G e sn o cp eA H b O , uijiaxom 
i ip o B e A e n n A  { D C ^ p e n A y M iB .  r a x  i  n e p e a  p e c n y G a i x a u c b x i  o p r a n u  
A C p A caB H ox BAaAH B iA n o B x A u o  AO 3aK 0 i!G A aBC i'Ba Y x p a x n c b x o x  PGP.
BiA iMCiii napoAy Yxpaxnn npano posnopAAAcenHA npupoAUMMU 
pecypcaMH sAificniOE BepxoBiia PaAa Yxpaxncbxox FGP^^f
Decisions made by Mmpriroda were to be compulsory to all enterprises, factories and 
organisations. A failure to comply with decisions made by Minpriroda would result in legal 
procedures being instigated. A monitoring system would be created by the Ministry to facilitate 
accurate information about the state of the environment and on the implementation o f decisions 
made by the Ministry.
Although the law outlined the framework for Ukrainian environmental policies it failed to 
provide a mechanism with which to implement the intentions of the law and what was more, it was 
not supported by other laws, which might strengthen its implementation. Thus,
. .3 a p a 3  MOBa h a g  ax  n p o  B A o c x o n a a e u u A  c a M o r o  s a x o n y ,  x a x  i  n p o  
npHHHATTA illUIMX SaXOHOAaBAMX a X X iB ,  a  XaXOAC BXOAACeiBIA 
Y x p a x i iM  y  M iA c u a p o A iiH H  n p a c o B H u  e x o a o r iA i iM H  n p o c r i p  lujiaxom  
p a T H ( l ) i K a u i x  i c u y i o q u x  y r o A  i  x o u B e i m i f t ,  m o d  crBOpHXM  b
25 ‘ Ibid.. pp. 5-6 (article 4).
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AeimaBi HOp.Maayiy 6asy aa a  npaBOBoro BHpimeMMa npoGaevj 
BpHpoAOKopMcryBainiJi xa oxopouH  npopoAH^^z.
Poor implementation of the law as well as a lack of sanctions against those violating the 
law, posed great obstacles to combatting pollution. V. Shchtur, prosecutor of Zaporizhzhia oblast, 
in an article in Pravda Ukrainy^^'^ argued that in many cases the prosecutor's office was helpless in 
cases of environmental crimes partly due to poor legislation and partly as there was simply no 
methodology for measuring the loss caused by such crimes:
OcnoBbi yroJioBMoro mxonoAaxeAbcxBa Coiosa CCP m c o io s h lix  
ljecny6.riHK, npMimxne b xoime naxHAecaxbix poaob, libiiie 6e3naAeAOio 
ycrapcAH. BeAb o5  aKOJiornH xor^a iipocro ne AywaAH. HecKOAbKO 
npMpoAOOxpanHbix craxen pasGpocanbi no rAanaM h pa:iAeAau 
pecnyGAMKancKMX yroAOBHbix k o a ck co b . CHcreMiioro xapaxrepa arw 
cxaxbu ne nocax. Mnorne h3 coAepAcauiHXCA n iih x  nopvi ne 
Aenci'Byiox, nocKOAbxy ne oxAaAcen MexaiiM3M h x  jjeaAMsanHH.
Thus, although everybody would agree that there was a need to protect the air from 
pollutants, this proved veiy difficult in actual practice as
...Ho ceH Aenb oxcyxcxnyex oijiHUHaAbiio yxBepACAeimaa MeroAHxa 
HCBHCAenHn ymepGa, npHBHiiennoro iiapyiueiiHeM 3aKoiioAax6AbCTna 06 
oxpane axMoc<|)epnoro nosAyxa. B peayAbxa're yAce roAbi SeaAeflci'Byex 
craxba 27 cooxDexcrByiomero 3aKona..,HAH BOSbweM ex. 228 VK YCCP. 
Ona npeAycMaxpHsaex yroAOBiiyio oxBexci'Bennocrb xoAbxo b cjiynae 
npeBbiuienMB b axMoc<I)epe npeACAbno AonycxMMbix xonuenxpauMH {UEK) 
BpeAiibix nentecxB.
B Aecaxxax ropoAOB YxpaHUbi 3XH fl/lK  npeBbiiuaioxca MHoroKpaxno. 
Ho KOAH'ieci’BO yroAOBiibix a o a  na sarpasnHxeAeM axMOC#pbi, 
saBeAennbix sa roA. moakho GyxBaAbno no naAbuaM nepeaecxb. H3 
AecAXH a6A, 3X0H KaxefopHH, BosSyACAeiiHbix no 3anopoAccKOH 
oG ab cxh  3a nocAeAiiHe xpH roAa, b cyA, nanpaBAeiio x o a b k o  oab o!
The reason for this was the following:
...ilaA ce npM xaxoM SoAbujOM CKonAeiiHH npeAnpMaxHH, x a x  b 
3anopoACb6, npu cxoab om  coAepAcanuM b h x  obiGpocax nbiAH h rasa -  
iiHxaxHX M6X0AHX onpeAeAenHfl 3XMX BbiGjXicoB ne A a iox cneuMaAHCxbi 
opranoB canHxapnoro naASopa h KoMHxera no oxpane npHpoAbi. To 
e c i’b, nex BOSMOAcnocrH onpeAeaaxb ymepG, nanecennbiH xaACAbiM 
KonxpeiHbiM npeAnpHflxneM. M im MnnHcrepcxBO SApaBOOxpanenHa
252 ypnAOBMfi Kyp' £p, 27.12.1994, c. 8. 
ripaBM VKpamihu 31.1.1991, c. 2.
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YCCP, iiM FocKOMTer YCCP no oxpane npHpoiUJ 9'I'ot nonpoc ne 
[jeuiaiOT.
Fines imposed for the 'thoughtless' use of pesticides and fertilisers in agriculture and 
emissions of harmful substances into Ukraine's rivers were very small and more recently, one had 
stopped imposing fines altogether; instead people were given a warning. The prosecutor's office 
in Zaporizhzhia oblast had examined the activities of the administration of several regional 
executive committees in the oblast and had detected a large number of violations. For instance, 
the chairman of the kolkhoz 'Peremoha' (Orekhovskyi region), A. Nosenko, together with the chief 
agronomist, V. Maslak, had in May 1989 organised the burial of three tons of chemcial weed- and 
pest-killers on the outskirts o f the village Mala Tokmachka. Another incident, organised by 
workers at the wholesale base Ukrtorhstroimaterialy, was also clearly in breach with existing 
legislation. However,
OSbeKTMBHocrn paAU iiayio cxaaarb. mto ecrb Miioro ueAOcraTKOB n n 
HaA3ope opruHOB npoxyparypbi 3a HcnoAiienneM saxoiioB 06 oxpane 
npHpoAbi. Hbiiie B oGaacTBOH npoxyimiyi* oGpasonau oTjieji no
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...B CBA3M C OTCyTCrBHeM B YrOAOBIIOM KOACKCe CraxbH 06 
OTBeTcrBeiiHOCTH 3a 3arpn3BeHHe 36MAH cjteiioBaTeAH BbiuyACAeiibi 
GbiAH Bbiiieci’H noCTUHOBAeuMB 0 npeKpauieiiHH oGohx yroaoBiibix aba 
-  "3a oTcyTcrBMeM cocraDa iipecrynAeuHii”. BnnoBUbie oTAenajiHCb
cropySAeBbiMM urrpa^aMH, KOTopbie uüaoachah aAMHiiHcrpaTMnnbie 
XOMHCCMM.
Shchur in this connection called for a special section to be added to the Ukrainian Criminal 
Code (crimes against the natural environment), which would make people legally responsible for 
polluting or in any other way harming the environment. Further, he considered it necessaiy that 
fines imposed for environmental crimes be raised to a level reflecting the actual damage caused. 
Shchur did, however, admit that the problem rested not only with inadequate legislation, but also 
with sometimes poor investigation;
I
uaAsopy 3a coGAiOAeHMeM axMX saxouoB. CosAana BanopoAccxan 
npHpoAooxpatiHTeALHafl MeAcpaHOuuaa npoxyparypa.
However, by the end of 1992, no real change for the better had taken place. A meeting by 
the Collegium of the Ukrainian General Prosecutor, attended by representatives o f various 
ministries and departments, revealed that there were still major difficulties with implementing 
environmental legislation. As pointed out by Dmytro Vasiliev, General Prosecutor of Ukraine,
...Bohh (M iuiciT[xrrBO oxopoiiH naBXOAMuiiiboro npHpOAtioi’O 
cepcAOBHuia, opra iii cayxcG M in icrepci'B a oxoponn 3AopOBMi,
' #
'I
cneuia;ibiiü criîoiîeiia iiicneKuia jiepmiaiiol no oxoponi AmitcMwro 
i  Hopnoro MopiB, pHSiiicfieKHii i  TOMy noAi5nnx) nwr.iaiiaioTb ne 
raK, jiK xoTi.ioai 6. He BHJiBjinioTb boum eKo.iorianHX b-iommhI b , hk 
i  BanoAiio'i’b Be.BMKOï uikoæm AepîKaBi. ne |X)3rjuuaiOTb Marepia.ii 
.... ne nanpajinioTb u i via'repia.aH b oprann nix>KypaTypH, iîriiuio 3 
saKOHOM npo oxopony naBKOJiHmnboro npMpoiuioro ce^ejtoBMum.Ha 
îKa.ib, saKOHH ne 3acTocoByioTbCfl tmmh m caMMViH Koi!Tpo.aioioaMMH 
opranaMH nepm 3a nce^^t
Attempts at improving the situation were, however, made throughout Ukraine. In 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast, for instance, a working group, composed of Ukrainian People's Deputies 
and specialists was set up to examine the issue^^^ and from October 1991 an ecological police 
force was created to investigate environmental crimes and prosecute those responsible for such 
crimes^^^, In KJiarkiv a brigade for urgent ecological assistance was established in the summer of 
1992257 Additional legislation to reinforce the Law on the Environment was introduced during 
1992. In August, for instance, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution on the responsibility 
for damage inflicted upon the country's forests and vegetation. To discourage people from 
violating the legislation, fines were increased by 25 times^^s. In November the same year, a 
procedure for the restriction, temporary and permanent closure of enterprises, factories and 
organisations violating environmental legislation was issued by the Ukrainian Parliament^^^ 
Enterprises systematically exceeding those limits for use of natural resources, violating ecological 
nonnatives and standards, would in the future be closed, whereas enterprises where such violations 
were registered from time to time would be temporarily closed until the necessary technical 
changes had been made.
Although the legislative side was being improved, the structures which were supposed to 
enforce existing legislation did not follow suit. In July 1992 the Ukrainian Minister of the 
Environment, lurii Shcherbak, made it clear that structural changes started to transform 
Derzhkompriroda into a Ministry of Environmental Protection, such as changes in personnel, 
ecological schemes, involvement in legal aspects of environmental protection, ecological 
monitoring, environmental impact assessments and international co-operation, were only in the 
beginning stage. The Ministry's achievements so far were modest:
CboroTiui MiiinpMpo7iH...uara7{y£ SyjiiBeJibHMM MaûmiMMK. iia axoMy 
BaaepiuyioTb iiyjibOBMH uhkji. PeiyjibTaxM poGorn
MiHicrepCTBa...”HeiîTimHi”...He BTiajioca 3aripoBa>nHTH eKouoMiq[ii
254 yp„l 19.12. 17:00 ’’TeJiepaitiOKauajr "HpaBo". (transcribed in Ukraine Today. Ukrainian Media
Digest, 21.12.1992, no. 376, p. 12.
255 YT-1, 28.11.92. M u inpo’’. 21:00, translitterated in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest,
30.11.1992, no. 352, p. 33.
PajimfCbKa VKpaXm, 4.10.1991, c. 2.
257/y : 13.6.1992,0.2.
/leMOK}MTHwa YKpalna, 13.8.1992, c. 1.
259 Fo.noc YkimXiim, 10.11.1992, c. 7.
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f
üaTKejii nn.iHuy a npMpomoxo|X)ia!iM A ia.iw iocri. UbOM.y, KpiM 
ycLoro iiiinoro, 3ana:Hca& me h aaranbiia etcoiiOMiMiia neBManaMeiliera. 
Saiiyviaiia ko-imcl rpyna onepaTHBiioro pearynamui ic iiy  E tI.ibkm ita
nanepi^^o.
Shcherbak also pointed out that the Ministry did not receive the necessary back-up from the 
legal apparatus. For this reason, the Law on the Irreversability of Retribution was not being 
implemented. The employees of the Ministry too easily agreed not to close down enterprises and 
as for the Law on the Environment itself, Shcherbak assessed it in the following way:
...HacraB >iac ouiiiUTH xiii BnpoBaATKeiiini SaKoiiy ii|)0 oxopoiiy 
iiaBKOJiHniiiboro npHpojuioro cei:>eAOBHiiia. a^Txe Horo 0K[X3Mi c r a r r i  
Aoci lie BHKOuyioTbCJT, a aeiiKl A iie MOTKyxb Syxn BHKonairi. C n iA  
xaKOTK nocHJiHxw Bn.xHB lia (jiopviyBainia 6iOii7icery 3 viexoio 
BAiHCueiiHfl 3aK.riaiieiiAX y iiaKoni npHHUHnlB. ^okoiicbuo rioxpidiie 
"eKOJiorimie" y3ro4*;eiiim 3aK0iiiB, m o i x  iipHHMaioxb. Ha iipHKaayi, 
iciiyioxb icroxHi po36i>Knocri b 3aKoiiax npo oxopony 
naBKOJiHmiiboro npnpoanoro ceijeaoBHma, npo Micucüi PajiM xa 
MicucBe caMOBpflAyBanim i  npo nojiaxKOBy cHcreMy...
...Annapax M inicreixrrna ne cxan cxpaxerimiMM mxaboM ynpaBJiinmi 
iiaBKOJiHmniM cepCAOBHmeM, a o S a a a ii ynpaBJienim ne smopjim 
nocMJiMXH KOHxpoJibuy TiiaabHicxb, nepes mo nepi^KO AOBOTiHaocb 
saTiOBOJibiiaxMca pojuiio cnoCT'epiraqa i  ne BTiajioca nepeAxu uxa 
pjiyxoro saxHcry m  nacxyny na pyfliiiBUHKiB npHpoAA.
An ecological information service run by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry 
of Health was also not working as intended^^k
Neither the sanitary service was fulfilling its functions, V. Trach, the chief state sanitary 
inspector of Donetsk oblast, in a lengthy article in Uriadovyi kurier^^^ linked the deteriorating 
state of the environment in the oblast with people's health:
Xo'iexbcii uaivf xoro bh n i ,  ajie npox/iroM oCTam iix T iecinupi'i y  
jKHTi'i cycriiJibcxBa a'ajincB bmIiih cneuM(])iKM 3axBopioBaiib. Hxmo 
lia noaaxKy cxojiiiT ii iiK lieK n ifln i xoopodH 3aHMajiH npoB i/me M icue 
B IX cxpyK xyp i, xo u n iii doiim ocjia^iaioxb .fiHme viaa bIticokh b Ia  
sarajibiioï Ki.BbKocxi. Hmii nepena^iaioxb xexiioreiin i cIiaKXopM.
260 rjjioc VKpaïHM, 29.7.1992, c. 16.
261 A resolution (law) giving the public access to all ecological information was passed in 1990 and the two
ministries created a 'hot telephone' at the Kiev Center of Health, where people could consult experts 
on issues of a medical and environmental character. A 'hot telephone' was also set up in Minpriroda's 
press-center, but neither this service was working properly. See YpmoBHff Kyp ’ sp, no. 20, MaA, 
1992, c. 2, for more details.
262 YpmoBMH Kyp’Ep, 10.7.1993, c. 6.
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i i. :-
The importance of the sanitary seiwice was increasing in parallel with the increase in 
pollution. However, due to outdated directives - the service was primarily oriented towards 
prophylactic work following the outbreak of epidemics, lack of (adequate) staffing, and poor 
instructions - the sanitary seiwice was rather helpless in combating pollution:
dBMMaHHO, cauiTapiia cJiyxcGa yftuBe h npanioe, KepyiOMHCh 
BMSiiaiieiiMMM AepîKaBHHMH jioKyMeiixaMM. Aae jikmmh? Aoci BMimi 
iieBKi iiicrpyKnii. npuHinixi me y 2 0 -r i  poKM, xa h 'TlojiOTKemm 
npo AepTKaniiMH canixapnuH narmiA b CPCP” hxâ 31 xpanmi 1973 
poKy No 361. CPCP fJK TiepjKana noMep. a no/iojKeiimi 6&3CMepxne.
In order to 'save the nation' a permanent, unified co-ordinating body, with the prerogatives 
of a state committee ought in his view be established. This was the only way, argued Trach, in 
which the scenario predicted by V. Polishchuk (he predicted that by the year 2040 the Ukrainian 
ethnos would disappear completely) might be avoided. A Law on the Protection of Health could 
be delayed no further. There was also a need to do away with the powers of the bureaucrat 
(chinovnik):
I
KajKyxb, mo CLUA aocmvjm po3KBixy saB^ iiKH roMy, mo xaM Kepye 
3aK0H. y nac 3aKon ne Kepys. Kepye bhhobiimk, bk h h  y Ayuii
CBOIH saaumaexbCB nindoKHM niriJiucxoM.
As an example, Trach referred to the trust 'Dzerzhinskvuhillia', which produced raw 
material for making coke, of which there was a deficit in Ukraine. Working conditions at 
'Dzerzhinskvuhillia* could only be described as 'anti-human' - contents of coal dust exceeded 400 “
milligrams per m^ of air, and in the period 1989-1992 alone, 223,000 work hours were lost due to |
poor health among the workers. The economic loss was estimated at 2.9 billion coupons. The 
sanitary service, however, could do very little to improve the situation: I
I
A mo MOîxe b n un im n iR  C H xyau ii xoR jxe ro.FioBiiHH AepxcaBiiMH 
am ixapiiHH JiiKap M i era ÜBepjKHHCbKa, mo5 BnjiuiiyxH iia 
oGcraiioBKy? B in  motko omxpailiyBaxH TiupeKxopa maxxn a?K na 500 
icajjOoDanniB a6o iiariHcaxM ftoiviy «leprone cyoope nonepetmeniin.
3iiopoBMH r.riy34 niwasye: xyx noxpiOna uiJia cHcreivia eKOiioMi'iiiMx 
AiHOBMX 3axo7iiB, iiKa oranRXb 3A0p0B ' a napoAy nnme BHpo6nM4HX xa 
ocoS mctmx iiixepeciB Oyiib-fiKoro KOJiexxMBy.
Bk Txe, OKpiM niTlBHmenmi npaooBoro ciaxycy canixapnoro narmiTiy,
MOTKua BnjiHBaxM na xexnoreniiHH OesyM n YKpaini?
I
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2.4 Conclusion
The environmental problems Ukraine was faced with in the late 1980s/early 1990s were extensive 
and as it turned out, had a negative impact on people’s health. There was a growing sense - not 
only among Greens as will be seen in following chapters, but also among people with different 
(political) views, including members of CPU - that these problems, compounded by the accident 
at Chernobyl, were imposed upon the republic by ‘Moscow’ and that ‘Kiev’ could do little to 
change the situation for the better unless it gained real influence over its natural resources and 
industries. There was also considerable scepticism among members of the political opposition 
regarding Ukrainian authorities’ committment to environmental reform, as measures taken proved 
to have little or no effect. Moreover, it became clear to many that environmental reform could 
only be successful if accompanied by radical reforms o f the Soviet Union’s economic and political 
structures.
Frustration with the lack of real environmental reform and also a sense that Ukraine was 
helpless in dealing with its environmental problems as long as decisions were made by powerful 
all-union ministries in Moscow, facilitated the emergence of a Green Movement in Ukraine - a 
movement keen on finding real solutions to real problems. Sovereignty and later independence, 
was seen as a necessary means by which to achieve this goal and also as desirable in itself, as the 
Soviet Union was perceived o f as a restrictive and undemocratic empire, harmful not only to the 
environment, but also to the culture, language and traditions of the Ukrainian nation. Although, as 
will be seen below, the relationship between the Greens and the CPU was at times strained, the 
Greens also came to benefit from growing concern over the deteriorating state of the environment 
within the ranks of the CPU. As the data above indicate, such concern was well-founded. The 
struggle to prevent further environmental deterioration in Ukraine is the topic of the following 
chapters.
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3 Building the Green Movement (May 1986-October 1989)
a series of interviews with those involved with setting up the Green Movement. Such interviews 
were conducted throughout the summers of 1990, 1991, 1992 and the spring/summer o f 1994 - in 
Kiev, Nikolaev, luzhnoukrainsk and Poltavshchina. The Green Movement’s archives in Kiev * as 
well as private archives were also consulted, as were the State Archives on Public Movements
 ^While in Kiev in the summer of 1992,1 was able to access a scroll of photocopied newspaper articles about 
Zelenyi Svit - some of which were local. Unfortunately the references contained no page number, only 
title of the newspaper the articles were taken from and the date when they were published. References 
that contain no page numbers are taken from this scroll and may be viewed at Zelenyi SviTs office in 
Kiev.
' Î I
3.0 Introduction
In Ukraine, as in the other former Soviet republics, there was an official Society for Protecting the 
Environment as well as student druzhiny, based at universities and institutes, prior to Gorbachev’s 
introduction of glasnost and démocratisation. Although, as seen in Chapter One, the Society to 
some extent and the druzhiny to a larger extent were able to operate somewhat freely, the 
Chernobyl accident and the secrecy by which it was surrounded - clearly demonstrating the limits 
of glasnost - caused various sections of Ukrainian society to acknowledge the need for an 
independent environmental organisation, which not only would object to anti-environmental 
decisions made by political decision making bodies in Ukraine and the USSR, but would also 
provide environmentally sound alternatives to such decisions. Out of this need emerged Zelenyi 
A'v/V (Green World) in 1987.
In this and following chapters I will analyse the emergence and the development of Zelenyi 
Svit at the background of the general political changes that took place in Ukraine after the 
association emerged in 1987 until it split into two movements in December 1994. This chapter 
covers the period from 1986 until m id-1991 (the Soviet Period) and consists of three sub-sections. 
In the first one, Origins, I look at how Zelenyi Svit was initiated and eventually formally 
established under the auspices of the Ukrainian Peace Committee in December 1987. The second 
section covers the period from January 1987 until October 1989, when the association’s Inaugural 
Congress took place in Kiev. The emphasis is on building an all-Ukrainian Green Movement, 
uniting and initiating local green groups throughout Ukraine. Attention is also given to the early 
campaigns of Zelenyi Svit. Finally, in the third section, I look at policies and internal
■'■ft.
: îdevelopments within the Green Movement, until m id-1991.
To a large extent information for this chapter and the following chapter was obtained through
;■f
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(Kiev). In the latter, CPU documents, outlining the Ukrainian Communist Party’s policies towards 
the Greens were found, and these documents form the basis of the analysis of relations between 
the two. A survey conducted amongst local and regional branches of Zelenyi Svit during a 
meeting of the Green Council in early June 1994 also forms a significant part of the analysis - 
although the data are used only tentatively, to indicate rather than to draw firm conclusions, as the 
number of responses was not big enough to be representative for the entire movement as such.
■ :However, the opinions and views expressed in the survey are valid as representing the views of 
fourteen local and regional branches of Zelenyi Svit. Combined with similar views expressed by 
other groups in interviews and through observation^, it is my belief that this survey gives a good 
indication of opinions at the local level, as opposed to those views expressed by the leadership of 
Zelenyi Svit and activists based in Kiev. Finally, all issues of the newspaper Zelenyi Svit from 
April 1990 onwards have been consulted.
In some cases written sources used contradict each other. In other cases, information given is 
incorrect. A mistake commonly made by writers on the Ukrainian Green Movement is that 
Plachynda’s leadership of Zelenyi Svit (1988-89) is not acknowledged. Thus lurii Shcherbak is 
referred to as the first leader o f Zelenyi Svit, when in actual fact he was its second leader (from 
January 1989)“^. A second mistake made is the claim that Zelenyi Svit was founded by the 
Ukrainian Writers’ Union and the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers.^ Although
representatives of these unions were involved in the setting up of Zelenyi Svit, scientists and young 
enthusiasts were also taking part and the association was registered as an independent 
environmental association by the Ukrainian Peace Committee, not as an integral part of the 
Writers’ Union. I have therefore chosen to rely on oral accounts given by those people who were 
involved in setting up and later working within Zelenyi Svit where written accounts produced by 
Western scholars contradict the former.
 ^For further details about this survey, see Appendix.
 ^ During my visists to Kiev and Nikolaev, I was allowed to attend meetings of the Mala Rada and Zelena 
Rada (Kiev) and a pre-election meeting (Nikolaev). I also spent some time working with archive 
materials in Zelenyi Svi f s  office at Podol in Kiev and was thus able to see for myself how the 
movement works from within.
 ^ See for instance David Marples, ‘Ecology: The Green World’, p 160, in Ukraine Under Perestroika. 
Ecology. Economics and the Workers’ Revolt (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). Ukrainian Press
Service. News from the USSR. See also The Ukrainian Press Agency, ‘The last generation to have 
seen nature’ - Greens form in Kiev’ (London: April 1988), p. 9.
 ^ See press release referred to in above footnote and also Jane L. Dawson, The Emergence o f the Anti- 
Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR (Berkeley: Univ. of California. 1990), p. 5. This error was also 
made by David Marples in his early writings on the Ukiainian Green Movement (See Marples, 1991).
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concern about a biochemical enterprise facilitated the local green movement. The Nikolaev
■Ji
3.1 Origins
Amongst Kiev activists who took part in creating Zelenyi Svit there is general consensus that the 
need to establish a Ukrainian independent Green Movement was a direct result of the Chernobyl 
accident on 26 April 1986. Andrii Demydenko, for instance, refers to Zelenyi Svit primarily as an 
anti-nuclear association^ and Serhii Kurykin has also stressed that Chernobyl more than anything 
else facilitated its emergence^.
This view has been contested by representatives of local groups (collective members of 
Zelenyi Svit), who refer to local environmental problems as being the direct reason for establishing 
their particular group. Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit, for instance, quoted the construction of 
Pristrialivsk radar station close to Mukachevo as the major factor. Similarly, Bukovina Zelenyi 
Svit emerged out of concern about children falling ill from alopecia in Chernivtsi in late 1989. 
Some 130 children had to be sent to Kiev and Moscow for hospitalisation and the cause o f the 
accident is thought to be thallium poisoning, although officially no reason has yet been given. The 
Dnipropetrovsk Greens also refer to child illness as the factor which triggered their movement into 
being, whereas Horlivka Zelenyi Svit in Donetsk oblast emerged due to chemical pollution from 
local enterprises. In Lutsk, Greens were concerned with agricultural pollution, whereas in Uman
.Greens united to protect South Bug and later against further construction of the luzhnoukrainsk 
nuclear power station and in Klierson people were concerned with pollution of the Black Sea^. In
several areas, like for instance Vinnytsia, Ternopil and Dnipropetrovsk, Green groups were 
established prior to the Chernobyl accident and with non-nuclear agendas.
As seen in Chapter Two, the accident at Chernobyl not only came to constitute an element of 
‘new thinking’ in Soviet foreign policy, but also probably contributed to the emphasis on 
environmental reform from 1987 onwards. In addition it became an important element in 
broadening and radicalising the concept o f ‘glasnost, by exposing the shorteomings o f the Soviet 
political and economic system as such. Thus, although in a number o f local cases the Chernobyl 
accident was not in itself the direct reason for setting up Green groups, the general politicisation of 
society that followed in its aftermath facilitated, or rather paved the way for, Green groups not 
only in Ukraine but also elsewhere in the former USSR,
Moreover, Chernobyl was not only a terrible accident in terms o f damage done to the 
environment and to people’s health - it also became a symbol of a more general environmental
 ^Adriy O. Demidenko, Chornobyl Accident and Development of Anti-Nuclear Movement in Ukraine. This 
paper was presented at a seminar in the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of 
Glasgow, in November 1990.
 ^Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, May. 1994,
® Cf. question 4 in Questionnaire. I
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crisis in Ukraine and elsewhere^. As argued by Shcherbak, Chernobyl was not only a 
technological, but also a psychological and environmental catastrophe, cracking the myth o f the
considered to be environmentally harmful, thus causing pollution. Chernobyl also highlighted the 
defects of Stalin-Brezhnev socialism, which had facilitated bureaucratisation, incompetent
silence in the following way in an article about the Ukrainian Green Movement printed in FORUM
3.5.1988, in (|)OiiJi No. 1. onuc No. 25. cnp. No. 3347. apK. 17.
Ibid., p .  2.
infallibility of science and the blind faith in technology and facilitating the opposition towards 
further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine*^ and, one may add, towards other technologies
?
.leadership and deception of the people to mention but a few. From this exposure emerged public 
loss o f faith in governmental institutions' '.
I
3.1.1 Initiating the Green Movement
Jane Dawson in an essay on the anti-nuclear movement in the Soviet U n i o n c l a i m s  that prior to 
Chernobyl it was an official myth that Soviet nuclear power was absolutely safe. Vocal opposition 
to nuclear power amongst the scientific community and society at large prior to the Chernobyl 
accident was ‘almost non-existent...the bulk of society had neither the interest nor the opportunity 
to form a mass social movement opposing nuclear power in the USSR’'^.
The official response to the accident was to blame human error rather than technical flaws for 
causing the accident and to focus on the global implications of nuclear disasters in general, linking 
this issue to Soviet efforts at facilitating disarmament. No immediate changes were made to the 
Soviet nuclear programme and in Ukraine eighteen new nuclear reactors were to be built at 
existing or new nuclear power stations between 1986 and 1990'"'.
Dawson scrutinised the official Soviet press to find articles dealing with general concerns 
about nuclear safety and the future of the Soviet nuclear power programme after the Chernobyl
i
accident. She found that there was an almost unbroken silence on this issue . The Ukrainian 
Writer and Physician lurii Shcherbak, who was amongst Zelenyi S v ifs  initiators, explained this
No 22/1990:
,
i
- See 3eJienHH C b It -  mane iuui nam oro cn iJib iioro ManSvTHOro - an appeal d istributed to  w ork ers’ 
c o lle c tiv e s  to  ga in their m oral and financ ial support (1992).
JJiTeparypm VKpaXria, 26.1.1989, c. 2.
Jliw parypiiü  15.3.1990 (n.p .).
Dawson (1990).
' ' ib id .,  p. 1.
See report to the CPU Central Committee labelled ‘secret’ and signed by B. Kachura and S. Hurenko on
■4;
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Citaiia:ia 61,1.1 ujok  1986 r. - 61,1.1a 6o;ii>. 6 i,u  crpax, no ocOBuanHe 
npHMHii npnm.10 nosjKe, rAe-TO lepei foa- JIiojim cra.iw nonMMaTi,, 
■ITO C HHMH njX)M30mAO lie TOAbKO ITQ-TO Cl'paimiOe M neilOCTHACMMOe. 
no M iieAonycrMMoe'^.
The Role of Ukrainian Writers
As pointed out in Chapter One, writers in the Russian empire and later, in the USSR, have 
performed two functions; on the one hand, they have been used as a tool to promote change and 
once achieved, to secure that things remain that way (cf. socialist realism). On the other hand, 
writers have a long tradition of voicing opposition to political authorities at times when such 
opposition could not easily be voiced. Thus they have sometimes been referred to as ‘the people’s 
conscience’ (sovest naroda)'^.
Prior to the Soviet Writers’ Congress in June 1986, Gorbachev signalled a shift away from 
highlighting the supreme role of the working class as an ideological vanguard of Soviet society 
and elevated the intelligentsia at its expense'^. The term ‘intelligentsia’ as Sakwa has pointed out, 
is wider than the corresponding English word ‘intellectual’, not being limited to people with 
higher education, but rather being associated with notions of independent thinking and moral 
integrity. Thus, by elevating the intelligentsia, Gorbachev initiated the transition from conformity 
towards diversity. This policy was stated very clearly in a speech at a closed session on 19 June 
1986 on the eve of the Soviet Writers’ Congress. Gorbachev said that ‘society is ripe for a change. 
If  we step away, the society will not agree to return. The process must be made irreversible. If not 
us, then who? If not now, when?...If we don’t involve the people, nothing will come of it. All our 
plans depend on influencing the people’'^. As is now well known, however, Soviet writers and 
later also journalists, did not necessarily present to the people those ideas favoured by the CPSU. 
This would soon became obvious also in Ukraine.
lOpuH llfepSaK, ‘CTDOHTb. a ne viiHMTOAcarb’. (IXdPYM, no. 22/1990, c. 31.
Such claims/references have been made on a number of occasions - for instance the Ukrainian Writer 
Borys Oliinyk in a speech at a meeting of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union in honour of Oles Honchar, 
who had been put forward as a candidate for the elections of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
by the Writers’ Union, reminded the audience that ‘ it is said that the writers are the conscious of the 
people’. Similarly, the scientific secretaiy of the Shevchenko Institute of Literature, M. Naienko, 
claimed that ‘...the literature has always been the conscience and the voice of the people; the people 
expressed its most imminent worries through the lips of the writers, its most treasured thoughts and 
feelings, defending its right to freedom and imortality. In addition, the voice of the writers is gaining 
strength in times of chmgQ...\JIiwpaTypHa. YKpaXiia, 9.3.1989, c. 3).
** Oles Honchar referred to this shift in official policy in his speech to the Writers’ Union on the eve of the 
elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, arguing that the CPSU put high hope in the 
writers. This hope was reflected in talks Gorbachev held at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee 
with representatives of national literatures. (Ibid.)
Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Refomrs 1985-1990 (Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1990), pp. 72-73.
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B o f h  ro2Ke xpeSoBaAH AcepTB, a mli nepecraAH CAenaTb mm AcepTBbi, 
XOTÎI MX yuaxcaA M  h  b h x  B epu iiH .
"A:'
a
lurii Shcherbak, who as will be seen below, played a key role in the emergence of Zelenyi
Svit, when talking about the role of the writers made a reference to the Russian revolution, arguing
that all writers in one way or the other took part in the revolutionary process, Gorbachev’s
policies of glasnost and démocratisation also constituted a revolution and it was therefore only
natural that the writers would take actively part in this process^®.
The first unofficial Ukrainian reactions to the Chernobyl accident and its implications on
nuclear power in general were therefore not surprisingly voiced by Ukrainian writers. Already in
May 1986, at an International Writers’ Conference in Leningrad, Oles Honchar - prominent
Ukrainian writer and also Chairman of the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet Peace Committee
{Komitet Zashchity Mira) - in a speech addressed the accident at Chernobyl, arguing that the
21Soviet government was responsible for the accident . The same month, Honchar also expressed 
criticism with regard to the Chernobyl accident on Ukrainian radio. As a result, the journalist who 
interviewed him lost his job. Only after Honchar had complained about this directly to the CPU 
First Secretary, Shcherbitskii, arguing that since he was the one who voiced the criticism, any
pretensions should be directed towards his person and not towards the journalist, was the journalist
22reinstated .
Shortly afterwards, at the June 1986 Congress of Soviet Writers, which took place in 
Moscow, the Ukrainian delegates denounced the nuclear power industry for its indifference to 
public opinion and blamed the same central authorities for russification and the construction of a 
large number of nuclear reactors in Ukraine . In conjunction with the Congress, 20 of the most 
prominent Soviet writers, amongst them Oles Honchar, were invited to a meeting with Gorbachev 
in the Kremlin. Honchar asked Gorbachev why he was hiding the truth about the accident at 
Chernobyl and made the following demand: ‘we have a right to correct information’. Gorbachev 
then replied - reiterating Boris Shcherbina - that nuclear power was a relatively new science and 
that ‘science demands sacrifices’. Honchar then allegedly replied as follows: 1!
;;
1Interview with lurii Shcherbak, 23.12.1988 ('ÜTKpOBeitHbiH |>a3roBop). transcribed by Radio Liberty 
Monitoring in USSR Today. Soviet Media Actualities on 23.12.1988, no. F, 585, p. 10._ . . . .
Interview with Borys Zrezatsev of the Ukraninian Peace Committee, Kiev, on 12.5.1994.
Ibid.
Ukrainian Reporter, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.
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official Ukrainske Tovarystvo Okhorony Prirody (UTOPf^ Concern for the environment amongst 
.Ukrainian writers was in no way a new phenomenon. As early as 1961, Literatiirna Ukraina - the 
newspaper of the Writers’ Union - started printing materials on Nature and the Environment. 
These materials were usually printed under the heading ‘Dazhbog v opasnosti’ or simply 
‘Dazhbog’. Similar materials did not start appearing in Literatuimaia gazeta (Moscow) until 1969, 
so in a sense, Ukrainian writers were well ahead of their Soviet colleagues in this field.
However, Plachynda claimed that it was more difficult for Ukrainian writers to have materials 
published on the environment than was the case for Russian writers as censorship was much 
stricter in Ukraine than in Russia. Glavlit checked all materials for nationalism, whereas the CPU 
checked them for anti-sovietism. Occasionally, however, due to the limitations of people working 
on censorship, critical materials would occur and then there would be a scandal. In 1969 
Plachynda wrote ‘Hrivuchi’ - an ecological novel on the river Dnepr and related environmental 
problems. This book did not make it through the censorship and was not published until 23 years 
later, when a controversial hydro-electrical power station had already been built.
In October 1987 Oles Honchar again attacked the use of nuclear power in Ukraine at an all-
The point Honchar was trying to put across to Gorbachev was that a science that demanded 
sacrifices of the level of the Chernobyl accident, simply was not needed^''.
Serhii Plachynda - another prominent Ukrainian writer and the first Chairman of Zelenyi Svit 
- claimed that shortly after the Chernobyl accident, members of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union 
started discussing the possibility of setting up an alternative (independent) organisation to the
union creative conference in Leningrad. He criticised the building o f new nuclear reactors and
stations, asking rhetorically ‘ Who will say that each of these atomic power stations, built or 
planned, does not conceal another potential Chernobyl?’ The speech was rounded off by a call for 
a Chernobyl Forum to be held so as to discuss the implications of the Chernobyl accident^^.
Starting from 1987 a number of critical articles regarding the controversial Danube-Dnepr 
Canal, the ecological state of the Dnepr river and the accident at Chernobyl - to mention but a few 
- started appearing in the Ukrainian press. Literaturna Ukraina was in the forefront of this 
ecological crusade. In the autumn of 1987 the Chernobyl theme also entered Ukrainian literature 
in a number of different genres and, as pointed out by Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, in a
Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994. As Honchar himself was ill at that time and thus not
available for comment, it was not possible to have this information confirmed from him directly. 
However, all members of Zelenyi Svit to whom I spoke - regardless of their political views - had only 
good things to say about Honchar and stressed the important role he personally played in facilitating the 
emergence and registration of Zelenyi Svit in December 1987. Kuiykin also pointed out that Honchar 
always had a ‘democratic attitude’ and that he had earlier published several books which official 
authorities did not like. ‘He used’, said Kuiykin, ‘his influence to help us’.
Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Ukrainian Writers’ Union, Kiev, 23.5.1994.
Ukrainian Reporter, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.
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manner almost typical of the development of genres in old Ukrainian literature: first folklore and 
chronicles, then poems and epic poems, followed by novels^^. lurii Shcherbak's story Chernobyl - 
a documentary novel - is best known amongst the chronicles. Poems were written by Dmytro 
Pavlychko (‘The Cranes flew to Chernobyl), Borys Oliinyk (The Road to Chernobyl) Ivan Drach 
(Chernobyl Madonna) and Viktor Kordun (A letter from Home and The Zone) to mention but a 
few.
Common to all these works is that they address not only technical aspects of the accident, but 
more so the moral ones. Kordun, for instance, puts the following question: ‘have we not betrayed 
our own soil?’ and goes on to ask for the land’s forgiveness. Another writer, Mykhailenko, has 
argued similarly, pointing out that ‘Our guilt before the ruined earth is unforgivable, and 
inexcusable...’ Other works link the accident to the history of Ukraine and/or to the fate of 
Ukraine as a nation. Aleksandr Tkachenko, for instance, sees the accident as yet another disaster 
imposed upon Ukraine from the outside - just like the suffering caused by the Tartar hordes, Stalin 
and the Nazis. This leads Onyshkevych to conclude as follows:
It is as if Ukrainians see themselves as a nation guilty of the specific sin 
of trusting others and allowing the nuclear station to be built, of having 
people risk the experiment at the plant and perform similar misdeeds - as 
well as a multitude of other real and alleged sins. It is as if Ukrainians 
see themselves as historically guilty. Also morally guilty - at the 
threshold of the twenty-first century and at the threshold of a new 
civilisation, for allowing this to happen in Ukraine - and thus reaching 
the bottom of an existential and moral pit’^ .^
•I;Generalised references to the ‘decent, ethical, and moral values’ o f the past are made to hint 
at a way out of this pit, accompanying, as will be seen both below and in other chapters, calls for 
an ecological, cultural and national revival as a means by which to secure the survival of Ukraine 
and everything living on its land.
Another group of people who got ‘involved’ with the Chernobyl accident at an early stage 
were the cinematographers. The Ukrainian film director Volodymyr Shevchenko, who went to 
Chernobyl to film, was amongst the first casualties together with six fire-fighters^^. Other 
cinematographers were also either concerned or directly involved with the Chernobyl accident and 
it was therefore only natural that the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers joined forces with the 
writers. lurii Tkachenko of the Union was amongst the founders o f Zelenyi Svit, and another
See Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, ‘Echoes of Glasnost: Chornobyl in Soviet Ukrainian Literature’. 
in Romana Bahry (ed.). Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine (Ontario, CA: Captus University
Publishers, 1989), p. 152.
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 158. Borys Oliinyk, for instance, mentioned Shevchenko in his poem ‘Sim’ (Seven).
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economist and a political prisoner for 24 years. The two of them decided to set up a public
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cinematographer, H. Shkliarevskii, shot ‘Mi-kro-fon’ in early 1989 - one of the first accounts of
.the real impact of the Chernobyl accident in the Narodichi region not far away from Chernobyl
itself. Rumours about child illnesses and deformed animals being born occurred in late 1988.
.Shkliarevskii showed his documentary to Zelenyi Svit members from the Institute of Nuclear 
Research in 1989 and as a result, they went to Narodichi, which had not been evacuated, with their 
own dosimeters, recording levels of radiation much higher than those considered safe for 
habitation^°.
The writers and cinematographers thus at an early stage chronicled and asked critical
■ "questions about the Chernobyl accident, making people aware of the seriousness of the accident
'and its environmental, health and also political implications. They thus came to play a two-tiered 
role in Ukrainian debate at the time - on the one hand being the vanguards of glasnost in Ukraine, 
while at the same time increasingly frequently voicing criticism of the very political regime which 
had bestowed upon them this vanguard role.
The Role of the Scientists
It was around this time - in October 1987 - that Serhii Plachynda was approached by Sviatoslav 
Dudko - a professional ecologist working at the Ukrainian Branch o f the Academy of Sciences^'. 
Dudko had access to information labelled ‘secret’ or ‘for official purposes only’ (dlia sluzhebnogo 
polzovania) concerning the state of the environment in Ukraine in a professional capacity. Such 
information also arrived in connection with the Chernobyl accident and Dudko soon came to 
realise that the scope of the accident was much bigger than admitted by the Communist Paity. The 
problem was, however, that the information he had was classified, and therefore could not be 
passed on to others.
In May 1986 Dudko discussed this dilemma with a close friend, Vladimir Sakhaev, an
ecological group - a club - to address these issues, but did not know exactly how to go about it. 
Therefore Dudko decided to contact writers and scientists whom he knew personally, to establish a 
core group. In that connection he was asked a number of questions, such as what kind of group he 
wanted to set up and where it would be registered. When people were told that he wanted to set up 
a group independently of official authorities, many declined to join. Plachynda and some others, Ahowever, agreed.
 -----------------------------------------Demydenko (1990), pp. 1-2.
"  Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994. This was confirmed by Plachynda in interview on 23 
May the same year.
1
The Role of Moscow
The first organisation to be contacted about the new initiative was UTOP. The response was not 
very positive. Dudko was told that since an organisation to protect the environment already did 
exist {UTOP), there was no need to set up another one. Dina Protsenko, the Chairman of 
Derzhkompriroda, the Ukrainian State Committee on the Environment, was also very much 
against the idea, arguing that there was no need for such an organisation.
Somewhat later, the initiative group heard that Sergei Zalygin - Russian writer and editor-in- 
chief of the Soviet literary journal Novyi Mir - had set up a Green group; Zelenyi Mir, in Moscow. 
Zelenyi Mir was registered as an all-union environmental association under the auspices of the 
Soviet Peace Committee. Therefore, Dudko’s initiative group headed by himself, Plachynda and 
Academician Hi'odzinskyi, made contact with the Ukrainian Peace Committee and were 
introduced to its Chairman, Oles Honchar, and to Deputy Chairman Borys Zrezartsev.
During the summer of 1987, Nikolai Reimers of the Soviet Peace Committee (Moscow) 
visited Kiev and Dudko met with Reimers to discuss the initiative group he had set up. Reimers 
expressed himself in positive terms about the new initiative and suggested that it should be 
subordinated to Moscow - i.e. the group would operate as a relatively autonomous unit but 
formally be a part of the all-union Zelenyi Mir. Dudko replied that at that time he was not in a 
position to discuss organisational issues, as first the organisation would have to be set up and only 
then would it be possible to decide what should be its relationship to other organisations.
The Role of Young Members of the Intelligentsia
Somewhat later, in the autumn of 1987^^, the Green initiative group, which by then counted some 
20-25 members, was contacted by a smaller group made up of young people (students, members of 
the Kiev State University druzhina, and a journalist). The group, which had been initiated by 
Serhii Kurykin (a history teacher) and Andrii Hlazovyi (a journalist on Uchitelskaia Gazeta), got 
the idea to set up an initiative group to Zelenyi Mir in Kiev after having seen an interview with 
Sergei Zalygin on Ukrainian TV on 5 June 1987. Hlazovyi and Kurykin, who had earlier studied 
together at the Pedagogical Institute, had already been thinking of setting up a Green group for 
some time, considering themselves to be Green by conviction and adhering to the ideas of the new 
left in Western Europe. They had heard about die Grtinen in Germany but did not know how to go 
about things in Ukraine - until Zalygin appeared on TV. They wrote a letter to Zalygin and also 
contacted Zrezartsev of the Ukrainian Peace Committee, introducing themselves as representatives 
of the Kiev initiative group to Zelenyi Mir and with a request that they be given access to any
32 Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, 28.4.1994.
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information the Peace Committee may receive from Moscow. Zrezartsev promised this, but the 
summer went by with no such information being passed on and also with no reply from Zalygin.
In September 1987^^ the Hlazovyi/Kurykin group held a meeting in Kiev. Altogether six 
people were present at this meeting. Towards the end of the same month, Oleh Listopad - a 
member of the Kiev University druzhina and a journalist - was contacted. Initially he was 
sceptical of the initiative, but eventually joined. It was decided that the group go to Moscow to 
see representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee in the hope that they might be more helpful. 
The group was received by Nikolai Reimers. He made it clear that anyone could set up Green 
groups, but only under the auspices of Moscow. Moreover, he told them that an initiative group 
already existed in Kiev, under the leadership of Sviatoslav Dudko. He provided them with 
Dudko’s telephone number and in October the Hlazovyi/Kurykin group made contact with the 
‘Dudko/Plachynda’ group.
3.1.2 Joining Forces: Role of the Ukrainian Peace Committee
In November 1987 an informal meeting was held in the premises of the Peace Committee. The 
meeting was attended by both initiative groups, and altogether some 26-27 people were present, 
amongst them writers Boris Oliinyk (CPU) and Ivan Drach - who later became First Vice 
President of RUKH. Other well-known people like Academicians Hrodzinskyi and Polishuk and 
the film director Tkachenko, who made unofficial films about Chernobyl after the accident, were 
also part of Dudko’s group. Thus, whereas the group around Kurykin and Hlazovyi was young 
and enthusiastic, those around Dudko had the expertise (scientists) and the name/credibility 
(writers) needed to set up and make the new movement politically acceptable. It also proved an 
advantage that Hlazovyi was a journalist in the sense that he had access to the press and was thus 
able to spread information about Zelenyi Svit and about the issues with which the association was 
concerned.
Looking back, Dudko now thinks that Sergei Zalygin’s group was initiated by Soviet 
authorities to control the Greens following the accident at Chernobyl. This view is shared also by 
Ihor Dzeverin, a Zelenyi Svit activist, who holds the view that it was official policy sanctioned 
from above to gain control of the Green Movement to prevent it from becoming too radical. Prior 
to the Chernobyl accident and to the broadening of glasnost which it facilitated, the environment 
was not such a politicised issue. Some environmental groups existed in various parts of the Soviet 
Union, but these were not republican movements (i.e. with membership structures in all oblasts of 
the respective republics), nor were they mass movements (in most cases they had only a handful of
33 Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.
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IIImembers) and finally, they were preoccupied primarily with nature conservation, the preservation 
of cultural monuments and buildings, and old trees (see Chapter One). Loose groupings of 
scientists and writers, as seen in chapter one, were campaigning at all-Union level against 
pollution of Baikal, against plans to redirect the flow of the Siberian rivers from the North to the 
South and against melioration - but these groupings focused on particular issues without 
questioning the leading role of the CPSU as such.
This situation changed after the Chernobyl accident. As seen above, Ukrainian writers started
to question not only the way in which ‘Moscow’ handled the accident, but also the very policy of
building nuclear power stations on Ukrainian territory in the first place. It is not unlikely,
therefore, that Moscow was interested in trying to control the Green Movement in Ukraine to
avoid a radicalisation similar to that of the Estonian Greens and, ultimately, the questioning of
Moscow’s authority to make decisions regarding the economic development of the countiy on the
territoiy of the entire Soviet Union. Zalygin was well known not only as a writer, but also as a
campaigner on the environment. Thus, he had the potential to gather people around his movement.
In the Soviet Union, the leaders of official groups and movements were nonnally just public
figureheads, whose only role was to gain good publicity for and provide the movement with
credibility. The actual work was normally conducted by the deputy leader(s) and activists on the
.ground. Thus, although no one would be able to question Zalygin’s sincerity on the issue, it 
cannot be ruled out that attempts were made at controlling the emerging Green movements 
through him.
A number of famous scientists joined Zalygin’s initiative (see Chapter One). These scientists 
conducted alternative ecological expert assessments and voiced criticism of projects thought to be 
non-environmental, but they were concerned with the state of the environment in the entire Soviet 
Union, not only with the territoiy of one republic in particular. Besides, they were not likely to
i
encourage national sentiments. Consequently, one united Soviet Green movement led by Zalygin 
would be a lesser evil to official authorities than republican movements led by locals. The 
structure of Zelenyi Mir was tight and centralised - not a loose grassroots movement like the 
Socio-Ecological Union (SES) which emerged later - and thus allowed for some control of 
republican, regional and local units. Even if no attempt would be made officially to influence the 
agenda of the movement, this agenda may not have been considered so potentially explosive as
that of independent republican movements. What was more, the link between peace and ecology 
reflected in the close links between Zelenyi Mir and the Soviet Peace Committee - which, by the 
way, had branches in all republics and most oblasts, thus providing a parallel structure with the 
potential to influence local chapters of Zelenyi Mir - matched Gorbachev’s words to the effect that
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peace and ecology were inextricably linked (see previous chapter). Finally, the fact that the 
emergence o f Zalygin’s group was so well publicised also appears to strengthen this view.
Borys Zrezartsev of the Ukrainian Peace Committee, who in 1987 was the deputy leader of 
the Committee, however, refutes such allegations. The Peace Committee neither received any 
orders from Moscow to set up a Green movement, nor did it initiate Zelenyi Svit itself. Rather it 
was the other way round; people would contact Honchar and himself and tell them that Chernobyl 
and the environment were closely linked issues. It was actually a deputy leader of Zelenyi Svit, the 
film director lurii Tkachenko, who linked the issues of peace and ecology, arguing that ‘to protect 
the em/ironment is to protect peace’^ ''. And when asked whether or not it was chance that made 
the Peace Committee the founder of Zelenyi Svit, Academician Hrodzinskyi replied that to him it 
was perfectly natural that the Committee supported Zelenyi Svit, then peace can only be achieved 
when one protects also the environment^^.
Ecology and environmental protection were hardly paid any attention at all by representatives 
of the Peace Committee prior to the Chernobyl accident, and as seen above, Honchar in various 
speeches focused solely on the Chernobyl accident and did not make more general references to 
the state of the environment in Ukraine prior to the emergence of Zelenyi Svit, Had the Peace 
Committee been acting on orders from Moscow, such references would no doubt have been made. 
It is interesting to note in this connection that Kurykin and his group in the spring of 1987 
contacted the Peace Committee with a request that they be given a chance to participate in the all- 
union Green action ‘Zelena volna’ (Green Wave) but received no support whatsoever.
Although the Peace Committee was an official organisation with limited scope for 
independent action, Dudko claims that as a result of Honchar’s leadership it gained relative 
autonomy - i.e. it could allow itself more than had it been chaired by somebody else.. Zrezartsev 
made similar claims, arguing that the Ukrainian Committee was relatively autonomous due to 
Honchar’s skill and to the fact that he did not fear the authorities. With regard to relations with 
Moscow, the Ukrainian Committee only had to make accounts to Moscow from 1957 to 1959. 
However all money collected in Ukraine had to be handed over to Moscow. Then the Ukrainian 
Committee submitted proposals requesting funding to Moscow. To give an example, in 1985 the 
Committee collected 75 million roubles. It then requested that 15 o f these be returned from 
Moscow, but was eventually only given one per cent of the money collected. Zresartsev expressed 
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, arguing that relations with Moscow were not so good 
during the leadership o f Borovik and the cosmonaut Grechko in the 1980s. Economically, Kiev 
was dependent upon Moscow, whereas in other respects it had more autonomy - although the
B & i i p m i f f  K m x b , 27.10.1989.
"  CoBercKB/i YKpaHim (n.d .)
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following comment by Academician Sitnik: ‘why is this necessary?’ Not all the members of the
Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994. Zrezartsev told me that although the Peace Committee
■   ^  ■ ..............................
'I
members of the Peace Committee monitored Gorbachev’s speeches closely and adjusted (‘we must
36study what the leader says’) its policies accordingly .
Officially Gorbachev tried, as pointed out in Chapter Two, to link the issues of nuclear
disarmament and the peaceful atom. Honchar’s comments on Chernobyl, however, not only
expressed concern about the impact of the accident, but also criticism of the way in which the
accident was handled by the CPSU as well as criticism of the Soviet nuclear power programme in
general and the possible implications it may have on Ukraine in particular. To illustrate this,
. .Zrezartsev referred to a meeting that took place of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Peace
Committee in May 1987. At this meeting Honchar argued that had Ukraine been an independent
.country it would have had no money to build nuclear power stations. ‘This money’, he said,
‘should rather have been given to our enemies. That would have been less dangerous’. The fact 
that Honchar as the leader of an official organisation could make such statements is in itself an 
indication that the Ukrainian Peace Committee was not merely implementing political directives 
from Moscow when eventually registering Zelenyi Svit under the auspices of the Peace Committee 
in December 1987.
Kurykin does not rule out the possibility of the Soviet Peace Committee having some kind of 
hidden agenda with regard to Zelenyi Mir. However, as will be seen below, the path that was 
eventually chosen regarding the registration o f Zelenyi Svit in Ukraine, did not coincide with the 
path preferred by the Peace Committee in Moscow. Initially, the Kurykin/Hlazovyi group
suggested to register Zelenyi Svit by the Ukrainian Peace Committee as a branch of Zalygin’s
■Zelenyi Mir. After some discussion, however, the following idea emerged: Zelenyi Svit ought to 
be registered as an independent, i.e. Ukrainian, ecological organisation. Reimers of the Soviet 
Peace Committee, as seen above, favoured the former. The Ukrainian Peace Committee, on the 
other hand, did not find the suggestion that Zelenyi Svit be registered as a Ukrainian organisation 
unreasonable and at a meeting of the Presidium on 28 December 1987 - attended by 
representatives of the initiative group - Honchar proposed that Zelenyi Svit be registered with the 
Committee on these terms. There were several issues to be discussed at the meeting, and the 
question as to whether or not to register Zelenyi Svit was the last on the agenda and was addressed 
only after some three hours when people were tired and just wanted to end the meeting. Honchar’s
suggestion that the Peace Committee register and cooperage with Zelenyi Svit was met with the
would adjust itself to Gorbachev’s new policies, it did not always agree with these. For instance there 
was opposition within the Committee to his plans for revolutionary change (L’Hunanite - 1987) as 
revolutionary change was incompatible with stability. The Ukrainian Peace Committee held the view 
that first the CPSU had to be reorganised and then one could start making changes.
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Presidium were present, but it was sufficient for a quorum and the proposition was endorsed. At
the time of registration, Zelenyi Svit had just 27 members^^ most of whom were Kiev intellectuals 
- writers, cinematographers, scientists, journalists and other well-educated people.
Following the decision of the Presidium a scandal broke out. In 1987 it was still difficult to 
spread information through the newspapers. Hlazovyi, however, contacted people he knew in the 
agricultural department of Robitnychna Hazeta - this department, by the way, was in charge of 
environmental issues. On 6 January 1988 a short note was published, listing names of prominent 
members of Zelenyi Svit to make it appear as a solid organisation, and information about the 
organisation as such. However, Robitnychna hazeta was the organ o f the CPU Central Committee 
and the newspaper had worked closely with Ukrainian Derzhkompriroda for the 20 years or so it 
had existed. Dina Protsenko, who was also a member of the Peace Committee’s Presidium, and as
seen above, did not favour the setting up of Zelenyi Svit, was not present at the December 28
Committee regarding the note in Robitnychna hazeta. The Ukrainian Council of Ministers,
:
meeting. According to Hlazovyi, Protsenko contacted the paper and said: ‘what kind of Zelenyi
.Svit can there be, once we have a State Committee for Environmental Protection?’ The editor of
Robitnychna hazeta, Shibok, then contacted Elchenko (second secretary of the CPU Central 
Committee) who was a friend o f Protsenko. He said that ‘we cannot have such non-governmental
organisations’. An explanation was required, and eventually Zalygin had to be contacted. Once 
he had given his comment, everyone calmed down and the issue was closed.
Zrezartsev confirmed that Protsenko objected to registering Zelenyi Svit - as did others in the 
Peace Committee. However, he cannot recall that Elchenko at any point contacted the Peace
i .
however, did, asking the Committee if it really needed this, i.e. Zelenyi Svit. The Committee then
.argued that ‘you are a state structure, this, i.e. Zelenyi Svit, is a public organisation.’ The Peace 
Committee was also requested to provide a list of Zelenyi Svit members, indicating whom of these 
were party members^^. Zrezartsev claims that the CPU was careful about Zelenyi Svit. UTOP 
initially considered Zelenyi Svit something of a threat, but in Zrezartsev’s opinion that was 
understandable, given that UTOP was part of the state structure.
To conclude then, to the extent ‘Moscow’ was trying to control Green movements in the 
USSR by trying to control already existing movements and initiating new movements through the 
Soviet Peace Committee, this strategy failed in the case of Ukraine - partly as those activists who
SeJieimM coin no. 4/1991, c. 1.
Dudko claimed that shortly after Zelenyi Svit he was called up by Zrezartsev, who wanted to see him in 
person about a matter he could not discuss over the telephone. Once Dudko arrived at the Peace 
Committee he was asked how many members of Zelenyi Svit were party members. Dudko’s reply was 
that he did not know as they did not make biographies on each individual member. However as 
addresses and telephones were provided, he argued that the ‘organs’ could find out that themselves, as 
that was what they were paid to do.
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initiated Zelenyi Svit were firmly committed to creating an independent Ukrainian Green 
Movement, and partly due to the Ukrainian Peace Committee’s respect of and support for this 
commitment - not only through the registration of Zelenyi Svit as a Ukrainian association in 
December 1987, but also through a policy of non-interference in setting the agenda for the 
association, while yet providing financial and technical support for its work.
3.2 Building and Developing an all-Ukrainian Green Movement
3.2.1 Developing a Strategy and Setting an Agenda
At the time of registration, a list o f 24 Zelenyi Svit members had been compiled^^. None o f these 
were women"''' and they all had higher education: four were writers (Plachynda, Shcherbak, Ivan 
Drach who later became deputy leader o f RUKH and one Kniazhuk). Another two were 
journalists, one was a teacher, another one a film director, one was in charge of a department of 
the Ternopil Pedagogical Institute and the rest were experts and academicians (altogether 10, of 
whom seven were members o f the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences). Age-wise most of the 
members were in their forties or fifties - only one of the members of the initiative group was a 
student, Oleh Listopad. To give the association an image towards the general public, Archbishop 
Makaryi of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomka was included on the list, as was the Ukrainian 
Cosmonaut Oleksandr Viktorenko.
Throughout 1988, Zelenyi Svit met regularly at the Peace Committee - at the busiest, meetings 
were held every Thursday at 5 p.m. There was much disagreement regarding what kind of 
organisation Zelenyi Svit should be etc. and meetings often lasted until eleven or twelve o’clock. 
More and more people joined in - some were invited by members to join, others heard about 
Zelenyi Svit and joined at their own initiative - and it was soon decided that one should go out in 
the streets and gather people.
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CnicoK AJieniP itiiuiaTiBiioH rpvnnu VKimincfaKOl acouiauil ”3eJieiiMH CbI t. This list, containing 
the names and work titles of all the inititiative members was given to me by Dudko in Kiev, 1994.
The name of one woman, Vika Pinnik, was included on the list, but crossed out with blue ink. She was 
linked to the CPU Central Committee.
■
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Narrow Expert Group or Broad Grassroots Movement?
Once Zelenyi Svit’s relationship to Moscow had been settled, the question as to what kind of 
association it should be soon surfaced. The two initiative groups consisted, as seen above, of on 
the one hand well-known experts and writers (Dudko/Sakhaev group) and on the other hand young 
members of the intelligentsia (Hlazovyi/Kurykin group). These groupings had different ideas 
about what organisational structure to choose for Zelenyi Svit.
Dudko envisaged Zelenyi Svit as a club consisting of experts, writers (with a name and 
reputation), journalists and ordinary people. Experts were needed to produce alternative 
infor nation and thus oppose public decisions on environmental issues on technical grounds. The 
writers were needed to give Zelenyi Svit a name, the journalists to spread information about the 
association and those issues with which it was concerned, and finally there was a need for ordinary 
people to mobilise the population"". Hlazovyi, on the other hand, favoured a grassroots movement 
open to everyone - including non-experts, and opposed Dudko’s vision of Zelenyi Svit - in his 
words Dudko wanted to turn the association into a discussion club for experts - on the grounds that 
it was be in g ‘elitisf. Dudko summarised this conflict in the following way: T was asked: do you 
want to create a branch of the Academy of Sciences? This is a public organisation. The leaders 
and members should be ordinary people’.
The disagreement between the two groupings was also reflected in different preferences with 
regard to who should be the leader of the association. In early January 1988 the first leader of 
Zelenyi Svit was to be elected and there were two candidates - Plachynda and Shcherbak. 
Plachynda was backed by Dudko and Sakhaev, whereas Shcherbak was favoured by Hlazovyi and 
Kurykin. Shcherbak, according to Kurykin, supported the view that Zelenyi Svit ought to be a 
political grassroots organisation, linking up a number of groups locally. Shcherbak, however, 
declined the offer to run for Chairman and Plachynda was eventually elected"'^.
Hlazovyi and Kurykin were opposed to Plachynda’s leadership not simply because he was 
Dudko’s candidate, but rather as in their eyes, he was an ‘eco-nationalist’ and not ‘Green’. 
Plachynda remained a controversial figure with certain groupings within Zelenyi Svit throughout 
his leadership, which lasted until January 1989, when lurii Shcherbak took over, although he did 
much to promote the association through a series o f articles addressing environmental issues in the 
Ukrainian press"'^.
Towards the end of 1988 a conflict broke out due to an article Plachynda published in 
Vechirnyi Kyiv about the writer Bulgakov. In the article he claimed to have interviewed people
Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994. 
Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994.
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who could confirm (as witnesses) that the famous writer had taken part in a an incident in 1915, in 
which Menshevik students were being shot at. As a result of these ‘revelations’ vandals attacked 
the Bulgakov museum on Andryivskyi Spusk and removed a memorial plaque from the building. 
A sculpture was also destroyed. Hlazovyi and Kurykin reacted very strongly to this article. In 
their view, Plachynda was discrediting Zelenyi Svit by publicising it, even if it was written by him 
in his capacity as a writer and not as the leader of Zelenyi Svit. Plachynda took this criticism to his 
heart and resigned as the leader of Zelenyi Svit shortly after. On 7 January 1989, at the first annual 
meeting of the organisation, lurii Shcherbak was elected the new leader. A Co-ordinating 
Committee, consisting of some 14 to 15 members was also set up, a bank account was opened and 
the group started to work more systematically.
Although Plachynda was the official leader figure in Zelenyi Svit during 1988, Dudko, who 
was elected executive secretary, was in actual fact running the organisation. Dudko claimed that a 
major reason for this was that people were generally scared of sticking out, as at the time it was 
not completely without risks to work on the environment - in other words, many adopted a ‘wait- 
and-see’ attitude. Anatolyi Panov, another Zelenyi Svit member who has been active in the 
association since the very beginning, has confirmed this: ‘it is right that many were scared in the 
beginning. Perestroika was taking place in Moscow, not in Kiev, and it was difficult for us to 
predict the consequences of our actions’"'"'. I will return to this question below.
The Building of an all-Ukrainian Association
During 1988, the primary task of Zelenyi Svit was to set up local chapters of Zelenyi Svit. As 
Zelenyi Svit had been registered as a national Ukrainian organisation, it had to be represented 
locally. In this connection Dudko spent much time travelling around the country either initiating 
or asking existing groups to join. Some Green groups existed prior to the emergence o f Zelenyi 
Svit'. in Ternopil, for instance, the first ecological groups emerged already in 1980. The very first 
one evolved from the Esperanto club"'^ o f the enterprise ‘Vatra’ - this group was later called 
‘Espeko’ (Esperanto Ecology) - under the leadership of Ihor Pushkar. Esperanto clubs were 
amongst the first informal groups to appear in Ukraine and its members were being harassed by 
the KGB and in other ways intimidated. Inspired by the Law on Small Rivers, the ecological 
group of the ‘Vatra’ enterprise was primarily concerned with the protection o f small rivers and in 
1982 organised a 160 km long expedition along the river Stripa - an expedition that was attended
Intem ew  with Anatoiyi Panov, Kiev, 16.5.1994.
The first esperanto club in Ternopil was established in 1978 (Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, 
Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994,
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also by Esperanto members from ‘Aniketso’ - another Ternopil Esperanto group - biologists from 
the Ternopil Pedagogical Institute, the Khmelnitsky! Institute of Domestic Economy and 
esperantists from Khmelnitskyi. Such expeditions became an annual event, and later a similar 
expedition was conducted on the Dniestr river"' .^ These groups later joined up in ‘Noosfera’ and 
joined Zelenyi Svit as a collective member.
Local groups also emerged at an early stage in East Ukraine. In Dnipropetrovsk, for instance, 
Viktor Kliazan organised an ecological seminar by the Komsomol as early as 1975 in response to 
the high incidence of child disease in the area. Seminars on resource use were organised and 
received official approval initially, but later met with official resistance due to the materials and 
topics used/discussed and were therefore closed.
In 1983 Khazan in his capacity as a physicist got to hear about physical problems related to 
nuclear reactors. Three years later, in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident on 28 
April, he was visited by a physicist from Kiev. Together they measured radioactivity in 
Dnipropetrovsk. They were told not to tell anybody about the readings, but information about 
radiation levels and prophylactic measures were somehow passed on to others and more than one 
thousand people allegedly followed their recommendations. No First of May Day Parade was held 
in Dnipropetrovsk due to high levels of radiation. At this point it became clear to Khazan and 
others that an alternative to UTOP was needed. UTOP was primarily an organisation for children, 
planting trees and running courses at schools, but without a strategy on the use o f resources. 
Kliazan read about Zelenyi Svit in the newspapers, established contacts with Zelenyi Svit in Kiev 
and joined the First Congress in 1989. In neighbouring Donetsk oblast, a group was set up in 
Horlivka in October 1988 (not registered until September 1989) in response to environmental 
problems in the area. This group received an invitation from Kiev to attend the Congress in 1989.
A Green group emerged early also in Luhansk - one of the dirtiest oblasts in Europe. This 
group was initiated by Kostiantyn Zarubitskyi in 1987. Zarubitskyi was writing his post-graduate 
thesis on technology and morals on the background of socio-economic relations and through his 
work became aware of the need to protect the environment. He contacted friends and 
acquaintances and set up an initiative group. The Luhansk Greens emerged within the Komsomol 
structure (Zarubitskyi was a member of the Komsomol and eventually also joined the CPU). Still, 
however, it took seven months to get the statute registered. The group held its first meeting in 
November 1988 and was registered as the municipal ecological club ‘Luhan’. Its first meeting was 
announced in the press/radio and was attended by some 50 people. Amongst these were the 
deputy leaders of Luhansk CPU, Derzhkompriroda and other official figures. According to
Poci'HCJiaB TnepAOcryn, - Posbhtok etcPAorisnoro d v x v  iia 3axijm iH  VKnaïiii. given to me by the 
author. Additional information given in Sosnoviy Bir, 20.5.1994.
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linterview with Adrei Orlov (Simferopol), Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994. 
For question text, see Questionnaire.
Zarubitskyi these joined the movement to ‘watch it’. Some people accused Zarubitskyi of simply 
being a puppet to official authorities, but even so he was put under quite a lot of pressure by the 
secretary of the municipal Komsomol and the secretary of the municipal party committee. They 
told him that he answered for whatever the group did with his party ticket. He also had to justify 
the group’s actions to these groups. The Luhansk Greens planted trees and measured nitrites and 
nitrates in food. All food products were to be issued with proper certification, but this was hardly 
ever done. Contacts with Zelenyi Svit in Kiev were established through Hlazovyi, whom 
Zarubitskyi contacted via friends in the capital. Zarubitskyi’s group took part in preparing the 
Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit in October 1989.
In Vinnytsia groups were formed as early as between 1980 and 1985. Members o f these 
groups heard about Zelenyi Svit through the media and sent a delegation to the first congress in
October 1989. Local groups later joined together in an oblast organisation on 1 December 1989.
‘Dzarylgach’ - a Green group in the town of Skarovsk (Klierson oblast) was founded on 12
December 1988. This group had heard about Zelenyi Svit and sought contact with Kiev through
Derzhkompriroda, before Zelenyi Svit was officially registered with the Peace Council. Bukovina
Zelenyi Svit also emerged prior to the official registration of Zelenyi Svit (November 1988) in
response to the incident of thallium poisoning in Chernivtsi in which 120 children suddenly went
bald. In Mukachevo (Zakarpatia oblast) a local group emerged in opposition to the Pristrialivsk
radar station. The group was not initiated by Zelenyi Svit, but later joined up with it at its own
initiative. Strong groups emerged in Nikolaev oblast (Zelenyi Mir) and at the Crimea (Ekologiia i
Mir) in opposition to the luzhnoukrainsk and the Crimean nuclear power stations respectively.
The Crimean group was founded by Sergei Shuvainikov, who is currently the leader of the Russian
Party of Crimea, and he later made contacts with Kiev and joined Zelenyi Svit. Ekologiia i Mir
maintained contacts with Zalygin in Moscow in the form of information exchange"'^. Also in
Cherkassy and Dniprodzhershinsk did Green groups come into existence prior to the emergence of
Zelenyi Svit. In Lutsk, on the other hand, the group was initiated by Zelenyi Svit centrally, which
also provided practical assistance in setting the group up"' .^
Other groups were either founded by people who read about Zelenyi Svit in the newspapers
or were set up with the help of the Peace Council. According to Zrezartsev, the Peace Council had 
.an established structure in all the 25 Ukrainian oblasts. The oblast groups were by Kiev ordered to 
mobilise people and establish a Green structure. In this way, groups were founded in Poltava, 
Cherkassy, Odessa, Rivne and Zakarpatia. By the time of the First Congress in October 1989,
____________________________
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Zelenyi Svit united some 300 local groups with a total membership of some 500,000 people. Later 
another 100 or so groups also joined the Zelenyi Svit structure .
Some groups emerged spontaneously in response to local environmental problems and the 
general broadening of glasnost and démocratisation after the emergence of Zelenyi Svit, and later 
joined forces with Kiev. Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit in Zakarpatia oblast, for instance, was set up in 
the summer of 1989 as the ecological section of the Mitrak Society by locals concerned primarily 
with the Pristrialevsk radar station and a military airport in the close vicinity of Mukachevo, but 
also with an asphait-bitumen factory, the need for a Green zone in the town and people’s health in
Mukachevo. The first ecological meeting in Zakarpatia was organised by these people on 16
.September and at this meeting all the issues mentioned above, were discussed. Prior to the 
Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit members of the Mukachevo Green Movement contacted Kiev 
and as a result, it was represented at the Congress^".
Not all ecological groups chose to join ranks of Zelenyi Svit: Tovarystvo Lev from Lviv, for 
instance, joined just for a short while, whereas Kliarkiv activists (most of them were professional 
ecologists, economists, psychologists, medical doctors etc.) of the Ecoforum Association 
(established in 1987^'), while maintaining contacts with Zelenyi Svit chapters in Kiev and 
elsewhere, chose to cooperate with official authorities to solve local ecological problems. As a 
result of such co-operation, a number of laws to protect the environment were adopted.
To get an idea as to how aware those who joined the Green groups locally were about the 
environmental issue prior to the Chernobyl accident and (in most cases) the emergence of their 
groups, I asked the respondents of my survey this question. All answered in the affirmative. 
Bagin, of Horlivka Zelenyi Svit (Donetsk oblast) qualified his answer by referring to one of the 
dominant devices of the CPSU:
He.noi3eK - uaps npHpoAU. floKopuM npnpoAy n nocraiiMM ee na 
cjiyxcGy seAonesecrBy.
This, he argued, was a very dangerous aim, then it is simply not possible to subjugate nature. The 
result of such a policy could only be its destruction. In Horlivka the problem was aggravated by 
high levels of child disease caused by pollution. In Mariupol, Evhen Bal became concerned with 
the environment as he saw the water quality of the Azov Sea deteriorate. Concern through 
observation was also given as a reason for environmental concern prior to Chernobyl by the
■I
Conversations with Hlazovyi and Panov, Kiev, summer 1994.
Information taken from Evheniia Derkach’s election platform. Parliamentary Elections, March 1994. 
Vladimir Butenko, ‘Green Perestroika in Kharkov’. Environmental Policy Review, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 
1992, pp. 28-29.
I
Ternopil and Mukaclievo Greens as well as the Lutsk Greens. The head of the Lutsk chapter of 
Zelenyi Svit, by the way, is a writer, and he wrote essays about environmental issues as well as
a
voicing his concern about the Rivne nuclear power station, built on karst ground, prior to 
Chernobyl. Others developed an interest in environmental issues through DOP (Kherson
53Ecocentre) and through the youth section of UTOP (Vinnytsia) and classes at school as well as 
through personal contacts with ecologists at Kiev University. Those respondents who took either 
only minor or no interest in environmental issues prior to Chernobyl all mentioned the lack of 
information as the major reason (Mukachevo, Dnipropetrovsk, Nikolaev, Odessa)^"^.
To conclude, then, the answers I obtained seem to support the view that Green groups 
emerged not only as a result of démocratisation, but also very much so as a result of glasnost, 
which facilitated the spread of information about the state of the environment and the impact of
■■pollution on the environment and on people’s health.
Gathering information and making the Association known to the General Public
In order to establish local chapters in all the twenty five Ukrainian oblasts, it was of vital 
importance that information about Zelenyi Svit was being properly distributed. In 1987 it was still 
not easy to have information about informal groups spread through the press, but Zelenyi Svit 
benefited greatly from personal contacts and also from its close relationship to the Peace 
Committee. Not only did the latter provide it with premises and office support. It also made
funding available (100,000 roubles) and put its activists in contact with Greens abroad.
Furthermore, Zelenyi Svit benefited from Honchar’s and Zrezartsev’s access to the media as 
representatives of the Peace Committee. The press and Ukrainian TV covered the meetings of the 
Committee. Besides, the president of Gosteleradio happened to be a member o f the Peace 
Committee’s Presidium. He was on good terms with Zrezartsev and this link proved useful to the 
Greens. Zrezartsev also had experience as a journalist and maintained links with the press. From 
time to time he would include information about Zelenyi Svit in his reports on the Peace 
Committee. Such reports were submitted quarterly to RATAU  (currently Ukrinform) and all 
newspapers, including the regional ones, were obliged to publish them. Finally, every Sunday 
morning Zrezartsev did a three minute chronicle on radio, following the news. He often took the 
opportunity to say a few words about the Greens while on the air.
,!
i
^ ^ IftauL K i osepa”, "Cniti o u i  B o j ih h I ”.
T h e s e  c o u r s e s  w e r e  e n t it le d  ‘BocnnTaiiHe JienHHCKoro OTiiomeiiHJi k  n p n p o a e ’.
See Questionnaire.
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Another important factor was that it was impossible to ignore people like Plachynda, 
Hrodzinskyi and Shcherbak. From late 1987 onwards, Plachynda, Shcherbak and other writers 
wrote articles, poetry, short stories and novels with a reference to the Ukrainian environment. lurii 
Tkachenko of the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers has stressed the role of the writers as 
follows:
M n j io cep /m e  k  npnpojie  - ^'\'Q iie pocK om b. a raaD iioe y c io n n e  
caM ooxpane iinn. 3 r y  n c r n i iy  a a o x n y .ia  b iia c  KueBCKaa opra iiH sanm i 
C o io sa  riMcaTeaeM YCCP. no ii icphimefi icorop oro  b dyKBa.abiioM 
CiVibic.rie CTOBa iiauu ia  npn ioT acconnauH B  ”3e.nenHH C B i ' f? ^
The role of the writers was also acknowledged by the respondents. A majority agreed that the 
writers were instrumental in facilitating the Ukrainian Green Movement:
Table 3.1 Agreement/Disagreement that Writers played a Role in Facilitating the Ukrainian Green 
Movement
Group Agree Do not
agree
Ternopil oblast ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Mariupol ZS X
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dzharylgach (Kherson) X
Ecocentre (Kherson) X
Odessa Greens X
As seen from the table above, the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Greens do not agree that the 
writers involvement on the environment played a role in the emergence o f the Ukrainian Green 
Movement. There may be several reasons for this - a major one could be that the Ukrainian 
writers wrote on 'Ukrainian’ issues, whereas in Eastern Ukraine - particularly in the 
Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts - there is a large ethnic Russian population. It may thus very 
well be that these writers did not appeal to the Russian speaking people o f Eastern Ukraine. 
Another - related - reason may be that those Ukrainian writers who did write on environmental 
issues did so from the point of view of 'Ridna Ukraina’ thus appealing to national sentiments
Bemprmfi Kmn, 27.10.1989 (n.p.).
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which the Russians did not share. If this was the case, though, one would expect also the South 
Ukrainian Greens - where there is a large Russian population - to voice similar views and this was 
not the case. A more plausible explanation for this geographical difference may therefore be that 
the Ukrainian writers wrote on issues not related to Eastern Ukraine^* .^ And those who did - like 
Plachynda, who focused on the fate of the Dniepr river - did so from a national point of view, thus 
alienating rather than appealing to those living in the area.
The answers I received to the question of whether or not Greens locally were familiar with 
Ukrainian/Soviet writers concerned with environmental issues prior to the emergence o f Zelenyi 
Svit seem to support this view. Bagin of Horlivka Zelenyi Svit was r familiar with any Ukrainian 
writers, although he had heard of Russian writers’ struggle against turning the flow of the Northern 
(Siberian) rivers and against the Volga-Chorgai Canal. Khazan of Dnipropetrovsk Zelenyi Svit 
listed three poets - the Russian poet Rylskii and the Ukrainian poets Drach and Vinhrakovskii, but 
not writers like Plachynda and Shcherbak. An interesting picture emerged when the respondents 
were asked whether or not they were familiar with environmental campaigns conducted by 
Ukrainian writers^^:
Table. 3.2 Familiarity with Environmental Actions conducted by Ukrainian Writers.
Group Familiar with Not familiar with
Ternopil oblast ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS
Lutsk ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dzharylgach (Klierson) X
Ecocentre (Kherson)
Odessa Greens X
In Nikolaev, for instance, the Writers’ Union and the oblast branch of the Culture Fund took part in the 
campaign against expansion of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. A local writer, V. Boiko, 
was for some time co-chairman of Zelenyi Mir together with Anatolii Zolotukhin (who, by the way, is 
Russian by nationality). Moreover, the planned Danube-Dniepr Canal was opposed by well-known 
Ukrainian writers in a campaign that ended successfully in 1987. Thus, people were aware of the role 
played by writers on environmental issues. Similarly, in Odessa, which has a large Russian and also 
Jewish population, writers were involved in campaigning against the Odessa nuclear thermal station.
By environmental actions 1 mean actions similiar to and on the scale of the Russian writers’ struggle 
against turning the flow of the Siberian rivers and against the Canal Volga-Chorgai in particular, and 
melioration more generally.
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Whereas a majority of those who answered in the affirmative had heard about the campaign 
against the Danube-Dniepr Canal, and about Plachynda’s crusade against water reservoirs on and 
pollution of the Dniepr and Shcherbak’s writings on Chernobyl, none of the Eastern Ukrainian 
Green groups were familiar with these campaigns. All the respondents - including those from 
Eastern Ukraine - were, however, familiar with similar campaigns conducted by the Russian 
writers, thus supporting the view that Ukrainian writers do not appeal to the Russian speaking 
community o f East Ukraine.
When asked what was the merit of the writers, I got a number of different answers; the 
Ternopil Greens acknowledged Honchar’s involvement in setting up Zelenyi Svit as ‘enormous’ 
and also gave credit to Plachynda and Shcherbak for ‘telling people the truth about the state of the 
environment’. It was also pointed out that the writers played a major role in widening the limits 
to glasnost (Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit), and in spreading ecological knowledge as well as imbuing 
people with a love for Nature (Bukovina Zelenyi Svit). The Mariupol Greens pointed out that the 
writers were better able than anybody else to formulate their thoughts - also on the environment, 
whereas the Nikolaev Greens stressed that the merit of the writers consisted of one thing; that 
‘conscience had not yet died in people’. The Klierson Greens, on the other hand, pointed out that 
the writers influenced people’s awareness and public opinion (i.e. awoke its awareness, or rather 
revived it). Finally, the Odessa Greens stressed that the writers explained things to the public and 
appealed to people to join in the fight for survival.
The writers, on the other hand, acknowledged the scientists’ role in providing them with 
information that the writers could then translate into a language that could be understood by the 
general public. lurii Shcherbak, for instance, acknowledged this relationship in an article 
published in FORUM:
B o p r a iiM sa u H H  ^ a n x c e n m i  cb ir p a .iM  5 o j i b u i y i o  p o iih  y u e iiM e  h s  
M iic r n y T a  T o c m i a n a  (le cn y f if in iC M , K’O T o p u fl iia ; ii ,iB a e T c a  C oneT O M  
n p oM 3B 04H T e.n w ib ix  CH.Î1 Y K paM U H . Gnu p a c n o . io r a j iM  i io c r o B e p i io H  
u iH liop M an M ef i, - 4J u i 6 o .r ib in n u c r B a  a r a  M ii(|)O pM auna 6 i . i . ia  
i i e i i o c r y n n o H .  H a r o  6 i.i.r ia M iiH uuaTM Ba a r o u  r p y n n b i ,  K O T o p y io  Mbi 
iiO M C pïK M BaJ iH . n o j iy ' iH .r io c b  t o k :  m x s i ia i in n  h  n a u i a  B O B M O îK iiocn.
GbiTb pyiiopoM c  Bbixo40M lia MacGOBbie Kanajibi. C .bobo iiMcareJieM m 
airropHTer yaeiibix nee aro o6be4miH.fTH^ f
Dudko also acknowledged the link between the scientists and the writers/journalists, referring 
in this connection to Hlazovyi, who was working as a journalist in Robitnychna Gazeta and whom 
Dudko and other scientists fed with information that he could then use as a base upon which to 
write articles explaining technical things in an understandable language to the general public.
KDpnu IRepSaK, (I)OPyM,22l\99Q, c. 30-31.
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. . .Moreover, a newspaper article could reach a much bigger audience than could a scientific article 
on the same subject^^. Thus, Zelenyi Svit was able - also through its own channels - to spread 
information about its activities. Finally, the Peace Council provided Zelenyi Svit activists with a 
cover vis-à-vis the authorities, as did prominent members of the association.
During 1988 a major focus of attention in Zelenyi Svit was on organisational issues. The 
question as to what should be the relationship to Zelenyi Mir in Moscow had to be finalised and a
Greens furthermore declared that ‘we do not want to be the last generation to have seen nature in 
its existent form’^^ . References were made to general pollution in Ukraine, but the major concern 
of the conference was with Chernobyl and the lack of openness by which it was surrounded, lurii 
Shcherbak informed the overcrowded hall that the nuclear fall-out had also affected areas as far as
.300 km into Belorussia, from where the population should be evacuated. Moreover, radiation
ÏInterview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994.A brief account of this conference appeared in a press release from the Ukrainian Press Agency in London
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decision had to be reached on structure (horizontal vs. vertical) and issues (Chernobyl/nuclear
power vs. others) to be addressed by the organisation. Finally, the most important question of
what should be Zelenyi Svi f s  relationship towards the general public had to be solved.
As regards the first issue, Zelenyi Svit’s relationship with Moscow was finalised on 29 March
1988 during its first conference (one of four arranged prior to the First Congress) which took place
in Kiev’s Cinema House (Dom Kino)^^. Nikolai Reimers attended this conference, and Dudko
took the opportunity to bring up Zelenyi Svit’s relationship with Zelenyi Mir in Moscow. The
.former, he said, was a Ukrainian independent organisation, willing to co-operate with Moscow - 
even to the point of conducting joint campaigns - but not in any way willing to become part of the 
latter’s structure. Reimers did not respond to Dudko’s announcement, but after this conference, 
the relationship between Zelenyi Svit and ‘Moscow’ cooled considerably^’.
At the conference a general strategy for Zelenyi Svit’s future activities was for the first time 
articulated and a plan of action endorsed. The concept ‘ think globally, act locally’ was adapted as 
a cornerstone in Zelenyi S v it \  work and 5 June was declared ‘Environmental Protection Day’. In 
this connection the Greens called for a large demonstration to be held in Kiev on that day. The
(no. 83, 31.5.1988). The press release refers to the conference as the founding conference of Zelenyi 
Svit. Representatives of Zelenyi Svit themselves, however, refer to a conference which took place in 
April 1989 as the founding conference of Zelenyi Svit as a programme was endorsed and a prelimnary 
statute endorsed. As regards the location of the April 1988 conference, whereas the Press Agency 
claims that it took place in the Writers’ Union House, Dudko told me that it took place in the Cinema 
House. This is of less importance, however. Still, since in cases where written information contradicts 
information obtained through interviews, I have chosen to rely on the latter, I refer to the location of the 
meeting as the Cinema House. A more detailed press release appared in the April 1988 issue of the 
Ukrainian Press Service’s ‘News from the USSR’ under the heading ‘The last generation to have seen 
nature’ - “Greens” form in Kiev’, pp. 9-10.
Information provided by Dudko in interview, Kiev, 14.5.1994.
Ukrainian Press Service, The last generation to have seen nature - ‘Greens’ form in Kiev, pp. 9-10.
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levels in the Poltava and Zhitomyr regions were said to be higher than at Chernobyl itself. The 
Ukrainian authorities were criticised for failing to evacuate the local population immediately after 
the accident and for withholding information surrounding the accident.
A series of demands were listed in a declaration endorsed by the meeting: official authorities 
were urged to repeal the ‘glasnost prohibition on information about the state of the environment 
and the pollution of food supplies. Doctors were requested to tell the truth about illnesses caused 
by radiation. The government was urged to publish textbooks on ecology, a Ukrainian ecological 
newspaper and to commission scientific research and questionnaires about the construction or 
completion of new nuclear power stations. Finally, the declaration expressed anger that nuclear 
power stations were still being built and demanded that referenda be held prior to the construction 
of new nuclear power stations^^.
3.2.2 Campaigns (1987-89)
Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian association came into being in response to the Chernobyl accident, 
and it was therefore not surprising that the dominant issue during 1988 was not only Chernobyl in 
particular, but nuclear power in Ukraine in general. Only three to four days after Zelenyi Svit had 
been registered by the Peace Committee, a campaign was launched against plans to construct a 
nuclear power in the town of Chyhyryn by the Dniepr. This campaign was followed by similar 
campaigns against a nuclear power station planned on the Kerch Peninsula on the Crimea, and 
against further expansion of nuclear power stations in Khmelnitskyi, Rivne and luzhnoukrainsk.
Other issues, addressed simultaneously, had an environmental as well as a cultural aspect to 
them. This was the case with the campaign to prevent a bridge being built over the Dniepr to the 
island o f Kliortytsa, which was not only a nature preserve, but also an important historical site for 
the Ukrainians. The historical and cultural significance of areas in danger of being destroyed was, 
as will be seen below, not simply confined to non-nuclear issues, but was also linked to the 
potential damage nuclear power stations could cause. Thus not only the need for a revival of the 
Ukrainian natural environment was voiced, but also the need to protect the people of Ukraine, its 
culture and historical tradition from destruction. (This is an issue to which I will return in more 
detail below).
For reasons of space I cannot go into too much detail about each particular issue addressed by 
Zelenyi Svit on a national and local level. A more detailed study of one particular campaign is 
provided in Chapters Six and Seven (luzhnoukrainsk). I will, however, briefly look at issues and
ib id ,
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I,1means of campaigning to illustrate how campaigning changed and how, from initially being 
primarily conducted by experts in the form of expert assessments, the general public and means 
like collecting signatures and demonstrating, gradually became more common.
■VI
Non-Nuclear Issues
One of the first campaigns initiated and conducted by Zelenyi Svit was a campaign to prevent a 
bridge from being built over the Dnepr river from the mainland to the island of KJiortytsa in early 
1988. An activist froi- Zaporizhzhia - he was alone - contacted Z'^Jenyi Svit regarding plans to 
build this bridge. The island, which is the largest island situated in the Dniepr river, had been a 
protected historical and cultural heritage preserve since 1965. In order to accommodate the new 
bridge, a part of the island which was part of a nature reseiwe (zapovednik) would have to be
O j iH k n  in a n  i n tn r \ / ! p w  w i t h  MTtTJ
:
destroyed - and possibly with it a 700 year old oak tree . Dudko in an intervie  ith NFU  
pointed out that although the status of Khoitytsa had been discussed for decades, no protective 
measures had so far been taken. To illustrate this point, he gave an example: the Research and 
Production Institute of Mechanisation and Electrification of Cattle Breeding was occupying about 
40% of the island despite its status as a nature preserve. Were the plans to build a bridge to go 
ahead, this would ruin the island as a historical preserve. What was more, it would also threaten 
some one thousand species of wild life with extinction. Zelenyi Svit would therefore try to 
persuade the Zaporizhzhia City Executive Committee to overturn its decision. Should this fail, 
they would appeal to the Ukrainian government or even to Soviet authorities^^.
Apart from being a nature resort, Khortytsa to many Ukrainians symbolised something far 
more. It was there the Cossacks in their time fought the Tartars and protected Christianity against 
Islam. In many regards Khortytsa thus proved a tricky issue as Zelenyi Svit could be accused of 
being ‘national democrats’. There was reluctance amongst Zelenyi Svit members to go to 
Zaporizhzhia, so in the end Dudko ended up going himself. He was seen by the raikom, the major 
constructor of Zaporizhzhia and others. The problem, however, was that they did not want to 
show him the project, as he represented Zelenyi Svit. Once back in Kiev, he contacted the 
projectors in his capacity as a member o f the Academy of Sciences. Together with other experts 
he prepared two alternative projects, including cost calculations. These projects were presented to 
the general public at a conference organised by Zelenyi Svit, and which took place in the Ukrainian
Interview with Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994. This issue is also addressed by Dudko in an interview with 
NFU (no. 18/88). The reference to the oak tree was made in Zelenyi Svit's general appeal to Ukrainian 
workers’ collectives: dejieiiUH CniT - IlJanc namoro cniJibnoro MaHfivTHboro. TpviioBOMv 
KOJieKTHBV (n.d.).
Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko in NFU no. 18/1988.
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Academy of Sciences Conference Hall at vul. Hruzhevskaya 4^ .^ One of these projects was 
eventually acknowledged as a better alternative and rather than building a new bridge, the old one 
was being improved.
Another issue, which was high up on the priority list of Zelenyi Svit was the fate of the Dniepr 
river. Serhii Plachynda had already for two decades been concerned with the state of the Dniepr 
river and in November 1987, he published an article on this issue ( ‘Who will become the master of 
the Dniepr river?’ '^^ ). A number of articles were to follow. Concern was expressed about the fact 
that the speed of the river flow had decreased by 5-6 times and that all the water reservoirs which 
had been built on the river were damaging its biological regime^^. Concern was also voiced over 
radioactive contamination of Dniepr via the Pripiat river - one of its estuaries - which was severely 
contaminated by fall-out from the Chernobyl accident and with radioactive contamination of the 
Kakhovsk water reservoir, which simultaneously served as a drinking source for the local 
population as well as the cooling pond of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. An active 
campaign to prevent pollution of the Dniestr river was also conducted by Zelenyi Svit.
A third issue which received much attention from Zelenyi Svit was chemical pollution. Like 
Russia (e.g. Kirishi close to Leningrad), also Ukraine had a vitamin factory whose pollution 
constituted a direct threat to peoples’ health. Further, Zelenyi Svit took part in a campaign against 
the vitamin factory in the Uman district (Cherkassy oblast). Dudko addressed this issue in NFU  
(no. 18/88): ‘Uman Vitamin Plant is constantly spewing out pollutants into the environment, thus 
doing irreparable damage to the ‘Sotyivka’ forest park preserve’. As the vitamin factory was 
subordinated to Moscow, Moscow was also involved and it became clear to the Green activists 
how difficult it was to solve environmental problems in Ukraine against Moscow’s will. The 
efforts of Zelenyi Svit were, however, crowned with success: in 1989 the industrial set-up 
producing nicotinic acid was dismantled and the plant switched to the packing of medicines. 
Similarly, a factory producing polyurethane in Svalaia (Zakarpatia) was eventually stopped due to 
pressure from the Greens^^.
A high-profile campaign was also started to prevent the construction o f industrial facilities 
and the felling of trees in Holosiivskyi forest and in the village of Feofania - both o f which were 
parts of a national park and nature preserve area. The Kiev gorispolkom had issued a resolution 
forbidding any industrial construction there. Thus, when it became clear that the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences intended to build an Institute of Chemistry in Feofania, these plans were naturally 
opposed by Greens and by locals living in the area.
Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994. 
Kro CTOU6T xo3flHiiOM ünenoa? 
ripaBÂa YKpaMHu, 19.3.1988, c. 3.
News from Ukraine, no. 18, 1988, p. 2.
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The Institute of Chemistry would be a very expensive project, the costs of the first stage of 
which were estimated at some 22 million roubles. When felling of trees started on the building 
site, the local population started to voice its opposition to the project. Together with the Greens, 
they organised pickets and a number of public meetings which were attended by USSR People’s 
Deputies and representatives of party organisations and authorities. In July 1989 they succeeded 
in gaining the attention of Ukrainian radio and some newspapers and the project was eventually 
cancelled^^. Demands were made to leave Feofania in peace and for an independent ecological 
expert assessment to be made of the project.
Zelenyi Svit set up a joint commission with the Ukrainian Writers’ Union to look into the 
issue of chemical giants being built in natural preserves. A meeting on the issue was organised in 
the Writers’ House in Kiev and attended by people from the town of Irpen outside Kiev. Harsh 
words were used against official authorities for allowing such construction. The poet Mykola 
Tkach, for instance, stated bluntly that ‘the construction of chemical giants in protected areas is a 
crime against the people!’. Plachynda, who opened the meeting said that the issue had long been 
ignored by official authorities and that a letter should be formulated by the meeting to Prime 
Minister Vitalii Masol, bringing to his attention the fact that the ecological situation in the Irpen 
zone was deteriorating due to a cluster of chemical enterprises spewing out a dangerous cocktail of 
pollutants. According to the Chief Doctor one chemical enterprise alone emitted some 1,605 tons 
of harmful substances annually. In the Irpen zone there were close to 30 sanatoriums (rest homes) 
and 40 pioneer camps. To secure the health of people visiting these facilities as well as the health 
of local residents, the meeting came out against further construction of chemical enterprises and in 
favour of installing pollution reducing devices and eventually close existing ones. Some success 
had already been achieved: one of the departments of the Machine Building Enterprise had
already been closed at the request of the Sanitary Inspectorate. But new chemical units were under 
planning.
An Irpen resident, the translator Dmytro Palavarchuk, voiced the concern of the residents in 
the following way;
Pado^mn rasera, 4.8.1989 (n.p.).
I
I
X  xpeda BMiieci'H m iviexci Ipneim o r i Bci xiMiMiio uJKijuiuBi 
nexM. M m  fie BpaxoBysMo to, mo b ipneiis B'G^a^caioTbCB 20 
BCioro Pa;uincbKoro Corny. I BCi noBuinii iuixaxH roio xiM ieio...
Palavarchuk finished off his speech by calling it a crime against people to build chemical 
enterprises in protected areas. This was greeted with applause by those present. Calls were made
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to establish harmony between Man and Nature, then ‘our souls are like the air we breathe’. 
Moreover, one should return to old popular traditions and ancient knowledge on Man and oneself.
It was accepted that modern society cannot get by without scientific achievements, but only in as 
much as the safety of the people and nature can be guaranteed, taking into consideration the 
assessment of scientists, ecologists and public opinion. A draft letter to Masol was approved by 
the meeting^’.
Another industrial project to which Zelenyi Svit was opposed, was that of a paint factory, 
which the Swiss company Sand us wanted to build on the Crimean Peninsula. Dudko provided 
Hlazovyi with all the information he had and sent him to the Crimea to investigate - in his capacity 'as a journalist with Robitnychna hazeta. A feature story resulted from this visit, which in turn
72
Swedish Campaign against Acid Rain per email.
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triggered off a story in Krokodil - the satirical Soviet biweekly magazine. Various Moscow-based 
newspapers were also involved. After a month an agreement was reached with the Ministry in 
charge and Sandus pulled out of the project.
From the very start of its existence, Zelenyi Svit got involved with alternative energy in 
general and with bioenergy in particular. An excursion to a bioenergy facility by the river Desna 
was organised. The site contained six windstations. In China and Poland bioenergy was widely 
used, but it never really caught on in Ukraine. Thus, Plachynda amongst others, took an interest in 
tiying to promote the use o f bioenergy - with modest results, however. This issue has later been 
picked up by activists who left Zelenyi Svit and set up ProSvita, whose leader is currently Serhii 
Kurykin. This group has bought a farm and is in the process of setting up alternative energy
%facilities on its premises to demonstrate how to make use of them. A seminar on alternative
72energy was held with the support of Green groups in Sweden .
Zelenyi Svit also succeeded in having the planned construction of a railroad station in the 
South of Kiev cancelled. The planned railroad station required the destruction of 250 hectares of
forest in the Bykovina region, at a site where thousands of local residents were executed by the
NKVD in the 1930s. Protecting the site was thus not only an issue of ecological, but also of 
historical concern.
The Greens were also involved in a campaign to halt the construction of the planned Danube-
Dniepr canal in South Ukraine (see Chapter Six) and early on also got involved with military
issues. In the vicinity of Mukachevo in Zakarpatia, a military airport and a radar station
(Pristrialivsk) caused not only considerable environmental pollution but also inconvenienced 
.locals with noise. The issue was first addressed in the summer of 1989 and a public meeting was
   :-----------------------K-3, 23:00, 26.1.1989, transcribed in Ukraine Today - Ukrainian Media Digest - compiled by Radio 
Liberty Monitoring, 27.1.1989, no. U-016, pp. 18-19.
Interview with Serhii Plachynda in Kiev, 23.5.1994 and information provided by Jan H0ystad of the
'!
For further details, see Derkach’ election platfonn, March 1994. 
Ukrainian Reporter, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.
'held on 16 September. On 2 November a picket of the RADAR STATION was attended by 13
.people, but soon interrupted by the police and KGB. Shortly after, on 9 November, a similar 
picket gathered 150 participants and when it was repeated on 16 November more than one 
thousand people were present. Starting with these pickets emerged a big public protest. One of 
the initiators, Evheniia Derkach, got in trouble with the authorities due to her campaigning, and 
was on a number of occasions called in to the procurator’s office and the KGB. She was also 
hassled by the administration where she worked.
As military issues were the prerogative of all-union ministries, Derkach and some 120 other 
demonstrators went to Moscow in early February 1990 to picket the last meeting of the old 
Supreme Soviet. The demonstrators demanded that construction of the RADAR STATION be 
stopped. A local referendum in Zakarpatia supported the claims and together with 42 local 
activists, Derkach once again went to Moscow to present the result of the referendum to official 
authorities there. The presence of foreign correspondents prevented her from being arrested and 
she was eventually seen by the then Minister of Defence, Marshal lasov. Shortly after, he sent a 
dispatch to Zakarpatia ordering a halt to construction. However, this dispatch did not solve all the
problems surrounding the RADAR STATION. Radioactive grounds from the station still have not 
been removed and military aircraft is still flying over Mukachevo. Every now and then the issue is 
brought up with authorities in Kiev - so far without a final decision being made on how to deal 
with these issues in the future. The issue still serves as an example of how Ukrainian Greens were 
successful in influencing official authorities, which in turn made decisions in line with demands 
made by the Greens against environmentally unsound projects^^.
Nuclear Power
In December 1987 a round table of writers, academics and scientists took place in Kiev. The 
round table, entitled ‘Scientific-Technological Programmes and Morality’, revealed that 90% of 
Ukrainian territory was unsuitable for nuclear power. At approximately the same time the third 
bloc at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was restarted and two reactors at Zaporizhzhia and 
Khmelnitskyi nuclear power stations went into operation again.’"’ The idea that not only 
Chernobyl nuclear power station but also other such stations were possibly not so safe thus caught 
hold of the environmentalists and resulted in a campaign against nuclear power in Ukraine which 
has continued up until the present.
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The first public meeting to commemorate the Chernobyl accident was arranged in Kiev by the 
Writers’ Union on 26 April 1988’ .^ Although information about the meeting was not generally 
distributed beforehand, several hundred people turned up and the room was overcrowded. The 
meeting was chaired by lurii Shcherbak, who shared the platform with lurii Chernychenko, a 
Moscow writer specialising in environmental and agricultural themes, three officials from the 
Ukrainian nuclear power industry and some elderly people who had been evacuated from Pripiat 
following the accident. The meeting opened with a minute of silence in memory o f the victims of 
Chernobyl and a telegram from the Armenian writer Silva Kaputikian expressing solidarity with 
the Ukrainians was read out to those present.
The meeting addressed not only the technical aspects of the accident at Chernobyl, but also
75
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Kiev’) is used as a reference with regard to this meeting.
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made references to its political aspects. For instance, Chernychenko is quoted as saying that ‘here
.in the heart of Salvador, two years before the millennium of Christianity, the Chernobyl disaster 
showed clearly the evils of bureaucratism, Stalinism, totalitarianism, call it what you will. The 
crowds parading in Kiev on 1 May that year had no idea of the danger threatening them from the 
air, because the bureaucrats deliberately kept them in the dark (loud applause from the audience). 
This is no less terrible than the H-bomb in the hands of the imperialists. Indeed, we continued to 
manufacture and deploy medium-range nuclear missiles even while the British workers were 
demonstrating against Cruise and Pershing (again applause). So glasnost and democracy are vital
76to our very survival as the human race’ .
The audience was able to ask questions to the representatives of the nuclear industry, and 
although mostly polite, those attending the meeting were sceptical o f what they were told. The 
officials were asked questions about radioactive dust, the topsoil and the state of the rivers. lurii 
Andreev, when asked about the advisability of siting the Chernobyl nuclear power station so close 
to the river Dnepr and within such a short distance of Kiev, admitted that it was not a sensible 
location, the planners had made a mistake at the expense of gaining access to cheap cooling water 
for the reactors. Still, nuclear power was essential to the USSR and the problem could not be 
solved at the level of Ukraine alone, but only at an all-union level. At this time everyone was 
talking and shouting. Shcherbak pointed out that the Ukrainian Writers’ Union had organised a 
campaign on this issue and had obtained the cancellation of the planned Chyhyryn nuclear power 
station. Further results could be achieved through energy saving.
The evacuees told their stories to the meeting and complaints were made about evacuation 
being delayed for up to a week after the accident. A young woman claimed that she and her
Geoffrey Hosking from SSEES attended this meeting, and a his written account of the event f  Glasnost in
Ibid.. p. 1.
friends had tried to organise a reunion of Chernobyl victims on October Revolution Square in Kiev 
on the first anniversary of the accident, but were prevented in doing so by the KGB, which warned 
that there may be a provocation from the West. This year they were not forbidden to assemble, but 
it proved impossible to gain access to the Square as it was cordoned off by police and occupied by 
a May Day rehearsal. However, an unsanctioned demonstration did take place earlier that day. 
Oles Shevchenko - a member of the Culturological Club and of the Helsinki Union at the time - 
gave an account of this demonstration in an interview with David Marples in December 1988” . 
Members of the Culturological Club and of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union carried banners about 
ecology and demanding a nuclear-free Ukraine at the demonstration. Police used force to break it 
up and some 50 protesters were detained. Shevchenko himself, received a 15 day prison sentence. 
This incidence thus clearly demonstrates that there were limits to what kind o f activities official 
authorities were willing to tolerate. The woman who provided this information to the meeting 
urged the writers - referring to them as the ‘conscience of the people’ - to help those detained. Her 
request met with a mixed response by the audience whereupon Shcherbak moved on to the next 
topic on the agenda.
Finally, lurii Samiilenko had to answer questions about the sarcophagus erected onto the 
damaged reactor at Chernobyl. His claims to the effect that water could not penetrate this 
sarcophagus for 300,000 years were met with disbelief and roars of laughter by those present at the 
meeting. The idea that any question regarding nuclear power should be decided by the public 
through referendum was put forward by Kovalenko, Borys Oliinyk read a poem and after that the 
meeting came to an end without a final speech or a resolution. Hosking found the meeting 
somewhat disorganised; it did, however, represent a beginning to something that would soon 
become a normal event in Kiev and elsewhere in Ukraine: public meetings on issues not only 
concerning the environment but also human rights and Ukraine’s status in the Soviet Union, to 
mention but a few.
The first (officially sanctioned) public meeting arranged by Zelenyi Svit in Kiev took place on 
5 June 1988 - on ‘Environmental Protection Day’ as declared by Zelenyi Svit - on 29 March. This 
was a tactical move: it would be difficult to justify denying the Greens the opportunity to stage a 
public meeting on a day dedicated to environmental protection. Local authorities did, however, 
make two demands in connection with the meeting: firstly, it would have to be a precondition that 
UTOP be allowed to participate. Secondly, a list of the topics intended to be covered had to be 
produced as well as the names of those who would address the meeting. Dudko said anyone who 
wanted to join the meeting was welcome to do so. He also produced the list requested by the
David Marples (RLPRD), ‘USSR - A Visit to the Soviet Union: Part II. Some Interviews’. Munich, 
20.12.1988, F-566.
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Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.
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gorispolkom. Shortly afterwards, he was called to a meeting with the leader of gorispolkom, 
Zgurtsev, and several other representatives. They all objected to the last issue on the agenda: 
alternatives to nuclear power. Several expert-members of Zelenyi Svit had worked on a statement 
and it had been agreed beforehand that Anatoly! Panov would read this statement during the 
meeting. Gorispolkom made the meeting conditional upon this statement being scrapped. In 
‘return’ Zelenyi Svit was promised publicity in the newspapers. Gorispolkom also decided the 
place for the meeting - the Arch memorial for the Russian-Ukrainian pact of 1654, off 
Khreshchatyk. This was acceptable to Dudko as the meeting took place during the week-end - at a 
time when there would normally be quite a few people there.
The meeting, which was led by Dudko and attended by some 5-6,000 people, thus took place.
The idea was that the whole initiative group would be present to represent Zelenyi Svit, but
according to Dudko, several failed to show up. Many were, as acknowledged by Panov,
frightened. Amongst the issues addressed were melioration and the need to protect forests from
destruction’ .^ Towards the end of the meeting, Dudko took the opportunity to say a few words
about Zelenyi Svit, mentioning that the association had elaborated its own programme on nuclear
power, whereupon he stepped away from the microphone. People then demanded that this
. . .programme be read and eventually this was done - by Dudko. After this incident Dudko was again 
called in to the gorispolkom. He was accused o f having broken his promise and told that if Zelenyi 
Svit later asked permission to stage a meeting, this would be turned down. Dudko had, however, 
never given a written promise and the newspapers all the same never printed any information 
about the meeting before it actually took place. Members of Zelenyi Svit themselves put up notes 
on news boards and lamp posts. Information was also spread by word.
On 13 November 1988 Zelenyi Svit activists - together with the cultural group Spadshchyna
(Heritage), Hromada, and the independent ecological association Noosfera - organised the biggest 
and first publicised political meeting in Kiev so far. Estimates as to how many people attended the 
meeting at the Republican Stadium vary, from 40,000 to 10,000 (more conservative ones) 
Addressing the meeting were writers like lurii Shcherbak, Volodymyr lavorivskii and Dmytro 
Pavlychko as well as Oles Shevchenko and Ivan Makar - a poet from Lviv - representing the 
Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The Green Movements of Latvia and Lithuania were also represented, 
as was the poet Rostyslav Bratun from Tovarystva Leva (Lviv) and the Russian Academician 
Fade! Shipunov. The meeting was permitted on the condition that it address only ecological 
issues. However, the meeting represented, as noted by David Marples, one of the first occasions 
when transition from ecology to politics took place. It became the first significant set toward
■Î
than was the case elsewhere. Dams that had been constructed on the Volga and Dniepr rivers were
”  Marples (1991), pp. 138-44.
For a detailed account of the demonstration, see ibid.. pp. 138-144.
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Strengthening the Popular Movement to Support Perestroika (RUKH) - which eventually entered
the Ukrainian political scene in 1989’ .^
A detailed account based on a tape of the demonstration provided by a Canadian student,
Chrystina Freeland, has been given in David Marples’ book Ukraine under Perestroika. Ecology,
Economics and the Workers’ Revolt ’^’. Readers who would like a more detailed account o f the
demonstration are referred to this book. Considerable attention was given to Chernobyl and to
nuclear power by those present at the meeting and below I will briefly summarise those demands
that were made and the new information about Ukrainian nuclear power provided by those present.
Dmytro Pavlychko, for instance, demanded a stop to construction work at Chyhyryn nuclear power
.station, whereas Shcherbak provided new information on Chernobyl. Academician Shipunov in
.his capacity as Head of a Laboratory at the Scientific Council on Questions of the Biosphere with 
the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow bluntly voiced serious criticism of the Soviet nuclear 
power programme, arguing that Ukraine was on the way to an ecological catastrophe. Soviet 
nuclear power stations, he argued, were emitting some 350% more tritium into the atmosphere
-''I
causing environmental damage estimated at some 25 billion roubles annually. The atmosphere 
over Kiev was described as ‘dead’ and a dangerous reduction in ozone levels had been detected by 'frii
space craft over a number of Ukrainian cities. Finally, Shipunov called for extensive agricultural 
reform, encouraging an extensive overhaul of the existing ministerial structure and a shift from co­
operative to family-based farming of the land. Rostyslav Bratun, chairman of the Lviv branch of
Zelenyi Svit criticised the construction of the Rivne nuclear power station on karst ground and also 
expressed concern about the construction of chemical enterprises in Drohobych, Ivano-Frankivsk
and Kalush. Bratun demanded that the people be allowed to voice their opinion and that decisions 
be made bearing in mind local opinion.
.As had been the case at the 5 June meeting, official representatives also attended this meeting.
"'7 ,
Following a series of public speeches critical o f Soviet environmental policies generally and their
impact on Ukraine in particular, a representative of Derzhkornpriroda addressed the meeting. It 
was acknowledged that the state of the environment in Ukraine was complex, but, said the speaker, 
some improvements had been made. Water pollution had been reduced considerably over the last 
two years and measures were being taken to improve water quality in the basins of the Black and 
Azov seas. What was more, local and regional branches of Derzhkornpriroda were in the process 
of being set up and these would help cut pollution further.
I
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This speech was followed by a new round of highly critical speeches, lurii Vysotskii of the 
Cherkasy Ekolohiia society, for instance, addressed construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power 
station and other environmental problems in the region. S. Dorohuntsov, Chairman of the Council 
for the Study of the Productive Forces of Ukraine, brought it to the attention of those present that 
although the Chyhyryn nuclear power station would apparently not be built, the construction 
workers have not been ordered to halt construction. Dorohuntsov also used the opportunity to 
criticise construction projects such as the Dniepr-Bug estuary and expansion-schemes for chemical :industries in Ukraine (see above). Most of the other speeches focused on nuclear power.
■The meeting, which was scheduled to last for some four hours, came to an abrupt end when 
Ivan Makar, a representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was to give a speech. Makar had 
just recently been released from prison, where he had been for attending a demonstration in early 
August, and as soon as he started his speech the microphone was switched off by security officials.
Rather than stop talking, however, Makar shouted out his speech. In his view, ecology should be 
closer linked to socio-political issues, one of which was sovereignty and the right to secede from 
the Soviet Union. Makar encouraged the emergence of a popular front to work closely with 
similar fronts in the Baltic States. Only then would public demonstrations and meetings have an 
effect on First Secretary of the CPU, Volodymyr Shcherbitskii and on the Minister o f Health, 
Anatolii Romanenko.
A series of resolutions were endorsed by the meeting and later cited in Rohitnycha hazeta.
These came to form the basis of a petition that was eventually passed on to the Ukrainian Supreme 
Soviet. It was pointed out that the ecological situation not only in Ukraine, but also elsewhere was 
serious and needed to be addressed seriously. Still the full picture was not known about 
Chernobyl and Ukrainian official authorities were still clinging to the Tnyth’ that no alternatives 
existed to nuclear power. The meeting demanded that construction of nuclear reactors at the 
Crimean and Chyhyryn nuclear power stations be stopped. Similarly, expansion of existing 
nuclear power stations should be halted and the Chernobyl nuclear power station be closed down 
immediately. Existing nuclear reactors should be properly examined so as to establish whether or 
not they complied with international safety standards. Similarly, other industrial complexes that 
were harmful to the environment should be closed down and further construction be stopped.
More specific demands were made with regard to the South Ukraine Energy complex (SU EK): 
the meeting demanded that no further construction be undertaken prior to the assessment o f the 
project by an ecological expert committee. As for ecological glasnost, the meeting demanded that 
ecological information be made available without any restrictions. The meeting also called for 
public opinion to be taken into consideration when deciding the fate of projects potentially
.harmful to the environment - in the form of referenda. Finally, more politicised demands were
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plans’^’.
Chyhyryn Nuclear Power Station
One of the first issues with which Zelenyj Svit got involved, was the construction of the Chyhyryn 
nuclear power station^^. The first opposition to the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power
:■ ■ ■ i
made in that the petition claimed that the party apparatus in Ukraine did not represent the interests 
of the Ukrainian people and had thoughtlessly exploited natural resources.
;
What then was the significance of this November 1988 meeting? As pointed out by David 
Marples, the meeting brought together people from different parts of Ukraine with different 
political views in opposition to industrial/energy projects harmful to the local environment of 
which central ministries in Kiev and Moscow were in charge: ‘it had become evident that in 
making plans for the expansion of industry in Ukraine, the authorities had spared no zone, no city 
in considerations of nature protection or historical preservation. Moreover, it was also clear that in 
many cases the local party and government associations concurred with the public’s anxieties over 
the environment: at the least, they declared this to be the case. The result was a gathering of local 
forces in open opposition to centrally based ministries that were more concerned about fulfilling
A;
One of the first actions to gather information on the situation in areas affected by fall-out
from the Chernobyl accident, was undertaken by Zelenyi Svit activists in early 1989. As pointed
out above, H. Shkliarevskii went to Narodichi and shot a documentary following rumours of ill
children and deformed animals that started circulating in Kiev during the autumn of 1989. The
documentary, which was given the title 'Mi-kro~fon ' (fon in Russian is the term used to describe
background radiation levels), was shown in private screenings to Zelenyi Svit activists working at
.the Institute of Nuclear Research in Kiev. They then went to Narodichi with their own dosimeters 
and measured radiation levels in seven villages that had not yet been evacuated. Their readings 
showed levels far exceeding the safety limits.
The information about Narodichi caused a public outcry and official authorities were forced 
to act on public pressure. Following Narodichi the silence on Chernobyl was once and for all 
broken. This issue surfaced at the same time as the anti-nuclear campaign took on in other parts of 
Ukraine and transformed Zelenyi Svit into a broad anti-nuclear mass movement.
:f-':I
"Tbid.. p. 144.
Construction at Rivne started in 1971. Originally plans were made to build the largest regional electi ic 
power station (4PEC - 4epxcaBiia pauonna eJtCKTixicraimiB) in Europe - to operate on liquid fuel. However, 
as there was a lack of such fuel, it was later decided that the power station operate on solid fuel. As such fuel 
was also insufficient, it was eventually decided to turn the power station into a nuclear power station. As 
work went on for such a long time, enormous costs were incalculated.
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station emerged in the summer of 1987. On 6 August a letter written by several writers from 
Cherkassy entitled ‘Tryvohy Chyhyryna’ appeared in Literaturna U k r a i n a The writers 
expressed concern not only with the possible dangers associated with the nuclear power station, 
but also with the fate of Chyhyryn, which carried historical significance to Ukraine:
U e  m e h iieciiTKH r e x r a p in  nenHKopHcraiiux poiuoMux 
sa iie A d a iii ca4H, craiiKU. O a K a r io m i m iia c u  M iiiep a .ib iiu x  1104,
Y iau d yT iii f a . i w i e o . i o r i a i i i  icy pop ru u ( lU ia T o p i l  Tu iiy
M H propo4CbKoro i  T pycK a iieubK oro (im ac iie, n i 4  ca.vioro AEG!).
People must be given control with their own fate and the fate of their land, argued the writers. 
Besides, Chyhyryn also held historical significance for the Ukrainians. They were supported by 
scientists, in favouring the discontinuation of construction of the nuclear power station for 
technical/geological reasons. Amongst the signatories of the letter (total of II)  were three 
people’s deputies^"*
PoayvfiiOBH caoio B i4noBi4a;iL»ici'b sa [lesy-ribTara 4 ifl.fibiiocri 
Tpy40BHx KOJieKi'MBiB iia TepHTOpil namoro panony, mm, TenyrarM  
MicneBHX Pa4 nai}04iiM X  AenyxaTiu. iie M as m o MOTK.nHBocri BiiecxM 
pa4HKa.ribiii smIhm mo40 5y4iBiiMuxBa uboro od’TKxa axoMiioi 
eiieprexHKH. BnaTKasMO, mo n yMonax nepe6y40BH, 4eM0K pax iï i  
n a c iio c r i xaxa neBHSjiaaeiiicrb y 6y4iBiiMUXBi ftHrHpHiicbKOl A EG  
4a.ai xpMBaxM ne noBHmia. ToMy npocuMo BpaxynaxM namy 4yMxy 
i  4axM KOUKpexni B i4noB i4 i na .sanuxanmi: xxo i  axy non ic
n i4noBi4ajibiiicrb sa noMH.riKH npH iipoeKxynanni e.aeKxpocxaniiiH y 
MurupHni sa SMapnoBani b pesy/ibxaxi Hboro MiabonH KapSonaimiB 
napo4HHx Komxin?
In May 1988, Literaturna Ukraina published a series of public responses to this letter. As 
will be seen below, arguments against completing construction at Chyhyiyn could be put into three 
groups: firstly, argued the opponents, the project was ecologically dangerous, as cooling water for 
the nuclear reactors would have to be provided from the Dniepr river, which was already drawn on 
to capacity. Secondly, construction had started without necessary inspection and without 
contacting local residents and finally, the location chosen for the nuclear power station was a well- 
known historical landmark, being the headquarters of the former Hetman state.
Shortly after the founding o f Zelenyj Svit, Anatolyi Panov managed to get hold of a small bus 
and it was arranged that a journalist and a photographer accompany a group of Kiev activists to 
Chyhyryn to gather more information on the issue. Once again, however, people were scared and
fliTeparypna Ytcpaïna, 6.8.1987 (n.p.).
These deputies were I.Briukhovetskyi (deputy of the regional council), I. Kiyvenko (deputy of Verkhovna
Rada) and I. Zakliarchenko (deputy of the village council).
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in the end Dudko ended up travelling to Chyhyryn alone together with the journalist and the 
photographer. The group - although much smaller than expected - was well received (meetings 
with the leadership of the nuclear power station had been arranged beforehand), but all the time 
kept under observation to prevent it from contacting people. Various cultural arrangements were 
proposed to the group, as were drinks, coffee and tea. One morning, however, the three activists 
got up at the break of dawn and went to the construction site unaccompanied. Since those in 
charge of construction knew about the presence of the group, it was allowed in. The workers, 
most of whom had been brought in from Russia, were ready to lynch the activists, because if they 
had their way the construction workers would be made redundant. The leadership of the
project should be abandoned altogether.
Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, 14.5.1994.
,11
construction team did not know how to handle the situation as it was not prepared for such a 
confrontation.
Local residents, with whom the Greens succeeded in making contact, were more forthcoming.
.Only few years earlier, during construction of the Kakhovsk water reservoir on the Dniepr river 
they had been forced to abandon their homes and now it seemed likely to happen again. 
Moreover, compensation offered to them for the loss of their homes was set ridiculously low.
Thus they welcomed opposition to the nuclear power station and asked the Greens to help them^^.
Back in Kiev, Dudko initiated yet another alternative independent expert assessment as had been 
done o f the planned bridge over the Dniepr river to the island of Khortytsa. As a result, a second
:official expert assessment took place a month later. The official assessment concluded that the
Meanwhile, in Cherkassy, members of the local green group Ekolohiia, headed by lurii
Vysochyn, gathered 7,500 signatures in support of a telegram addressed to the USSR Supreme
Soviet, expressing broad concern regarding the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power
station. The text was composed at a big public meeting on ecology. A month later, in April 1988,
the Greens received an answer - from USSR Minatomenergo, which was considered deeply
disappointing. Apart from being vague, the letter made it clear that it was not up to the public to
decide questions of state significance. Moreover, said the writer of the letter, lurii Ignatenko, at
present there was no reason to reconsider the decision on the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear 
.power station. However, argued Viktor Hrabovskyi, Literaturna Ukraina’s correspondent who 
reported the case, after the 19th Party Conference people thought that they had the right to decide 
questions of state significance when such decisions affected their lives. Moreover, radio, TV and 
the Ukrainian press talked about the possibility of halting construction^®.
Jlireparypim VKpaïfia, 18.8.1988, c. 1,3.
262
In the spring and summer of 1988, Ukrainian newspapers published numerous letters and
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public complaints about the project. Literaturna Ukraina, for instance, reported that the public
response to the appeal by Ukrainian writers to discontinue construction at Chyhyryn had been
.overwhelming: people made phone calls, wrote letters and stopped by at the redaction. These 
people were not only Ukrainians, but also people living in other republics. A major point of 
concern amongst the general public, was the historical significance of Chyhyryn, not only for
Ukraine, but also for the USSR: eight writers from Lviv, for instance argued that Chyhyryn was 
one of the most sacred historical landmarks of Ukraine and should therefore be protected;
CaMi c-'iona M urupu ii, C y S o T iB , X o .a0 4 im ü  Hp, iiK i iipHxoiiBTb 40  
K04CI101 .1I04HIIH B (OllOCri 3 pB4KaMH T.f. lUeiBteilKa, CHMBO.lisyiO'ri) 
naHB4po4CMe b  n a i i i i f i  i c r o p u a n i ü  n av ib iT i. I  iie  ri-ibK H  4 .ÜI 
y K p a iH U iB . ftnrHpHBCBKa 3eM.na & 47KepeJioM iFarxiieiiiiH i io c r if ii iH x  
po34.yM iB ripo 40.110 GparepCTBa yK p a iiicB K oro . pociH C BK oro ra 
5 i . io p y c b K o r o  n a p o 4 iB .
Similar views were expressed by five readers from Kirovohradshchyna, M. Sukhov, P. Fedorov, 
V. Makarenko, M. Surozhok and O. Dolya:
Xto )K ne 4 0 4 yMaBCH c e p e 4  K B ix y io r o  c a 4 y , b caMOMy e n i n e i i r p i  
napo4 u o ï naM’îiTi byaoBarn aroM iiy  ejieKTpocraiiniio? Xi6a 
Æ iinpo poapaxoBanHH na x a x y  CHJiy axoMUHX ra iiiiuMx cra im in?!
!
A biologist, I. Cherniavenko, produced a letter signed by 97 people in support of
discontinuing construction at Chyhyryn. Children from the 13th middle school in Rivne oblast
gathered signatures against further construction. One doctor V. Ostapchuk attacked the
bureaucracy, arguing that as long as nobody was responsible for anything, nothing would change.
.The deputy leader of Derzhplan, V. Nikitenko, revealed that Ukrainian institutions were opposed 
to the project when it was elaborated:
IlpoeK'r 6 y 4 iBiiHU,TBa ftHrupMiicbKOi AEG. BUKOuaiiHH KnlBCbicMM 
Bi44i.BeinuiM iucrnTyTy ”ATOMeiiepronjX)eKT” ua ociioBi iiM iii 
4ii04oro  yiiiiliiKOBaiioro npoeKxy, po3K.rui4aBCH Top iK  y c i  Ma 
3auiKaB.neiiMMM opranlBauiaMU pecny5.riiKM i  3 G im u iic r io  i x  lie 
y3ro44ceiiMH. U iKaoo, mo oc iiob iim m  m o th o o m  Bi4.M0BH crajia 
Bi4cyT iiici'b y iipoexT i ’VieTaabiiGl dajiaiicoBoï [X)3Po6kh nuxaiib 
B040cn04CMBaiiHa 3 p. d.ninpo, mo s ocnoBiioio i im ti io io  aprepiE io  
pecnybJiiKM. onaney AEG iia eKoaoriqiiy odcraiiOBicy p erio iiy  A
illlUHX (liaKTOpiB".
Fie announced that the project was currently being reworked, in connection with a resolution 
by all-union directive bodies and existing rules and norms recommended by the IAEA. New
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elaborations made based on the analysis of the Chernobyl accident were also taken into account, as 
was a resolution (No 533) passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on 26 May 1987^’. Also 
Literaturna Ukraina came out against further construction.
Some months after the letter of the Cherkassy writers (August 1987), Ukrainian TV broadcast 
a program called ‘Hrani Piznannia’. The programme was attended by well-known Ukrainian 
scientists and then vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, V. Kukhar. The latter 
voiced the view that the Chyhyryn nuclear power station should and would not be completed on 
the following grounds;
ripo 3neyieiiiiii ftMrupMiicbKOi AEG Cboroiuii nuTamui imua.ii ue 
croïTb. 3a jma TMXcui oiiic.ui na aanuxamui ’’AKxya.ibiioi KaviepH"
- ;iaciyniiHK Munncxpa Axovmoi EneiiexuKM GGGP, 0.J1. Jlaiiuiuii. 
npaxoByiOMH, uio iTecriyd.aiKa (axvte xaK i  cKaaao - "iieciiybaiKa”)
BHHUJ.ria 3 np0n03HUi£l0 [ipMnMIIMXH 6y4iBtIHUXB0 ftuPMpmiCbKOl 
axoMuoi. MiiiaxoMeiiepro posmiwa £ uvioBipnicrb poaxamynainia 
‘mmpHiicbKHX rtoxyxcnocreH na iimiHX axoMiiux craiiijiax iia 
yxpaiui.
Other programmes were also broadcast - like ‘Chyhyryn nuclear power station - for and 
against’ (Chyhyiynska AES - za i proti). Altogether there were three such programmes and they 
were all sceptical to further construction of the nuclear power station. In addition, numerous 
publications appeared in the press. They were accompanied by public activity and by a campaign 
conducted by Zelenyj Svit. Thus, public opinion came down firmly against the Chyhyryn nuclear 
power station - a view which was shared by the Ukrainian scientific community.
Throughout 1988 and 1989, opposition towards the Chyhyryn nuclear power station 
continued to appear on the pages of the Ukrainian press. Local residents from Lutsk in Volynia 
oblast, expressed anger against building a nuclear power station in Chyhyi*yn - ‘the heart of 
Ukraine, one of the pearl of our history. To build a nuclear power station in this place is, in our
view, pure v a n d a l i s m A l l u r e s  to the greatness of Chyhyryn in the past were made again in
.Literaturna Ukraina in an article covering the visit of the Russian writer, Viktor Astafev to
Chyhyryn: Poruch, where the nuclear power station was being built, was a memorial to the
renown warrior Ivan Rzhevskii, colonel Iakov Korobtsy and other ‘Orthodox god-loving warriors’, 
who were caught in battle defending Chyhyryn in 1678 when it came under attack from a 120,000 
strong Turkish-tartar horde. Moreover, overlooking Chyhyryn was Bohdanova bora, with a 
memorial to Bohdan Khmelnitskyi. After construction started, the landscape was being destroyed; 
-------------------------------------------
^^r in o  nocMJieiiHfl Do.rii eKcneoxHSH n p o eK x iB  tia OvaiBHMUxBo Kuvniiux HacojiuorocnoiiaDCbKHX  
o 5 '  EK x iB  3 M6X010 rioneDejixceiiHil HeraxHBimx eKO.riori4tiHX n a c.r iiitK iu .
Pajiaucbm YKimiim. 27.9.1989 (n.p.).
Un 3eM.'ifi - lie crap'roBMH viaHÆUBiHK. Ue i  no.iHCKa. i  tkh'ith. i
34opoB’ii AH'i'fliie. Ue ciana iiijiiucbKa, ue ace MaMbyriie ixiioro
po4y i  iiap04y. H k  x c e  Moxciia nMiUMXH üoro c b o ï .mm pyRUMU?!
'
People were told about the blessings of the nuclear power station, but, argued the author:
He rpeSa 6jiar! Tpe6a xch tta, 34opon’ n (liisHMUoro i  iiyxoBuoro.
Ha a/ipecy npoBiiUiHx nncbMeiniHKiB niiuuH jthctm 3 ilninpoBHX 
SeperiB: ciM  thcbb rpovia/inii riiAiiHcaJiM Jincr na XIX
napTKOiKpepeuuiio, bkmh i  aoctbhb 3a a^iiecoio 11 jieuerar Bopuc 
OaiHUMK. 3  TpudyiiH ueiiiurpa/iCbKoï B cecB iruboi KoïKliepeimiï 
npo ilHrUpMllCbKHH CMIUipOM PGBOpMB OueCb F GlBiap.
Concern was also expressed with the possible implications the nuclear power station would 
have on public health. The general ecological situation in Cherkassy was bad due to several 
chemical enterprises. Besides, the drinking water was already polluted. It was feared that the 
nuclear power station would further raise levels of pollution in the area. Besides, it was likely to 
harm the environment elose to the site. The site, by the way, was situated in a local nature 
preserve where construction of any enterprise was banned in the first place.
More technical/scientific evidence against continuing construction at Chyhyryn also surfaced: 
an article in Radianska Ukraina'^, for instance, pointed out that once completed, the reactors of 
Chyhyryn nuclear power stations would operate below the level o f the Kremenchuh water 
reservoir. In other words if the water reservoir for some reason burst its banks, the nuclear power 
station would be flooded. Moreover, the reactors were being built on unstable sand ground. 
Although this was not karst, as was the case on the site of the Rivne nuclear power station, it could 
still cause sliding of the ground below the reactors.
The Greens, for their part, published a six point appeal in Vechirnyi Kyiv on 26 December 
1988, arguing for the abandoning of three nuclear power stations; the Crimean and Chyhyryn 
stations, and also the South Ukraine Energy Complex. More specifically, on the Chyhyryn nuclear 
power station, the association called for an immediate stop in construction pending the judgement 
of independent experts.
Due to pressure from the public and resistance to the project from the Ukrainian scientific 
community, construction at Chyhyryn was temporarily halted while the project was being re­
examined based on stricter rules for the construction and location o f nuclear power stations that 
had emerged in the aftermath o f the Chernobyl accident. There were, however, reports from 
Cherkasschyna that construction continued at full speed. This was confirmed by M. Bilokur,
"fi
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I  mo 5  TaM ue 6yjio - mm Sy^e axoMna cra im ia , mm «xecb iu iu e  
aimpMEMCTBO iVfiuicieixn'oa euepreTHKH, Bce 04110 nuTaima U4ce
nuclear power station. This suggestion was well received by local authorities. In a letter to CPU
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deputy in charge of the construction workers. He said that ’already for two years now we are 
building the nuclear power station, but we do not know what will come out of it’"’®.
Not everybody was against continuing construction, though. The general director of the
nuclear power station V. Sapronov, and its leadership generally, favoured further construction on
the grounds that so much money had already been spent on the site that there was no way back: 
the only way to write off 95 million rubles that had been spent at the construction site since 1 
January 1988 was to complete construction^’. With regard to reports that construction was 
continuing, he argued that equipment work of the nuclear power station itself was being stopped, 
but that a factory to make installations for the nuclear power industry was being set up. This 
information did not go well down with greens and others opposed to the nuclear power station: 
the opponents argued that every nuclear power station had its own factory to provide installations.
I
Consequently there was no need for the factory that was being built at the Chyhyryn site. A 
driver, living seven km away from the site of the nuclear power station, when asked by Astafev 
what was his attitude towards the station, argued that he did not really care as it was not being 
built in his area. But, as Astafev replied, it is not a question o f kilometres should an accident take
place. It would affect everyone - not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere.
First Secretary o f the party raikom, V. Bratik, expressed the view of the local party 
organisation, arguing that the primary issue o f concern was not so much with whether or not the 
nuclear power station would be built but more with the future of Chyhyryn. If the nuclear power 
station was eventually abandoned, then Minenergo should set up some alternative 
enterprise/facility:
BMpiuiene...MM 6 i 4M ne SaMMMO - mm 6y4e  axoMiia cra iiu ia , mm iie 
6y4e. Mm SaMHMO, mo nepcncKTHBa 3a BurupunoM, 3a floro 
P03BMTK0M...A mo Tyx 6y46 upMB ' flsaiio. flKi o6'£KXM, nac ue 
Cboroani naBixb i  ue xypby £.
First secretary o f Cherkassy party obkom, Oleksandr Ruzhitskyi, shortly after informed that 
there had been no resolution to halt construction o f the Chyhyryn nuclear power station.
In the meantime the Ministry of Energy continued its assessment of the original nuclear 
power station project. Eventually it was proposed that a thermal electrical station replace the ' t
JJiwpaTypim VKiMXim, 19.5.1988, c. 7.
f
General Secretary, Shcherbitskii, Ruzhitskyi and the leader of the oblast soviet executive 
committee, V. Shapoval, expressed the following view:
OdmecrDemiocrbio nee ocrpee crannTcn nonpoc o uiJeKpameiiHH 
crpoHTeJiiicrna A3C m pasMemennn na crpoMTe-niiHOH n.rioma4Ke 
6e3onacHbix n BKOJiormiecKOM oTiioiiienHH upempuaTun.
OSkOM IiapTHH M oSjlMCnOJIKOM B UeJlOM n0Jt05KHTe.BbII0 OTHOCBTCa K 
n[)64Ji0yKeiiMflM MHiBiiepro CCCP, h Mmia'roM3iiepro YCCP o 
cipoHTeJibcroe na cymecTByiomeH luioma^Ke TenaoaaeKrpocrannMM na 
base naporasoBbix ycxanoBOK (nPY), Tenannnoro KovinjieKca m pwta 
BKoaorHMecKM MHcrbix npoH3B04Ci'B, CBBsauHbix raaBUbiM o6pa30M c  
BbinycKOM TOoapoB napoanoro noT[3e6aenMH^ .^
Ruzhitskyi and Shapoval requested that their view be taken into consideration when deciding 
the future use of the site. Their suggestion would, they argued, improve supplies of electric power 
in Central Ukraine as well as make more efficient use of the construction workers provided by 
USSR Minatomenergo as they could switch from building the nuclear power station to building 
the gas station, housing, a proper infrastructure, various enterprises planned for construction. 
Moreover, their suggestion would provide proper heating of houses in surrounding villages as well 
as secure measures initiated by the Ukrainian government to protect and develop nature preserves 
on the territory o f the Chyhyryn region.
A hand-written note attached to the letter, and written by Volodymyr Shcherbitskii on 17 May 
1989 to B. Kachura o f the Ukrainian Central Committee, supports the propositions made by 
Ruzhitskyi and Shapoval: T think it makes sense to follow this suggestion. Talk it over with 
comrade V.D. Hladush and V.O. MasoP^^. Shortly after, on 19 May 1989, the USSR Council of 
Ministers passed a resolution permanently abandoning the Chyhyryn nuclear power station and 
converting it into an ‘ecologically clean enterprise’ "^’.
Although the outcome of the campaign to stop construction of the nuclear power station at
-
Chyhyryn ended positively from the point of view of the Greens and others who shared their 
concern, there was still something to be said about the autonomy of all-union ministries and 
departments that made decisions ignoring what would be in the best interests of those who would 
be affected by these decisions. Borys Oliinyk, addressing the first USSR Congress o f People’s 
Deputies on 25 May 1989 thus made a fierce attack on Soviet bureaucracy generally and its
>■decisions with regard to nuclear power in Ukraine in particular:
-------------------------------------------
Letter No. 124/2. of 12.5.1989 in (1)0H4 No. 1, oiinc No. 32, cnp. No. 233, apx. 20,21. 
K 40KVMRI1TV No. 964/140. in $0H4 No. 1, onnc No. 32, cnp. No, 233, apK, 18. 
PaxtmcbKa YKpaXiia, 24.5,1989 (n .p .).
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B npjiMOH CBJ13M C yK itenjieiiMevi cyBe[3enHTeTa iieciiyfi.riHK - ripobaeviu 
coxpaneiiM ii C[X34U obH iaHM a. Baumxa e e  ü t  iiamecrBMH ueiirpa.ribnbix 
Be4 0 MCTB, KOTopbie 6e3aaK a3an!io  BiieÆpaiOT A3C. xMMUMecKHe 
M oncrpu, BœB03M0îKHbie Kaiia/iu, r^ e hm B34yM aerca. A riocKoabKy 
CBOH "icyKyuiKHHbi 4,apbi” Be40MCTBa. KHK npaBHJio. iioabpacbiBaiOT b  
obîKHTbie BeKaMH, 04e.fT0Be*ieHHbie KyabTypHO-McropHMecKHe neiirpu, 
KaK-TO: K h c b , MHrapHii, K aneB, 3anopoxbe, P o b iio , XMeabiiHUKHH,
nOCKO-BbKy 3TH MHHbl fl04C0BblBaaMCb ne TOAbKO 1104 HaUMOliajIbllbie 
CBfn'bniH, HO h no4 bcio pecnybJiMKy, 6opb6a npoTHB liOBoaBJiemibix 
npoMbiuiJieiinbix 3axBaT4HK0B BMX04MT yxce lia nepanA naan. H 
BHpaB4y. eme O4nii-4oa MepiioSbuia, ne iipHBe4M rocno4M. h y^ce ne c  
K6M M iieKOMy b y a e r  cpaxcarbca iim sa iisbiic, iih m  Kyjibrypy 
Boobme^ .^
However, he proceeded, the first victory over this seemingly uncontrollable bureaucracy had 
already been won. The decision to stop construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station was a 
prime example. A similar decision ought, however, to be made also with regard to the nuclear 
power station on the Crimea, because not anywhere else in the world were nuclear power stations 
being built in an area that was so potentially dangerous due to several geophysical conditions (see 
Chapter Six).
Oliinyk’s views were very much shared by Valentina Shevchenko, chairman of the Presidium 
of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Members of Zelenyj Svit accused her o f hiding information in 
the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Her address to the Congress of People’s 
Deputies, though, was very much in line with CPU’s general attitude towards expanding nuclear 
power in Ukraine at the time (I will return to the CPU and nuclear power in more detail in Chapter 
Six). Almost one third o f the Soviet nuclear power industry was located on Ukrainian territory as 
were a considerable part of the country’s metallurgical and chemical enterprises - despite o f 
Ukraine being one of the most fertile areas in the USSR, accounting for roughly a quarter of its 
agricultural produce. Her attitude towards ‘Moscow’, however, was less confrontational than that 
o f Oliinyk:
Ha4o ocasaTb, mto corosnoe npaBHTejibCTBo bo mhopom nouuio 
pecnybiiHKe iiaBcipeny. Ho nacTO/iTenbHbiM naujMM npocbbaM npniurrbi 
peuieuHn o KoncepBaunn crpoHTejibcrBa 04eccKOfi n XapbKOBCKOH 
AT3B[. ripexpameno coopy^cenne hoblix siieprobnoroB na 
MepnobbmbCKOH cranuMH h MurapniicKOH A3C. npoBe4ena 
axo/iorHMeCKaji 3KcnepTM3a lOjfcno-yKpaHiicKoro aneproKOMnnexca h 
paccMaTpHBaercji nonpoc ero aajibnenuiero pa3nnTMfl.
95 riepBbiH cbe34 naD04Hbix aenvTaTOB CCCP. 25 Ma» - 9 Hionn 1989 r.. ci'eHorpa(|)HMecKMH OTMex. tom  II 
(MocKBa: H34aime BepxOBiioro Coeeia CCCP, 1990 r.), c. 37. Borys Oliinik was elected from the CPSU 
list. He is a poet and at the time secretary of the board of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union.
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This, however, did not mean that everything was fine and well: decisions to stop construction 
o f the Crimean nuclear power station and of new reactors at the Khmelnitskyi and Rivne nuclear 
power stations were dragging out in time. This, argued Shevchenko, agitated the public and had 
brought about a tense political climate in the republic. With regard to nuclear power there was 
obviously a need for it also in the future. However, no further expansion was admissible on 
Ukrainian territory due to a number of objective factors that had so far not been taken adequately
The Greens were thus able to mobilise support against the construction of the Chyhyryn
I
into consideration:
Mbi noiiHMacM, mto 6 e3  aTOMHux ajieKTpoCTanuHfi n n ioeiinpm n’Hü 
TsixejioH MHAycrpMH lie obouTHCb, no h pasBHiiaTb ux jia.abiue y iiac 
iie x y ^ a . He XBaxaeT hh boæiux, hh rpy^oBb ix pecyiÆOB, iiaK:a.aeiia m  
npe/ie.aa aicoaormiecKaa obcranoB K a.
.
To compensate, new technologies that would not only be energy-saving, but also less harmful 
to the environment should be implemented^^.
Yet another deputy of the Congress of People’s Deputies and later also of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, V. Romanenko - director of the Institute of Hydrobiology o f the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences - brought up technical evidence to prove that the decision to abandon construction at
Chyhyryn was correct; i
.Mjiomajim  ^nm puncKOM  aroM noH sJieKTpocraHUMM, a  e e  
n|)eA noaarajiocb  crp on xb  y KpeM eii'iyrCKoro BOAOxpaiiHJiHuta, hh no  
3KOJlOrHM0CKMM, IIH BO 9K0H0MMHeCKHM ROKasaTeaflM 116 HO^XOAHT.
OoaeMy? HoroMy, <ito KpeMeiniyrcKoe BOitoxpaimjiHme -  aro 
B04opacnpeAeAMT6abHoe Bo^oxpanHJiHuie. Hs nero nuTaexca bo^oh 30
97MH.naHGHOB aeaoB6K  m npoMbiuiaenHOcrb .
nuclear power station not only from experts, but also within CPU circles. Their arguments in turn 
made the CPSU abandon plans to build a nuclear power station in Chyhyryn.
■i
HePBbiH Cb63j naooüHbix JienviaTOB CCCP. 12- 24 aexaSpa 1989 r.. crenoiqxuliHMecKuü otmct. tom VI 
(MocKBa: MB^anne BepxoBHoro Conei'a CCCP, 1990 r.), c. 449. Shevchenko’s speech was not presented to 
the Congress, but handed over to the Secretariat o f the Congress for publication.
HePBaa ceccmi BenxoBiioro CoBexa CCCP. creiiorpadiHBecKHH otm6t. nacrb III. 13- 17 hiohh 1989 r. 
(MocKBa: HSAanne BepxoBuoro Coaera CCCP, 1990 r.), c. 178.
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Chernobyl
As for Chernobyl, Zelenyi Svit undertook several campaigns and actions against this nuclear
9 8power station both before and after the association’s First Congress . To give but a few 
examples, vitamins obtained from charities abroad were distributed to those areas most affected by 
Chernobyl by Zelenyi Svit activists. What was more, Greenpeace in Germany gave a tox-rad lab to 
Zelenyi Svit to enable the association to conduct alternative analysis of the soil and the water in 
areas affected by radiation. This lab was run by Volodymyr Tykhyi, a radiobiologist by 
profession. An organisation to help victims of the Chernobyl accident, Vriatuvannia, was 
established as a collective member of Zelenyi Svit. This organisation is currently headed by Evhen 
Korbetskyi, himself a nuclear physicist. Another organisation, MAMA-86, consisting primarily of 
mothers whose children were born after the Chernobyl accident, was also set up within the 
framework of Zelenyi Svit to send children affected by radiation on holidays to places free from 
radiation.
3.2.3 Further Organisational Developments
On 7 Januaiy 1989, the first annual meeting of Zelenyi Svit took place in Kiev. At this 
meeting lurii Shcherbak was elected new leader of the association and a co-ordinating committee 
consisting of some 14-15 members was set up. Zelenyi Svit opened its own bank account and was 
generally made more mobile, Plachynda, explaining his reason for leaving Zelenyi Svit, argued 
that ‘people with personal interests and a cosmopolitan outlook had joined the movement. These 
people were young and wanted some benefits. They asked me to send them to Poland and to 
London to attend a symposium. 1 told them 1 would not let them go. We had enough problems to 
solve within Ukraine’s own borders and 1 held the view that we should spend our financial means 
and our energy on this - not on trips to foreign countries. Therefore, we gave priority to 
expeditions’^^ . He maintained that he was not opposed to Western Green groups as such: Zelenyi 
Svit received journals and visits from Western Europe and he was not against learning from their 
experiences. However, money was scarce and therefore foreign trips could not be justified.
Above 1 have given some attention to Chernobyl and its significance in relation to the Green Movement. I 
will, however, not go into the long and complex discussion surrounding this issue for two reasons: Firstly, it 
is impossible to address this issue properly on just a few pages. Secondly, there is a substantial literature on 
Chernobyl, whereas information about other anti-nuclear campaigns is much more sparse. I have given some 
attention to the nuclear power station at Chyhyryn as this was one of the very first campaigns initiated by the
Greens and thus important in organisational terms. For a detailed account of one particular campaign, see 
Chapters Six and Seven.
Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.
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Plachynda’s opposition to travelling abroad was linked to a broader debate within Zelenyi Svit 
as to where its priorities should lie and what exactly should be the relationship to Green groups 
and organisations in the West. It would eventually turn into a debate on equipment and hard 
currency and end in bitter personal conflicts - a situation which reached a peak at Zelenyi Svit's 
second Congress, which took place in Ivano-Frankivsk in late March 1990. I will return to this 
issue below, suffice it here to say that this issue, possibly even more than other factors such as a 
general dépolitisation of the Ukrainian public, a drop in support due to the deteriorating economic 
situation in Ukraine has been the most damaging cause of dispute within the Green Movement 
itself.
Plachynda’s exit from Zelenyi Svit also facilitated a broader exodus o f people who held more 
radical views on the national issue. Plachynda is known for his radical views, and in an interview 
with the author complained that during Shcherbak’s leadership o f Zelenyi Svit links were made 
with commercial structures to channel funds to the association. This, he said, could be explained 
by the fact that Shcherbak was a Jew*°°. Whether or not Shcherbak is a Jew or a Ukrainian is 
beside the point. Judging by his speeches, Shcherbak is as patriotic as Plachynda in linking 
ecological revival to the revival of Ukraine - but whereas the former include all people living in 
Ukraine in this revival, Plachynda stressed the ecological revival o f the Ukrainian people in 
p a r t i c u l a r I n  addition to electing a leader and three deputy leaders: Dmytro Hrodzinskyi 
(corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences), V. Sakhaev (a doctor of 
economic sciences) and lurii. Tkachenko (film director), the annual meeting also elected a co­
ordinating committee - Zelena Rada - and a secretariat’^^ .
March 1989 Elections to USSR Congress of People’s Deputies
1988 had seen an increased politicisation not only of society in general, but also o f so-called 
informal movements and groups in the USSR. This politicisation caught on in the aftermath o f the 
XIX Party Conference (June 1988) and demands in the Baltic States for economic and later also 
political sovereignty. In Ukraine radical groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and 
the Culturological Group, which to a large extent were composed of former political prisoners
'"“Ibid.
As for the commercial links in question, I have been told by members of Zelenyi Svit who do not wish to 
be named, that a bank - Narodnyi Bank - was set up with capital fiom rich Israelis and that members of 
Zelenyi Svit were involved with setting up this bank. lurii Samoilenko, since December 1994 the leader of 
Zelenyi Svit, was at that time sitting on the board of the Narodnyi Bank. The dire financial situation Zelenyi 
Svit is currently in - its office in Kiev was at the end of 1994 temporarily closed due to a lack of funds and 
due to disputes within the movement - seems to suggest that there is no direct financial link between the two.
PamtcbKa yKjxiïm, 18.7.1989 (n.p.).
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control o f industries on this territory and consequently also no control of the amount of pollution 
they'had to suffer as a result. Then as pointed out by Oles Honchar
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released in an amnesty in 1987, were amongst the first to emerge on the political scene. Zelenyi
Svit, though, from the very beginning claimed that it was a non-political movement whose policy
was that of consolidation and co-operation, not confrontation.
It soon became clear, however, that the environment was in fact a highly politicised issue. 
This was acknowledged by Academician Hrodzinskyi, a prominent member of Zelenyi Svit. When 
asked to explain this state of affairs, he argued as follows:
...ToM.y. UK) uojiiTHKa ;ty%:e iiOB’siiîana 3 eicoiiOMiKOio. a eKOUouiKa 
T iciio  n e p e n a i  r a s  rhcji 3 eK O .a o r ie io . Y bb'jibk.v 3 u h t  po3B'ii:miiiui 
eKoaoriMUHx npod.qeM 3aB5Kau cynpowjmncn piuieuiuiMu 
eKo.rioriiinoro xapaKxepy. a ace ue Banina £ A iio.aiTMniti fiHTaima
ypfWOBoro MaciUTady. ToM.y w e iii 3po3yMi.io. no.viy T i .  xro 6yu
cepea ”3e.neuHx”, nparuya yBiuTU 40 c o a i i y  uauioro iiapaaMeirry.
Ta A BuSopui 3ae6 iab iuoro niÆrpuMyBaau i x  i a e l .  hkI  bohh i
The link Hrodzinskyi had in mind, was that of economic and political structures and policies. 
Ukraine suffered from a cocktail of pollutants emitted into the air and water by close to one 
thousand chemical enterprises and other factories and five nuclear power stations. Only five 
percent of the Ukrainian industry was controlled by Ukrainian ministries and departments - the 
remaining 95% were controlled by all-union ministries and departments. Since 1976 Ukrainian 
agriculture had been centralised, too. What was more, all the Ukrainian nuclear power stations, 
including Chernobyl, were controlled from ‘Moscow’ by Minatomenergo (the Soviet Ministry of 
Nuclear Power). A feeling of helplessness and of anger was brought about by campaigns to have 
the most seriously polluting enterprises closed and campaigns to reduce the impact o f nuclear 
power in Ukraine being hampered by ‘Moscow’. This archaic centralised structure of the 
economy was not only inefficient in that it encouraged output at the expense of quality and thus 
also maximal use of natural resources (created waste), but it was also highly undemocratic and 
dangerous to the environment in the sense that the people inhibiting a physical territoiy had no
:
Hajtiiau ionajibn i BiAOMCTna, xaK i kk MiiiaTOMeiiepro. MiiuiOArocn, 
x iM iB iii KoiicepiiH, in i u i  cynepriraiiTM, iie bbbjickm xoByxb 
paxyBaTHca 3 iiiTepecaMu iiapoay ft 4ep:*:aBH, ue b o h h  riOAiJiu 
K païiiy m obS m  iia iiKicb Bi/ioM'iu ew ipa™  i  neuia^iio iiiBenaTb 
BCMJiio, BHHHKaioTb lia D ixep iiapoan i MiJibiipan. A CKijibKU ^i^Baiio 
LUKOiiH naBKoauuinbOMy cepe^oBuiny. rpyinaM, piKKaivi!'"''
s
PamiŒKa YKpaXiia (n.d.). 
JliTepaTyprm VKpalaa, 9.3.1989, c. 3.
lurii Shcherbak and other members of Zelenyi Svit had on numerous occasions expressed their 
discontent with the economic and political system for its lack of glasnost on environmental issues, 
for the secrecy surrounding the Chernobyl accident in particular and nuclear power in general and 
also for the authority of the departments ranking higher than that of well qualified s c i e n t i s t s I t  
therefore came as no big surprise that some 20 enterprises and scientific institutions representing 
practically all the electoral districts of Kiev suggested Shcherbak’s candidacy. He was eventually 
formally put forward as a candidate in the Shevchenko electoral district to compete with several 
other candidates and an election which he won.
Shcherbak presented his electoral platform to the general public in Literatnrna Ukraina on 16 
M a r c h T o  Shcherbak the ultimate measure was Man and his well-being. Therefore, he did not 
favour the ‘quantity o f steel per capita, but rather the health of the people and its children’. 
Relations between people must be humanised, he argued, the device no longer being ‘he who is 
not with us, is against us’, but rather ‘he who is not against us, is with us’ - thus reversing official 
doctrine. To protect Man from the ‘system’, he called for the adoption of a Law on Human 
Rights.
In the economic sphere Shcherbak called for stabilisation (fight against inflation) arguing that 
this was a prerequisite for improving the ecological situation in Ukraine. There was also a need 
for changing priorities, reducing spending on defence and on what he referred to as ‘the expensive 
and ambitious projects of Minvodgosp, Minatomenergo and other departments/bureaucratic 
structures’. Shcherbak also called for an overhaul of economic structures, replacing the command- 
administrative system with more self-rule and with a number of means of ownership.
On the issue of deflation, Shcherbak sought justification in the writings o f Lenin, arguing in 
favour o f a
B i 4H0B.neHim jieiiiHChKux npHimuniB iianuo iiam noï noaiTUKH.
...BceSiqiie posiuMpeinni npao coiobhhx pecnySa iK , oSaacreu, paüoniB, 
nepexi^i i x  iia rocnpospaxyiioK xa peaau ie  
caM0BpflxyBamifl...3aaHuiKiB cxaaiiim unw xa SpexuieBmuHH b y c ix  
cilieixix iiapoAHoro acnxxn.
Shcherbak was in favour of strengthening the national consciousness o f the Ukrainian people
through increasing the importance of language, culture, histoi-y, and its national peculiarities. In 
this connection the Ukrainian language should be declared the official language of Ukraine, while 
at the same time full rights should be given to other languages spoken on the territory of the 
republic. Negative aspects such as national nihilism, chauvinism and ethnic conflicts should be 
fought energetically.
See interview with lurii Shcherbak in Jlireparypim YKpct.ïna, 26.1.1989, c. 2. 
JliTepaTypua YKpaXna, 16.3.1989, c. 2-3.
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As for ecological issues, Shcherbak suggested that an article securing the right o f  every I
citizen to live in an environmentally clean environment be incorporated into the Soviet 
Constitution as one of the basic human rights. Furthermore, as a first step to combat pollution and 
the health problems it caused, Shcherbak wanted full glasnost on data linking health problems to 
pollution, including data on Chernobyl. With regard to nuclear power, he favoured a halt to 
construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine and a radical solution to the problems - technical | |  
as well as others - that emerged as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The people should have its 
say on issues such as the construction of new nuclear power stations and/or enterprises that would 
have a negative impact on the environment. This should be done by means of referenda. Another ÿ:way to secure the improvement of the Ukrainian environment was to expand the Green movement A 
and to create independent (public) research institutes and laboratories to be used for conducting 
environmental impact assessments.
#Finally, Shcherbak called for realism, arguing that he was in no position to promise the 
electorate manna from heaven as he did not have the financial means, nor the power, the 
administrative apparatus or the possibility of building houses, kindergartens and hospitals in his 
electoral district. He could, however, promise those who would vote for him that he would do 
everything within his powers to execute his programme and to secure the rebirth o f Ukraine 
through the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies.
The Green Movement took an active part in the election campaign by supporting candidates 
whose programmes were acceptable to them from an ecological point of view. As pointed out by 
lablokov, the Russian biologist and environmentalist, it was next to impossible for any candidate *to the Congress of People’s Deputies to be elected without having included in their programme a 
section on the environment. There were, however, vaiying degrees of commitment to the
environment amongst the candidates and Zelenyi Svit thus urged people to vote for those 
candidates who had a clear and concise programme suggesting how to combat pollution in 
Ukraine:
■■■:
F|X)MaiuiHM, xau iiam M iruiir 6yAt noKaTKaM nceiiai>Oitiioro 
eKOJioriqiioro pyxy. Hapoii Mepes pe^ieiieiwyw. nepes c b o i x  =#
AenyxaTiB noBHneii osfixu KOirrpoJtH eKOJioriHiioft c u x y a u i i  b  c b o ïx  i
pyKM. ripoGjieMH eKOJioriBHOl 6ecneKH YKpainu waiob BMpMutyBaxu 
lie A6Cb, a na Y K p a iiii, i  BupiniyBaxu i x  iie Koiuycb. a iiaw.
Bucyeafixe KaiiAHAaxawH b Aenyxaxn x u x , xxo Mae a ixK y  
eKOJioriBiiy nporpawy a I h . CxBopiouxe AenyxaxcbKHX eKOJioriqui 
rpynu i  BUMarauxe b Ia  h h x  3B ixiiocxi. MasMo naA iio, mo 
AeMOKpaxHsanisi cycniJibcxaa - ue i  uoBi MOACJiHBOCxi b 6opoxb6 i
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3a sGepejKenHîi tiai3Ko;iHLHiiboro cepeaoBHma i  rapairria ycnixy 
6opoTb6H'“l
Judging by the election result, people seemed to follow Zelenyi Sv i f s  advise: a number of 
those writers who either supported or worked within Zelenyi Svit stood for election - among them 
were also Oles Honchar and Professor of Chernivtsi University, Leontyi Sanduliak - and altogether 
seven of these were elected people’s deputies. Shcherbak was at the Congress of People’s 
Deputies elected a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of its subcommittee on 
nuclear ecology’®^. As a deputy he was entitled to his own office in Kiev. Personally Shcherbak 
did not need this office, and he therefore gave the one-room office he was allocated in Hostynnyi 
Dvir in Podil to the association. Being on good terms with Ivan Saliy, then first secretary of the 
Podil party raikom, Shcherbak through the latter managed to obtain a bigger office (two small 
rooms and a larger meeting room) shortly after, and this office is still being used as Zelenyi Svi f s  
headquarters”’^ .
Founding Conference. Kiev. 26 April 1989
The elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies not only highlighted the environment as 
an issue, it also greatly improved Zelenyi SvWs potential to succeed in its campaigns through its 
own deputies and through deputies who were sympathetic to its case. Boosted by the elections and 
generally optimistic about the future, the Greens came together in Kiev a month later to discuss 
organisational issues and to pass a provisional statute, according to which Zelenyi Svit would base 
its work prior to the Congress scheduled for the autumn.
The statute described Zelenyi Svit as being a voluntary public organisation, created to unite 
the forces o f organisations and the public in Ukraine to secure ecological equilibrium in Ukraine 
as a condition for a healthy existence of both Man and the environment. The founder o f Zelenyi 
Svit is the Ukrainian Peace Committee.
As regarded the organisational structure o f Zelenyi Svit, it was horizontal. The association 
united and co-ordinated the activities of local and primary groups, but at the same time collective 
members o f Zelenyi Svit retained the right to their own structure as well as having organisational 
and financial autonomy. There would be no membership fees nor would there be any membership 
lists. With regard to official authorities and the CPU, the statute made it clear that Zelenyi Svi f s
3BeDiieiiHH npejcraBHUKiB "seaeiioro d v x v ” j o  rnoM aiiflH  y K P a iH H  - ü op ori cninnijiBHSHMUKM.
rnoMaaflHH yKPaiuH.
Paôomn imera, 26.7.1989 (n.p.).
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.
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activities would be based on interaction with Soviet, (republican) state and party organs,
enterprises, co-operatives, scientific institutions and public organisations, including other informal
organisations. Zelenyi Svit would also co-operate with international ecological organisations.
The major task of Zelenyi Svit would be to activate the people of Ukraine to take directly part
in the solving of ecological problems in Ukraine and to organise broad public control of the
implementation of environmental legislation. Zelenyi Svit would try to secure the right of the
people of Ukraine to live in an environmentally clean environment.
Point six of the statute listed the major aims o f the association: first o f all, it would form an
ecological outlook on the world and create ecological awareness amongst the people of Ukraine.
Secondly, it would spread information about prominent ideas and achievements in the field of
environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources. To improve the state of the
environment, Zelenyi Svit intended to set up an information bank on the ecological situation in
Ukraine and elaborate ecologically sound programmes for the development of industries, energy,
transport and agriculture in addition to composing alternative programmes to officially endorsed
decisions and projects. Alternative ecological expert assessments would be made in connection
.with the construction or reconstruction of industrial facilities, energy-producing objects, transport
.and agriculture. Experts and the media would be included in this work. Zelenyi Svit would also 
initiate legal acts to protect the environment as well as press for glasnost on matters regarding the 
state of the environment. In cases of violation of environmental legislation, the Greens would 
bring this to the attention of the legal system for adequate measures to be taken. Finally, the 
statute called for a discussion of problems and ideas relating to the interaction between man and 
the environment and for broad international co-operation with ecological and anti-military 
organisations aiming at protecting man from environmental pollution and from nuclear war. To
facilitate the latter, Zelenyi Svit would take active part in the Ukrainian Peace Committee’s work 
to promote peace and a clean environment.
The statute was very liberal on the issue o f who could join Zelenyi Svit as individual or 
collective members. Anyone accepting its statute and willing to take actively part in protecting the 
environment was welcome to join - including Green groups, state enterprises, co-operatives, public 
organisations and scientific and establishments. No membership fee would be requested. 
Members had the right to obtain information from Zelenyi Svit and to bring to the attention o f the 
association issues they would like the association to address. Collective members could conduct 
campaigns on their own, independently o f Zelenyi Svit. However, only elected organs had the 
right to speak on behalf o f Zelenyi Svit as a Ukrainian association. As will be seen below, Zelenyi 
Svit would provide local and regional organisations with some legitimacy and protection from 
harassment and/or prosecution as it was a Ukrainian association and had many well-known people
-i;
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amongst its ranks. This situation was reflected in the statute, which made it clear that Zelenyi Svit 
would provide its members with protection from ‘unlawful intimidation and persecution’ as a 
result of their environmental activities’”’.
Zelenyi Sv i f s  structure would be as simple as possible, according to the statute. A congress 
would be called once every two years. The delegates would endorse the statute and a programme, 
elect a leader and deputy leaders, a secretariat, Green Council {Zelena Rada) and a control- 
revision commission. Between congresses, Zelena Rada^^^ would co-ordinate Zelenyi Svi f s  
activities. The Council would meet no less than twice a year and would be composed of Zelenyi 
Svi f s  leader, deputy leaders, members of the secretariat, representatives of the collective 
members, scientists and other experts. Day-to-day activities would be carried out by the 
association’s secretariat. Finally, the control-revision commission would see to it that there would 
be no violations of the statute and secure the implementation of decisions made by the congress as 
well as keep an eye with Zelenyi Svi f s  finances. The latter would be composed by voluntary 
donations and sponsor money in addition to money earned for public lectures, concerts and other 
fund-raising activities, such as the sale o f badges. This was curiously similar to that o f the CPSU. 
As a voluntary public organisation, Zelenyi Svit would be exempted from paying taxes. Zelenyi 
Svi f s  structure is graphically depicted on the following page.
The statute was published in the news^a^Qr Radianska Ukraina on 18 July 1989 - as the only 
Ukrainian newspaper that printed the temporary statute and organised a public discussion around 
it. The response to the draft statute was very good. The editorial board referred to a letter from 
one V. Samiilenko of Severodontesk, who had requested a copy of the statute from the newspaper. 
Many similar letters had been received and the journalists had at their own initiative distributed 
300 copies of the newspaper with the statute in it to public activists. Unfortunately it was unable 
to keep up this service, so anyone interested was requested to contact public libraries and read it 
there” A public discussion of the statute in the form of readers’ letters was printed in Radianska 
Ukraina on 18 and 30 of July, 19 August and 2 September 1989. Public response varied. F. 
Polishchuk from the village o f Ki'upets in Klimelnytska oblast, for instance, was unhappy with the, 
distinction between individual and collective members. He also did not approve of registering 
local groups of Zelenyi Svit locally, with local organs. In his view, these should be registered only 
in Kiev, then in his own experience it proved very difficult to create local groups of Zelenyi Svit. 
All attempts at registering such a group in his own area ended with officials shouting at him ‘what
" “ PointIII, p. 7.
As seen above, the first Zelena Rada was elected at the Januaiy 1989 conference in Kiev and consisted of 
some 15 Ze/cny/5'v/7 representatives.
Valentin Smaha in PajomcbKa YKpaXna (n.d.).
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do you think you are?’ This seemed to be a common problem to local organisations all over 
Ukraine.
Figure 1.1 Zelenyi Svit's Organisational Structure
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Comments to the statute emerged also in other papers. Danylo Kulyinak, a member of the 
Soviet W riters’ Union and head of the Kiev Derzhrybinspektsiia’s Public Council to Protect Fish 
wrote in a letter to Radianska Ukraina that his feeling after having read the statute was that he had 
been reading a copy of that of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection, UTOP. Consequently, 
he asked rather rhetorically, ‘do we need to create yet another UTOP'l He suggested a few 
improvements to the statute, including a clause that public control be exerted over the activities 
and cadre policies of Derzhkompriroda and to arrange for Zelenyi SviFs best qualified people to 
work within its structure. He also favoured référendums to be held with regard to the most
If
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important ecological problems and for the public to be able to veto controversial decisions with an 
environmental side to them"^.
Zelenyi Svit was not formally registered by the state, although it was founded under the 
auspices of the Ukrainian Peace Committee. The Founding Conference therefore decided to 
contact Derzhkompriroda to have the statute registered with the committee. Following this 
request, a heated debate took place in the Collegium of the state committee. As seen above, 
Derzhkompriroda had so far had a very arrogant attitude towards Zelenyi Svit, holding the opinion 
that there was no need for an independent environmental organisation in Ukraine as there was 
already a state committee, which was the only body ‘which did the right thing’. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, sceptical questions like ‘why do we need this creation? We are a state institution and 
they are informais. Thus we will be held accountable for them’, surfaced. In the end, however, 
the committee decided to register the statute, keeping in line with Prime Minister Ryzhkov’s 
words to the effect that ‘we must all become green!
A resolution' was passed on 25 July, stating that Derzhkompriroda registered the temporary 
statute and saying that all branches of Derzhkompriroda had been instructed to maintain 
permanent contacts with Zelenyi Svit. The resolution also referred to the expressed agreement of 
the Zelenyi Svit's secretariat to rework the statute bearing in mind comments made by 
Derzhkompriroda, Minfin, Miniust, Derzhkornpratsy and Derzhkomvidavu. These comments were 
attached to the copy of the resolution I was given by the Adviser to the Parliament on 
Environmental Issues, V. Oleshchenko. Altogether there were three pages of comments.
Most of the changes suggested by the various ministries were related to technical aspects of 
the statute - for instance, the Ministry of Justice wanted the reference to the Peace Committee 
removed. As an independent organisation, Zelenyi Svit was not subordinated to anyone. 
Similarly, the Ministry o f Finance wanted to add a clause on what to do with the assets of Zelenyi 
Svit should the association dissolve itself and Ministry of Employment {Derzhkornpratsy) wanted a 
clarification on what exactly would be the responsibilities o f the leader, deputy leaders, secretariat 
and control-revision commission. There were, however, also attempts at changing the contents of 
the statute for more overtly political reasons. The Ministry of Justice, for instance, suggested that 
the idea to set up an information bank be scrapped altogether, as this simply was not realistic.
Cm&rcKan YKpanna, (n.d.), c. 4.
[JpaBM yKpaiiMM, 28.7.1989, c. 3.
riocranoBa b I j  25.07.1989r. No. 19 ”npo Degci'pauiio OraTVTV yKpalHCbKol exojroriMHOl 
acQ U iauil ”3eJienMH C b I t . signed by First Deputy Leader o f Derzhkompriroda, 1. Liakh.
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Moreover, Zelenyi Svit was recommended to remove a preamble to the statute as ‘there is no need
for such an emotional preamble’"^.
F. Polishchuk did, as seen above, complain about opposition from the side of local authorities
towards attempts at creating local Green groups. This should, according to Radianska Ukraina,
.not repeat itself in the future, as Derzhkompriroda had sent its resolution ‘down the system’ and
moreover, as the resolution ordered regional and local units of Derzhkompriroda to co-operate 
with Zelenyi Svit. This did, however, not mean that the relationship between Derzhkompriroda 
and Zelenyi Svit automatically improved. As will be seen below, especially the youth wing of the 
latter was sceptical of the commitment of Derzhkompriroda to reform.
Why did it take Zelenyi Svit so long to adopt a statute? Academician Flrodzinskyi tried to 
answer this question in an interview with Sovetskaia Ukraina, arguing that some kind of system 
was needed to unite groups when they started emerging. Those people who initiated Zelenyi Svit 
wanted the most democratic form possible for this purpose and were against a vertical structure 
and a bureaucratic-centralistic approach. United by common ideas, and a yearning to find the best 
methods by which to solve the environmental problems in Ukraine, the Greens needed time ‘so 
that life itself could teach them how best to find a path worth following"^.
Another question frequently asked with regard to the statute o f Zelenyi Svit, was why there
was no membership fee. This could be explained, argued Hrodzinskyi, as when fees were
gathered, there was an element of obligation which constituted one step on the path towards
bureaucratisation. As Zelenyi Svit united people with a commitment of conscience membership
.fees would therefore make no sense. Expenses incurred in connection with congresses and other 
activities would rather be covered by earnings from activities such as concerts, public lectures,
I , gvoluntary donations, and film viewings . Membership lists were not to be kept - members would 
only be issued with a card stating that they were members of Zelenyi Svit and with a badge. This
was understandable given the general political climate under which Zelenyi Svit emerged. As 
pointed out by Zrezartsev above, the Peace Council had to submit a list o f the initiators to Zelenyi 
Svit and it was also requested to provide information o f a personal character about these people. I 
have also noted how people locally were being harassed by the authorities in connection with their 
environmental activities. Thus, not having a membership list could serve two purposes - on the
one hand it would make it more difficult for authorities to pinpoint members of Zelenyi Svit to
implement sanctions against them, on the other hand it could attract potential members who were
vary o f the consequences o f membership in an informal organisation and therefore would
____________________________
See 3avBaaeeHiiii jig GraTVTV yKPalncbKOl eKO.riori«iHOi a c o u ia i i i l  ’’3eJienHU Coi r", attached to 
Derzhkompriroda'^ resolution (see footnote above).
PaytnncbKa JA/«i7/a (n.d.)
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otherwise not have joined. Besides, this created a sense of informality and equality very different 
from the bureaucracy of public organisations and may in itself have served as an attraction to the 
general public.
Relationship to Derzhkompriroda. UTOP and POP
As seen above, Dina Protsenko, the Chairman of Derzhkompriroda, was not very happy with the 
emergence of Zelenyi Svit. As her committee was in charge of addressing environmental issues in 
Ukraine, there was no need for any other organisation to do the same. Academician Hrodzinskyi
K0HMjX)JU0I0My < I )y i!K u iio " ^ .
pooling its own expertise in the field.
.in an interview with Radianska Ukraina gave an evaluation of Derzhkompriroda'' s work from the
point of view of Zelenyi Svit:
(4ep»:K:oMnpHpo4a) 6.naroAaptia, ryMaiiiTM'iaa opranisauia. iixa 
ripame 3Po5htm Gamro ri usowy naripnMi yiaa napo/iy. Ta ax i i ï  
MOîKJiHBocTi? PaûoH a6o Micio Mas aac ojin oroy iB ox  qoaoniK, mo 
aafïMaïoïLca u h m h  cnpaBaMH. Ulo u i Kijibxa aojioaiK n a oGjiacrb 
MOxyTb spoGuTH, xpiM Toro, moG saincinoDaTH n ou ep xn en y
jÿ
Thus, Hrodzinskyi held the opinion that Derzhkompriroda was not sufficiently equipped and 
staffed to address environmental problems in Ukraine in an adequate manner. Zelenyi Svit would 
therefore not simply duplicate the work of the committee but rather support and strengthen it, by
A similar view was expressed by Dudko: when asked whether Zelenyi Svit would not simply
duplicate the work of the Committee he replied as follows; ‘indeed, it is this committee that 
should be paying attention to the ecological situation in the republic, which, according to M. 
Gorbachev, has taken us by the throat. Regrettably the work o f the State Nature Protection 
Committee is ineffective. Is not this the reason why the Committee was against our association’s
foundation because we meant the end o f its quiet life? Nature cannot wait until the committee 
reorganises its activity. Nor can we sit on our hands. Because it is concrete and useful activity 
that makes i f
Evidence towards the alleged inefficiency of Derzhkompriroda was provided in a lengthy
article written by Volodymyr Boreiko - activist in Zelenyi Svit and inspector o f Derzhkompriroda ~
121which was published in Literatnrna Ukraina on the eve o f the Founding Congress o f Zelenyi 
Svit. In the article, Boreiko explained his reason for leaving the committee by referring to several
-------------------------------------------
* PajimicLKa YKpaXna, 31.10.1989 (n.p.).
News from  Ukraine, no. 18/1988 (n.p.).
JJiwpaTypim YKpaXna, 19.10.1989, c. 3.
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attitude to the prospect of a merger'^''.
of Radianska Ukt'aina^^^ expressed severe criticism towards UTOP, suggesting that currently the 
only organisation which could secure real change in the sphere of the environment, was Zelenyi
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exam ples o f  neglect and politically  m otivated anti-environm ental activities under the leadership o f
Protsenko, I will return to this article below.
As for UTOP (Society for Nature Protection), there was, as pointed out above, initially
.opposition to the creation of an independent ecological association under the auspices o f the Peace 
Committee. Dudko in an interview with NFU  claimed that the Society regarded Zelenyi Svit as
rivals in the first place, but claimed that relations had improved and that the two organisations had 
found a common language as they pursued the same o b j e c t ' M o r e o v e r ,  whereas the Society was 
primarily concerned with ecological education and information, Zelenyi Svit ‘emphasised practical 
efforts to rectify previous mistakes and avert new ones’. Thus, there were no grounds for 
competition between the two organisations whatsoever. The Society had even participated in 
financing Zelenyi Svi f s  expedition along the Dniepr, so relations were good.
It soon became clear, however, that Zelenyi Svit had a much broader appeal to the general
public and was much more efficient than was the Society, and attitudes towards Zelenyi Svit
therefore changed within UTOP. As seen in Chapter One, in Moldova, the Society for
Environmental Protection decided to merge with the Moldovan independent Green movement -
AVIA ~ and in November 1990, the Moldovan Green Movement {MEM) emerged out of this
decision'^^. A similar initiative was proposed by members of UTOP: three activists from
Cherkassy suggested that since Zelenyi Svi f s  aims coincided with those of the Society, it would be
a good idea to merge the two organisations. The authors of the article, which appeared in print in
Radianska Ukraina - the CPU’s official organ - acknowledged that the Society to some extent
suffered from formalism. This, they argued, was a feature common to most political organisations
.which had been active prior to Gorbachev’s new policies of glasnost and démocratisation. 
However, Zelenyi Svi f s  statute did not state clearly in which way the association differed from the 
Society. Thus, a situation of potential competition arose, and this, argued the authors, was not 
needed. Given the severity of the ecological crisis in Ukraine, everybody should rather pull 
together to stop it. The local activists were even willing to adopt the name of Zelenyi Svit as part 
o f a merger and would like to know what would be the position o f the Presidium of the Society’s
Another letter from V. Ivantsev - former public inspector of UTOP - printed in the same issue
ÏIINews jrom Ukraine, no. 18/1988, p. 2.
Âse B. Gr0deland, Report on a Visit to USSR (London; The Ecological Studies Institute, Summer 1991), 
p. 38.
PüMHCbKa yiepaïmi, 30.7.1989, c. 4.
Ibid.
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Svit, not UTOP. The latter, which was established in 1946, initially did much good. Amongst its 
early members were well-known scientists, writers, journalists and film-directors and at one point 
UTOP even contacted Stalin to save the Kiev nature preserve Horysta from being flooded. 
However, during the time of stagnation, UTOP fell prey to bureaucratisation and the positions held 
by the leadership of UTOP came to match those of various ministries and departments. Following 
the introduction of glasnost and démocratisation it would be reasonable to expect changes to take 
place also within UTOP. However, no changes had so far taken place. In this connection Ivantsev 
referred to the composition of UTOP’s Presidium. Of a total o f 15 members, 14 were 
functionaries of various ministries and departments. Not one single member was a well-known 
ecologist, writer, journalist or representative of youth or informal ecological organisations. The 
Republican Council of UTOP neither counted one single youth, although more than half the total 
membership of UTOP was made up of students and pupils. Some 90% of the Council 
representatives were working in ministries like Agroprom, Minvodgosp, Minlisgosp and other 
ministries polluting the environment. The Section to Protect the Forests was normally headed by a 
representative of Lisgospzag and the Section to Protect the Soil by someone from the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
Some officials generally sympathetic towards UTOP however, held the view that this close 
link between the society and various enterprises and ministries were not necessarily such a bad 
thing. Viacheslav Oleshchenko, who in 1992 worked as the environmental advisor to the 
Ukrainian Parliament, claimed that since many directors of industrial enterprises were members of 
the society and as the deputy prime minister was the leader o f UTOP effective pressure could be 
exerted on the directors to improve the state of affairs. Should a member be excluded from UTOP, 
this would mark him as an unworthy member of society ~ a bad person - and this, according to 
Oleshchenko, had some effect'
As regards local branches of UTOP and their attitude/relation to the emerging independent 
Green groups, I asked the respondents how they viewed this relationship. The Ternopil Greens 
expressed the following view:
(other than Zelenyi Svit) BCUHecKHe itpyrne oSmecFBa hmkto b cepbes 
lie DocnpwiiHMajT, b tom qucjie m oGmecreo oxpaiibi ripnpo4bi. 
OSmecrBo oxpaiibi npu|X )# i ue M on io BbicrynuTb c axTUBiioH
Interview with Viacheslav Oleshchenko, Verkhovna Rada, Summer 1992. The general impression 1 got 
during the interview was that Oleshchenko felt resentment towards the Greens for being so successful 
in such a relative short period of time, whereas people like him, who had for decades worked on 
environmental issues, had achieved a lot less. In any case, he provided me with materials expressing a 
negative attitude towards Zelenyi Svit due to internal disputes at the time. This is an issue to which I 
will return in part two of this chapter.
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#no3HUHefi, rax xax ee  pyxoaoAHreJiH 6oaJincb 3a Mecro paGoTbi h 
liooGfue 3a cboio AanbiieHiiiyio cy;j,b6y.
The Mukachevo Greens had a mixed, but predominantly negative relationship to UTOP, 
whereas Bukovina Zelenyi Svit said they co-operated with UTOP on a number of issues. The 
Dnipropetrovsk Greens stressed that their aims were very different from UTOP, which was 
described in the following way:
PyxoDOACTBO "OGutecTBa Oxpaiibi Bpiipom" cocroii.rio m3 neiicHonepoB 
H iiey;ia'iUHX0B apMMU. KTB. napTopraiion, h ciaBUJio CBoeu iia/iaaeù 
npoBe^aeiine 5eceA b mxc.aax o t o m ,  xax 6e[}0Mb CQUMa.iHcrM>!ecxMe 
iieiJCBbfl raM , r i^e o h m  p o g t m  no luiany h iie niDeiino-norajiHCb ;i.ia
COUMa.lMCTMHeCXOM BbipyGxM.
In Horlivka, UTOP did not co-operate with Zelenyi Svit, whereas in Lutsk relations between 
the two organisations were described as friendly and tolerant. In Vinnytsia a large group of young 
activists from UTOP took out membership in Zelenyi Svit as they were dissatisfied with existing 
limitations on work in UTOP. The initial objections of ‘the old leaders o f UTOP (referred to as 
‘Starikov’) were overcome in a few months’ time and replaced with dialogue and co-operation. 
The Uman Greens described their relations to UTOP as ‘pragmatic’, whereas no relations were 
established between Zelenyi Mir and UTOP in Nikolaev, then
OGuiecFBO Oxpaiibi BpupoABi Glijio cosiiano cnepxy, xoM naprueM , b 
OTJIHBHM OT aCCOUHaUHM, KOTOpail C034aJ10Cb CHMSy, caM a, no cbocm
HiiMUHaTHBe. OSmeCTBO Oximiibi IlpM|X)Abi ([iMiiaHCHpoBajiocb 
xoMiiapTMeH, 3KOJiorHqecxaii accouHauMa iiMxeM iie (jiHiiancMpyeTca.
Finally, in Klierson oblast Dzharylgach was co-ordinating its activities with UTOP.
As regards DOP, the members of the Kiev State University druzhina ‘Leninskii dozor’ 
discussed what should be the relationship between Zelenyi Svit and DOP. UTOP and DOP co­
operated closely in the sense that the former would provide funding for actions undertaken by the 
latter. Often such action was aimed against poachers. Assistance was also given to the druzhiny 
by trade unions and by the Komsomol. The issue of what should be the druzhiny''s relationship 
towards Zelenyi Svit was discussed at a conference attended by all the Ukrainian druzhiny. Some 
activists held the view that Zelenyi Svit was becoming an influential organisation and shared the 
goals of the druzhiny. Co-operation was therefore to be encouraged. Others were more sceptical, 
arguing that Zelenyi Svit wanted to control everybody and that a more cautious approach was 
therefore required. Eventually, it was decided that the Kiev druzhina, together with individual
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listed buildings), but also to the health of people living in this environment. It is thus
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.ftyoung environmentalists join Zelenyi Svit as its youth wing - molodizhne krylo. As will be seen
below, this youth wing was active in the initial stage
All groups asked about their relationship to DOP expressed this relationship in positive 
words. In Vinnytsia, for instance, two druzhiny even joined Zelenyi Svit as collective members. In 
Horlivka and Dnipropetrovsk, however, the druzhiny were either non-existent (Horlivka) or their 
work was hardly visible (Dnipropetrovsk).
■ Î
Other Green Groups - Relationship to Zelenyi Svit
The Zelenyi Svit structure was not the only Green group to emerge in Ukraine at this time. A 
number of informal movements (neformaly) started to emerge during 1987 as clubs and single 
issue campaigns. The freeing o f political prisoners from December 1986 onwards was one o f the 
key factors that facilitated these movements - particularly so in Ukraine'^^. Taras Kuzio has made 
a very thorough study o f informal groups in Ukraine between 1985 and 1989'^^. The first groups 
to emerge were concerned primarily with human rights and cultural issues. Culture, however, is as 
seen in Chapter One, very closely linked with the environment. A culture can be preserved and 
developed only within a reasonably healthy environment. A damaged natural environment will 
inevitably pose a threat not only to areas of cultural significance (cf. Acropolis in Greece - air 
pollution from cars are threatening to destroy it. Pollution is also a serious problem for Krakow’s
;:,ft
understandable that the informal groups that emerged in Ukraine to promote Ukrainian culture also 
took a keen interest in preserving the natural environment.
The Ukrainian Culturological Club which was set up in Kiev in August 1987 was primarily
Î
concerned with those aspects of Ukrainian Culture which also had a nationalist aspect . Nuclear 
power and the environment were thus linked to the survival not only of Ukrainian culture but also 
of Ukraine as a nation. On 26 April 1988, on the second anniversaiy o f the Chernobyl accident, 
members of the Culturological Club organised a demonstration in Kiev, at which statements like 
‘No more Chornobyls’, ‘Turn Ukraine into a Nuclear-Free Ukraine’ and ‘The Ukrainian 
Culturological Club is Against Nuclear Death’ were made 131
Interview with Oleksyi Kabyka, Kiev, August 1992.
Hosking (1988), p. 4, Taras Kuzio, ‘Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under 
Gorbachev. 1985-1989’. in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), Ukrainian Past. Ukrainian Present (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992).
In 1990 Kuzio gave me a longer version of Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under 
Gorbachev. 1985-1989 (before it was printed). As this version contains more references to groups 
involved with ecology and culture in 1987-88,1 will in the following refer to this version of the paper. 
‘'"Kuzio(1990), p. 4.
Ibid.. p. 5.
In the spring of 1987 Tovarystvo Lev (The Lion Society) was set up in Lviv. The link 
between culture and the environment was stated even more directly by this society, which
132 'described itself as an ‘independent, community eco-cultural youth organisation...’ The Society 
was organised around four sections: historical, ethnographic, ecological and socio-political’. In
132
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addition to opposing nuclear power plants, the Society also organised an ecological expedition in 
May 1988 entitled ‘Dniestr-88’ to raise public awareness of the pollution of the river'^^.
.In the spring of 1988 an independent student organisation - Hromada - was set up at Kiev
.University. The students, were strongly opposed to nuclear power. A similar position was
adopted by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and also by RUKH, which was set up in 1989.
At the initiative o f most informal Green groups in Ukraine, the environment became an important 
.issue.
As seen above, the Culturological Club, for instance, adopted a much more
radical/confrontational approach towards official authorities than did Zelenyi Svit. Zelenyi Svit, on
the other hand, while pursuing policies that got increasingly more radical, did not opt for a
.confrontation. Its representatives were careful to stress that Zelenyi Svit should in no way be seen 
as a movement in opposition to official authorities, but purely as an environmental organisation, 
committed to improving the state of the environment in Ukraine. Consequently, although Zelenyi 
Svit retained the right to co-operate with any like-minded individuals, a low-key approach was 
adopted towards the more radical groups. There may have been several reasons for this. On the 
one hand, the political climate in Ukraine was much more dogmatic than in many other Soviet 
republics. As seen above, the Zelenyi Svit statute thus provided legal protection to its members 
against harassment due to environmental activities. There was therefore, understandably, fear 
amongst Zelenyi Svit members regarding possible sanctions from official authorities against 
members, whose campaigns official authorities may not approve of. Equally important were 
strategic considerations. It was probably thought that by being less radical, but keep a high profile 
by providing sound alternatives to non-environmental official projects and by spreading 
information to the general public, more could be achieved than by ‘alienating’ the organisation 
from the general public by adopting a confrontational approach, which could easily be hampered 
with or discredited by the authorities.
t
3
ftIMx, p. 6. 
m . p . 7 .
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JJiTeparypiia YspaXiia, 15.2.1990 (n.p.). Only an estimate of the total membership of Zelenyi Svit can 
be given as the association had no formal membership - see above. Not only local and regional Green
3.2.4 Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit (Kiev, 28-29 October 1989)
By October 1989, when the Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit took place in the Artists’ House 
(Budynok Khudozhnikiv) in Kiev, Zelenyi Svit had united some 300 regional and local groups in
all oblasts of Ukraine, with an estimated membership of approximately. 500,000'^"'. All these
groups were represented at the Congress on 28-29 October 1989, which was attended by some 600 
people, of whom 301 were delegates (49 delegates failed to attend). Seventy five of these 
delegates were under 30 years of age and 237 had higher education - 62 held university degrees. 
Although a majority of those present were Ukrainians, there were also a considerable number of 
Russians, Belorussians, Jews, Rumanians and Armenians present. The delegation from Kiev 
formed the largest group at the C o n g r e s s S o m e  50 Soviet and foreign journalists covered the 
Congress and more than 100 observers from the West (Greenpeace Great Britain, Dutch, Swedish, 
Canadian and American groups) and Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia) were present
Given the size of the Congress and also the faet that all oblasts were represented, it not only 
came to serve the purpose o f bringing together most of the Ukrainian Green groups that had either 
joined or had been initiated by Zelenyi Svit, but also as a forum at which information could be 
exchanged about environmental problems/campaigns in the regions. A majority o f the speeches 
thus focused on environmental problems throughout Ukraine.
With regard to policies and organisational issues, although there was less time for debating 
these, two tendencies could be identified within the movement. On the one hand, there were the 
moderates, who favoured a policy o f co-operation, rather than confrontation with official 
authorities. On the other, there was a group of radicals, who preferred a less co-operative 
approach. These groups, or rather currents, clashed on a number o f issues, suffice it here to say 
-------------------------------------------
i
groups could become collective members of Zelenyi Svit, but so could enterprises, trade unions and 
other independent organisations/associations. Thus the number of workers at such enterprises/trade 
unions would be included in the calculation as to how many members the association had. In some 
cases Greens themselves argued that anyone taking part in meetings and other activities organised by 
the Greens were actually members of the Green Movement (put in reference). Consequently, the figure 
of 500,000 members must be treated with some care. As will be seen below the Green Movement did 
enjoy widespread public support - particularly in its campaign to prevent any further expansion of 
nuclear power in Ukraine. If one adds the number of people who in one way or the other took part in 
these campaigns the figure easily exceeds 500,000 (in the case of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power 
station alone, 250,000 signatures were collected). The average number of activists per local/regional 
group was in 1994 between 20-60. Even if we made a very generous estimate of 200 activists per 
group and multiplied this by 300 groups, we would come up with a total number of not more than 6,000 
members throughout Ukraine. The figure of 500,000 is, however, one frequently used by 
representatives of Zelenyi Svit - although it is being contested by some members sceptical of its size and 
no breakdown of this figure into locaFregional groups has ever been shown to me by Zelenyi Svifs 
leadership.
Beuipnm KmXb, 30.10.1989 (n.p.).
BeuipiiHH KhXb, 5.11.1989 (n.p.).
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Zelenyi Svit strategy, the question of Ukrainian independence, whether or not there was a need for 
a Green Party, and on the association’s attitude towards Derzhkompriroda.
Criticism of Derzhkompriroda
The issue which caused the most heated debate was the question as to what exactly should be 
Zelenyi SvW  s relationship to Derzhkompriroda. As seen above, the Committee - chaired by Dina 
Protsenko - was not very happy with the emergence of Zelenyi Svit in the first place. Opinions 
were divided over Derzhkompriroda within Zelenyi Svit not so much for this reason, but rather due 
to the fact that a large proportion o f the association’s members felt that the committee did not 
tackle environmental problems in an adequate manner. Whereas some, like Hrodzinskyi, put this 
down to inadequate resources and staffing, others, like Volodymyr Boreiko - who had previously 
worked as an inspector with Derzhkompriroda, but resigned in 1989 - were less understanding. In 
an article published in Literatnrna Ukraina on the eve of the Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit, 
Boreiko attacked his former employer for a lack o f will to address environmental issues and for 
political nepotism. A draft resolution - one of a total of 22 resolutions eventually passed by the 
Congress - expressing serious dissatisfaction with the Committee thus caused a prolonged debate. 
The radicals, represented by Boreiko, who had earlier also been a member of DOP, and other 
young people, who had joined Zelenyi Svit in their capacity as members o f predominantly the Kiev 
University druzhina, fought to pass the resolution, whereas the moderates (scientists, writers) 
wanted to soften its edge - and to adopt a more constructive approach.
Moloda Hvardia on 18 November 1989'^^ published the draft resolution on Derzhkompriroda 
presented to the Congress by Zelenyi Sv i f s  Youth Wing, which included the Kiev University 
druzhina ‘Leninskyi dozor’. The resolution stated that despite resolutions passed by the USSR 
and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers, so far no unified service for environmental protection had 
been created. Derzhkompriroda in its present form was dependent upon various departments, 
deprived of rights to technical and financial support and lacked qualified specialists. Moreover, 
the Resolution on Ukrainian Derzhkompriroda had not yet been ratified. Furthermore, the 
resolution expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the person who had been appointed 
Chairman of Derzhkompriroda was an engineer by profession, thus, in the view of the Youth Wing 
not qualified for the job. Moreover, it was argued that he had been hired against the will of public 
opinion. Similar situations were identified in oblast, local and regional committees. 
Derzhkompriroda was staffed with officials who had compromitted themselves during the period 
of stagnation by their incapability to protect the environment at the time. Little had also been done
137 Mo.fiOM rBapmn, 18.11.1989, c. 2.
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to provide glasnost into the activities of Derzhkompriroda. In its present form, argued the Youth 
Section, the committee was not able to protect the environment from further destruction.
Others were less critical, possibly due to the fact that Zelenyi Sv i f s  statute had been 
registered officially through Derzhkompriroda^^^, possibly because they realised that rather than 
antagonise the committee, it would be more beneficial to enter a dialogue with it and try to pull
together in areas of great concern to the association. Shcherbak thus stressed the need to co-
operate with official environmental protection bodies'^^. Yet, the Congress did acknowledge that 
Derzhkompriroda still was not working 100% efficiently and suggested how an improvement 
could be achieved in the resolution eventually passed by the Congress: firstly, it was argued that a 
unified state environmental protection body be created, under which all inspection be 
subordinated.
Secondly, the Committee should be subordinated to Parliament rather than to the Council of 
Ministers as this would make it independent of various ministries and departments'"'''. The 
Committee should also be given the right to veto and check any facility - including military ones -
situated on the territory of Ukraine. The Chairman of Derzhkompriroda should be accountable to 
the Parliament and provide reports of the Committee’s activities to Verkhovna Rada on a regular 
basis. Chairmen on all levels of the Committee should be elected on their merit, taking into 
consideration public opinion. Furthermore, total glasnost on all activities of the Committee must 
be introduced. Decisions made by the Public Council of Derzhkompriroda (this Council'"" was 
proposed by Derzhkompriroda prior to the Zelenyi Svit Congress, and would be attended by 
representatives of the Green Movement and other public organisations) should be made 
compulsory for the apparatus of the Committee to implement. The resolution also called for the
I
creation of an independent institute for environmental protection and ecology (Ukraine) and for a 
public investigation into actions sanctioned by the former head of the Committee, Dina Protsenko.
Finally, the resolution called for the reconsideration of the hiring o f V. Filoneko as Head of 
the Committee and also of the Deputies I. Liakh and V. Kubrak, who according to Zelenyi Svit 
bore responsibility for the passivity of the Committee. As an example o f how public institutions 
and informal organisations concerned with environmental protection ought to co-operate, the 
resolution referred to the Lviv Committee, praising work conducted on the Striiske water reservoir 
and Radekhiv biochemical enterprise'"'^.
I
PajiMCbm yKjjaïna, 16.2.1990 (n.p.).
PajimicbKa yKpaXiia (n.d., n.p.).
This was the case in Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova.
‘‘‘ Shortly after the Congress Robitnychna hazeta announced that Derzhkompriroda was setting up the 
‘advertised’ Public council.
Mojjom rBapAHH, 18.11.1989, c. 2.
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Zelenyi Svit thus remained faithful to its own principle on what should be the relationship to 
official authorities and to other political organisations: ecology ranks higher than economy and 
politics. Thus the Greens will co-operate with anyone, whose aims coincide with those of Zelenyi 
Svit on environmental issues (cf. Shcherbak’s address to the Congress) Moreover, Zelenyi Svit 
would be open to everyone - regardless of nationality and political beliefs - who acknowledged the 
statute and programme of the association and who were willing to work towards improving the 
state of the environment - in other words, Zelenyi Svit would be an inclusive, rather than an 
exclusive movement. In this respect it differed from for instance the Estonian Green Movement. 
As an illustration of this, it is sufficient to refer to strong, predominantly Russian chapters of 
Zelenyi Svit existing in Nikolaev and the Crimea in the South and in Dnipropetrovsk and 
Dniprodzherzhinsk in the East. I will return to this issue in Chapter Eight.
Morality
Like Greens elsewhere, also the Ukrainian Green Movement was critical of industrialism, blaming 
the blind faith in progress for many of the ills of the Ukrainian environment. Academician 
Hrodzinskyi in an interview with the daily Sovetskaia Ukraina prior to the Congress called for a 
return to pre-industrial values, holding Nature in high regard and seeing it as something holy. 
Such values were common to all historical societies and are still deeply rooted in Ukrainian pre- 
Revolutionary culture:
OraBaeinm 4 0  npHpo;iH hk ao  aorocb CBirroro Gyjio npm ’aManfie BciM  
none|)eAHiM .mo4 CLKHM cycniJibcrBaM. Texiiojioriqiin xce b Ik  
npH3BiB ;io TOro, mo mh, B0'ieBM4i>. sacjiiimeiii c u o e io  M oryT n icrio, 
noiiHuaEMo pyniiyBaTM iXMBy npnpoTiy, ce|ieii h k o ï  Jiio/iHiia 
(j)opMyBajiacb ax u m  npoTiiroM coreiib THCiiq, p o x i ix  iia TJii i ix o i  
Bi7i6yBa.Fiocb ([lopMyBaHiia a io jicb x o i CBiAOMOcri, ( j i ia o c o i j i i l ,  
ncHxiXH, siieuiToio, CBiTocnpMMMaima.
Zelenyi Sv i f s  theoretical framework will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven,
suffice it here to say that the elaboration of a philosophical and a moral alternative to the Marxist- 
Leninist notion of Nature serving merely as a tool to human progress was an important aspect of 
the more general process of building the Green Movement in the late 1980s. The Congress 
endorsed a resolution on morality (see Chapters Six and Seven) and many o f the Congress 
speakers addressed the issue o f moral responsibility towards future generations in terms of 
maintaining rather than destroying Nature. The issue of Man’s rights vs. Nature’s rights were 
discussed as was the crisis of Mankind, facilitated by the present environmental crisis. The device 
of Zelenyi Svit - Survival, democracy, humanism - neatly sums up the problem as seen by the 
Greens. The prime aim of the movement was to secure the survival of Nature and of Man
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(including the attributes of the area in which he lives - i.e. culture, language and nation). To 
facilitate the implementation of policies aimed at doing minimal harm to the physical environment 
and to the people inhabiting this environment, full-fledged democracy with a set of democratic 
control mechanisms is required. Another precondition for making society a better place for 
everyone to live, is the harmonisation in human relations - thus the commitment to humanism. A 
starting point would therefore be to develop a new morality towards Nature and in human relations 
more generally.
Programme and Statute
Although the adoption of a programme and statute were high on the agenda of the Zelenyi Svit 
Congress, these were eventually adopted in a hurry and without much debate towards the end of 
the Congress. Vechirnii Kyiv reported that the discussion o f these two major documents started 
just three to four hours before the end of the last day, thus not leaving much room for 
amendments'"'^. This was to cause problems within the Movement later, as will be seen below. 
As for the Statute, it was endorsed in a slightly changed form from the temporary statute adopted 
by the March conference, incorporating most o f the changes of a purely technical character 
suggested by the various ministries and Derzhkompriroda. As regards the programme. 
Academician Hrodzinskyi summarised it as follows:
nporpaM a CKJiamTHMeTLca 3 a b o x  qac iH ii. Y  n e p m in  snaflAyTb  
B i4po/i3fcennfl rp y u T iB  Y xpa iH M , CTBopeiimi e x o a o r iq i io r o  'iM croro  
ci.fiLCbKoro p ocno/iapcrB a, o iioB aem ia  jiiciB, orn op e iin a G esnequoro  
BOAUoro cepe^oBH u ia, BH croro n o B ir p a n o r o  G acen iiy . iiuiKLue 
xaTKyuM, cyTb nporpaMw, Kiimena iwera n a u jo ï  ^iiaJibnocri - 
rapanTyB a iiiia ï i e ï  a x o c r i  3a a x o ï  p i s K o
BpocraTHMe i  r p n im a ic r b  i  n on  i  myBaTMMerbca r e n o ^ n n
caM O ï n ioncbK O i n o n y n a u i i .  /Ip y r a  q acrn n a  riporpaMM n e p e n ia y e  
M ar icT p ajib H i nanpjiMH n a y x o B o r o  saG esneaen im  p im e n n a  B c ix  umx 
HMTaiib. Hm lie  iiaHrojiOB iiiLue 'ryr crB ope iiin i A H iiaM ianoro  
iiK popM au iH H oro G a iixy  n a iin x  npo re, mo B i^ G ynaeT L ca b npM po^ i 
i ia u io l  p e c n y 6 j i iK n ‘'‘‘*.
Zelenyi Sv i f s  programme is primarily concerned with practical issues. One of its sections 
lists the reasons why the Ukrainian environment is in such a bad state. Another section outlines 
the goals o f the movement, while a third deals with tactics - i.e. the means by which to achieve
Be'fipimd Kmïd, 4 .1 1 .1 9 8 9  (n .p .) . 
PaAmicbKa YKpaXna (n .d ., n .p .).
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these goals. The programme also contains a theoretical framework. A detailed discussion of this 
framework is provided in Chapter Eight. I will therefore focus on the practical aspects o f the 
programme in this chapter - although the reasons listed as the cause of Ukraine’s environmental 
problems form a critique of the command-administrative system founded by the CPSU and rest on 
a set of values rejected by the Greens as unsound, and are therefore linked to the alternative 
theoretical basis elaborated by the Greens.
There was some debate on how to allow collective members into Zelenyi Svit. The Youth 
faction suggested that this be done only by the Congress, which would take place no less often 
than once every two years. This suggestion was, however, not endorsed. Thus Zelena Rada would 
be responsible for endorsing new members as outlined in the statute'"'^. As for funding Zelenyi 
Svi f s  activities, it was decided not to collect membership fees. Shcherbak pointed out to the 
Congress that the association had sponsors who supported its work materially, Golovrichflot, for 
instance, had provided Zelenyi Svit with a boat to use for expeditions and this boat was in the 
process o f being equipped with a scientific-investigative lab. Zakarpatlis intended to fund the 
association’s future newspaper and Kiev Misksistemotekhnika had apparently agreed to contribute 
towards the costs o f running Zelenyi Sviè^^. As seen above, Zelenyi Svit also received financial 
support from the Peace Committee. Donations in the form of hard currency and technical 
equipment were made by Western environmental organisations. At the time of the First Congress 
o f Zelenyi Svit inflation was running low and costs were not too high. Compared to what would be 
the situation just one year later, Zelenyi Svi f s  financial situation was thus reasonably good.
Other Resolutions
The Congress, in addition to passing a programme and a statute, also passed a total o f 22 
resolutions covering a wide range of topics. A resolution on the Chernobyl accident called for a 
‘Chernobyl Nuremberg Tribunal’ to sentence those guilty of the accident. Similarly resolutions on 
the elections with an appeal to create a bloc of democratic forces, on ecology and local council, on 
the Earth and many more were endorsed by the Congress. At the initiative of a Poltavshchina 
delegate, My ko la Kutsenko, a critical address to Arnold Hammer was also endorsed, raising the 
issue of his dealings ‘with the bureaucratic apparatus of the Soviet and Ukrainian governments 
behind the back of multinational Ukraine’ - resulting in pollution. The address requested Hammer
BeuipiiMM Km ïd, 4.11.1989 (n.p.). 
PajimiCbKa JAA^i'/za, 31.10.1989 (n.p.).
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argued Shcherbak, was a tested path amongst Greens who did not wish to become integrated with
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tto ‘stop (his) amoral actions on Ukrainian territory’ (the Greens referred to a chemical enterprise 
on the Crimea)'"'^.
As pointed out above, age-wise the average member of Zelenyi Svit was in his late
thirties/early forties. To increase the number of younger members, the Congress passed a
resolution on work with the youth. The resolution expressed its support of the ecological course
taken by the new leadership of the Komsomol and urged editorial boards of the Komsomol and
pioneer newspapers/journals, the leadership of the publishers ‘Molod’ and ‘Veselka’ to look at
problems of ecological education of young people. The setting up of the ‘youth wing’ of Zelenyi
.Svit was endorsed and a call made to local groups to actively involve youth environmental groups,
druzhiny, ecological clubs and centres in their work. Previous attempts by Derzhkompriroda to
influence the work of the druzhiny was criticised as was the politicisation of children’s ’ education 
and military courses in higher educational establishments. Student druzhiny, ecological centres 
founded under the auspices of the Komsomol and others were encouraged to join Zelenyi Svit and 
pull together to secure the protection of Nature and Mankind'"'^.
Politics and the Environment: the Need for a Green Party
Campaigning throughout 1988 and 1989 had made it clear to Zelenyi Svit activists that 
environmental issues were also political issues - in that their successful solution depended on the 
right political decisions being made. Shcherbak in his address to the Congress (or article 
published prior to Congress?) tried to identify the best way by which the Greens could maximise 
their impact on such decision-making. On the one hand, the path of Zelenyi Svit could be
maintained also in the future. The Greens could also seemingly conditionally follow the course of 
Greenpeace, conducting ‘courageous actions’ to protect the environment. The path of Greenpeace,
Æ
any political structures. However, also a third path existed:
. . .O r B o p e i i iu i r i a p T i ï  S e j i e i m x  Y k p i h h .  L U j u i x  n e n  - K o iiC T H T y u iH H O  
saKOHHHH i  Brm cyE'i'bC J i b n a p a M e x p n  n p a B O B O l n a i o p a a i c r c b K O l  
a e p x c a B M , b n o a i T H x y  n e p e S y ^ o B H . / l a a  T o r o ,  m o 6  l i e  cri'BopiOBaTH  
K o i K lm i x r y  3 K o M y i i i c r m i i i o i o  r i a p T i E i o ,  M o a c iia  G y j i o  5  n e p e a b a q u r u  
n o A B i n u e  q j ie iiC T B o b I13Y, o c K i J i b x n  i i a p x i a  m i  ue c n o B iA y o a j T a  6  
U K y cb  i i i e o j i o r i u i i y  A O K T p n iiy , c i ’o h 'im  u I u k o m  i ia  r p y i r r i  s a x n m y  
TKHTTfl B y c i x  HOrO BHJlBax''^^. -tl
■ f i
____________________________
Ukrainian Press Agency Release.
Momjia rmpMMff, 1.11.1989 (n.p.).
Mojiom rmpAMn, 18.11.1989, c. 2.
delegates attending the Congress encouraged the creation of an initiative group to set up a 
Ukrainian Green Party (PZU)*^^.
:
f
A G reen Party  w as needed for the follow ing reasons:
...Aaa SojjoTLÔM 3a npMnn'rra nojiiTMHiiMX p iinenb . akmmm croHTh 
eKO.TOriniii npo5.rieMH. FIoTpeSna nona i  AJUi roro. iuo6 none 
eKo.noriHue MMcnenua 3 iionoMoroio "sejieimx” AenyraTiB viajio 
noMiTiiy Bary b I a  BepxoB iioi Paau Jio ciahCK O l, crajto nopMOio
150iiauioro cycnu ibC T B a .
IIn addition, the power of the Greens could be greatly enhanced through a Green political 
party. What was more, although Shcherbak - in order not to clash with official political authorities 
on this issue - did not rule out CP SU membership in combination with membership of a Green 
Paity, Marples interpreted this to the effect that ‘by its attacks on the bureaucracy and on the 
nature of industrial decision making in Ukraine and by its unceasing opposition to nuclear power 
plants, Zelenyi Svit has in fact adopted a political stance that divorces it from Party Ideology 
(though not from the views o f RUKH)’*^ ’. It therefore came as no big surprise - although from a 
political point of view it was a risky step to take as Article Six of the Soviet (and Ukrainian)
Constitution, ruling that the CPSU was the leading political force in the country implying that its 
authority may not be challenged by any other political force had not yet been abolished - that some
Independence
During campaigning at local and regional levels, as well as campaigning on nuclear power in 
Ukraine, members of Zelenyi Svit had encountered numerous difficulties in having industrial 
projects thought to be environmentally unsound reversed, and polluting enterprises closed. A 
major reason for this, was not only a resistance from Ukrainian political authorities, but also due to 
the fact that a number of these were subordinated to the Centre and any decisions regarding their 
future therefore had to be settled in Moscow. To some extent this was not only bad, as initially, 
Ukrainian political authorities were more dogmatic and orthodox than were Soviet authorities.
Thus, appealing to ‘Moscow’ in some cases proved a fruitful way of bypassing the Ukrainian 
authorities. In other cases, though, it proved a great obstacle, in that it made campaigning a lot 
more difficult. A general mood of dissatisfaction with this state of affairs emerged and the idea 
that Ukraine could only improve the state o f the environment in the republic if it gained control of
■yPaAiiHCbKa VKpaîHa, 16.2.1990 (n.p.).
Radio Liberty Report no. 104/90, 9.2.1990,p. 20. 
Benipum Kh îb , 5.11.1989 (n.p.).
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Be'fipuMfi Km ïb , 5.11.1989 (n.p.).
peDXOBiioi paxH i  najH MinicrpiB yKPamcbKol PCP).
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its own territory and its own enterprises had firmly taken hold amongst Zelenyi Svit members by 
the time its First Congress took place.
lurii Shcherbak addressed the issue of Ukrainian sovereignty at length in his speech to the 
Congress, arguing that an overhaul of existing economic structures was required as was a thorough 
reform of the enterprises themselves, to make them more environmental. Only by gaining 
economic sovereignty could Ukraine gain control of its own natural resources and of industries 
located on Ukrainian territory. However, the need for Ukrainian sovereignty was listed as one out 
of a total of four measures required to improve the ecological situation in Ukraine: this also 
required the inclusion in the Ukrainian Constitution of an article on the right of Ukrainian citizens 
to live in an environmentally safe environment, increasing the percentage of the gross national 
product spent on environmental issues from 1.2 to 3 percent and full glasnost on data regarding the 
state of the environment’^^ .
Several o f the Congress delegates called for Zelenyi Svit to be represented in the Ukrainian
V
Parliament, Verkhovna Rada. Elections to parliament were scheduled for March 1990 and it is 
thus understandable that those Greens who favoured a Green Party were in a hurry to create one.
The good results the Greens had fielded for the March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies no doubt also encouraged such calls. Nine USSR People’s Deputies from 
Ukraine attended the Zelenyi Svit Congress and some of these - Oliinyk, Sanduliak, Bratun,
Burykh and Kutsenko, in addition to Shcherbak - addressed the participants of the Congress’  ^ .
While getting a more political movement, Zelenyi Svit called - as its representatives had done 
on numerous previous occasions - for uniting everyone, regardless of social, national or political
■.Ï
status, to act uncompromisingly and responsibly to protect ‘Mother Earth’:
Haw y c iM  - podiTiiMKaM, cejifliiaM, iiiTenireimii, iipan iB im icaM  
napTiHHMx o p r a i i i s a u iH  i  paa, n|]e;iCTaBiiMKaM nW iViaacbKnx 
o p r a i i ia a i iiM  i ie o b x ia i io  oS’eanaracb, cn i.H biio jiijiTM b I m ’h 
BpiiTyBaiiim x c h i t j i  iia n aa n er i^ ^ ^
Despite its somewhat critical attitude towards Derzhkompriroda and towards CPU policies on 
the environment, Zelenyi Svit succeeded in opening a broad dialogue on the environment, in which 
party members and CPU representatives took part. Vechirnii Kyiv also registered a change in 
approach by Zelenyi Svit: one could already feel that meetings, which to some extent were still
■
Bevepnan OMecŒ, 3.11.1989 (sBepiienna - vnacriiHKiB MiTHiirv ’’hoDHo5Hab”: iium’h tl i  nepecroDora ao
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dominated by slogans, were m oving towards reflection, and directed towards concrete 
actions
The Congress reelected lurii Shcherbak as leader of Zelenyi Svit. Four deputy leaders were 
also elected: academician Dmytro Hrodzinskyi, film director lurii Tkachenko, Anatolyi Panov and 
Andrii Hlazovyi. The latter was proposed by the Youth Section. Mikhail Prilutskyi - a journalist 
o f Literaturna Ukraina - was elected editor of Zelenyi Svit’s future newspaper - also that called 
Zelenyi svit. Whereas Shcherbak was unanimously reelected as leader of Zelenyi Svit, the deputy 
leaders were only elected following what Vechirnii Kyiv referred to as a ‘sharp democratic 
struggle’ Sviatoslav Dudko, who had until the Congress seiwed as executive secretary of the 
association failed to be formally elected to any position and was less active in Zelenyi Svit 
following the Congress. A Zelena Rada consisting of 71 members - a majority of whom 
represented Kiev - and a secretariat of 20 were also elected by the Congress.
Future Tasks - Zelenyi Svit
lurii Tkachenko listed three key tasks that Zelenyi Svit would pursue in the future. Firstly, not 
substituting state organs, the Greens would
H acrynaT b ’’cJ ieiîa” n a  HuepT iiocrb, KociioCTb rex  nncraimMH juui 
KOTopbix qecTb BeAOMcrnenHoro M y iw npa npeBbime oSm eaeaoBenecK H X  
M iiTepecoB, H iiTepecoB iip u pom i.
Secondly, Zelenyi Svit would continue to make alternative real suggestions as to how best to
solve environmental problems. In order to do so, the association would organise independent
ecological expert assessments of official political projects considered harmful to the environment.
Thirdly, priority would be given to influencing public opinion’ ®^.
Immediately after the Congress a sanctioned meeting took place outside the Republican
Stadium. Several thousand people attended the meeting and a number of slogans were promoted,
such as: ‘there is no peaceful atom’, ‘remove nuclear power stations from Ukraine. People from
areas affected by radiation brought the following slogans: ‘we want our children to be healthy’,
‘we want immediate evacuation (from those areas affected by radioactive f a l l - o u t ) O t h e r
slogans included the following: ‘no to ecocide!’, ‘yes to the Green Party!’ and ‘it is time for a
Chernobyl Nuremberg ( t r i a l ) ! O n e  boy was arrested by police for raising the Ukrainian blue
Be^iipimii K m ïb, 4.11.1989 (n.p.). 
BevipiiHH K m ïb, 30.10.1989 (n.p.).
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BeHipuHH KmXb, 27.10.1989 (n.p.). 
Ukrainian Press Agency Release. 
Be'ilpiiMM K m ïb, 5.11.1989 (n.p.).
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and yellow flag, but people attending the meeting were informed of this and he was released 
shortly after they contacted the police demanding that he be set free. The meeting lasted for about 
two and a half hours. Most of the speakers addressed the nuclear threat hanging over Ukraine.
3.3 Official Response towards Zelenyi Svit
3.3.1 CPU: Support and Control
As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, the issue of the environment was initially not 
considered a ‘dangerous’ issue by the CPSU, The first independent environmental groups that 
emerged were concerned with culture and the environment, restoring monuments considered to be 
of cultural significance and protecting old trees and forests from destruction. Throughout 1987 
and 1988, however, the political side of the environmental question became more obvious as 
following the broadening of glasnost, more information became available on the state of the 
environment and on environmental pollution’s impact on people’s health. In Ukraine the issue of 
Chernobyl made the environmental movement potentially more threatening as a political force 
given the secrecy by which it was surrounded and the notion that Chernobyl and other 
environmental disasters were inflicted upon Ukraine from ‘Moscow’ - thus threatening to fuel 
nationalist sentiments, particularly in the Western parts of Ukraine.
As seen in Section One, Zelenyi Svit almost did not get registered with the Peace Committee 
due to opposition from the CPU. Similarly, attempts were made at merging Zelenyi Svit with 
UTOP - attempts that failed due to the lack of enthusiasm from within the ranks of Zelenyi Svit 
itself. On the other hand, by being registered under the auspices of the Ukrainian Branch o f the 
Peace Committee under the leadership of Oles Honchar, the Greens gained a certain degree of 
‘semi officiality’ given that the Peace Committee was a Soviet official organisation and that 
Gorbachev had himself linked the issues of peace and the environment in several speeches made 
during 1987 and 1988. What was more, USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov had in a speech to 
the Congress of People’s Deputies argued that ‘we must all go Green’. Finally, Sergei Zalygin - 
the editor o f Novyi Mir and head of the USSR Peace Council - had set up Zelenyi Mir in Moscow, 
thus creating precedence for such a movement to be set up also in other republics.
The CPU Social-Economic Department was present both at the first republican conference of 
Zelenyi Svit held on 25-26 April 1989 in Kiev and at the Founding Congress held on 28-29 
October of the same year. Assessments of these two events were produced for the CPU Central 
Committee by A. Savchenko - Head of the Social-Economic Department of the CPU Central 
Committee. Both reports contain generally detailed information about the proceedings themselves
297
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and address demands to form a movement in support of perestroika {RUKH) - in April - and 
RUKtPs attitude towards Zelenyi Svit in particular. Considerable attention is also given to 
criticisms of the CPU made by Zelenyi Svit activists - in the second document a recommendation 
as to what should be official CPU policies towards Zelenyi Svit was also provided, thus clearly
indicating that Zelenyi Svit was by the Communist Paity considered to be a political force that 
would have to be reckoned with in the future.
CPU’s attitude towards Zelenyi Svit was rather complex - as noted by Savchenko, amongst 
the members o f Zelenyi Svit were also CPSU members. And, as it turned out, these were just as 
C l  itical of official environmental policies as were non-party members:
B  ocHOBiioM BbicrynjieiiH a coy iepxcaaH  k p h tm to c k h h  ana^iHB 
3K O J iorH iiecK O H  C H TyauH M  B o T A e a b i ib ix  o b m c r i i x  h  p e c n y 6 .r iH K e  b 
neJioM, M .3JioxceiiH e orib rra  h  r p y ^ in io c r e n  b n p a K T M 'iecK o n  p a S o r e  
ca M O A eaT e.ib H b ix  3K O J iornM ecK H X  o S ’ e^ H n e iiM H  n a  w e c r a x .  Pe:iKou 
K p u T H K e 3 a  neD M H M aTe.nbH oe O T i io u ie im e  k  iip o 5 .iieM a M  aK o.aorM H  
n o i iB e p r a j ia c b  K p e M e ii 'iy r c K H H , HH KO.aaeBCK UH , M nanoBCK UM ,
C.FiaByTHiictcHH, UleneTOBCKHH rapHcnojiKOMbi u ropKOMbi napTUM^^\
I
However, not all criticism against official authorities was welcome - according to Savchenko 
many of the speakers made
HeKopiDeKTHBiibie BbiCKasbiBanMii. ofiBHneiiHii, m iaan cb  npoBOKauHoniibie 
aaiiBaeiiMa h Bbinatibi b aapec naprMuiibix, coBercKHX u 
rocyaapci’Beniibix opranoB’
Comments made by guests from other republics towards the CPU were ‘highly extremist 
politically...’. E. Kibaidze from Georgia allegedly accused paity workers of being against the 
environment, whereas the writer and leader of the Belorussian Green Movement V. Iakovenko 
argued that the accident at Chernobyl opened a wide range of crimes committed by party and state 
organs and that the Ukrainian ‘party hierarchy’ on the second day after the accident evacuated its
...
children. One lu. Anorik was reported to have said that ‘the existing system brought our country 
to a crisis. The entire system must be reshuffled’, and he called for the foundation of an ecological 
union of all countries as an alternative to the USSR Council of Ministers, insisting that this union
-
should have its own independent press.
:-'.rJudging by Savchenko’s report, however, not all those present voiced such ‘extremist’ views. 
Attempts at making Zelenyi Svit a member of RUKH^^^ failed, and N. Kalugin’s (First Deputy of
»
36:33^
■the CPU Central Committee’s Social-Economic Department) address to the Conference, in which 
he listed measures taken by the CPU to improve the state of the environment
B ne;io.vi iiaui.ia nomep^KKy y KoiicrpyKTHnuo HampoeiiiiOH aacrn 
Ae.ieraron m SojiLUJMUorBa M.ieiioii ceKiDerapuara. Peumre.ibiio 
BbicryriM.™ npoTHB jieHcrBMM 3Kcr[ieMMCi’0B a.ieiiu cexpeiiipuara 
accouHauMM lO.B. MuuieuKO, A.n. E. iaBOBbin.
Due to attempts by nationalist/anti-Soviet sentiments to gain the upper hand within Zelenyi 
Svit (direct mention was made of Y. Chornovi! of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union) - which was 
referred to as a ‘workers’ ecological movement’, Savchenko made the following recommendation:
3 t o  F iiefiyeT o r  napTMHiibix. coBercK H x n xosiiH crueiinb ix 0 |irdnoB  
BHHMaTejibiioro nsyM eiina odm eCTBe iiiioro MneiiHa, h ea o ra a ra re a b iio H  
oprauHsauMH npaKTH'iecKoro p eü ieiim i ocrpbix  BonpocoB, o fioc iioB am io  
nooraBJiein ibix Tpy/uiiJUMMHCfl na coCToaBiiiHxcii sKOJiorHaecKHX 
MHTHiirax M 4p yrH x coSpaH H ax, HiiHunaTHBUbix M cBoeBpeivieiiHbix 
iiefiCTBHH B CBÎ13M C BpOBGJieHMeM ÏBKHX MepOnpHHTHH BlipeA t.’ '^’
No exact figure for how many members of Zelenyi Svit were simultaneously also members of RUKH, 
exist. However, Zelenyi Svit as a movement was favourable to the initiative to create a movement in 
support of perestroika and conducted several joint actions together with RUKH  following the 
emergence of the latter. A breakdown of delegates to the Second Congress of RUKH  by membership of 
civil and political organisations (see Ukrainian Reporter, vol.l, no. 1, 1991, p. 5) produced the 
following figures:
RUKH
Shevchenko U krainian Language Society
U krainian Republican P arty
Dem ocratic P arty  of Ukraine
M em orial
Zelenyi Svit
CPSU
SNUM (Ukr. Student Society)
Spadshyna
D em ocratic Platform  of CPSU 
U krainian Christian Democratic Party  
Peasants Democratic Party  
Komsomol
98.02
25.36
12.66
6.15
4.90
1.82
1.30
1.04
0.73
0.68
0.47
0.42
0.21
The figure in this table indicates how many delegates were also members of Zelenyi Svit. The number of 
rank-and-file members of both organisations was likely to be higher. There were also Zelenyi Svit 
members who symphatized with RUKH  without actually being members of it. Moreover, the 
Second RUKH Congress took place in 1990, when the political situation in Ukraine was a lot more 
polarized than was the case in 1989, prior to the formation of political parties and prior to the 
Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty. Thus, support of RUKH vtas probably higher in 1989 than in 
1990. Despite such support, however, the Green Movement was initially as we have seen above, 
cautious not to create conflict with the CPU. Such concern, together with a wish to be completely 
independent, seem to have brought about the decision made at the Zelenyi Svit Conference.
Ibid.. apK. 44.164
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The Zelenyi Svit Conference had proved, argued Savchenko, that the CPU could control the 
movement if
riapTHHHwe KOMHTCTbi, nepRLi'iHue napTopraiiMBauMM npn arrauiJOH h 
yM eaoH  p a d o r e  M oryr npoBOAHi'b co o io  .lu jin io . ^loSnBa'ibcii 
noM ep:^KM  d o .ib n m iic iB a , y cn e in n o  npo'rM nocroarb sKcrioeMHcrcKH 
nacrpoe im uM  neiIiopManbUbm oS'eiiHneiiHsiM h n iynnaM , xaB arb o rn o p  
MX .aHjiepaM, iie  ^ o n yc iM tb  npoiiMKHOBeHMa b pyKOBojuiiitMe opra iibi 
3'roro jiBMîKeiiMB (kyuKUMonepoB h3 YKK. YXC,
To secure that this would be the case also in the future, it was recommended that paity officials 
and representatives from various ministries be present at future meetings of Zelenyi Svit to present 
official views and gain support for them. To control the ‘opposition’ within the movement, a 
suggestion was put forward that whenever necessary, the CPU should
4ai'b OTnop 9KCTpeMHcraM, ;ieMaroraM, KJieBeTiiHKaM h  ariauTiopHcraM.
B pa^e cjiyqaeB Sb iao 6bi n ejiecoo5pa3i!o npHcyxcrBHe na waccoBbix 
MeponpHflTHflX M JiMu npoKypopcKoro aaasopa, KOTopue m ofjih 61.1 
;iarb noaciieiiHa no (jiaKTaM napyuieiiHa KoiicrHTyuHH CCCP,
COBCTCKMX SaKOnOB*^^
Local party committees were ordered to strengthen party influence over independent 
ecological groups and to speed up decisions regarding the environment and people’s health. In 
other words a two tier approach was elaborated where, on the one hand, the CPU would actively 
seek to control the Green Movement from within, while at the same time attempt to appease the 
more extremist groupings by actively seeking to improve the state of the environment and - should 
it be required - take legal action against these groupings to keep them ‘on the carpet’ - i.e. not to 
voice ‘extremist’ views on the national issue.
It is understandable that the CPU was keen on keeping nationalist sentiments under control 
given that these could cause problems in CPU’s relations to the CPSU in Moscow. At the time 
this report was written, the CPU leadership probably thought that environmental questions could 
either be solved in Ukraine alone, or that it would prove not too difficult to get the support of 
‘Moscow’ to solve these issues.
Towards the end of 1989, however, when the Founding Congress of Zelenyi Svit took place in 
Kiev, the political situation in Ukraine had become more radicalised. This also reflected itself in 
the speeches that were made at the Congress, where RUKH  representatives suggested the 
elaboration of a joint ecological platform and where calls were made for a Green Party to be set
Ibid., apK. 45.
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up. Despite this, however, Savchenko noted a more constructive approach towards the CPU than 
earlier:
Ha nmiBHaacb KOiicrpyKTMBiia uim p a iiim e n osn u ia
’’Se.aeiioro C B iry” moao usa& M oail 3 KoMnapriEio. B cK .iaa i 
aeaeraT iB 6y .io  MHVia.io M.ieiiiB KOPC, y roviy Mnc.ii ilepniuM 
ceKiierap Mockobckopo pauKoviy n a p r i i  vi. Kmeiui B .I . 4poGoryii, 
3UB. iaeo.aoriqiiMM o iM i.aov i MnKO.ialBCbKoro oGKOviy n a p r i i  A.Æ 
KoBajii). Hpo T ic u i  KOirraKTH 3 napTlHiiHviM opraiiaMM posnon i.u i b 
CBoix BHcrynax Ae.ieraTM 3 MMKO.naiBCbKOi i  KpnxicbKoi 
oG.nacreH^ ^^ .
Speeches by party delegates were well received, argued Savchenko, and he also pointed out 
as a positive aspect of Zelenyi ^vfV-CPU relations that attempts by some delegates to prohibit party 
workers from joining the Green Movement were not endorsed by the Congress. Savchenko’s 
report also claimed that overall the programme and the statute of Zelenyi Svit were supportive of 
the party line on social-economic and environmental issues. To the extent criticism was raised, it 
had to be admitted that several of these criticisms were well founded. On these grounds, a series 
o f changes in Ukrainian environmental policies were recommended to make sure that an image of 
the CPU as that of an environmental refomiist was created’ Moreover, to balance the popularity 
o f Zelenyi Svit it was recommended that the Society for Environmental Protection be given a 
thorough overhaul, putting its structure and activities more in line with those o f Zelenyi Svit.
It may seem, from the above that the CPU responded well to Zelenyi Sv i f s  propositions on 
the grounds that these were sound from an environmental point of view. To some extent this may 
have been the case. On the other hand, however, orders were given from Moscow to strengthen 
efforts to improve the state of the environment in the republics from 1987 onwards. Most of those
(Doiui No. 1. onnc No. 32. cnn. No. 243. aPK. 102.
Amongst these measures were the following: 1) to increase control with the implementation of resolution 
No. 357 of the Ukrainian CPU and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers of 18 November 1988 "T1|X} 
jiOKODinHV nepeGvaoDv cnpanH oxodohh nPHpoiH p p e c n v 6 j i iu i '“. and also the enforcement of 
several resolutions of the CPU Central Committee on the Improvement of the Environment. 2) 
recommend that the Collegium of Derzhkompriroda examine the materials of the Congress and take 
into account constructive critisisms raised by Zelenyi Svit. Strengthen the influence of the CPU on 
the coordination of environmental groups and of Zelenyi Svit. 3) Recommend that the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences and Derzhkompriroda conduct a sociological study of public opinion with 
regard to the most urgent environmental issues in Ukraine 4) consider the possibility of 
Derzhkompriroda issuing a monthly evnironmental journal 5) to speed up the passing of a 
Resolution on Improving Environmental Safety in Ukraine in the Ukrainian Parliament. 
Recommend to the Presidium that it examine the suggestion of subordinating Derzhkompriroda to 
the Parliament. 6) Recommend to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers that it 
spread information about the state of the environment, speed up the ratification of the Resolution on 
Derzhkompriroda and examine the possibilities of setting up a modern scientific-methodological 
center attached to USSR Go.skomrpriroda and a similar center by the USSR Academy of Sciences.
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measures suggested by Savchenko were measures that had already been initiated from Moscow 
and which would merely be speeded up in response to the emergence of Zelenyi Svit. As seen in 
Chapter Two and as will be seen in the Case Study below, however, local party organisations in 
particularly polluted areas increasingly came to voice dissatisfaction with the state of the 
environment in their areas and the lack of measures taken centrally - in Kiev and in Moscow - to 
address them properly.
As regards Zelenyi Svit, there was some disagreement regarding policies towards the CPU. 
On the one hand, the view was expressed that Zelenyi Svit must be completely independent from 
party and state structures. Consequently no party members must be allowed to join Zelenyi Svit. 
On the other hand - and this was a view commonly held by Zelenyi SviPs leadership - the Green 
Movement ought to be open to evei’yone - regardless of personal political views - who wanted to 
actively contribute towards the improvement of the Ukrainian environment. For tactical reasons it 
would also pay off not to antagonise the CPU too much as this would only lead to confrontation 
and restrictions being imposed on the activities of the Greens. Thus, although Zelenyi Svit did 
become increasingly radicalised as the limits of glasnost were being pushed and as the association 
gained massive public support for its campaigns, initially it was wary of expressing any overt 
political views and care was taken not to associate Zelenyi Svit with any particular political 
movement/grouping (e.g. RUKH, URP).
I have now examined official CPU policies towards the Greens as defined centrally, in Kiev. 
How did local and oblast party organisations respond to the Greens? This question will be
V. Drobotun - first secretary of the Moscow raikom party organisation - in Kiev in an interview
addressed in greater detail in the case study, suffice it here to say that in the case of the Nikolaev 
Greens, the Party’s attitude was ambivalent - on the one hand taking part in the activities o f the 
Greens, on the other hand tiying to keep it under control so that its campaign would not get out of 
hand. This also seems to have been the case in the Crimea, where a massive campaign to prevent 
the construction of a nuclear power station at the Kerch Peninsula was launched in the late 1980s. .3-
published in Literaturna Uh'aina argued that it was perfectly natural for the raikom to become a 
collective member of Zelenyi Svit given that the Moscow region was one of the most polluted 
areas of Kiev. Moreover, several members of the intelligentsia living in the region were 
concerned with the state of the environment and had already over a longer period of time and 
efficiently worked within Zelenyi Svit. Drobotun characterised them as ‘like-minded’ and -3#
therefore it made sense to work together within one organisation to facilitate an improvement in
.the state of the environment. The Moscow raikom decided to join Zelenyi Svit in the autumn of 
1989 and was admitted as a collective member in December the same year. Joining forces with
Î
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Zelenyi Svit had, according to Drobotun had a positive effect on the local environment, although it 
would be wrong to say that it had improved significantly’^^
It seems that several factors were decisive in determining local and regional party 
organisations’ attitude towards the emerging Green Movement. To some extent this had to do 
with the type of activities the Greens engaged in - nuclear power and military issues were 
obviously politically more sensitive issues than say, pollution from local transport, ecological 
education and concern about high levels of nitrates in food products. Moreover, calls for access to 
data linking environmental pollution with health (previously such information was not available to 
the general public) also did not please local party organisations. In Western regions, where the 
link between pollution imposed on Ukraine by an indifferent ‘Moscow’ and environmental and 
health degradation was soon established, local party organs objected to what they perceived of as 
outbursts o f ‘nationalism’ and ‘extremism’.
I got the following response, when asking the respondents o f my survey to describe the 
CPU’s attitude towards them and their activities:
Table 3.3 CPU Attitude towards the Greens
Group Positive Didn’t disturb our 
work
Disturbed our 
work
Negative
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X X
Bukov ina ZS X X
Lutsk ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk 
obi. ZS
X
Horlivka ZS X X
Mariupol ZS X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzarylgach
(Kherson)
X
Ecocentre
(Klierson)
X
Odessa Greens X
Judging from the survey, their response was predominantly negative. In terms of 
geographical location, there is also not much difference: the four first groups represent West 
Ukraine, the three following ones are East Ukrainian, Vinnytsia and Uman represent Central 
Ukraine and the four latter ones are South Ukrainian. To the extent there is a difference in party
168 Jlireparyptia VKpaïiia, 1.3.1990, c. 4.
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.attitude this has to do with the founding date of the movement. As pointed out by the Mariupol 
Greens (the Committee to Protect the Aral Sea, which was set up in 1989), ‘the leadership of the 
party gorkom joined the committee as a member. This was very fashionable at the time’.
When asked how local and regional party organisations interfered with the work of the
Greens, I got various replies. In Ternopil, for instance, following the first mass environmental 
meeting, organised by the ‘Noosphere’ club, reprisals against its leadership took place. Ihor 
Pushkar, the most active leader, was sacked from his job. Similar repressions were not only 
initiated against Greens, but also against leaders of other independent groups and movements. The 
Mukachevo Greens, who were campaigning actively against a military radar station alleged that 
they were victimised at work, were being monitored by the KGB, the police and the procurator’s 
office, and that local authorities were reluctant to register their group, which was set up prior to the
I
.emergence of Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian environmental association in October 1989. As seen 
above. Green-minded people in Dnipropetrovsk organised an ecological seminar under the 
auspices of the Komsomol long before Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. Initially they had 
no problems with the local party organisation:
OpraHHsauHOMHbie crpyK 'rypu  B naaaae n e  upu^aBajiH sn a q e im e  
/leiiTeJibnocTH ceMM iiapa, tcm 6 o ; ie e , on Gliji b pawK ax oïliMUMaJibiiOM 
nojiMTyHeGbi. H  m x c e  n o iiy n a ji rpaiuoTu h  noHeruLie snaK u 3a 
yM enue opranusoB aTb MOJio.iiexcb. FIotom nonBHJiocb pa3 iiim »:enH e, H io  
MLi HirrepecyeMCfl n e  tcm , neivi na^o. CeMU iiap 0(j)nnMajibno saKpbuiH. 
O pra iibi G esonacnocrH  M iiTepeconajiHCb neKOTopLiMH iiporpaMMaMH 
paGoTW.
Bagin o f the Horlivka Zelenyi Svit (Donetsk) expressed the view that the Greens were 
ideological enemies of the Communist Party as they demanded access to information that had so 
far been kept away from the general public and labelled ‘state secret’. In Vinnytsia the Greens 
were being characterised as a ‘destructive force’ in the local mass media and also in speeches 
made by party and other officials. The collection of signatures against the construction of new 
reactors at South Ukraine and Klimelnitskyi nuclear power stations were condemned in particular. 
In Nikolaev, the CPU representatives allegedly adopted a positive attitude towards the Greens on 
the surface, but restricted their work through the KGB. In Kherson Greens were also met with 
hostility:
Mbi GbiJiu nepBOH oGmecFBeiiHOH opran u sau u eH  b ro p o ^ e , p a n o iie  u  b 
oG jiac i’H. Hauia AeaTejibHocib n e yicjia^b iBajiacb mm b iiau iH e  
H3Becnibie paMKH, ceju ia  cyMHTHuy b yMax. CaMLiM ’’cipamnbiM” Gbuio 
TO, TTO iia c  nonMMaji napo^. FlojiHTHKa uaMajiacb c  ^BHxcenHii 
sejieHbix...
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Local party organisations, on the other hand, passed their grievances about the Greens on to 
the CPU Central Committee, and a selection of these letters can be found in the State Archives in 
Kiev. The participants of the XXIV Kirovohrad regional party conference (Kirovohrad oblast)
‘with pain in their hearts’ informed the Central Committee about an incident that had taken place 
on 22 April (Earth Day) in Kiev during an ecological meeting to commemorate the Chernobyl 
accident:
KoMytiiCTH, ijc i rpyjiaini pauoay sacyvtxcyioTb A i l  eKcrimviicTCLK-u 
uacrpOEiniux e;ieMeiiTii3 ra xy.iiraiiCTByioBux m o .io a h h k Ib , b k I  3 
BHiiJiTKOBMM uMuisMOM iiaruiioACHJiH naM’ HTb B. I . Jlenliia , AepxcaBiii 
CHMBOAH CPCP, BHcryna.iM 3 iianaAKaMU iia KflPC ra PaAniicbKHü 
ypa;t’®. , :
The indignant party members urged that the organisers of the meeting be severely punished 
for this act of vandalism. A similar complaint about the same meeting was received from party 
veterans from Kiev. The complaint was signed by the presidents of nine regional party veteran 
councils and brought to the attention of the CPU Central Committee that several SNUA^^^ activists 
had shouted slogans against Lenin and in other ways try to discredit Lenin at the 120th anniversary 
of his birthday. Thus, they asked:
H 3T0 na3biBaeTcn aKOJiorusecKOU AeMoiicrpauueH, u aro  [lasbiBaei’cn 
ACMOKpaTHeU? CTpaUlHO M t o ,  4T0 3THX (l)aillMCl’ByiOUlMX MOJIOATHKOB 
fie ocrapoBuaH meAinue b ico.iiGiiiie ni^ eACTaBureau HapoAiioro Pyxy 
YKpaHiibi, oGmem'BeiHibix oprauHuannû "3e.iieiiHH cBiT”, ”MeMopnaji” h 
Ap. 4 a  H iieyAMBHTeabiio. Bcab yxce  iia MMTunre, KOTopbiu eeji 
iiapoAiibiH A enyrar CCCP B. H b ophbckhh , 3TM iiacT|)oenHa 6bi.Tu 
liOAorpeTbi GTKpoBeHiibiMH iianaAKaiMM iia KHCC, KoivinapTHio YKpaHUbi, 
npaBHTeAbCTBG pecnyS-niHKH
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The signatories urged that measures be taken so as not only to avoid a future Chernobyl but 
also to avoid a similar expression of ‘extremist-nationalist’ sentiments - which in their view was 
just as dangerous. Another letter was sent from the Secretary of the Chernihiv oblast party 
committee regarding a ‘culturological’ action - “Dzvin-90” - where ‘nationalist’ and ‘extremist’ 
views were voiced’ Common to all these complaints, however, is that no Zelenyi Svit activists 
are being criticised for unacceptable behaviour per se. And as will be shown in Chapter Eight,
-------------------------------------------
(PoBA No. 1. ortHC No. 32. cnp. No. 369. auK. 20.
™ SNUM was one of the most powerful student groups in Kiev at the time and among those that organised 
the hunger strike against Prime Minster Fokin’s government in November 1990.
(Doha No. 1. onnc No. 32 . cnn. No. 3 6 9 . aoK. 6 3 .
CDgiia No. 1. onnc No. 32 . cnp. No. 3 6 9 . auK. 12 0 - 2 3 .
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Zelenyi Svit and later also PZU  went to a great effort to curb nationalist (as opposed to national) 
sentiments within the Green Movement.
3.3.2 Local Authorities and the Greens
Local authorities - in the same way as the CPU - responded in a number of different ways to the 
emergence of Green groups in their areas and to their activities. As seen above, activists in 
Dniprodzherzhinsk complained that local authorities made it very difficult to register groups 
locally. Local administrations in some instances also tried to prevent various campaigns from 
going ahead, A good example is the planned anti-nuclear walk between Netyshyn and Kiev 
(through Narodichi). The walk should have started in parallel with the First Congress of Zelenyi 
Svit on 27 October 1989 and was scheduled to finish on 3 November. However, local 
administrations forbid it on the grounds that it was anti-nuclear power station. The Zelenyi Svit 
Congress then appealed to party organs and local council in Klimelnytskyi oblast as well as to 
deputies o f the USSR Supreme Soviet to allow the walk to go ahead as p l a n n e d T h e  walk, 
which was organised together with RUKH ‘for a more objective examination of the situation in 
those places where the nuclear power stations were located, the heightening of people’s ecological 
culture and the development of a packet of propositions on improving environmental 
legislation’ was eventually allowed to go ahead, following the route Slavuta, Shepetovka, 
Novohrad-Volynskyi, Korosten, Ovruch, Narodichi, Polesskoe, Ivankov and Vyshhorod. The 
walk was ended with a meeting in Kiev.
The deputy leader o f Kiev gorispolkom, V. N. Kocherga, on the other hand, was positive 
towards Zelenyi Svit in general, making the following assessment of the Inaugural Congress:
Bbiciyn.rieiîMa iiucaTejui Ojieca Toiuiapa u Apyrux opaTopoB Gw.iu
KOIlCTpyKTMBHbIMM, OHM HpMSblBaJlM K eAMHeHMIO, B6Ab MbI TO.TbKO
cooSma moxcm oTOABMiiyTb 3.aoBeiuyio Teub Hepiio6bi.rui. Becbvia
MJi'repecua Mbicub o npaae Ka>KAoro iia iipoACMBaiiMe b 3KO.norMaecKM 
HMcroM c|)eAe'^ ^
BevipriMM Km ïb , 5.11.1989 (n.p.).
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In the survey local groups were asked how they were treated by local authorities in the 
aftermath of their emergence. I obtained the following results:
173
Beuiprmff Kmïb , 27.10.1989 (n.p.). 
BevipjiMfi Kmïb, 4.11.1989 (n.p.).
Table 3.4 Local Authorities ’ Attitudes towards the Greens
Group Disturbed us Did not Other
disturb us
Ternopil oblast ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS X
Donetsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dzharylgach (Kherson) X
Ecocentre (Kherson) X
Odessa Greens X
Bukovina Zelenyi Svit noticed a change in local authorities’ attitudes towards the Greens, 
arguing that o f late the latter had initiated a dialogue with them. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens 
claimed that since local authorities only worked with official organisations, they only turned to 
local authorities as individuals. On some occasions such contacts were successful and resulted in 
local problems being solved. In Horlivka, local authorities left the Greens in peace - i.e. did not 
disturb them - and in Mariupol relations were very good. This may be explained by the fact that 
the Committee to Save the Azov Sea was set up with the blessing and the participation of local 
authorities/the local party organisation and it appeared at a later stage than most o f the other 
respondents. The Uman Greens described relations with local authorities as ‘pragmatic’, whereas 
the Nikolaev Greens voiced the view that local authorities responded to them in exactly the same 
way as did the local party organisation in that the former was subordinated to the latter. In 
Kherson oblast relations to local authorities were ‘very difficult’, although over time they did 
improve. Such relations were also difficult in Odessa, whereas the Eco-centre - which is also a 
relatively new organisation - described relations as ‘normal’.
It is again interesting to note that whereas all the West-Ukrainian respondents argued that 
local authorities tried to interfere with their work, not one of the East-Ukrainian groups thought 
that local authorities tried to interfere in their work. This may be explained in terms o f stronger 
political discord in the West-Ukrainian oblasts as well as by the fact that the Green groups were 
stronger in the Western areas in terms of membership and turnout at meeting and pickets. In that 
sense, the activities of the Greens who voiced generally more radical views and demands than 
those of the East, posed more of a ‘threat’ to local authorities than was the case in the East.
I
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As will be seen in the case study (Chapters Six and Seven) in the case of the Nikolaev Greens, 
however, although initially local authorities were somewhat cautious of their activities, they soon 
became a powerful ally of the Greens in passing resolutions undermining decisions made in 
‘Moscow’ to expand the SB EK. Similar situations may also have occurred elsewhere. It is 
therefore not possible to talk about a coherent policy towards the Greens common to local 
authorities throughout Ukraine. Rather such policies - in many cases it was not even possible to 
identify a clear policy, but rather a set of ad-hoc responses to actions undertaken by the Greens - 
were determined by a number of factors such as Zelenyi Sv it’s policies, its support among the local 
population, the issues in question and the time period, during which these issues were addressed. 
Plachynda expressed the view that the Communist Party was entirely negative towards the Green 
Movement: ‘CPU had a bad relationship towards us. When we held our first meetings, police was 
present but it did not know how to relate to us as it had no instructions. We marched down 
Klireshchatyk while they stood by looking, not knowing what to do with us. Then instructions 
appeared. For instance, we had to pay for meetings’ However, as will be seen in Chapters Six 
and Seven, the CPU’s relationship with the Greens was somewhat more complex.
3.4 Politicisation and Discord
3.4.1 Local Elections/Elections to Verkhovna Rada (4 March 1990)
Although an initiative group had been set up to form a Green Party, the Partita Zelenykh Ukrainy 
(PZU) was not formally established until April 1990. It was therefore not surprising that the 
Green Movement, following its success in the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies a year earlier, put forward its own candidates for both local and national elections in 
March 1990. Nomination for the 450 seats in the par l i ament ' s t ar t ed on 3 November 1989 and 
candidates had to be approved by a Central Electoral Commission (CEC) numbering 31 members, 
and 450 District Electoral Commissions (DEC). A meeting of Zelena Rada was called in 
December 1989, at which a list of candidates to Verkhovna Rada and the local councils was set 
up’^^ .
Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.
Ukraine chose to do without a Congress of People’s Deputies and elect a unicameral Parliament 
Verkhovna Rada ~ directly.
Mojiojia rnapAMff, 16.3.1990 (n.p.).
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Registering these people officially as candidates, however, proved a difficult task. Although
the Electoral Law eventually passed by the Ukrainian parliament was rather liberal - for instance it 
rejected the election of deputies based on quotas allocated to the CPU and other official public 
organisations, and the only requirement for nominating a candidate was that he/she be endorsed by 
a majority vote at a meeting attended by 200 or more e l e c t o r s - it soon became clear that the 
DECs did not follow the Electoral Law to the letter. Potichnyj argues that the reason for this 
might have been that the DECs were created by the oblast executive committees and the executive 
committees of the local councils, most of which were controlled by arch-conservative forces'^’’. A 
number of infringements of the Electoral Law were recorded by the press and by the informais 
themselves. Informal organisations were most likely to suffer from these. The Shevchenko 
Ukrainian Language Society and Zelenyi Svit were particularly hard hit by bureaucracy, arbitrary 
regulations and blunt violations of the law. RUKH, on the other hand, was refused registration by 
the Ministry of Justice until February 1990, which effectively prevented it from participating in 
the elections as the deadline for nominations was 4 February.
Î 'In the case of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, DECs in some cases refused to 
register its candidacies on the grounds that the Central Election Commission had not certified the 
Society’s status as a legal organisation. The chairman of the latter, V. Boiko, on the other hand 
claimed that there was no need for this as the Society was officially registered on 20 May 1989. 't? 
,Those DECs which refused to register candidates from the Language Society were ordered to 
reverse their decisions by the Central Election Commission. This order was ignored by DECs in 
Kdiarkiv, Ternopil, Rivne and Nikolaev’®’.
As for the Greens, in Kiev they were allowed to register by some regional councils (e.g. 
Pechersk region), whereas in other regions their candidacies were turned down. To give but one
'example, in the Vatuhinskyi region Greens were only registered if they were put forward as 
candidates by workers’ collectives and thus officially did not stand as Zelenyi Svit 
representatives’®^. Eight candidates failed to register due to obstacles put in their way by the 
DECs; nomination meetings were sometimes held at an inconvenient time, or the time was 
changed on a very short notice with only a few ‘reliable’ people being notified about the change.
In some instances permission for holding meetings was not granted and the decision was not given
183in writing, which effectively prevented the Greens from making an appeal .
      ~
Peter J. Potichnyj, ‘The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine’. Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), Ukrainian Past. 
Ukrainian Present (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 123.
‘®“lbid., p. 124.
Kym>rypa h zkhttîU 11.12.1989 (n.p.).
M ojioaü FBapMMH, 23.2.1990 (n.p.).
MoJioji yKpaïUH. 1.2.1990 (n.p.).
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■Similar problems were encountered in other parts of Ukraine. In the South, for instance, 
Viktor Bilodid, an engineer working at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station and the initiator 
of the campaign against further expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex, was put 
forward as a candidate by the local Green movement in electoral district No 288. His candidacy, 
however, was refused by the Arbuzinka electoral district election committee on the grounds that 
the General Director of the Energy Complex, Volodymyr Fuks, had been put forward as a 
candidate in the very same district. Besides, it was argued, the luzhnoukrainsk Green Movement 
did not have its own statute. Consequently Bilodid’s candidacy could not be approved. Although 
the electoral committee sought to justify its decision by referring to the electoral law, its 
interpretation of this law was open to question. It was true that the Green Movement in 
luzhnoukrainsk did not have its own statute. However, it was a collective member o f the Nikolaev 
oblast association Zelenyi Mir, whose statute had been registered. Thus the refusal to register 
Bilodid as a candidate seemed to be motivated more by political than legal considerations’®'’.
The obstacles encountered during the election campaign by the Shevchenko Ukrainian 
Language Society and by Zelenyi Svit prompted D. Pavlychko and lu. Shcherbak - both USSR 
People’s Deputies - to lodge a formal complaint regarding violations of the Electoral Law during 
the registration of candidates, with Verkhovna Rada. Shcherbak had himself been put forward as a 
candidate in one of the Kiev electoral districts’®^. Their complaint was passed on to the Central 
Electoral Commission on the basis of point 15, article 22 of the Electoral Law to clarify the facts 
provided by the two deputies and to examine them in line with existing legislation. If necessaiy, 
the Central Election Commission would refer the case to Verkhovna Rada for clarification of the 
Electoral Law’®^. There was, however, not much chance of the complaint being successful. The 
Secretary o f the Central Election Commission, M. Lytvyn, admitted that a large number of protests 
had been lodged with the commission. However, most complaints were ignored. Boiko dismissed 
accusations to the effect that the District Election Commissions had erected ‘artificial obstacles’ to 
prevent candidates from informal groups being registered, as ‘groundless attempts to discredit 
democratically elected electoral organisations’. Sixty eight o f 120 appeals were reviewed. O f 
these, 42 were upheld and only 16 reverted. Four of the latter concerned candidates from the 
Shevchenko Society and Zelenyi 6'vi/® .^ Rallies and meetings were held in several cities and 
towns throughout Ukraine to challenge the rulings of the DECs’®®. Critical articles regarding 
individual candidates also appeared in the Ukrainian press during the election campaign.
' PajinHCbKa YKpaXiia, 30.1.1990 (n.p.). 
deaefiHH cbIt, no. 12, 1990, c. 1. 
fliwparypH a VKpaïna, 15.2.1990 (n.p.). 
PamiChKa VKpalBa, 4.2.1990 (n.p.).
188 For an account of such meetings in Nikolaev, see Chapters Six and Seven.
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Despite the obstacles put in Zelenyi Svi f s  way, Rostyslav Tverdostup, leader of the Ternopil 
oblast branch of Zelenyi Svit, concluded that the Greens had achieved ‘considerable success’ in the 
elections. Although dozens of candidates were denied even the right of registration’®^ altogether 
43 candidates from the following oblasts were elected to the oblast councils: Voroshilovhrad (2), 
Lviv (2), Chernihiv (2), Khmelnytskyi (2), Ternopil (2), Ivano-Frankivsk (1), Zhytomyr (1), 
Odessa (8), Vinnytsia (4), Sumy (1), Dnipropetrovsk (1), Volynia (2), Zaporizhzhia (1), Cherkassy 
(2), Nikolaev (11), Chernivtsi (1) and the Crimea (1). There had also been significant success in 
elections to local councils, but Zelenyi Svit did not have any exact figure for how many people 
were elected’ ”^. There was no breakdown regarding how many people were elected as Zelenyi Svit Irepresentatives and how many made it as ‘independents’, but the article noted that several of the 
Green candidates ‘passed’ as a result of support from local enterprises, institutions and assemblies.
Zelena Rada had given its support to three candidates from Kiev to Verkhovna Rada\ O. Kotsibiia,
E. Proniuk and V. Shovkoshitnyi. These and seven other candidates supported by Zelenyi Svit
were elected to the Ukrainian Parliament’^ ’. .
Despite the obstacles that were put in Zelenyi Sv it’s way during the election campaign, the 
Green Movement’s political impact by early 1990 was significant. As noted in Chapter Two, in 
February 1990 a special session of Verkhovna Rada was called to discuss ecological issues and to 
pass a Law on Environmental Protection. The fact that three members o f Zelenyi Svit from Kiev 
(Nataliia Preobrazhenska, Anatolyi Panov and Evhen Korbetskyi) were invited to attend the 
session is in itself an indication that the authorities took the organisation seriously as well as it 
having become so powerful due to a number of successful campaigns that it could not easily be 
overlooked or ignored.
I
-------------------------------------------
‘^ ^ToepAocryn (n.d.), c. 3.
Zolotukhin was approached for a rough estimate. Having consulted with other Greens he suggested that 
roughly 1% of the total number of deputies were Greens. His estimate was made on the following 
basis: The highest number of Green deputies to oblast and local council were found in Nikolaev: 
10 out of 120 deputies in the oblast Soviet were Greens, as were seven of 90 city soviet deputies and 
another three (of 50-60 deputies) in the regional (raion) councils. Bearing in mind that there are 25 
oblasts in Ukraine, it is reasonable to assume that the number of Greens to oblast and local council 
did not exceed 500 of a total of approximately 75,000, i.e. roughly 1% of the total number. 
Zolotukhin’s estimate is a maximum estimate (20 deputies per oblast). The real figure, judging by 
the response I got from my survey, is likely to be considerably less - somewhere between 200 and 
250. It is, however, not easy to give an accurate estimate, as many people sympathetic towards the 
Greens were elected as independents. Thus, although they might vote with the Greens, they cannot 
technically be defined as Greens. Similarly, some deputies who were elected as ‘Greens’ changed 
their allegiances once elected.
Mojiom rmpMMfi, 16.3.1990 (n.p.).
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3.4.2 The Emergence of the Green Party of Ukraine
On 26 April 1990 - on the fourth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident - the Green Party of 
Ukraine was founded. Shortly afterwards, it was officially registered as the third political party in 
Ukraine (after URP and the Democratic Peasants’ Party). As PZU  is considered in Chapter Five, I 
will not go into detail about the emergence and development of the Green Party here. The 
emergence of the Green Party and also of other political parties did, however, have a considerable 
impact on the Green Movement. Some explanation regarding how Zelenyi Svit was affected is 
thus required in order to get a firmer understanding of later developments in the Movement itself.
According to the Soviet Constitution, the CPSU  was the leading force in Soviet society. In 
practice this meant that the Communist Party was the only legitimate party and that no other 
political parties could be set up to challenge its power. In February 1990 the CPSU  Central 
Committee, following big demonstrations attended by several hundred thousand people in 
Moscow and elsewhere, changed Article Six of the Constitution, thus opening the way for the 
establishment of other political parties, although it was not until the following October that they 
were specifically legalised. In Ukraine, the first political party to appear was the Ukrainian 
Republican Party (URP), which was founded on the base of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union - a 
group promoting human rights in Ukraine which emerged after the signing of the Helsinki Accord 
(1975) and which was composed primarily by dissidents. Shortly afterwards, the Democratic 
Agrarian Paity, headed by Serhii Plachynda, former leader of Zelenyi Svit, emerged on the 
political scene, followed by PZU  and a large number of other parties.
As pointed out above, the Ukrainian Green Movement was not a homogenous movement; 
people of different political orientations, ages and backgrounds joined its ranks - some because 
they were generally concerned about the deteriorating state o f the Ukrainian environment, others 
because they wished to take part in the political process and there were not so many movements to 
chose between. Once it became possible to set up more radical movements and even parties 
several activists left the Greens and joined other political forces. A substantial number o f the most 
visible activists within Zelenyi Svit either left the movement altogether or shifted their attention 
towards the Green Party. As the members of Zelenyi Svit were not united behind a common 
‘Green’ ideology, a struggle to gain control with the movement broke out between the various 
factions. Similarly, conflicts also emerged between those who held the view that PZU  had a 
‘natural right’ to control the Green Movement since it was its ‘political wing’, and those who did 
not approve of PZU  and certainly did not condone the idea of any natural or close relationship 
between the two {^Zelenyi Svit must be completely independent’).
By 1991 Zelenyi Svit had reached a peak in terms of achievements and political influence. 
Not only had it succeeded in stopping the construction of new and the expansion of existing
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.nuclear power stations through a series of successful campaigns which culminated in the passing 
of a moratorium on nuclear power adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in September 1990; it also 
managed to put an end to a number of environmentally harmful industrial and military projects 
throughout Ukraine. In terms of results, much of what the Greens aimed for had been achieved. 
Moreover, with the radicalisation of Soviet and Ukrainian society, the political focus shifted from 
environmental issues to their underlying factors such as extensive economic reform, economic and 
political autonomy and from late 1990 political independence. As the initial public enthusiasm for 
political reform started to wear off and as inflation took off, people became more introverted, 
focusing their attention on how to get by under changing economic conditions. Gradually it 
became more difficult for the Greens to mobilise people and take to the streets to draw attention to 
environmental issues and possibly as a result, those activists left within the movement rather than 
uniting to develop new strategies to tackle environmental problems under changing conditions 
started fighting amongst themselves for positions within the movement. lurii Shcherbak had since
s
1989 managed to contain various currents and groupings. Following his departure for Moscow as 
a deputy to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and later as a member o f the USSR Supreme
Soviet, the first signs of conflict became visible. They continued to build up on the eve of the 
Second Congress o f Zelenyi Svit which took place in Ivano-Frankivsk in March 1991.
3.4.3 Preparing for the Second Congress (March 1991)
As seen above, two groupings could be identified within Zelenyi Svit in the early days - the 
‘Ukrainians’ (i.e. those who held the opinion that the Green Movement must focus on solving 
environmental problems in Ukraine at the expense of cultivating and expanding links with Greens 
abroad) and the ‘globalists’, who argued that the Ukrainian Green Movement was part of a larger, 
world-wide movement and that the two tasks must therefore be addressed in parallel. With the 
resignation of Plachynda in 1989, the latter gained the upper hand within the movement. Links 
were established with a number of Green groups in Europe and also in Canada and the United 
States: BUND and WWF (Germany), Milieukontakt and EYFA (Holland), Friends o f  the Earth 
(Britain) and Greenpeace, to mention but a few. As a result of such contacts, Greens were invited 
to and travelled abroad representing the Ukrainian Green Movement at conferences and meetings. 
Similarly, Greens from other countries were received by Zelenyi Svit and introduced to the 
problems with which the Ukrainian Greens were faced. The international Green community on a 
number of occasions presented Zelenyi Svit with equipment (computers, fax machines, tape 
recorders and video cameras), as well as financial and other assistance. Accusations o f nepotism, 
greed and irregularities therefore soon emerged within the association. It was argued that only a
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limited circle of Greens from Kiev were allowed to travel and that they benefited personally from 
these trips by not handing over to Zelenyi Svit equipment intended for the association. Some 
people also felt that the association was suffering from extensive foreign travel among its 
leadership. Those towards whom such accusations were made responded by arguing that these 
accusations were rooted in jealousy, a lack of talent and a lack of understanding of ‘Green’ ideas.
responsible for most o f these. Firstly, the Secretariat had exceeded its powers by employing three
newspaper Zelenyi Svit without the consent of Zelena Rada. The First Congress had decided to 
hire staff to run the Green office on a daily basis and Zelena Rada had shortly afterwards - on 16 
December 1989 - confirmed the appointment of four people (a chief secretary, a reader, an 
accountant and a secretary-cashier). No permission was given by Zelena Rada to hire additional
PiineiiHa ceKPeTapiaTV a c o u ia u i i  ”3ejieuHH Ciiir" nxA 15.12.90 p. 3 iiDHnoAV atcrv Koiirpomuo- 
D eD i3iünol KOM icii.
The Report of the Control Revision Commission
On the background of this Zelena Rada on 14 July 1990 decided to sort this conflict out. It was 
decided that a revision of Zelenyi Svi f s  organisational and financial activities during the first six 
months of 1990 would be conducted by the Control Revision Commission over the summer and 
that a report would be produced shortly after the conclusion of its work on 1 September. The
■report was handed over to the Secretariat by the three members of the Control Revision 
Commission (O. Dupak, O. Izotenko and M. Malyshko) on 12 December 1990, following a 
request made by the latter on 5 December’
'The report exposed a number of irregularities and sharply criticised the Secretariat for being I
additional members of staff for the Podii office and seven members of the editorial board of the
A
Staff. The issue w as further aggravated by the fact that the three people appointed  to the  office
were all members of the Secretariat! Thus lurii Myshchenko (Kiev) became secretaiy, Nataliia 
Preobrazhenska (Kiev) was appointed a reader and Volodymyr Tikhyi (Kiev) was made chief 
secretary of Zelenyi Sv i f s  Expert Collegium. The latter post was later taken over by Serhii 
Fedorinchyk (Kiev). Another member of the Secretariat, Andrii Hlazovyi (Kiev) was made 
departmental editor of Zelenyi svit. This, wrote the Control Revision Commission, constituted a 
gross violation of the statute, which ruled that it was the prerogative of Zelena Rada to set the 
number and compose the list of Zelenyi Svi f s  full-time employees.
Secondly, the Secretariat was criticised for its emphasis on international activities. The report 
argued that such work was given priority at the expense of practical environmental work within 
Ukraine itself:
i
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OcnOBliHM naiipjlMKOM AiiULHOCri i  IlOBCBKilHeBHHX TypGoT q/îeifiB 
CeKjîeTapia'ry ci'a.iw viixciiapOAni 3B"Ji3Ki. iioiaAKH 3a KopAOii i  
BiAnoBiAH i iipmhomm 3aK0pA0iinx roci’eH. OpMMOMy M oiiono.aisau ia  
H i E1 A ifiAbnocj'i rpynoio 'laeiiiB CeKiTerapiary Ue.viHAeiiKO, riaiioB, 
MimenKO, r.aa30BHH, Tmxhh, KypMKiii) Gea mayaem ia # x iB u i B  - 
MaeiiiB ”3e.aeiioro CuiTy". ”3eaenMX AenyiaT iB”. oGaaam x, mI clkhx 
op n iiiisau iH . eKOJiorlMiiMX rpoMaiicbKHX oG’TAnaub ”3eaeiioro  
CuiTy" B c iE i  yKpaliiM npHHOCHTb BeaHKy iiiKOiiy anropM'reTOBi 
a c o u ia u i i  i  BCbOviy eKoaori<iuo,viy p yxoa i. I  u i  KGirraKTU Bce 
G iubuie npuHMaioTb upuBaniHu xapaKTep, xoaa jiiioTb bohm a i i i  
iM eiii ”3eaeiioro CBiTy"'^\
Although the Secretariat had appointed additional staff to run the Zelenyi Svit headquarters, 
no improvement could be seen in the way the Secretariat conducted its affairs. Poor organisation 
and arbitrariness was rife; the Secretariat’s meetings were seldom planned and little or no 
information was passed on to its members beforehand. Key issues such as the activities of local 
and regional groups and the results of public expert assessments o f environmentally harmful
delegation of responsibilities within the Secretariat and by a lack of feedback on performance’^ .^
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projects were ignored as was the question of how best to co-ordinate and provide methodological 
assistance to local organisations. Crucial financial issues were not addressed adequately, nor were 
proper time frames set for the implementation of decisions made not only by the Secretariat but 
also by the Congress and Zelena Rada. Implementation was further complicated by poor
The shortcomings of the Secretariat were further aggravated by poor attendance at its weekly 
meetings. Throughout 1990, it met 45 times. On average these meetings were attended by no 
more than six-seven - of a total of 21 - members. Thus, in most cases decisions were made 
without a quorum by a group of Kiev activists. It was also a problem that those who were 
simultaneously appointed members of the Secretariat while at the same time holding positions in 
Zelenyi Sv i f s  staff were amongst those who attended these meetings on a regular basis:
...HajiBniCTb nocriHHO i G iJibuiocri uiTaniux npauiBHMKiB-BJieiiiB 
CexpeTapiaTy cefieA npucyT iiix na 3aciAaiiuax BMSuaaaE xapaK'rep 
piiueub, mo npuHMaawcn, BiiMAcyE BHMorjiuBiCTb ao  poGoru 
iirraTiioro anapai’y. He BunaAKOBO, mo ue .wnepAxceuo per/iaMeuT 
poGoTH CeKiDCTapiaTy i  poBUOAin o6oB"n3KiB mxm BJieuaMu 
CeKjierapiaTy i  urraTHUMM npauiBimKaMu'4
4
Ihid., pp. 3-4.
The report concluded that the Secretariat had failed to implement several decisions made by the Congress. 
For instance, the Expert Commission had not yet staited to function. Similarly, a Legal 
Commission had yet to be established. Protocols were not compiled properly and no list containing 
the names of Zelena Rada’s and the Secretariat’s members had so far been published in Zelenyi svit.
'" 'm id ., p. 3.
1
Thirdly, the revision also revealed that there was insufficient accountability for funds in 
Zelenyi Svit. Only Shcherbak, as the leader of Zelenyi Svit, and Anatolyi Panov, as director of the 
Fodil office, had the right to sign documents on the use of the association’s funds. However, as a 
rule rather than the exception, such documents were signed by other people. Furthermore, large 
sums that were spent on various projects and other activities were not broken down for costs.
Gifts in the form of money or equipment from foreign Green Groups were also not 
sufficiently accounted for. Members of Zelenyi Svit were often presented with such gifts when 
representing the association abroad. Zelena Rada and also the Control Revision Commission had 
long recommended that a member of the Secretariat be made responsible for the registration and 
keeping of such gifts. Although the issue had been addressed by the Secretariat more than once it 
failed to appoint anyone for this task. The Commission complained that it had only received an 
incomplete list o f funds or equipment kept by individual members o f the Secretariat on behalf of 
the association’^^ . Thus, argued the report, the Secretariat had ignored the recommendation of 
Zelena Rada and individual members of Zelenyi Svit that such equipment be registered through the 
book-keeping and be temporarily kept by the founders of Zelenyi Svit: the Peace Committee or 
Derzhkompriroda^^^. Alternatively, it could be kept in the Green Office so that the entire 
association may benefit from it, or be given to regional branches which were generally very poorly 
equipped - not in private homes, accessible only to a selected few.
As for hard currency, the Commission noted that several members of the Secretariat were also 
keeping hard currency donations at their homes’ ®^. This was understandable, as the leadership of 
Zelenyi Svit had not opened a hard currency account with the Ukrainian branch of 
Zovnishnoekonomichnyi bank SSSR. It had also been established that some members o f the
Spectometer and other equipment to a total value of more than 6,000 US dollars. Hlazovyi kept goods 
worth 6,500 DM (computer, printing facilities, electronic telephone and disks). Panov was 
responsible for goods worth more than 2,000 US dollars (videomachine, three dictaphones, portable 
player, two cameras, three radiometres, audio and videotapes),and Demydenko had goods worth 
more than 5,000 US dollars (IBM PC, software, copymachine ‘Canon’, PC-201, fax machine, 
telephone with answering machine, electric typing machine, dictaphone, beta-gamma monitor, 
video and audeo tapes). Similarly, Tykhyi kept a tape recorder, videoplayer with tapes, fax machine 
with paper, videocamera with tapes, dictaphone, radiometer B-20 and equipment to measure gamma 
radiation with. Hlazovyi sent a letter to Dupak - a member of the Contiol Revision Commission - in 
response to a request of 7.12.1990 regarding equipment that was not accounted for. Contrary to 
rumors, nobody had given the association a laboratory. However, on 11.9.1990, Zelenyi Svit had 
received a large number of technical equipment from Germany. All the equipment was set up and 
ready for work (20.11.1990) and Tikhyi, in whose name the gifts were handed over, was responsible 
for its keeping. During the period November-September tests had been conducted of milk, 
contaminated tenitories surrounding Kiev, and also of gamma radiation in houses. The results of 
these tests could be obtained from the secretariat.
Ibid.. p. 8.
As examples, the report referred to Tikhyi (200 US dollars, 500 Swiss francs), Panov (100 US dollars) 
and Demydenko (103 US dollars and other).
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association’s leadership had opened accounts in foreign banks in their own name’^^ . The Control 
Revision Commission was unable to establish how many accounts had been opened and how much 
money there was in each of them. As for the implications of this, the report concluded as follows:
4exT0 MOAce sasiiauuTM. luo ue iie npoTHpiuuTb suKouy, a .ie  iia 
■saciAauJuix C expeTap iary u i  nuTaiiiui ue po3r.uiAa.iucL i
nporoKOAbiio tie 0(l)0pM.ii0Ba.riHCH.
To gain full insight into the matter the report recommended that international organisations 
and sponsors be asked how much money they had donated to Zelenyi Svit. The report generally 
also called for more openness and accountability within the association on issues regarding 
equipment and hard currency funds^’’’’. Not only hard currency and equipment was not being 
properly accounted for: Zelenyi Svit was co-founder of several small enterprises, cooperatives and 
centres. No information existed on these and no financial accounts had been discussed by any 
elected body of the association. Almost the entire income of Zelenyi Svit originated from 
donations made by various enterprises and organisations. A number of the former were polluting 
enterprises simply making tax-free contributions to social organisations. Hardly any personal 
donations were made during the same period. This, suggested the report, indicated that Zelenyi 
Svit’s authority was dropping^^’. Finally, the report identified irregularities in the handling of 
humanitarian aid to Chernobyl victims. To give but one example, medicines earmarked for 
Chernobyl victims had allegedly been sold^’’^ .
The Control Revision Commission made severe criticism of Zelenyi Svit's staff, which it 
claimed was characterised by poor work discipline. To substantiate its claims, the Commission 
referred to lurii Myshchenko, the chief secretary, who was absent for two and a half months while
For instance, Anatolyi Panov had opened an account with Deutsche Bank, and it was also known that 
Andrii Demydenko and lurii Mishchenko had opened accounts in the name of local branches of 
Zelenyi Svit a b ro a d .tBiAOMO nno B iA K D urra p a x v n tc iB  ocepeAKaMU "3C” 3a KOPAOitoivtl.
Members of Zelenyi Svit heard that the association recieved equipment worth 200,000 DM and that 
Tikhyi had this equipment. None of it had passed through the accountant at the office and no 
person had officially been appointed to look after it. Besides, Zelena Rada had not looked into the 
issue of utilizing hard currency provided by the Soros Fund to set up an independent ecological 
laboratory in Ukraine. Tikhyi was in charge of this programme but he was moving over to 
Greenpeace.
Ibid., p. 7.
Vitamins from Switzerland (1 tonn), medicines and 10,000 single use syringes, were given free of charge 
to hospitals No. 2 and 14 in Kiev, a child hospital in Zhytomyr and a hospital in Slavutich, but the 
documentation was not properly processed. Moreover, as stated in the Control Revision 
Commission’s protocol of 15 December 1990, some of the medicines passed on to the Greens 
through Volodymyr Ivanov - a member of PZU’s leadership - had been sold to wives of Zelenyi Svit 
members, the payment for which had been used for some charitable aims, from which the PZU was 
alleged to have benefitted.
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apparently failed to notify members about time and place of them. Shcherbak had only attended
Ukraine. There was also a lack of information about foreign visits of association members. The 
newspaper predominantly printed articles written by members o f the Secretariat and the editorial 
board, not from rank-and-file members.
In conclusion then, the Control Revision Commission passed a positive judgement on the 
activities o f local and regional groups and also with a majority o f members o f Zelena Rada. With 
regard to the Secretariat, however, it recommended that the Congress declare its work
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visiting the US and Canada together with the director of the Green Office, Anatolyi Panov. The 
report noted that rather than sacking him for failing to fulfil his duties, the Secretariat praised
Myshchenko for his international activities. However, asked the Commission, ‘what kind of
.regular work of the Secretariat can one talk about when the leadership of the association is 
.continuously absent?’
With regard to the 132-member Zelena Rada things were somewhat better. During its five 
meetings since the First Congress, a number of important questions had been discussed such as the 
registration of collective members, Zelenyi Sv it’s participation in the 1990 elections, the creation 
of the Green Party (April 1990) and the endorsement of the statute of an Eco Fund (July 1990). 
However, poor attendance was also causing problems for Zelena Rada: more than half of its
,;4-i
members failed to show up at all its meetings. Consequently, there was no quorum and decisions
made were not legally binding. The Secretariat was given some of the blame for this, as it had
one o f the meetings (and five of the meetings in the Secretariat). Consequently, the association
. :
was in actual fact not headed by Shcherbak, Zelena Rada and the Secretariat, all elected by
Congress, but by a small group within the Secretariat - namely Panov, Hlazovyi, Myshchenko,
Preobrazhenska, Tykhyi and Demydenko. This situation posed a threat to inter-movement
democracy should the Congress fail to come up with a solution.
.Although the report was largely critical of the work of elected bodies and the administration
of Zelenyi Svit it noted that local and regional groups (groups in Odessa, Cherkassy, Nikopol, 
Nikolaev, Kiev, Ivano-Frankivsk and others) as well as issue-oriented groups such as Spilka 
Vriatuvannia and the Committee in Defence o f the Dniepr had achieved much during 1990. The 
radar station in Zakarpatia had been stopped, as had the Berezivsk chemical combine in Odessa 
oblast. Similarly, expansion of a chemical complex in Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) had been 
cancelled. Campaigns were ongoing to protect and ‘revive’ Syvash, the Black and Azov Seas, 
Dniepr and small rivers throughout Ukraine.
The newspaper Zelenyi svit had also achieved a great deal and dues should be given to those
who established the newspaper. As for the contents of the paper, though, things could have been 
better: articles were generally not directed towards solving pressing environmental problems in
, ... .. . . .
;|
‘unsatisfactory’. Moreover, it recommended that Hlazovyi, Demydenko, Myshchenko, Panov, 
Preobrazhenska and Tykhyi be barred from taking up elected positions in Zelenyi Svit as they were 
incapable of organising the work of the association. General dissatisfaction was voiced with the 
entire membership of the secretariat. None of them should be allowed to be elected to leading 
positions or appointed as staff within the association. Finally, the report recommended that a
The Secretariat's Response to the Control Revision Commission's Report
Upon request, the Control Revision Commission’s report was handed over to the Secretariat on 12
203 Pimetma cetcpeT ao iaT V  a c o u i a u i i  "deaeuuH  CbI t” a i j i  15.12.90 o. s npHHOjiv a tcrv  KOnnx).m,ao-
renewed Zelena Rada analyse the findings of the Commission and put all its efforts into use so as 
to mobilise the people of Ukraine to do away with the ecological crisis in the republic. The report 
was signed by only two members of the Commission. Malyshko did not sign as he was not present 
at most of the Commission’s meetings.
,;..ÿ
December 1990. Shortly after, on 15 December, the secretariat came together to discuss the
::
■
findings o f the report. Needless to say, its response was negative. In a statement^^^ passed by the
meeting, criticism was voiced with the Commission for delaying the report - work on the report 
was completed on 1 September, but the report was only handed over three and a half months later - 
and also for allowing some members of the Secretariat - in particular, V. Cherinko - to take part in 
its work as consultants:
Ü 0  y i a c T i  II i i e i i i c i l  pobcra ceK p e T a p ia r y  sa.nyqw.iMO i hk 
n ep ea ip iiio M i OKjieMi M.neiiH ceK iD crap iaT y (30K)%Ma - B. % p i i iw c o ).
TaKi MeTOAH o 6 '£ K T H iin o  iieAyrb ao po3Ko.ri.y i  iioim  Aifictio 
3aBAaAM iiejiHKOH uiKOAM poGoTM ceK|)eTapiaTy.
This, argued the Secretariat, was a good example of how the methods used by the Control -.ÿ,-
Revision Commission were directed towards schism and discord. As for Cherinko, the Secretariat 
strongly criticised his person in its statement: not only had he presented the report o f the
Commission at the Green Party Founding Congress in September 1990 - but he also conducted his 
own personal campaign against those members of the Secretariat who were criticised in the report.
As a part of this campaign, he had handed the report over to the press before it had even been 
signed by the members of the Commission:
PoanOBCiOAAcyBaB me y Dcpeaii 1990 [lOKy aKT peo isil u Kyaapax 
3"i3A.y ri3y, nocHJiaBCH y c b o i x  B u cryn ax  iia 3 " i 3 A i  na SyuiMTO 
AOBEAeni 3.aoBACMBaiimi opewMx ‘laeiiiB ceKperapiaTy, a r ir y io 'iH,  ____
l3eBi3imioi K O M ic i ï .
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npoT M  ï x  o 5 p a i in n  n a  K e p i B i i i  nocaA M  b n S Y  (npM u b o v iy  cam  
aK T H B iio  AOMaraiO'iMCb um x  a o c a a ) .  B i . i b u i e  T o r o ,  i ie n iA i iH c a n H M  i  
iie n o A a n H f i  0 ( [ ) i u i f l i i o  a  ter p e B i 3 i ï  iiO TpanH B y s a c o S w  .v ia c o B o i  
iH ( l ) O p M a u i i .  3 r i A i i o  3 iiHCbMOBHM n o n c iie iiH B M , siKi A a jia  3 u b o r o  
npH BO A y KPK, B iA i i O B iA a j ib n i c r b  3 a  posB C iO A A cem iB  a K r y  p e B i 3 i i  
■leACMTb i ia  B. H e p i i iK O .
The Secretariat acknowledged that the report contained several appropriate suggestions for 
improvement in the work o f the Secretariat. Financial information should periodically be 
published in Zelenyi svit and the working procedures of the Secretariat could definitely be 
improved. Delegation of tasks to individual members of the Secretariat should also be considered. 
Similarly, the Secretariat admitted that the planning of its work and the control o f the 
implementation of its decisions had been badly conducted and that Turii Myshchenko was to blame 
for this. As for the Expert Collegium, for which Panov and Pertseva were responsible, Zelena 
Rada had not yet confirmed its composition, although the Scientific Secretary o f the Collegium 
had been confirmed. With regard to the Secretariat’s international activities as well as staff 
appointments, however, the Secretariat chose to remain silent.
However, emotions were running high, dividing people into two groups; those who supported 
and those who objected to the Control Revision Commission’s report. The general atmosphere 
within Zelenyi Svit was such that some people wanted to go to the procurator’s office with these 
documents. Others, like Evhen Korbetskyi, a harsh critic of Anatolyi Panov, who was executive 
director of the Podil office at the time, found this unnecessary. If one person was being made 
legally responsible then several innocent people would be pulled into the conflict. His opinion 
was therefore that there was sufficient evidence to make the office leadership administratively 
accountable, but within the framework o f Zelenyi Svit - not in court. Neither lurii Shcherbak was 
happy with the prospect o f a court-case. According to Korbetskyi, Shcherbak feared the publicity 
it would cause as it was likely to damage not only the image of Zelenyi Svit, but possibly also his 
own reputation. When the documents were still handed over to the Procurator’s Office, Shcherbak 
handed in a written resignation, stating that he was stepping down as leader of Zelenyi Svit. The 
resignation was withdrawn approximately one and a half months later and prior to the Congress, 
when it became apparent that there would be no court case. The findings of the Control Revision 
Commission were, however, considered sufficiently serious to call an extraordinaiy congress to 
address the matter.
In Korbetskyi’s view, the underlying cause o f the problem was the First Congress’ decision to 
elect an administrative apparatus to run the association on a day-to-day basis. Generally, ‘the
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executors must be independent of the legislative, otherwise a struggle for power will break out’ "^'\ 
It was exactly this that had happened within Zelenyi Svit.
that they had actually been handed out for free. Besides, and a lot more seriously, not one o f the
204
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The yellow and blue flag, which is now the official flag o f Ukraine, was used by nationalists and others 
favouring Ukrainian independence at a time when it was still banned and only the Soviet Ukrainian 
flag was legal. To those opposing the idea of breaking up the Soviet Union, the yellow and blue 
flag thus came to symbolise extremism and nationalism at its worst.
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Press Coverage
So far the conflict between the Control Revision Commission and the Secretariat had been an 
internal matter. On 30 January 1991, however, a ful 1-page article written by a previous member of 
the Green Movement, Masaryk, and entitled ‘Scandal in a Noble Family’^^  ^ appeared in 
Robitnychai hazeta. The article argued that Zelenyi Svit was not such a humanistic and noble 
organisation as it would like people to think. The Control Revision Commission’s report, the 
Secretariat’s response to it and also the impression left in the aftermath of the Founding Congress 
of PZU  gave evidence to this. Moreover, as a result of Zelenyi Svit’s ‘thoughtless’ actions several 
pharmaceutical enterprises had been closed, making it virtually impossible to obtain vital 
medicines. People were generally tired of environmental issues and were getting headaches from 
hearing about them. What was more, Zelenyi Svit was not a non-political association as it claimed 
to be: on a number of occasions it had taken part in meetings under the yellow and blue flag^ *^ .^ 
Even worse, members of the Secretariat had signed several declarations together with other 
movements and political parties ignoring the opinion of rank-and-file members. Campaigning 
conducted by Zelenyi Svit was characterised by extremism - for instance, Greens had ‘terrorised’ 
personnel at Khmelnitskyi nuclear power station, thus not exactly contributing to the enhancement 
of nuclear safety. Masaryk also noted that a series of seminars and round table discussions had 
taken place, but with little result as they were all of a declarative nature. As for ‘so-called’
successes, these were questionable - for instance, the campaign against the Crimean nuclear power 
station had been conducted primarily by the Crimean Greens themselves. Only afterwards did 
they join Zelenyi Svit as a collective member. And as for the often cited 500,000 members, this
was nothing compared to UTOP, whose membership counted several million people.
The report produced by the Control Revision Commission clearly indicated that Zelenyi Svit
.may not be such a noble organisation after all: for instance, Zelenyi Svit activists had sold 1,200 
badges for two roubles each. Shortly after their sale, however, a report from staff at Podil claimed
Î
I----------------------------------------
Interview with Yevhen Korbetskyi, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994.
C K a n a a J i  v S jia ro n o A tio M v  ciMeHCTDi.
î
four deputy leaders of Zelenyi Svit was able to explain how much, where and how money donated 
to the association had been spent.
Zelenyi Svit also suffered from nepotism, argued Masaryk, referring to two incidents which he 
claimed confirmed this: to create its own symbol Zelenyi Svit had arrangéd a competition.
Amongst those receiving prizes was the wife of one of the deputy leaders of the movement. The 
woman in question was an artist by profession. Of course she should be allowed to take part in the 
competition. However, in such cases great care should be taken and one should act with clean 
hands. Otheiwise a situation similar to that which had recently arisen in MAMA-86 might take 
place:
■}5
11Cyrb 1 1 ,  3  O A H oro b o i c y ,  G .n a r o p o A u a : o 6 ' £ A i i a T n  m o . io a h x  m u m . y  jiK H x A iT H  3 '} iD H .r in a i  n i c . i J i  a n a p i l  I3 f l o p i i o R u . i i .  Boim. 
o 5 ' EA iiaBU iH Cb, 3 B e p i iy .iM c a  b  p i s n i  M iA c n a p o A U i  o p r a n i s a i i i l  ;i 
n p o x a m i i iM  n p o  r y v i a n i T a p i i y  A o n o M o r y . I  A l n c i i o  TU K y A o n o M o r y  
O A epA cajiM . I  p osnO A i-fiM JiH  m I ac c o d o t o ,  p o A H sa v iH  i  siiauoM M M M . B 
T o v iy  SM C J ii - H B M iiie sr a A a i ia  ’’K e p i i i i i a ” A p y x m i a .  T o ac  o am ii ijiaKT  
3 ApyACHMOIO MOACe 6 y T H  B M n aA K G B icriO . / I l ia  - l i e  CHMlITOMaTUMllO.
.
As for the Control Revision Commission’s critical remarks regarding foreign travel, Masaryk
had the following to say: all members of the Secretariat had been abroad - some once, others up to
several times. As a matter of fact, establishing contacts with foreign groups was the only real
result achieved by Zelenyi Svit more recently. So active was the movement in this area that one
could sometimes get the impression that Zelenyi Svit had turned into a branch o f Intouristl
International travel and receiving delegations from abroad accounted for a major share o f Zelenyi
Svi f s  budget. However, what benefit for Ukraine could there possibly be in sending 16 Germans
.to Crimea, Odessa, Lviv and West-Ukraine? And how did one improve the ecological situation in 
Ukraine by spending a month in the United States or in Canada? Given that there was so much 
sleaze within the association regarding its international involvement, was it then not hypocritical 
of Zelenyi Svit to criticise the CPU nomenklatura for its excesses?:
"
X id a  lie ”3C” iia iic ix  nepexpecriix .aae iia i ic i  sacratiKH 
3.rioiio.ayMHy napT iuiiy iioMeiiK-narypy, aka descopoMHo uHKOpHCTOBys 
CBO£ cayAcdoBe craiioBHme? l  BOAiioaac nopoAAcy e cboio (saM icrb  
aoTMpbox LüïaTHHX npauiBiiMKiB, :3aTBepAAceimx 3 ' 13aom ”3C”, ryr  
yAce npamoE B iciM , npHMOMy BCi c ta o k h  p o s id p a a n  'laeiiM 
ceKpeTapiary, rodro opra iiy Budopnoro), Koxpa nuab iio creACHTb 3a 
THM, m od lie nlAnycPHTH syAcoro ao HOBOiiBaeuoi ro A iB im n i.
I
As for Zelenyi SvWs  claims to be a non-political association this was nothing but a joke, because
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'Si
f
B oiU ioM ac A i û c i i o  SaaropoAiiMH p y x .  noK aH K aiiH H  o d 'e A i i a T U  aiO A efi 
3 piSllH M M  [lO airH H IIH M H  i  I ie a i r i f i l lM M H  IlOIVUlAaMU, K epiB llH U T lîO  
”3C’’ n e |)6 T a o p iO £  n a  u K p a û  noaiTM SO D aiiM H . r ip H 'io v ty  o a n o o c i d i i o .  
He iiM Taio'iM  i  lie  paaaM HCb y  C B O ix  a i a x  3 p a a o b m m h  aaeiiaMM, 3 
AKHX A aaeK O  iie  B C i BK paR  " a i n i ”. TaicHfi BMxoAMTb i i a i o p a a i s M .
The Secretariat’s response to the Control Revision Commission’s report further served as an 
illustration o f the lack of democracy within the association: first the members of the Commission 
had been told that there was nothing for them to examine. Afterwards, once the report had been 
compiled, its members were accused of acting like a procurator. As for the Secretary’s statement 
that the activities of the Commission were directed towards splitting up the Green movement, 
Masaryk noted that such statements had a familiar sound. However, ought not the Secretariat 
rather bear in mind that the Control Revision Commission was elected by the Congress and 
subordinated only to the Congress? References to the ‘splitting up’ of the Green movement were 
not really that appropriate, as such a split had taken place a long time ago. Local organisations 
and grass-root democracy had been pushed away by a new-founded nomenklatura which believed 
it had the right to act in the name of all Greens on any issue.
Although there were honest people within the movement who did try to do something, these 
were being side-stepped by those who did not. Worse than what was happening within the 
movement, however, was the damage recent events would do to people who believed in the 
Greens:
Bo iiaH crpa iun iu ie re, mo aioah hokh mo B iparb y ’’seae iiH x”, i i io A i  
AK B ocra iim o H aa iio . Boiocb o;moro: posqapyBamiA S y a e  mBHAKMM 
i  ripKHM.
Zelena Rada had dutifully passed decisions to ‘indicate’, ‘draw to the attention’ and 
‘concentrate efforts’, thus leaving too much space to the apparatus. Which measures to take to 
deal with the situation would be up to the Congress to decide. Masaryk noted, however, that 
Shcherbak, having made himself familiar with the conclusions of the Control Revision 
Commission, had declared them ‘predominantly correct’. And not awaiting the Congress, he had 
handed in his resignation.
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Zelenyi Svits Response to the Press Coverage
..Zelenyi Sv i f s  leadership responded negatively to the criticism raised in Masaryk’s article. Rather 
than refuting allegations made in Robitnychna hazeta, however, the article was referred to in 
Molod Ukrainy and Komsomolskoe znamia respectively. The first one published an interview with 
Serhii Kurykin, whereas the latter published Shcherbak’s reaction to Masaryk’s allegations.
Molod Ukrainy^^'’ gave a very favourable impression of Kurykin, whom it claimed suffered 
from ‘pathological modesty’ and moral integrity. Most of the article covered various actions 
undertaken by Zelenyi Svit recently, a majority of which focused on Chernobyl, and special 
attention was given to alternative energy - an issue with which Kurykin was particularly
concerned. The issue of funding also came up during the interview and Kurykin pointed out that
we ‘cannot work without sponsors these days’. A considerable number of these sponsors were 
foreign and Greens were therefore concerned that Intourist had increased its rates, making it very 
expensive for Zelenyi Svit to cover accommodation costs for foreign visitors.
With regard to Masaryk’s claim that establishing contacts with foreigners was the only real 
result of Zelenyi Svi f s  activities and that sometimes one got the impression that the association 
was turning into a branch of Intourist, Kurykin had the following to say:
f l  poarjiHAaio mo c r a n io ,  ak CKJiaAouy qacTHiiy sa r d a t i io ï K a w n a itii 
no AHCKpeAHTauiï iiobhx rpowaACbKHX pyx in . Tom (liaKX, mo 
ny6.niKauiio  noflyAOBano na c y M im i cnpuBAcnix i  yABtmx r p ix iB  
”3ejTenoro C B iry ” 3 napTiHiiHMM cnpaBaMM, CBiA'iMTb npo iiaMaraiimi 
CKOMniMMeTyBiiTH ”3e.nenHx" YKpaïUM saraaoM, saTanpysaTM i x  ak 
cycn iJ ib iie  A B u m e . fluTan iB  xon y ib  neperonaxM, mo na Y K p a in i  
6 yjia , £ i  5yAe .™me om ia saraAbnoBlAOMa "sAopona" cycn iJ ib iia
CMJia. Oamii BMsnannMM n|X)naranAMcr koahcb saynaACHB, mo
iia n iB n p a B A a  sabacah n e i i e r o H J iH B im a  3 a  A n iiy  6 p e x m o  - on eB H A H o, 
HHM n p H n u H n oM  i  n ocf iy ro B y io T b C A ^ °® .
Not only the leadership of Zelenyi Svit took part in the debate that followed the publication of 
Masaryk’s article. The editorial board of Robitnycha hazeta expressed surprise that the leadership 
of Zelenyi Svit did not turn to its pages in order to refute Masaiyk’s allegations, but rather chose to 
express its dismay through other newspapers. Referring to Kurykin’s and Shcherbak’s responses, ■y:
the newspaper argued that neither convincingly succeeded in refuting M asaiyk’s claims - as a 
matter of fact, not a single fact was refuted. Rather the two Zelenyi Svit representatives chose to 
attack Masaryk’s person, accusing him of ‘attacking democratic forces’ and for ‘slander’, but not 
substantiating their claims. The newspaper reminded its readers that the article was based on the
MojïOÂ YKpaSHn, 13.2.1990, c. 1-2. 
Ibid., p. 2.
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findings of the Control Revision Commission and that letters arriving from members of Zelenyi 
Svit went to show that not everything was well within the association. One such letter, or rather an 
article, under the heading ‘A short memory is a poor advisor’, appeared in the same issue of 
Robitnychna hazeta.
V. Cherinko, who in addition to being secretary of Zelenyi Svit was also a people’s deputy of 
the Kiev City Council - Kievrada - tried to explain why Masaryk’s article had caused such a strong 
reaction: this time the newspaper had not simply attacked the CPU, KGB or any other official
structure as it had become so common to do. But rather it had attacked a ‘holy cow’ -
■ ::
‘perestroika’s democratic child’ - the association Zelenyi S v i f . As a member of Zelenyi Svit, 
Cherinko made it clear that he did not read the article without sorrow. However, as the 
association’s secretary he was forced to admit that what Masaryk wrote was unfortunately true. In 
actual fact the situation was considerably worse:
Yxce AaBHO uer iiu 6 opl5li 3a aKOJiormo, nu AevioKpaTHM.
IlpaKTHqecKM aAMMiiHcrpaumi ”3eJienoro cBixy" iiOAMHuaeT noA œbii 
aKTHB, a Aaniio noniaTiiyBuiMHcn auTopHTer nwTaercA yKperiuTL 
BepSoBKoPi croponriHKOB, npufieraa ko BceBOSMOAcriuM nocyaaM m 
oheiiiaiiHAM. Hpn aroivi. pasSpacwBaa BOKpyr no;x)H ne.rieniiie 
rioAHTH'iecKMe saABaeiiMA, xeiua cBoe Bocaajieiinoe aiMoaiobHe. He 
noToviy AH MHorwe h3 Tex, kto gtgaa y hctokob ”3eaeuoro CBiry" h 
AeucTBHTeaLHO MOP cyiueCTBeimo rioMowL n yayqujeiiHM 
3KoaorHqecKoro rio.noAceuHa i)ecny6.nMKM HMenno b [xiMKax 
accouMauHH, noKHiiyaH ee.
Such people included Dr. of Biology, V. Polyshchuk and Dr. of Technology and Chair o f the 
Department of Industrial Ecology at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, Professor A. Shutko, to 
mention but a few. To them it had become an impossible hixuiy to waste time on putting together 
proclamations issued by the movement, calling for the world to be turned upside-down. As an 
example of the inability of the movement to make quick and sound decisions, Cherinko referred to 
the last meeting o f Zelena Rada which took place on 2 March and which was attended by only 56 
of the 120 members. The poor turnout, argued Cherinko, was indeed a question of democracy: 
Shcherbak made such an effort to persuade those present to declare the meeting competent that in 
the end only one question was addressed - namely that of where to conduct the upcoming 
Congress.
Although an extraordinary Congress was being called to address the crisis in the Green 
Movement, Zelenyi Sv i f s  future looked bleak in Cherinko’s view. The association lacked 
individuals who could generate new ideas. What was more, Shcherbak had long ago lost his 
influence within the Green movement. There were several reasons for this, the most obvious 
being his work as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as a result of which he was in effect
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AenyxaTCKMe 5;iaiiKH m ii07j,nHci>. c KOTopu.viM vioacho y  icoro-ro 
niJIipOCMTb.
permanently based in Moscow. Consequently, he knew practically nothing or very little about the 
Green movement in Ukraine. At small meetings of the Secretariat the following views were heard 
with increasing frequency:
IJiepbaK navf iiyAcea noica a ro  icaK 3fia.\ia, a e m e  flo .ib u ie  -  - e io
The tragedy of the situation, argued Cherinko, was that Shcherbak did not understand this. A 
second reason, was Shcherbak’s poor memory. He was elected a USSR People’s Deputy as a 
candidate for the Greens. And
M noKa Oil npebbiBa.n b BopaejibCKovi ilovie TBopaecrBa, r y i  
npeABbiSopiiyio KawriauHio ne.a ei'o iiiTaS, b Koropo.vi jipMiii.aoQi 
paboraTb h Miie. KaK bmamtc, aabbiBMHBOci. — ii-aoxaa iioMomiiMua.
As concerned the report of the Control Revision Commission, Cherinko held the view that the
report should be handed over to the Procurator’s office. He also hit out at Kurykin and Shcherbak
.for the way in which they handled Masaryk’s article: Kurykin, argued Cherinko, in Molod
Ukrainy encouraged everybody to join PZU  although he had himself (earlier) expressed his 
unwillingness to do the same due to a lack of faith in the decency of its leadership. Thus
-Kurykin’s appeal was in itself an issue of decency. As for Shcherbak, his criticism was even more 
out o f place. Whereas Kurykin, as seen above, criticised the article as an ‘attack on democracy’, 
Shcherbak focused entirely on Masaryk’s person:
Orop'iaeT Ace ro, hto b raKOM SjiaropoAHOM ABHAceiiuH, kbk ”3C”, 
nOHBHAHCb CBOH 5lOpOKpaTU. paCKOAbUHKM, 0nn03HUH0HepLI M AaACe 
KA0BeïHHKM. KoHKiDeTHO MMeio B BMTiy ci’a'i'bio B "PaboseR rasere” - 
’’CKaiuiaa n 6;iaropoAnoM ceMeflcFBe” Moero bbiBmero noMoimiuKa 
BaaAMMRpa MacapbiKa. or  ycn yr KOTO[5oro npnmaocb oTxasaTbca m.3- 
sa ero becnpocneriioR aetiH.
:S
Î
I
Once again, argued Cherinko, Shcherbak’s memory was playing tricks with him. Then was it 
not the same Masaryk who during the election campaign had supported Shcherbak’s campaign 
through his publications? Following Shcherbak’s successful election to the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies Masaiyk was appointed assistant to Shcherbak in Moscow. When Shcherbak 
was abroad it was Masaryk who had to do all the deputy work. Prior to being elected a deputy of 
Kievrada Cherinko had been assistant to USSR’s People’s Deputy lavorivskii in Moscow, thus
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A second letter, written by one L. Lysak, a deputy of the Zaliznychnyi regional council in
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having experienced for himself how much hard work this involved. Moreover, he had often met 
Masaryk in his capacity as Shcherbak’s assistant. How, asked Cherinko, could Shcherbak speak in 
such a derogatory manner of his former assistant? But coming to think about it, maybe it was not 
so strange after all, then Shcherbak had changed assistants three to four times already.
As for claims that the article slandered the Green Movement, Cherinko had the following to
say:
Ho B se \! r o n ia  s a x .iio q a e rc ii K .ie n e ra , ec .iH  cum lOpHft HuKc.naeBUM 
iipua iia eT  m qkt peBM3HOnnoR romhcchm, m to , s to  iioaBH.riHCL y x c e  
CBOH b iopoK paT b i?  3to k B onpocy o  b.ia ropoviCTBC  m 
K.iieBeTe...HanpacniJ n o ry rw  ’’annapaTMMKon” o t  ”3 e .ie n u x ” obBm iH Th 
0nn03MUH10 B CT|3eMAeHHH paCKOJIOTb M.RH ABACe yilHBTOACHTb 
”3ene tioe ”  ABHAceiine. E A H iic iB e iiiio e  c rp eM A e im e  " s e . ie i io io "  a n n a ix iT a
- yAepAcaTbCfl aa rmaBy. Hama Ace uenb - BospoAMTb,
7ieno.riHTH3HpoBa'n> hctmuho AeMOKpaTHsecKoe ABMAceaue "seaeBbix",
Koaeqffafl ue.ab KOToporo - cnaceiiHe poaboh 3eM.an. KaR pas o 5  aroA 
ne.BM B nwiieuifieM "3ejienoMy C B ir i"  h :ia6bmH. A Roixn'Kaa naiMarb
- nnoxoM noMomHMK. a
Kiev and a member of its permanent commission on ecology and environmental protection, 
appeared next to that of Cherinko. Lysak criticised the Zelenyi Svit chapter in his part o f Kiev for 
being ‘inactive’. To illustrate his point, Lysak referred to plans to build a four-lane road in the 
region. This was considered inadmissible as air pollution already exceeded maximum limits in
this area. Besides, the road would pass a hospital and other health institutions nearby. To get not 
only moral but also practical support attempts had been made to establish contact with the leader 
of the local Zelenyi Svit chapter, V. Tymonin - but with no result:
IHanpaciio Mbi, AenyraTbi paAcoBera, npMSbiuaAM iia noMomb nam ”3eA6BMH C b I t ” . KaK bhaho, Taxas "MejioMb” ero ne nirrepecyer.H tO  AC, CnpaBHAMCb CBOHMH CMAaMM: AOpOFH 3A6Cb BC 6yA0T. ÜKuAb
TOAbKO, BTG B HpOTaCOBOM îipy yAC6 yCBeAH BbipybHTb OKOAG TblCSMM 
AepeBbeB uennux nopoA.
.Another example was linked to a housing co-operative - ‘Aviator’ - which intended to set up 
houses in one of the region’s Green spots. Rather than opposing construction, Tymonin did the 
following:
On 3 a m iA  ’’npH imHnnaAbm iyiG” nosHnw io, BcanecKH noAAepACMBan 
saM ecrnTeAS npeA ceA areA s p a A co n e ra  d a pH U K o ro . KOTopbiA caM 6bm  
‘lAeiiOM fcoonepaTMBa ’’ÀBHaTop”. b ytiHMTOAcenHH seA enb ix "AeiicMx" 
paA o iia.
During the election campaign, argued the author, the Greens had stirred up a lot of fuss to 
protest the fact that their candidates were not registered. However, many ‘non-Green’ deputies 
now wanted to establish contacts with the Green movement but got no response:
Kax BHAHO. 3C HHTepecoBîi.ia iie  iia cro f iiu a s b o p sb a  sa :}7iopoBbe 
o x p y jx a io m eH  c\)Q&hu a  HMeiuio c o o e  npebLiBaiiHe b op ra n a x  
ynpaB .ieiiH s. T orA a - c x a x o A  ue.ibio?
As for results, the author was unable to identify many concrete results of Zelenyi Svit's work - 
although there was not a lack of promises. For instance where was the much advertised 
international centre for child radiology, promised already a year earlier by Shcherbak? Did it 
maybe prove too difficult for the Greens to fulfil their promises?
3iiaio OAHO: BLicrynaTb iia MMTHiirax h  A a n a r b  HirrepBbio - r p y j ia  
M H oro  lie iiaAo. A bot A e n a T b  acao - yxce nocAOAciiee. He noTOM.y 
AH A ioA H  p asyB ep H A H C b  B ’’seAeiibix”, yxoAJiT o r  imx. 3iiaio. 
iianpHMep. sto y  iiauiHX coceAeft b jK obtiicbom pafloiie riepBHMiiaji 
opranHsauHA yjxe npaxTMqecxH npexpaTMAa cyiuecpBOBaiiHe. JIioah 
ycraAH ot Soatobiih. A bot Bwecro nee noxa iihxto iiMsero iie
niDeAAOACHA.
I
Assessment
I have now looked at the background to and the debate that took place following the report of the 
Control Revision Commission. How just were the accusations made against Zelenyi Svit, how 
well did Zelenyi Svit's leadership deal with these accusations and to what extent was the Control 
Revision Commission right to criticise the Secretariat?
As for the allegations that Zelenyi Svit was being turned into a branch o f Intourist, i.e. that too 
much emphasis was made on establishing and maintaining international contacts, Zelenyi Sv i f s  
budget for 1990^^  ^ did indicate that foreign travel and covering expenses for foreign visitors 
constituted a substantial share of the association’s spendings. In 1990, Zelenyi Svit spent a total of 
31,112 roubles. Salaries accounted for about a third of this sum (11,584 roubles). Altogether 
4,882 roubles were spent on foreign traveP^°. Another 3,188 roubles were spent on covering 
expenses incurred by foreign groups and delegations visiting Ukraine at the initiative o f Zelenyi 
Svit. Thus a total of 8,070 roubles (25.9% of total spendings) went towards international relations. 
-------------------------------------------
IPinancoBOTOcnoAapcbKHH s B i r  sa 1990 nix DecnvbAixancbKoi acou iau ii ”3eAenMH C b I t ” iia 
1990 pix no acouiauii i  excnepTHlH xoAexii :jaTBepAAceiio mraT o xiAbxocrri 7 (ciiu) 
OilHIIHUL 3 MiCflMHHM ÆOHAOM .jaDoSiTIIOÏ HAaTH 1500 (OAIIÜ PHCOTa n ’iirbcoT) XapbOBamjiB. 
Panov and Myshchenko travelled to Canada and US, Demydenko, Plekhov and Fedorinchyk went to 
Czechoslovakia and Tikhyi to Switzerland.
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Travel expenses within the USSR accounted for 366 roubles (Moscow, Leningrad), and travelling 
within Ukraine for another 607 roubles (Klimelnitskyi, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk) - together thus 3.1% 
of the association’s expenses. It can of course be argued that given the big difference in costs of 
travelling abroad and travelling within the USSR at the time, these figures in no way reflect the 
ratio of international and domestic travel. For an association with limited funds it is, however, 
significant that close to a quarter of its expenses went towards maintaining international contacts. 
On the other hand the Green movement in Ukraine was part of a world-wide movement which was 
getting increasingly interconnected. It is therefore not surprising that attention and money were 
put towards establishing and maintaining such contacts. Equally understandable are the concerns 
of some members to the effect that too much money went towards maintaining an apparatus and 
international contacts, which together accounted for two thirds (58.9%) of Zelenyi Sv i f s  budget.
As for the issue of who benefited from Zelenyi Svi f s  international contacts - i.e. the Green 
Movement or individuals claiming to represent it - that is a different stoiy. As seen above, Zelenyi 
Svit obtained equipment worth several hundred thousand DM and thousands of US dollars from 
foreign organisations. Moreover, those who did go abroad not only obtained information about the 
history o f the international Green movement^ and practical knowledge of how this movement 
was run - they also spread information about the environmental situation in Ukraine, thus bringing 
to the attention of the outside world the environmental legacy o f the Soviet Union. As an 
example, a number of publications (newspaper articles) appeared in the American press following 
Preobrazhenska’s visit which focused on Chernobyl. Similarly, Demydenko gave a talk about the 
Ukrainian Green Movement at ISEES, University of Glasgow in November 1990. He also showed 
films on Chernobyl and provided more general information about Zelenyi Svit at a big Conference 
on Local Non-Nuclear Zones that took place in Glasgow at the time and which he attended. 
Similarly, both Demydenko and Preobrazhenska - visiting Glasgow in 1991 - took part in a broad 
discussion on Chernobyl arranged by the Glasgow City Council.
However, as seen above, there seemed to be no clear criteria for selecting people to represent 
Zelenyi Svit abroad. All the people whose names were referred to in the report of the Control 
Revision Commission were Kiev residents and members of the Secretariat. Moreover, established 
procedures were not followed in releasing funds for these travels. What was more, no proper 
mechanism existed for how to register donations and equipment made to the Ukrainian Green 
Movement. In some cases disputes even arose as to what were personal gifts and what were gifts 
given to Zelenyi Svit as an association. Needless to say, it was not possible for Zelenyi Svit to 
prove that certain items were intended for the association if those who received them said 
otherwise. It was also next to impossible for other Zelenyi Svit representatives to clarify this
211 Articles on this topic written by Hlazovyi and Demydenko were published in Zelenyi Svit.
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question with the organisations/individuals involved abroad - partly due to poor and expensive 
communications and partly also as such investigations would put the Ukrainian Green Movement 
in a poor light. From the sound of the report the Secretariat was mainly to blame for the lack of 
clear-cut procedures on these matters. This was unfortunate not only as Zelenyi Svit as an 
association was in some cases denied access to equipment from which it could no doubt have 
benefited, but also as it lay the ground for a number of personal conflicts and fall-outs within 
Zelenyi Svit, which in turn led not only to the loss of high-profile activists such as Demydenko, 
Tikhyi and Hlazovyi, but also of others who got fed up with endless quarrels and clashes on this 
issue.
To conclude, then, the links with foreign Green groups proved both a blessing and a curse to 
the Ukrainian Greens: a blessing in the sense that equipment and other assistance was obtained as 
a result, but also a curse in the sense that they unleashed a conflict that would eventually bring the 
movement down (I will return to this issue below). The conflict over Zelenyi Sv i f s  international 
activities also reinforced disagreement on other issues and facilitated personal animosities within 
leading bodies of the movement that could not easily be overcome. Had the Secretariat been better 
organised and had a clear set of priorities been set from the very start, the right balance could have 
been struck between national and global commitment. Moreover, had proper procedures for 
registering donations been established and followed, the entire movement could have benefited 
from technical and other assistance received from abroad.
Choice of Place for the Congress
The views expressed in the Control Revision Commission’s report that relations between ‘Kiev’ 
and the regions had suffered at the expense of Zelenyi Svi f s  international activities was shared by 
many local organisations throughout Ukraine. In the Western regions there was increasing 
dissatisfaction with what was perceived as Kiev representatives’ attempt at running the association 
single-handedly through the Green Office in Podil. Greens in the South and East were angered not 
only by Kiev’s wish to run the movement but also by the fact that Zelenyi Sv i f s  leadership spent 
so much time establishing contacts with the international Green Movement when there were so 
many unresolved problems in Ukraine that needed urgent attention. Smaller groups also 
complained that Kiev did little to assist them in their work. Whereas big and well-established 
groups such as the Nikolaev and Ternopil chapters did not depend on or even need such assistance 
- in the case o f the former, it was conducting its own campaign independently of Kiev and also 
very successfully; in the latter, international contacts were established directly - smaller groups
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whose activists were being harassed by the authorities and that needed help to become ‘workable’, 
did suffer from the lack of attention from Kiev.
The diverging views between Zelenyi Svi f s  grassroots and the Kiev organisation also caused 
disagreement regarding the choice of place for the Second Congress. The Kiev group sent a letter 
to all members of Zelenyi Svit on the eve of the convening of Zelena Rada (2 March 1991), which 
would decide this question, arguing vehemently in favour of Kiev being chosen for this purpose^ 
The Ivano-Frankivsk group had suggested that the Congress be held there on 29-30 March. The 
Kiev group, however, held the view that the Ivano-Frankivsk group was not up to the task. 
Besides, it disagreed over the motivation behind choosing Ivano-Frankivsk: it was true that the 
ecological situation in the area was difficult and that there was a need to activate the work of 
Zelenyi Svit and its collective members locally. However, justifying the choice of Ivano-Frankivsk 
based on the ecological situation there, was difficult as also a number of other places in Ukraine 
suffered from equally or even more difficult conditions. Besides, it was could be questioned 
whether the Ivano-Frankivsk group would be able to provide accommodation for the expected 
150-200 delegates - although it claimed this would be no big problem:
O aiiuko , ua iiaijj bscaha. 3tm apryweiiTb i iie  aBA iiioTca AocraTOSiibiiViH 
n lie  ysMTbiBaioT H iiTepecw Bcero aK oaornqecK oro ABMAceiiHii yK pan iiL i 
"deaeuMM C n ix ”.
1. IIp aK T H q ecK H  b c h  y x p a n i i a  iia x o A M T ca  b  s o i i e  sK O A o r M q e c K o r o  
GeACTBH ii, a  M H o r n e  p a n o i ib i  iiecnyG -riH K M  iia  r p a n n  a x o A o r n q e c K o n  
x a T a c r p o ( l )b i  h a m  3 T y  r p a i ib  n e p e c i y n u A H . I lo a T G M y  j ia n a T b  
n p e / t n o q T e im e  m 3 T h x  c o o O p a A c e iiH H  x a x o M y - r o  r o |X )7 iy  x a x  M e r n y  
n p o B e A e n n a  c b e a x a  c q n r a e w  i ie u e A e c o o O p a s i ib iM , reivi 6 o .r ie e  q i o  
B b ies /u ib ie  s a c e x a i iH i !  c  p a ccM O T p e iin e M  x o i ix p e T i ib ix  a x o A o r n q e c x n x  
n p o S .a e M  cA eA O i ia A o  6 i i  n p o B 07 iMTb p a i ib u ie  n  n j ia iiH p o B a T b  b  O y j iy m e M  
u a  y p o B i i e  3 e A e n o i  P a a n ,  C e x p e r a p n a T a  a c o n M a u n u .  B x c n e p T u o H  
KOAAerMH H A p y r n x  H c n o A n n r e A b H b ix  o p ra iiO B  a c c o n n a u n n .
2. MiiHLiuaTopbi npeAAGAceiiHii g nixiBeAeiinn II cbesxa 3C  Biie K'neua 
iieAOCTaTGquG qerxG upeACT’aBAHiGTb ce6e b KGMUACxce 
GprauHsanHGiiiibie npobaebi nGjirGTGBXH h ii[K)BeAeiiMA Cbesxa h 
oSiexTHBHG cyAcaioT xpyr sariHTepecGBaunbix amu, XGTopwe xgtgam 
Obi npniuiTb yqacTMe b paOoxe cbesxa. K[X)Me lorG, yAeAbiiun nee 
”3e.iieiibix” M3 KneBa aBAiiexcii AGMHiiHpyiGiuMM bg Bcex 
McnGAUMxeAbiibix Gpraiiax accouHauMM ”3e.qeiiMH cbI t”. uGaxoMy 
GprdHMsaTGpcxG-GTqexnaii paÔGxa, ecrecrBeiiiiG, AGJiyXiia b gciigbhgm 
Aeqb na hhx.
Moreover, as both Zelena Rada and the Secretariat were accountable to the Congress, all 
members of the two bodies (almost 150 people) must attend. As a large proportion o f them lived
f l o  B O iip Q c v  o Mecre m B peM euM  npoBe^ieiiMii II c i j& s a a  yxpaH iicxGH a x o A G r M q e c x o M  acoiiMaiiMM 
”3eAeiiMM C b I t ”.
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in Kiev, it was clear that Zelenyi Svit simply could not afford to cover travel expenses for so many 
people to Ivano-Frankivsk from Kiev. It would also cause problems to attract experts and people’s 
deputies to the Congress as a number of these were Kiev-based and not likely to travel all the way 
to Ivano-Frankivsk. Most areas in Ukraine had reasonably good connections with Kiev, whereas it 
might prove rather coniplicated to travel to Ivano-Frankivsk. Besides, the Congress was likely to 
get more publicity if it was held in Kiev. Zelenyi S v it \  Founding Congress, which took place in 
Kiev in October 1989, however, passed a decision that consecutive congresses be held in the 
regions so as to raise the association’s prestige lo ca lly ^ 'D esp ite  the objections voiced by ‘Kiev’, 
Zelena Rada in the end therefore decided to hold the Congress in Ivano-Frankivsk as originally 
proposed.
Anatolyi Zolotukhin claims that the reasons for Kiev activists wanting to hold the Congress in 
Kiev and not in Ivano-Frankivsk were not so much motivated by objective factors such as those 
mentioned above, but rather by a wish to expose existing and prepare the ground for new conflicts 
in the Green Movement:
KoiieHiio, noAAHHiiOH npHMHiioH Aceaaumi ymx cha npoBOAHTL a^eîAy 
u Knefie ue 6u ao neobxoAHMOcrn npHrxacHTb AcypiiaAncroB, 
Aeny'raTOB, 9KcnepT0B hta.. CKopee naoSopor, SbiAa ueoSxoAHMOCi'b b 
npHBAeqeiiMH cha, crpeMnmnxca ic paspymeuuio nsnyTpn 3eAeiioro 
Cbhtb^’'^ .
By forces seeking to destroy Zelenyi Svit from inside, Zolotukhin had in mind primarily Kiev 
representatives who had joined or supported PZU  and whose aim was to gain control with the 
association. These people, he claimed, had the backing of the authorities. The latter would just be 
too happy to see Zelenyi Svit torn apart by intrigues and conflicts as the association had a great 
deal of support among the Ukrainian people^^^. Although many Greens find Zolotukhin’s 
conspiracy theory too far-fetched, many agreed with him that the problems which had surfaced in 
Zelenyi Svit during the previous year were very much the making o f Kiev-representatives who did 
not actually do much of the work achieved by Zelenyi Svit - this work was done primarily by local 
and regional organisations with no or little assistance from Kiev - and who were preoccupied with 
fighting for positions and personal gain. Finally, in the former USSR there was a big ‘distance’ 
between city and countryside and between capital and regions. Thus some people representing the 
local and regional branches of Zelenyi Svit felt that Kiev wanted to direct them and give them 
instructions for what to do and how to do it, when locals were far more knowledgeable about the
Information provided by Antaolyi Zolotukhin by email, 27.5.1995. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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issues they were campaigning on anyway. As one Green put it; ‘in Kiev there are only bosses’. 
Some locals also felt that Kiev focused almost solely on Chernobyl and nuclear power at the 
expense of other equally important local issues.
From Kiev’s point of view, however, the situation looked somewhat different. Those activists 
who initiated Zelenyi Svit and who had done much to proliferate the movement and worked on 
campaigns such as the ones to protect Khoitytsa, Chyhyryn and Holosiivskyi lis, naturally found 
such criticism unfair. Preobrazhenska and Panov, for instance, had put much time and effort into 
lobbying Verkhovna Rada and as a result attended its special session on the environment (February 
1990) as representatives of the Green Movement. Moreover, although there were objective 
reasons for criticising Kiev for poor leadership, international contacts from which the Greens in 
Ukraine had benefited, were established. And finally, with regard to the Green Party, the Green 
Movement had itself decided that such a party be established and that it act as the Zelenyi Svit’s 
political wing.
The way Kiev activists saw it, it was definitely a problem to run the association on a day-to- 
day basis as the organs that were to give the guidelines and directives for how this should be done, 
continuously failed to come up with a quorum as it proved difficult to gather people representing 
the districts in Kiev to attend meetings of Zelena Rada and the Secretariat. Thus, in their view, 
there was no alternative than to make decisions without a quorum. What was more, it was only 
natural that a majority of members elected to representative organs were from Kiev, as - due to 
poor communications and transport - it was expensive and time-consuming for the districts to 
continuously travel to Kiev and it was simply too difficult to run Zelenyi Svit as a true grass-root 
organisation within the Ukrainian context of the early 1990s.
At this stage, therefore, it was possible to understand the grievances expressed by both 
‘groups’ (Kiev vs. regional groups). Having said that, though, the movement as such, by not 
facing up to the conclusions drawn by the Control Revision Committee’s report, rather than 
removing the growing tension within the movement further intensified it; those annoyed by the 
discoveries of the report grew increasingly hostile towards ‘Kiev’.
Most of the Greens regardless of their views on developments within Zelenyi Svit were 
unhappy with Cherinko’s part in exposing these to the general public. In Zolotukhin’s view, 
Cherinko’s article in Robitnycha hazeta represented the first attempt at trying to break Zelenyi Svit 
by attacking its leader, lurii Shcherbak. Shortly before the Second Congress started, Zelena Rada 
met in Kiev. It gathered in order to prepare the Congress, but as Cherinko was present at the 
meeting, his article and his person were also given considerable attention. Many of those present 
were in favour of telling him to leave the meeting. However, Shcherbak assured everyone that he 
would take Cherinko to court and left it at that. It would be up to the Congress to make a final
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decision on how to deal with Cherinko and also whether or not to follow the recommendations of 
the Control Revision Commission^'^
Thus the stage was set for a battle at the upcoming congress between those who endorsed and 
those who did not approve of the report supported by the Control Revision Commission, and 
between ‘Kiev’ and the regions.
3.4.4 The Second Congress, Ivano-Frankivsk, March 1991
The Control Revision Commission’s report was officially not an issue to be discussed by the 
C o n g re s s^ b u t reluctance in Green circles to talk about the Congress and incomplete files clearly 
indicate that feelings were running high in Ivano-Frankivsk: transcripts of all congresses are kept 
at the Green Office in Podil. However, the file on the Second Congress only contain some 
resolutions and technical documents.
As pointed out by lurii Tkachenko one year later at the Third Congress, however, the Second 
Congress was both filmed and recorded on tape. According to some members of Zelenyi Svit the 
transcript was removed from the Kiev office by people who were strongly criticised at the 
Congress so as to avoid unwanted publicity. A slightly different explanation was given by lurii 
Samiilenko, who in 1994 was deputy chairman of Zelenyi Svit. According to him, the transcript 
was kept by the Greens in Chernivtsi and in my presence he telephoned Chernivtsi requesting that 
the documents be sent to Kiev. However, I did not get a chance to access these documents. Bits 
and pieces of information will therefore have to be patched together so as to gain some insight into 
what exactly happened in Ivano-Frankivsk.
Shcherbak’s opening address to the 237 delegates who had gathered in Ivano-Frankivsk was 
generally positive, outlining Zelenyi 5'viY’s achievements since October 1989: looking back, the 
Greens had come a long way, he pointed out. In the beginning the association had nothing - its 
members only shared a wish to work towards improving the environment in Ukraine. Despite all 
the obstacles they initially encountered, Zelenyi Svit started working and had over the last one and 
a half years solved quite a few organisational issues not to mention a string of environmental 
issues. The Greens now had their own premises, their own bank account, in which there was close 
to 100,000 roubles, and their own symbol - a yellow sunflower set against a Green background. 
All this had been achieved thanks to the enthusiasm of rank-and-file members of the association.
Ibid.
Officially, however, the agenda of the Second Congress made no mention of the Control Revision 
Commission. The agenda contained the following five tasks: 1) a general account of the
movement’s activities to be given by Shcherbak, 2) discussion of statute and programme, 3) election 
of executive bodes, 4) discussion of resolutions and finally, 5) an ecological meeting.
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The two most important tasks identified by the First Congress in 1989, namely to create a 
‘Green’ newspaper and a Green Party, had both been implemented: the newspaper Zelenyi Svit 
was set up in April 1990 with a circulation of 30,000 copies issued twice a month. PZU  was 
founded the same month.
In terms of practical environmental work much had been achieved - particularly on issues
such as Chernobyl and nuclear power. The Greens had successfully lobbied Verkhovna Rada into
passing a moratorium on any further construction of nuclear reactors on Ukrainian soil and also a
decision to close dov/n the nuclear power station at Chernobyl. A radiological laboratory had
.recently been opened and as a result of Zelenyi Svit’s international activities foreign organisations 
were beginning to take an interest in Ukrainian environmental problems. Greenpeace, for 
instance, had opened an office in Kiev and also set up a diagnostic centre in Pushchi-Vodytsa. 
Medicine and vitamins for Chernobyl victims were received from abroad for distribution through 
Zelenyi Svit and children who had suffered from Chernobyl were being sent to Switzerland, 
Holland, France and Israel to recover. Chernobyl had been put on the agenda and was being ■'f'ï
debated by the United Nations and UNESCO and links were being established between the 
Ukrainian Greens and Greens elsewhere.
In contrast to the Control Revision Commission, Shcherbak’s assessment of the Secretariat
and its achievements was predominantly positive: the Secretariat had resolved a number of
organisational issues and also planned and carried out several actions, meetings and conferences, 
as well as seminars and round-tables. As examples, Shcherbak listed a round table on Chernobyl 
in January 1990 at which the future of the nuclear power station had been debated. The Ukrainian 
government, Verkhovna Rada and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences had attended this round 
table and it proved decisive in the parliament’s later decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station. Two months later, in March, a round table on drinking water in Ukraine was conducted 
and in April moral aspects of the Chernobyl accident were discussed at yet another conference - 
also organised by the Secretariat. A conference on the ecological crisis in Ukraine took place in 
May 1990 and in September the same year the Greens had arranged a seminar on the state of
'Dniepr. Similarly, Zelenyi Svit had made contacts with the IAEA, UNESCO, Derzhkompriroda
and Ukrainian/USSR Minzdrav, as well as the Procurator’s office , various women’s and youth
organisations and finally, ecological and legal organisations in both Ukraine and abroad. The
.Greens had also engaged in a number of cultural activities, such as the music festival Chervona 
Ruta (Chernivtsi) and an exhibition of Green art (Kiev). Zelenyi Svit had co-founded the 
Vidrodzhennia and conducted a number of lectures and meetings on environmental topics
in Donetsk, Rivne, Zakarpatia, Khmelnitskyi, Kiev, Odessa, Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.
:
-------------------------------------------
A society set up to help the so-called ‘liquidators’ and other victims of the Chernobyl accident.
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members over the past one and a half years.
Zelenyi Sv i f s  political impact had also been considerable: a major achievement of the Greens 
in 1990 was the successful lobbying of Verkhovna Rada which in February 1990 passed a
Î
■Finally, hundreds of articles, resolutions and appeals had been written and issued, as had a
substantial number of interviews on radio and TV. Press conferences were held frequently^
.Shcherbak also expressed satisfaction with the work of Zelena Rada, which had discussed 
several important issues at its four meetings since the First Congress: such issues were the
ecological session of Verkhovna Rada in February 1990 and the Greens’ participation in it, 
elections to Verkhovna Rada and to local assemblies (councils) in March 1990, the creation of the 
Green Paity, the newspaper, the Eco Fund and regional groups, as well as the fourth and fifth
.anniversaries of the Chernobyl accident. Zelena Rada had also registered several new collective
resolution to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station and to halt construction of the radar station 
in Mukachevo. Moreover, the parliament decided to release information that had been classified 
regarding the ecological situation in Ukraine and the results of the Chernobyl accident. The 
Greens were furthermore involved in facilitating the moratorium passed by parliament in 
September 1990 on the construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine and in facilitating a concept of 
who was living in contaminated areas, and the status of contaminated areas, and the citizens who 
suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident.
Whereas at the First Congress of Zelenyi Svit Shcherbak had made it clear that the association
. . .was non-political, committed only to the improvement of the environment in Ukraine, he now 
pointed out that
”3 e .n e im H  C b I t ” a c h b c  m aaK oiiaiviM  c b o e ï  B J ia c i i o i  n[X )rpaM w  i  
B BaA ca E c e 6 e  i i e B i A ' £ M u o i o  CKJiaAOBO io q a c m i o i o  AeM OK im THM iiHx cm .x  
y x i i a i u H ,  a x a  n ix ir o j io c M A a  i i e s a a e A c i i i c r b .  3 e .r ie H i  c t o b a m  d p i w i x  
TMX, XTO 3 'E A u a B  ACMBUH A a i im o r o M  J lb B iB  1  K m ï b  a c h b h m  
A a iim o r o M  s j iy x H ,  b y x H  n o p i w  3 roAOAyiO BHM H cryA eu T a iv iM  u a  
M a u A a i i i  i i e s a A e A c i io c T i  i  C o ^ i ïB C b K O M y  M a ü A a i i i  y  K u e n i ,
J lb B O B i ,  3 a n o p iA C A C i ,  M y K a a e B i ,  X a p x o B i .  X ivieAbH H UbK O M y,
P iB U O M y, iiiLUHX M ic x a x  i  ceaax^^°.
In March 1990 three meetings had been held on Independence Square in Kiev protesting the
decision of the election commission not to register candidates from Zelenyi Svit. A Green column 
had been forced on the First of May and throughout 1990 Greens took part in a number of 
meetings conducted by the so-called ‘democratic forces’. In September 1990 Verkhovna Rada 
was once again picketed and in October 1990, Zelenyi Svit gave not only moral but also financial 
support to students on hunger strike to remove the government of Prime Minister Masol, who was
____________________________
Shcherbak’s address to the Congress, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 4.
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becoming increasingly unpopular with the Ukrainian people^^*. Zelenyi Svit also took part in the 
.creation of democratic organisations in various parts of Ukraine - for instance Demkonhres in 
Kharkiv and Detnokratychna Uki'aina in Kiev.
Other members of Zelenyi Svit publicly voiced the political aspects of its work. Anatolyi 
Panov, for instance, stated that 'Zelenyi Svit works together with RUKH  and new political parties 
to achieve real state independence for Ukraine’. Other participants at the Congress argued that in
a climate of political reaction orchestrated by the CPSU, Zelenyi Svit must stand firmly on its
222democratic, anti-imperial position . This position provoked accusations in Western Green 
circles to the effect that the Ukrainian Green Movement was ‘nationalist’. As this issue is
"discussed in depth in Chapter Seven, the national question and the Greens will not be addressed 
here. It must, however, be pointed out that all informal political movements and later also parties
Ithat emerged in Ukraine stood united on this issue. Although the aim coincided, the reasons for 
favouring Ukrainian independence varied. For the Greens this commitment was rooted in a wish 
to protect the environment - a wish that could only be achieved once Ukraine gained control over 
its own natural resources and with industries on Ukrainian territory.
Given that the Green Party was intended to be the political wing of the Green Movement it
can of course be argued that Zelenyi Svit should have avoided overtly political involvement.
.However, during the late 1980s/early 1990s it was simply not possible for any informal movement 
not to take a stand on issues regarding the future relationship between Ukraine and the Soviet 
Union and to make a stand on issues such as democracy, economic reform and others. The ground 
was therefore set for a battle between currents within Zelenyi Svit supporting the PZU, RUKH, the 
Communists and other political forces (those with other political agendas). This added to the level 
o f conflict in the movement and once again a distinction could be made between the 
‘internationalists’, who held a low profile on the national question and the ‘republicans’, whose 
position was very clear cut on this issue.
Although Shcherbak’s address to the Congress was over-all positive, others were less 
satisfied with recent developments. Sviatoslav Dudko, whom Shcherbak had personally asked to 
participate at the Congress, raised a warning finger to those who thought everything was good and 
well within the movement. Zelenyi Svit was in crisis - the Congress in itself bore evidence to that 
effect. Whereas initially, the Greens had been successful in annulling or putting a stop to several 
environmentally harmful projects, over the last year the association had moved away from actions 
towards declarations:
-------------------------------------------
I
Zelenyi Svifs budget for 1990, showed that the association gave 1,000 rubles in support of the 
hungerstriking students.
QiiODAeiiHH SejjefiMH Cnir, reprinted in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest, RFE/RL Research 
Institute, 13.6.1991, no. UF-2I4, p. 24.
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aTax. axTHBicraMM ”3e;ieHoro CBixy” spnG.ieao mmmbao, a.ie cnax ÿ
IipaXTMBHOl npnp0A00X0p01IH0H A iiU b llO C r i ClipMBHHHB b I A X I a 3 f
pflA iB  a c o u i a u i i  3 u a m io i x iJ ib x o c r i  imimx,  (paxiBuiB, | |
n p o ilie c io H a A iB -e x o A o r iB . 3M iiuenuH  a x u e ir r lB  b uaripjiMxax pofloTM
BHAHJiocb B 3iiHAcanni npo$eciHBoro piBiui saxoAiB nponeAenMx |
acouiauiEio. B SiJibiuocri bobh  iiocsit AexjiaparHBBHfi xapaxxep i  
Ma.no BHpimyioTb nacyiiJiii npoSaeMM.
To amend the difficult situation Zelenyi Svit was in, Dudko recommended that a set of 
priority issues be identified and that work be focused on these tasks. First of all, there was a need 
for a concept o f ecological relief in Ukraine, given that no such concept existed Secondly, 
structi.ral economic reform was needed as were proposals on legislation affecting the environment,
Thirdly, more ecological expert assessment must be made by better utilised by involving 
Ukraine’s scientific community in this process.
Neither Dudko could avoid looking into the revelations made by the Control Revision 
Commission prior to the Congress. Whereas he did not express dissatisfaction with the 
establishment of links with like-minded groups and organisations abroad, Dudko was highly 
critical of the way in which people were selected to represent Zelenyi Svit internationally:
B  a X T i XOIITpOAbHO-p6Bi3iOHHOÏ K O M iC il o y j io  3aT0pX!iyT0 
M iAciiapoAHe cn iBpoftiT iiHUTBO. U e u  nanpjiM A i f lJ iw io c r i  a c o u i a u i i
niAaiiMH xpHTHm iiH o u i n u i  b c r a r r n x  ’’C x a iu ia x  b G aaropoA uoM y S
c iM eH ci’B i ” y  "PoG iTUM BiA r a s e x i"  x a  in iuH X . BneanenHAA, m o  B in  
noBH iieu saAHmHXMCb i  axxHB isyBaxM Cb, a  :ie Gyxw M o n o n o a iE io  
B ysb xoro  x o A a  o c iG . K i a b x i c x b  noBH ima G yxu p osm n p em ia  3a  
p a x y i io x  c n e u ia j iiC T ' iB , niTeAcraB iiHxiB p e r io n iB .  » xhm  e npo m o  
cxasaxM  na M iAcnapoAiiOMy p i B i i i .  J'i
$J:
Although critical of members of Zelenyi Svit’s leadership, Dudko finished his speech by C
■Ïcalling for unity within the movement. The association was composed of people whose political |
views were different. These differences must not be allowed to overshadow the common aim that f
should unite every member of Zelenyi Svit, namely the idea of survival. Should the Greens fail to 
unite behind this idea, then their future was likely to be bleak. Only by acting as a united Çi;
movement would the Greens be able to execute their political, economic and social programmes:
V
T oM y cyM tio. m o  b SopoxbG y 3 ’’arenxaMM in a x o A y M cx n a ”. 3a 
xpnaaxMM bmcjiobom a iA e p a  p o c iA c x n x  x o M y n i c r in  IfoAOSKOBa,
BxaniyBca uI ahA pjiA x en ep im n ix  # n K u io n e p iB  ”3eAeiioro c n ix y ”, f
a ue MOAce cnpMBHUMxca ao nocHAenna xou(|)ponxau il i  posnaAxy | |
a c o u ia u i i .  T a x i  xeu A e im ii oAce upocxeAcyioxbca. /I,jm i x  
noAOAauHfl i  upunuEieuna cxiiA Gyuo 6 BiiecxM G iubm c y i T s B i  
3M iuH 3 craxyx a c o u ia u i i ,  b h p o G h x h  M exau iSM  ynepeA A ceuua
3A0BACHBaHb nOCUAOBHMH OCoGuMM.
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LUaiioniii ae.ieraTM 3"i37iy, Ao6po7iii. MycMvio ycaijj,o.vinrM, mo
cboroAHHH cro iTb iiMTaiimi iiacKiAbXH a c o ii ia u i îi Gy/ie A itiio io .
TOMy BiA p iiiieiib 3 " i3 A y  ;ja;ieAiHTb i l  iioAa.ibuiHH iiocryn. ra
3iiaMenH)i B cyciii.'ibiioviy a c h it I  YKpaiiiH^^^■
I
A number of other delegates also criticised the central organs of Zelenyi Svit, which, it was 
claimed, did not function properly - particularly the organisation of independent expert 
assessments was unsatisfactory.
A considerable number of propositions as to how to improve the work of Zelenyi Svit were 
made prior to the convening of the Congress. The Kiev group, for instance, recommended that the
suggestions of the Control Revision Commission be taken into account and that measures be taken 
to prevent people from holding elected posts in the leading organs of the association while at the 
same time being employees of Zelenyi Svit’s administrative apparatus^^" .^
i
The Nikolaev oblast group following a meeting on 23 March 1991 at which it had examined 
the work of the association over the last years and discussed future tasks, recommended that 
candidate members be appointed to Zelena Rada. Should members for some reason not be able to 
attend, candidate members could step in for them and that way there would always be a quorum. 
Such a practice had been introduced at oblast level with a positive result^^^. The group also 
pointed out that there was a need to improve Zelena Rada as firstly, it did not pay sufficient 
attention to the issue of the Dniepr being contaminated with radionuclides from Chernobyl, and 
secondly, did not facilitate co-ordination and interaction between local chapters of the association 
on this issue. This was particularly regrettable as a majority of the Ukrainian population had no 
choice but to drink such water.
F o l lo w in g  th e  r o w  o v e r  Zelenyi Svit’s in te r n a t io n a l a c t iv i t ie s  a n d  th e  s h o r tc o m in g s  in  th e  w a y
it conducted its financial affairs, Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir recommended that the resolution passed by 
the First Congress ‘On Morals and Morality’ be incorporated into the statute and made 
compulsory for all members of Zelenyi Svit. Finally, a clearer leadership structure was proposed, 
consisting of the chairman and four vice chairmen. Each vice-chairman would be responsible for 
the work of two commissions each^^^. I will return to changes to Zelenyi Svit’s structure below.
      ....
If
Dudko’s speech, p. 3.
This proposal was laid out in a project - decision of Zelena Rada, dated Kiev, 2.3.1991 and prepared by 
the initiative group of Kiev Zelenyi Svit (p. 2).
This proposition was put foiward in a letter to lurii Shcherbak dated 26.3.1991 (No. 39) and signed by 
Anatoli Zolotukhin.
The vice-chaimien would be responsible for the following areas;
1) 3ko$ou a  h HayBno-MCCJieAOBaTeAbCKHH nenxp d ea e iio ro  C bhtu.
2) no DsaHMOAeHcrBHio c opraiiaMU BJiaciH. rocyqpeACAennaMH h no BsaHMOAeHciBHio c  oSmecrBeiiHbiMW
opraiiHsauHflMM H napraaMH.
As for the Control Revision Commission’s report, several members of Zelenyi Svit stressed 
the need to improve the atmosphere within the association. However, when the time came to vote 
on the report o f the Control Revision Commission, an overwhelming majority (156 to 18 with 12 
abstentions) chose not to endorse the report, expressing instead dissatisfaction with the work of the 
Commission, which failed to agree the position of its members.^^^ Instead, the Congress passed a 
resolution stressing Zelenyi Svit’s intention to sort out its problems. The resolution (On the 
Constructiveness of Our Actions) referred to internal conflicts within the movement in the 
following way:
...Mm lie MOAce.MO rax oi.vio (|)i.fioco(|)CK’M a m n m r j i  jio AecrpyK imimx 
A iH yceiKAui a c o u ia u i i .  Mm iie moaccmo BM3iiaTM iiopMoio cku[)()m 
OKpeMHX iiaujMx M.aeiiiB neiDCBecru poGoty 3 e m i io ï , KoncrpyKTMBnoi 
(l)a3M y (jiaay iacyB am u i ci'ocyiiKiB uan iirau iu i om G ucrux oG])aA,
MaiiinyAJiuiH iiaBKoao cnpanH aaMiCTb roro. iiioG poGm’u caiuy 
cnpaBy. KoMy BwriA iii A i l  B3a em iioï iieMou.iaM? Ha Koro
oG ' ektmbuo npamoiOTb l a x i  aioah? - Ha tmx, xto npanie iiaiuoro 
po3im.ay. Ha tux, KOMy mm, hk AoGpOAiMiia noaiTMMua c ia a ,
saoacaeiMO^ ^®.
Looking back, the resolution claimed that the Greens had been so successful since their 
beginnings and that protecting the environment had become such a high-profile issue that official 
authorities and various ministries and departments could no longer openly work against Zelenyi 
Svit. Therefore their tactics had now changed and attempts were being made at destroying the 
association from within. As part of this ‘campaign’ against the Greens, the Ukrainian press was 
misinforming the public about the Greens, discrediting their leaders and activists. Zelenyi Svit 
adopted a philosophical approach towards those standing behind this campaign. If they ‘hated (the 
Greens), then that showed that they feared (them)’. A small group of Kiev activists were accused 
of acting out this campaign by attempting to break the movement from within:
4 a h  posnaaiOBamm uboro BHKopMcroByiOTbcn nci .sacoGu, b  TOMy 
BMCAi i  cnpoGu po3Koay n i  A racaaMM ”Aeno;iiTM3a u i i ” 3 Goxy 
iiCBeAMKOi rpynM 'm en is  KniBCbKOi MiCbKOi o p r a i i is a u i i .  BtIm .
UJi KaMnaaifl cBiABMTb nepui sa Bce npo re, mo SeneuHM CbI t aocif 
BnuMBy iiacTiAbKM, mo cranoBMTb cepHosny onosHHiHny cuay. Aaa  
Toro H nycKaioTbCfl y  x iA  #abm M B i qyrxM^^^.
3) no BsaMMOAeHCTBMio c oGaacTHbiMM accouHauMaMM m no BsaHMOAeMci'BMio c 3eJieiibiMM ApyxMx
pecnyGauK m cxpan.
4) Mm|)opMauMonnaa c  laseroM ”3C”. m cexpexapHar c oprorAcaoM.
See QnoBaenMH "3eaenMM CbI i ”. reprinted in Uk ia ine Today, RFE/RL Research Institute, Ukrainian 
M ed ia D igest, no. U F-214, 13.6.1991, p. 24.
30 Ge|x?3itfl 1991 p. P esoa iou ia  2-ro 3"i3AV YEA "3eaeiiMM C bIx” Hdo KOiiCTnvKXMnniCTb namux
SeJieimii coir, no 5, 1991, c. 1.
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Inform a tion prov ided  b y  A n a to ly i Z olotuk h in  by em a il, 2 7  A u gu st 1995.
T h is  reso lu tion , w h ich  is referred to in greater deta il in Chapter S ix , m ade it clear that person al d isp utes  
be addressed in an orderly m anner and that all m em bers regardless o f  p o litica l, r e lig io u s or other  
b e lie fs  un ite  beh in d w ha t th ey  all had in co m m o n  desp ite  these  d ifficu ltie s  - n a m ely  to  protect the 
env ironm en t.
Seiiemm œ ir,  no. 5, 1991 , c. 1.
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,It is difficult to establish whether these Kiev Greens were acting on behalf o f others or 
whether their actions were motivated by genuine concern with what they perceived of as 
irregularities and abuse of positions among the leadership of Zelenyi Svit. However, uniting 
against a perceived outside ‘enemy’ or ‘threat’ may also have been a convenient way of deflecting 
attention, then there were flaws in the way Zelenyi Svit functioned. This was acknowledged by the 
newspaper Zelenyi Svit, which in an article covering the Congress admitted that there had been 
discussions about ‘serious errors’ in the work of central organs such as poor co-ordination, 
particularly of independent ecological expert assessments and ecological programmes. The staff 
of the Green Office had also committed numerous mistakes.
Anatolyi Zolotukhin in a private conversation with lurii Shcherbak during the Congress (the 
two of them were both in the Congress Presidium) expressed the view that Zelenyi Svit must be 
guided by moral principles even if this meant making unpleasant decisions then pretending as 
though nothing had happened would be equal to sanctioning a lack of morality and even become 
an accomplice. Zolotukhin thus favoured harsh measures to be taken against those people 
criticised by the Control Revision Commission^^°.
The Congress, however, rather than punishing any particular individuals for mismanagement, 
chose a different approach: to deal with the situation the Congress decided that the only possible 
principle on which to base the association’s activities was mutual respect and agreement on the 
basis of pluralism of opinion and peaceful constructive criticism and self-criticism. Any 
‘destructive actions’ facilitated by members of Zelenyi Svit should be addressed by Zelena Rada.
The Congress recommended that disorder, the telling of lies or unfounded accusations and slander 
of other members, should that kind o f behaviour occur, be punished by expulsion and that this be 
made known to the general public through the newspaper Zelenyi Svit. Any attempt at fuelling 
personal conflicts at the expense of practical work to protect the public and the children, was 
deemed amoral. Finally, the Congress urged all members to respect the resolution on morality and 
morals endorsed by the First Congress in 1989^^ \  Zelenyi Svit thus concluded that despite 
numerous attempts at breaking up the movement both from the outside and from within, Zelenyi 
Svit continued to develop as a true grassroots (basis democracy) movement, which rested on the 
initiative of numerous local groups and organisations all over Ukraine^^^.
I
It is of course possible that individual members of the Green Movement such as Cherinko 
were either used or chose to take part in an officially orchestrated campaign against Zelenyi Svit. 
The association was as seen above very successful in campaigning against chemical enterprises, 
nuclear power and other sources of pollution since it was founded in 1987. However, criticism of 
Zelenyi Svit raised publicly was taken from the report of the Control Revision Commission and 
was not really refuted by neither Shcherbak nor Kurykin. For some, referring to official 
authorities as standing behind a campaign against the Greens, thus may have been a convenient 
way of defusing criticism. Moreover, as so many prominent members of Zelenyi Svit were being 
critic sed, excluding them would not have solved the problem but rather destroyed the movement. 
Following the establishment of PZU  and with the emergence of numerous new political 
movements and parties several prominent members had left the Green movement. Thus, it simply
Ukraine and the market in interviews with the media during the Congress. Anatolyi Panov, for 
instance, discussing the market, argued that the question of the market was a complicated issue:
233 K~3. 1:00, 3 1 .3 .1 9 9 1 , transcribed in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest, co m p iled  by  R ad io  L iberty  
M on itoring, no. U F -1 1 4 , 3 1 .3 .1 9 9 1 , p. 3.
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could not afford to lose any more. And in terms of image, expelling several of the most visible 
Greens in Kiev would not have been such a good idea. Weighing the pros and the cons, it 
therefore seemed that Zelenyi Svit while acknowledging that there was a problem, chose to focus
. T.'i.
on how to avoid further mismanagement rather than punish anyone responsible for this imanagement. Instead, the Congress joined force against those Greens who, by openly criticising
their own movement through the press, had ‘betrayed’ Zelenyi Svit and by appearing as a united
movement towards the general public. In doing so, a (potentially) damaging conflict was avoided
.in the short run. However, this proved a bad policy in the longer run as personal conflicts which 
surfaced following the publication of the report remained and with time grew more severe, 
eventually bringing the movement down.
A number of resolutions were adopted by the Congress outlining Zelenyi Sv i f s  position not 
only on environmental issues, but also attempting to define its policies more generally. Leading 
members of Zelenyi Svi f s  leadership voiced their positions on issues such as the future status of
I  AJui iiac 3EJ1EHHX laKoac m o a c c  Gyxu iieGesneqiiMM. M m 3a re, 
ino6 5 y iî pMiiox. M m 3a re , m o6 po3BMBa.aacn A eM oxpax ia, CBo6o7ia, 
i i i iu ia x H B a  a i o a c h .  A.ne 5x iiexepoBaiinH pHiiox MOAce SyxH me 
G iJibm sryGnMM a a a  iiam oro GaraxocrpaACAaAbiioro xpaio. Toiviy mm 
B im n im ii ix  yw oaax noBMiiiii BM3na«iMXH: ffio iiaw poGnxH, ax iiaM
BMmynaxM. M m 3a re. m o6 b h p o G h x m  x a x i  :mxoiiM, x a x i  BMMom, 
m o5 iipMpoAa y x p a in H  Gy^a a a h  b c x x .
M m 3 a x jiM xa E M 0  B c i x  iieG aH A yA ciiH x aiO Aefl i ie  n iv iA a a a xH ca  
UboroACHiiMM e x o iiO M iq iiH M  BMFOAaM, f l x i  oGimie p H iio x . A 
naM 'axaxM , m o  n p xp o A a  y x p a i i iH  i ia  x p a io  s a r n G e j i i^ ^ l
I
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Panov expanded on Zelenyi Svi f s  attitude towards the market in a note^ "^^  published on the 
eve of the Congress. The Greens were not against market relations as the market provided 
opportunities for developing democracy, freedom and individual choice. However, an unregulated 
market could be harmful to the environment. If the market was not subordinated to the 
environment (and not the other way round) it could be even more harmful than the administrative- 
command system to the Ukrainian environment. To secure this, the Greens should work to 
facilitate the implementation of environmental legislation and the setting up of structures and 
mechanisms to protect Nature and Man. The Greens therefore urged the Ukrainian people not to 
succumb to immediate economic gains, promised by the market, but to remember that the 
environment was on the verge of destruction.
The Congress - bearing this in mind - issued a resolution on agricultural reform^^^. The 
resolution expressed concern that those who would implement new legislation on land reform (the 
Law on Land and Soviet Presidential decree of 5 January 1991 ‘On the Priority Tasks for the 
Implementation of the Land Reform’, as well as programmes on the development o f farming - 
private and leased property) might choose the easy path of allotting plots of land that had not yet 
been cultivated, thus opening for a wave of extensive farming (the ploughing-up o f virgin soil). 
Such farming was not likely to have any real socio-economic effect but would be harmful to the 
environment. Referring to Ukrainian state and economic sovereignty, the Greens recommended 
that a moratorium on the cultivation of virgin soil be adopted.
The sharp and increasing politicisation of Ukrainian society in particular and of the USSR 
more generally, caused a bit of a problem for the Greens. On the one hand, it became easier to be 
an independent movement and work on environmental issues. On the other hand, the politicisation 
also affected the members of Zelenyi Svit, ‘dehomogenising’ its membership mass. As Shcherbak 
pointed out, the (political) situation in Ukraine was becoming tenser. The social situation was 
very uncertain and discussion on the national question intensified as plans were made to hold a 
national referendum on this issue. This did of course also affect the Greens. It would be 
impossible for Zelenyi Svit to isolate itself from political problems, argued Shcherbak, as these 
very problems would determine how the natural environment would be preserved^^^ in the future.
^^ ‘* 3ejieiia la e i i  acmthme!
Pesojiioulii II  3'13AV yKualncLKOl eKO.TOriqiiol acouiauii ”3eJi6HHH CbIt’’. Criono ao 
cniBrpoMaAiiH. The resolution was signed by the members of the initiative group to create a 
National Ecological Center in Ukraine: lurii Shcherbak and Leontyi Sanduliak (USSR people’s 
deputies), Academician lurii Hleb, lurii Sheliah-Sosonko, M. Holubets, lurii Kostenko and lurii 
Akimov (Ukrainian people’s deputies).
K-3, 22:30, 31.3.1991, transcribed in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest, compiled by Radio 
Liberty Monitoring, no. UF-114, 31.3.1991, p. 5.
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Initially, when the association was set up, people were united behind the desire to improve the 
state of the environment. By March 1991, however, when a number of serious battles had already 
been won and other issues such as Ukraine’s future role in the Soviet Union and what economic 
model to follow became more prominent, a number of different positions emerged within Zelenyi 
Svit. As political parties began to emerge, some members joined PZU, whereas others preferred ;|a#RUKH, and yet others looked to CPU for guidance. As a movement Zelenyi Svit therefore had to ; |
;ï:itread very carefully, facing the dilemma of having to make a stand on current crucial issues such
237
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as Ukraine and the market, while at the same time trying to find common ground that could unite 
rather than cause a split between the various currents within the movement. It also had to define 
the role o f Zelenyi Svit vis-à-vis the Green Party. I will return to this issue in greater detail below, |
suffice it here to say that with the emergence of PZU  as the political wing of the Green Movement 
the political struggle intensified within Zelenyi Svit. Thus, although Anatolyi Panov was right to 
point out that the delegates gathered for the Congress - in spite of holding membership in a 
number of political movements and parties - were able to unite behind the common aim to save 
Ukraine, which was on the verge of ecological catastrophe^^^, these personal political allegiances 
with increasing frequency would cloud this common aim at the expense of the struggle to gain the 
upper hand within the movement.
Shcherbak in his speech to the Congress tried to assess political events in Ukraine following 
the Founding Congress o f Zelenyi Svit in 1989 and define its political role in a climate o f radical
political and economic change. In the summer of 1990 the Ukrainian parliament had adopted a 
Declaration of Sovereignty. During the spring of 1991 the ‘communist empire’ crumbled, the î|
Ukrainian economy collapsed and tensions between the people of the Soviet Union and the CPSU f
reached a peak with the latter threatening to restore ‘order’ with the help of army units, special 
agents and OMON.
Thus, while attacking the Soviet Union as an empire and describing Ukraine as a nation 
which had to put up with a lot of suffering as a part of it and therefore fully supporting Ukrainian 
independence, Zelenyi Svit was much vaguer on issues such as what an independent Ukraine
'wshould be like. General concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘market economy’ were
%used but no proper attempt was made at defining these. A resolution issued to Verkhovna Rada,
'I.for instance, stated that
:
Bch i c r o p i a  CPCP s SesnepepB uo io  SeaKOM npoM icitoio B in t io io  
iiepücaBiioro xoTajiiTapHBM y npoTM BJiacnoro iiapo iy. Ko.riHCb Boiia 
Be.iiaca GanieTaMM i  moaÆiMH, n o r iM  i’OJio;ioMopoM i  ryjiaroM,
Aenopran iaM M  i  eTiionHAOM, sa p a s - MopHo6H.aeM i  i i o b h m h  AEG. T;:
yI
To free Ukraine from this situation, the Greens requested that the Ukrainian government
Verkhovna Rada and signed by Nikolaev PZU. The resolution was written by hand but numbered 
(no. 12) and filed with other Congress documents.
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Although the very same system was now trying to reform itself, the essence on which its 
power rested remained ‘anti-human’, according to the Greens: ‘for the soulless communist
leadership, the people was a means, not an end’. The environmental legacy of the regime also 
counted against it:
CoiosiioMy ypiiitoui Ma:io 6y.io siihihhtm rnorii piuoK i  osep.
,
I
uaupaiiH...;ieM .'ii, . i i c u  3 n i . i io u u .v i  nOBiTiteM, neiÆTiîopMrn Mopii y  
K a u a j i is a u iH u i  Biitcron iiM KH, OTpyiTM i ia m i  r i . i a  
i ia f ic r r p a x im H B in io io  x iM iM tio io . a a y u i i  - iA e o n o r iM iio io  orpyTO io. 
B i n  3 a 3 ix n y B  na n a m e M a n S y n ie  MHC.aeimMH AEG. B on n  
SyTtyioTbCH, MOBJiiiB, n e ”5.xara n a p o A in ”. AEG na.iem a i'L ’’U e irrp y ” i  
Irna.F tincLK a AEG i m e  noK asa.ia 3pa30K /iM Krary ’’fy nT iB iiH K a .v f
JÏM TBH.
Ha yK pa iim  noi!a;t 95% b c I e ï  npoMMCJioBOcri na.ie^KMTb ’’Ueirrpy". 
By;j(L-}iKoi m h t I  "Ueirrp’’ M oxe iw r n c a  ao eKoiioMuquoï f.aoKa^iM 
VicpainH npunMUHBinH nocra'iainni e.neKTpoeneprii. ren.na, bo;ih . 
TpaKTopoB. aBTOMOÔH.alB. 3a6;(OKynaBLUH TpancnopT i  s b 'b o k , ;iaco5H 
MacoBOï inciJopMauiï.
immediately nationalise ail nuclear power stations and all industries located on Ukrainian territory. 
Furthermore, they demanded that it implement the decision made by the parliament in 1990 to 
close down Chernobyl. As stated in the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty, Ukraine should be
■ .
made non-nuclear and neutral. Finally, a Ukrainian constitution should be adopted as quickly as
possible - with a programme to resolve the republic’s ecological and economic crisis^^^.
A majority of those present at the Congress were positive to Zelenyi S v it’s policy and its joint 
activities with RUKH  and the emerging new political parties to secure real state independence for 
Ukraine. It was argued that in the present situation of political reaction, the Greens must step 
forward with their own position in union with other democratic forces.
■ 3
I
The Leadership Issue
The Congress not surprisingly reelected lurii Shcherbak as leader and also elected five deputy 
leaders - an increase by one from previously. lurii Tkachenko was re-elected, whereas the other 
four deputy leaders elected represented the regional branches of Zelenyi Svit: Oleksandr Bagin 
(Donetsk oblast), Anatolyi Zolotukhin (Nikolaev oblast), Leontyi Sanduliak (Chernivtsi oblast)
;
P ea o jiio u ia  1 1  3 'x 3 j iv  pecnvSjriKaiiCbKol eKO JioriBitoi a c o u i a n i i  ’’BeJieiinfl GbI t . add ressed  to
Î
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and Roman Stepaniak (the Western oblasts). Serhii Plachynda, the previous leader of Zelenyi Svit 
became an honorary member of the association.
In an effort to streamline Zelena Rada, membership was reduced from 120 to 62 people. The 
Congress hoped that this would make the council a more ‘manageable’ institution and also 
contribute towards the reduction of costs as it proved rather expensive to cover travel expenses for 
so many people whenever the council convened. The new Zelena Rada was composed of the 
association’s leadership (Shcherbak, Plachynda - who in addition to being the chairman of the 
Committee to save Dniepr was also made an honorary member of Zelenyi Svit, the five deputy 
leaders, eight representatives of all-Ukrainian issue-oriented organisations such as the Eco-Fund, 
the Ukrainian Peace Committee and the Green Party, as well as representatives from Spilka 
Vriatuvannia, the Committee in Defence of Dniepr, Zelenyi Svit’s Legal and Expert Commissions
membership would no longer be accepted. People would in the future only be able to join Zelenyi 
Svit as collective members - i.e. as members of a local group. This was done as a number of
and the newspaper Zelenyi svit. The remaining seats were taken up by representatives o f the oblast 
organisations^^^ and by people who were elected directly by the Congress. A majority of the latter
Iwere Kiev representatives. Of the 62 members of Zelena Rada, only seven (11.3%) were women. Although this represented an increase compared with the previous Zelena Rada, it was still far 
away from the number of women active at a high level in the Green Movements of West European 
countries. The membership list also revealed a lack of young people - a majority were men in 
their 40s or 50s. Attracting young people to Zelenyi Svit has proved a problem up until present.
There are various reasons for this and I will return to these below.
.As for the Co-ordinating Committee, which in effect would replace the Secretariat in running
the movement on a regular basis, it was composed of 20 people, of whom three were women and 
14 from Kiev. The members of the Co-ordinating Committee were all proposed by lurii 
Shcherbak and confirmed by Zelena Rada. It is interesting that Panov, Hlazovyi, Demydenko, 
Tikhyi, Kurykin and Preobrazhenska who were all criticised in the Control Revision 
Commission’s report, were re-elected in spite of the report’s recommendation that they be banned 
from election to Zelenyi Sv i f s  representative bodies. The Control Revision Commission, 
however, was completely changed and also enlarged. Three of its five members represented Kiev 
and the other two came from Mukachevo and Ternopil (West-Ukraine) and were also women.
A number of changes were made to Zelenyi Svit’s structure. For instance personal
individuals often spoke on behalf of Zelenyi Svit at their own initiative, thus putting the movement
  _
Altogether 24 oblasts were represented (Vinnytsia, Volynia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia, 
Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, Kiev oblast, Crimea, Lviv, Luhansk, Nikolaev, Odessa, 
Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Klimelnytskyi, Cherkassy, Chernivtsi, 
Chemihiv)
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as such in a bad light. Most of the amendments made to the statute and the programme, however, 
were cosmetic, adjusting the two to the recently adopted Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty.
Prior to the Second Congress a Commission was set up to look into how to make Zelenyi Svit 
a more efficient organisation. The Commission, which was composed primarily of Kiev Greens^"^  ^
endorsed most of the recommendations made by the Control Revision Commission, urging that 
specific tasks be delegated to eaeh member of staff at the Green Office in Podil so as to avoid 
confusion and make sure these tasks were implemented. It was also recommended that protocols 
be kept on incoming and outgoing mail, that book-keeping be improved and that journals be kept 
of meetings in Mala and Zelena Rada so as to keep record of what decisions were made by these 
bodies and who was in charge of them. So far no lists containing names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of the members of these two bodies had been made. This should be done as soon as 
possible, to ease contact between members of Zelenyi Svit and their elected representatives.
To improve links between the ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ bodies of the association and the 
office, the Working Group suggested that readers be appointed amongst staff in the Green Office 
to work with Zelena and Mala Rada. A reader was also required to deal with international 
contacts. To keep an eye with the two councils, it was recommended that the Analytical 
Commission look at the implementation of decisions made by them. With regard to Zelenyi Svit’s 
Commissions, their work could be improved by working out a time-schedule and clearer 
specifications as to what exactly their responsibilities would be. Information on the Commissions 
could then be put up in the Podil office.
Although the Working Group aimed at improving the efficacy of Zelenyi Svit, some of the 
suggestions put forward could easily produce the opposite result - namely increased 
bureaucratisation. For instance, the suggestion that one person be put in charge of the 
correspondence and mail, one person in charge of photocopying, etc. could bring about a situation 
where permission would have to be requested and given for collecting mail, sending mail and so 
on. Other suggestions were more likely to give a positive result: to avoid any future disputes on 
Zelenyi Svit’s property, an inventarisation of its material goods ought to be conducted. A 
commission could be set up for this purpose. In the financial sphere, the Working Group 
recommended that the right to sign financial documents be the sole responsibility of the Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of Zelenyi Svit. To avoid hiring of additional staff not sanctioned by the 
Congress, the report urged that staff be appointed on merit by a special commission composed of 
Zelenyi Svit’s Chairman and his deputies. To increase the prestige of staff the Group
Sviatoslav Dudko was appointed chairman of the Working Group and was assisted by I, Berkashkevych, 
I. Havrylov, S. Kurykin, S. Fedorynchyk, K. Kholiavenko and V. Shevchenko.
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recommended that salaries be raised. As for representative functions, these should be the 
prerogative of the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and heads of the commissions.
Finally, to improve links with the public, the Working Group suggested that a ‘Green 
telephone’, operative 24 hours a day, be established. People would then be able to at any time 
contact the Greens about urgent issues relating to the environment so that these could be followed 
up by Zelenyi Svit activists. Attempts should also be made at getting regular access to TV and 
radio on a monthly basis. Information about the state of the Ukrainian environment could then be 
passed on to a broader audience. Through the mass media the Greens could also establish a 
dialogue with state o rgan  working on the environment.
3.4.5 Zelena Rada (March 1991)
After the Congress was over, Zelena Rada met on 31 March^"^’ to endorse an executive committee 
that would be in charge of the Podil office until the next congress. The discussion on this issue 
was chaired by lurii Shcherbak. He proposed that Anatolyi Panov be appointed Zelenyi Svit’s 
executive director and that he be included in the Co-ordination Committee. Panov’s candidacy 
was also supported by lurii Tkachenko and was then endorsed by Zelena Rada (38 in favour, three 
abstentions).
Zelena Rada also confirmed the members of the Co-ordinating Committee. Bearing in mind 
the recommendations of the Analytical Commission, each of its 20 members was put in charge of 
one particular task in the hope that this would do away with previous mismanagement and unclear 
division of tasks. In order to secure a quorum at the meetings of the Committee, Demydenko 
(Kiev) suggested that the quorum be set by the number of Kiev representatives on the Committee. 
This proposal was not endorsed by Zelena Rada as it would simply give Kiev control with the 
Committee. Also the deputy chairmen of Zelenyi Svit were given specific responsibilities; for 
instance, Bagin was put in charge of a commission on relations to strike committees in Ukraine, 
Sanduliak became leader of the Scientific Council, Stepaniak was made co-ordinator of the 
Western region and Zolotukhin put in charge of the Methodology Commission. Finally, it was 
decided that members of the Control Revision Commission were free to attend meetings of Zelena 
Rada in the future.
Bearing in mind the personal conflicts and tensions within Zelenyi Svit, lurii Tkachenko 
appealed to everybody to be less aggressive and join forces behind what united the members of the 
movement rather than what divided them. Shcherbak stressed that the most important thing was to
ripoTOKOJi Nl. 3aciiianini 3e.neiioi oajin YEA "SejieiiMH CbI t". 31 5epe3ini 1991 n.
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work and to pay less attention to those features and characteristics of individual members of the 
association that one did not like. During the latter half of 1991, however, the question of 
Ukrainian independence somewhat overshadowed developments within Zelenyi Svit.
3.4.6 Independence
Zelenyi Svit published a number of articles on Ukrainian independence during 1991. Several of 
these were written by Andrii Hrabovskyi, one of the Green Movement’s ‘ideologists’. He argued 
very clearly in favour of Ukrainian independence on various grounds, one of the most important 
ones being the environment.
Once it was decided that a referendum would be held on this issue in conjunction with the 
upcoming presidential election in December 1991 Zelenyi Svit, like most other independent groups 
and political parties, started campaigning actively in favour of independence. The issue was 
debated at length by Zelena Rada in September 1991 and a statement outlining the position o f the 
Greens on the matter was printed in Zelenyi svit shortly after. In the statement the Greens argued 
that the decision to hold a referendum on the future status of Ukraine was illegal from the point of 
view o f international law, in that it violated the right of all people to independence. However, 
taking into account the current situation, Zelena Rada had made the following decision:
BoaîKaTH nmaiHui nponeAeinia BœyKpaïiicLKoro pe([)e[)eiwyMy 1 
rpyiitm u.p, naHBaxc.fTMDiuiuM b 4iji.nb iiocri a c o n ia u i ï  ”3e.neiiMH 
CbIt”. BaKJiHKaxn B ci o p r a u is a n i l  ra i x  BJieiiiB b M ac, mo 
gajiHmuBca 40 pe^epeimyMy, c n im n o  3 iuinHMM e^MOKpaTHMiiHMH 
CMJiaMM spoSuTM BC0 B i j i  iiHX 30^6^16 4JU1 nponaraii4M i 4 e i  
ne3a.iie2cnoCT’i  yK pa inn. 3a6e3neMemia 1 1  jieMOKpaTMMiioro 
|X)3BHTKy^ ‘^ .^
3.5 Conclusion
By 1991 Zelenyi Svit had reached a peak in terms of achievements and political influence. 
Not only had it succeeded in stopping the construction of new and the expansion of existing 
nuclear power stations through a series of successful campaigns which culminated with the 
passing of a moratorium on nuclear power adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in September 
1990; it also managed to put an end to a number of environmentally harmful industrial and 
militaiy projects throughout Ukraine. In terms of results, much of what the Greens aimed for had 
been achieved.
242 SeJienMH CBiT, n o .  1 5 ,  1 9 9 1 ,  c .  1 .
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With the radicalisation of Soviet and Ukrainian society, the political focus shifted from 
environmental issues to their underlying factors such as economic reform, economic and political 
autonomy and from late 1990 also political independence. As the initial public enthusiasm for 
political reform started to wear off and as inflation took off, people became more introverted, 
focusing their attention on how to get by under increasingly difficult economic conditions. 
Gradually it became harder for Greens to mobilise people and take to the streets to draw attention 
to environmental issues. Possibly as a result, those activists left within the movement rather than 
uniting to develop new strategies to tackle environmental problems and keep public interest high, 
started fighting amongst themselves for positions within the movement. As seen above, lurii 
Shcherbak had since Zelenyi S v it’s early days managed to contain the various currents and 
groupings. Following his departure for Moscow as a deputy of the USSR Congress o f People’s 
Deputies and later as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the first signs of conflict became 
visible. They continued, as seen above, to build up on the eve of the Second Congress of Zelenyi 
Svit and despite the reconciliatory tone of Shcherbak’s address to the Congress, were not at all 
resolved. The effect such conflicts had on the movement is a central theme in the following 
chapter, ‘Conflict and Decline: The Green Movement under Ukrainian Independence’.
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The Second Congress in many ways became a turning point for Zelenyi Svit. Not only did it reveal 
that conflicts were building up within the Green Movement, but it also revealed Shcherbak’s 
enormous authority within the Movement. It was largely to his credit that the Congress managed 
to unite people with very different opinions behind a resolution condemning attempts at splitting 
up Zelenyi Svit from within. When Shcherbak was offered a seat in the Ukrainian government as 
Minister o f the Environment, Greens were not only concerned with the impact this might have on 
the Movement in terms of popular support, but possibly even more so on how this would affect 
internal developments within Zelenyi Svit. The conflicts that erupted prior to the Second Congress 
in Ivano-Frankivsk were further compounded by the emergence of the Green Party o f Ukraine (see 
next chapter) and differences in opinion on what the relationship between movement and party 
should be. On top of this, it was becoming increasingly difficult to mobilise people in support o f 
campaigns initiated by the Green Movement. It was precisely such campaigns and Shcherbak’s 
skillful leadership that had served as the ‘glue’ holding the movement together.
Below, I will focus on internal developments in Zelenyi Svit and relate these to regional and 
political factors that might help explain why the Green Movement started to disintegrate in the 
early 1990s. I will also take a close look at the parliamentary and local elections of 1994, tiying to 
explain why support for the Greens dropped, compared to the previous 1990 elections. Finally, the 
so-called ‘philosophical alternative’ to Zelenyi Svit - EkoMisiia - is discussed and its potential role 
as a new umbrella organisation, uniting Greens frustrated with the state o f affairs within Zelenyi 
Svit, is assessed. The chapter is divided into four sub-sections: ‘Leadership Struggle and
Discord’, ‘Green Support’, ‘Regional Differences’, and ‘The Future o f the Green Movement’.
4.1 Leadership Struggle and Discord 
4.1.1. Green Minister of the Environment
Zelenyi Svit activists had, as seen above, since the second half of 1989 fought a campaign to 
remove V. Filonenko from the post of chairman of Derzhkompriroda, arguing that he was not a 
professional ecologist (by education, he was an engineer) and therefore not adequately qualified
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!were to a large extent cosmetic. The bureaucratic structures remained largely intact and resistant
f
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for the job. Moreover, claimed the Greens, despite the 1988 resolution on Goskompriroda passed 
by the Soviet government, few changes for the better had taken place within the Ukrainian State 
Committee \
Although it was true that Derzhkompriroda faced harsh opposition from more powerful 
ministries and departments such as Minatomenergoprom, Minkhimprom and Minchormet, it was 
equally true that it under Filonenko’s leadership was being unacceptably passive. Industrial 
projects for the Bukivna forest (Kiev) had been stopped early on by the Greens, for instance, and
S
not by the Ministiy. For almost half a year the Greens had been fighting against the creation of 
garden plots in a water protection area in the Koncha-Zaspa region. Filonenko had four months 
previously categorically come out against such construction at a meeting of Derzhkompriroda’s 
Public Council attended also by Zelenyi Svit representatives. However, work to convert the site
!■
had already started . Frustration over Derzhkompriroda’s poor performance was shared with 
Greens also in other parts of Ukraine . Filonenko was not removed from office, but the election of 
a new chairman to Derzhkompriroda and the passing of a Ukrainian Law on Environmental 
Protection were put on the agenda o f Verkhovna Rada’s Second Session scheduled for 1991. 
Zelenyi Svit proposed Leontiy Sanduliak as its candidate for this job" .^
Sanduliak’s credentials were impressive. Not only was he the leader of Bukovina Zelenyi 
Svit', he was also a USSR People’s Deputy and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament. Moreover, 
being a professor of Medicine at Chernivtsy University he was well qualified for the job from a 
professional point of view. However, Sanduliak was also an active member of RUKH - he was a
member of RUKHs Velika Rada - and this no doubt made him less suitable for the job from the 
point of view of the authorities.
For the authorities, however, it would not necessarily be such a bad idea to put a 
representative o f the Green Movement in charge of Minpriroda: on the one hand, once the Greens 
were themselves in control of the Ministry, critisim of the Ukrainian authorities for poor 
performance on the environment might be softened. Moreover, given that the achievements of 
Derzhkompriroda so far were poor, continued poor performance under the leadership of a Zelenyi 
Svit representative might weaken the favourable image of the Green Movement vis-à-vis the
general public. Political and economic changes were taking place in Ukraine in 1990 but these
ito change., A Green Minister of the Environment would therefore only have limited scope for 
manoeuvring and not be in a position to rock the boat off balance. It is not unreasonable therefore
‘ Derzhkompriroda was given ministerial status in 1991.
 ^SanenHM cdI t, no. 2, May 1990, c. 3.
 ^See Chapters Six and Seven for details.
See S eJ ien m  cnir, no. 8, August 1990, c. 1,2 and also SemimM œ î t , no. 13, October 1990, c. 7.
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to assume that circles within the government and the CPU who were unhappy with Zelenyi Svit’s 
achievements so far (for example the pro-nuclear lobby) would be more than happy to weaken its
.popularity among the general public and thus also its political impact. So although appointing a
member of Zelenyi Svit as chairman of Minpriroda could be seen as an acknowledgement of
Zelenyi Svit, the motives might have been less honourable.
Although Zelenyi Svit had proposed that Sanduliak be appointed for this post, some were less
.happy when Prime Minister Vitold Fokin offered the Ministiy to lurii Shcherbak, As seen above, 
by early 1991 it was clear that Zelenyi Svit was not such a unified association as it would like the 
public to think. Shcherbak was possibly the only - or at least one of the very few - person who had 
the authority to contain these conflicts and seek their solution. The Green Movement could
therefore ill afford to lose him as its leader. Following his election as chairman of PZU  in April 
1991 some members of Zelenyi Svit had expressed the view that Shcherbak ought to resign as 
chairman of Zelenyi Svit. However, these members had so far been in a minority. When the issue 
of the ministerial post came up, such demands increased in frequency.
Opinions were divided as to what Shcherbak might achieve as a member of the government.
Fokin’s government was coming under increasing criticism in the summer o f 1991 due to
.increasing inflation and also as he was considered a rather dogmatic and inflexible leader by the
‘democratic opposition’ in Ukraine. Joining Fokin’s government was therefore very much a 
gamble for the Greens. On the one hand, there was the possibility that Shcherbak would succeed 
in reforming and securing wider powers for Minpriroda. However, should he fail to achieve this, 
the damage could be substantial not only to Shcherbak personally, but possibly more so to the 
Green Movement.
Those opposed to Shcherbak taking over the Ministry of the Environment argued that as long 
as the political and economic structures in Ukraine remainded unchanged, one minister could do 
little or nothing to improve things. Once people realised that having a Green Minister of the 
Environment made no big difference, they would lose faith in the Greens and its authority would 
drop. Besides, asked some, would it not be better for the Green Movement to remain completely 
independent from the state structures, thus allowing it to freely criticise the authorities?
Despite disagreement within Zelenyi Svit (and also as will be seen in the following chapter, 
within PZU) Shcherbak decided to accept Fokin’s offer. It took two rounds o f voting in 
Verkhovna Rada before Shcherbak’s candidacy was eventually endorsed. Although he was 
considered competent for the job, many CPU deputies were sceptical to his political attitudes. 
However, Fokin insisted that Shcherbak be given the job and put him forward as his candidate also 
for the second round. Some CPU raikom first secretaries eventually vouched for Shcherbak,
"'si-
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urging the deputies to think in an ‘up-to-date’ manner and he was eventually elected w ith 254 
votes^.
Shortly after he was appointed Ukrainian M inister o f  the Environment, Shcherbak resigned as 
chairman o f  Zelenyi Svit. H is deputy, lurii Tkachenko, took over as interim leader o f  the 
association until a new leader could be found. Shcherbak did, however, retain the leadership o f  
P Z U  and the stakes were thus higher for the Green Party, where opposition to Shcherbak’s 
appointment was also more substantial.
As for the Ministry, Shcherbak tried to reorganise it by firing people who were not up to the 
job and by replacing them with members o f  the Green Movement. His attempts, however, proved 
much more d ifficult than he had originally envisaged. During a conversation w ith Shcherbak in 
K iev in August 1 9 9 1 ,1 was told that he had been given a limit by the government as to how many 
people he could actually sack. Besides, Greens were cautious about taking up jobs in the ministry. 
Volodym yr T ikhyi (K iev), for instance, turned down such an offer and chose to work through 
Greenpeace, which opened an office in K iev the same year. Andryi Dem ydenko was also h ighly  
sceptical, although he was eventually persuaded to take on the job as head o f  the M in istry’s 
International Department.
Shcherbak also sought changes more generally. In early October 1991, for instance, he 
claim ed that Ukraine was the m ost polluted countiy in Europe and that there was a need for an 
ecolog ical security council, subordinated to the Ukrainian President, to address these issues^.
i l
Such a council was, however, not created. Later, Zelenyi Svit criticised President Kravchuk for 
fa iling to include som eone w ith expertise in this area on the State Duma subordinated to him. 
B esides, Green dissatisfaction w ith the M inistry’s performance remained.
A s w ill be seen in Chapters S ix and Seven, Zolotukhin o f  N ikolaev Zelenyi M ir grew so
■frustrated with the way deputy minister Liakh handled the issue on whether or not to expand the 
South Ukrainian Energy Com plex, and the w ay in which the local branch o f  the M inistry handled 
environmental problems generally in the oblast, that he wrote a letter to Shcherbak drawing to his 
attention these matters. A s Shcherbak was ‘Green’ he hoped som e good would com e out o f  his 
complaint. Although Shcherbak acknowledged that in som e cases the M inistry could have 
performed better, he did not find this circumstance sufficient to justify  the dism issal o f  any
.particular individuals - including Liakh.
Shcherbak’s reply caused d isbelief in Nikolaev. Although som e people were o f  the opinion
that Zolotukhin had taken things a bit too far, others were disappointed with Shcherbak, w ho it 
w as alleged had ‘sold out’ to official authorities rather than fighting the bureaucratic structures he
 ^M-1, 09:00, printed in RFE/RL Research Institute, Soviet Media News Budget, 20.6.1991, no. 516, p. 24.
 ^ Mojiom YKpaïHM, 2.10.1991 (n.p.).
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had h im self earlier criticised. Shcherbak’s departure from Zelenyi Sv it also had a negative impact 
on the association. As pointed out by Serhyi Hrabovskyi, Shcherbak’s resignation unleashed 
conflicts within Z elenyi Sv it which he had managed to keep under control. lurii Tkachenko, the 
deputy chairman o f  Zelenyi Sv it and interim chairman until a new leader was elected, did not have 
the same authority among Zelenyi Sv it as Shcherbak had, and was thus unable to prevent these 
conflicts from erupting. A struggle for power between supporters o f  PZU , R U K tl, people with 
leftist sympathies and the politically independent started shortly after and w ith it the decline o f  
Z elenyi Svit.
In terms o f  public support, however, Z elenyi Svit had by 1991 established itself as a highly 
popular and authoritative informal organisation, capable o f  m ob ilising up to 15 percent support in 
opin ion polls. In polls conducted during 1990 and 1991, the Greens ranked among the four most 
popular political organisations and parties, thus clearly indicating that although discord was 
beginning to emerge within the Green M ovem ent - in the same way as was the case in other 
organisations and parties - the Greens were still a significant force in Ukrainian political life. I w ill 
return to this issue in more detail in Chapter F ive. To illustrate my point, however, I include two  
polls printed in Zelenyi S v it and the U krainian Reporter. These are representative o f  several polls 
conducted during this period.
Table 4.1 Support fo r  Greens in Kiev during 1990 (% o f  electorate)'
O rg./Party January February June November
RUKH 25.3 29.0 45.8 53.6
Zelenyi SviHPZV 13.4 15.3 13.3 12.5
CPU 19.5 18.4 10.1 10.0
Komsomol 4.1 4.7 1.3 0.4
U krainian Republican Party 1.0 0.9 2.4 1.3
D em ocratic P latform  of the CPSU -- 6.3 1.1
U krainian Student Society 2.8
U krainian Democratic Party 1.0
O thers 17.1 17.2 11.9 2.3
Person more im portant than org./party 
affiliation
19.9 14.2 8.9 15.0
Similar results were found by the Ukrainian Academy o f  Sc iences’ Institute o f  Philosophy, 
which polled the electorate on political support in January and July 1991:
3e.fieiiMH CBiT, no. 7-8, 1991, c. 3.
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Table 4.2: Support o f  Greens (in %) in Ukraine during 199(f
G roup January July
RUKH 27 46
Greens 13 13
CPU 20 10
Nationalists 3 7
¥
a
As seen from both surveys, the Greens maintained a relatively stable support base throughout 
1991, ranking second only to RUKH. R U K H s  broader appeal to som e extent no doubt was 
connected w ith its demands for Ukrainian independence at a time when other political m ovem ents 
and parties - including the Greens - were more cautious on this issue. Besides, several o f  R U K H s  
leaders were w ell known and respected members o f  the creative intelligentsia, who appealed not 
only to environmentalists, but also to others.
Follow ing the Ukrainian Declaration o f  Sovereignty in June 1990, Ukrainian society became 
increasingly politicised and a differentiation occurred in terms o f  party/organisational support. 
URP, the most radical party, was com posed primarily o f  former prisoners o f  conscience, who  
lacked popular appeal and whose support base was limited to the West. RUKH, on the other hand, 
had among its members also (former) members o f  the CPSU  and a much broader appeal 
throughout Ukraine. Although the gap in support between RUKH  and the Greens was 
considerable and on the increase, it is still significant that the Greeens polled higher than the CPU. 
B y 1990 Zelenyi Svit had established itself as a highly efficient organisation w h ich had won a 
number o f  ‘v ictories’ in the field o f  the environment. This, more than anything else, secured its 
high ranking in the polls; people had heard about Zelenyi Svit (being the first informal mass 
organisation to appear in Ukraine as a result o f  glasnost and démocratisation) and they knew that 
the Greens not only talked, but did what they said they would do.
The Greens managed to keep this support and even increase it vis-a-v is other political 
m ovem ents and parties throughout 1991 - a poll printed by Zelenyi Svit in January 1992 gave a 
clear indication in that respect;
Ukrainian Reporter, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3. This survey was conducted by the Ukrainian Academy o f 
Sciences’ Institute of Philosophy. A
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Table 4.3 Attitudes to
Population (in % f
the Ukrainian Public Movements and Political Parties among the Ukrainian
Political
organisation/party
Not
fam iliar
with
actively
support
support positive
toward
s
do not 
support
negative
towards
R ating
Zelenyi Svit 32.3 14.8 27.3 17.1 5.9 2.6 0.06
RUKH 17.8 12.3 21.3 20.4 16.7 11.4 -0 .5
Ukr. Student Society 39.6 10.7 14.7 21.5 8.9 4.6 -0.11
PZU 44.8 7.0 14.9 20.8 9.1 3.4 -0.14
SNUM 38.1 8.4 14.4 21.1 11.8 6.3 -0.16
PDVU 45.4 5.4 14.5 23.1 8.0 3.6 -0.19
DPU 44.4 3.4 11.6 25.4 11.7 3.5 -0.23
UKhDP 50.2 4.0 9.0 13.3 10.4 3.3 -0 .24
URP 37.8 2.9 11.4 25.4 14.8 7.6 -0.25
UNDP 47.8 2.3 10.4 24.7 11.7 3.1 0 0.26
NPU 45.2 3.0 10.0 25.0 12.3 4.6 -0 .26
Kotnsomol 37.9 4.9 11.2 21.2 15.2 9.7 - 0.26
SDPU 52.3 3.2 8.0 23.2 10.6 4.3 -0.31
OSDPU 57.1 2.1 5.0 22.2 10.3 3.4 -0 .32
LDPU 54.9 1.9 5.1 23.4 11.0 3.8 -0.32
UNP 52.7 2.4 5.2 23.3 11.3 5.2 -0 .32
CPU Coalition 23.7 2.3 8.1 23.4 23.6 19.0 -0 .37
'A
i
Î
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A s seen from the table, the electorate was not very w ell fam iliar w ith most o f  the political 
parties which emerged during 1990 and 1991. Alm ost one third o f  those polled had not heard 
about Zelenyi Svit. However, only RUKH  and the coalition founded on the base o f  the C P U  once 
the Communist Party was banned in Ukraine after the unsuccessful coup in August 1991, were 
better known by those polled than were the Greens - even Komsomol could not beat the Greens in 
terms o f  its awareness among the general public! As for support, Zelenyi Svit ranked higher than 
both RUKH  and the Society o f  Ukrainian Students - the latter rose to fame during the student 
hungerstrikes in Independence Squre in October 1990 - and it was tw ice as popular as the Green 
Party, which was also considerably less known by the general public.
Judging by the results o f  this survey, the Greens did not seem  to have lost any support 
throughout 1991 despite infighting and the loss o f  Shcherbak as a leader. This situation, however, 
w ould change in the next few  years, partly due to increasing d isillusionm ent with politics among 
the Ukrainian electorate, partly due to a shift o f  focus from environmental issues to econom ic  
problems and statebuilding among political decision-makers in Ukraine, and finally also due to 
problems within the Green M ovem ent itself.
SeJienMH coir, no. 1, 1992, c. 3.
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4.1.2 Pretext to the Third Congress
The most important task for the Greens follow ing its active campaigning for Ukrainian 
independence and involvement in collecting 100,000 signatures in support for Shcherbak’s 
candidacy for the presidential elections in 1991, was to elect a new leader. Thus, a major reason - 
although not the only one - for once again calling an extraordinary congress was to sort out the 
leadership issue. Svit. Another important reason was the collapse o f  the U SSR  in December 1991.
Independent Ukraine was in the process o f  consolidating itself and there was a need to adjust 
strategy and tactics to new political and econom ic circumstances. Public interest in environmental 
issues was dropping in parallell w ith the worsening o f  the econom ic situation. Verkhovna Rada, 
although it had passed several ‘progressive’ decisions on the environment, was not characterised 
by a high level o f  ecological awareness. President Kravchuk’s pre-election programme did not 
contain one single word about the environment. It was therefore d ifficult to tell whether the new  
centralised structure o f  leadership through presidential representatives would conduct an active 
environmental policy.
Shcherbak’s M inistry o f  Environmental Protection was facing numerous problems - although 
there had been some successes. Zelenyi Svit therefore had to define its role in independent 
Ukraine and also establish which forms o f  public activity would be m ost efficient in the future. 
The decision was made by Zelena Rada at a meeting in K iev on 15 March 1992 and preparations 
started shortly afterwards*^.
A s seen above, the Second Congress did take a number o f  steps to improve the w ay in wh ich  
Zelenyi Svit was run. However, no immediate change for the better was registered. B esides, the 
focus shifted from organisational to political issues during the second half o f  1991 as Zelenyi Svit 
was busy preparing for the referendum and also the presidential election com ing up on 1 
Decem ber, for which Shcherbak had been put forward as a candidate for PZU. A t the grassroots 
level, however, the dissatisfaction remained. In Novem ber 1991 V. Sandul - the leader o f  N ikopol 
Zelenyi Svit - which was conducting a campaign against further expansion o f  the Zaporizhzhia 
nuclear power station in a letter to Zelenyi Svit voiced criticism with the w ay the Green M ovem ent 
was run:
HeobxiAiio riiüiiflTH piBCHb poSoTH B nenTpi, BBUISOK 3
AepiKaBHHMH npHpoAOOxoiMHUHMM opraiiaMH. B o n o sH iiil 6yjio
Kpame, a s a p a s  TpeSa npauiOBaTM Giabuie. 4 e  K O op4H H yio«ia  [X)jil  
”3C , B MCîKax PecnySjiiKM? 4aBanre obroBopnMO cran cnpaB b  
”3C”, lie MefcatoMH, noKu ne spobnTt ”Po5iTiiH'ia ra.sexa”. Abo hokm 
pecnybJiiKancLKa a c o n ia n ij i nepeTBopnibca b  KnïncbKy".
3ejienM M  œ ît ,  no. 7, 1992, c. 1.
“  3 a m m d  cbIt, no. 17-18, 1991, c. 3.
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Sandul’s fear that Robitnycha hazeta would once again launch a veritable attack on Zelenyi 
Svit turned out to be unfounded. However, as had been the case prior to the Second Congress the 
Ukrainian press also this time published information to the effect that things were not so well 
within the Green M ovement. An article attacking its growing bureaucracy written by Andrii
H lazovyi, one o f  the founding members o f  the association, appeard in print in the w eekly Visti z  
Ukrainy^^. I
Hlazovyi, who was at that time working as a journalist in the newspaper Zelenyi Svit had 
approached its editor, M yhailoo Prilutskyi, with a request that his article be published, but was 
rejected. Through another member o f  Zelenyi Svit, Serhyi Hrabovskyi, who was working as a 
member o f  the editorial board o f  Visti z  Ukrainy, he arranged to have his article published there 
instead, much to the embarrassment and anger o f  those who did not share his views.
tochka zoru), pointed out that although the official reason for calling a Congress was to make
However, the situation had changed:
1
The article, which was entitled ‘Tlie Koba Syndrome - A point o f  V iew ’ (Sindrom Koby - I
changes to the already outdated programme and statute o f  Zelenyi Svit, it was more important for 
the delegates to seriously consider the future o f  the Greeen M ovement.
When Zelenyi Svit emerged in 1987 it had a democratic, inflated structure rooted in ‘basis 
dem ocracy’, the organisational principle o f  Greens world-w ide. There were no ‘e lites’, no 
‘functionaries’ or ‘statists’. Initially, there was also no paid staff and no membership fees. All
:ç„
necessary work was conducted by volunteers, o f  whom there was no shortage. This could be
explained by the fact that
IMo:*:e T o w y ,  m o  y  n p o r p a v u in x  W K y M e f ix a x  n e  5 y .r io  n i  :a co p cT K O ï 
’’i ^ e o J i o r i M i i o i  ü M T p H M a i io c r i”, n i  n a m i p n o i  s a n o j i iT H S O D a n o c r i .
O t  i  n p a m o B a j iM  n J iiM -o-n.rr iM  j ik )4 h  s  4 y ) K e  p i s n o i o  B ^ a n e io  ra  
y n o 4 o 6 a n n B M H  xaK, m o  sjiobyiiH 3ac.niy5Kene B M sn a n n a  n Y K p a ï n i  ra  
sa  l ï  Me^caMH.
I
Mac cnjiHBan. C H T y a u in  M in a j ia ca . OrplMKO sp o c r a j ia  K iJTbK ici’L 
aK T H B icr lB  ’’s e a e n o r o ” p y x y . 3  ' a n n a n ca  T a K i-c in c i kou jth , c y n a c n e  
eaeK T pon iie  o6 .aa4n an n a . oO icM . San p am oB aan  c r a a i  iv iia c n a p o a n i  
KoirraKTM. T o ^ i n  BMiiHKJia i i e o 6 x l 4 n i a ’b crnopMTH an ap ax . Hl,ocb  
n o 4 i 6 n e ,  4 0  i^ en i, B ia b y B a a o c a  i  b in u in x  p y x a x  x a  noBOCTnopeimx 
n a p x i i ix . K oacn a  snanna o p r a n i s a n i a  nonnnna MaxH opra iiH  
y n p a B a in n a , n e  - nopM aab iio. A a e  x o r o  411a s'anaa ioxbC H  i
n e p m i  s a o B i c n i  CMMnxoMM ”cH ii4poM y Ko6 m”.
B I cth 3 VKpaïnff (n .d ., n .p .) .
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Things were such that drawing a comparison to Stalin was not out o f  place. For Stalin, or
Koba, as he was called by friends, the climb to power started with the obtaining o f  a modest
secretarial post as ‘ch ief clerk’ o f  the Bolshevik party. The usurping o f  power from modest
.positions, argued H lazovy i, was a feature common to societies during tim es o f  social upheaval or 
revolutions, bringing about the creation o f  a new statehood. And, he added, it was even more 
fam iliar to post-totalitarian societies, populated by people who were raised in the spirit o f  a 
centralised, anti-democratic ideology:
4y2Ke baraTO cnoKyc nunHKae , k ojih  ao pyK iioTparrjunoTL 
KepiBiiHH nopT{[)eab a b o  Ba4ce.rii ynpaB.rii[ina - lie  m be  siiaMeiiiia, 
4ep4caBiiHX cipyK’ryp m  rpoiwa^cbKHX o p r a iiisa u iH . Occbjinno 
roCTpoi (jmpMH cHiuipoM iiab yB as, kojih 40 nopiqiejib .vbbumh, a 
B aacejii ynpaB.niHini 4eKopaTHBiii i  40 4co4Uoro M exaiiisM y iie 
n p H n accB an i. BypxjiHBO p o cry x b  cHMriTOMH: 404a Jii biJibiue
npan ieiiH fl ’kepyBaTM”, 4k Bor iia 4y iu y  uokjibb, 4a j i i  - KOMiuieKC
iienorp in iH M O C T i, i ,  iia p e u iT i ,  n o 4 i a  OTOMeiiim iia iiau iH x i  
"BauiHx”. (D y iiK u ion ep  noMMiia & n|)0 c e b e  caM oro 4yiviaTH i
rOBOpHTM BHKJTIOMHO y  MFIOJKHMi, flK 438111 MOIiapXH: ”Mh
BMpiuiHJiH...”, ”Mm BBa:®:a £ mo...”
Having an adm inistrative apparatus o f  its own would not necessarily be so bad had it, as is
com m on in all ‘c iv ilised’ countries been paid to serve the organisation and implement required
.technical work necessary to keep it going. However, in the former USSR, the apparatus worked 
for itself and not for the organisation. This turned out to be the case also in Zelenyi Svit and 
H lazovyi gave an example to illustrate the situation:
Miikojih BMHHKaiOTb iianiBaiieK40THMHi CHTyau il. kojih ob p a iii 
3”i340M K00p4Mayi0Mi opraiiH ’’Sejienoro C o iT y” yxaaaioioxb iiaaara  
Maxepiaabuy n i4TpMMKy HKOMycb KOHKpeTHOMy npoeK iy (iianpHKaaa 
T4K b yao  3i  cniaKO io ’’BpaTyBaiiua”, Koan i n  byaw n o ip ib if i  iioBi 
4O3MM0TpH). a norp ib H i koluth baoKyiOTbcii anapaxoM - MOBanB 
’’iiiMMM roayoaxH aio4eH” (xobxo - naaxnux (liyiiKnioiiepiB).
Vryatmannia eventually found m oney elsewhere to buy the dosimeters it required. The
question that had to be answered, however, was i f  this situation was acceptable in an organisation 
w hose major aim was to protect the environment. The organisation com m ittee o f  Zelenyi S v it’s 
Third Congress had received several suggestions to changes in the statute, m ost o f  w hich regarded 
the role and influence o f  the apparatus. To improve the state o f  affairs, H lazovyi suggested that 
Zelenyi Svit return to its origins, where there were no paid ‘generals’ or ‘professional leaders’. In 
addition, provisions should be made to secure that no more than 10-15 percent o f  the association’s 
budget be spent on maintaining an apparatus. Zelenyi Svit had gained its authority through real
.a
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action. This authority, concluded Hlazovyi, must not be lost as a result o f  the ‘apparatus 
syndrom e’*^ .
In H lazovy i’s v iew  Prilutskyi refused to print his article as it indirectly criticised Anatolii 
Panov, the executive director o f  the Green O ffice, for his adm inistrative style. Prilutskyi and 
Panov were good friends and it was at Panov’s initiative that Prilutskyi, who used to work as a 
journalist o f  Literaturna Ukraina and who had arranged for Panov to publish articles on the 
environment in this newspaper, was invited by Zelenyi Svit to becom e editor o f  Zelenyi svit. After 
the Second Congress in Ivano-Frankivsk it was decided that Zelenyi Svit would no longer have an 
exec utive director. Instead there would be three readers, each in charge o f  strictly defined tasks, 
and each o f  whom would be subordinated to one o f  the association’s three deputy leaders. The 
readers would be appoined on merit. This decision was made on the initiative o f  Evhen 
Korbetskyi, one o f  Zelenyi Svit’s deputy leaders at the time, and was opposed by Anatoli! Panov.
A s seen above, the new statute which was adopted by the Second Congress and was to be 
presented to the Ministry o f  Justice for registration, was changed prior to registration. This caused 
considerable dissatisfaction and anger among activists in the association and many thought, 
although this could not be proved, that Panov had been involved w ith changing the statute. Thus, 
H lazovy i was under the impression that Prilutskyi was collaborating w ith Panov to keep away 
from the pages o f  Zelenyi Svit any article which directly or indirectly critised the state o f  affairs in 
the Green Movement*"*. Apparently also an article written by Serhii Hrabovskyi w as turned down. 
Follow ing this decision the collegium  o f  the newspaper collected signatures in support o f  printing 
H lazovy i’s and Hrabovskyi’s articles. When their request was again turned down, they 
collectively walked out o f  the newsapaper.
Although many people agreed w ith H lazovy i that Zelenyi Svit was suffering from  
‘verticalisation’ (i.e. a pyramid structure), not everybody approved o f  the w ay in wh ich he 
criticised staff at the Green O ffice. Ihor K irilchuk (Kiev), for instance, found it unfair to criticise 
people sim ply for being concerned about the salaries o f  those people working at the office. The
A number of Zelenyi Svit members have voiced dissatisfaction with the way in which the office at Podil 
was run under the leadership of Anatolii Panov. Andrii Demydenko, for instance, complained that 
he had turned the association into an inefficient and bureaucratic structure. Faxes and letters were 
left lying about in the office unread and little concrete work was conducted from the office 
(interview in Kiev, 30.8.1982). Similar complaints were voiced by Hlazovyi (interview in Kiev, 
18.8.1992), who claimed that Panov wanted to decide everything once he became executive 
director, controlling letters and faxes. Kurykin, who was in 1992 working as a liason officer for 
Friends of the Earth and Hlazovyi, who performed the same function for Milieukontakt Oosteuropa, 
did not receive faxes until weeks after they airived and had personal mail intercepted. Some letters 
regarding funding for projects carried Shcherbak’s false signature. Korobko (interview in Kiev, 
22.4.1994) added to the list o f complaints by arguing that Panov left the office in a mess and that 
local groups allegedly associated with Zelenyi Svit could not be traced. Documents about these 
groups were found in the office.
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1982.
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Green M ovem ent wanted to have an office and a staff. Rent, labour and communications were not
'
free, they cost money. Making phone calls out o f  Kiev was expensive, but necessary for the 
association to function properly. Having said that, though, Kirilchuk did not approve o f  
Prilutskyi’s decision not to print H lazovy i’s article. In his v iew  it should have been printed 
together with a reply from the association to the points raised*^.
The conflict between the editor o f  Zelenyi svit, Mykhailo Prilutskyi, and newspaper staff, one 
o f  whom was H lazovyi, had been building up over some time. The two groups had very different 
view s on what the newspaper should look like. To Greens comm itted to the international Green 
M ovem ent, such as Hlazovyi and Kurykin, Prilutskyi was not fundamentally ‘Green’. He shunned 
politics and preferred to print ‘uncontroversial’ materials exploring ecolog ical traditions in 
Ukraine, cultural issues and alternative medicine, whereas Hlazovyi wanted more materials on the 
international Green M ovement, environmental problems in Ukraine and d iscussions around 
Zelenyi Svit.
collapsed and it was decided to send someone from the newspaper to Germany to get it fixed.
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The aims o f  Zelenyi svit were spelled out in print shortly after it had been registered w ith the 
. .Ukrainian State Comm ittee on the Press in 1990: The newspaper would ‘objectively look into 
Ukrainian ecolog ical problems and also address related political, social, econom ic, moral-ethic, 
philosophical and medical aspects’. It would also ‘introduce (its readers) to the activities o f  the 
Greens not only in Ukraine, but also in other parts o f  the U SSR  as w ell as in other countries’ and
finally, educate people to think ecolog ically, ‘through the revival o f  the ecology o f  the human 
sou l’’ .^ G iven limited space it was therefore not surprising that differences arose on what to
publish.
Although the two groups clashed over H lazovy i’s article it was two other issues that triggered 
open confrontation: firstly, attempts to privatise Zelenyi svit and secondly, Prilutskyi’s firing o f
17members o f  staff . According to staff the editor o f  the newspaper had no right to either hire or 
fire people as this was the prerogative o f  Zelenyi Svit’s Congress. Prilutskyi, for instance, had 
been endorsed by the Second Congress, although there had been irregularities in the appointment 
o f  the editorial board. On the other hand, it could o f  course be argued that given that the 
newspaper had jo ined Zelenyi Svit as a collective member it was up to the newspaper itse lf to sort 
out editorial and staff issues - as was the case for other collective members. The editorial board o f  
Zelenyi Svit challenged Prilutskyi’s firing o f  a computer technician by taking him to court'**. 
W h ile investigations were being conducted, the newspaper did not appear in print.
____________________________
Interview with Ihor Kfrilchuk, Kiev, 12.5.1994.
3 e j ie i im  cbît, no. 12, 1990, c. 1.
Interview with Serhii Kurykm, Kiev, Summer 1992.
According to Hlazovyi, the firing was a result o f a trip made to Germany. One of the computers’ harddisk
1
i
This caused concern in both camps. Kuiykin, for instance, complained that other newspapers 
no longer wanted to print information about the Greens as it was getting increasingly expensive to 
publish. Besides, newspapers were becom ing more commercialised and political subjects were 
being replaced by more speculative materials. A ccess to the media was therefore restricted. The 
attention o f  the Greens thus in 1992 shifted from the press to the radio. Links had also been 
established w ith Ukrainian TV - although these contacts were made by PZU  activists. The 
struggle to control Zelenyi Svit was therefore all the more understandable.
The computer techn ician’s case eventually came before the court. The judge sided w ith the 
technician and awarded him compensation in the form o f  two m onths’ salary (1,300 kupons). 
C onflict arose again on whether the newspaper should pay or whether Prilutskyi, having fired the 
technician illegally, should pay.
Prilutskyi’s interpretation o f  events, however, was very different. The way he saw it, 
H lazovy i and his supporters on the editorial board tried to gain control with the newspaper by 
tiying to privatise it. In a letter to Zelenyi Sv i f s  Co-ordination Comm ittee he wrote the following:
BnacjiiiioK! t u k h x ,  s y M H C i i e  c i i p j i M O B a i i H X  n p o T H n p a B i m x ,  
r i p o T H s a K O i i u H X  o S M a i i H H X  4 i H  3 SoKy u p a u i B i i H K i B  p e i i a K U i ï  A. II.
PjiasoBoro, EA. KouiodimKa, A.T, MoaroBoro, cuiBsacnoBHMKaMH 
rasexH ctujim 3 04Horo boxy A couiau ia , a 3 4pyroro - Bumœra^aiii 
npH B ax iii oco5h, a ne KOJieKTHB p e ^ a K u i l ,  «K 3a3iiaBajioc}i y 
piuiem ii sbopiB ra b noxBajii Bejieuol Pa4H* .^
In an interview in the summer o f  1992, H lazovyi maintained that formally not only  
Zelenyi Svit but also its staff were the founders o f  Zelenyi Svit. Thus staff therefore had a say on 
whether or not to privatise the newspaper. However, he continued, who would want to privatise 
something as econom ically unviabie as Zelenyi Svit anyway? To substantiate his claim s, he 
argued that in the early days the Green newspaper had a circulation o f  30,000 cop ies. B y the time 
he and other members o f  staff walked out on Prilutskyi circulation was down to 14,000 copies. 
For two and a half months during the summer o f  1992 the newspaper did not appear and 
financially it was surviving on 2,000 U S dollars given by foreign sponsors. After the walk-out 
only the editor and two members o f  staff remained and none o f  these, argued H lazovy i, were 
capable o f  producing a newspaper^**.
A  slightly different version o f  events was g iven by Ihor Kirilchuk: The conflict which  
arose in the newspaper Zelenyi Svit broke as the newspaper had to be re-registered. The statute o f
Apparently Prilutskyi urged them to go (this conversation, claimed Hlazovyi, was taped), whereas 
later on he denied this.
Mo.nOÂ yKpaïHM, 3.7.1992 (n.p.).
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.
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avoid a scandal^*.
Thus, whereas to Hlazovyi, the conflict arose as a result o f  lack o f  democracy w ithin the 
newspaper and a lack o f  comm itment to ‘thinking globally’ at the expense o f  ‘acting locally’ - i.e. 
focusing on Ukraine and on cultural rather than political aspects o f  the environment -, to
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the newspaper read that it was the editorial board’s collective property. However, as only one 
name was written down on behalf o f  the editorial board, the newspaper automatically became
H lazovy i’s property. Hlazovyi and his supporters within the newspaper were threatened w ith a 
court case i f  they did not back down, and eventually they left the newspaper voluntarily so as to
A third version was given by Anatolii Zolotukhin, who saw the conflict within Zelenyi Svit
as yet another attempt by the authorities to gain control with the Green Movement:
Flo noDOity Koii(I).rinKTa ii rasere CKaxy 04110, mio b .nioSoM co5 i.ith h  
iiyîKiio Bcer4a pasjiuMaTL r.rraBHbie u BropocreiieiiiiHe mothbbi. 
rJiaBiibiM 4JUI BC0M iiaujeM MCTopuM 6bma h ecrb 6opb5a c  BJiacTbio h 
lie noTowy, mto HMeuiio mw 3Toro xothm , a noxoMy mxo ujiaCTb,
6y4yMM SeccoBecnioM 110 cBoen ripMp04e, Bcex4a 6y4ex ci’peMHXbcii 
Q40Jiaxb H iiac xaKMivm...OxuoM iiameH rasexbi jiBJiiiexcn MMxawa 
ripHayuKMH....(Hauja rasera) na Miioro npHBneKaxejibiieH tapyrux raser) 
no MeiibuieH Mepe no $opMe. Mxo Kasaexca co4epxcanHB, ro axo 
Bceraa 6buio npe4MexoM o c o 6 o h  safioru BJiacxeR, noKa ee j b o 4 h  ne 
saxnaxuaM rasexy. KoneMiio sanexnofi MesxoH B.nacxM Bcer4a 5buio 
y4ajiHXb MS rasei'bi ee orua — OpHaynKoro, no h 40 axoro 41111 mm 
noKa aro ne yaaexciE^.
Prilutskyi, as the ‘father’ o f  the newspaper Zelenyi svit, would not want to see the 
newspaper crushed by conflicts - his committment to the Green cause, particularly by reimbuing
people w ith respect and love for the environment, was sim ply too deep for this:
Î'?:.
■I
ripMayuKMH besycjiOBiio aecxiibiM m xaaamviMBbiH neaoneK (on nn inex  
saM eqaxeabitue ctmxm), no on Man ne iipMiiMMaex Man ne xoaex  
noiiMMaxb, ‘ixo nepBbiMU b ero  ôi^axcrBO Bcxynax caMwe 
desnpaBCTBennLie a io4M m ne 4 iia co6ci'Beiinoro OMMineiiMii, a 4Jni 
xoro, axoSbi b KoxopuH yïice pas aoxasaxb, qxo Bce raxHe 4ce. kbk
OHM.
Zolotukhin the newspaper fell prey to a power struggle between on the one hand, those who were
■■committed to the environment (Prilutskyi) and those who were just interested in strengthening 
their own position at the former’s expense. In ray v iew , however, mistakes were made by both 
sides. I have no reason to question the committment to protecting the environment o f  neither
Interview with Ihor Kirilchuk, Kiev, 12.5.1994.
Email from Anatolii Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, 18.10.1995.
T
23 Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, 24.4.1994.
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Prilutskyi nor Hlazovyi. Both o f  them were working hard for the com m on cause although their 
approaches were very d ifferen t Even though it has been impossible to get a com plete picture o f  
what exactly happened w ithin the newspaper Zelenyi Svit prior to the Third Congress - many rank- 
and-file members do not know them selves - it seem s that the conflict, although it eventually turned 
into a power-struggle - at least initially reflected differences in approach more than a w ish for 
power per se. Had there been more tolerance and agreement within Zelenyi Svit that all v iew s on 
the future development o f  the movement had the right to be voiced prior to the Congress, this 
conflict could have been avoided and people like Hlazovyi and Kurykin m ight not have left the
■■'IGreen Movement.
4;; 
■K
i
A s pointed out by Zolotukhin, the split o f  the Green M ovem ent became very clear on the eve
o f  the Third Congress when Zelena Rada addressed the conflict within the newspaper. Prilutskyi,
trying to find a w ay to solve the conflict, proposed that the newspaper be registered not as an
organ o f  Zelenyi Svit, but as the organ o f  the editorial board. This proposition was not endorsed by
Zelena Rada, according to whom the newspaper was the property o f  the Green M ovement.
Eventually, a vote was made over whether or not to discuss the conflict at the upcoming Congress.
.Only som e 20 people were present at the m eeting and 11 o f  these voted against bringing this issue
up at the Congress. Thus, the issue was effectively closed. To those who preferred to talk this
.issue over at the Congress, however, the decision was in itself undemocratic as sixty members o f  
Zelena Rada were needed for a quorum.
4.1.3 The Third Congress (30-31 May 1992)
The third congress was called in a relative hurry and several Greens therefore complained that it 
was unstructured and poorly planned^^.
The Congress opened w ith a priest blessing those present, follow ed by a more general address 
to the delegates. The priest expressed the v iew  that there was a great need for a Green M ovem ent 
in contemporary Ukraine, then
”3ejienHH C b I t ” - ue rapMoiiia eKOJioril i  rapMoiiiii juouclkoï 
4 y n i i  i  rapMonia ycLoro cyu ioro iia seiMUii. I bh e caiue thm 
3BenoM, Korpe 4aci'b xop ou ii n oS p i napocrKM iiJui MaHfiyTiioro 
noKOJiiiinii. Mm  CLoro4 n i  b c y e x i,  a anocroji flaiiej! nMcas: ’T e e
Meni M04cna, ajie ue see  KopMciio. B'rpaqeiio noByrra rapM on iï b 
aym ax Jiioiieft. BaacaeMO ycboro naHKpauioio y  iiauiM p o 6 o ï i  na 
5jiaro YKpalHMl
XpMCTOC BocKpec! X pH croc nocKped XpH croc BocKjied Aiviiiiil'*. 
____________________________
CTeiioiuaMa l l l - r o  3”i3Jtv a c o u ia n i i  ’’3ejieiiMH CBir”. 30 TpaBiin 1992 noK v. m. Kmib. c. 1.
"-k.
The address was follow ed by the national anthem being sung by all the delegates and a speech  
by the temporary chairman o f  Zelenyi Svit, lurii Tkachenko. He called for unity, reminding those 
present that Ukraine was threatened by a catastrophe and that the Congress had to think about how  
to escape this catastrophe. This could only be achieved if  people
...4 yMaTM TiJibKH npo re, mo iiac o6"&4ny&, npo iiaiuy p o S o ry . Y c i  
.ni04H MaioTb npaBO na iiooary. byjUMO iipamonaTM, manyiouH oamu 
omioro^^
It soon became clear, however, that the Congress would be dom inated by discord rather than 
unity: lurii Tkachenko’s speech to the Congress, for which he had been allocated 15 m inutes and 
not 25 as he had requested, was continously interrupted by critical questions and his words on 
morality and amorality did not go down w ell with many people:
S a rew  c  w ecr  nocbinajiHCb iie  y n e n n b ie  iier/iaM enroM  penauK u u 
nonpocbi: aecK axb, Ky^a ^ ea n cb  100 4 oa.aapoB CtUA, H caeanoBenne  
Koxopbix oS iiap y^ cH aocb  e m e  na npouuioM  Cbesae: noqeiviy ne
npoiiyM epoBan u n e  npom iiyp on an  xcypna.x y n e x a  ^ en ex c n u x  
nocxynaeiiM H: n a  nxo, coS cxB en no , p acxojiy toxcfi ’k en b rn  najyrHM’’:
n o n ec  a u  naK asan n e q k x  MaabimKO, rioxepaBmMH 4 0 KyMenxbi 
n p o m a o r o  c ia esm  m nponaa, m nponaa^^.
Shortly after Tkachenko’s appeal open conflict broke out. More than half the time o f  the 
Congress was taken up by clarifying relations between the Kiev delegation and delegations from  
other oblasts, between members o f  the Kiev delegation itself and finally, w ithin the leadership o f  
Zelenyi Svit. M olod Ukrainy referred to the latter as a ‘striptease o f  am b itions’ performed in front 
o f  the 200 delegates and guests attending the Congress. Much tim e was also wasted over 
procedural questions such as the com position o f  the Presidium o f  the Congress and the quotas 
allocated for the various regional groups by the Mandate Comm ission. I w ill return to these issues 
below.
An article which appeared in M olod Ukrainy shortly after the Congress argued that Zelenyi 
Svit could no longer be considered a ‘Green’ movement, as it seem ed to have forgotten about the
environment altogether! Those who wanted to talk about environmental protection and what their
.groups had achieved so far were sim ply not given access to the floor. A s a matter o f  fact, it was
____________________________  Î
“ M L ,p . 1-2.
“  PecnySjiHica, no. 1,1992 (n.p.).
argued, they might just as w ell never have shown up! Even the Control Revision C om m ission’s
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report bluntly stated that ‘ecological work has not been the main task in the activities o f  Zelena 
Rada’. But was the latter not the reason for creating Zelenyi Svit in the first place? Seen at the 
background o f  all the personal conflicts, the newspaper argued that temporary leader lurii 
Tkachenko’s speech o f  self-appraisal could at best be seen as a bad joke. Firstly, his claim s to the 
effect that Zelenyi Svit was the first environmental movement in Ukraine was sim ply not true, as 
the university druzhiny and UTOP already existed at the time. Besides, to say that the Zelenyi Svit 
had been the first to declare its committment to the principle o f  decency sounded nothing but 
funny on the background o f  the struggles o f  the Congress. What the movement really needed was 
constructive action not just nice words^* .^
Still, the Greens were good at praising them selves. Nataliia Preobrazhenska allegedly  
towards the end o f  the Congress complained that she and the leadership o f  Zelenyi Svit as w ell as 
members o f  staff were not able to inform the delegates about ‘how much they had done for 
Ukraine’. To this Danylo Kulyniak, M olod Ukrainy’s observer at the Congress, wrote that it was 
possible they had done much - but in terms o f  travelling abroad as had been clearly pointed out in 
the Control Revision C om m ission’s report, presented to the Congress by its head, Shulga. 
According to this report, Preobrazhenska (K iev) in the course o f  one year had been abroad four 
tim es, visiting the United States and Britain. Similarly, Panov, Zhovnirenko, Kurykin and 
H lazovyi (all K iev) had several tim es visited the United States, France, Austria, Britain and other 
countries. ‘I f  this could be called “work for Ukraine”, then they definitely heroically protected our 
environment and a happy future in N ew  York, Paris, London and V ienna...’ ®^.
Andrii Demydenko, who had worked as a coordinator on international contacts prior to the 
Third Congress prepared a report on Zelenyi Svit’s hard currency assets, anticipating that this issue 
would cause debate at this Congress as it had done at the previous one in Ivano-Frankivsk. The 
report^**, which was addressed to the Control R evision Com m ission, pointed out that as some 
members o f  the Coordinating Committee o f  Zelenyi Svit kept bringing up his name in connection  
with the assocation’s hard currency assets. He therefore found it necessary to produce the report 
to set things straight and in the hope o f  possibly avoiding clashes over this issue at the Congress, 
then
BBaxaio, ulo caMe TasMiiHua (sKa noKpMBiiE besJiaAzi») (liiiiaiicoBMx i  
rocno4apcbKMx cn{)aB 3EJ1EH0F0 CBITY ra n o c i'if in e  ramMyBainin 
anapaTOM cnpo6 ïx  p e B is iï, z ro.rioBiroio ripuMHiioio BMnHKiieHini TOi 
aTMOC(l)epM nocriHiiHX 3BHHyBaqenL i  CKaiuiaaiB, uio cynpoBOAXcye 
ocraiiHiM qacoM Baci^aiiiin. TaKa aTMoc(I>epa BMri^na thm. xto  b
Mojiojt YKpaïiM, 3.7.1992.
3 n iT  nPQ BaJtiOTHi ua4X04xeenHH ra  sh t ix ith . KmI b. 20.5.1992.
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Ka.naMyTHiH B04i xoriu 5h iipHXOBarn cboï 3JioB4CHBaiinji mh 
iieBMiinui npauiOBivrH ue tia ceSe, a lie kopmct'b cnpaBi.
Having g iven a detailed account o f  hard-currency earnings and the way in which they were 
spent, he urged the Revision Com m ission not to delay its work but to get to the bottom o f  matters 
so that the issue could be closed and enable Zelenyi Svit to move on. Although during the first 
couple o f  hours delegates raised issues regarding hard currency and foreign travel, the matter was 
settled w ithout any major confrontations.
The issue that caused the most controversy, however, was not the international aspects o f  
Zelenyi Svit’s activities, but rather demands by the Kiev delegation to the effect that it be allocated  
more delegates to the Congress. Such claims were not received w ell by representatives o f  local 
and regional branches o f  the association and caused a sharp exchange o f  words between these and 
the Kiev representatives as w ell as among the Kiev representatives themselves:
ripeACTaBMTejiM ciojihuli TpeSoBajiM. no Miieimio opraiiH3aTO[)OB,
SojiL u ie nojTOîKeHHoro ’’noca/ioMiiLix” Mecr", mtoS u  nporaïuuT b  
Bbiroüiibie c e 5 ii  peiueiiMn. C ica m a j i pasrajx iJica u e iia  u iyrxy^ " .
This issue kept resurfacing throughout the Congress. K iev representatives argued that there 
w as a proposition to allow  two representatives from each o f  K iev’s 25 regions as w ell as the leader 
o f  the K iev organisation votes at the Congress^*. Natalia Preobrazhenska (K iev), who was the 
leader o f  the Mandate Commission, briefed the Congress on the issue. Apparently the K iev group 
had requested two mandates for each region o f  Kiev, eight mandates for its leadership and one 
mandate per collective member o f  the city organisation. A list o f  21 names from the regions had 
been provided for this purpose. The Kiev delegation’s proposal had been passed on to the 
Organisation Committee and was debated by Zelena Rada the day before. Zelena Rada  refused to 
add an additional 11 mandates to the 10 originally allocated for Kiev. The Kiev delegation then 
turned to the Congress with a request that it still be granted another 11 mandates. The Mandate 
Com m ission with a vote o f  three to one endorsed the ruling o f  Zelena Rada  on this matter^^.
However, questions were being raised from the floor as to w hy Kiev had been given 10 
delegates in the first place. To this, Preobrazhenska responded as follows:
CxeHOrpaMa l l l - r o  T is j iv  a c o u i a u i l  ”3ejteitHH C b It”. 30 Tpapim 1992 dokv. m. K h ib . c. 3-1.
pp. 15-1, 15-2.
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OpraiiisauifiHHH KOMirer 5yi3 oSpatiMM 3e.nenoio Pajioio. Ue 
po5oMHH Saraxo .iio;ieM iie 6y;ie. Bi;moBiinio 40 oSjiaci'efl,
w  M ic r  6 yjia na^ana xaKa KBOxa^ .^
Shalimova o f  the Kiev delegation, however, argued that as there was no quorum at the 
Congress there was no reason to deny K iev the 11 seats it requested. Prior to voting taking place 
all delegates should be formally registered, then according to the statute only registered delegates 
were eligible to vote. After registration the number o f  delegates with a right to vote would drop 
from 166 to some 120 delegates. Consequently, there would be no reason to deny K iev the 11 
seats it requested.
Stepaniak from Ivano-Frankivsk reacted sharply to Shalimova’s calculations and protested on 
behalf o f  his oblast organisation. Many people had contacted him follow ing the Organisation 
Com m ittee’s decision to grant the oblast only seven seats at the Congress. Those people, he 
argued, worked just as hard as the Kiev representatives and had the same right to be represented at 
the Congress. A lso Sidorkin o f  Uman Zelenyi Svit was irritated w ith the Kiev delegation. S ince it 
had no intention to formally registrer, the issue o f  whether to let it remain a member o f  Zelenyi 
Svit ought to be addressed. Secondly, he recommended that the Kiev delegates be taken o ff  the 
lists o f  delegates. Then there would be quorum and no more fuss.
Others, like Popova, expressed surprise with the device chosen for the Congress ‘Agreement 
in the Nam e o f  Survival’, when those present proved so unable to live up to this very device. 
Members o f  the Kiev delegation not only picketed but also tried to bloc the Congress. From the 
floor one delegate went so far as to liken the K iev delegation with a Fifth Column - all the fuss 
was aimed at gaining an advantage in terms o f  mandates vis-a-vis the oblast groups - demanding 
that it be expelled from the auditorium. Bagin from Donetsk oblast then joined in, arguing that 
expelling the Kiev delegates was not even necessary as they them selves declined to take any 
further part in the Congress:
T o j t lk o  4T0 6 w a o  suMUTaiio saaBJieuHe KueBCKOu opraiiMsauHM o  
IlMKeTHpOBailMH CLeSAU. B 3T0M SaflBJieHHH 'I0TKO CKasaHO, MTO OliM 
oTKasbiBaiOTCfl o r  y q a c m a  b cLesAe. FIoaioM y n p o iu y  nocraBHTb na  
ro.riocoBaHHe - yAOBACTBopuTb mx saiiB aeuH e u TpeSoBaiiMn h JiMmnrb 
MX KBOTbi. ToPAa na m y  KBory yMeiibiuMTca K0.niH‘iecTB0 A ejieraxoB  
cbesAa '^ .^
Honcharenko, h im self from Kiev, finally put an end to the debate by arguing that there were 
many ways in which the number o f  delegates to the Congress could be determined. For instance,
”  m ,  p. 16-1.
Ibid., p. 17-2.
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one could follow  the example o f  Klirushchev, who had once gathered 12,000 kolkhoz 
representatives in K iev and who took three hours to address those present. After that plans were 
that each oblast be allowed to address the forum. In the end, however, it was decided that 150 
Zelenyi Svit representatives be allowed to attend the Congress. Thus the Kiev delegation had no 
reason to be dissatisfied w ith its 10 mandates. Ten mandates accounted for six percent o f  the total 
number o f  delegates, whereas the population o f  K iev made up only three percent o f  Ukraine’s total 
population. As for the registration o f  the Kiev organisation, Honcharenko suggested the 
following:
: |
%
Ï
I
I,MoAcna sapeecrpynaTH K u iucLKy o p r a i i isa i i i io  sriAHO s KBOpyMOM i  
nono cn iB iiaAae 3 AOKyMCHTajibiiMM o(|)opM.fieiin)iM, aic q.neiiiB 
eK O J ioriqiioï a c o u i a i j i i  3e.iiennH C B if
The dispute erupted again on the second day o f  the Congress, regarding Sam iilenko’s, 
Sham ilova’s, Preobrazhenska’s and Honcharenko’s (all from K iev) mandates. Once again the 
dispute took place between Preobrazhenska on the one hand, and Sham ilova on the other. The 
latter referred to the arbitrariness o f  the organisational comm ittee, allocating seven delegates to the 
biggest oblast organisation, Ivano-Frankivsk, w hile at the same tim e giving Borispol region o f  
K iev oblast the same quota:
Bot m o  0  TOM, icaK p a S o r a a  iiam  oprKOMUTer h KaK co6;iioA aeT c ii 
KBOTa H yBaxceim e k iiauiHM oSjiacriibiM  opranusauMaM. /(e.fieraTaMH  
OT ATOM pafioiiiiOH oprdHMsauHH SbiJiH BbiSjAiubi ripeo5paA cencK afl h 
r  ouMapeiiKO, KOTOjibie iie hbjia!Otc}i qaeiiaMH atom pauoimoA  
opranusauHH. PoHMaiieuKo iia ceroA un JiBaaeTcn npeAceAareJieM  
KueucKOH opraiiMsauMM. Bor ato bum k CBeAennio^^.
Preobrazhenska replied that although Borispol region had been given seven delegates, Kiev 
oblast as such had received a total o f  12, which was not unreasonable, g iven the size o f  the 
population in the oblast. Sham ilova, however, argued that Zelenyi Svit had no proper criteria for 
allocating the delegates. Relations to laws and legal proceedures w ithin Zelenyi Svit clearly 
reflected the lack o f  respect for laws and proceedures which were so typical in Sov iet society. As 
had been the case in the CPSU, a ‘privatisation’ was taking place also w ithin the Green 
M ovement.
m w . p. 18-1.
yKPaxiicbKa eKOJioriqiia a c o u ia u i f i  ”3ejienHH C b I t”. GrenonjaMa l i l - r o  3”i 3AV a c o u i a u i i  
”3ejienHH C b I t”. 31 rpaBua 1992 noKv. m. Kmïb. c. 11- 1.
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After a noisy debate, the Kiev delegation got its way to the dismay o f  delegations from other
.The regions were not only dissatisfied with the quota K iev had been given but even more so 
w ith the amount o f  time lost for clarifying relations between the Kiev delegates. Sham ilova’s and 
Preobrazhenska’s exchange o f  accusations therefore caused angry comments from regional 
representatives - some even demanded that those who interrupted the work o f  the Congress be 
expelled. One unnamed delegate stated that he had travelled to Kiev to attend a republican
37congress, not a forum o f  the Kiev organisation .
Finally, the Kiev representatives caused outrage due to some com m ents made by Cherinko to 
the effect that the environmental problems in Ukraine were caused by Jew ish Communists 
( ‘zhidokom m unisty’) and called for the Greens to fight them. V. Tymonin, a K iev delegate, said 
he was appalled at this suggestion. This view  was later reiterated in an article written by Cherinko 
and another Kiev Green published in the local newspaper IClireshchatyk, and as a result they were 
expelled from Z e / e n y / i n  the autumn o f  1992 .
oblasts. However, not all the Kiev delegates were happy with the number o f  delegates K iev was 
eventually allocated. V. Tymonin, for instance, could fully understand that the Kiev delegation  
was appalled w ith receiving only nine after having requested 21 seats at the Congress. N ine seats 
was little for a city with a population o f  almost three million. The delegation should in Tym onin’s 
view  have been given at least 15 seats - one for each region in K iev and one for the leader o f  the 
K iev organisation.
The Second Day o f  the Congress focused on organisational issues. In adition to electing a 
new  leadership o f  Zelenyi Svit those present debated a draft programme as w ell as proposed 
changes to the statute. Besides, the leadership issue took up a considerable part o f  day two o f  the 
Congress. The new statute that the delegates had just endorsed, ruled that Zelenyi Svit be headed 
by a chairman and three deputy chairmen. Similarly, the Congress would appoint the editor o f  the 
newspaper Zelenyi Svit at the recommendation o f  Zelena Rada, which in turn would confer with 
the newspaper staff prior to chosing a candidate for the post. With regard to the office at Podil, the 
executive director would be chosen on merit and appointed by a special com m ission set up for this 
purpose. It was the prerogative o f  the executive director to hire staff to assist him in the office, the 
number o f  staff being determined by the Congress (or Zelena Rada). Each deputy chairman would  
work in close contact with a reader appointed to work on the issues for which the deputy chairman 
was responsible.
”  Ibid.. p. 5-1.
Âse Berit Gr0deland, ‘The Ukrainian Green movement: Nationalist or internationalist?’, in Elworthy, 
Anderson, Coates, Stephens and Stroh (eds.). Perspectives on the Environment 2 (Aldershot: 
Avebury 1995), p. 87.
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Five candidacies were put forward for the chairmanship. These were Leontiy Sanduliak o f  
the Chernivtsi Zelenyi Svit - a professor o f  M edicine at Chernivtsi University and also a USSR  
People’s Deputy. lurii Tkachenko, who had acted as chairman after Shcherbak’s departure from 
Zelenyi Svit but whose authority in the association, at least judging by the reactions to and during 
his opening address to the Congress, was not very high, was also put forward as a candidate. The 
other three candidates were Korbetskyi and Honcharenko, both from Kiev, and Primak (not 
indicated where from). Prior to the vote, the delegates again got caught up in procedural 
deliberations. For instance should the current leadership resign prior to the vote, or should it 
automatically step down after the Congress had elected new leaders? Moreover, should the 
Congress make some kind o f  assessment o f  the outgoing leadership prior to voting over the new  
leaders?^^ In the end it was decided simply to go ahead with the vote.
Sanduliak was elected with a clear majority (83 o f  116 votes). In his speech to the Congress
follow ing the vote, he called for unity within Zelenyi Svit and as a gesture o f  reconciliation  
towards the Kiev delegation expressed the view  that one o f  his deputies'^^ be a K iev representative. 
Sanduliak was satisfied that the leadership o f  Zelenyi Svit had been passed on to the regions, but as 
he would not spend much tim e in K iev, he needed a deputy who would be permanently based in 
the capital and who could sign documents on his behalf. H is own cho ice for the deputy 
chairmanship was lurii Tkachenko, who he claimed was a tolerant person - and tolerance was a 
quality badly needed in Zelenyi Svit at the time. Sanduliak’s suggestion, however, did not go well 
with all those present. A  comment from the floor was far from tolerant on the matter: Tkachenko 
had allegedly likened the Third Congress o f  Zelenyi Svit to the putsch (August 1991) and this 
could not easily be forgiven. Sanduliak’s argument to the effect that whoever be elected for the 
post must have authority not only in K iev but among other chapters o f  Zelenyi Svit as it would  
depend on him/her if  the association would put disputes aside for the sake o f  constructive work, 
also did not com e out in favour o f  Tkachenko. Again a reply was made from the floor to the effect 
that Tkachenko did not believe that Zelenyi Svit would change and therefore was not the right 
person for the job. Alternative propositions were therefore made. These were Korbetskyi and 
Honcharenko from K iev and one Tokarev (not indicated where from)"^*.
Tkachenko only got 29 votes in support for his candidacy and thus failed to be elected. 
Honcharenko was vigorously supported by the K iev delegation as being an ecolog ist by profession  
he w as w ell qualified for the job. However, it was held against him that he was a poor organiser.
-------------------------------------------
yKoalncbica eKOJiori«ina acou iau ia  ”3e.nenHH CbIt". GreiiorpaMa l l l - r o  i f is a v  a c o u ia u i i  
”3ejieHHH CbIt”. 31 TpaoHa 1992 ixikv. m. Khïb. c. 27-1.
According to Zelenyi Svit's statute, the three deputy leaders be in charge o f one region each (i.e. West, 
South and East).
CTenorpaMMa l l l - r o  3”13AV a c o u ia u i i  ”3eJienHH C b I t”. 31 TDapiu! 1992 rx)KV. m. K h ïd . c . 29-1.
372
The behaviour o f  the K iev delegation bore w itness to this, argued Shalim ova, an ou tsider from  
Kiev. Panov suggested that V olodym yr Boreiko, a form er m em ber o f  the student drnzhiny, to  hold 
th is post as there  w as a need for new  blood in Zelenyi S v i t ’s leadership. B oreiko, how ever, 
declined to  stand for election putting his support behind H oncharenko. In the end, H oncharenko 
got 52 votes, K orbetskyi 57 and Tokarev 17. A  second vote was then m ade betw een H oncharenko 
and K orbetskyi, w hich the latter won. K orbetskyi w as thus elected first deputy chairm an from  
Kiev"^^. Zolotukhin  from  N ikolaev and Stepaniak from  Ivano-Frankivsk w ere put forw ard as 
candidates for the tw o other posts. S tepaniak w as easily  elected w ith a vote o f  78. Z o lo tukh in ’s 
candidacy w as m ore controversial - at least w ith the Kiev delegation. He w as elected, but not w ith 
a m ajority , and the resu lt w as therefore contested from  the floor. R epresentatives from  the 
Southern oblasts o f  N ikolaev, O dessa and Klierson launched a  counter-attack  on the K iev 
delegation  arguing that it w as largely thanks to  Zolotukhin that reactor No. 4 o f  the  South- 
U krain ian  nuclear pow er station had not been built and that expansion o f  the Energy C om plex  in 
luzhnoukrainsk  had been endorsed in a lim ited version. The exchange o f  opinons tha t took  place 
betw een ‘K iev ’ and ‘the S outh’ is interesting in tha t it reveals the tension  that d id  and still to  som e 
ex ten t exists w ithin Zelenyi Sv it betw een K iev and the regions. I have therefore chosen to  include 
them  below :
13 3aJiv: ToBapHiUH KneBaaue! K aK ue y  o a c  ecrb  iipeTensHH k
SojioryxMuy, BMCKaxcure.
T. SojioTVxnn: CboroAUi Bxce spoayMiJio, soMy kmbiim AoSHoaJiMca,
mob IM iiaAajiM 11 rojiociB , 6o jiioam, b kI npnlxajiH 3 i^ r io n iB , 
BAce B iA ’iAAcaiOTb. H n p H ïxaB  na Aeiib p a iiim e, 3 i5 p a n  
cn eu ia j iicT iB . abb ïm  sanAamm. mob byjia spobaena enepreruana 
nporpawa. I  a lie nanpomyioca b y m  3acryriiiHK0M. Ue w en i
H ia o r o  iie AacTb.
13 3ajiv: OAeccKaa Aeaerauua, XepconcRafi, k to  npoi'UB
3o.aoTyxm iaV 3 to iiam peraon, h mu ro.aocyeM 3a 3o.noryxM iia.
13 3aay: ToBapumn! BjiaroAapa 3ojiOTyxMHy na IO îkiiom aTOMiioH
lie cjiyanjiocb Mepnobbmîi. A n KneBe, bJiaroAapa TOMy, aro nnoxo  
paboTaxiH "seneiiue", c.ayaHAca fiepiiobbuib.
T o j io B a : 3ojiOTyxHii -  o cB iA a en a  moAMiia, B in  ([lax iB eub. im o B  B i n  
na mo poboay n imacnoi iniuiaTHBU.
n. KonbeiibKHH: KDachuh pernon iiu oahofo cjiobu npoTHB
3ojioT yxuna ne CKasaji. B m poe: nubopu y^e  aaKonaHJincb, mu mx 
noATBepAMJiH. HeAOBepnfl MU ne BbiCKasanu oaern on  kommcchh, 
noATOMy AanaHTe npoAOJiAcaxb paboTaxb'^ l
So although the second day o f  the C ongress was m ore constructive than  day one, personal 
conflic ts lingered on, slow ing th ings down.
Ibid.. pp. 30-1 and 31-1.
Ibid., p. 35-1.
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1:
There were three proposed versions o f  the statute - one was to make some changes to the 
existing statute formaily registered w ith the Ministry o f  Justice after the Second Congress. The 
other was a revised version o f  Korbetskyi’s statute, which was endorsed by the Second Congress 
but to which amendments were made prior to its official registration (see above).
Amendments and changes to the statute had been discussed by one o f  the sections the 
previous day - 17 people had taken part in this discussion and Korbetskyi presented the Congress 
w ith proposed amendments as w ell as inform ing those present about parts o f  the statute that were 
controversial and upon which no agreement had been reached. The thrust o f  Korbetskyi’s version 
o f  the statute was the systématisation o f  the association. Zelenyi Svit functioned as an umbrella 
organisation uniting groups w hose membership varied from two or three up to 1,000 people. 
There was a need to specify relations between these groups as w ell as making the organisational 
structure o f  Zelenyi Svit clearer. The Congress noted that Zelenyi Svit was in the process o f  
stagnating. The main reason for this, it was argued, was the imperfection o f  the statute.
The issue that caused the m ost heated debate was whether or not to allow  for individual 
membership in Zelenyi Svit. Those favouring individual membership argued that in som e areas o f  
Ukraine there was no local branch o f  the Green Movement. Besides, an individual may not want 
to jo in the existing branch o f  Zelenyi Svit in his/her region for personal or other reasons. As 
Zelenyi Svit aimed at uniting Greens throughout Ukraine, these people must not be barred from  
jo in ing the association on an individual basis.
This argument, however, met with strong opposition. Korbetskyi, for instance, argued that all 
members o f  Zelenyi Svit were individual members who had joined forces in a local or regional 
group. A  danger w ith allow ing for individual membership, it was argued from the floor, was that 
individual members working in the oblasts and regions, had in the past made errors and discredited 
the movement. An element o f  old Sov iet thinking in the form o f  ‘kto k ogo’ was also used against 
individual membership:
ft DuaTKaio, ino nisKoro nepconaabiioro iie MOAce Gym. Ha Gjiaro 
yKpaiiiH MOAce Gy™ Ti.ribKH 3 iiawH.
Sanduliak held the v iew  that if  there was no established group in a region then Zelenyi Svi f s  
task should be to establish such a group rather than push away individual members. Accord ing to 
the statute three people could techn ically organise a local group. The suggestion to keep 
individual membership failed to get enough votes during balloting and was therefore dropped from 
the statute.
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As for the programme, the Third Congress failed to pass a new programme. Instead it 
endorsed the old one (i.e. the one adopted by the Second Congress) w ith a few  changes. The 
programme was criticised by M olod Ukrainy’s correspondent for lacking in concrete plans and for 
being o f  a declarative character;
y  n poeK T i nporpaviM y E A  "3e.ienMM C air” G y .io  G araro  KpacnBHX 
c j i iB , naB iTL (jipasa npo xaxHCT npaB ceR cya.ib iiH x \ieiiuiM ii, a.xe r o A i  
iiiyKaTM 'raw u iocb npo iconKpeTuy npupoAOOxopoim y p o G ory  b  
y x p a i i i i ,  m oA e im y, i ie n o v i im y  i  aaîKKy. Mo.viy G, iianpnK.naA. ne 
CTBOpMTM rpoM aacbKy i i ic n e ic n i io  oxopoiiH  npnpoAH "3eaenoro 
C B iT y”.
From what has been written above, one m ight easily get the impression that nothing positive 
came out o f  the Third Congress. However, work in the various sections was constructive and a 
number o f  resolutions elaborated by these were eventually endorsed. The Greens were far from 
impressed w ith Ukrainian authorities’ handling o f  the environmental crisis the country was in 
generally and the issue o f  nuclear power in particular:
Houa AepAcaBna BJiaAa, j i k  i  e r a  pa KOM yiiicrH'tna. A eM o iicrpys  
iiesAaTH icTb saxucrMTH c b o ï x  qxiM aAaii b I a  aTOM iioi bvmh. A.ne 
napOA yK p a iB H , m o nocrpaxcAaB Gi.ribme sa  o c i x  b I a  
MopHoGwAbCbKoro J iuxa, ue Aonyci'UTb noBTopeiiiia n i s i  Gesr-iiysAnoi 
no.aiTHKH'^ '*.
The Ukrainian Declaration o f  Sovereignty, passed in June 1990, stated Ukraine’s intention to 
be nuclear-free and this intention was w idely supported by the Ukrainian people. H owever, the 
Military-Industrial Com plex did not halt its efforts to push Ukraine into further develop ing its 
nuclear energy industry. The Ukrainian Cabinet o f  Ministers and the Presidential Adm inistration 
under pressure from Atomenergoprom  intended to win the Ukrainian people over on its side by 
threatening an energy crisis should nuclear power be abandoned altogether. However, Kravchuk, 
arguing that there was no alternative to nuclear energy forgot about Chernobyl and numerous 
accidents at other nuclear power stations in Ukraine. He was forgetting that the international 
community considered not only RBMK-reactors but also VVER-reactors inherently unsafe. 
Follow ing German reunification five VVER-reactors built with Sov iet technology were closed due 
to poor safety. Ki avchuk also forgot that Ukraine was ranked one o f  the poorest within the CIS on 
water supplies and that increasing capacity at the nuclear power stations would exhaust these
denenHH cbI t, no. 10, 1992, c. 6.
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.supplies. F inally, he was ignoring the recommendations o f  Minenergo and leading Ukrainian 
scientists that alternatives did exist. The Greens therefore urged Ukrainians to demand from the 
government and the president that Chernobyl be closed, that no revision o f  the existing  
moratorium on the construction o f  nuclear reactors be allowed, that a ban be made on the
' :construction o f  reprocessing facilities for nuclear fuel in the Chernobyl zone, and, finally, that
maximum effort be made at providing people with the opportunity to live in an ecolog ically clean 
environment.
Another resolution was addressed to President Kravchuk. Zelenyi Svit rem inded him that the 
ecological situation in Ukraine had become so severe that its population was beginning to drop. 
To improve efforts to solve the ecological crisis the Greens requested that a specialist on ecology  
be appointed to the Duma to make sure that environmental problems be addressed in parallel with 
econom ic and state-building issues. The Greens put forward the name o f  Academ ician M yhailo 
Holubets “ a botanist - for such a post.
A  number o f  propositions to facilitate the solution o f  the ecological crisis were made to 
Verkhovna Rada to save the river Dniestr from dying. Dniestr provided drinking water for 10
m illion people in Ukraine and M oldova. Its water was also used by enterprises in Prikarpatia and
Karpatia. As a result, its water flow  had been halved. In 1983, follow ing the burst o f  a dam at
Stebnykivsk potassium combine, a large stretch o f  the river was left virtually dead. To save the
river, the Greens recommended that a special com m ission be set up. There was also a need to
protect small rivers from destruction. Twenty thousand small rivers were destroyed in Ukraine 
.during the Soviet period, and o f  the 70,000 small rivers that were left, only 1,700 had a normal 
river bed. The resolution also recommended that the Carpathians (Lv iv, Ivano-Frankivsk and 
Zakarpatia oblasts) be given status as a recreational zone. F inally, Zelenyi Svit called for the 
creation o f  an ecolog ical police force to safeguard the environment until people grew sufficiently  
aware o f  their own dependence o f  a protective and sensible approach to the environment.
The Congress ended, as it had started, in seem ing unity. D elegates gathered around the Blue
Pond (S ince ozero), an artesian spring on the outskirts o f  Kiev, where priests from the two  
Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church) blessed the pond and also nearby kindergartens and schools. Those who had 
gathered to watch the blessing held lit candles, a choir sang and, noted the correspondent from 
Respublika, the atmosphere seem ed to have a calm ing effect on people who had only a few  hours 
previously been at each other’s throats. A woman from the region spoke to those present, 
reminding them about their obligation to protect the environment and that ‘Cosm os is watching us 
now ’. This caused a little dispute with the priests present, who thought God was more important 
than Cosmos:
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the Presidium o f  the Congress, shouted that it was violating Zelenyi Sv i f s  statute and prom ised
46
XpemaTMK6A992, c. 7. 
Pecny&JiMKa, no . 1 ,1 9 9 2  (n .p .).
JIioam! CnymauTe Nieiin, .aoah! bckhii.vb iieixrr m iieGy, ucKpu'ia.ri 
iipauooaBiiLiH cBiimeiiiiMK. To, bto bbm ceuMac roBopu.iH iipo 
(|)M.aoco(|)Mio, npo ICocmoc - a to  c.aymaure b iipyrovt Mecre, u b uiioe 
Bpewfl. 3 to  iiHKaKoro oniomenna k iiaM lie UMeer! Mix moahmch 
TocnoAy iiameiviy Mucycy Xpncry! H ceuMac iiouAeM BneiieA c 
rocnoAovi!
Generally, press coverage o f  the Congress was far from favourable. The K iev newspaper 
Khreshchatylc^, for instance, pointed out that Zelenyi Svit had failed to conduct its Congress in 
accordance w ith the dev ice chosen for it, namely ‘Unity in the Nam e o f  Survival’. An exam ple o f  
how  bad things really were, the weekly R e s p u b l i k a correspondent Marina Koroleva reported a 
number o f  incidents where emotions had been running high. A woman, angry at being cut o ff  by
Éthat she would inform the United Nations and UNICEF about what was happening! Tkachenko’s 
attempts to keep order during the Congress fell flat, and she concluded that Zelenyi Svit was close  
to a split:
:
H. o. npeAceAarejifl XpucroM  BoroM npocuji aaji yrcMOHUTbCii. M eiiee  
uaGoxcHLie Ae.tierarM iipocujiu era  saTKiiyTLcii h oGsbiuajiu
npOBOKaTOpOM.
Or MaccoBux GecnopsAKOB c MopAoGoeM cnac Aejierax b BbimuroU 
COpO'IKe, BblCKOMHBmHH K TpuGyUB H noripOCMBUIMH KOJl.ner
"oGjieniHTbCA m noroBopuTb npo oGca”. Oocjie 'rpanesbi cbe.3A, 
AeBH30M KOToporo Gbui jTosyiir 'Cornacue bo  h m b  BbiACMBanuif, 
npoAOJiACHJi cboio  paGoxy...
Neither M olod Ukrainy's correspondent seem ed to believe that Zelenyi Svit had a future,
questioning its very right to call itself an environmental organisation as environmental work no
‘longer seem ed to be a priority issue. Had Zelenyi Svit sim ply been transformed into a travel 
agency for a selected group o f  people who had given them selves the right to speak on behalf o f  all 
Greens in Ukraine and to represent them internationally? Or had it becom e a means by which a 
chosen few  could make political careers? Could Zelenyi Svit any longer be seen as an association  
uniting all forces working towards the protection o f  the Ukrainian environment?
I f  this was the case, there were few  signs o f  this at the Congress. A s a matter o f  fact, quite 
the opposite seemed to be the case. N ot only did the Congress abolish individual membership in 
Zelenyi Svit despite the fact that there were many individuals who were not organised and w ho did 
not belong to any local or regional chapter o f  the association for this or the other reason, but who
I
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would still like to be affiliated with Zelenyi Svit; it also did not appear particularly concerned with 
work conducted by local and regional groups, where quite a few  achievements had been made"^ .^
I have now had a look at how Zelenyi Svit's Congress was perceived by people from the 
‘outside’. But what reflections did the Greens them selves make after what could at best be 
described as a stormy event? L. Herbytskyi, Professor o f  M edicine from Dnipropetrovsk, stressed 
as positive that although there had been clashes over a number o f  issues, unity prevailed in the 
end:
Xopouio TO, 'iTO cbesA lie pacKoaoacii u m o vii>i cyMe.iiH usGpaxb 
iioBoro .TMAepa. OpuaeM noaiu eâMiior.aaciio. hw.io ipu KaiuiHAara, 
110 Jl.M. CanA.y.nflKa ripoiue.n c nepnoro pasa. H ato iieBSupaa na ro, 
MTO nacTB KHeBCKOH Ae.nerauMH ne.na ce5a Kpauiie AecrpyKTUBno, no 
cyTM G.rtoKHpoBaaa paGoxy m iihixajiacb copuarb ci,e3A. Bi.uim 
iieMMonepno BbicoRue aiuGnunn, xcaxcAa auAepcraa, B.xaci'n. (To, axo 
CaiiAy.miK nsGpan c nepnoro 3axoAa)...Bce.aaex onpeAeaeniibie naaeîKAbi 
na TO, axo b AaabnefimeM on cyweex cnaoxuxb oxaacro pacKoaoroe 
ABHAcenne ’’seaeiiux”. Xopomo m to , arc ocnoBiiaa aacxb ue noin.fia 
3a KH0BCKHMH Gyiii'apBMH, axo Aeaeraxbi cyMeau n.xoAOTBopiio 
noxpyAWTbca b paGoawx kommcchbx m ciiokohiio, Gea noaMxnaecKHX 
waneapoB. BbipaGoxarb ci'paxernio "seaenoro” ABMAcenna.
Although at the national level Zelenyi Svit was riddled with conflicts, this was not the case locally. 
A s a matter o f  fact the Greens’ rating in East Ukraine remained high. N ot so long ago a survey 
had been conducted among students in Dnipropetrovsk on support for informal m ovem ents. The 
result o f  this survey showed that the Greens in terms o f  popularity were way ahead o f  other 
political public organisations and movements.
lu. Vysochin, an engineer from Cherkassy, was less positive when passing judgem ent. He 
was worried about travelling in general among the leadership o f  Zelenyi Svit and held the v iew  that 
the priorities o f  the association had yet to be set right:
.
A M05Ker, eci'b cwbiai weubme esAHXb 3a uepeAOBbiM oulitom, no 
Gojibuie MHxaxb o new b cneuuajibUOH .riMxeparype? A 
CAKonoMJieuuyio 3a caex Aioro Bajiioxy iiycKaxb na npHoGiiexeiiHe 
Ae{|)MUHxnoM lianaAiiOH annapaxypbi. Y nac gaum AyMaiox o  cbomx 
noJiHTMHecKHx aMGnnHAx, Apyrne o nyreniecrBUAx. Ho kto-to acc 
AOAAcen AyMaxb oG YKpaune!
There was no shortage o f  issues that needed to be urgently addressed - for instance the use o f  
chem icals in agriculture. Their use could only be described as barbaric. N ot only was it depleting 
the layer o f  fertile humus in the soif^; it was also posing a serious danger to people’s health:
'’" ib id
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:
...BaMiiiiHe HAoxMMHKaTOB lia oGmee m ncHXHMecKoe sjioponbe 
ae.aoneKa. 05m eH 3Be(;n io. mto se.vmM Mo.uioBbi OTpaiiaeiibi h ra\i 
iiaSjiioAaercn BcnaecK iiacHJiMji. Ha KaiiKase, n C()eAnefi Abhm bcmam 
OTpaB.neHbi...Bbi AyMaexe. h n YKpam ie napBapcrna mo Acer npon30HTM?
TaM , TAB XHMHB. AAbl npOHMKAM B KpOBb. a  M03r '16.10136X3 - BHOJHie.
Serhii Hrabovskyi, the Green M ovem ent’s philosopher, tried to explain the root o f  the
.conflicts that were tearing Zelenyi Svit apart:
Humus forms very slowly - it takes 100 years for 1 cm to build up. Over the last 50 years Ukraine had lost 
more than 90% of its humus and further losses could be expected if the chemicalisation of 
agruculture continued unchanged.
.•y
CyuteCT'Byer iieSo-ibniaa rpynna iiojiHïmecKMx Gopuon cidcam
’æJieubix”, MM DcerAa uajio icoro-ro K.ieHMHTb, pasoG-iaiarb. Biepa 
OHM Gopo.iMCb c KHCC, ceroAini c xapbepMcraMM b ”3e;ieiioMy c n i r i ”
M c  ’’ACMAOKOMMyiiHcraMM”. O ahako  cbe:iA 3a ATMMM ”Aii'ry3HacraMM” 
lie  n o u ie .i, leM  npoiiBM.i cboio MyApocrb.
Another reason for all the quarrels was no doubt the departure o f  lurii Shcherbak as the
association’s leader. Many others left with him and as a result the intellectual level among its
membership had dropped. Deputies o f  Verkhovna Rada and well-known scientists were virtually
.absent from the Congress grounds and this was in itself revealing, according to Hrabovskyi. And 
those outsiders who did show up out o f  curiosity were com pletely put o ff  by the tense atmosphere 
among the delegates. A  Dnipropetrovsk delegate, for instance, had been accompanied to the 
Congress by the deputy chairman o f  the gorispolkom on ecology, sc ience and technology. The 
latter left after one and a half hours, arguing that there was not a working atmosphere at the
Congress. Hrabovskyi was saddened by the discord in the movement, but still hoped that it be 
able to sort out the differences and once again get down to constructive work:
%MBaa aïM0C(i)epa iia nojiMTH'iecKOM cb^Ae. OACMBJiemibie b w k p m k m  
"Bbi npoBOKaxop!, Bu iipoBOKarop!" - Bbi yabiGaexecb, a Miie rpycn io  
BMA6Tb. AO BCrO MbI AOUJAM. X oTfl U U6A0M Cb63A BCexaKM CAe.nUJl 
pAA noAesiibix A6A. YAaAocb MsGpaxb pyxoBOAorBo. 3 t o  oueiib 
xopomo. ...ByA6M iiaAeaTbCJi, a t o t  a c a o b o m  Ayx B03oGjiaAaer b iiaiueM
ABHACeilMH.
Zelenyi Svi f s  new leader, Leontii Sanduliak was also fairly optim istic regarding the future: 
W hile acknowledging that there were conflicts within the Green M ovement, he claim ed that this 
was only natural given its democratic structure and the fact that it united people w ith very different 
view s on m ost things:
I
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OAno3iia'iHO 3 ' Ï3A AiHCiio ouiüMTM iic MOACiia. Cfipaiîa y  xov iy. mo 
”3e.nen i” oG 'eA iiyioTb .iioAePi pi3i(HX ynoAoGaiib; ”3eAeiiufl C a i r ” -  
ue OAita 3 uaücrap iu jiiH x AeMoxpaTuaiiux o p r a u isa u iU , iiesa.ieîxiiMX 
n i 4 KnPC...B o p r a i i ia a u i i  MOAcyxb Gyxu aioam 3 naupiBUo- 
MaiiiTuiiuMMH uorAHAaTM. Tax mo OAiiocrraHiiicrb ua 3 ' i 3 A i  6y.*ia 
6  npocTH AMBiioio i  neupHpoAHOio. Baaîxa io , mo o p r a i i i s a u i l ,  a c  
Bce Bup imyeTbCfl OAUocraftuo h oAHoroAociio Ayxce iieG esnc'in i. 6 o  
£ iiociiiMH TOTajiiTapnoro Ayxy. A y  ”3eAeimx” npoA cranaeu i AyAce 
p i3 H i i  3a $axoM , i  3a bIxom , i  3a nojiiTM'iUHMH rior.miAa.MH 
aioah: TOMy m 6.yah A yxœ  pi3iiM BHcryriH'’^ .
Sanduliak did, however, admit that there were problems at the Congress:
SaraaoM  6y.no npoTHcroriiimi mI ac .nioAbMH, a x i  xori.nH  
npoAOBAcyBaxM x p a m i  x p a A w u il o p r a i i i s a u i l  -  i  xuMM. xxo  x o x iB  
Aoxop iiiiiHX 3M iii 3 Mexoio 3axon.neitrifl x e p iiîiiu x  uocua. ü iH c iio , ua 
ujieuapiiHX sac iA auuflx 6y.no Garaxo ra.nacy. u o cr iA u o  crauMJiHca 
uMxauuA |3er.naMeuxy xom o, 'loGxo BiAnyna.nMca cnpoGw 
3aGiopoxpaxM3yBaxH 3 ' ï 3A-
A s regarded the K iev group, Tkachenko expressed understanding towards it: As people o f  the 
capital they wanted to represent Zelenyi Svit to the outside world. This, in his view , was the 
underlying reason for all the d iscussions regarding the reglament and evei-y point o f  the statute. 
However, although there were conflicts within the Green M ovement, conflicts were also frequent 
in other political movements:
y  B cix  uoDHX AeMoxpaxnnuHX op rau i3an iax  iiajiBiii uoA iG iii 
CM xyau iï. H e  BHuaAXOBO ac xaAcyxb — Ae xpu y x p a i u u i ,  xaM 
MOTHpM n a p x i ï  i  ii'axb AyMox. Ua Ao.nii ue OMMuyaa i  3eJieuHH 
C b Ix .  A.ne BAce ac Meue paAya, mo ua cexuiHitMx saciAauuax, Ae 
oGroBopiOBajTHCB xouxpexu i n ixa iiua A in  seaenMX CH.n, Amjia AiaoBci 
[joGoxa.
Zelenyi Svit would, however, survive despite this big number o f  opinions, then unlike what 
was the case in for instance Belorussia and M oldova where there were a number o f  Green groups, 
Ukraine had only one such group - Zelenyi Svit. Sanduliak hoped that things would stay that way.
Andryi H lazovyi, however, was far from satisfied w ith the Congress, arguing that the Green 
M ovem ent was in serious trouble not only due to a number o f  objective reasons, such as the 
econom ic crisis, disillusionm ent with the authorities’ incapability and w ith the ‘predatory’ policies  
o f  the Fokin adm inistration. Subjective reasons, such as the lack o f  co-ordination between ‘K iev’ 
and the local organisations, the bureaucratisation and poor efficiency o f  the association as w ell as
SeJieiiMM CBlT, no. 11, 1992, c. 2.
.1I
380
som e leading figures’ detachment from real life had taken their toll. As a result o f  
mismanagement many well-known activists sim ply did not wish to attend the congress. Due to 
poor management the new version o f  the programme was not ready in time for the Congress. 
Moreover, a number o f  issues listed on the agenda o f  the Congress were passed by in silence. 
Tkachenko, whose speech was full o f  elegant sentences, romantic recollections, compliments and 
angry philippics, failed to even acknowledge that Zelenyi Svit was go ing through the most 
dramatic stage throughout its entire existence.
However, the Congress had given Zelenyi Svit a second breath. The new statute considerably 
reducea the powers o f  the apparatus, cut the number o f people in the co-ordinating bod ies and 
abolished individual membership, from which the association could only benefit. H lazovyi put 
much hope in the election o f  Korbetskyi as one o f  the new deputy leaders. Korbetskyi was critical 
to the current state o f  affairs within the central organs o f  Zelenyi Svit and had his own v iew s on 
how to organise their work. This gave hope for changes for the better. The com m issions had 
worked w ell and future tactics for how to act on nuclear power, alternative energy, protection o f  
health and water had been staked out. Compared to many other political m ovem ents Zelenyi Svit 
had therefore done well:
Mae MO n a  Y K p a x n i  c y M iiy  r p a A U U i io :  T iDCT iH : i ' l 3 A  Ma.rio ne
K O A c n o ï rp oM aA C L K O ï o p r a i i i i i a n i l  i i e c e  b h 6.yxob hh  sa p u A . Maao n e  
P03K0J10BCA n a  3 - b O M y  3 ' i 3 A i  PYX, B iA 6 y .r iH c a  po3K O J i B YPFI ra  
coniaJi-AeMOKpaTiB. Ha cBoeMy TiDerbOMy 3 ' i 3 A i  3e.F ien H H  C b It 
p u c H K y n a B , 3a  B - iy in u M  bhcjiobom  O A iio ro  K O J i e r n - A c y p n a j i i c r a ,  
nep eT B O p H T H ca n a  " p o M a n r M 'in i p y l n n ”. H i n p o x y ,  bhacmjih. I  
M a e MO i i a A i i o  n a  K paure^'’.
4.1.4 Leadership Struggle and Further Discord
H lazovy i’s optimism received a serious blow when only a month after he was elected chairman o f  
Zelenyi Svit, Sanduliak was appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Romania. Korbetskyi, Zolotukhin  
and Stepaniak thus had to work as interim leaders until a new leader could be found. Competition  
and disagreements between the three deputy leaders soon became a strain for Zelenyi Svit, An 
article in Zelenyi svit likened the interim leadership to a three-headed snake:
Bo 3a.nMiJiHJiHcn 3 3acryniiHKM ro.noBH, n x i  spoaom iipM3iia‘iHJiH ce6e 
cniBrojioBaMM i  no'iaan axTMBiio ”AiBTu”^ ’.
3 eJienMM c b î t ,  no. 9, 1992, c. 3. 
SeJieiiM M  CBlr, no, 3, 1993, c. 7.
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IIZolotukhin, for instance, independently developed an Energy Programme for Ukraine, not 
consulting w ith anybody else, and started pressing it upon the government. The programme
proposed that all nuclear and thermal power stations be replaced with gas turbines used by m ilitary 
ship and aircraft. This, argued the author o f  the article, was incompatible with the Green
52M ovem ent’s opposition to the Military-Industrial Complex . Zolotukhin was also accused o f  
acting single-handedly when signing a document on behalf o f  Zelenyi Svit stating the latter’s entry 
into the Anti-Communist and Anti-Imperialist Front {Antikommunistichnyi ta antiimperskii front - 
AAF).
A  scandal broke follow ing an article in Literaturna Ukraina on 25 February . The article,
accompanying the declaration o f  the Anti-Communist, Anti-Imperialist Front claimed that Zelenyi
Svit supported the Front. There were, however, diverging v iew s on the desirability to be
associated w ith this front amongst members o f  Zelenyi Svit. A s mentioned before, som e o f  its
members were affiliated w ith the Communist Party. These people would naturally want to have
nothing to do w ith the front. Others were politically independent, hold ing the v iew  that Zelenyi 
.Svit should avoid taking sides in the evolving political struggle in Ukraine and rather concentrate 
on environmental activities and they were all unhappy w ith the w ay in wh ich the decision to 
support the Front had been made; Ihor Dzeverin shortly after, at a m eeting o f  Mala Rada, strongly 
criticised membership in the Front, his main argument being that it was up to the Congress to 
make such a decision. Eventually it was decided that Zelenyi Svit should opt for observer status 
with the Front. Dzeverin and others with him were therefore dismayed to find Zolotukhin sitting 
in its presidium. One o f  the initiators to the Front was a member o f  K iev PZU, V. Tymonin. The 
leader o f  PZU  at the time, V italii Kononov, was not happy w ith the Front either, arguing that 
‘Green’ participation in the work o f  the Front would put the Ukrainian Greens in an awkward 
position v is-à-vis the W est European Greens. The lack o f  clarity on this issue thus further served 
to fuel conflicts within the Green M ovement,
G iven the political situation in Ukraine and the politicised nature o f  the environment in itself, 
it was, as pointed out above, d ifficult for the Greens to remain above politics. Leontii Sanduliak 
had, however, stressed that the Green M ovem ent must retain its independence, avoid ing any direct 
involvem ent with other political groups:
Although it is ti'ue that gas turbines already used in aircraft and ships would be utilised, the technology 
accompanying their use was new and elaborated by two Nikolaev scientists, Borysenko and 
Hryhorenko. By making better use of fuel and by utilising waste, harmful emissions could be 
reduced to a minimum. Thus, not only would this be an environmentally more friendly alternative 
to nuclear and thermal power, but also much cheaper than further expansion of nuclear power in 
Ukraine.
JliwpaTypna VKpanm, 25.2.1993, c. 3.
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tF::r£>'a:
...EKOJioriMiii 3ycH.i:iJi AeviOKpaTH'niMX nap iiA  'lac oG 'siu ia iH . A;ie 
3eaeHMH pyx noBHiien jimuaTMCfi iiesajieAcimvi, Bin noBHneu math 
CBOE Baacne :ia6apB;ieun}i. Bm noAyviaHTe: GiaLiuicTL aioAefl ue
3iia£ iiaaiTB npo xop o iu i eKoaoriM ni njDoiiDaMH AeMOKixiTH'iiiMX 
napTiH, -  aae 3 caMHX ua3B ”3eaeiiHH CaiT", DapT ia 3ejieim x 
[UHix)KMH 3araa po3yM i£. mo nepea iihm -  eKoaoriM iii 
o p r a a is a u i ï .  3  u i s ï  TO'ixy 3opy, MaOy ri,, t o h , xto BuaAcae ce6e  
cnpaBAciiiM eKoaoricroM, aoriMiio noBMiieii craxH aaeiioM 3e.aeaoro 
C a iTy. I  r iapT iï, axmo boiih cnpaBAi aGaioxB npo CKoaoriio. 
noBHHUi BHcrynaxH KoaeKTHBiiHMH aaeuaMH ao 3eaeiiMH C b I t .  A ne 
iiannaKH. lU e  crocyeTLCJi i  ’TIo b o i  yK pa iim ”. aaencxBo ’seaeiiHx” b 
BKiM 3apa3 oSroBopiOE'i’bca. ftxm o ue napx ia iiianpMeMuiB -  
3eaeiiHH C a lx  6yae  ao n e i  y a o B ia n iu  ono3H u i ï .  Orate, axmo 
axiCL n a p x i l  saanaaioxL npo cboe KoacKXMnne aaencxao y 3eaenoro  
C u ixy , TO B ia  Uboro bohh aum e Bwrpaioxb: fttcmo 3eaeiiHH C n ix
3iaa£X bca 3 khmocl: to  nporpaioxb yci^'’.
A ll political, econom ic and environmental questions were closely linked in Sanduliak’s view . 
Trying to solve one o f  these without taking into consideration the other two would sim ply not be 
possible. Zelenyi Svit therefore needed a political tinge. However, this tinge should be ‘Green’. 
Enterprises must be controlled, especially during the transition to the market, to make sure 
em issions were w ithin set limits. On the issues o f  statehood and independence Zelenyi Svit had to 
vo ice its position as they were closely  related to the environment. The problem, o f  course, 
remained how to avoid upsetting members o f  the Green M ovem ent in the process, as so many 
diverging v iew s existed regarding the political aspects o f  its activities.
The internal personal conflicts in Zelenyi Svit intensified follow ing an article published in 
Kievskie vedomosti on 3 February 1993. The article, which was labelled ‘the Greens sell out to the 
Pro-Nuclear Lobby. So far only by Retail, and only at the Highest LeveP^^ claim ed that the 
editorial board o f Kievskie vedomosti had received information about K orbetskyi’s participation in 
the work o f  the com m ission o f  the Scientific-Technical Union o f  Power Engineering Specialists 
and Electrical Engineers in the summer o f  1992 (Nuclear Energy up to the year 2000), which had 
reached the follow ing conclusion:
nocraBH Tb n a  PuBencKOH m BanopoAccROH ABC, n o  OAiiowy G jioicy, a  
na  XweabirnuKOH -  ue.ib ix xp u , aKxuBiio roxoBMXb xaApbi a a b  
"MHpnoro axoM a”, saK ynnxb MMUopxnoe oGopyAOBaHwe, yuejiH'iMXb 
HIlBeCXHUMH...A CneUHaJlbllO AJIB npHAWpBHBblX AKOJlOrOB H 
npHpOAOOXpanHxejieH cosA axb o c o G y io  cjiyA cS y no yAOBJiexBopeiiHio 
”o6i,eKTHBnbix h cy5T>eKTMBHbix xpeGonanHH o G m eciB en n ocrH ”.
3e.fieiiHM CBiT, no. 11, 1992, c. 2. 
KHOBCKHe BejiOMOCTM, 3.2.1993, c. 9.
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Kievskie vedomosti disagreed with the recommendations of the report and the attempt by the
B6K.
56 3e.neum c b I t ,  no. 3, 1993, c. 7.
I
Not only had Korbetskyi taken part in preparing the report; the final draft had been received 
by the vice-president of the Scientific-Technical Union Power Engineering Specialists and 
Electrical Engineers, A. Dupak, who had not too long ago been Chairman of Zelenyi Svi f s  
Revision Commission!
pro-nuclear lobby to push its ideas through prior to the passing of the Law on Nuclear Energy. It
■also questioned the integrity of Zelenyi Svit. Then was it not rather strange that on the one hand 
members of the association, including Korbetskyi, were totally opposed to nuclear power, while on 
the other they were actually condoning it:
A k t h b h c t w  yxpaMUCKOü BKOJiorH'iecKOH AcouuauM H ”3e.neiiMM C n i ' i” 
iiacrpoenL i peLUMTeabiio. H x AOKyMeiiTbi iip eA n o iiora ïo ïb  BOoGme 
saxpbiTb A op ory  ”mh])iioio aroM y". C onpeA ceA areab ”3eJienoro C a ir y "  
E. KopGeuKMH C'iMïaeT, «rro nporpaiviivfa-MaKGM.MyM -  .laRpb irne ABC. 
0  KaKOM-JiuGo pacuiHpeiiHM c e iH  aroMfibix 3.aeK'rpocrauuHM iie  m oacc t  
GblTb M pe'lH AO nOJIbllOH AHKBHAaUHM nOCJieACTBHA aepnoGbuibcicoA  
aBapwH. H o  MiieiiMio E. K opG enK oro, t a m  paGoxbi XBaiHT na n ea n A
Not surprisingly, the article caused a sharp reaction amongst the activists of Zelenyi Svit. 
Korbetskyi was labelled a ‘traitor’ and calls were made to exclude him from the ranks o f Zelenyi 
Svit. Preparations of the Congress suffered under this issue. Nobody worked; everybody talked 
about the newspaper article. Zelenyi Svit as an association did not favour the improvement of 
nuclear power but was against nuclear power on principle. Although Korbetskyi voted against the 
majority of the commission in question this was not taken note of. Therefore it looked as if 
Korbetskyi was in favour of nuclear power. His mistake was that he did not inform Zelenyi Svit 
that he was on this commission. An article in Zelenyi Svit^^ claimed that nobody in the association
were aware of this programme and that it was discovered by chance, as one o f its authors left
behind his copy in Zelenyi Sv i f s  office during a meeting with Korbetskyi. Korbetskyi refuted the
.views presented in the Kievskie vedomosti article in an article headed ‘Two Aspects’ (published in 
Nova MG on 27 February 1993), but the incident all the same did great damage to his image 
within Zelenyi Svit.
A third issue of disagreement within Zelenyi Svit was linked to the statute endorsed by the 
Third Congress. Evhen Korbetskyi told me that he presented his own version o f a new statute to 
the Congress. Initially people were against his draft, but after more than two hours o f discussion 
the Congress agreed to endorse it. Shortly after the Congress, however, the documents
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disappeared. Korbetskyi suspected that they were removed by Anatolyi Panov , as he was
strongly criticised by the Congress in his capacity as director of the Podil office. Panov, as
57
executive director of the Green Office, and Korbetskyi, as one of Zelenyi Sv i f s  deputy leaders, 
were put in charge of registering the new statute with Miniust (the Ministry of Justice). 
Alterations were made in the text of the statute before it was registered and Korbetskyi blamed 
Panov for single-handedly having edited the statute. Different interpretations of what happened to 
the statute were given by other members of the association. In any case, due to increasing 
pressure, Panov resigned as executive director of the Green Office in December 1992.
The decision to call yet another congress to solve the leadership issue following Sanduliak’s 
departure from Zelenyi Svit was not a direct result of Zolotukhin’s and Korbetskyi’s activities, but 
was made in mid-December 1992 by Zelena Rada. At this meeting, Korbetskyi criticised Zelenyi 
Svit for poor and inefficient work. This was received badly as Korbetskyi was ‘only’ one o f three
'deputy leaders. It was decided that a new leader had to be found so that one could criticise freely
without this being ill-perceived.
Not everybody approved of convening a new Congress on this pretext itself, though. Ihor
.Dzeverin, for instance, when recommended by Korbetskyi for the organisation committee that 
would prepare the Congress, expressed the view that prior to convening the Congress new issues 
ought to be identified for discussion. In principle he was against a Congress as it was likely to be 
overshadowed by personal conflicts and a leadership struggle rather than constructive work. This
seemed a likely scenario, in his view, as Korbetskyi and Panov, who were both power engineering 
specialists had a habit of criticising one another, putting in doubt the professional integrity of the 
other. The view that a Congress was needed did in the end prevail and the Congress was 
scheduled for early 1993.
The leadership issue came up at the last meeting of Zelena Rada prior to the Congress. A 
minority decided to support Korbetskyi’s candidacy despite his chances now being rather slim. 
Others favoured Korobko, who in their opinion would be an ideal candidate as he was not only a 
people’s deputy of Ukraine but also represented the periphery, coming from Kryvyi Rih. Another 
factor that further strengthened his candidacy was that Korobko was considered an honest person, 
having declined both a house and a car, which the Ukrainian MPs had awarded themselves. As 
there was still disagreement on the need to call a congress - the PZU faction and those supporting 
Panov favoured a Congress, whereas Zolotukhin led a group of people opposing it - a vote was 
made on the issue. A majority voted in favour. I .
Panov was a member of the Congress’ secretariat and was thus partly in charge of all documents enorsed 
by the Congress. He was also a member of the Editorial Commission, whose task it was to suggest 
and recommend changes to the statute and the programme of Zelenyi Svit - as was Korbetskyi.
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Attempts were made at building a bridge between Korobko and Korbetskyi to avoid open 
conflict. These attempts, however, failed. Towards the end of the meeting everybody was 
quarrelling with everybody. Panov was criticised for having changed the statute o f the association, 
whereas Korbetskyi was accused of having betrayed the Greens. Following a break, compromise 
was reached - the Congress must go ahead. The PZU  fraction and those supporting Panov 
favoured a Congress, whereas Zolotukhin led a group of people opposed to holding the Congress. 
Zolotukhin supported Korbetskyi’s candidacy as new leader of Zelenyi Svit. Others, including 
younger members of the movement, abstained.
A few days before the Congress convened, Oleksii Kabyka, a former Zelenyi Svit activist, 
currently working with Greenpeace Ukraine noted that
Aajibuie, TGM xyA ce. nocT onnub ie  nenpeK pam aiom H ecH  cK am aab i 
H ApaKH sa  BJiacrb m Ten.rii)ie Mecra, Aeiibrn. HM Kaxou paGoxbi. ft  
yA ce 0 C0 6 0  lie  A«Ay iim iero  o t  tmx^^.
4.1.5 Fourth Congress (February 1993)
As seen above, critical remarks were made on Zelenyi Svi f s  structure prior to the Congress both in 
written (cf. Hlazovyi’s article) and spoken form. This criticism was to some extent taken into 
account by the association’s leadership and prior to the Congress a commission was set up to look 
into possible ways of improving the efficacy of the Green Office in Kiev as well as of the elected 
organs of the Green Movement. Due to all the criticism that had been raised against him, Panov 
on the first day o f the Congress asked the delegates that he be re leaved from his duties as 
executive director of the Green office, after having presented the Congress with an account of the 
office’s activities between 1991 and 1993. This request was granted. In an interview with 
Vechirnyi Kyiv some time after the Congress, Panov expanded on his decision to step down as 
executive director of the Podil office:
Xo'iy niTH h3 c b o e ï  nocaAM, ocKiJibKH nporiiroM ipuBaaoro 'lacy 
"I'liniyB JuiMKy” i  ctcopiui sa iiœ  npocro crowHBca. OroMHBca ne 
BiA poGoTM, a BiA BocriHiiHX Koii(l)JiiicTHHX GHTyauiH, cynepeaoK, 
noix)AAC6HHX iiesAopoBHMM aMSiuiiiMM. CBOsMy iiacrynnMKOBi xo'iy 
iioGaAcaTH y c n ix iB  i  mI uiihx  iiepaiB. 3a n ocr iH iio ï Biflim  
'leGTOJiioGcTB iiaiuHX .riiAepiB AyAce buacko po Ghth  cnpaay^^.
58 Letter from Oleksii Kabyka, Kiev, 24.2.1993. 
B&fipiiMM Km ïb , 16.3.1993, c. 2.
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This problem was compounded by the politicisation of the Green Movement generally and 
the intrigues among Zelenyi Svit leaders in particular.
Following Panov’s account, the leaders of Zelenyi Svi f s  commissions were given a chance to
inform the Congress about the activities of each commission. However, half the commissions had 
been non-functioning so this did not really serve much purpose. Only a few of the commission 
leaders actually took the opportunity to present the delegates with such an account. Fedorinchyk, 
head of the legal commission, urged the Congress to pass a statute. He suggested that the text 
from the statute endorsed by the Third Congress be re-endorsed and registered by the Ministry of 
Justice. Should the Congress fail to do so, future work would prove difficult. He won support for 
his proposition from other delegates, amongst them Ihor Dzeverin,
With regard to the leadership issue, a number of delegates raised sharp criticism against 
Sanduliak - some even went so far as to call him a ‘traitor’ for having taken advantage o f the ; 
Green Movement to create a name for himself. Some people thought Sanduliak already on the eve 
of the Third Congress had been asked and accepted the post of Ukrainian ambassador to Romania 
and that by accepting the leadership of Zelenyi Svit he had let the movement down, further 
preparing the ground for much of the infighting that had taken place within the movement since.
The sense of betrayal was sharpened in that many members o f the Green Movement also felt 
let down by lurii Shcherbak, who they suspected of having made a name through the movement 
and simply used it as a springboard to climb the career ladder. Others, although they did not 
blame Shcherbak for ‘moving on’ - after all it was very much due to his effort that the Green 
Movement had become so popular and well-respected - admitted that losing two well-known 
leader figures over such a short time had left the Green Movement in something of a limbo, 
opening up for conflicts and infighting between individuals that Shcherbak and Sanduliak had 
managed to contain by uniting the Movement behind them.
The three deputy leaders, Korbetskyi, Stepaniak and Zolotukhin each made a speech at the 
beginning of the Congress. Korbetskyi took the opportunity to address organisational issues and 
suggested that the statute be improved. He also criticised Panov for having performed poorly as 
the executive director of the Green Office. Stepaniak, on the other hand, focused on regional 
issues and made an attempt at uniting the delegates. Eventually Zolotukhin produced a speech
■against Korbetskyi and against Zelenyi Sv i f s  involvement with the Anti-Communist, Anti- 
Imperialist Front.
The first day of the Congress was taken up by accounts and general speeches - the Minister of 
the Environment, lurii Kostenko, for instance addressed the delegates providing them with an 
account o f the environmental situation in Ukraine. Kostenko’s speech was emotional and yet 
factual. Research conducted by geneticians found that every eight out of 10 new-borns would be Ï
I
deformed. Following Chernobyl, a Damocles’ sword was hanging over Ukrainian children. 
Kostenko dreamed of the time when Zelenyi Svit would be out of work as all ecological problems 
in Ukraine would have been resolved^®.
Some of the speeches focused on environmental issues, others were of a more ‘exotic’ 
character: Iiyna Kalynets, a delegate from Lviv, reported how in Lviv a book on conception and 
child birth had caused a scandal. Apparently Kalynets found the book too explicit and felt it 
should be banned. She made her request to the Prosecutor’s office, but rather than having the 
book banned, she was eventually taken to court and sentenced for defamation and fined. At the 
time of the Congress she was in the process of appealing. This incident is revealing in that it 
clearly shows how diverse members of the Green Movement in Ukraine were - the Movement 
serving as a common ground for moral conservatives as well as liberals and uniting people with 
veiy different (political) beliefs.
Ihor Dzeverin has identified four ‘alliances’ within Zelenyi Svit that were fighting for power 
prior to the Fourth Congress: the Greens from Zakarpatiia, a substantial proportion o f whom were 
also members of the Green Paify, were closely linked with the Green Party faction of Zelenyi Svit 
(The Green Party was a collective member of Zelenyi Svit). This faction was headed by the leader 
of the Green Party, Vitalii Kononov. A second constellation was formed by the Vinnytsia Greens, 
Korbetskyi and his supporters^'. The Greens from Ivano-Frankivsk had so far united behind 
Panov, whereas the Lviv Greens formed a fourth ‘alliance’. As far as the Kiev organisation was 
concerned, it had two ‘camps’ - one more and one less nationalist. The Kiev Green Nationalists 
were headed by Viktor Cherinko. He was accused of being a fascist, following statements to the 
effect that the environmental problems in Ukraine were the making of Jews^^ and expelled in the 
autumn of 1992 before the Fourth Congress took place. The national question was, as will be seen 
in Chapter Eight, a sensitive issue for the Ukrainian Green Movement. Panov, for instance, 
claimed that Cherinko and those sharing his views were not really ‘Green’ but tried to use the Yi 
Green Movement to promote views and ideas alien to Green thinking:
JlioAM, }iKi ue MajiH iii'ioro cniJibiioro 3 eKO.aori e lo.
BMKopMCTOByBajTH PdCJia ”3eJienHx” :iapaAM B.aaciioro iionyjii;3My, 
upuxoByBajiM iihmm c b o ï  iiau ionajiiC T M 'in i BMCxynn. B ohm 5 y j in  y  
KepiBHHX opra iiax crojiM'moro B i M i m y  ao acobtub MHtiyjioro poxy , 
a n ic j ia  onKJiioaeHim i s  a c o u i a u i i  saciiynajiH ’’nau iouajiL uo- 
uaTpiOTHBiiy” o p r a u i s a u i io  ”3eJieuHH C a iT ”. HpupoAiio, 
uau iouaa icT M H u i npoDOKauix rpynu ftepiiiLKa iiia K o ro  B iAuom einm  -------------------------------------------
™ BevipHHfi Khïd, 11.3.1993, c. 3.
Fedorinchyk supported Korbetskyi. He had good links with local groups in East Ukraine (Donetsk) and 
Southern Ukraine (Nikolaev) which later united behind Korobko’s candidacy for new leader of the 
association.
This issue is addressed in detail in Chapter Eight,
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AO ”3ejie iioro  CuiTy” ue Maiorb. FIhkpo. m o T ie .ie iii” ue 
a acrp axouau i u iA  raKHx aopnpM3iu. do poGorn u a c o u i a u i i  
saayra.uH u c ix  t h x ,  x t o  ro.iocuo u:xm upo c u o e  GaAcaumi GopoTMca 
3a  oxopou y npu|X)AH. T u k h m  m huom  y uam ux .laaax ouMUM.iuca i  
uyAbrapu i Kap ' a pucru. b k h m  ue AaioTb c u o k o i o  .laupu IfiepGaKa i  
CaiiAyaaKa^ l
Cherinko was, following his expulsion, replaced as the radical wing of the Kiev organisation
by representatives from the right who took on his position and his methods. The attitude of the
Kiev group was and still is basically that Kiev is the capital of Ukraine and that Kiev should
therefore hold the leadership of Zelenyi Svit. This view was contested by regional and local
.groups, the dominant view of which was that ‘Kiev knows (and does) nothing’. Given the vacuum 
that had emerged at the higher echelons in Zelenyi Svit following Sanduliak’s departure for 
Romania, the Fourth Congress came to serve as a battleground between these groups to gain the 
upper hand within the Green Movement.
One of the ‘highlights’ of the Congress was the leadership election. It was decided that 
voting by rating be used and that people vote by raising their hands. Initially there were 10 
candidates for the job, but several declined to stand, amongst them Anatoli! Panov. The first vote 
produced no clear winner: Korobko was in the lead, followed by Samiilenko of PZU,
Honcharenko o f Kiev Zelenyi Svit and Iryna Kalynets from Lviv. The second vote was then held
i
64between Korobko and Samiilenko , This vote was secret - each delegate voted with his/her 
mandate, in front of the Presidium, The vote dragged on and many people left in the course of it. 
After the votes had been counted, Korobko held a small majority of two votes. However, 
disagreement broke out as to whether or not he had absolute majority. Eventually, all the PZU
representatives got up and walked out of the Congress in protest of Korobko’s election. To avoid 
splitting the Congress on this issue, Dzeverin and lavorska, from the Vinnytsia organisation, had a 
word with Korobko and requested that he suggest Samiilenko as his first deputy (according to the 
rules, it was up to the leader o f Zelenyi Svit to name his deputies). This suggestion did not go well 
with people who were opposed to the Green Party. In the end, however, the Congress managed to 
unite behind Korobko and Samiilenko as chairman and vice-chairman respectively.
Korobko was a relatively new face in Zelenyi Svit and PZU  members did not like the fact that 
he was a former member of RUKH, which they suspected of trying to gain the upper hand in the 
association. Besides, he was accused o f not be ing‘Green’: Panov put it in the following way: ‘he 
is not "our" man - he is a stranger, and it is obvious that he is not g r e e n V o l o d y m y r  Hrekov, a
BeuipHHH Kh ïb, 16.3.1993, c. 2.
Samiilenko was chairman of the Green Party’s secretariat.
T w f a M A  XZ 1 A 41 1 0 0 /1Interview with Aiiatolii Panov, Kiev, 16.5.1994.
member of PZU  from Lviv oblast, made similar claims: ‘Korobko was unknown to us. We knew 
little about him. He appeared at the Congress by chance and was elected illegally as there was no 
quorum when the leadership question was decided’. However, as nobody wanted a big conflict, 
Korobko’s candidacy was eventually accepted by all factions in the hope that this would improve 
the current situation in Zelenyi Svit^^.
Four new deputy leaders were also elected. These were Honcharenko (Kiev), Zolotukhin 
(Nikolaev), Bagin (Donetsk) and Sinius (Lviv) and they were responsible for the Central, 
Southern, Eastern and Western regions respectively. Serhii Fedorinchyk was appointed new 
leader of the Green Office in Kiev at the initiative of Korobko. His candidacy was opposed by 
many due to his alleged bad temper and also by the EZt/-fraction as Fedorinchyk was negative 
towards the Green Party. Given that he was not a member of PZU, however, he was considered to 
be ‘neutral’ and an acceptable compromise figure for the directorship following Panov’s request 
that he be relieved of his duties. It also counted to Fedorinchyk’s advantage that he was a skillful 
and hard-working activist (he had taken part in the preparation o f the legal assessment of the 
Chernobyl accident conducted by the Green Movement and by independent lawyers). His 
computing degree further increased his suitability for the job as the office had received computers 
from foreign sponsors and the majority o f the association’s members were computer-illiterate. 
Finally, Fedorinchyk had proved himself an efficient fund-raiser by obtaining money from the 
Vidrodzhennia Fund  to purchase additional computers for the movement.
Although Zelenyi Svit had initiated the Green Party at its First Congress, those members of 
the association who were sceptical of PZU  argued that Zelenyi Svit was a non-political 
organisation and therefore did not want to become a part of the Green Paity. The activities o f PZU  
members within Zelenyi Svit were by some perceived as an attempt at gaining control of the 
association.
As the Third Congress did not elect a new Revision Commission, the Lviv organisation raised ® 
this issue with the Congress as the one that was elected by the Second Congress had no authority.
During the debate that followed, it was decided that all elected organs be operative for two years.
As the Second Congress took place in March 1991 and the Fourth in February 1993, the old 
Revision Commission retained its powers for another month. The idea was that the Congress elect 
a Mini-Congress which would then convene and elect a new commission. The Congress, however, 
failed to do this, again proving Zelenyi Sv i f s  inability to stick to its own statute.
The second day of the Congress was devoted to discussing and editing Zelenyi Sv i f s  
programme. A special commission had been set up to edit the programme and it spent some two 
hours on this task. The most important changes compared to the previous programme were as
Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4.1994.
390
follows: Zelenyi Svit would not join any political bloc which was not ecological and it was 
stressed that ecological considerations should be placed above any economic considerations. The 
ultimate goal o f the Green Movement was to defend Nature. This implied controlling the State, 
which in turn controlled the economy, which in turn determined the state of the environment. 
Some discussion took place within the commission on what should be Zelenyi Sv i f s  position on 
nuclear power. Panov made it clear that the Green Movement must say ‘no’ on principle to 
nuclear power, whereas Dzeverin held the view that the Greens say ‘no’ to nuclear power at 
present, but that this view might be changed later. Panov agreed with this, but added that ‘if we 
are in favour of nuclear power, then we are not Green’. In the final draft, Zelenyi Svit came out 
against nuclear power. The discussion that followed the presentation of the programme to the 
Congress revealed that most of the delegates opposed to it. A question was raised as to what was 
the difference between a programme and a declaration, Preobrazhenska commented on the point 
on nuclear power and made a short speech on Chernobyl. She also repeated that Korbetskyi be 
held responsible for having acted against the ideas of Zelenyi Svit.
Another issue that caused considerable controversy was a point included in the new 
programme defending sexual minorities (homosexuals). The former USSR is morally very 
conservative, and homosexuality was for decades a taboo. To the extent it was talked about, 
homosexuals were branded as abnormals who ought to be severely punished for their unnatural 
behaviour. Not unexpectedly, therefore, many people were against including such a point in the 
programme of Zelenyi Svit and eventually it had to be taken out of the programme altogether. 
There was general consensus that the draft programme was poor - Tarasiuk, for instance, labelled 
it incompetent. Rather than spending time trying to improve the draft programme presented to the 
Congress, some people suggested that an alternative programme, elaborated by Academician 
Hrodzinskyi, be endorsed instead. The vote, which took place towards the end o f the Congress, 
was only made by 60 (out of a total of 110) delegates. Of these 27 voted in favour o f the draft 
programme and 30 people against.
Complaints to the effect that once again the regions were ignored at the expense of conflicts 
in Zelenyi Sv i f s  leadership surfaced both during and after the Congress. A. Petrenko, for instance, 
raised a scathing attack on this situation in Zelenyi Svit:
CboroAHi lice GiJibuioï chjih iiaGupaa poaGpar, ;x)3noAi;i lUiaAU, 
lieBMiHim i  iieGaAcaiBiB KoncipyKTHBHo ripaiaoBaTH, nojiiTMBHHH 
aBaiIT10pH3M.
JliOAH 3'ixajiHCfl 30 B C i£ ï YKpaiuM Ha uen 3 ' 13A, moG posnoBicru 
npo CB0Ï  npoGacMH, moG snauTM niATpuMKy b cbIh GopoTbGi na 
MicuflX nepe3 croaM'iny npecy i  croaH'ini iiiCTUTyTH BaaAH. Aaacc 
AC 3H0By ue 3iiaHuiaocn nacy Aan BHcryniB t h x ,  mo myxa £ m a a x iB
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DMpiuieiiHB eKoaoriMîîHX lipoGaew. Hloct byiccye b iiaiiiux iio b h x  
crpyKTypax.."
However, Zelenyi Svit might manage to overcome aii its problems - if local and regional 
organisations were able to keep up their good work and make their own initiatives also in the 
future:
ByaeM cnoA iBaTucb. mo o p r a n i s a u i i  ”3eaeiioro c u ir y ” b M ic r a x  i  
c ea a x  YKpaiiiH. a k I  craryTOM MaioTb npano na isaacu i 
in iU iaT H B H , GyayTb i  a a j i i  poGuTM cboio cripany, iieSBaAcaionu iia 
o p r a iiisa u iH H i npoSaeMU b ueinpi*^®.
Petrenko’s hopes, however, would prove in vain. Rather than resolving any of the major 
conflicts in the association, the Congress reinforced them. During the spring, however, which saw 
the lifting by secret presidential decree of Verkhovna Rada's moratorium on the construction of 
new nuclear reactors in Ukraine, and the parliamentary elections, the Greens, in an effort to 
overturn the former and do well in the latter, temporarily buried their differences,
I have now looked at conflicts within the Green Movement. It ought not, however, to be 
forgotten that Zelenyi Svit was a highly efficient and successful association, which enjoyed a great 
deal of support among the Ukrainian population during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Was there 
a properly thought out strategy behind the campaigns launched by the Ukrainian Green Movement 
or were they simply spontaneous and not so well planned? I will try to answer this question below.
Green Strategy
The Green Movement in Ukraine emerged as an independent (i.e. non-governmental) movement, 
whose major aim was to prevent further deterioration to the physical environment and thus also 
damage to people’s health. As seen above, a large number of campaigns were launched in various 
parts o f the country, ranging from huge actions against ftirther expansion of nuclear power, via 
campaigns to prevent pollution emanating from military bases to small-scale actions such as 
planting trees and preventing local polluting enterprises from being built.
In pursuing their goals, the Greens had a spectrum of means and strategies which it could 
make use of to reach these goals. They could, for instance, try to work inside the system; working 
in a polluting company to make it cleaner, working in a state structure such as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection or going into politics. Or they could work outside the system, by means
67 SeneHMd cbI t, no. 3, 1993, c. 7.
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By ‘ecotage’ I mean ecological sabotage, which involves the violation of existing legislation and 
regulation, such as stopping production at a polluting enterprise through sabotage, as opposed to a 
blockade.
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of ecotage^^, blockades and symbolic actions and happenings. In between these two extremes are 
a number of means which can be applied both on the outside and inside of the system, like 
ecological education, petitions, lobbying and ecological research, as well as working in an 
environmental company.
When the Ukrainian Green Movement emerged in December 1987 there were still limits to 
what its activists could do: meetings had to be sanctioned beforehand and were in some cases not 
allowed to take place. Staging demonstrations was still risky in that it could have repercussions 
for those attending. And some activists were, as seen above, harassed for their involvement in the 
Gre m Movement. Choice of methods depend on a number of factors: opportunity structures (i.e. 
the political and economic framework within which the movement operates, responsiveness 
among the general public and access to decision makers), group and personal resources (size and 
aims of movement, access to equipment, funding, qualifications among members).
In the former USSR where opportunity structures were scarce and where the movement had 
to be built from scratch, one would expect non-violent, ‘responsible’ actions as these were less 
likely to be crushed and thus more likely to be visible to the public, to which the Greens appealed. 
Moreover, actions that would appeal to a wider audience were needed; scientists and writers had 
for several decades ‘campaigned’ for the environment, but on a limited number of issues and at an 
expert level, only rarely receiving mass support. Secondly, one might expect a degree of co­
operation/lobbying with the authorities given that public participation in 1987 was almost non­
existent and results therefore difficult to achieve without some support from ‘above’. Thirdly, 
alternative information was required to contest official data of which there was a general shortage 
in the first place. To summarise, then, a combination of public pressure, non-violent action and 
alternative information thus seemed likely to yield the optimal result.
I have looked at means and strategies in detail in Chapter Six and Seven. To compare means 
used by the anti-nuclear lobby with those used by other groups I therefore asked the respondents 
what methods their movements made use of and how these methods had changed over time. When 
asked which methods had been used, I obtained the following result:
Table 4.4 Green Strategy/Methods
Grou
P
picke­
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meetings,
demon­
strations
collecting 
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tures in 
support of 
petitions
news
pape 
r and 
jour­
nal 
arti­
cles
TV/
radio
appea
ranees
confe­
rences/
round­
tables
work
with
dep./
state
organs
(Min-
priroda)
dep­
uty
work
ille­
gal
acti­
ons
(eco-
sabo-
tage)
oth­
er
Ter­
nopil
obi.
X X X X X
Muka
chevo
X X X X X X X X
Buko-
vina
X X X X X X X
Dni
prope
trovsk
X X X X X X X X
Hor­
livka
X X X X X X X X X X
Lutsk X X X X X X X X X
Mari­
upol
X X X X X X X X
Vin-
nytsia
X X X X X X X X
Uman X X X X X X X X X
Niko­
laev
X X X X X X X X X
Dzha-
ryl-
gach
X X X X X X X X
Eco­
centre
X
Odes­
sa
Green
s
X X X X X X X X
Other actions used were ecological education through schools, institutes and universities 
(Ternopil, Ecocentre - Klierson), scientific work (Ternopil, Uman, Nikolaev), summer camps, 
cultural activities and expeditions (Dnipropetrovsk), hunger strikes (Horlivka), gathering of 
information, analytical work, problem-solution (Uman), expert assessments o f ecologically 
harmful projects so as to obtain a state/official expert assessment (Nikolaev). As expected, all 
groups gathered and spread information and mobilised the general public in support o f their 
demands through demonstrations, meetings and the collection of signatures.
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Work with local authorities and the Ministry of Environmental Protection was also on their 
priority lists. These means all had in common that they were cheap, more likely to be successful 
(from 1987 until 1991 there was an enormous interest in politics generally in Soviet society and it 
was therefore relatively easy to mobilise people to attend meetings and demonstrations out of 
curiosity; once information was spread, people could then be mobilised by appealing to their 
genuine concern for children’s health, and also the environment), likely to be palatable to the 
authorities and eventually, have an impact - due to hard facts and widespread public support.
Not more than two groups - Horlivka Zelenyi Svit and Ternopil oblast Zelenyi Svit - used 
ecotage as a means of campaigning. Ecotage was not likely to go down well with the general 
public in a country like Ukraine and the implications for those involved could, as 1 have already 
pointed out, be severe. Only recently has ecotage been used, and then primarily by Greenpeace 
activists. Although members of Zelenyi Svit have expressed admiration towards Greenpeace, they 
have not started making use o f the same methods - partly as it requires proper funding and certain 
skills and also because there are so few young people left in the association {Greenpeace'’s 
activists are young people). Neither the conflicts within the Green Movement facilitate ecotage, as 
this requires a disciplined and united organisation.
With the liberalisation of the political climate in Ukraine, ecotage and more radical action 
could be expected - but on the other hand, widespread political apathy and economic hardship, by 
which it was accompanied, impoverished the Green Movement and eroded its support base. 
Besides, many of the more innovative and inventive members of the Movement left to join other 
political movements, political parties or to set up more specialised Green groups with links to the 
West European Greens. Also of significance was the fact that by 1991 when Ukraine declared 
itself independent, a number of major battles (the right against the expansion of nuclear power, 
campaigns against chemical and other polluting enterprises) had already been won and the Green 
Movement started to decline. With the introduction of independence, however, many of the issues 
which had already been won, re-surfaced - the argument now being that Ukraine had to assert its 
new-won independence by freeing itself from the dependence on Russia for energy, fuel and 
various industrial products. Thus, old issues were opened and old and tested methods once again 
applied by the Greens. It is therefore not surprising that only about half of the respondents 
reported a change in methods used:
II
}
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Table 4.5 Change o f  Methods
Group Methods Changed Methods Unchanged
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
(a.:ie
yitocKoiiajiMJiMCb)
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgach (Kherson) X
Ecocentre (Kherson) X
Odessa Greens X
When asked how their methods had changed, the respondents came up with a variety of 
answers. Ternopil Zelenyi Svit, for instance, explained the changes in terms of political and 
economic events, which had led to a fall in public activity and made the movement more low- 
profiie:
OocJie noA'seMa oGmecraeiiuoM aKTHBiiocTH a 1991 r. b 1992 r. 
na'iajiocb ee ocjiaÔJieuMe. To -Ke caMoe Kacaercn h aeaeiioro 
^BHaceima. BicoiiOMHqecKafl CHTyauna ycyry6H.na arc cocroBiiHe. C 
6oaee axTueiiLix (popM warejibuocTb nepemaa b 6o.riee cnoKofiiioe 
pycjio. Paiibijje npaKTMKOBaaHCb: iinKeTMix)BauMe, MHTHiirH.
aeMoiicrpauHH, cGopbi noanuceu, 3Koca6oTa2K.
The Dnipropetrovsk Greens, on the other hand, argued that there were less meetings in 1994 
than what had been the case earlier, but more constructive work:
riepexoa ic BwpaSoTKe KoucTpyKTHBiioM crparerHH 
npHpoaonoab30BauHB, paSore c aerbMM n woaoae^Kbio, naioabsoBanHe 
Macc-Meana, oGpameiine k npo6.rieMaM BaopoBbJi -  Menbuie MHTniiroB -  
6oabme e^KeaaeBiion "aeproBOM" paSoTbi.
In Horlivka the Greens’ work was less extremist than had been the case before. This could be 
explained in terms of political and economic change more generally, which had changed 
awareness among the political leadership locally and their attitude towards environmental 
problems. Zolotukhin o f Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir pointed out that his organisation had shifted its 
attention from the general public to the councils:
'i
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CeroAim oaenb a io x n o  opraun^oiîaTb h iioayMHTb KOiiK|Deniyio 
noMepîKKy iiaceaeiiM)i, aaiifiToro ubiîKMBaimeM r ycaoBMiix
o5iinmaiiHB, no9Toviy och o b h o h  ynop iiyxcno jiejiarb iia pa5ory c 
iieny'raTCKH M  Kopiiycovi m yaeabiMM, paGoraib k u k  TencBOMy
KaÔMiieTy c iiy6.nnKauMeH ero pe3yjib'iaT0B.
Also in Odessa more work was undertaken together with scientists and various organisations 
and activists who supported the movement. Finally, in Bukovina the authorities were now 
sometimes moving towards the Green Movement - which was a change from before.
Those groups which had not changed their methods justified this in a number of ways. The 
Mariupol Greens argued that it was simply not able to change its methods as it had neither the 
financial means to do so, nor could it draw on the same level of activity as previously. The 
Vinnytsia Greens, on the other hand, claimed that they were in the process of improving its 
methods, which were o f different kinds and one may add, which had proved effective. Finally, the 
Ecocentre claimed that the same methods were being used simply because they were effective and 
needed to protect the environment. This brings us on to the efficiency of those methods used and 
the Greens’ assessment of their own methods:
Table 4.6 Methods and their Efficiency
Group Efficient Inefficient Don t know
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgach (Kherson) X
Ecocentre (Kherson) X
Odessa Greens X
Although a clear majority felt that their methods were effective, several of the respondents 
qualified their ‘yes’, by arguing that the methods were not always effective (Bukovina, Florlivka). 
The Kherson Greens argued that some methods were effective, whereas others were less so and the 
Ecocentre, although claiming to use effective methods, argued that these methods could still be 
improved. Finally, Vinnytsia oblast Zelenyi Svit held the view that although the methods were 
effective themselves, the problem was that their range was insignificant in facilitating major 
changes in public awareness. To the extent existing methods were not the best, they proved
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difficult to change not only due to general political and economic change in Ukraine, but also due 
to internal organisational matters, such as a lack of funds, lack of activists, equipment, expertise 
and poor communications:
Table 4.7 Methods not the Best, but not Possible to Change them
Group insufficient lack of lack of poor other
funds activists adequate
equipment
communica
tiens
reasons
Ternopil obi. ZS X X X X
Mukachevo ZS no funds no
equipment.
Bukovina ZS lack of 
laboratory 
facilities and 
expertise.
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X X X
Horlivka ZS X X X lack of 
experience 
and 
expertise.
Lutsk ZS X X X X
Mariupol Greens X passivity 
and 
impoverish 
ment of 
population.
Vinnytsia obi. ZS
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS X X X
Dzharylgach X X
Ecocentre X X
Odessa Greens X X
When asking which means were most efficient for current campaigns - regardless of financial 
obstacles and other deficiencies within Zelenyi Svit I got the following result:
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Table 4.8 M ost Efficient Means by which to Campaign at Present
Group Picke­ Mee­ Col­ Arti­ TV/ Conf­ wor­ dep­ eco- other
ting tings/ lect cles in radio eren­ king uty sabo- me­
de- signa­ news­ appe­ ces/ with work tage ans
mon- tures pa­ aran­ round depu­
stra- for pers/ ces tables ties
tions peti­
tions
jour­
nals
Terno­ X
pil obi.
ZS
Muka­ X X X X X X X X
chevo
ZS
Buko­ X X X X
vina ZS
Dnipro­ X X X X X X
pet­
rovsk
obi. ZS
Hor­ X X X X X
livka
ZS
Lutsk X X X X X X X X
ZS
Mari­ X X
upol
Greens
Vin­ X X X
nytsia
ZS
Uman X
ZS
Niko­ X X X
laev
obi. ZS
Dzha­ X X X X X X
rylgach
Eco­ X
centre
Odessa X X X X X X X X X
Greens
As seen from the table above, a shift has taken place away from picketing and 
meetings/demonstrations towards the production and spreading of information and deputy work. 
The Ukrainian Greens’ attitude towards eco-sabotage remained virtually unchanged, however, thus 
indicating that the Green Movement was largely law-abiding.
The Ternopil Greens found it difficult to pinpoint one or two methods which were more 
efficient than others, as each region had adopted their own methods, which proved useful to some, 
but not to others. However, ecological education was very important to Ukraine as a hole. The 
Uman Greens favoured a mix of various methods as they were all efficient, depending on the
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situation. The Ecocentre also favoured a multiple approach, whereas in Dnipropetrovsk cultural 
activities were being used with success. Less positive were the respondents from Mariupol and 
Nikolaev. The former argued that no means were really efficient until harsh environmental 
legislation and proper monitoring facilities had been established to secure their implementation. 
The latter argued that as long as a ‘dictatorship of the executive’ existed, it was impossible to 
achieve anything.
Although there was a need for some new methods, a majority of the respondents did not seem 
to think that there was any major difference between working within the Soviet Union and in 
independent Ukraine. To some extent the problems they were facing in 1994 were different from 
the ones which they faced some years earlier. Other problems were brought to life again as a result 
o f the new-won independence. A comparison o f working conditions in the USSR and Independent 
Ukraine thus gave the following result:
Table 4.9 Comparison o f  Working Conditions in the USSR and Independent Ukraine
Group Easier in the 
USSR
Easier in 
Independent 
Ukraine
No difference: 
difficult then, 
difficult now
Difficult to tell
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk X
obi. ZS
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgach X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X
Thus, although the problems were different, it had not become easier to work under Ukrainian 
independence - although, prior to the collapse of the USSR, the Greens had argued that 
independence was a pre-condition for improving the state of the environment in the republic. As 
seen above, the explanation was to be found in the republics’ of the former USSR struggle to gain 
real independence - in Ukraine’s case from Russia, upon whom it depended for fuel. 
Consequently, the pro-nuclear lobby gained a powerful card on its hand, claiming that Ukraine 
could only cut its dependence on Russia by creating a full nuclear cycle on its own territory - i.e. 
by producing, storing and reprocessing its own fuel and by expanding the existing capacity to 
generate electric power. It was as a result of such arguments that President Kravchuk in February
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1994 issued a secret decree overturning Verkhovna Rada's moratorium on nuclear reactors and 
giving the go-ahead for the creation of a full nuclear cycle on Ukrainian territory. It was also such 
considerations that made the Ukrainian government sanction the construction of an oil-terminal by 
Odessa, through which oil could be received from the Gulf states and other countries so as to 
reduce dependence on Russia for oil and gas.
Problems that were successfully solved by claiming that Moscow was polluting Ukraine, thus 
resurfaced as ‘necessities’ required to protect Ukrainian independence. Although, with Western 
technology and equipment their safety may be enhanced, their potential to cause wide-spread 
pollution should an accident occur, thus remains. So although in the longer term, Ukraine may 
benefit from its independence in terms of environmental safety, the short term outcome may be 
less impressive - especially as the Green Movement has emerged as a weakened actor on the 
political scene in Independent Ukraine and as the general public is less concerned with 
environmental issues now than just a few years ago. As Tverdostup (Ternopil) put it:
Paiibuie r}i»:ejiG 6i>lbo ncnxG.norMBecKH. 'renepi Ta?Ke.riG fiGpGTbcn co 
BceoSmeH anarneM, aKoiiGMMMecKMMM TpyjuiGcrfiMH.
Bag in (Horlivka) agreed, arguing that at present people were only concerned with material
and technical problems, not with environmental issues. Apathy and a lack of faith among the
general public had become a serious obstacle (Odessa, Mukachevo) as had the lack of concern on
the part of the authorities:
Bg BjEicMeiia CCCP iipG6.neMi.i ne |)euia.riM, no iiejia.riM bma, ti'g 
iipmiHiYiaior 5.im3kg k cepiiuy h iibiTaioTca peiiiMi'b. CerGEiEia BJiacrw 
lie maaiG'r jm.MQ arere. (Bal - Mariupol).
Still, there was general agreement among the Greens that the ecological situation in Ukraine 
would only improve once the Ukrainians retained a sense of being in control of and responsible for 
their own land (i.e. through political independence and privatisation of the land):
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Table 4.10 Ideas about how to Improve the Ecological Situation in Ukraine
Group only
through
politics
primarily
by
influenci
ng
political
decisions
primarily
through
the
revival of
Ukr.
culture
only
through
the
revival of
Ukr.
culture
through
the
revival of 
pride in 
the Ukr. 
nation
only 
when 
Man feels 
in control 
of his 
own land
don’t 
know 
how best 
to
achieve
this
Ternopil 
obi. ZS
X
Muka­
chevo ZS
X
Bukovina
ZS
X
Dnipro­
petrovsk 
obi. ZS
X
Horlivka
ZS
X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol
Greens
X
Vinnytsia 
obi. ZS
X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev 
obi. ZS
X X X
Dzharyl­
gach
X
Eco­
centre
X
Odessa
Greens
X
It thus seems that the long-term solution to Ukraine’s environmental problems is to be found 
in spreading awareness among the general public on the environment and the need to protect it, as 
well as in the establishment of a direct link between the land and the people, imbuing the latter 
with a sense of responsibility towards its protection.
4.2 Green Support
4.2.1 Parliamentary and Local Elections {March and June 1994)
As seen above, the Greens from the very start emphasised the need to take actively part in the 
preparations of and debates on environmental legislation and environmental policies through 
elected organs such as Verkhovna Rada and local and regional councils.
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All groups polled either had their own deputies or the support of deputies in the local and 
oblast parliaments. The Ternopil oblast organisation, however, complained that those deputies 
who were elected on a ‘Green’ platform soon forgot about their commitment to the environment 
once ‘in position’:
There was an explanation for this:
i
Preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 March started shortly after the 
Congress closed. Candidates were put forward in a number of oblasts and in Kiev. Due to the 
electoral law, however, which made it easier to launch a candidacy through one’s work place or 
place of residence than through a public organisation, several of these candidates balloted as 
independents. No ‘Green’ candidates managed to get directly elected to parliament and only two
Greens made it to the second round of the elections.
.Although the Greens failed to win any seats in Verkhovna Rada during the March 1994
parliamentary elections it was hoped that they would fare better during the local elections, which 
were coming up in June. In my survey I included questions not only regarding the Greens’ 
experience in local and regional parliaments, but also about their strategy for the local elections.
BojibiJJHUCTBO A e n y r a r o B ,  B buiB H iiy rb ix  or 3 e .r i e i io ro  Cni'i'a b 
n o cJie itc rB H H  rio'iTM iiH K aK o n  aK O JiorH B ecK ofi /re B T e .n b iio c rn  iie  
npoBOAUJiH, noMomH 3 e .r i e i io ro  CaiTy ne iiaBa.i n u  0 4 h h  mb iim x.
Bee 3T0 H3-3a iiecoBepuieiicrBa usbupaTe-nbiioro 3aKOiio;ta3'ejibcrBa, m3- 
3a noTpeSu'rejibCKOH iicHxo.aornH .aioAefl h  /lenyTaTOB b  t o m  »tHC.Be. 
Ecjiw 6bi 5biJiH Bi,i5opLi no napTHfliibiM cnucKaM t b k h x  AenyTaroB 
Moxcno 6bi.ao 6i.i oTOSBaxb. Hexoropbie M3 imx b o iu jih  m B03r.aaBH.aM 
aK O JioPM aecK H e k o m h c c h m .
Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit had two deputies in the oblast soviet and two deputies in the town 
soviet. Bukovina replied that they had very few delegates, without specifying the number, 
whereas Horlivka Zelenyi Svit had four deputies in the town soviet and another three in regional 
councils. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens did not put forward their own candidates during the 1990 
elections, but several members of Zelenyi Svit were elected either as independents or affiliated 
with other organisations to various city council throughout the oblast. The Committee to Protect 
the Azov Sea had its own deputies, and the committee was taking part in elaborating draft 
resolutions and decisions that would eventually be passed by the council to which these deputies 
had been elected. Finally, Vinnytsia and Nikolaev oblast organisations - among the biggest
i
:
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chapters of Zelenyi Svit - announced that they had six and 10 deputies in the oblast council 
respectively. The Vinnytsia organisation had another eight deputies in regional and town council.
Several ecological issues had been lobbied through these deputies and other deputies sharing 
their views. In Nikolaev the 10 deputies backed up by Zelenyi Mir had forced a group of ‘radical- 
democratic action’ in the oblast council. In the city council there were five deputies representing 
Zelenyi Mir. Green deputies at all levels had joined commissions on the environment and thanks 
to this the Green Movement had considerably influenced the work of the oblast and city council. 
This is an issue to which I will return in Chapters Five and Six. Finally, the Odessa Greens had 
seven deputies, in conjunction with whom they were preparing issues to be debated at sessions and 
by the presidiums and also controlling the implementation of decisions made by the council.
A majority of the respondents (Ternopil oblast, Bukovina, Horlivka, Mariupol, Nikolaev 
oblast, Ecocentre and Odessa) reported that they co-operated with deputies who did not represent 
Zelenyi Svit but who shared their views on various issues with implications for the environment.
I have now shown that most Green groups either had or were able to co-operate with deputies 
in the town/city and oblast council. How efficient were these ‘Green’ deputies and how satisfied 
were the Greens with the result of their work? The survey gave the following result:
Table 4.11 Assessment o f  Green Deputies
Group Satisfied Mostly Satisfied Not very Mostly Unsatis­
satisfied and
unsatis­
fied
satisfied unsatis­
fied
fied
Ternopil obi. ZS 
Mukachevo ZS X
X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk 
obi. ZS
X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS
Dzharylgach
Ecocentre X X
Odessa Greens
As can be seen from the table the Greens are divided by territorial lines in their assessment of 
the deputies. Whereas the East (Dnipropetrovsk, Horlivka and Mariupol) are not very positive in 
their assessment, the West (with the exception of Ternopil oblast) and the South are predominantly 
positive. This difference may, to some extent be explained by the fact that local, regional and 
oblast councils in the East were traditionally more conservative (even dogmatic) than what was the
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Hrodzinskyi was asked if there was a need for Greens in parliament. He answered in the 
affirmative:
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I
case in the West. In the South, moreover, the Greens were fighting very specific projects such as 
the South Ukrainian nuclear power station (Nikolaev) and various chemical enterprises and an oil 
terminal (Odessa), against which there was broad local opposition. In the West, people were
united against military pollution considered to be imposed on the local communities by Moscow 
(thallium poisoning o f children in Chernivtsy and radioactive pollution from the Pristrialivsk radar 
station in Mukachevo). Given their implications and the fact that the Western parts of Ukraine 
were a stronghold of national sentiments, it would therefore be easier for the Green deputies to 
argue their case in the oblast,local and regional councils. Another factor by which to explain this 
difference is the number o f deputies each group have. As seen above, those groups positive in 
their assessment of deputies are also the groups whose number of deputies is the highest - thus 
enabling them to form an efficient Green lobby within the councils.
The Ternopil group, does, however, not fit in with this explanation. It is one of the biggest
local branches of Zelenyi Svit in Ukraine and had some highly active (and visible) deputies in both
the oblast and local councils^^. The most plausible explanation seems to be that whereas other 
,West Ukrainian Green deputies were united behind one or two key issues, there was no one issue 
.which stood out in Ternopil. Moreover, West Ukraine was more politicised during the early 1990s 
than other parts o f Ukraine - thus the focus shifted from the environment to more urgent issues 
such as independence, economic and political reform. As pointed out elsewhere it was virtually 
impossible to be elected to the USSR Congress o f Deputies in 1989 without a Green platform. 
Similar tendencies were seen in 1990. This commitment did, however, for a number of deputies 
just last during the election campaign and faded shortly after. It seems that Green deputies in 
Ternopil belonged to this category.
West European Greens still debate whether or not it is necessary or even desirable for the 
Greens to be represented in legislative bodies - the argument of those negative to such 
representation being that the Greens are opposed to the very system of which these bodies are a 
part. Consequently, this system must be fought by extra-parliamentary means - i.e. from the 
outside. If one is to follow the popular distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ ecologists or, to 
use the German terminology, ‘realists’ and ‘fundamentalists’, it becomes rather obvious that the 
Ukrainian Greens are indeed among the former^*. Prior to the June elections, Academician
™ The deputy M. Melnychuk, for instance, headed the ecological commission of the town administration and 
another deputy, A. Znarko, was working actively in the town soviet - see Tnep/iocryn (1992), c. 3.
This is a question which has been further explored in Chapter Eight.
I
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K a x  a na npeiibwyiuHX B w Sopax M cnoawoBaaM  nom ep iacK y iiaiiiMx 
aKTHBHCTOB B TpyAOBbix KOJiJieKTHBax, oT^ejibBbix MMKpopaHOuax.
P i'i y  T i.vi, m o ;iapa3 nocrynoBO  3viiiiiO£TbC!i n p iopM T er .iiOACbKHX 
u iB iiocreM . TpMBa.iMH 'lac Be.ibMH aK iya.ibHO io 5 y .ta  Te.vta iipaa 
.uoAMHM. A ; ie  sapaa c y a i i .ib c r B O  i ie ; ia : i i  6 i , ib iu e  y cB i^ ioM -iioe . m o  
npaBO lia SesiieB iie iiaBKoaM mns ce[>eA0Bnme - iiaH ro.aoB iiim e. 
H a c r y n n e  T H C iiq oa irra , iia v iiH  no ivu ia, 6 y a e  rM caM oairraM  
e K o a o r i ï  - t o G to  iia H ro jio B iiim o io  c r a n e  iipofiaev ia iiMavMBaiimi y  
BKpaA spyëiiO BanoM y TexiioremiHM  BimnBOM iiaBKOJiHmiibOMy 
œ p ea o B M m i. ’’S e a e i i i ” o S c r o io io r b  i a e ï  e K o a o r is M y , croivrb, tb k  
6h m obh th , n on a a  no.niTHKO io. T oM y b y c i x  EBponeflcKHX 
riapaaM eiiTax bohh e  M im io io  K o iic o a ia y io a o io  ch jio io . B iiaiUbOMy 
yKpalHCbKOMy n ap aaM e irri i i o x p i f i i i i  riepm sa  iice iie " se a e iii"  
SaaaK y iiH , a  ’’n e a e i i i ” ( j ia x iB u i  - cepHOB iii. n o p i ia n i  la  o 5 i : in a i i i  
JBOaM^^
Most of the local and oblast branches of Zelenyi Svit would take part in the local elections - 
although, at the time the survey was conducted, not all of them had put forward a list of 
candidates. As for those groups that had already endorsed such lists, Ternopil oblast had 
nominated two candidates and also initiated the creation of a youth election-campaign association, 
Moloda Heneratsiia (Young Generation). Horlivka Zelenyi Svit put fow ard five candidates to the 
town soviet. Emphasis was put on the town soviet and not on the oblast soviet as the latter did not 
exert any particular influence on life in Horlivka and the surrounding region:
4eJiaeM  craoK y iia  ropojrcK on {cobct), A o d j ia c r n o n  C o b c t  
nocK oabK y iie  c y m e c r a y e r , o c o 5 o b o  bjihuhmb iia xcuaiib ro p o /ia  h  
perH ona lie  OKaabiBaer, ToabKO iia a o r n  c o d n p a e r  h  xpaTMT iia  CBoe 
co iiepjKa iiH e.
In Vinnytsia the Greens would ballot within the framework of the electoral bloc ‘Centre’. No 
candidates were put forward directly from Zelenyi Svit:
Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev put forward 15 candidates for the 60-seat oblast rada. Thirty five 
candidates would ballot for 75 seats in the city council. The strategy followed by the Nikolaev 
Greens was by its leader, Anatolii Zolotukhin, described as follows:
:k
C x p a x ern a  3aKJiio‘iaexcfl b row, iii'o6bi n o c a e  BbidoixiB co sa a x b  
BuenapxHHiibiH, neHxpHcxcKMM, aeMOKpaxM'iecKHH K ayd  M sdnpareaeM  
”3K 0c” -  aK oaorn a , K .yabxypa, odpasoB a iiH e, co d crB e im ocxb . b 
KOxopoM  od'beAMiiHXb BCC cuab i, ax o  c o a a a a o a , Biie r o c y a a p c r B e iiiiu x  
crp yK xyp  h nonb ixaxbca OKasaxb npoijieccMOHaabiioMy n oM ep acK y
BeuipimM Kmïb, 26.4.94, c. 2.
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lïnODb H sSpa iiH biM  a e i iy r a x a M . B K .iy O e , odbeaniiHXb iice 
n u en ap xM H H b ie  o p ra iiH sa u H M  x w n a  ’’O p o c B i r H ”, ”3 e . i e i i o r o  C ü i x y ”, 
a c c o u w a u H H  y a H r e a e ü .  X B o p a e c K n e  c o t o s b i  m n i)e iB ip n u H M axe.xM .
The Odessa Greens planned to put fow ard 20 candidates. In Dnipropetrovsk no candidate 
would be put forward directly from Zelenyi Svit, but Greens would still take part in the elections. 
A similar situation existed in Bukovina: in all democratic organisations and parties there were 
members of Zelenyi Svit and they would ballot for the local as well as oblast councils. Mukachevo 
had so far only registered one candidate.
In Mariupol, however, the Committee to Defend the Azov Sea would not take part in the 
ballot. Evhen Bal explained this decision in the following way:
(He 6y4eM y^iacxBOBaxb) xaK k s k  xepMHu ’’COBETCKAH BJlACb” 
pacmn(I)pGBbiBaexc)i xaic: "COBETOB MHOTO -  BJIACTH MAJIO”.
Neither would the Ecocentre. In the latter case, however, this decision was understandable in 
that the Ecocentre was an expert organisation working on research and concrete projects, not a 
campaign organisation. The Mariupol decision was more surprising, as there were Green deputies 
in the outgoing councils. Bal was however not satisfied with their achievements and might have 
felt that the organisation could gain more through extra-parliamentary activities. Besides, it cost 
money to take part in the elections and most of the Green groups were short of money. If they 
expected to do poorly, it might have been considered a better idea not to take part at all.
To conclude then, the Green Movement as a whole had gained a more realistic understanding 
o f what it could achieve through the local and regional councils. Disappointment with deputy 
performance and high election campaign costs therefore prevented some groups from putting 
forward their own candidates. And those groups which did, had fewer people elected to the new 
councils than during the previous (1990) local and regional elections. The Greens therefore 
emerged from the elections with less potential for influence than before. This, together with the 
difficulties they had in mobilising the general public, financial problems and conflicts within the 
Movement, did not make the future prospects for Zelenyi Svit look promising and also caused 
considerable disillusionment among those activists who remained in the movement. Below I will 
look at the impact all these factors have had on Zelenyi Svit's membership.
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34.2.2 Membership Trends in the Ukrainian Green Movement
As noted earlier, the Ukrainian Green Movement did not introduce formal membership when it 
was founded in 1987. There were a number of reasons for this; one being that Zelenyi Svit was 
meant to be an alternative to officially sanctioned movements. Secondly, it was thought that 
people’s moral commitment to the movement was more important than their formal affiliation and 
thirdly, formal membership was avoided so as to reduce to a minimum the chances of sanctions 
being imposed on members by the authorities. In later years, however, some chapters of Zelenyi 
Svit have introduced formal membership and the ones which have not followed suit, are 
reasonably small groups and are therefore able to provide data on those people who are actively 
taking part in their activities.
In the survey I included questions on age, sex, educational background and membership 
development so as to establish who the Ukrainian Green Activist is and also to enable us to 
compare him/her to Green activists in Western Europe.
Table 4.12 Total Membership: Breakdown by Gender
Organisation Total Membership Gender (in %)
(N=) Male Female
Ternopil oblast ZS 200 60 40
Mukachevo ZS not fixed 20 80
Bukovina ZS 1,400 35 65
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS 250 50 50
Horlivka ZS approx. 70 (collective members; 
7-8,000 people)
37 63
Lutsk ZS
Mariupol Greens 160 70 30
Vinnytsia oblast ZS 350 (not fixed) 40 60
Uman ZS not fixed - up to 500 participate 
in actions organised by ZS
50 50
Nikolaev oblast ZS 90-100 60 40
Dzharylgach (Kherson obi.) approx. 110 80 20
Ecocentre (Kherson obi.) 15 70 30
Odessa Greens 36 82 18
As seen from the table, membership varied from 70 to 500. Most of the local movements, 
however, each had a core of activists which was much smaller (between 15 and 40) and which ran 
the movement, organising campaigns, lobbying and being involved with fund-raising. Ordinary 
members and people sympathetic towards the movement were then mobilised to take part in 
specific campaigns or drop in on meetings irregularly.
A majority of the groups surveyed had a male dominance in membership composition. In 
some groups there was a disproportionately large male membership, whereas others had a small 
female majority. This was the case in Mukachevo, where the movement was initiated by a woman
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- Evhen iia Derkach - who opposed plans to build a military radio station (Pristrialivsk radar
station) in the region and who wanted a military airport on the outskirts of Mukachevo to be closed
down. Another member of this group, Liubov Karavanska, balloted, as seen above, in the March
1994 parliamentary elections for the PZU. Female representation was high also in Bukovina and
Horlivka, where concern for children’s health seemed to be a key factor. In Chernivtsy
(Bukovina), for instance, the Green Movement emerged out of concern for children falling ill with
.allopecia and in Horlivka children were not healthy at birth due to serious industrial pollution.
Vinnytsia oblast Zelenyi Svit focused on eco-culture and education, which might have been
regarded as ‘soft’ topics and also had a female leader, lavorska.
As a rule, men are politically more active than women in Ukraine and in political groups and
movements men are generally better represented than women. It would therefore be more
.interesting to compare the female ratio in Zelenyi Svit with that of other organisations to see if 
there are more women in this association than is the case elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, no 
data is available to do this. As regards female representation within Zelenyi Svit's elected organs, 
which as seen above indicate that they are under-represented compared to their total number, this 
can be explained in the following way: The rules of representation gives only one person per 
collective member of Zelenyi Svit (i.e. local and regional groups) access to the Mala Rada and 
Zelena Rada. As the leaders of most of these groups are men, this explains why they are better 
represented in these bodies.
With regard to age, I found a concentration of members in the 35-55 cohort for a majority of
'
the groups. This is a feature common to Green groups also in other former Soviet republics and a 
feature that makes Zelenyi Svit distinctively different from the similar groups in Western Europe, 
whose majority of members is below 35 years of age. The explanation for this phenomenon is to 
be found in the Soviet system itself. Those people who are now in their late 40s/early 50s were in 
their teens during the Klirushchev era and grew up in a relatively liberal political atmosphere with 
the thaw and denouncement of Stalin. When Gorbachev introduced glasnost and démocratisation 
these people in particular became involved in public and political movements. Another reason, 
frequently mentioned by members of Zelenyi Svit themselves, is that people belonging to this 
generation had grown-up children, were financially better off and had more spare time than the 
younger generation. Members of Zelenyi Svit told me that many of its younger activists left as 
they found the endless conflicts within the association frustrating and restrictive. Finally, young
;
i
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people in the former USSR were less concerned with politics than the older generation. With 
economic liberalisation this trend was reinforced in that young people got involved in buying and 
selling commodities as a fast way of making money, thus not having the time for politics.
The age break-down of members of Zelenyi Svit are depicted in table 4.13 below:
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Table 4.13 Age Break-Down (1)
Group under 20 20-25 25-35 35-45 45-55 over 55
Ternopil obi. ZS 10 40 40 10 3 2
Mukachevo ZS 5 10 25 35 20 5
Bukovina ZS 40
(pupils)
5 7 15 20 13
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS 40 25 15 6 12 2
Horlivka ZS 7 14 26 37 11 5
Lutsk ZS -- —-
Mariupol Greens -- 5 10 20 40 25
Vinnytsia obi. ZS 20 7 13 48 6 2
Uman ZS -- equal equal equal equal none
Nikolaev obi. ZS 10 15 20 25 20 10
Dzharylgach 25 30 27 22 5
Ecocentre 2 3 5 4 1 none
Odessa Greens -- 4 8 12 6 6
This phenomenon becomes even clearer when merging the groups in the following way:
Table 4.14 Age Break-Down (11)
Group under 25 25-45 45-55 over 55
Ternopil obi. ZS 50 50 3 2
Mukachevo ZS 15 60 20 5
Bukovina ZS 45 22 20 13
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS 65 21 12 2
Horlivka ZS 21 63 11 5
Lutsk ZS — - " " "
Mariupol Greens 5 30 40 25
Vinnytsia obi. ZS 27 61 6 2
Uman ZS none under 20, 
otherwise equal 
for all groups, 
except over 55 
(none)
Nikolaev obi. ZS 25 45 20 10
Dzharylgach """ 27 (none between 
25 and 35)
22 5
Ecocentre 5 9 1 none
Odessa Greens 4 (none under 20) 20 6 6
In terms of membership development, I expected a general decline, then as pointed out above, 
many people left Zelenyi Svit to join  other political groups and parties, because the issues on which 
they were campaigning were solved or because they got fed up with the numerous conflicts within 
the association. The result from the survey confirmed this, although some groups reported an 
increase in membership over the last few years:
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Table 4.15 Membership Development
G roup Increased Unchanged Declined
Ternopil oblast ZS X
M ukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
D nipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
H orlivka ZS X
L utsk ZS X
M ariupol Greens X
(officially, nobody has 
left)
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Um an ZS number of active 
members increased
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dzharylgach X
Ecocentre X
OdessaGreens X
Each group was asked to qualify their answers. Those groups whose membership mass had 
been reduced, argued that the reduction was a result of difficult economic conditions in Ukraine: 
The state was unable to provide people with food and inadequate salaries. People therefore had to 
work extra and spend time growing their own food (potatoes and vegetables) at their allotments. 
‘The question right now is of biological, not ecological survival’ (Ternopil). The Mukachevo 
Greens added that there was no longer any pressing problems in the region. Moreover, people had 
lost faith that something could be done given the poor implementation of existing legislation and 
lack of boundaries, Horlivka, Mariupol, Nikolaev, Kherson and Odessa agreed with Ternopil: in 
Mariupol the level of activity had dropped as a result of the impoverishment of the population. 
People no longer had time for ecology as all their energy was spent on finding food to feed their 
families. Similarly, Zolotukhin argued that ‘the people had become so impoverished that it had to 
occupy itself with concerns o f elementary. Finally, the Klierson Greens answered that not only 
had people lost faith in their own and the Green Movement’s ability to change something, but due 
to the material difficulties they faced, they no longer had the physical strength or the nerve 
potential for public work: ‘People are weak: Everybody thinks about cabbage leaves for their 
own profit’.
Some groups, however, managed to increase their membership despite the deteriorating social 
and economic conditions in the country. Bukovina had expanded as teachers and school children 
as well as the Pedagogieal Institute and Soiuz Ukrainok Bukoviny had joined the Greens as 
collective members. Dnipropetrovsk oblast Zelenyi Svit explained its increase by a deliberate 
attempt on the part of the Greens to activate the young and also as a result of the intellectualisation 
of the Movement, which had facilitated a clearer presentation of ideas and perspectives to the
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.general public. Vinnytsia had expanded as every group it united was working on one concrete
problems and the public could see results of their work - for instance they had managed to obtain 
new (game) reserves, independent information on radiation levels in the oblast, the state of the
4.3 Regional Differences
one-way communication.
Several local groups allegedly said prior to the Third Congress in 1992 that they were 
thinking of leaving Zelenyi Svit as they had no use for Kiev whatsoever. On the contrary, being a 
member proved an expense as travelling costs had to be covered to attend meetings of the Mala 
and Zelena Rada as well as the Congresses. Besides, Kiev was accused of taking no interest in 
what was happening locally. As the conflict grew into outright war between ‘Kiev’ and the
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ozone layer, etc. Finally, Uman Zelenyi Svit had benefited from increased awareness and
activation of the intelligentsia in the area.
The answers I got thus seem to confirm that groups working on concrete issues and also
groups that manage to sort out their finances can survive and even expand under harsh economic 
conditions. The problem for Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian association, however, is that conflicts 
and the struggle for positions within the movement have overshadowed the issues it was created to 
solve, thus limiting the Greens’ impact and doing damage to Zelenyi Svit's favourable image with 
the general public. I will return to this issue below.
i
4.3.1 Regional and other Cleavages within the Green Movement
As seen in the beginning of this ehapter, local groups emerged either at the initiative of locals 
concerned with the impact of a deteriorating environment on people’s health and by pollution in 
itself, or they were initiated by Zelenyi Svit activists in Kiev. A figure often quoted by the Greens 
themselves, is 300 local and regional groups joined together in Zelenyi Svit. However, the number 
of active local organisations has been reduced since 1991, when the Green Movement reached its 
peak in Ukraine. There are a number of reasons for the decline which has taken place in Zelenyi 
Svit, suffice it here to say that it has been difficult for them to communicate with the ‘centre’, i.e. 
Kiev.
According to Hlazovyi local groups have been offered little or no assistance due to 
bureaucratisation of the Green Office in Kiev and due to a weakened economy within the 
movement. It should all have been so different. The central organisation was intended to assist 
the member groups with information, advise, equipment and funding, rather than facilitating a
I
i
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Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.
Hrekov is a member of the Lviv Zelenyi Svit group and also a leading figure in PZU.
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regions, the association’s statute proved a useful ‘tool’ to Kiev; it could be used to manipulate and
gain control over the Green Movement by calling extraordinary meetings of the Mala Rada and
Zelena Rada so often that eventually locals would not be able to attend and thus unable to
influence decisions made on key issues. It was also a problem for the local groups that ‘Kiev’ did
not always inform them when and where these meetings would take place. Some groups, such as
Vinnytsia, solved this problem by delegating powers to Kiev-member Ihor Dzeverin, who shared
.many of its views and concerns. Others, however, did not like the idea of being represented by 
Kiev-members very much.
1
Fed up with all the quarrels and the time they took up at meetings of Mala and Zelena Rada 
and not in need of assistance from Kiev anyway, the Ternopil oblast group - one of the biggest and 
strongest of the collective members of Zelenyi Svit - planned to leave the association in 1992. In 
terms of achievements, Greens in Ternopil had managed to do a lot. The Kiev organisation, 
however, was in the view of Ternopil Zelenyi Svit not very skilful. Besides, ‘Kiev’ had no money 
and expected the local groups to contribute to its budget. The whole structure of the Green 
Movement could, in the view of one Ternopil representative, be likened to that o f the former 
CPSU, where local organisations were supporting the ‘centre’, but getting very little in return/^. In 
the end, however, Ternopil decided to stay. That did not mean that dissatisfaction was any less 
than before.
In 1994, West Ukrainian Greens once again threatened to leave Zelenyi Svit. Such an intent 
was voiced prior to the convening of Zelena Rada in May that year, by the leader of the Ivano- 
Frankivsk Greens, Stepaniak, who showed up in the newspaper Zelenyi svit informing its editorial 
board that unless the conflicts that proved so damaging to the association were solved, Ivano- 
Frankivsk oblast organisation would ‘walk out’. In that case, it was likely to be followed by Lviv 
and Ternopil oblast organisations.
Volodymyr Hrekov^'^ outlined the strategy of the West Ukrainian Greens as follows: Once 
the announcement of Ivano-Frankivsk’s intentions had been published a new Congress would have 
to be called. Such a move would be supported by the Volynia, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and 
Cherkassy Greens, and then Zelenyi Svit would rid itself of the East Ukrainian Greens (i.e. the 
Donetsk oblast Greens), who had joined Zelenyi Svit at a later stage, but who demanded that 
people like Samiilenko, Preobrazhenska and Panov, who had been active in Kiev Zelenyi Svit since 
the vei*y start, be excluded from the association.
Thus a conflict started to build up between local groups and ‘Kiev’. Similarly, tensions 
surfaced between local groups: Zelenyi Svit was strongest in West Ukraine. In the Eastern oblast
I
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Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4,1994.
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of Donetsk, for instance, there were two local groups (with the exception of the Committee to Save 
the Azov Sea, which is an all-Ukrainian association) in the spring of 1994. In West Ukraine, on 
the other hand, Galicia (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts) and Zakarpatiia there were 
1,000 Greens altogether. Ternopil oblast alone had almost 40 groups with 370 members.
On numerous occasions during the spring of 1994, members of the latter and also Kiev
Greens supporting PZU, would criticise Bagin from Horlivka Zelenyi Svit for not doing enough to
facilitate the emergence of new and the expansion of already existing branches of Zelenyi Svit in
the oblast. Hrekov, for instance, argued that (Bagin) the Donetsk Greens allowed the Communists
to win the elections (parliamentary elections) and that they were not ‘Green’^ .^ Iryna Haniukova
(Kiev) was appalled at what she saw as ‘favouritism’ towards the Donetsk Greens when five
computers were being allocated to local groups to create and equip five regional offices of Zelenyi
Svit. She claimed that although there were only 20 members of Zelenyi Svit throughout Donetsk 
.oblast it was still given a computer, whereas the Lviv oblast organisation, which counted 860 
members, got none. Haniukova also found it strange that there were so few members of the Green 
Movement in Donetsk oblast given that the ecological situation there was far worse than in Lviv 
oblast^^.
Bagin tried to answer Haniukova’s question at the meeting of Zelena Rada in Kiev in late 
May 1994: Two or three years ago there were 10 local groups of Zelenyi Svit in Donetsk oblast. 
Now, however, only three groups remained. Two local groups in Makiev and Donetsk city were in 
the process of being established, but expanding the Green Movement proved very difficult. An 
important reason for the decline, he argued, was the general economic situation in the oblast.
Most o f the factories were idle and the workers were sent on unpaid leave. The Green Movement 
in Donetsk oblast was more practically oriented than in many other parts o f Ukraine - operating at 
factories with concrete problems. Now they were being met with the following argument: (Since 
the factories were standing idle) ‘Here everything is clean. There is nothing to do’. They were
■also told that the Greens were a nuisance. The miners’ problems, the lack of funds, etc. were 
looked upon as far more important by the local population. The Donetsk organisation therefore 
needed assistance from Zelenyi Svit in Kiev to address a number of issues in the oblast that needed
77to be solved urgently, such as the Shevchenko Mercury Combine and others. The combine was 
not only a local problem and not even only a Ukrainian problem - the Russian authorities had 
made contact with the Ukrainian government requesting that something be done to reduce
Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, 30.5.1994.
Mercury was being removed from surface pits (i.e. not closed pits underground). Thus soil over a large 
area needed to be recultivated. Emissions containing 10-15 times maximum permissible levels were 
also contaminating the air over a large territory. ...e;
M
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emissions from the combine. The Donetsk Greens wanted to develop an ecological programme 
for the combine, but did not itself have all the necessary resources for it^ .^
Tensions between ‘Kiev’ and the regions intensified following the Third Congress. A good 
example is a regular meeting of Mala Rada, which took place on 4 May 1994 in Kiev. The issue 
of the local elections came up and there was much talk about which candidates Zelenyi Svit would 
support in Kiev. This did not go down well with My ko la Korobko, Zelenyi Svit's chairman: ‘Now 
we are talking about whom to support/not support in Kiev. But what about for instance 
Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv?’ Moreover, was it really the prerogative of Mala Rada to discuss 
these issues - was it not up to Zelena Rada to determine the association’s position as an all- 
Ukrainian organisation? Finally, Korobko urged Mala Rada to not only discuss things that were 
being done in Kiev. Priority should be given to the spreading of information and co-ordination 
between local groups. Zelenyi Svit had an average of three to four local groups per oblast and it 
was important that these be properly included in the association’s activities'^.
The meeting ended, however, with a veritable clash between Haniukova (Kiev) and Bagin 
(Donetsk), in which the former refused to speak to the latter unless he spoke in Ukrainian, which, 
she reminded him, was the official language of Ukraine. Emotions were running high and there 
was also a sharp exchange o f words between Preobrazhenska (Kiev) and Zolotukhin (Nikolaev). 
At the end, everyone was shouting or arguing with everyone, and the issues on the agenda seemed 
to be completely forgotten. It was a sad sight, illustrating to the full how Zelenyi Svit was 
destroying itself from within by falling prey to personal conflicts, rooted in regional and political 
differences.
To gain a clearer picture of relations between ‘Kiev’ and the regions I asked my respondents 
what actions they had undertaken jointly with ‘Kiev’, what kind of assistance they had received 
from the Green Office at Podil and how they thought the Green Office could be made more 
efficient.
With regard to joint actions, the Ternopil oblast group had co-operated with ‘Kiev’ while 
protesting the planned expansion of Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station in Netishyn and had also 
received assistance in the picketing of the Pristrialivsk radar station. Similarly, the Mukachevo 
Greens co-operated with Kiev on the RES as well as on the military airport by Mukachevo. The 
Bukovina Greens received assistance in the organising of meetings, trips and marches and in 
writing letters in protest about incidents of alopecia among children thought to be a result of 
thallium poisoning. In Vinnytsia, Kiev assisted in the planting of trees in protected river zones 
and also helped organise a scientific-practical conference on problems related to the South Bug
Own notes from Zelena Rada, Kiev, 28-29 May 1994. 
Own notes from Mala Rada, Kiev, 4.5.1994.
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river. Nikolaev had co-operated with Kiev on the Chernobyl days. Earth Day and other 
manifestations, as well as in the organising of meetings and pickets. The Klierson Greens, on the 
other hand, said they had only been given ‘good advice’, but no practical help. Horlivka had so far 
received no assistance whatsoever, whereas the Mariupol Greens stated bluntly that ‘Kiev’ was not 
really interested in local problems: ‘"Kiev", in our opinion, only took an interest in Chernobyl, 
and did not wish to see anything else’.
As for practical and technical assistance, only Uman Zelenyi Svit claimed to have received 
none. The Ternopil Greens had received an old computer and a printer, which it proved difficult 
to use under existing conditions. A former employee of Zelenyi Svit, lurii Mishchenko, had been 
helpful more generally and assistance was also given through personal contacts. Pickets organised 
by the Greens in Mukachevo were in some cases reinforced by activists sent from Kiev. 
Moreover, lurii Shcherbak had raised the issue of the Pristrialivska RES at the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, for which the local Greens were grateful. Bukovina Zelenyi Svit, without specifying 
exactly how, claimed to receive assistance rather frequently, particularly as of more recently. In 
Dnipropetrovsk Greens received information about conferences and other events, but on a 
somewhat irregular basis. Humanitarian aid in the form of vitamins had been distributed in the 
oblast by Zelenyi Svit via the oblast organisations. Finally, support had been rendered in obtaining 
a computer and a dictaphone through the Soros Fund in Kiev. Horlivka Zelenyi Svit had on a 
number o f occasions turned to Kiev for assistance, but although its requests were not turned down, 
the organisation received no help either. Under the directorship of Serhii Fedorinchyk, a 
photocopy machine had been provided. Lutsk Zelenyi Svit received humanitarian aid, but nothing 
more. Vinnytsia oblast Zelenyi Svit received financial support to plant trees within the framework 
of a campaign organised under the auspices of the Ukrainian Ecocentre labelled ‘Ukraine’s Green 
Nimbus’ (Zelenyi nimb Ukrainy). The Nikolaev Greens until 1994 got virtually no help. 
Recently, a computer and a dictaphone were provided. The Uman Greens received no help from 
Kiev, whereas the Mariupol Greens claimed to have turned to Zelenyi Svit with suggestions for 
joint action, to which they never even got a reply. In Odessa the Greens received moral support, 
but no material assistance was ever rendered.
The result came out somewhat differently when the Greens polled were asked to indicate on a 
fixed form exactly what assistance they had received from the Green Office in Podil:
f
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Table 4.16 Assistance from  Zelenyi S v it’s Kiev Office
Group access conne­ advice equip­ office finan­ lob­ no
to info ctions ment/ sup­ cial bying assis­
to access port assis­ tance
other to tance at all
organis equip­
ations ment
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X X X
Dnipropetrovsk X X X
obi. ZS
Horlivka ZS X X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X X X X X
Uman ZS X
(not 
needed 
so far)
Nikolaev obi. ZS X X X
Dzharylgach X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X X X X
A majority of the local organisations polled received assistance from Kiev in the form of 
access to information, help to establish connections with other organisations, advice and access to 
equipment. Only Vinnytsia oblast Zelenyi Svit claimed to have received financial support and help 
in lobbying through ‘Kiev’. This is an interesting result in that I would expect ‘Kiev’ to lobby not 
only national, but also local and regional issues with the Ukrainian parliament and various 
ministries and departments in the Ukrainian capital (and prior to the collapse of the USSR, also in 
Moscow).
Although many local Green groups were pre-occupied with problems that did not carry 
national significance, others tried to fight enterprises, nuclear power stations and other issues o f a 
national or even Soviet significance: In Mukachevo and Bukovina the Greens attacked the 
military (i.e. the Soviet Army) and in Nikolaev the Greens conducted a successful campaign 
against further expansion of the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. People locally, however, 
were resourceful and conducted their own campaigns at several administrative levels at the same 
time. Thus it might also have been a case of local/regional organisations not requesting such 
assistance in the first place (see Chapters Six and Seven).
Although some assistance had been provided, none of those organisations polled were 
satisfied with the way in which the Green Office in Kiev was run. I therefore asked how the office 
could be improved and got the following answers:
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Table 4.17 How to Improve Zelenyi Svit's Kiev Office
Group Better 
contacts 
with local 
org.
More
personnel
More
equipment
More
money
other
Ternopil obi. ZS X X X
Mukachevo ZS X X change 
leader and 
executive 
director
Bukovina ZS X X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X The Kiev 
‘board’ must 
serve the 
org., not run 
it.
Horlivka ZS X X we also need 
well 
equipped 
regional 
centres
Lutsk ZS X X X X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X X more ‘even’ 
work of 
office.
Uman ZS better
qualified
staff
Nikolaev obi. ZS X X X
Dzharylgach less ‘civil 
war’
Ekocentre X
Odessa Greens X X X must 
earmark 
funds and 
find the best 
group of 
executives
Thus, as seen from the table, although the lack of equipment and financial resources 
constituted a major problem for Zelenyi Svit, Greens considered the poor relationship between the 
central and local/regional organisations more harmful to the association as such. This relationship 
would determine the ‘workability’ o f the Green Movement and upon this relationship rested the 
issue o f whether or not the movement would survive in its present form. To find out what was 
local groups’ position on the matter, I asked the respondents if they preferred a vertical or 
horizontal organisational structure and obtained the following result:
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Table 4.18 D esired Organisational Structure, Zelenyi Svit
G roup Vertical H orizontal
Ternopil obi. ZS X
M ukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS
D nipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
L utsk ZS X
M ariupol ZS X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Um an ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgaeli X X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X X
Most o f the respondents qualified their answers. The Ternopil Greens justified a horizontal 
structure pleading adherence to a key principle of the international Green movement, namely to 
‘act locally, think globally’. Moreover, nobody knew better than the locals which problems were 
most important and which methods were required to solve them. Dnipropetrovsk Zelenyi Svit 
opposed a vertical structure on the grounds that it tended to produce administrators, who more 
than anything tried to gain power over others. However, good coordination between the local 
groups was definitely needed.
In Vinnytsia, Greens favoured a horizontal structure as it allowed for initiative, as well as 
better take into account natural and other particular features of each region. However, most of the 
regional groups were not ready to make direct contact with the International Green Movement and 
had limited access to communications and information. A centre o f some kind was therefore 
required. Even more importantly, a horizontal structure helped overcome the stereotypes of 
imperial thinking and the syndrome of ‘provinces’. Finally, a horizontal structure was preferred 
by the Bukovina Greens as it would allow regional organisations to help each other directly, 
without having to go via Kiev to facilitate such links.
The Odessa Greens favoured a two-tier structure, in which relations between Kiev and the 
oblasts were organised vertically, whereas local and regional groups were linked horizontally. A 
similar attitude was predominant in Klierson oblast and also in Horlivka. The latter argued that 
there was a need for a unified centre, through which work could be conducted more efficiently on 
inter-regional and all-Ukrainian environmental problems. Klierson wanted a centre, but in the 
form of a co-ordinator, which could give consultations, moral support, facilitate access to lab 
facilities and interpretation of data and expert assessments. The Ecocentre also thought there was 
a need for a co-ordinator at national level. Only one group; that o f Nikolaev oblast, preferred a 
vertical structure, but claimed that attempts at creating an efficient vertical structure within Zelenyi
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Svit were being obstructed by PZU  representatives, backed up by the Ukrainian authorities. A 
strong centre was needed ‘like air’ to withstand the ‘dictatorship of the executive’.
A reason for wanting a tight organisational structure may have been rooted in poor 
communication facilities and peculiarities specific to the Post-Soviet Union. Besides, 
organisations and political parties with a tight organisational structure were better capable of 
dealing with opposition within their structures, thus allowing them to operate more efficiently. It 
may very well be that Zolotukhin’s position reflected growing frustration with in-fighting and 
conflicts in Zelenyi Svit rather than a wish to be controlled and told what to do by Kiev, then as 
will be seen in the case study, Nikolaev oblast conducted a successful campaign against expansion 
o f the South Ukrainian Energy Complex without any assistance from Kiev.
As for Zelenyi Svit’s present structure opinions were divided:
Table 4.19 Assessment o f  Present Zelenyi Svit Structure
Group Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgaeli
Ecocentre
X
Odessa Greens X
Tverdostup of the Ternopil Greens said he was satisfied with Zelenyi Svit's structure, holding 
the view that it had emerged and developed historically. However, more decentralisation was 
required, then one should act on the principle ‘when there is a problem there is also a (local) group 
to solve it’. The Greens in Bukovina were also happy with the current state of affairs. The only 
drawback was that Zelenyi Svit was suffering from a lack of discipline. Greens in Vinnytsia and 
Odessa were also predominantly satisfied.
Others, like the Greens in Mukachevo, held a different opinion. In their view Zelenyi Svit 
was not productive as a movement as it had no real leader (Korobko was considered too weak for 
the job). In Dnipropetrovsk there was dissatisfaction that so much depended on who was in charge 
in ‘Kiev’ (i.e. the office at Podil). Greens from Lutsk did not like the lack of agreement and 
ambitions, which in turn resulted in the settling of accounts between members of the association. 
Zolotukhin (Nikolaev) was unhappy about the composition of Zelena Rada, calling for barring any
420
i.I
3
• S
S
■i:r
1I
3-!
member of a political party be it PZU  or any other from its ranks so as to avoid it being turned into 
an organ for empty political struggle. Finally, neither the IClierson Greens were very happy with 
the existing structure - but not so much because it was wrong per se; rather the chronic lack of 
funding, which again made travelling difficult, was to blame.
4.3.2 The Fifth Congresses (December 1994)
Personal disagreements and conflicts in Zelenyi Svit were highly visible at the May 1994 meeting 
of Zelena Rada. The meeting had to appoint the executive direetor of the Green office in Podil 
and there were two candidates - Serhyi Fedorinchyk, who was already holding this post, and Ihor 
Kirilchuk, a centrist, whose aim was to build bridges between the various factions o f the Green 
Movement and try to unite them behind concrete plans and actions. As seen above, Fedorinchyk 
held the support of a number of regional groups (e.g. Donetsk, Nikolaev and Netishyn). He was 
also supported by people positive to RUKH and those sceptical to the Green Party.
Kirilchuk, on the other hand, as leader of the Youth Wing of Zelenyi Svit was supported by 
younger members of the association, who felt that bickering and quarrelling between older 
members o f Zelenyi Svit was preventing the organisation from functioning properly. He also had 
the backing of Greens who felt the movement had to freshen up its image in order to attract young 
people to the movement. Although not a member of PZU, Kirilchuk was well-liked by most PZU  
supporters within Zelenyi Svit. He had also established links with EkoMisiia - a loose horizontal 
network of small and specialised Green groups, primarily from Kiev, and set up by people who 
had earlier left Zelenyi Svit, disillusioned with what they perceived as its increasing 
bureaucratisation and stagnation. Finally, Kirilchuk had the support o f a group o f Greens who 
were sceptical to Fedorinchyk due to what they referred to as his bad temper.
Korobko was on good terms with Kirilchuk - the latter spent much time working in the Green 
Office together with Fedorinchyk, whom he respected although he did not share his dislike for 
PZU  - but Fedorinchyk was Korobko’s protégé. The two groups mobilised as many members as 
possible prior to Zelena Radars meeting in Kiev and intense lobbying took place in the meeting 
hall prior to the convening of a special commission to appoint the new director. It was a close 
race, but in the end Korobko and Fedorinchyk’s group was defeated.
Following this appointment, the conflict between the two groupings intensified. Attempts at 
trying to reconcile the various currents in the movement failed and in December 1994 two 
Congresses took place - one in Kiev, which was attended by representatives of three quarters of 
the Zelenyi Svit members, and one in Donetsk (attended by one third). The latter was attended by 
the grouping favourable to Korobko and Fedorinchyk. Formally, the Kiev Congress was called in
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order to re-elect the representative organs of Zelenyi Svit. The leadership issue had long been 
discussed by local chapters of Zelenyi Svit and PZU  supporters in the aftermath of the Fourth 
Congress, still held the view that Korobko had not been properly elected due to the lack of a 
quorum during the vote. Another issue of dispute concerned the collective property of the 
association and the lack of ability of certain leaders to master complicated processes within the 
Green Movement, thus blocking its further development®^.
The Congress eventually took place in Kiev on 3-4 December 1994 despite the protestations 
o f members of the leadership of the association (as seen above, it was decided that every two
■congresses be held locally and not in Kiev). Altogether 134 delegates attended the Congress from 
all oblasts except Sumy, Luhansk and Nikolaev. The Luhansk chapter of Zelenyi Svit had
dissolved itself prior to the Congress - a new green group emerged on its base. The Sumy group
■ .■ ■
had withered away, whereas Zelenyi Mir of Nikolaev failed to attend in protest with what was 
thought to be an illegitimate Congress, staged by PZU  activists to take control over the Green
'Movement. There were sharp discussions regarding the future of Zelenyi Svit rooted in different 
understandings among the delegates as to how best to solve the ecological problems in Ukraine. 3Despite this, however, the delegates were united on the need to take firm action so as to protect the 
Ukrainian environment. This was reflected in the slogan of the Congress; ‘A Green Light for the 
President’s Reforms’.
The Congress was very much dominated by members and supporters of PZU. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, lurii Samiilenko was elected chairman of Zelenyi Svit. A  total of six 
deputy leaders (compared to the previous four), each with certain responsibilities were also 
elected: Viktor Khazan from Dnipropetrovsk was elected First Deputy Chairman and co-ordinator
for East Ukraine (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea and Sevastopol). Hryhoriy
'Honcharenko was put in charge of the Northern regions (Kiev, Zhitomyr, Chernihiv, Sumy,
Poltava and Kharkiv oblasts), Oleh Sydorkin was responsible for the Central Region (Cherkassy, 
Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson oblasts), Mykola Symus was put in charge 
of the Western regions (Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpatia and Lviv oblasts), whereas 
Tetiana Matiunina was to keep an eye on the Podil-Dnistrovskii regions (Volynia, Rivne, 
Khmelnytskyi and Ternopil oblasts). Iryna Haniukova was to take care of organisational and 
administrative matters. Finally, Oleh Listopad, a journalist of Zelenyi Svit would take care of 
work with youth. Mala Rada was streamlined and would in the future be composed o f the 
Chairman, deputy chairmen and leaders of 20 commissions also appointed by the Congress. Mala 
Rada would - unlike what had been the case in the past - be an executive organ that would
-------------------------------------------
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implement decisions and policies as laid out by the Congress and Zelena Rada. Zelena Rada, or 
Velika Rada, as it was also called, was to be made up by Mala Rada, representatives of all oblast 
organisations and collective members of Zelenyi Svit^\
As a majority of the commission leaders were from Kiev, Kiev thus had a majority of the 
members of Mala Rada. This was no doubt practical from an operational point of view, in that 
experience showed that representatives from the regions failed to attend its meetings on a regular 
basis due to the travelling involved as these meetings took place in Kiev every week (or two 
weeks). Thus, a larger number of people would be likely to show up and decisions easier be made 
with a quorum. On the other hand, should Mala Rada continue to function not only as an 
implementing but also as a decision-making body, the view that Kiev was trying to control the 
movement at the expense o f regional groups may well arise again. A number o f commissions 
were set up®^ . Three of these (Commission on Health, Ethics and the Analytical Commission) 
were headed by women - two from Kiev and one from Vinnytsia®®.
The Congress also passed several resolutions, the most interesting o f which was the one on 
the non-political status of Zelenyi Svit and on the Construction of the Oil Terminal by Odessa. The 
first made it clear that being politically independent, Zelenyi Svit would cooperate with political 
parties and organisations on environmental issues. However, it would not join any political blocs 
or associations with a non-ecological profile:
ripo nosanapTiHHMH craryc ”3e.ntenoio Ciiiry": Byjiyqu ue3ajieiKHHM 
nenojiiTMiiHMM iieypM onuM  o6'£;m a iinaM  nx)i\ia;icLKMx eKOJiori'iHHx 
o p r a n isa u iH . ”3eaeiiHH C t i i f ’ (YKipaiirchKa CKOJioriana a c o n ia n ia )  
E BiAKpuToio ;io c n iB iip a u i  c  y c i x  iianpiiMKiB c b o e ï  4 ia .r iL iiocri a 
no.niTH»iiiHMM napriîiMH Ta imuMMu opra iii;}au iiiM u, jik I  ue5aM 4y»:i 
4 0  no4 onanna eK O J ioria iioi b  Y ic p a î ii i .  YEA ”3C”
yTpHM.yETbCJi B i4  Bcayny 40  f)y4b-}iKHx o 5 '£ 4 iia i ib  i  5.rioKin 
HeeKoaoriHiioro c n p i m y B a i n u i .
It is significant that Zelenyi Svit publicly declared its willingness to cooperate with political 
parties whose aims in the sphere of the environment coincided with those of the movement. The 
implication of this statement, was that it indirectly legitimised a close relationship between Zelenyi 
Svit and PZU. Similarly, the resolution could be used by PZU  activists within the movement to try 
to break the affiliations between RUKH  and Zelenyi Svit as it could well be argued that whereas
3e.fienMM coir, no. 2, 1995, c. 2.
Commissions were established on the Protection and Rational Use of Land, on Water, Forests, Nature 
Preserves, Scientific Problems and Independent Ecological Expert Assessments, Health, Monitoring, 
Ecological Education, Legal Issues, Analytical Issues, Anti-Military Issues, Anti-Nuclear Issues, Chernobyl, 
Mass Media, Information, Youth, Energy, Ecological Enterprises, Market Reform and Ethical Questions. 
3emiMM CBiT, no. 3, 1995, c. 2.
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PZU  was primarily an environmental party, the same could not be said of RUKH. This statement 
could not have been passed so easily had the supporters of Korobko, who also happened to be
highly sceptical o f PZU, been present at the Congress.
A resolution on the Construction of the Oil Terminal by Odessa, was by some members of 
Zelenyi Svit interpreted as a sign of the Movement moving away from being a purely 
environmental organisation to becoming increasingly politicised. The Resolution argued that 
construction was possible as long as international norms and regulations for oil terminals were 
being observed. However, the Greens in Odessa had put up a vigorous fight against this terminal 
on the grounds that it would be harmful to the environment. When Verkhovna Rada eventually
■
sanctioned the terminal, it did so arguing that Ukraine needed its own oil terminal so as to break its 
dependence on Russia for fuel - in other words to achieve real Ukrainian independence. Thus 
some people felt that Zelenyi Svit had betrayed its very own purpose - that the environment stood 
above both politics and the economy.
Survival was still high on the Green Movement’s priority list: A resolution ‘On the
Adaptation and Survival of the Ukrainian People in Conditions of Ecological Crisis’ noted that the 
population growth had dropped progressively following the Chernobyl accident and that low level
i
background radiation and food contaminated with chemicals and radioactive substances posed a
yéreal threat to the survival o f the Ukrainian nation. The President and the Ukrainian Government
ywere therefore urged to create a programme to secure that children and pregnant women be f
supplied with ecologically clean food and for the pharmacological industry to produce devices
''■"fprotecting against radiation and sorbents, that would absorb radionuclides. A priority issue for 
Zelenyi Svit would be to establish the cause of growth in mortality, illness and birth figures and to 
solve problems regarding drinking water and environmentally clean food products for children and 
women throughout Ukraine. In this connection, Zelenyi Svit endorsed a programme for the I
'S‘Adaptation o f the Ukrainian People to Conditions of Ecological Crisis’, developed by the Institute k
of Medical Ecology (Dnipropetrovsk State University). L
.■
The Congress also expressed concern that land privatisation was as a rule conducted without M
Vtaking into account environmental concerns and disregarding the historical and cultural
*significance of the land in question. It therefore requested that measures be taken to protect the 
national heritage of Ukraine during privatisation. Finally, it was acknowledged that 
communication between ‘Kiev’ and local branches of Zelenyi Svit was poor. There was also a lack 
o f regular information on the activities of local and regional groups. To improve this state of 
affairs, it was proposed that regional groups once every six months and local organisations no less ;
than once a year make reports on their activities available to the elected organs of the association
424 'I
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as well as to the newspaper Zelenyi Svit and the media more generally. The overall goal o f Zelenyi
Svit was to activate the ecological and the anti-nuclear movements in Ukraine®' .^
.The delegates of the Fifth Congress expressed high hopes for Zelenyi Svit in the future:
TieiiH ”3C” ciio;UüaiOTLCif. mo V ;3'ï:w  u c o n ia n i i  icoirco.iiiiyE i x  
3.VCH.ÎU1Î1 i  B im puE pea.ibitnn iii.iax jiui Biimny na eKo.ioriMiiy 
CBi40Micri, iiapoiiy YicpaiBU. a BijiTUK - i  iia craii ï ï  iioBKi.i.m.**^
Fïcwever, this hope was crushed shortly afterwards, when the remaining one third of Zelenyi
Svit convened an alternative Fifth Congress in Donetsk. Little is known about the Congress in
Donetsk other than that it re-elected Mykola Korobko as Chairman of the association. As pointed
out by Dzeverin two competing organisations both claiming the name and the property o f Zelenyi
Svit thus existed side by side after the alternative Fifth Congress. And just like he predicted, both 
.organisations would in the foreseeable future spend all their efforts trying to gain control over the 
property, stamp and other attributes o f the Green Movement®^. According to Dzeverin, the ‘Kiev’ 
group was formally in the right, but mistakes had been made on both sides. Anatolii Zolotukhin, 
on the other hand, claimed that ‘Kiev’ was in the wrong. By early March those who attended the 
Donetsk Congress had sent a letter backed up by 70 documents, which allegedly gave evidence to 
‘the criminally punishable actions’ o f the PZU  leadership. Although the authorities were on
tP Z H s  side, the Donetsk Congress would get out of this situation with dignity, as the truth was on 
its side® .^
It has proved difficult to get the full picture as to what exactly happened within Zelenyi Svit 
from May 1994 and up to the two Congresses which took place in December the same year. It 
does appear that the key issue of dispute was P Z H s  influence within Zelenyi Svit and what should 
be the relationship between the Green Movement and the Party in the future. Korobko and those 
people supporting him, were negative to PZU. The PZU  activists within Zelenyi Svit, on the other 
hand, were very much opposed to RUKH, of which Korobko had been a member until it 
transformed itself into a political party and which Fedorinchyk supported. To some extent it is 
therefore correct to say that a struggle was taking place between PZU  and RUKH  supporters in 
coalition with independents and those opposed to PZU  on principle, for the upper hand in the 
Green Movement. The level of strength between those supportive of and those negative towards
I
Senetmfi cdI t, no. 2, 1995, c. 2.
^Komrrni m SMopoDbe, no. 30-31, 1995, c. 1. 
Letter from Ihor Dzeverin, dated Kiev, 15.1.1995. 
Letter from Anatolyi Zolotukhin, 15.3.1995.
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damage Demohatychna Ukraina. Panov did, however, express regret that Fedorinchyk and 
Zolotukhin had broken with the Movement. Fedorinchyk had been a member of Zelenyi Svit from 
the very beginning and Zolotukhin had done much for the movement. However, Fedorinchyk 
supported RUKH  and as the Green Movement had its own ideology, Zelenyi Svit should side with 
neither the ‘national-democrats’ nor with the ‘communists/socialists’. The overall effect for the 
Movement could therefore be only positive, although a struggle with the ‘break-away Greens’ was 
to be expected®®.
Ihor Dzeverin, considering himself a Communist, questioned Zelenyi Svit’s alleged non­
political stand, by arguing that compared to the Donetsk Congress the one held in Kiev was highly 
politicised. The Donetsk Congress was less nationalistic than the Kiev Congress. As evidence, he 
referred to the former’s resolution on the Odessa oil terminal, which in his view was motivated by
Letter from Anatolii Panov, Kiev, 3.2.1995.
the Green Party was reflected in the level of attendance at the two Congresses, As seen above, 
three quarters attended the former, whereas one third attended the latter.
The fact that a minority broke with ‘Kiev’ and arranged its own Congress may be taken as an 
indication that Zelenyi Svit as an organisation will consolidate itself and emerge strengthened and 
united from the ‘ordeal’. Anatolii Panov, for instance, claimed that the situation within Zelenyi 
Svit had somewhat improved following the Kiev Congress:
I...H36aBM.3MCL o r  ueKOTopux .iroiiefi. »ito vieiiui.in nopvia.Tiwio padoTUTb.
TaKHX, KÜK C. (I)e4 0 pi-iiiMHK, H. Kopod ico h Apyrnx. H:iGpa.in. 
liaKoneu, lOpy CaMOH.:ienico iii5ejicejia're;ieM. a am|X'.k'vopom orra.ioH  
Hropb Kmph.hl'i.vk. Pado'ra cra .ia  d o .iee  KoiiicperiioH, no Bce paaiio 
ne.rierK0 . H er jiener', nenaaro cojiep^caTb o(|)Ho. H])aB4 a, (DeAopnimnK 
lie ycnoKOH.aai n iia.YiepeBaerai 40Ka:3arb. «rro iiani cbe:34 dbi.i 
nenpaBOMOBiibiH. On b  c b o f o  onei^evib c IxopodKO npone.a iipyroH  
Cb034 B AoiieiiKe, h  odparM.noi b  MnnMorepcrBO i o o i ' h u h h ,  arodi.i 
40Ka3ai'b ero  npaaoMoanocrb. Taic nro na.inuo pacKo.ri, kuk 3T0 
cayHMJiocb c PyxoM m c  Pecnyd.aMKancKon naprnen (YPH)...
■ :ïi
Still Panov held the view that ‘Kiev’ had acted properly in that it had ‘freed’ itself of what he
referred to as ‘several demagogues and slaves to routine’ like Korobko. Panov never considered
Korobko to be ‘Green’ and he argued that Korobko - since he failed to be re-elected to Verkhovna 
.Rada was simply clinging on to Zelenyi Svit for personal reasons. He had also managed to get a 
foot inside the leadership of Demokratychna Ukt'aina - an organisation dominated by RUKH- 
members and supporters. In the same way as Korobko had destroyed Zelenyi Svit, he would t
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political rather than environmental concerns®^. Although this situation was regrettable, there was 
an explanation:
. . .  B m 4 h m o .  3 T 0  d b i . i o  n p a K T M 4 e c i c H  i i e M : 3 d e > K i i h i M  b  r e x  y c i O B H f l x .  
K o r ^ a  ” 3 e . a e i i b i e ”  c ' l H ' r a i o T  c e 6 > i  y q a c i i H K a v i n  n a u n o i i a . i H c r H M e c K o r o  
( x a K  i i a s b i B a e M o r o ,  ’’i i e M O K p a T H H e c K o r o ” ) 4 B H 4 c e n H a .  a  n e o d x o A H M O c r b  
n o c r p o e u H H  H U C T H T y T O B  i i p a B o n o r o  o S m e c r u a  n  o d e c a e a e u n a  r a p a i i T H f i  
n . a i o p a . i H 3 M a  (I'.e. c o d c r n e i n i o  i i e M O K p a T H a e c K n e  3 a 4 a M n )  M a . a o  k o i o  
aadoTBT.
This situation and the split which took place in Zelenyi Svit in December 1994 gave cause for 
pessimism regarding the future of the Ukrainian Green Movement:
B o iocb , 4T0 naHMBaeTca oneiib cicysiibiH iiep n o4  u M cropnn 3C. 
r ipejK 4e B cero. nornuy. sro 3Ko.aorn4ecKHe iipHopuTeTbi Tenepb jib iio  
yM ityr na niopoH h jih  TpernH n.aau. f l  Mvieio b bh4.y we t o .  h t o  3 C  
n e  dyAGT saiiMMaTbca oxpanon npHp04bi, 3'ia p a d o r a , b o s m o x h o ,  iiajK e 
HnTencM(l)HUHpyeTca, ysHTbiBan dec.cno])ni>!e 4 e.noBbie Kasecraa iioni^ ix 
.riH4epon). npocTO  B o n p o a i o t o m .  Kaicne lu arn  npe^npHimMaTb, 
KBKMe cm iLi noM epX H BaT b. a icaKne o cy ^ c ^ a ib , Kaitne aK unn  
oprann30BbiBaTb m t . f l .  dy^iyr pem aTbca na ocnoBannM n e  
3K0J10rH46CKHX, a COBOBM 4pyrUX npMIIÜHîTOB, CBîI3aniIb!X c 
nojiMTMBecKHMH, xosjiHCTBeniibiMH H npoMHMH pacseTaMH.
4.4 The Future of the Green Movement
Conflicts and infighting have been a common feature to the Ukrainian Green Movement since its 
Second Congress in 1991. If one compares the Ukrainian Greens with for instance die Grünen in 
Germany or, for that matter, the French and Belgian Greens, one finds that also these movements 
have fallen prey to infighting and personal animosity. To some extent an explanation might be 
found in the traditionally loose structure of the Green Movements, which allows for diverging 
views to clash rather than being kept under control by a strong vertical leadership structure. The 
conflicts which arose in the Ukrainian Green Movement, however, were of a different character to 
those of the West European Greens and did much more damage than what was been the case in 
e.g. Germany.
A reason often given by Greens themselves is that the Green Movement emerged as one of 
the first independent (political) movements in Ukraine, thus bringing together people of different 
political views, different ages and backgrounds - who did not necessarily share a common
89 Letter from Ihor Dzeverin, dated Kiev, 15.1.1995.
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commitment to Green ideology. Whereas in the West the Greens emerged in a ‘saturated’ society
where people had both the time and the money to take actively part in political life, in the former
■
USSR the Green Movement emerged as a 'spontaneous’ phenomenon. Green ideology was not a 
central and uniting element. In Ukraine it might be more correct to refer to the Greens as a 
‘partisan Green movement’: In the East, for instance, people are not ‘Green’ by nature. But rather 
as their children are dying of pollution they have no other alternative. Being Green is for them a
9 0means of survival rather than a means to an end .
Another reason can be found in the political structure of the USSR prior to the collapse of 
communism. Evhen Korbetskyi has pointed out that most members of Zelenyi Svit suffer from a
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, May 1994.
Interview with Evhen Kortbetskyi, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994. 
Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4.1994. 
Interview with Zhenia (surname not known), April 1994.
Bolshevik attitude - i.e. they were brought up to take part in a political struggle and will for that 
reason fight any view slightly different from their own^\ Ihor Dzeverin also resorted to 
psychological factors: ‘When people live under a totalitarian regime they become aggressive and 
behave like children’. This phenomenon he refers to as ‘Soviet psychology’. As a result, ‘we are 
not well-balanced and relaxed as people are in the West’.
A further complication arose due to the politicisation not only o f the Green Movement as 
such but of Ukrainian society generally, where the extremes ruled the ground (cf. election result to 
Verkhovna Rada\ communists and nationalists did well). None of these groups was likely to give 
in but would carry the struggle to the bitter end. As seen above, it culminated with the splitting up 
of Zelenyi Svit in December 1994.
Volodymyr Hrekov also looked to the past to explain the conflicts in Zelenyi Svit: People in 
Ukraine, he claimed, were generally good-natured, but they had not seen much good in life and all 
along their most important aim had been to survive. Therefore people got aggressive and vented 
their anger at each other. ‘All the time we think who is against whom (‘kto ko go’) and see 
enemies everywhere’. Ideally, however, the Greens should be people of a high moral standing, 
raising themselves above such concerns^^: ‘as long as Shcherbak was in charge of the movement 
conflicts were contained. Shcherbak was a great personality who succeeded in raising above petty 
conflicts and had the ability and the authority to control the "trouble-makers". His predecessors, 
on the other hand, were not people of a similar standing and with the same degree of authority’ ®^.
It was also been pointed out that ordinary people do not get involved with public movements - 
only ‘personalities’ do. Some people are slow to understand things, others pick them up easily. 
Some are good at talking but do little, others do the opposite. As Zelenyi Svit was a loose 
organisation it had to accommodate all these differences and a variety o f political views. There
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We cannot simply exclude people because they are different’
Intei*view with Ihor Kirilchuk, 12.5.1994.
f
were also big differences in age and a general lack of tolerance towards others. If someone did not
understand something, he/she may be labelled a fool, then contest this view (‘you are such a fool’.
‘What do you mean I am such a fool’, etc.) and another conflict would be born. Ihor Kirilchuk has 
.pointed out that people in the Green Movement have a very long memoi-y; things that were said 
years before keep re-surfacing, leaving people as permanent enemies and unable to unite around 
constructive work.
Not surprisingly, there are divergent views amongst the Greens as to how best to achieve the
.Movement’s aims. Preobrazhenska, for instance, is an emotional person who holds the opinion 
that nuc'ear power can only be fought successfully through the media. Korbetskyi, on the other
hand, wants to achieve the same but works at a scientific level. The mistake of Zelenyi Svit, 
argued Kirilchuk, was that it failed to acknowledge that the best results are achieved when one 
works on several fronts simultaneously, not only on one: ‘We need various people in order to work 
constructively: RUKH  people, nationalists, West Ukrainian Greens and East Ukrainian Greens.
I have now looked at personal and socio-political factors explaining the conflicts within
Zelenyi Svit. It is, however, not possible to give a full picture of the background to the infighting
unless one also takes into account political allegiances and currents within the Green Movement.
.There are several ways in which to classify members of Zelenyi Svit at such a level. Put crudely, 
the conflicts reflect a struggle between those who do and those who do not approve of the Green 
Paity. The former hold the view that the movement and the party should be closer knit and that 
the movement should be loyal to the party. The latter, among which are RUKH  and URP 
supporters and also communists and socialists, hold the opinion that the movement should remain 
completely independent, thus not siding with one political party in particular.
Another cleavage can be identified between, on the one hand, the ‘nationalists’ and ‘anti­
comm unists’^^  and on the other ‘socialists’ and ‘communists’. The ‘nationalists’, according to 
Dzeverin, support the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Communist Front and they are also against one-sided 
disarmament (i.e. nuclear disarmament with the war-heads being sent to Russia for dismantling)^^.
In between these two groups are the centrists and as all three groups are of approximately the same 
size, it is difficult for any one of them to gain the upper hand in the movement.
I;
This distinction was made by Ihor Dzeverin, himself a communist, and sceptical of people favouring an 
independent Ukraine and being negative towards communism. Those people labelled ‘nationalists’ by 
the communists, object to being branded ‘nationalists’ as they perceive of themselves either as 
‘democrats’ or as ‘patriots’, supporting a democratic and independent Ukraine.
Interview with Ihor Dzeverin, April 1994.
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Finally, it is possible to classify the various currents within Zelenyi Svit in the following way: 
a group of older people, referring to themselves as 'patriots’ (i.e. the West is still the enemy) come 
together in Zelenyi Svit primarily to chat - whereas nominally they work for the Greens. A second 
group is composed of younger people from the former university drmhiny, the third group is 
composed of people supporting PZU  and finally, there is a fourth group, gathering people who are 
against PZU  - some of whom support RUKH or other political parties/movements.
By the end of 1994 the Ukrainian Green Movement found itself in a deep crisis and it still 
remains a question whether or not Zelenyi Svit will survive as an organisation. To find out how 
regional and local groups perceived the fighting within the movement, I asked in my survey if the 
Green Movement was in a crisis. I obtained the following result:
Table 4.20 Is the Ukrainian Green Movement in Crisis?
Group In crisis Not in crisis Difficult to tell
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgaeli X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X
As can be seen from the table, a majority of the groups polled answered the question as to 
whether or not the Green Movement was in a crisis in the affirmative. And Horlivka Zelenyi Svit - 
although claiming not to be in a crisis, acknowledged that there were problems. The 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast branch o f Zelenyi Svit is amongst the strongest branches of the association, 
having its own office and expanding its membership mass. In private, however, Viktor Khazan 
acknowledged that Zelenyi Svit was suffering from infighting and poor decision-making. Thus the 
Greens were aware of their problems, but disagreed on how best to solve them.
The Ternopil and Vinnytsia chapters thought the key to getting the Green Movement out of 
its crisis was to attract new people with new ideas to the Movement. lavorska of the Vinnytsia 
organisation saw the crisis as a natural process of generation change:
Euie lie  yiujiH re .rtH^epu, KOTopue aliopM M pouajincb na so j iiie  
iViaccoDLix npoT ecroB , npHBUKiuHe ob'LeiiHiiiiTbcii ’’npoTMB”, a iie iio icpyr
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»M46H. (PopviHpouaiiMe 15 vio;io4e4viiovi Kpi.iae rpyiiiii>i npaKTHKots.
Baajieiomnx iiaB!.iKaMH opraimsaTopon, hx iKwiep/KKa b perno iiax - 
iiaMa.io iioBoro arana b [lafinre ”3e.ieiiür() C B i ia ”.
Tverdostup, the leader of Ternopil Zelenyi Svit, thought that the solution to the crisis was to
be found in the education of activists and in bringing people with new ideas into the movement. It 
would also help if the Western Greens organised an aid programme to assist those Green groups 
still existing in Ukraine. Bukovina Zelenyi Svit held the view that ecological propaganda and work 
with school children was the best way to get through the crisis - by imbuing people with a genuine 
concern for and a wish to act in order to save the environment. Horlivka Zelenyi Svit believed in 
good examples, and argued that everything depended on how successful regional centres would be 
in implementing ecological projects as well as on Kiev’s ability to provide the regional groups
with the assistance they needed in order to achieve this. The Nikolaev Greens thought only |'permanent funding, independent of state funds, could save the Green Movement from sinking 
deeper into its crisis. It would also help if the Green Office was relocated from Kiev as then one 
would avoid all the conflicts around the Kiev office. Finally, all members of PZU  should be taken
■li
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off Zelena Rada. Zelenyi Svit could gain a lot from organising its activities along the lines of 
Greenpeace. Only the Mariupol Greens thought the future of the Green Movement was closely 
linked with that of Ukraine - arguing that Ukraine must get out of its financial crisis before the 
Green Movement can again prosper.
Although the Greens came up with several possible ways by which to stem up the crisis in 
which it found itself, this did not mean to say that they were convinced that Zelenyi Svit would ::
survive the crisis. There were diverging views among members of the Ukrainian Green 
Movement as to what the future o f the movement would hold. Sviatoslav Dudko, for instance, 
held the view that political movements and possibly also political parties, go through three stages: 
birth (rozhdenie), maturing (zrelenie) and decay (raspad/vymiranie). Zelenyi Svit, in his view, had Y
by m id-1994 entered the last stage. A similar fate may also await the Green Party. The decay 
started in 1990 when Shcherbak stepped down as leader o f Zelenyi Svit and was gathered with 
time.
Several reasons - objective as well as subjective - can be identified as facilitating the decline 
of Zelenyi Svit. Panov explains the decline by referring to general economic factors: Due to the 
difficult economic situation in Ukraine people do not have the energy or the time to actively 
participate in public/political activities. Similarly, the Green Movement is suffering from a lack of 
money and from poor organisation. However, the Green Movement in the West is also not so 
strong. Success followed by decline might, in Panov’s view, be a stage Zelenyi Svit has to go
i
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t h r o u g h . A s  pointed out by lurii Mishchenko, Zelenyi Svit was the first informal organisation to 
emerge on Ukrainian soil^®. Expanding on this, Serhii Kurykin has argued that there is also a 
political explanation for the weakening of the Green Movement; Zelenyi Svit was primarily an 
opposition movement. Following the collapse of communism it lost its political significance as 
uniting the (democratic) opposition. By 1992, however, this had still not been accepted by its 
members. Besides, the movement had no proper apparatus, but was run rather by a mixture of 
functionaries and elected representatives. Due to infighting to gain access to the leadership of 
Zelenyi Svit the association had lost influence over the political process in the country and had 
entered a destructive stage, destroying what had been built up*^ .^
Hlazovyi blamed political ambition for the decline that had taken place since 1991: ‘Both 
Zelenyi Svit and PZU  will fizzle out. We are faced with a cleansing of ideas. 1 may be too radical, 
but I hold the opinion that both o f them (i.e. ZS  and PZU) should abolish themselves. They are 
two monsters needed by nobody. When they emerged the social environment was unprepared. 
The potential of the Greens in Ukraine is enormous’. One has to be a very poor politician to 
‘abuse’ this potential the way the Greens have done. One of the problems is that the Green 
Movement as well as the Green Party are seen as a favourable ‘thing’ - through which one can 
make a career, without seriously committing oneself to their ideas’. Some people, like Volodymyr 
Tikhyi, even questioned the ideas of the Ukrainian Green Movement, claiming that Zelenyi Svit 
had no clear programme of action.
Others, were more positive, arguing that Zelenyi Svit would get through the crisis: Zhenia 
(one of the Kiev group’s young activists), for instance, argued that after Fedorinchyk took over as 
executive director at Podil things were happening. Whereas previously the office had been 
involved in disputes regarding foreign travel and equipment, Fedorinchyk had succeeded in 
obtaining computers through ISAR (and Fond Vidrodzhennia) to equip five regional offices. 
Moreover, the Green Movement was in the process of cleansing itself and would survive, Ihor 
Dzeverin was less optimistic, arguing that it might well be that Zelenyi Svit would not survive as a 
movement. However, the Greens would make a strong comeback once it became so dangerous to 
live in Ukraine that something simply had to be done to improve the state of the environment. 
Andrii Hlazovyi, on the other hand, argued that the future belonged to the small movements like
Anatolii Panov on bus to Zakaipatiia, April 1994.
This description is somewhat inaccurate, as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and several other small groups, 
such as the Culturological Club, were founded prior to Zelenyi Svit. The Green Movement, however, 
can be described as the first mass political movement in Ukraine (RUKH was founded the following 
year). For Mishchenko view, see 3e.m/M/i œ ir , no. 3, 1990, c. 5.
Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, 1992.
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Movement.
Overall, though, Zelenyi Svit was positive towards Western organisations offering grants, 
although ideally, the sponsors should have been Ukrainian:
100 This view has, needless to say, been contested by Serhii Plachynda, who holds the opinion that rather than 
setting up new groups, one must rather strengthen the one (i.e. Zelenyi Svit) that already exists.
 ^y.
MAMA-86 and the Ecocentre, which received material support from the West'®^. In Hlazovyi’s 
opinion, the only way in which the Ukrainian Greens could survive, was by receiving support from 
abroad. This created a certain discomfort for them as it was correct to say that the West thus 
effectively sets the agenda of the Ukrainian Greens (due to competition for grants) But it would 
take at least another four to five years before real Ukrainian sponsors would emerge.
Another problem is of course that people in Ukraine are generally sceptical o f foreign 4
' i ; 'organisations. Greenpeace, for instance, has in certain sections o f Ukrainian society an ‘image’ as | |
. 'aCan organisation which works for foreign money. Yet other problems arise as the problems %
Western Greens face are so different from those of the former USSR. Hlazovyi thus found it 
difficult to explain to the ‘West’ when it wanted the Ukrainian Greens to join a campaign against 
an international motorway to Kiev through the Carpathes that such a campaign would stand no |
chance in Ukraine as people wanted good roads. It could also be argued that the old roads were
bad from an ecological point of view - far worse than a new, modern motorway. Having said that, 1■f.though, he argued that one must distinguish between various countries when talking about the 
‘West’: ‘The Americans do not understand the Ukrainian Greens very well. The West Europeans, I
on the other hand, have a far better understanding, especially the Dutch, German and Y?
Scandinavians’
Others, like Sidorkin of Uman Zelenyi Svit were less willing to ask money from Greens in the 
West, holding the view that there were ways in which the Ukrainian Greens could work and earn 
their own money rather than having to ask or beg for them from foreign groups. Uman Zelenyi 
Svit developed a concept for how to achieve this and got involved in so-called ‘environmental ;|
enterprises’. Such fund-raising methods have, however, also been criticised from within the Green
101
I
i
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.
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Table 4.21 Attitude towards Foreign Sponsors
Group Positive Primarily positive, 
but danger that 
might become 
dependent upon them
Desirable to obtain 
grants from 
Ukrainian sponsors
Negative
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X X
Lutsk ZS X X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS
Nikolaev obi. ZS X X
Dzarylgach X X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X X
Most regional and local branches of Zelenyi Svit were in desperate need of some kind of 
funding, then activities organised to raise money by the chapters themselves were inadequate to 
cover costs incurred. Asked how funds were raised, the Greens replied as follows;
Table 4.22 Fund-raising
Group Member­
ship fees
Financial
activities
Sale of 
symbols etc.
Grants No funding 
available. 
This is a big 
problem.
Ternopil obi. ZS X
Mukachevo ZS
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS under 
planning 
(from 
charitable 
support of 
enterprises)
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS support 
from local 
commercial 
stractures 
and grants.
Uman ZS
Nikolaev obi. ZS X
Dzharylgach X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X X
li
4,;t'
I
II
434
A majority of the groups thought they could improve their financial situation by applying for 
grants from international organisations and by getting involved in financial activities such as small 
enterprises and by identifying possible sponsors. Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Svit also suggested the 
creation of ecological funds and of a holding-centre, through which the Green Movement benefit 
from the distribution of investments. The association also had its own ‘know-how’ on 
ecologically clean energy, which could be used as a source of income if only funding could be 
obtained for project work. Small enterprises could be created, argued Horlivka Zelenyi Svit, to re­
use secondary raw materials.
Table 4.23 How to Improve Zelenyi Svit’s Financial Situation.
Group Grants and sponsors Small enterprises and other 
financial activities
other
Ternopil obi. ZS X X
Mukachevo ZS
Bukovina ZS
Dnipropetrovsk obi. ZS X
Horlivka ZS X X
Lutsk ZS
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia obi. ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev obi. ZS
Dzharylgach
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X X
It seems likely that the Green groups which will survive are those that are either successful in 
obtaining grants and sponsor agreements with international organisations/Green groups and/or 
those groups which succeed in raising their own money through financial activities. One o f these 
groups, or rather ‘networks’, is EkoMisiia.
4.4.1 EkoMisiia
On 20-22 May 1994 a Conference on the Problems of Co-operation and the Priorities in the 
Activities o f Environmental NGOs took place at the sanatorium ‘Sosnovyi Bir’ in Kiev. The 
conference was initiated by EkoMisiia - a loose network of Ukrainian environmental groups based 
primarily in Kiev and was attended by 47 people, including myself, representing Greens in Kiev,
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Lviv, Kharkiv, Ternopil, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Klierson, Mariupol and the C r i m e a ' A l s o  
the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection was present, as were representatives of 
Greenpeace Ukraine, Milieiikontakt Oosteuropa (Holland), BUND and WWF (Germany), the ■ ^ y
Green Federation (Poland), ISAR (USA) and the Dutch Embassy in Kiev. The groups presented Y;
'33themselves and discussed problems arising from their work. A memorandum in which reasons
why NGOs were not operating well in the current political and economic conditions as well as
ways to amend this situation were laid out, was endorsed by the participants of the Conference:
aNon-governmental organisations (NGOs), Including environmental ones, 
are an indivisible part of the democratic system. In today’s Ukraine,
however, they are unable to play their positive role to the full extent, as
society has not yet been completely reformed. The lack of a legal base to 4 ||
regulate NGO activities, the absence of instruments, with which NGOs 
can exert influence on the decision making process and public ignorance 
on issues regarding existing ecological legislation, considerably decrease
the possibilities of efficient work. The potential of the Ukrainian Green i
Movement cannot be fully utilised also due to the absence of sufficient 
means of co-operation between the respective organisations as well as the 
information-link between them. A considerable number of 
environmental NGOs does not even have the technical equipment they 
need to function normally. The creation of a co-ordinating body and the 
provision of material and technical support to facilitate fruitful co­
operation, is an important means by which to preserve the environmental 
movement as such and also by which to facilitate its continued 
activation. From the viewpoint of various environmental groups the 
most efficient means by which to interact is a horizontal network based 
on the principle of parity between its members. Such a system was
created with the agreement of the conference by means of extending an ; |
existing network of environmental NGOs ‘EcoMisia’ to the national
level. Foreigners and international organisations take part in 'EkoMisiia'’ J;
as observers, ' ' #
TV coverage of the conference was provided and EkoMisiia was pronounced an all-Ukrainian
network, which Green groups were encouraged to join. Through EkoMisiia Greens would be able V
to take part in a continuous exchange of information and in the future they would gain access to a 
database containing information on the state of the environment in Ukraine, environmental
legislation, global ecological transformations and problems regarding sustainable development. ®%The network encouraged co-operation directly between local and regional groups and would also
These groups were: EkoPravo (Lviv, Kharkiv, Kiev), Zelenyi Svit (Ternopil, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk),
Dytyna i Dovkillia (Kiev), MAMA-86 (Kiev), Ekho-Vostok (Kiev), Ekologiia i Mir (Crimea), Spilka 
‘Vriatuvannia’ (Kiev), Ecological Cultural Center (Luhansk), Tsenter z informatsionnykh problem  
terytorii (Lviv), NFM  ‘Ekolis ’ (Kharkiv), Ecocentre (Kherson), Committee to Save the Azov Sea |  
(Mariupol), Aqua Vitae (Kiev), Medical Non-Governmental Fund ‘ Za radiiatsiinu ta ekologichu 
bezpeku’ (Kiev), PROsVITA (Kiev), Unicorn (Kiev), EkoMisiia (Kiev), Eletronna merezha dlia 
NUO  (Kiev), Greenpeace-Ukraine (Kiev). Y:
' i
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organise seminars and conferences on relevant topics. Finally, it would facilitate lobbying on 
environmentally important issues at various levels and publish and distribute ecological literature 
and periodicals. Strategy and priority issues would be decided at regular conferences by way of 
consensus. In order for the network to operate as smoothly as possible, an information service 
would be created on the base of the environmental publishing house Unicorn, where Hlazovyi 
worked. As priority issues EkoMisiia identified the following; environmental enlightenment, the 
selection and expansion of ecologically significant information, propagating the idea of 
sustainable development, work against further expansion of the nuclear industry and finally, the 
introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in the energy sector, industry and 
agriculture, EkoMisiia was committed to non-violent methods and to the idea of peace and co­
operation.
The Conference issued a resolution at the eve o f  the Congress, denouncing Presidential 
Decree No. 64 of 23 February 1994 and demand the ‘closure o f  the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station’. Moreover,
CTpaTeria eiieprosafiesneMeiiiui YKpalUM vtas fiasyuaTHca iia 
p a u iO H a j iu iO M y  UHKopucrainii i  vi{yiepiii:5anii iciiyioMux 
iioTyiKiiGcreH, eiteprosGepeîKeiiiii. umpoKOMy saiipoiiavi^Keimi 
TexiiojioriM a.rT bT epnaT t4B iiG i enepreTMKH.
To get an idea about how well known EkoMisiia was among local and regional chapters of 
Zelenyi Svit and what their attitude towards this initiative was, I included questions about the new 
network in the survey, which was conducted only a few days after EkoMisiia'’s Founding 
Conference. The Conference received publicity through TV and newspapers and the organisers of 
the conference, who were former members of Zelenyi Svit, had invited some local and regional 
groups to join the network. It was therefore possible to assume that Hlazovyi’s and Kurykin’s 
intentions were known at least in certain circles within Zelenyi Svit. The result from the survey 
confirmed this:
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Table 4.24 Knowledge o f  EkoMisiia
Group Heard about EkoMisiia Not heard about EkoMisiia
Ternopil oblast ZS X
Mukachevo ZS X
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS X
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dzharylgach X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X
Only two groups - Mukachevo and Lutsk - had not heard about EkoMisiia. Four of the 
respondents - Ternopil oblast, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Mariupol and the Ecocentre - attended the 
Founding Conference and joined the network. I was therefore interested in finding out what 
attitude those groups that did not join EkoMisiia had of it: Was it considered a competitor or were 
they positively inclined towards the new initiative? As the table below shows, the response was 
largely positive - none of the respondents expressed disapproval of EkoMisiia:
Table 4.25 Attitudes towards EkoMisiia
Group Positive Neutral Negative
Ternopil oblast ZS X
Mukachevo ZS
Bukovina ZS X
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS X
Horlivka ZS X
Lutsk ZS
Mariupol Greens X
Vinnytsia oblast ZS X
Uman ZS X
Nikolaev oblast ZS X
Dhzarylgach X
Ecocentre X
Odessa Greens X
Thus, should the majority and minority Zelenyi Svit fail to reach some agreement regarding 
the association’s name, office, stamp, bank account etc. it may be an option for local groups 
frustrated with the situation to either leave Zelenyi Svit altogether and join up with EkoMisiia or to 
establish some form of contact with groups working within this network. In December 1994 when 
research for this thesis was completed, the majority of EkoMisiia'’  ^ members were Kiev
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.organisations. Some local groups - with numerous clashes between Kiev and the districts within 
Zelenyi Svit fresh in mind - may for this reason be sceptical to the network. Others might not like 
the fact that Serhii Kurykin, deputy leader of PZU, initiated EkoMisiia together with another 
veteran of the Ukrainian Green Movement, Andrii Hlazovyi. However, EkoMisiia has already
established itself as a serious network, setting up communications in the form of access to email
II
and the Internet for local organisations and facilitating contacts with international sponsors and 
similar organisations abroad. If EkoMisiia succeeds in uniting a majority of local and regional 
groups throughout Ukraine and if infighting can be avoided, it might prove to be the ‘life jacket’ 
the Greens in Ukraine need right now - to help them through the current political and economic 
crisis in the country.
As for the Greens themselves, opinions are divided on the potential of EkoMisiia and of the
relatively small and specialised groups it unites. Ihor Kirilchuk, for instance, holds the view that
EkoMisiia does not share Zelenyi Svi f s  difficulties in making decisions. As it unites and has the
support of small groups, composed of people with shared views, members and participants are 
.interested in constructive work, not in quarrels and infighting. EkoMisiia can also draw on its own
:Ecocentre and publishing house.
Î
' i
Ihor Dzeverin, on the other hand, was more reserved in passing predictions: As EkoMisiia 
and many of the groups that have joined the network were founded primarily by people who left 
Zelenyi Svit due to conflicts, they are likely to after some time become victims of such conflicts. 
Therefore the network will remain small and relatively unknown. When asked if the fact that 
these groups are relatively well off financially due to their international contacts and possibly so 
content that conflicts may not necessarily arise, Dzeverin replied that this is of course possible.
But on the other hand, the ‘nationalists’ are not happy about receiving funding from abroad, and 
this may cause conflict in the future. In terms of funding, though, the Greens may not have any
■ 4:real alternative ~ at least in Hlazovyi’s view: ‘We cannot survive without assistance from abroad.
We need money and equipment and we do not have a properly developed network - it is easier for 
the Dutch, for instance, to spread our information. It is the groups with international contacts that 
survive’ and it is these groups that EkoMisiia unites. MAMA-86, for instance, received advanced 
equipment to measure radioactivity from abroad. Its readings are so accurate that Minzdrav 
(Ukrainian Ministry of Health) requests information from the organisation. The image this has 
earned the group as a credible source of information has opened doors to the media and to the 
political decision makers.
As for relations to Zelenyi Svit, Hlazovyi maintained that EkoMisiia wants to be a 
‘philosophical alternative’ to Zelenyi Svit, not a competitor trying to replace it. Many local and 
regional chapters of Zelenyi Svit which have left it have kept the name as it is well-known
A-
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throughout Ukraine. Some of the strongest chapters of Zelenyi Svit from Lviv (Tovarystvo Leva - 
alternative energy), Vinnytsia (eco-education), Bukovina (small rivers), and Kiev (the Youth 
League) have joined EkoMisiia as have the ecological publishing house Unicorn and a group of
Firstly, Andrii Hlazovyi and Serhii Kurykin, at whose initiative EkoMisiia^^'^ was set up and 
later expanded from a Kiev-based to an all-Ukrainian network, both have established close links 
with several foreign organisations (such as ISAR, Milieukontakt Oosteuropa, BUND and WWF).
A newsletter on the environment issued by Milieukontakt Oosteuropa and other green groups. 
See section below.
3
environmental lawyers (Ekojuristy). Meetings take place in Kiev once a week and if the topics to 
be discussed interest people then they will turn up. Funding is provided by Milieukontakt 
Oosteuropa.
In Hlazovyi’s view it is often the ones who organise contacts with abroad and do something 
concrete who are being criticised for it. Others do nothing but create discord and scandals; ‘now 
we have several organisations working on specific problems. We are moving away from a model 
with co-ordination. If someone gets a salary from an organisation in our country, they
I
I;fî
automatically think they have the right to control everyone and everybody. We think that is 
wrong. A loose structure is much better. Korbetskyi tried to modernise and reform Zelenyi Svit 
from within but he failed. We created EkoMisiia after the Fourth Congress as we realised that 
Zelenyi Svit was unable to do anything. Those left in Zelenyi Svit as of today are not capable of 
doing much’.
Others were more restrained in their assessment of EkoMisiia. Oleksii Kabyka of 
Greenpeace Ukraine and a former member of Zelenyi Svit, holds the view that while many of the 
new movements do their work - Hlazovyi, for instance, through Unicoim prints and distributes 500 
copies of WISE^^^ - their influence is still limited. Other groups, like ProSvita and MAMA-86 he 
was less familiar with. However, in order to have influence and be efficient there must be more of 
these groups. If  there were 1,000 of them throughout Ukraine, then it would be possible to talk 
about real influence. If there is only a hand-full, it is a weak movement. Kabyka thinks it unlikely 
that EcoMisia will strengthen the Green Movement as such - at least in the short term - arguing 
that the first signs of centralisation have occurred also within the network (‘Kiev’ trying to take 
control). It is, however, this network international organisations have chosen to cooperate with - it 
was not a coincidence that Milieukontakt Oosteuropa, ISAR, BUND and WWF attended its 
founding conference, which, by the way was also attended by Greenpeace Ulcraine.
In terms of grants, grass root organisations which are members of EkoMisiia seem more
likely to obtain access to these than do local branches of Zelenyi Svit. There are a number of
iireasons for this. Y
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Moreover, EkoMisiia has established contact with the International Department of the Ukrainian 
Ministry of the Environment, thus enabling it to further expand its international contacts. 
Secondly, due to the conflicts in Zelenyi Svit and the effect these conflicts have had on the 
activities of the association. Western organisations are less likely to provide the latter with 
grants
Finally, communication with local and regional groups is easier through EkoMisiia as this 
network is technically much better equipped than Zelenyi Svit. Unless things improve internally 
for Zelenyi Svit regional and local groups will be left with the following options: Either they can 
join EkoMisiia and seek support from abroad or they can get involved in economic activities 
(small enterprises, funds) locally, thus becoming self-financing. A third option is to seek support 
in the form of grants and sponsor deals directly with international organisations. This will become 
easier once local groups get access to computers and email (as seen above, Zelenyi Svit obtained 
computers for five regional offices through ISAR and Fond Vydrodzhennia). The two latter 
options might prove the most attractive for those who organised the alternative congress of Zelenyi 
Svit in Donetsk as Kui-ykin {EkoMisiia) is deputy leader of PZU  and they are negative to the Green 
Party.
4.5 Conclusion
As seen above, Zelenyi Svit collapsed as an all-Ukrainian association in December 1994, 
However, individual groups on both sides of the conflict remain relatively strong - especially the 
West Ukrainian groups, Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev and Dnipropetrovsk Zelenyi Svit. It might 
therefore be more correct to talk about a restructuring of the Green Movement rather than about its 
total collapse. Still one should not underestimate the damage the Green Movement has suffered 
from conflicts and disagreements over the last few years. Such conflicts are sometimes associated 
more with personalities and generations than with issues, and might in the end topple attempts at 
building new structures, such as EkoMisiia.
Possible scenarios for the further development of the Ukrainian Green Movement are 
explored in Chapter Nine, suffice it here to say that the future of the Ukrainian Green Movement 
will depend on some compromise being reached on the relationship between party and movement 
and also on issues. If these hurdles can be overcome, it might once again be possible to unite 
Greens in Ukraine - although the approach to environmental problems will inevitably change as 
the economic and political situation in Ukraine at present is very different from the one in which it
A report produced by Dag Arne H0ystad for the Swedish organisation ‘Forsurningssekretariatet’ 
concluded that ‘starting a project under the auspices of Zelenyi SvFs  Kiev office cannot be 
recommended as it would not be possible to prevent it from being pulled into Internal disagreements 
within the association’. Report obtained from Dag Arne I-foystad on email, 5.7.1995.
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emerged. Should they not be overcome, it seems likely that the Ukrainian Green Movement will 
remain fragmented and weak until either a serious environmental disaster once again hits the 
counti-y, bringing people together through necessity, or the economic situation improves so that 
people will again have the time and energy to engage in environmental and political activities.
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5 The Green Party of Ukraine {PZU)
5.0 Introduction
Although the focus of this thesis is on the Ukrainian Green Movement, the emergence of and 
development of the Green Party of Ukraine (Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy - PZU) has had a profound 
impact on Zelenyi Svit. It is therefore appropriate to take a closer look also at PZU  in order to gain 
a better understanding of the interaction between these two political forces.
When the idea o f setting up a Green Party was first launched in 1989, it was argued that 
whereas Zelenyi 5V/Y’s campaigning against environmentally harmful projects by mobilising the 
general public into action had been highly successful, the time had come to move ‘away from the 
streets’ and exert influence on political decisions through the very forums where these decisions 
were made - i.e. through local, regional and the national parliaments.
The Initiative Group to PZU  envisaged a division of tasks between, on the one hand, Zelenyi 
Svit, which would campaign at a general level, disclosing and raising public awareness o f 
environmental problems as a mass movement, and on the other hand, PZU, which would operate 
as the ‘political wing’ o f Zelenyi Svit, so to speak.
In this chapter I will assess PZU  with this division of tasks in mind, pursuing the argument 
from the previous chapter, that as the relationship between Zelenyi Svit and PZU  was never clearly 
defined, party and movement, rather than complementing each other, have had a negative impact 
on one another and on the whole, contributed towards the weakening of the Green Movement o f 
Ukraine. Their relationship was complicated by the fact that the Green Party was generally more 
oriented towards the West (the international green movement) than Zelenyi Svit, where people 
were more sceptical to the Western Green Movement and more concerned with national traditions. 
Many o f those people who were criticised within the movement for seeking close links with the 
international green community at the expense o f environmental problems at home became key 
figures within PZU. Thus, the conflict between the ‘globalists’ and the ‘nationalists’ developed 
from being simply an inter-movement issue into becoming a party-movement issue.
Secondly, I will look at public support for PZU  within the general context of Ukrainian 
politics, attempting to explain the discrepancy between the generally high green score in public 
opinion polls and the party’s poor election results. Finally, I try to place PZU  in the Ukrainian 
political landscape, arguing that the political strategy followed by the leadership o f the Green 
Party o f Ukraine has been a contributing factor to the party’s poor results in elections.
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6.1 The Emergence and Development of PZU (1989-91)
5.1.1 Establishing the Green Party
The Ukrainian Greens early on acknowledged that environmental issues and politics were closely 
linked and that in order to solve environmental issues, one had to put pressure on the political 
decision-makers. The successful election of prominent Greens such as lurii Shcherbak (Kiev) and 
Leontiy Sanduliak (Chernivtsi) to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1989 
strengthened the view of some Zelenyi Svit members that there was a need for a Green Party to 
complement Zelenyi Svit, the idea being that whereas the former mobilised the public in big 
campaigns, the latter would lobby the very same issues from within the political decision-making 
bodies to secure an optimal result. The ‘globalists’ (see Chapters Three and Four) furthermore 
saw it as a necessity to set up a Green Patty as this had been done by Green Movements in most 
West-European countries and as the Ukrainian Greens were a part of the broader, international 
Green Movement.
The CP SU did not change Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, according to which the 
Communist Party was the leading force in society (whose powers could not be challenged by any 
other political party or force) until February 1990. However, this did not stop people within 
Zelenyi Svit from raising the issue o f setting up a Green Party, in public. At Zelenyi Svit's
 ^Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.
1Inaugural Congress in October 1989 Andrii Hlazovyi initiated a debate around this issue. Many
people were against it but he won the support of lurii Shcherbak .
Those who opposed the initiative had various reasons for doing so; as pointed out in the
previous chapter, the members of Zelenyi Svit by no means constituted a homogenous group - but
rather a mix of ‘globalists’, ‘Ukrainians’ (or ‘patriots’), socialists, /^UATT-supporters and others.
.The socialists were naturally opposed to the idea of a Green Party as this was seen as a challenge 
to the CPSU. Others, such as the politically independent and supporters of other political 
movements, including RUKH, feared that a Green Party would seek to make Zelenyi Svit work for 
its purposes. There was also fear that too close links between movement and party might damage 
the credibility of the Greens among a population suspicious of the very notion o f political parties.
Trying to accommodate these diverging views and reassure the CPU, Shcherbak at the 
Zelenyi Svit's Founding Congress focused on the issue of form, arguing that the kind o f Green 
Party envisaged by Green activists in Ukraine differed in principle from traditional West European 
Green opposition parties à  la die Grünen in Germany:
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...3Ta napTHii ne 6opoaacb 6li m ujiacrb, oiia ne 5yjieT
KOH(l)pOElTHpOBaTLClI C KOMMyilHCI'HiieCKOH lUipTMeH. 1)0.166 TOIT),
KOMMyiiHcm MorjiH 0 y  craTL M.nenaMH napruH "3e.a6niix"\
The Green Party would rather represent the interests of the environment at the political level:
A Green Party.,.is required in order to make decisions taking into 
account the environment. It is also required so as to spread ecological 
thinking through ‘green deputies’ not only at a national but also at a local 
level.
Others, such as Kononov, wanted to establish a Green party to conduct green politics for the 
veiy reason that there were many communists and ex-communists in Zelenyi Svit, making it 
difficult to conduct ‘green’ politics through the association.
Although the Congress in the end endorsed the idea to set up a Green Party, many people 
remained highly sceptical. A frequently used objection was that the Green Movement was not yet 
ready for such a step. Thus, not few agreed with lavoryvsky, who argued as follows:
HasBdTbCfl napraeH ivtajio. HeoSxo/EMiwLi eme Kaiiecrua. npMcyuine 
napTHH: nocjteAOBaTejibiiocrL b AeHcroMfix, 4McnMnjiHiia,
H4eojiorHMecKan njiaTtpopwa, oTMexceuauHe (caK ot .neiibix, rax  n or 
npaobix Te'ieiiMH. A aconnauMa noxa 4to coctoht hx po3po3uennbix 
rpynn n nepeqHcneHiibiMM xaaecrBaMM ne objiam er^
In the aftermath o f the Congress, considerable efforts were made to appease and convince 
those sceptical to the idea that a Green Party would in no way be a threat to Zelenyi Svit. Andrii 
Hlazovyi, for instance, in an interview with News from  Ukraine^ said the following:
This does not mean in any way that the association sets itself the aim to 
become a party...The would-be party will, most probably, enter the 
association as one of the collective members. The matter is that we feel 
the time has come to set up a party on the grounds of ideology common 
for all the Greens in different counti’ies of the world to more effectively 
work for the implementation of our principles into everyday life.
Others like lurii Myshchenko, for instance, had a slightly different understanding o f what 
relationship there should be between movement and party, voicing the opinion that Zelenyi Svit 
would transform itself into a political party, but that this would happen gradually, over time;
 ^KoMCOMOMCKoe simmn, 5.11.1989. 
News from Ukraine, no. 45, 1989.
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In principle the idea of transforming (my underlining) Zelenyi Svit into a 
Green Party was broadly accepted (by the Congress). However, we are 
still a young organisation. Though Zelenyi Svit has united many Green 
groups, in organisational and financial terms, we are not yet fully 
prepared to form such a party .^
Details of the new party were still vague and although an initiative committee was being 
established to prepare a plan of action, a key figure at the Congress told The Uh-ainian Weekly that 
it may take some time before a Ukrainian Green Party would become a reality. Even after 
organisational work had started to establish PZU  objections were raised at the speed by which this 
work was proceeding: Serhii Fedorinchyk, for instance, at a niee ,g of the Kiev PZU  Initiative 
Group on 18 June 1990, argued that it was too early to set up a Green Party. However, once the 
time was right, it ought to operate through Zelenyi Svit^.
While preparations to form PZU  started, further attempts were made to define the future 
relationship between movement and party and to justify the need for a Green Party. R. Stepaniak, 
one o f the members o f the PZU Initiative Group, the head of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast Zelenyi Svit 
and deputy of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast soviet put it the following way:
”3eJienHH CbIt” yTBopMBiuMCb lia x n i J i i  i ie 5 y iia .. io ï  a ic r M ii i i ia i i i l  
rpoMa^CLKoro i m e p e c y  jio  npobjieivi e K O J io r ii , jikh c r a j in  rojiOBiiHMM 
npobaeMaMH i i a i i i ï ,  M oxce spoÔHTH 5 a r a ïo .  i  m n  pcriiiMTxy aoD oro  
eK O J ior ia iioro  MHCJienHii, i  4Jia . a i x B i m i i i l  i ia c .r ii4 X iB  rux  
4 e 0 o p M a u iü  y  posBHTxy eK ouoM iK H , iik h  npH3ne.riM 4 0  3arpo3JiMBoro 
eK O J ioriq u oro  maiiOBM iua, KO.an nM raaau b^kc c r o i 'n .  'I'aic; iiM^XMiia 
au n i  p i 4  Jii0 4 CbKHH? A j ie  a c o i i i a i i i i i  ”3eae iiM û C u i r ” -  n e .iim iie  
CB0£p i4HHH eKOaorlMIlHH rpOMa4CbKHH <l)pOHT. y  Moro lUnpOKiW  
MacoBOca'i lie  T im x M  c n a a , a  h  c j ia G x ic r b . o c ic i . ib x n  iv iacon ici'b  
iieM Hiiyqe npH3B04HTb 4 0  po3MHnaiiiia o c iio b iih x  n p n iin u u iB  r e o p i i  i  
npaxTMKH BJiaciie p y x y  ’’aejieiiM x” -  o i i i i i E i  3 iipoBl4M H x  
i 4 eo jio r iq H H x  i  nojiiT M q im x ch ji c y a a c i io r o  c i i i r y .  l 4 eo .r [o r iii 
Uboro p y x y  rp y irry eT b ca  iia c r p y iiK iH , a i r i c o  n n s iiaae iiiM  
c o u ia j ib H lH , eKOHOMlMiiiH, n oJ iiT M a iiiH  vd K y.abTyp iiiH  x o i m e i m i i  
i  KOpHCTyeTbCfl MacoBOio n i4T puM K 0 io  nepu i 3a o c e  i i r r e a i r e i m i i  
Ta ocB iq en H X  BHpobiiHquHKiB. 3au4BK u uboiviy ”3 e .a e n i” ocod J iiB O  y 
3 a x ± 4 H iH  E o p o n i ,  npoflBM.an c e 5 e  a x  c h j i li ih h , Bn.nuBOBWM 1 n tom  
4ce a ac xoHcrpyxTHB iiHH, SBaxeiiM fi p y x  .a iu o a eM o x p a T u a u o ro  
nanpiiM xy^.
Anatoliy Panov argued similarly in an article published in Zelenyi svit :
 ^The Ukrainian Weekly, 3 12.1989, p. 3.
- riDGTGKOJI sSODiB iHiulaTHBtlOl FDVnH 037. Khïd. 18.06.1990. 
 ^UpuKapnaTCbKa npasjia, 17.3.1990 (n.p.).
3eitennH CBii\ no. 6,1990, c. 4.
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Ajie îK yMOBM namoro rio.riiTMiiiioro î k h i t î i  T a x i ,  mo oxpiM 
M acoBO l nenapT iMiioï o p r a n is a u i ï .  î i x o i ü  e  ”3e;ieiiMH c b I t " ,  
BMMHKaE iieo G x iiiiiic i’L mbth rpoMa^cLKe ipipo. iieaiiy riojiiTHMiiy 
CHJiy 3 qiTKOK) i4 e o j io r i£ io  i  KoiiicperiinM no/iiTMaiiMM 
cnpflMyBanHflM. T axo io  c k . b o i o  mue cm ™  napT ia 3e.aeimx YKpaïiiw.
This view was endorsed by Haran (1991), who explained the need for a Green Party as 
follows: ‘in order to protect the environment one needs “green’' politics. And this, in turn,
requires not only a mass organisation like Zelenyi Svit, but also a party’ .^
Preparations and Debate
On 23 March 1990, the Initiative Group to the Creation of PZU  gathered in Kiev. The meeting, 
which was attended by Greens from various parts of Ukraine, listened to and discussed draft 
statutes and programmes as well as a political declaration. A co-ordinating committee and three 
commissions (editorial, organisational and information commission) were set up. A resolution, in 
which the Initiative Group solemnly declared that the formation of PZU  had started, was adopted 
by the meeting. Preparatory work was to be completed by 26 April 1990 at the fourth anniversary 
of the accident at Chernobyl and the founding congress was scheduled for the autumn. Members 
o f the general public were encouraged to join the new party:
Y c ix , XTO X0B6 B3JITH yqacTb y crBOi^eimi F13Y, icoxiy iieSaH/iy/iva 
40411 Y x p a lH M , 3 a n p o u iy £ M O  40 aici'MBiioi yqacri y CTBopemii 
H a u iG l n a p T ii: SBepiauTecb 40 Micnenux n p r a i im a n iM  ”3e.rie[ioro
CBixy”*°.
Local and regional branches o f Zelenyi Svit were crucial in setting up party groups throughout 
Ukraine. The resolution passed by the Kiev meeting therefore sought to quell any potential 
conflicts between supporters and opponents of PZU  within Zelenyi Svit from the veiy start:
CTBopeinifl n a p T i l  3e/ieuM x YxpaiuM ue ne;)e4Gaqa E 'i'panc(|)Gpiviauil 
d ejie iioro  C B iry y  napT iio . X oqa nporpaiviiii u i J i i  i  Mcm 
eKOJiGriquoro nopary iiKy YKpaxiiw y  3e.iieiiGro C a iT y  {aic 
a c G u ia u i ï )  i  n 3 Y  (bk i ia p T il)  c x o a c i ,  arie MerG4M i  (popMU i x  
4 iB 4 b iio c r i  p i3 H i. Y n a p 'r i i  b o u m  c y r o  n o a i r m a i i -  
napjiaMeHTCbKi, a  y  a c o n i a n i ï  -  ipoMa4CbKi, mo rpyirryioTbca iia 
sajiyqeni 40 npH po400xopo iiiiG i 4 iiiiib n o c:r i iiaHiuHpiuHX BepcTB 
cycniJibCTBa, crypSoBaiiHux cra iiG M  4GBKi.ruui i  340POB ' a iiapo4.y.
O. B. PapaHb, ‘ B a r a T G n a p T i H H i c T b  ua Y K p a i n u :  ( f G D M V B a i i u a .  n D o 5 . n e M H .  n e n c n e K r a B H ’  i n  B.
BiKTopeuKO (pe4), YKnalna SaraTonapTiHua (Khib: Mfl ’’riaM'fiTicM YKiDainu”. 1991), c. 26. 
’ Pe30JiK)uin sbopiB ii tiu ia ra B u o i rpvnu no crBOpeiBiio fla p rix  3e.neiiHX YKpaiiiu (I13Y).
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" K-2, 21:00, 10.4.1990, transcribed in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Libeity 
Monitoring, 10.4.1990, no. UF-108, p. 11.
Kyjibrypa i  no. 14, 1990, c. 2.
SaaeifMM coiT, no. 1,1990, c. 6-7 and SanenMM œ ii\  no. 3, 1990, c. 1.
14 Kyjibrypa I  æhttji, no. 14, 1990, c. 2.
The resolution was signed by 31 people, three of whom were women. All of them, except for
V. Masaryk, who was listed as ‘assistant secretary to USSR People’s Deputy, lurii Shcherbak’,
were rank-and-file members of Zelenyi Svit and a majority of them held high positions in the
movement: two were deputy leaders (Panov and Hlazovyi), nine were members of Zelena Rada
and six sat on Zelenyi Svit's secretariat. A majority of the signatories were from Kiev (17). Other
regions represented were Ivano-Frankivsk (4), Zhytomyr (2), Chernivtsi (1), Cherkasy (1) and the
Crimea (1). A number o f these people were already members of political institutions: two were
USSR People’s Deputies (Shcherbak and Sanduliak), one - a member from the Crimean oblast
soviet, one from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast and local soviets as well as a number of deputies from
local soviets in Kiev (6), Ivano-Frankivsk (1) and Cherkasy (I). Thus PZU  already from the very
beginning had a substantial deputy group. This was needless to say very important for a party
which saw political power as the most important means by which to improve the state of the 
.environment in Ukraine. Finally, a majority of those who endorsed the resolution had higher 
education and were in their late 30s or early to mid 40s (i.e. slightly younger than the members of
Zelenyi Svit).
.Although the Green Party would be concerned with the environment, this would not be its
primary task. Vitalii Kononov in an interview on Ukrainian r a d io  o n  10 April 1990 sa id  that
Ha nepuie Micue, nerieaae, Bce 4c raKH y a i a e  iio.riiTHqna 6opoTi>6u.
I  a noBHnen cKasarn, mo eKo.noria 6y 4e  aa 4pyr0iViy M ic u i" .
A similar view was voiced by Andrii Hlazovyi in Kidtnra i zhyttia^^: ‘the new political
organisation will not limit itself to (addressing) ecological questions only’. Its major concern 
would be to demolish the centralised economic and administrative system and build a free and 
open society.
People who were interested in joining PZU  were encouraged to contact local chapters of the
.Green Movement for assistance in setting up local party groups along territorial or professional 
lines, which would then later combine into regional groups - the idea being that regional party 
groups would be united at the national level during the autumn 1990 Congress'^. Zelenyi Svit and 
other informal environmental organisations were also taking actively part in discussing the draft 
programme and declaration of PZU^^.
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Movement, Iryna Lasar, who suggested he contact Serhii Khlebas, a Ternopil scientist, who was 
actively involved in environmental work. In the spring of 1990 these two - independently o f one 
another - drafted a statute. The statutes turned out to be almost identical. A third statute was then
therefore, did not allow for former CPSU members to hold any positions in PZU..
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:The two most active local initiative groups were Kiev and Ternopil. Both groups,
independently of one another, started working on the party documents in early 1990. As seen .-M
above, no Ternopil Greens attended the Kiev meeting of the PZU Initiative Group in March 1990. j ’l
However, talks about setting up a Green Party started there already in February the same year. y
Rostyslav Tverdostup, currently leader of Ternopil oblast Zelenyi Svit and a pacifist by conviction,
. .wanted to create an anti-militaristic party. He confided in a fellow member of the Green ;ï
developed on the basis of the two already made. A poster containing three points for the formation 
of an initiative group followed shortly after, and finally, a conference o f Ternopil oblast Zelenyi 
Svit convened, at which the initiative group was set up.
Drafting a Statute
In May 1990, the newspaper Zelenyi svit printed a draft statute proposed by Anatolii Panov (Kiev).
Panov favoured a hierarchical (and in the view of some fellow-Greens, totalitarian) movement Si
structure. Tverdostup and Khlebas having read it, decided it was inappropriate. Joined by Andrii |
Olenchyk - also from Ternopil - they re-edited their own statute. Unlike Panov, the three Ternopil 
Greens wanted a more anarchistic party structure. Their revised draft statute did not allow for the 
exclusion of members. One could, however, dissolve a party club and rid the party o f individual 
members who had failed to take part in the work of a club for the previous three months. It would 
be difficult to join the party, but once a member, there should be ‘limitless’ democracy.
Not all members o f the Ternopil Initiative Group, however, shared
■ ‘" ':4
Tverdostup/Khlebas/Olenchyk’s ideas: whereas one half of the members supported their statute 
another half favoured that o f Panov. Among the latter was Ihor Pushkar, a prominent figure in the 
Ternopil oblast Zelenyi Svit. As seen in the previous chapter, he organised the Esperanto group at 
the Vatra enterprise and later also Noosfera, Ternopil’s first green group. Pushkar strongly
;
opposed the admission of former CPSU members to the Green Paify. When the leader o f the 
oblast Zelenyi Svit organisation, Volodymyr Vydaiko, a former CPSU member, expressed a wish 
to join PZU, Pushkar was very much against this, although Vydaiko had been working actively in 
Zelenyi Svit for some time. Pushkar’s draft statute, based on Panov’s version, not surprisingly
In August 1990, a West-Ukrainian Green Party Conference convened. The leader of the 
Ivano-Frankivsk Greens, Stepaniak, attended as did people from Netyzhyn and Lviv. At this 
conference three versions of the statute were debated:
1) Panov’s.
2) Pushkar and Kulyshnyk’s
3) Khlebas, Tverdostup and Olenchyk’s.
SeJieiiHH cB iT  ([ly iiK u iony£ qiTKO, tu k  zee m ue (k y iiK n io iiy B a in  i  
opranisau iHHM H KOWireT 3e.r ienoï n a p x i l ’^
In the end, the third version was favoured. The Ternopil draft statute was to be printed 
locally so that it could be brought to Kiev by those attending the Founding Congress o f PZU  to be 
held in Kiev towards the end of October 1990. Five days prior to the Congress, however, 
Tverdostup and his associates discovered that Rovesnik, the local newspaper which had taken on 
this job, was going to print Pushkar’s statute! They tracked down Pushkar and put him with the 
following ultimatum: either he support their (i.e. Tverdostup, Khlebas, Olinchyk) statute, or he 
leave PZU. Before the newspaper could be printed, the print workers thus had to re-set the types. 
One point (aim: eco-socialist society) had been removed from this statute following the West- 
Ukrainian Party Conference, but otherwise it remained unchanged.
Prior to the PZUCongress the Ternopil Greens had attended two consultative meetings on the 
creation of PZU  in Kiev. At these two meetings they allegedly received a rather cool welcome,
, 5being perceived of by the Kiev activists as the ‘provincialists’ from Ternopil , although the group 
formed by Tverdostup in May 1990 as the ‘Party Club of Green Esperantos’ became the first 
party organisation not only in Ternopil oblast, but in Ukraine as such. A second party club 
Aspekt, headed by Khlebas, also emerged prior to the PZU  Congress.
In Kiev there were also diverging views as to what structure to choose for the new party. 
Like Tverdostup/Khlebas/Olenchyk, the ‘Internationalists’ also wanted as much inter-party 
freedom as possible. Panov did, however, have support also in Kiev: At a meeting in Kiev on 18 
June 1990, Shulga referred to the success o f Zelenyi Svit, which was largely attributed to the tight 
structure of the association, arguing that similarly, PZU could be successful only if it had a well- 
organised apparatus:
16
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Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Kiev, 20.5.1994.
As of May 1994 there were five PZU clubs in Ternopil (Information provided by Rostyslav Tverdostup, 
SosnovyiBir, 20.5.1994). 
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In this connection it is interesting to note that whereas those who favoured a tight party 
structure (Panov, Pushkar) belonged to the older generation (late 40s/early 50s), their counterparts 
were younger (early 30s) and had good knowledge of the Western Green Movement (the Ternopil 
activists through the Esperanto groups and direct contacts to Polish Greens and West-European 
Greens, the Kiev activists to West-European Greens through Zelenyi Svit).
A number of meetings took place by the Kiev Initiative Group during the spring and summer 
o f 1990, and the issue of structure took up a substantial part of the discussion. Many of those 
present emphasised that one had to prevent PZU  from becoming a patchwork of authoritarian 
structures, like the CPSU and also a group o f informal political organisations such as URP. At the 
same time care should be taken so as not to create merely a ‘party-club’ for political discussion, of 
which there was also an abundance'^.
The Ternopil statute was discussed by Kiev Greens for the first time at a meeting of PZU  
initiative groups from all over Ukraine, which took place in Kiev on 10 August 1990. The major 
aim o f the meeting was to prepare the founding conferences of regional party organisations as well 
as to continue the discussion of the draft statutes and programme principles for the national party. 
At the meeting, Klilebas repeated Ternopil’s wish for a unitary structure from below up, warning 
that otherwise the Greens would simply repeat what was referred to as the ‘mistake’ made by the 
communists: i.e. create a pyramid of power. Rank-and-file party members must be given
extensive rights and internal democracy was a ‘must’. Hlazovyi supported IGilebas, arguing that a 
horizontal structure was classic for Green Parties. Aleksandr Bagin (Donetsk) also favoured the 
Ternopil statute on the grounds that the official (i.e. Panov’s) version simply was a copy of the 
CPSU’s statute.
Rather than making those present choose one of the statutes, Shcherbak, who presided over 
the meeting, sought a compromise;
18
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C r a r y T  T e p t to n iJ im a ii  -  zeMOxparMunnA. a  n a p ia i ir  K n s i îa  -  
6iJibiuoBHTCLKHH...CTBopMTH p ob oB y  rp y u y  no p o b o T i  i ia z  craiyTQ.vi. 
Poboqa rpyna o 6 '  E/n iaa 2 - a  cra iy T H . Ilap.riaM enTap iB ue buozmth 
B opr. crpyK T ypu  n a p r i l^ ^ .
Khlebas was elected head of the editorial commission, whereas Panov was made co-leader, as 
the author of the Kiev version o f the statute. Other members of the commission were later 
appointed on a regional basis.
_____________________________
3eJiennfi œ lT .n o .'i ,  1990, c. 1: m eetingof KievPZC7Organisational Committee, 16.5.1990. 
Hanaaa njyKpaliiH . K hib. 10.08.1990 p.
One of the issues the editorial commission would have to consider, was whether PZU should 
be a mass organisation or whether a limited party membership was preferable. Many people
20 riDOTOKOJt 3 6 o D iB  l i i iü ia T H B H O ï rpvuH HBY. Knln. 18.06.1990 p.
shared Pushkar’s fears that former CPSU members might seek to infiltrate the Green Party so as to 
exert influence from within. In order to avoid this, some (Samiilenko, Maiytskyi) suggested that
people wanting to join the paity go through a test period of two years as candidate members prior 
to being adopted as fully-fledged members. This was surprisingly similar to the practice already 
followed by the CPSU. With regard to party size, Serhii Fedorinchyk (Kiev) at a meeting in June
1990 warned that PZU  might become a mass party, which in his opinion, was not the best option^®. g
Similar views were held by M. Butsyn (also Kiev), who two months later at a meeting in Kiev 
argued as follows:
‘;î;
OrKpbiïMe ([lopMbi lie roiifiTcn m iie fipaTcroo. fl aOco.iioriio |
iiecorjiaceii, mto mozoio ocex iipuiiMMarb. Kazczbin"’. IOthers, like lurii Babinin from Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), referring to the US .:p
‘■'"ÎRepublican Party, argued that PZU ought to be open to anybody wishing to join, the criterion
■" #being a wish to cooperate with the party.
As members o f the Kiev Initiative Committee were preoccupied with making arrangements
for setting up the Green Party at the national level, the Kiev party group did not emerge until 17 3#
■‘P'September 1990. Preparations for setting up the group, however, started after the Green Party had 
been officially proclaimed on 22 April 1990 - the International Earth Day. One o f the first
meetings o f the Kiev party club, which took place in Kiev on 16 May 1990, was rather 
disorganised and there was considerable confusion and disagreement among those present as to 
what approach to follow. A meeting held about a month later, on 18 June, proved more
.s'-'-'constructive; on the agenda were the Kiev PZU Conference, the election of head, organisational 
committee and composition of commission as well as time and place for the conference and 
representation o f groups. Three co-organisers were elected: Havrylov, Ivanov and Svyryda.
Drafting a Programme
The people who initiated PZU were motivated not only by what was perceived as a need for a 
political party to maintain the interests of the environment at the political level, but also by the 
success of Green Parties in Western Europe. Close links were established between leading figures 
in die Grünen and members o f Zelenyi Svit (Hlazovyi and Kurykin) during Christmas o f 1989 
when the latter were visiting Germany and it was thought that the Ukrainian Greens needed a Party
..
Hanaiia nSyKPalHU. Kh ib . 10.08.1990 p. : ■
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Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994. Kononov in an interview on Ukrainian R.adio claimed
also as a  m eans by w hich to  give them  an equal position w ithin the In ternational Green M ovem ent.
Having developed a sound knowledge of Western Green Politics, Andrii Hlazovyi, who elaborated
one of the draft programmes discussed at the Inaugural Congress of PZU, u se d  th is  knowledge as a 
starting point when writing the programme: T had access to the programme die Grünen and 
took approximately 65 per cent from there, simply translating it into Ukrainian. My version of the 
programme was therefore characterised by Green o r t h o d o x y G r e e n s  in West Ukraine 
(Tverdostup, Khlebas and a person from Klimelnytskyi who later left the part\ ) were also well 
acquainted with the ideas of the West European Greens and included some of t h e s e  in their version 
of the programme, which was much shorter than Hlazovyi’s version, but otherwise rather similar.
During the spring and summer of 1990 some of these ideas were presented in the Ukrainian 
press as the ideas of PZU. Stepaniak from Ivano-Frankivsk, outlined the basic ideas of the 
Ternopil programme in an article in Prikarpatska pravda on 17 March 1990. A major difference, 
he argued, between PZU  and other political parties, was that to the former, the ecological issue 
was seen as an ‘absolute and indisputable priority’. PZU  would seek to build an 'eco-socialisf or 
‘solidaric’ society, whose basic principle was as follows:
Bona lie cyneitenHTb i z e im  iiayKOBoro co iiia .a i:tM y, a .ie  40  
Bupiuieriiia Oararhox cycn i.nu io-no.r iiT H q iiux iiMTUiib G e.ic iii"
n i 4 X0 4 îiTb inaK u ie, n o - iiim o M y  conn posyw iioT b i  
sarajîb iioiiapozHOï zepzcaoH, ï ï  cou iajib iio -eK O iioM iq iii npHiiUiniM.
%
At the same time, however, PZU  was not against national independence. Economic, political 
and cultural sovereignty was seen as essential to facilitate an improved state of the environment in 
Ukraine. The interests of the nation ranked higher than those of the state, but people’s interests
(those o f the ethnically largest group as well as those of the minorities) ranked above anything 
else. This principle, argued Stepaniak, was the essence of Green Humanism. To the initiators of
PZU, the Green Ideology was seen as a logical step towards the development of an international 
democratic tradition, paving the way for a new, post-industrial epoch in the history of civilisation, 
‘a symbiosis of global humanism, democracy, morality and independent individuals, rooted in
that not only the programme of die Grünen, but also of the Slovak and Scandinavian Green Parties had 
been thoroughly studied by the initiative group. The best elements of these programmes, which were 
applicable to the Ukrainian context were used. Plowever, as the situation in Ukraine was very different 
from that of Western Europe, PZU would become perhaps a completely new kind of party. (K-3,
21:00, 10.4.1990), transcribed in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest, Radio Liberty Monitoring, 
no. UF-108, p. 11).
. Î
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Idifferent doctrines, from Christ to Marx, from Buddha to Gandhi, expressed at different ages and 
times, but very harmoniously inter-linked’.
According to Stepaniak, Greens were not absolutists, but rather pragmatists with original 
solutions to problems common to different societies: ‘the Greens are f i l l ing the same role in 
politics as the avant-garde does in culture’. Politically, the Greens did not occupy a position in the 
traditional sense to the left or right, but were moving ‘in the front’ of traditional parties. PZU  
would not seek to become a mass party, but wanted active people in its ranks. Its attitude towards 
technology was characterised by realism and a pragmatic approach: the Greens, although not 
against technology per se, were
3 a  TaKHH iiayK O BO -T ex iiiquH H  nporpec:, sikmh 5 h rap .v io iiiionan  .i 
iB T epea iM H  npHpozM i  .nioam iH.
¥
I
The best recipe for solving the current international ecological crisis was to put an end to 
monopoly (capitalist as well as pseudo-socialist), aiming towards the decentralisation of society 
and equal rights for everyone.
The state should, by the standards o f the Greens, be a ‘federation of independent citizens, united in 
organisations by conviction and interests. That as it was a ladder where the highest and lowest 
step were equally important’. PZU  was not only a green party, but also an anti-military party; one 
of its major aims would be to destroy all types of weapons (nuclear, chemical and biological) as 
these were regarded amoral and destructive. Furthermore, the party wanted to dissolve all military
I
blocks. Although members of the PZU  were pacifists, they acknowledged that the time had not 
yet come for complete disarmament by means of dissolving national armies. Rather than armies 
based on the drafting of conscripts, however, PZU  favoured professional, small armies. 
Institutions such as the KGB, Ministiy o f the Interior and the Ukrainian Army ought, in the 
opinion of the Greens, to be subordinated to Verkhovna Rada.
'Ukrainians' vs. Internationalists' r rwj  ^<
2 3As pointed out by Hlazovyi , few members of PZU  were familiar with international green
ideology - not even among the party’s leadership. Whereas a few highly visible and active 
members o f the initiative group thus sought a dialogue with Greens abroad, others were critical of 
their approach, arguing that they were too blindly adopting the views and ideas of the West- 
European Greens. Many of the criticisms voiced in the discussion of the party programmes 
preceding Congress in September 1990 focused on the differences between East and West.
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Volodymyr Ivanov^" ,^ argued that as Ukrainian conditions were different from those of Western
B k n a  Mette, fto M y  np H T a M a iiiii'ifi "teaeitHH iv.iacMUHSM", tooto 
opiEirranin iia apnauHnM "tcaacMsnnx' seaeiiMX iiap'riH 3 a \ i 4 i i o i  
Etiponn, aemo MexaiiiMiio cnpoeia’oitaiii iia tiamy a in c i i ic ii ) .
24 3ejienMM CBiT, no. 6, 1990, c. 3.
*:•
'3:ï
-f
Europe, the programme must reflect these differences:
Concepts such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ carried different m e a n i n g s  i n  t h e  East and 
West, and this needed to be stated clearly by PZU:
„
T e p M it tH  -  ’’c o i t ia j i i s M ”, 'K a n i r a a is M  M a io ii, y  i ia e  .ta e iM a e cH T  
p o K iB  B2K6 C K ia iiK H  3 a B ro ituo  T a y M a q e i i h .  O K p i M  t h x .  u io  i i o i i i i i p r m  
y  U J i i e u i i ,  ( D p a im i i  m d a x U u i iH  H iM e s a n a i .  A a e  ft . j a x i a i i i
’s e a e i i i” Bzce Saiarro ‘loro BipaTMan aepe's "iieBita.ai poviaiiii a 
KOMyHicrawH «iw couiaJi-yteMOKparaMH.
Ivanov was not at all happy with the term ‘eco-socialism’. He advised that T h o se  people who 
are in a position to allow themselves to play those games’. The Ukrainian Greens should avoid 
playing with such concepts in their programme, even more so as they w ere  o f  a declarative 
character. Instead, they should seek to revive and make use of Ukraine’s own traditions (what I 
have referred to as ‘eco-culture’ in Chapter One):
i f
,1
...E K oaor i'iH a  cB i40M icn >  saK aaaeiia y  T p a a n u iu iiy  a a u io i ia a w iy  
CBiitOMiCTb YKpaiiiM. I  H i eK O .r ioriq iii T p a 4 H H i i  'I'pcfin 
B i4o6pa3H T H  y  n c r y r i i .
B m to k h  c B i40M0 eK 0 4 o riM n o ro  c'raB.neiiiiH 40 cepeTOBMiiia i c i i \  imiiini 
a i04HBH M as MO lia y c i x  e r a n a x  a y x o B i io i  i c r o p i i  Y K p n in n . 
3KMBMM P03BHT0K i 4 6 i  rap M O Iliî JU04H1IM TB C B i'iy  H46 iS i4  441111 i \  
CJiGB'Jin 4 0  ’’o T iiiB  iiepiienTBa” npeii04o6iiM X A iiT o iiiB  ra  ( D e o a o c i s  
neaepcLKHX, m o  sa K a a a u  n i4B ajiH im  a y x o n i io i  r e o p i i .  eK o iiO M i'iiio i  
Ta a r p a p i io i  npaKTUKH M o iia cra p iB . Æ r n i  m o i 4 e i o  n i4X oim ioiO T i. 
Ta po3BHBaiOTb 4 i a a i  K u a B o -M o m m i i ic b ic o i  A K a a e M i i ,  iiosfaB U B im i 
‘iepe3 i4 e o a o r i q ! iy  B i4 K p u T ic r b  ra m npoK y apa icrm cy M iT o ia p o a im x  
KynbTypuHX KOiiTaKTiB yK pa iiiC bK y c B ia o M ic r b  | ) o r io t ia . ib i io i  
ofiM eJtceaocrri. 3 a  tm x q a c i i ;  Y ic p a iiia  y c n i 40MH.na c e d e  s a c n i i io io  
EBjx)nH.
Y  'MorHaaiicbKOMy” cei^eTO Bum i 3P040m n n p ic  f p n r o p iü  C K opo iim ia. 
% p e3  rapM O H iuiiy e r m c y  " M iicp o - ra M a icpoK oav iociu”. ucinpoM  
BKO i sn o n y  c i'a j ia  KoiiKi^eTiia .riioTCbica ocoÔ H C T icrb, 'lepea  
n e 4 a r o r iK y  " c p o m io i n p a n i ” B in  3noB noB ep iiyn ”xpmctiimiici>k>’ 
Y K p a iH y ” oSanq'iiiM  40  jbo4Hiim.
H obh h  ’’KocMiqiiHH .3/I6T” 11440.43 eKOJiori'iiiiM Uiei lia Y k p a i i i i  
T eop ia aKa46MiKa Bepiia4CbKoro, ima n CTBopuaa oasnc 44a
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noHOBJienna eKoaoriMiioro n iim yrrn i  ciipHHiiHTi'îi cyiuu;iiii\ i  imi 
3axi4no£BponeHCbKMX ’fejieiiMx" y n a i j i o M y  cyciii.iL cru i.
As part of this revival of past attitudes towards the environment, Ivanov recommended that
the role of religion be emphasised in PZU ’s programme. In this connection he suggested the
following change to the party’s ‘political principles’: ‘Greens hold the view that religion is one of
the highest forms o f conceptions of the world, which incorporated the principles of global
ecology’. The believers should be given back their churches, not only as an act of historic justice,
but also as a step towards the revival of ecological harmony in Ukraine. PZU  should express its
readiness to work with believers of any confession for this purpose. In stressing the importance o f
religion in imbuing people with ecological awareness and in stressing the importance of Ukrainian
traditions and thought, Ivanov established himself in opposition to key figures in the Initiative
Group. However, he won considerable support at the grass-root level.
Leonyd Talko, head of Zhovtnevo regional organisation o f RUKH  in Dnipropetrovsk,
expressed similar views to those o f Ivanov in a letter published in Zelenyi svii. He saw the
emergence o f a Green Party as one o f the first political parties in Ukraine as very natural due to the
serious state o f the republic’s environment and as Zelenyi Svit was a politically non-homogenous
movement. However, a Green Party would only gain political influence if it succeeded in creating
national consciousness as a step towards the creation of ecological consciousness. Talko justified
his position by arguing that firstly, the general public lacked an understanding of the ecological
‘wholeness’. There was also a lack of understanding of the inter-dependence o f the many regions
o f Ukraine, which had led to indifference to other people’s misfortune (‘Thank God, not here!’).
Secondly, there was a lack o f responsibility among people for their ‘own historical fatherland’.
.This carelessness was a result of low national consciousness among all (my emphasis) ethnic
■groups living in the republic, especially among the Ukrainians. However,
T iJibK H  qepe.3 ycBi^OM Jien iifi B c iw a  en iiiiiiH M M  rpynaïun  Y ic p a ï i in  iik 
BJia c i ie  BaTbKiBmHiiM, p i ^ i i o ï  seM-rti iipnflite A u o ' iy r o i  
B i4 n O B i4 a .r ib n o cr i sa  ï ï  M aAbyT iie.
Thus PZXfs programme should not only propagate the ecological unity o f  Ukraine, but also
seek to imbue people with national awareness. But, argued Tkalko, 'unfortunately not all
members o f the Greens see the need for this’. He finished off his letter by calling for a round-table
.on ecological problems and spirituality to get a debate going on the issue.
Others, arguing for a more ‘Ukrainian’ approach, made it an issue of national pride, raising i
the following question; ‘why copy the West, why not develop a Ukrainian alternative instead?’ S.
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Social-Ecological Initiative - a collective member of Zelenyi Svit - was unhappy with the name 
chosen for the paity
Oleksandr Svyryda’s (Kiev) alternative, national programme and criticism of the ‘international’
must not be turned into a national party:
iÎK m o MM xoqeMO nasaarM  n S Y  i ia p r ia  iiotîoro Tnny, s e a e i i i  n o i in im i  
BSflTM BC i llOOCtpepiBCLKMH npHlIUHIlH. 110 lia n iO ll. / l o  liUC iii; iy ii>  
.4104M, sK uto H3Y lie  b y a e  aauMKJi. iia nan . iiM ia iiin ix.
by Ivanov, the more nationalist-minded members of the Initiative Group did not call for a 
nationalist party per se, but rather for a revival of pre-revolutionary environmental traditions. And
25Liakh , a worker of the enterprise DVO ‘Azot’, and sitting on the council o i  the association
I f e  rapna nasaa 4.aii iieo iI iitiiH iio i iiaiqin. M e iii .vio>K.yTi. .laiiepe'iHTii, 
mo y  ncbOMy cniTi r ia p r i l ;taxHcry iianKo.iMitiiiboro c;epejtoijiiiiia r a  
.Î1104M11H B iit eKO.aoriMiioi K a T a c r p o c j m ,  lauinaaioTbcsi cavie iiapiiaM ii 
’’sejieiiMx”. A.ae x i6 a  T[)e6a y  ncbOMy ico.tiioaaTU 3axi;iV X ib a  ue 
Ma6MO npana iia imaciie ob.aHMMir.''
.
.Liakh suggested that the new party be called Ekolohichna partiia Ukrainy (the Ecological
Party o f Ukraine). With such a name the programme of PZU  could be considerably expanded.
.The new party should also allow for fractions. As there were both supporters of Ukrainian
independence (against a union treaty) and a confederative union, among the Greens, fractions such
as ‘Independence’ and ‘Union’ could be set up within the party. Another name proposed by one
26Nikolaichuk of Dniprodzherzhinsk , was Partiia ekolohistiv (The Ecologist Party).
One would expect that representatives from the nationally more conscious West Ukraine
.would be the most ardent supporters of Ukrainian independence, wishing to stress this in the party
documents. However, this turned out not to be the case. The ‘nationalists’ had their stronghold in
Kiev and surprisingly also in the East of Ukraine, whereas Greens from the West w ere the loudest 
opponents o f turning PZU  into a nationally oriented party. Following the distribution of
,dominance o f the two official draft programmes (Ternopil and Kiev), Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil) at 
the gathering of regional PZU Initiative Groups in Kiev on 10 August 1990" , w arned that PZU
The West, he argued, was Green and would join the Democratic Block. How/ever, as argued
: 
.they favoured the dismantling o f a transnational monopoly (the USSR), not a struggle against any 
individual countries, nations or ethnic minorities as such. The struggle against monopolies, by the
 :----------------------
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Hanaiia IIBYKDalHH. K m ï b . 10.8.1990 p.
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way, was pointed out as one of the key aims of PZU  in the Ternopil version of the programme, 
which was firmly rooted in Western Green thinking.
For ‘globalists’ as well as ‘nationalists’, the primacy of ecology over economy and politics 
was a key issue. And even the ‘globalists’ favoured Ukrainian sovereignty. Pushkar Justified this 
position at the Kiev meeting by arguing that experience had clearly proved that transnational 
monopolies were a ‘most cynical and damaging force to the environment’. Therefore, given that 
ecology was a key to survival, state sovereignty was by the Greens perceived as the only 
‘ecological guarantee’. Thus, the issue of disagreement was not so much the question of 
Ukrainian sovereignty (and later also independence), but more on whether to emphasise Western 
Green thinking in the programme, or draw on Ukrainian ecological thinking and traditions.
Another feature of PZU’s programme which caused some debate during the summer of 1990 
was the concept of the state. K. Maleev^^, a political scientist by profession, was far from happy 
with what he thought was a rather vaguely defined concept. In his view, the Greens had chosen a 
rather one-sided approach towards the state and its future functions. This, he argued, was 
especially strange as ecological problems, in all their seriousness, ‘showed an inherent 
unsuitability of traditional state types to solve these problems’ :
H nepe^yc iM  iwaio na y o a s i  re . mo is ja ra a b if in  K o iin e iin il  'u t  
3aKJia4eiio yaDJiemui npo ^epxam y >ik &4miy iiic T a n u iio , mo 
peryjTiOE xcm T e^ iam n iC T L  t I e I  m u  i i i m o ï  rpoMa^n. i  xo sa  a 
nepmOMy p 0 3 4 iJ ii  s inep4%:eiimi, mo "Aep^vaaa -  hk 4pafim ia. 40 
HaMBHmHH i  naHnnacqMH mafieab oaiiaKoiio i io T p ib iii  i  p i i m i ”, a.ie 
ue cK o p im e b m i u i t o k .
The third part of the programme, which carried the heading ‘state politics’, called for the 
‘encouragement of small and middle-sized farms’. Also ‘the stimulation of the production of 
quality-, primarily ecologically clean food products and industrial goods’. However, no mention 
was made of how this would be achieved, and at which level. Who should work with these issues, 
asked Malieiev: - the Soviet government? Every republic? Local councils, or some international 
ecological council?
In an article labelled ‘Any danger of eco-bolshevism?’, Serhii Hrabovskyi, one of the thinkers 
o f the Ukrainian Greens alongside people like Hlazovyi and the Ternopil Greens, made an attempt 
at defining the future role of the state from a green perspective^^.
Finally, Valerii Tsybryk^*^, who represented the association Zdorovyi sposih zhyttia {Healthy 
Lifestyle), criticised the lack of commitment to health in the programme theses - as a matter o f
3ejieHMH CBiT, no. 6, 1990, c. 4. 
""ibid.
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fact, no mention at all was made of this important issue. He therefore suggested that tlie following 
statement be included: ‘health is the highest value of Mankind’. PZU  should commit itself to 
supplying health programmes for the Ukrainian people at the state level. Furthermore, tax
34 The Uh'ainian Weekly, 11.11.90, pp. 2,14.
;
ViI
exemptions for donations towards health care ought to be a green issue. As part of its commitment 
to health, PZU  must create clubs and groups occupied with various healing techniques, organise 
summer and winter camps and facilitate research on health-related issues.
Inaugural Congress (28-30 September 1990)
The members of the Initiative Group not only differed in approach to programme, structure and 
name of the party. There was also disagreement as to where P Z U s  Inaugural Congress should be 
held. This issue was discussed at the meeting o f P ZU s  Co-ordinating Council in Kiev on 10 
August 1990, and those present were divided on whether to gather in Kiev or Ternopil. Kiev was 
favoured by the Kiev representatives as well as the Khaniv representative and lurii Babinin 
(Nikopol), whereas the West Ukrainians as well as Bagin (Donetsk) and Varpiak (Pavlohrad) 
preferred Ternopil. Malytskyi from Nikolaev suggested the Congress be held in Narodichi - one 
o f the areas most seriously affected by the Chernobyl accident. There was also some debate 
regarding the timing of the congress. Several of those present were in favour of calling the 
Congress in October, as this had been recommended by astrologers, and in the end it was decided 
that it be held in Kiev from 28 to 30 October 1990.
The Congress convened in the theatre hall of Hotel Tvrist^^ and was attended by 106 
delegates from 20^^ of Ukraine’s 25 oblasts - three of whom were USSR People’s Deputies: 
Shcherbak (Kiev), Sanduliak (Chernivtsi) and Honcharov (Enakievo). Geographically, the Kiev 
delegation was the biggest (18 people), followed by Ivano-Prankivsk (10), Ternopil (9) and 
Chernivtsi (8). The delegates to the Congress officially became the first members of PZU  as a 
national party^^. Guests from the Green Party of Czechoslovakia and scholars from the United 
States were also present^" .^
The Congress started with Lysenko’s prayer ‘Great God, Preserve Unified Ukraine for us’ 
(Bozhe velykyi, iedynyi nam Ukrainu khrany) in a hall decorated with the Ukrainian national flag 
(yellow and blue), party banner and portraits of Shevchenko and Vernadskii - the theoretical
At meeting in Kiev on 14.7.1990, attended by regional PZV initiative groups. See 3a lamsn cui /: no. 8, 
1990, C.2.
Ukrainska agencjaprasowa, noBiJOMaemin no. 250, 30.9.1990.
B Ic th  3 YKpaïHM, no. 42, 1990.
I fK  K oM napT iiu  YKpaïUM . H do vcraHOBBHH f ’iSA f l a i y r i l  :te.aeiinx Ytcnalun. Koiicy.ai/raiiT 
iAeojioriiiHoro B iA tiay  UK KoMnapxii yKpainn, B. AiiapiEiiKO, 3.10.90.
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inspirators o f  the  U krainian G reen M ovem ent. Som ebody had also put a blessed icon from the
and theoretical framework;
According to this ‘definition’, PZU  shared its theoretical framework with Zelenyi Svit, the 
difference being that whereas the latter was a movement, PZU  intended to establish itself as an 
independent, democratic political party. Shcherbak’s emphasis on the national Ukrainian
Second World War on the rostrum.
After the prayer, Shcherbak requested a minute’s silence for Ihor Lytvyn, a 25-year-old who 
had stated his wish to join PZU but who died of leukaemia shortly before the Congress convened. 
As a token of respect, the first party ticket was written out in his name. A minute's silence was 
also observed for the victims of Babynyi lar (Babyi lar^^), who were commemorated on that very 
same day in Kiev. After lurii Shcherbak’s opening speech, the Congress was addressed by lurii 
Myshchenko and Andrii Hlazovyi^*^. Telegrams were sent to the meeting commemorating the 
victims of Babynyi lar and to the conference of the Tovavystvo Uhxnnskoi Movy (The Ukrainian 
Language Society), which were both taking place the same day. Similarly, PZU  received
3 7congratulatory telegrams from already existing Ukrainian parties and movements . Most of the
s e c o n d  h a lf  o f  th e  first d ay  w a s  tak en  up by discussions in commissions'’^
.lurii Shcherbak, addressing the Congress, tried to define the Green Party in terms of policies
'.'ji.75
M m s ib p a a n c } ]  T yr, in o 5  sacaia'iuTn ciioio no.no ;io  criii'pjwceiiiia 
nojiiTMm ioï o p r d i i is a u i ï .  iiioi 7ie iilvuiopmiKonaiia .nniiir 
iiiTepecaM cycniJibcroa. iiapo;o. i ia i i io i  iiin iM sn n  -  VicpaïiiM. 
foJiOBiioio M6T0I0 iiQuioï iia p T iï . Ota 110 bopoTifia sa iin^Miiaiiini
YK iia iH H, ycix  ï ï  c h i iI b  i  aom ok. dopon.fia .la BiApmr/KOiimi icpaio 
-  (I)i3Miiiie i  A yxoB iie, eK o.noriM iio. c o it ia . ih i ie  i  eK oiioM iH iie. Hama 
(l)i.îioco(I)iii lie  Mae iiiaoro cni.'iBiioro a .aioAHiioiieiiaBMCiiHULKM.vm 
’’TeopiJiM H” i  ripaKTHitoio o i.ii.m oB H Sv iy , conia.a-iiauHSMy. 
T0TajiiTapH 3M y. Baeiimi Xpnora. iioivnu in BepiiaAoi.Koro iipo  
Hooaliepy, $iJioco(l)iii C k o p o b o a h  i  iioAy.vi'iiiie ch o b o  UIoBMeiiKa -  
OCL ijiefiiii ocuoBH iia u io ro  C B ir o iv n u i) . iiKi AnicryioT i, KonKperiiy 
xaKTHKy dopoTtÔM, riodyAOBany iia iipn iinnnax nanH ijii.iMN, aicrHiiiiHx 
rpoMaACLKHX A i n ,  iieiiacH.ni,crna ra iip iiM oi 7ie.vioK paT ii'’‘f
During the Second World War a large number o f .lews were killed by the Germans in Babyi lar, a ravine 
on the outskirts of Kiev. Until 1990 Soviet authorit ies played down the extent o f this incident, putting 
up a monument to the Soviet victims of the incident, without any mention o t'the fact that those who 
were killed at Babyi lar were predominantly Jews. Babyi lar has been m ade famous through Evgenii 
Eevtushenko’s poem ‘Babyi lar’ and also through Anatolyi Rybakov’s book ‘1-Ieavy Sand’.
Handwritten three-page summaiy of the Congress written by Vitalii Kononov.
”  SeJieiiHH CBiT, no. 12, 1990, c. 3.
Ukrainska agencja prasowa: noBiJOMnenim no. 250. Warsaw. 30.9.1990.
460
JJl Teparypua VKpaXim, 15.11.1990, c.2.
Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostiip, Kiev, 20.5.1994.
tradition, however, was, as has been seen, controversial within the PZU  initiati\e Group and 
became the key issue of dispute during the later discussion of the party programme.
The members of the PZU Initiative Group failed to unite behind any one of the programme 
proposals discussed prior to the Congress. The delegates therefore had to debate all of them, and 
this took up a considerable amount of time. Two versions were put forward by Kiev Greens, 
whereas the third originated from Ternopil:
1) Programme elaborated by Hlazovyi, Hrabovskyi and Deniydenko tKicv). favouring a Ukrainian 
Green Party sim ilar to those o f  Western Europe.
2) Programm e elaborated by Oleksandr Svyryda (,Kie\ ). diaracterised b\ a luuionalisi appioadi,
3) Program m e elaborated by Khlebas and Tverdostiip (Ternopil), which was more anarchistic than that 
o f  H lazovyi, Hrabovskyi and Demydenko.
Programmes one and three were in many ways similar to each other, but differed in structure 
and style"^“.
An attempt at seeking a compromise programme prior to the Congress was made by the 
Ternopil delegates on the eve of the Congress. They abandoned Svyryda’s programme on the 
grounds that it was too nationalist, but took out the essence from all programmes. The point 
originally included in the Ternopil programme on an eco-solidaric society was removed, as that 
was considered an ideal in the same way as communism and might be perceived as a threat by 
some. The elaborated Ternopil programme included an anti-militaristic point and was one page 'long. The two Kiev proposals were much longer (some 10 pages).
The Ternopil delegates then set off to Kiev, bringing along the revised programme and their
own proposal of the congress rules. The latter was endorsed by the Congress. As for the
programme itself, Hlazovyi, Klilebas and Tverdostiip succeeded in merging their two programmes,
keeping the key ideas o f both intact"^’. Guests from other political parties attending the Congress
as observers and guests found it somewhat surprising that there were so many versions of the
.programme. To the Greens, however, this was considered normal, PZU  being a party which not 
only declared tlie protection of Nature and Mankind as its basic principles, but also adhered to the 
principle of basis (grass-roots) democracy, whose decisions could only be made on the basis o f I
alternatives.
Much attention was given to the very concept of a Green Party:
BuiJiocti npo cawy Koiineimiio iiapriï "Ai.ienux” -  iieTpiuiiiiiiHiiiiiori 
iiaBiTL 3a CBoroAiiitiiiiix yxioii. flapTiï piuiHKa.ii.uo- 
AeMOKpaTHBiioro iianpjiMKy, "iiaHiieiiapTiiiiiimoi luipTii". hk uauna.ia
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”3e.rieuHx” r iexp a  K e j u i i ,  o x iia  i s  .xiciioiiiiiinh lu q n ' i i  ".jOK’Uiix" (DPI 1. 
riapTiï aaxM cry iie  iip o cro  iipi'ipojui, a n /Khttm -  X i i i  iii a .ia i im n  
i  JiiOAHUH, 3axM cry 3iieA0.iei!M \ i  a ick 'p iiN iiiio iiam iv a ep cn i  
cycniJiLCTBa, aaxM cry a iiaM iiiupiiioM y p im 'M iii i i i ;  /k iu o K , A ir e r i.  
c r a p H X ,  i H B a j i i A i B ' ’ ^ .
However, not everybody shared Hlazovyi’s enthusiasm for a ‘classic’ Green Party (i.e. a party 
rooted in the West European Green Tradition). The sharp polemical debate that took place on the 
programme reflected the division between the supporters of the ‘united programme’ (Hrabovskyi, 
Demydenko and Pushkar), which was characterised by European fundamentalist features, and 
those who favoured Svyryda’s programme for national revival"^ .^ Deputy of Kic\ rada, Viktor 
Cherinko, suggested that the following statement be included in PZlTs programme;
f l a p r i t i  3e.rieaHX c n p a M O ity e  c i to io  A i a . a . i i i c i h  iia  k o i i c o . i i v t a n i i o  
n a u i o i i a . n u io - A e M O K p a T H i i i iH X  c u . i  V i v i p a ï i i i i .
And Svyryda put forward a proposal that the new party be called Spilka 'Viclrochheimia 
Uh'ainy ' (The Union for Ukrainian Revival).
Cherinko’s and Svyryda’s positions met with fierce opposition from those who held the view 
that the environmental problems of Ukraine were not simply a national problem, but part o f a 
wider, international problem. A majority of the delegates represented West Ukraine, where 
national sentiments were stronger than in other parts of the country. Although the Zakarpathian 
delegation expressed the view that ‘Zakarpatia never belonged to Ukraine’ and wanted PZU  to 
commit itself to a future independent, federal Ukraine, the majority did not support Svyryda’s 
ideas. Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil) warned of the dangers linked with establishing a party of the type 
envisaged by Svyryda, arguing that
Hlazovyi in JTiTeparypna YKpalm, 15.11.1990, c. 2.
Vitalii Kononov: Undated three pages handwritten summary of the Congress.
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R K ino BHcynyTH na nepm uH  n.iaii ik’ ('K o.inriK ), a iiaii io iu i.ii.n c  
BiApoAAcemifl, t o a I  a e n i ie  iixve ii |)u w iiia m o a  ao o y A i . - a k o i  
icuyiO 'iH X n a p r if t  i  iieM as ce iio v  oTaopioaaTn iio a y . V e.ieiiy" ...
A 4M lie 3Aa£TbCB BUM, T O B a p u C l ' l i O ,  m u llj)Orpa,VlIlHH o G o p O T  M I O A O  
T oro, m o n a p T iii Mae npano B 3 H T M  a . i a A . y  i i  c u o i  pyiCH, rp oxii n axu e  
eKCT[3eMi3MGM aBaiirapA noro u o . i iT i ia a o i u  p .w y . a i i a u  i i o p i u i i a  
napT iJi caM e napnaMeiiTCbKOi'O t m u > ,  i i a v i  iio x p iG iia  i k '  M u c o B i c n .  
3aAJifi MapHoro 4 .aen cm a , a  A o u i p a  . a o A c n .  i \  u i A T p u v i K a  i i a i i i i i x  
ne()6ABM6opiiMX n oan u iH ...
...i.  .  . L ' c  («'S':'
the traditionally anti-nationalist approach of the International Green Movement and was in line 
with its commitment to ‘democracy’, ‘decentralisation' and ‘diversity':
. . . y M O B M  B M i i H K i i e n i m  p i s i i n x  n o . l i T i i ' i i i n x  i v i i n  i  i i a i i p i i M K i i i  i ;
Y K p a ï i i i  iiaATO cn eu ,M (l)i4 iii, p i . i i n n i . o i i  o a  . l a i a . i w i o n p n n i n n n n . x  i ;
CBiTOBiH npuKTM iti, TOMy x a f i  l i e  l i H K . i i i K a s  m i n x  i i o A n i i y  i i o v A t i a i i u i i  
iiauionaAbHM X r a  s e A e n n x  i A c n .  .m iiiir t iim  i i o i i m t b  i i n a m i n .  . a i m i n
The differences in opinion were so considerable that observers present at the Congress for a
while thought they might cause a split' '^ .^ Initial!} the two groups were so uncompromising 
.towards each other that it seemed that even the efforts of a 'reconciliation commission’ headed by
.Leontiy Sanduliak would prove in vain. The ‘Kiev team' (Hlazovyi, 1 Irabovsk} i and Demydenko)
.and the Ternopil group (Khlebas and Tverdostiip) did. however, reveal readiness to compromise. 
Although their programmes differed in construction, they were equally committed to the same 
Green ideas. The only ‘major’ difference between the two was that the Ternopil programme had a 
tighter structure, was shorter (two pages) and more elegant. The Kiev programme, on the other 
hand
K n ïB C b K H f ï  n p o e K T  -  i ia iiwAOK i iu p i i i o io  i i a p . i a i r r y .  i i a m i a k i i .  u \ n  
AOCHTb rp o M i3 A K H M  i  A c u to  iiepeiiaiiTaTiceiiw.vi, a a r e  i i i n p u i e  
oxQJiAioBaB n p o 6 . i e M a T H K y .
The majority voted in favour o f the ‘merged’ programme, whereas Svyryda’s programme, which 
Zelenyi JV/7 described as being more like the programme of a right-liberal party, did not gain much 
support. It was, however, acknowledged that Svxryda's draft contained several interesting ideas 
and good formulas, which deserved to be incorporated in the final version of the programme. This 
was done by the reconsiliation commission'^^. However, a compromise was eventually found and 
the Congress endorsed the Hrabovskyi/Demydenko/Pushkar programme as a basis for P Z l f  s 
programme and on the following day, incorporated the best elements from the other document. 
This programme was then endorsed by the Congress'*'^.
The programme finally endorsed by the Congress was thus a compromise between the two 
groups: its similarity to the programme of die Grüiien confirmed P Z U s  commitment to and place 
within a larger, international Green context, while it was still acknowledged that Ukrainian 
political and economic conditions were very different from those of West-European countries, 
requiring an ‘unorthodox’ approach. Thus, on the issue of independence, the Congress came up 
with a new term, namely that of ‘progressive nationalism’, which, it was argued, did not contradict
‘*'^ reHHaAMH K h p h h aaco b , HapoAAceiia b cvnepeMKax.
Senenm  c b I t ,  no. 12,1990, c. 3.
Vitalii Kononov: Undated three pages handwritten summary of the Congress.
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i . T . i .  B  na iuH X  .ymobux M o r y n i iH  ita iU o iia . 'iu n H H  p y x . m o  c B o e a a c iio  
ne oTpHMaa c iio im  poaanT K y 6 y i i  n e m a iu io  iip H .iy m e im M  i  n io 6 n n c } i 
aa n p o T a s i A eca'ra.iiT L  £ S escy M iiiB n o  iipo rpecM m m M , Go
cnpa.MOBaiiHH ire  npoTH i i n u o ï  i i a i j i i ,  a npoTM i . \ i n e p i i .  o c T a i i i ib o ï  
na i ia m iH  3 e M .'i i.  T o v iy  B in  ire  vioxxe lie  G y ™  i i i i iT p H v ia i ’HH 
Be.ieiiHMH. X04 y  posBM ire im x. A eM O K pavm iim x c y c i i ia b c m a x  n o a iG n e  
n o s A iia n m i ne s m o ïIv. ih b h v i.
Although a compromise was reached on the programme, feelings were still running high in 
both the ‘national’ and the ‘international’ camp. An incident that took place after the delegates 
had sung the hymn ‘Shche ne vmerla Ukraina’ clearly illustrated the gap between the two: a 
young man from Odessa, referred to as Mr Kheifets, made his way to the rostrum and accused the 
delegates of nationalism. The ‘nationalists’ reacted sharply to the incident, referring to him as a 
‘comrade’ in a derogatory manner and requesting that he immediately be excluded from the party. 
The request was supported by the person presiding over the congress at that time. Shcherbak, 
however, urged the delegates to show restraint and tolerance rather than falling prey to emotions"^^. 
As pointed out by Hennadiy Kuryndiasov, attending the Congress as an observer, it was a paradox 
that
y  c r a x y T i  -  cn en ia j ib im H  nyn icr  npo .noju ibiie crraBJieiimi a o  
(jipaK u iw . 3 TpnG y im  -  na.riici o fiona npo n.mopa.nl3M , a  n acn p aB A i -  
penpecMBiia iieTep iiM M icrb ao nyACOi a v m k h . m o npnraM anno Mei-im 
nony-m ipimM iiapTiAM. Y T iM . 'lOMy G ire ctbophth  cn eu ia j ib iin H ,  
eKO.riori'inHH r iM ii n a p x i i . . .
It ought, however, to be said that a lack o f tolerance towards views other than one’s own was 
not a feature limited to PZU, but frequently occured also in other political parties and movements 
(see discussion on ‘kto kogo’ in Chapter Three). Although the Congress succeeded in building a 
bridge between ‘nationalists’ and ‘internationalists’ as far as the programme was concerned, the 
issue on national vs. global commitment did by no means simply disappear, eventually forcing the 
leadership of PZU  to call a conference on nationalism in order to discuss the question at length 
(this issue is discussed in Chapter Eight). However, an address to the people o f Ukraine read out 
by Shcherbak at a meeting on 30 September indicated that PZU  acknowledged the need for a 
balance between the two:
M m  M O A i.m i£M O  o c u o n i i i  apH iiuM UM  n o.B iT H K M  e K O A o r iM im x  r ia p T iH ,  
i i K i  i c n y i o T b  y  c B i r i :  G o p o x b G a  3a  B M C xory  iiaBKO.r[M iH Hboro
cep eA O B M in a i  S A o p o n ’Gi .niOAMiiM; s a  c o u i a a b i i y  c n p a n e A A H B i c r b ,  
A C M O ic p a x i io  i  ire iiacH .n b H H n xB o . ByA C ivio G o p o x c i i  3a  B iA p o A x c e u m i
S e e  reiinaAMH K mpmmahcob and UK K o M n a p x ii YicpaiiiM. Hdo voraiiouBMM 3”13a F la p x i i  3e.nenMx 
YicnalMH. 3 .1 0 .9 0 .
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npMpoAW yicpaliiM. 3a i l  iiaiiioiia.iwio-Ky.ib'rypny i  ayxoBity
cnaAHiMiiy.
Biieuiieiii. luo lîwpinieniiîi e K O .io ria iiM X  u p o G a e v i Y iip a i i iM
n e v io A c iH u e  b  p a a i  aG ep e^K eiim i 3 a .iM :iiK iB  T O T a a i r a p i i o -
G iopoK paTM M U oro peaxH V iy i  Koaoniaabuoro c r a x y c y  p i i i i i o i ’o
Kpaio'^ ®.
PZU  would be a party for the survival of people and for a worthy future. All Ukrainians, 
regardless of nationality, age and religious beliefs were encouraged to support the Green Party and 
its aims. PZU was against attaching Ukraine to the central-imperial union treaty and in favour of 
establishing a sovereign state o f Ukraine in a peaceful, democratic way. If not, a new dictatorship 
was likely to take over. Shcherbak therefore called for maximum interaction with all democratic 
forces in Ukraine in the struggle for an independent, democratic and ecologically clean Ukraine.
The delegates’ position on P Z U s  programme also reflected their position as to where on the 
political scale PZU  ought to be. Whereas Svyryda had in mind a rightist liberal party, the large 
majority held the view that the Green Party ought to be somewhere in the centre. Shcherbak in his 
opening speech to the Congress labelled PZU  a party o f the left-radical centre (partiia 
livoradikalnoho tsentru/^, which represented a development from ecological politics {Zelenyi Svit) 
towards political ecology {PZU). Plowever, the Green Party would not only address the political 
aspects of ecology; like other political parties belonging to the democratic block, it would seek to 
prevent the return of a communist dictatorship and oppose a new imperial yoke, which under the 
cover of a ‘union treaty’ would seek to direct the Ukrainian people by the ‘corrupted CPU’.
Although Shcherbak on several occasions prior to the Congress had tried to reassure the CPU 
by arguing that PZU  would not compete with the Communist Party for political power, and by also 
suggesting that dual membership be allowed, speeches at the Congress did little to endorse this 
effort:
rioK-H iie 5yA6 AeMommauo cucreMy uacM/ibCT'oa i  lœpyuuii, 
vioiiono.ri.fibiioi n.xaAM O A i i i e ï  i i a p T i ï ,  m ca  npHne.aa icpaïiiy a o  
ifonnoro i c p a x y ,  a o t m  lie GyAe iiiiiKoro A O B i p 'a  a o  G yA b-m cM X  
AepxxaBiiMX crpyicryp^ .^
48 BBeoiieiinH vcraiioBiioro :f’i:v iv  FIBY ao ruoMaAmi YicpaiiiH. HanoAe YicuaiiiH! hoaTM i  cecroHl 
printed in Jejremfi œ ir , no. 12.10.1990, c. 3.
Ukrainska agencja prasowa, riouiAOM.rieiiiia. no. 250, Warsaw, 30.9.1990.
Ibid.. p. 2.
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demonstrations, strikes and if necessary also public disobedience.
Thus, the placement of PZU  in the Ukrainian political landscape differed slightly from person 
to person, although everybody agreed that the Green Paity would be a party of the political centre. 
This made PZU  different from Green Parties in the West - die Grünen, for instance, often being
Andrii Hlazovyi^^, in the aftermath of the Congress, sought to explain the major differences
.fJirepaTypiia Vicpaïiia, 15.11.1990, c. 2. 
Bici'M 3 yKpaïiiH, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).
53 Jllreparypm YKpaiua, 15.11.1990, c.2.
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Andrii Hlazovyi, commenting on the Congress in Literaturna Ukraina^\ however, argued 
that PZU  was a party to the left of the centre (Uvotsentristska partiia), justifying his position in the 
following way:
Ox i  n e .ie r K o  Gym . l i i i n v m  y  K p a i i t i .  a c  KHPC y iv p a n  
C K O viiiiX )\ie ryna .‘ia  c a x ie  iie  tiomrmi -  n e  G y A y m  iip n  u b o v iy  i i i ic o .iM  
H i  . l i n o r o ,  a i i i  i i a p r i s i o  -  C K op iiie  i i o . i i 'm 'r i i o - a A v i i i i i c T p a 'm m i M M  
o p A en o M , m o  i c i i y i i a n  y  ’'M oraepTO M y H H v i ip i" ,  iio:m  r p a A w u i f n io io  
i i o . i iT m i i io io  n iK a .io io .
Yet another definition was used in an article published by Visti z Ubriiny^^, according to
which PZU  was a party of democratic orientation (partiia demokratychnoho spriamuvannia), 
seeking real state independence for Ukraine through the implementation o f the declaration of state 
sovereignty passed by Verkhovna Rada in the summer of 1990. Another aim, closely linked to the
■first, was to build a legal state by non-violent means (political struggle), pickets, meetings,
4:
iIclassified as a radical party to the far left on the political scale - where Green Parties are in 
opposition to the very structure of the society in which they operate, opting for radical solutions. 
The very notion of Teff and ‘right’ in the Ukrainian political context, however, is very different 
from the way these concepts are used in Western Europe. I will return to this issue in more depth 
below, suffice it here to say that whereas the ‘right’ is associated with the CPU and an attempt at 
preserving existing political and economic structures (i.e. political conservatism), the left is 
occupied by extreme nationalist parties such as UNA-UNSO, none of whom the Greens wish to 
identify themselves. Thus, PZU  chose a place in the centre, although it could of course have 
defined itself as a ‘radical party of the right’, choosing more radical solutions to the environmental 
crisis in Ukraine.
between PZU  and Green Parties in the West. The major point of departure, he argued, was P Z U s
demand for total and real Ukrainian independence. This demand was natural for a people living in 
.the ‘ last remaining European colony’ :
. -y-ÿ:
«
f
He .'iMiue s ii03Muii e;ievieiiTaiDiioro iiarpiOTMsviy. a A 3 iipaKTHHiioro yy
fior;i}i;iy: npo mcy eijieKTHniiicrh laxMciy AOBKi.i.ia. npo Jiicy ;y
iio.'ii'rHicy coiiia.ibiioro saxMcry, iirre.'ieKTya.iijiioro H iApoA xceiiiiii (me
OAiie naxvAMBe iiporpaM iie im .ioxcetim i H3Y). lîiÆ poAxceiim i Ky.n/rypM  . y
i  ociîiTM  woKe  h th c ii  3a yv ion ic iiv n a i iin i  i \ i n e p i i - M G ! i o i i o : i i l ?
The major aim of PZU was to achieve économie, political and spiritual revival/rebirth of
Ukraine and secure its survival through the rebirth and protection of the natural environment and U
.the people living in this environment from the damaging effects of pollution. A ban on nuclear
energy and the re-proliferation of Ukraine as a non-nuclear zone were preconditions for this. §
As far as political means were concerned, PZU wanted to solve Ukraine’s ecological and 
general democratic problems by means of political methods. A hierarchy was envisaged, in which 
ecology would take precedence over the economy, politics and ideology, and where individual
rights were more important than the rights of the state. PZU would emphasise the ‘protection of 
the right of man to live in an ecologically clean environment and attainment of a harmonious
relationship between man and nature’. Further, ‘the highest value for Greens is the life of the | |
' yïplanet and the man who inhabits it. In the name of life, it is essential to immediately stop ominous 
processes that violate the balance of nature, degradation of the environment, militarisation, 
spiritual impoverishment, cultural and national degeneration. A consumer orientation cannot give #
a man good fortune or attainment of his life’s goals...Chernobyl - atomic, chemical, spiritual, 
political - continues. We must stop it’^^ . | |
The unified programme eventually endorsed by the Congress outlined PZU’s future policies 
in the political, economic and social sphere. Whereas it indicated what were the major aims of the 
new party, the programme failed to spell out how these aims would be achieved. A key element 
was demonopolisation and decentralisation in all areas of society, including the industry. The 
Green Party also opted for privatisation of parts of it, the equality of all ownership forms and the 
creation of mechanisms for national and regional programmes in the area of agriculture. It also 
sought the revival of private farming.
Individual rights and freedom is emphasised by most Green Parties. Not surprisingly, yItherefore, PZU advocated a wide range of rights for the individual towards official institutions as 
well as religious freedom and the equality of all confessions. On a wider scale, the Greens 
advocated the revival of spirituality of the Ukrainian people. Its wish to favour the strengthening 
of the family and affirm the cult of motherhood, however, were rather different from those of other
Green Parties, to which alternative lifestyles are supported at the expense of traditional institutions j |
such as the family^^. U- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  I
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The Ukrainian Weekly, 11.11.90, pp. 2, 14.
Bici'H 3 YicpaXim, no. 42,1990 (n.p.).
W hereas much o f  the C ongress’ time was taken up by the d iscussion o f  the programme, the
.passing o f  the party statute went relatively quickly and sm oothly. This could be expla ined, as the 
.Ternopil version o f  the statute had already been d iscussed at the Kiev PZU C onference, which  
took place a w eek earlier. Consequently, people were fam iliar w ith its contents^^. Altogether the 
delegates had to d iscuss three draft statutes - two from Kiev (Panov’s and Svyryda’s) and the one
:from Ternopil. The Ternopil version was adopted as the basis for the final statute, which
57contained elem ents from all three drafts .
,A s seen above, PZU  from the very start opted for a deflated structure - as a matter o f  fact the
. . . .party was created from below  by local initiative groups (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, K iev), which
later linked up. The two Galician and the K iev groups had even adopted different statutes and
programmes as the basis for their activities!^^ This, in addition to the fact that Green Parties
elsew here were all com m itted to maximum internal democracy, hardly made it surprising that the
structure opted for by the Greens was horizontal, w ith minimal powers delegated to the central 
. . .organs, g iving w ide autonomy to the regional organisations. The structure chosen was based on
the so-called territorial-club principle - i.e. party clubs were formed along territory or professional 
lines^^, granting clubs the right to unite into fractions on political platforms not contrad icting the
major principles o f  the party programme. The statute also encouraged the creation o f  regional and 
local co-ord inating com m ittees and other super-club structures. Clubs, moreover, had the right to
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.join public organisations w hose programmes did not contradict that o f  PZU  as collec tive  members. 
PZU  gave priority to the consolidation o f  all ‘democratic forces’ in Ukraine and also w ith the
international green com m un ity. Members o f  the party were given ex tensive rights; for instance 
they were not obliged to im plem ent party dec isions w ith which they did not agree. What was
■m ore, the regional party organisations could speak on behalf o f  the party without prior
consultation w ith the party leadership. This was, in addition to being a dem ocratic gesture also an
allow ance motivated by practical considerations, as the nine co-leaders even tually elected were
hard to gather so as to co-ordinate their activities as they were spread all over Ukraine*^ .
.H ow ever, there were som e limitations; a person working in state institutions, for instance, could  
not hold elected party posts*^'.
A t the national level, PZU  would be represented by its leader, the nine co-leaders and a 
Central Co-ord inating Council {Tsentralna Koordinatsiina Rada). The party’s headquarters would
____________________________
Vitalii Kononov: Hand-written three pages summary o f  Congress.
The Ukrainian Weekly, 11.11.90 (n.p.) and interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994. 
3e.'ieiwf! ciiir, no. 12,1990, c. 3.
B ic m  3 yKpüïtiM, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.
UK KoMiiapTiï yicpaïiiM. flpo vcranoiviHH Zïsji f la p T il  seaeiinx VicpaiLiiM. 3.10.90, apic 27.
, ' :
be in Kiev. Shcherbak in his speech to the Congress indicated how the party would seek to
implement its policies in the future as follows'^^:
(riSV) iiacaviiieiieA oprau iB an ia iio.iiT iviimx k.i.vGiii n a p r i i  b y c ix  
KyTOMicax y ivpaïim , Busiiaaenint KOHKpeTiioï c r p a r e r iï  A in. lie  
osiiaaas, mo na n c ix  pin in ix -  b I a  viicueBHx PaA i  a o  BepxoBiioï 
PaAH yPCP -  vm GyAe.no BMCiynarH i s  .«iKOiiojtaBnMvin 
iipono3Huia\iH iuüao  no.iiim ieiiini eKo.iorinnoi o cranv b p ism ix  
perio iiax y icpalnu.
Strategy and Tactics
Once the party programme and statute had been endorsed, the issue of strategy and tactics came 
up: how was PZU  going to implement its programme? As there was simply not enough time to 
discuss this issue at length, it was decided to call a new congress in Ternopil sometime in April 
1991 to address the strategy and tactics of the party. Whereas the party programme endorsed by 
the Congress was fairly general, the regional party organisations were in the process of elaborating 
their own local action programmes. A similar national programme (10-15 year plan) would be 
written to cover problems common to several regions. One of the issues to be covered in such a 
programme would be military-related issues - the Kiev, Zakarpattia, Crimea and Ternopil regional 
party groups were all concerned with such issues and it was suggested that the first PZU  
campaigns ought to address these issues. The Ternopil group, for instance, was worried about the
:situation surrounding the nature reserve Medobory. After a long struggle, the army had agreed to
return it for civilian use. Earlier it had been used for the testing of bombs. Similarly, the Black
Sea Fleet was causing concern among the Crimean Greens, being one o f the major polluters of
Ukraine’s territorial waters and shores, and in Zakarpattia campaigns were being conducted to stop
the Pristrialivsk radar station and also a military airport in the close vicinity of Mukaehevo*^^.
In the morning of 29 September - at the second day of the Congress - the delegates took a
break from their proceedings and gathered in the Shevchenko Park, where they buried a paper
image of Chernobyl and planted a young oak tree. The oak tree was to symbolise the birth and
.development of the Green Movement and also the triumph of reason over folly and good over 
evil . Hryhoriy Honcharenko, a Kiev delegate, then read a letter from Taras Shevchenko written 
to Br. Zalinskii in 1857, out loud to those present^^:
B ic m  3 yK-païiiH, no. 42,1990 (n.p.).
“  SeJieifHM cuii\ no. 13, 1990, c. 5.
Vitalii Kononov: Three pages hand-written summary of Congress. 
“ TeniiaAHM Kmpmhahcob (n.d.)
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.4 !'
fies |X)3.vvmor’0 po.ï.vviimiK kpacw .noyimiu ne iioGa'iwTh eiii.iwioio 
Bora y via/ieiibKoviy .incToaivV liaHMeiiuioi poc.iHiin. Bo'raiiiiii i  
300.iorii iiorpiGeii aaxnar. iiiaKiae ooTaniKa i  Boo.ioria Gyyie 
vieprnHM 'ipynoM noviixv aïoyibviH. A Baxaar aAoGyaacrrca Ti.ihKM 
ivîhGok'h.vi po3.yMiiiiia.vf fcpacM. CHvie'ipiï i  rapvioiiiï y fipwpoAi.
Elections of the leader and the nine co-leaders took place on the last day of the Congress, 
lurii Shcherbak was, not surprisingly, elected leader of the party, although other candidates were 
nominated for this post: Hlazovyi (Kiev), Hrabovskyi (Kiev) and Pushkar (Ternopil). Adding a 
humorous touch to the elections were proposals to elect Academician Vernadskii or Hryhoryi 
Skorovoda - whose ideas had shaped the framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement, but who 
were both long gone - as party leader*’^ . As co-leaders the Congress elected Oleh Sydorkin (Uman, 
Cherkassy oblastj, Vitalii Kononov and Oleksandr Svyryda (Kiev), Valentyn lankivskyi (Odessa), 
Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil), Leontiy Sanduliak (Chernivtsi), Aleksandr Bagin (Donetsk) and Nikolai 
Kudin (Poltava). The choice o f the Kiev co-leaders is interesting in that both Ivanov and Svyryda 
favoured a national rather than a global emphasis in the party programme. Finally, the Congress 
elected an auditing committee, composed by Volodymyr Tinionyn (Kiev), Ihor Havrylov (Kiev) 
and Andrii Olenehuk (Terebovlia) as well as a treasurer - Klavdia Khaliavenko (Kiev)^^ - and an 
editor of a planned future newspaper (Andrii Hlazovyi). As for the Central Co-ordinating Council, 
the Congress decided that it would be composed of the leaders of the regional (oblast) 
organisations. Its final composition would be revealed later*^ .^
Several resolutions endorsed by the Congress were not made publicly known. Instead they 
would be discussed by the Central Co-ordinating Council at its first meeting, lurii Shcherbak 
officially declared the new party at a meeting on 30 September. The very same day, a meeting 
against the union-treaty took place in Kiev. Congress delegates also demonstrated against the 
union treaty. Expectations to the new party were high among the Greens themselves. However, 
Hlazovyi, commenting on the event, worded himself cautiously: ‘whether or not PZU  becomes a 
leading force in Ukrainian society remains to be seen. Most importantly, though, a new party with 
a democratic orientation has emerged on the political scene’ *^^.
3eJieunM cuir, no. 12, 1990, c. 3.
The Ukrainian Weekly, 1 1 .1 1 .9 0 , pp. 2 ,1 4 .
UK K oM iiapT il yKpaiiiM . Flno vciaiioiviHH s i m  n a p r i i  3e.neiiHx yK p a liiH .. 3 .1 0 .9 0 , apK. 27 . 28 . 
JTiTepaTypim YcpaXim, 1 5 .1 1 .9 0 , c. 2.
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CPU Response to the formation of PZU
Among the many observers at the Congress was V. Andriienko, a consultant of the Ideology 
Department of the CPU Central Committee. Shortly after the Congress was over, he produced a 
report^^ to the Central Committee. Most of the report simply referred to what had happened at the 
Congress and identified key principles in PZLTs programme and statute. Considerable attention 
was also given to the political implications of the newly founded party;
BiAO.vio, na jikmx no.iiTnaiiux coioshmkuii G vac pospaxouynaTM 
icepiBiiHUTiJO ri3y. AivTMBicm a c o i i ia n i i  "3e.ieiiMu cB ir”. s.ieiiM 
opncoMiToi'y iio niAroTonui s'AsAy 5y.in cepcA tm x. x to  . aopioBUB 
Ciii.iK.v AeviOKpaTHanux cu.i yKpaiuM , saK.iuKaB ao iipoBeAeiiin:
B c e y K p a ï i i c B K o r o  t i o . i i T m m o r o  c r p a n i c y  1 A v O b t i i j i .  O p a B A a , n iA iiM C  
ri3y  r i iA  Baic.iHKOM AO C 'l'pafiK y i  ro.ioB iiH M M  B u v io r a v iu  i i e  G y a  
ifo r o A A ie iiH H  ;j 1 0 .  I l ie p G a K o .v i .
Although the Congress did not explicitly define its future relationship to the CPSU and the 
CPU, Andriienko pointed out that certain groupings within the party were hostile towards the 
Communist Party. Moreover, Shcherbak’s statement to the effect that P Z lf  s philosophy had 
nothing in common with Bolshevism and Communist dictatorship could be interpreted as 
opposition to the ruling party:
Ta nporpa.vin i  Maiii(|)ecry 0 3 y  (Buro.nouieiiMM iO.
LUepGaKOM 2 2  KBiriia 1 9 9 0  p. na MiTniiry, npHCBii'ienoMy 2fnio 
OK'peMi api’y.viefrrn, resn. peit.'iiKM, BHc.f[OB.!ftOBaifini y'lacnHKiB 
:fï;jA.y, cepcA hkmx Gy.ao i  Aeici-aiAca im.iininnix ajieniB KFIPC. 
CBiAaaTi. npo CBoroAniiunio iienpHMMpennicrb nacrnnn H3y. Tax, to. llfepGaK y BcrynnoMy caoB i niAKpec.aiOBaB, mo ’’iiama 
(l)i.aoco(l)ia ne Mae iiiMoro cni.abiioro 3 iieiiaBWcnoio iA eo.nor i&lo 
Gi.'ibmoBM3Viy. iianioiia.ii-conia.ni3.viy...”, mo a cn.an, mci iipamyTb 
AO Boaiinoro nepeBopcrry, KOMyiiicrHMiioi AHieraTypn...”, mo mm 
’’KMlieMO BMK.HMK TMM XMA(MM CM.riaM. flKi XO'iy ri) iîIIMMMTM IiapOA".
■i.
.Ai
Andriienko held the view that P Z lfs  future role in Ukrainian politics was likely to be of some 
significance, justifying his position in the following way:
3arocrpeiie cram ien m i .nioAeM a o  eK o.aorianM X npo6.neM, n o s M n i i  
e ico .ior iB  y  PaA ax iiaiDOAUMX A en y T a r iB , naAanm i aocm tb mnpoicMX 
aB'PoiioMiiMX npan napTiMiiMM crpyiorypavi, G esnepeano, oGyMOB.'noiOTb 
iiepcneKTMBM f l a i y r i i  3e.rieiiMX Y K p a iim .
UK KoMiiapTii YKpaiiiM. I I d q  vcraiiOBMMM 3”13a n a p r i i  3e.aenMx yimaiim, 3 . 1 0 . 9 0 .
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With this in mind, Andriienko recommended that local party committees in their dealings 
with PZV  bear in mind its negative attitude towards the Communist Party:
UapriHiii KOMireTM iinm iiiiii huxoautm roro, luo iiei'arnHiie i5
iii.K)\i\' crnaneiiini 113) ao IvFlPC i  lxoM!ia[yrix Yk-païiin. i i  neniie 
BiAXHAenini bIa conia.iicrM'iiB'ix opieiiTupiB OTBopiOK)n> siiaani 
Tp.VAiioini B uouiVKax inmixlB posBliiyBaiiini ciiI . ibiihx iipoGien.
KoiicrpyKTHBiioro Aia.iory.
Although Andriienko’s report was given as information^% members of PZU  shortly after
obtained a copy of a report signed by the Kiev city party committee secretary, M. Horovenko, and
1
passed on to the secretaries of the regional party committees ‘for implementation in practical 
work’.
The report, signed by Horovenko, of the XXX which was published in full by Zelenyi svil^^
(hoi IA N o 1. onnc No 32. cup. No 372. 
3e:ieimfi cui r, no. 16, 1990, c. 3.
turned out to be an edited copy of Andriienko’s report. It was accompanied by a comment from 
the Greens. The Greens thanked for the publicity, on the grounds that it could not be ruled out that 
some people, having read the information, would decide to change their red party ticket for a green 
one. As far as facts were concerned, everything in the report was correct. However, PZU  did not 
agree with the last column, then what deviation from socialist orientations was Horovenko talking 
about? Had the Greens really at any time been inclined towards those orientations? Besides, what 
exactly did the CPU mean by ‘socialist orientations’? Then in many countries socialdemocrats 
were working closely with the Greens. However,
...Lli c o n ia . i i c r n  ( i  iie .ie iii) iie ciiiBiipanioioTi. KOMyiiicraMM 
Gi.ibHioBHLiBKoro THiiy. I  opiEiiTHpn "pyicoBOAfnnen n
iiaiipainmoinen” spoA y-B iicy conia.iicraH iinMH iie Gyjin. A .inn ie 
TOi'a.iiTapno-KoviyiiicrM'inMMM. Tbk mo iie u.iyTaïrre BoAcnn Aup s 
liEiiiiieio...
From this statement and similar comments made elsewhere it becomes clear that the ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ Shcherbak had opted for between PZU  and CPU  was gradually being replaced by a 
more confrontational approach as glasnost gained momentum and democratic reform began to take 
hold.
6.1.2 Registering PZU
Initially, the Green Party adopted a membership policy very similar to that o f the Communist 
Party. Only after a close screening would people be allowed to enter the party as full members.
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'S:
Quality was emphasized at the expense o f quantity. This was done to avoid ‘infiltration’ o f former
Communists and others not necessarily committed to the principles of PZU. Shortly after the 1 |
T
i
Inaugural Congress in October 1990, a Law on the Registration of Political Parties was passed by 
Verkhovna Rada. The law ruled that each party to be formally registered submit a list containing 
the names of 3,000 members to the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice together with its formal 
application. It soon became clear that it would be impossible for PZU  to reach this number 
adopting the rigorous screening proceedure endorsed by the Congress.
To get an idea of how many members the party had, Vitalii Kononov in early December 1990 
contacted local party groups requesting information about membership figures. Although most of 
the groups reported an increase in membership and requested more membership forms, most 
groups had less than 10 members each. In Nikolaev (Lviv oblast) 40 applications for membership Q
had been received through the local ecological club ‘Dniestr’ but as of 24 November 1990 the
party club had only three members and 10 candidate members. The latter were in the process of T
being assessed for full membership. Pylypchuk, the leader of the party club, was, however,
73optimistic, arguing that ‘the future belongs to our party’ . #
The president of Crimean Zelenyi Svit, Sergei Shuvainikov, was far less optimistic. His
74 Tletter revealed a problem not only facing party activists in the Crimea, but also elsewhere:
IB iiacTOfirnnn viOMeii'r b KpuMCKoPi oG .iaoru  Becrn p aG ory  no %
co:viaiiM io iiap ru A u oro  ic.ayGa flB Y  iipaKTMaecKH neB03M 0zci!0.
ho.iB iuaa a a c n , yaacTiiHKOB aKo.Hon-MecKoro AUHAceiimi, b  ro.vi an ojie
Kpu.MOicoro "3C”. BiACKasa.mcB npoTUB iio.'iMTH3anHM oGmecrnennoro ^
3e.ieiK)ro ABHAceumi u iipeAiioHHTaioT ocraBarsca npocTO H.ieiia.viH
oGiuecTBemioH. ne iio.ini'mieci<oH. opraimsaiiMM. IThose in favour of setting up a Green political party wanted to set up the Ecological Party of T
Crimea, which might, in the future become part o f P ZU s  organisational structure.
In the late spring of 1991 Ihor Pushkar sent a letter to all the local party groups informing 
them about recent events and outlining the issues the party had to settle at the upcoming Second 
Congress. The Congress should have taken place during the spring of 1991, but was postponed T
due to difficulties in making people join the Green Party to gather the necessary figure to officially
,■register the party with the Ministry of Justice. Besides, the Ternopil Greens were busy preparing 
Zelenyi Svit's Second Congress, which also took place in Ternopil.
The main task facing the Congress was to register the party. For this purpose all the local
T:party clubs were requested to make a list of their members. Those clubs which provided such
ripoTOKO.'i N o . l.BaciA aiB Ui eKQ.rioriMiioro K.rtvGv ’’ü n icrp " . 2 4 .1 1 .1 9 9 0 .  
Letter from  Sergei Sh u va in ik ov  to V ita lii K o n o n o v , dated 1 2 .1 2 .1 9 9 0 .
information by 20 May 1991 would have the right to be represented at the Congress. The Ternopil 
oblast party club had some 400 members, but Pushkar pointed out that the situation was very 
different in many other oblasts, where there was only a handful of PZU  members. In Donetsk, for 
instance, people were joining URP as the republicans worked actively, whereas the PZU  activists 
there were simply passively waiting for people to contact them. This, argued Pushkar, was the
necessary to as quickly as possible register dem ocratic parties and in the quickest span possible be
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wrong approach; ‘one must go to the people, to each single individual, and explain and convince’. 
According to P Z U s  statute it was difficult to become a member of the p a r t y a s  when it was
endorsed, nobody knew that an edict would be passed, according to which each party should have 
at least 3,000 members before it could be registered by the Ministry of Justice. Therefore the
Central Co-ordinating Council passed a special decision regarding people joining the party in
: <-
Apri 1-May 1991 - the so-called Chernobyl ca lf . People wishing to join TZU during this period 
did not have to produce a recommendation letter or pay any membership fee. In Ternopil and 
Kiev work had already started to increase the membership numbers. Activists were attending 
political meetings, issuing membership cards next to RUKHA stands, contacting enterprises, 
organisations and schools, explaining to people the importance of ‘green’ politics and encouraging 
them to join the Green party^^.
The issue of membership and registration was addressed at length by the Central Co-
78ordinating Council on 18 May 1991 at its regular meeting in Kiev . Kononov informed those 
present that as of this date, the party had 1,800 members. So far only two parties had been 
registered: URP and Plachynda’s USDP {Ukrainska Seliansko-DemoIaxUychna Partiia). Ihor
Pushkar presented the meeting with a list of a further 450 members, bringing the total up to 2,250 
members. Shcherbak stressed the importance of registering PZU  as elections were coming up later 
the same year and should the party fail to register in time, it would be prevented from taking part
,y;:
in these elections:
The Ukrainian Green Party initially adopted a membership policy very sim ilar to that o f  the CPSU: first a 
person wishing to join, had to be recom m ended by somebody who was already a m em ber o f  the Green 
Party. Then, if  this recommendation was accepted, the person would be admitted as a candidate 
member until he/she was thought to be ready to jo in  the PZU. This strict proceedure w ould be followed 
to make sure that only those committed to the Green cause and no politically suspicious individuals 
would enter the ranks o f the newly found party.
Ihor Pushkar expanded on the Chernobyl call in an article in Rovesnik (no. 13, 24-30 M arch 1991, p. 5), 
encouraging all dem ocratic parties in Ukraine to jo in  PZU  without having to go through the full 
proceedures in connection with the fifth aniversary o f  the Chernobyl accident. This, he argued, was
,4:'ready for dem ocratic elections on a multi-party basis. 
Letter from Ihor Pushkar to all PZU local party clubs
The following discussion is based on information provided in UnmoKO.ii BaciAaniiii LltCP n3Y . \i. Kh I b. 
nv.nb ICiDOBQ 5A. 18 tpaiiiui 1991 p.
üyAce nara.ibiie. moa’c raK crarHCfi, mo iia VKpaiiii G.wtVTh ri.ibKH 
ABi iiapril: KFIY ra YPH. H A.wiaio, BoœiiM G\Ae iipoBCiieiio
bhGopm iipeaMAeina ra iiapriavieirry. KpaaayK ;i mkhm a nof'onopHB
iieABBHO lie iipeKpaciio poayviiE. firiY, O/IB. Cft, PYX. YPFI \oay ri,
cTBopn'i’H iieaa. le'Aviiy AevioKpaTHniiy Ykpalii}. Havi iiorpiGiio
BHBiiaMM'rHai BiAiiociio HeMOicpaTiBiiioi Ykpaiim. flilBY BHpiiiiH.ia
oG'EAiiaTMca 3po5iTiiHM pvxoM. 3apaa peiri'Hiir .le, lenrix 30%, a 
KOPC -  6-7%.
Shcherbak therefore urged that everything be done to register PZU  as quickly as possible. In 
this collection he revealed that the leader of the Presidium of Verkhovna Rada, Leonid Kravchuk, 
had called Boiko (Ministry of Justice) and asked him not to put any obstacles in the way for the 
registration of the Green Party.
Party representatives from various regions o f the republic informed the meeting what had so 
far been done to increase the membership of their clubs and of the obstacles they faced in the 
process. Tymonin said that the Kiev group had made the ‘not easy decision’ to actively seek new 
members in the city’s squares, at meetings and demonstrations. This strategy had paid off; in 
January 1991 there were only 100 party members in Kiev. By May that year a total o f 1,000 had 
been reached. Holub, however, insisted that people be admitted to the party only upon 
recommendation. Shcherbak agreed with Holub that the party did not need any ‘dead souls’, 
however, this problem could be avoided by providing people with proper and adequate 
information about the party and what it stood for.
In Ternopil people had to write ‘declarations of awareness’ before being admitted to the 
party. Bagin from Donetsk argued that the political situation was very difficult in his region. 
Besides, there was the added problem of translating the party documents into Russian and getting 
them printed. A party club was in the process o f being established at the Institute of Ecology. So 
far nine party members had been registered and in Horlivka people were approached in the 
factories with a request to join the Green Party. Sydorkin informed the meeting that in Cherkassy 
there were 96 members of PZU. In Zhytomyr, however, there were only five. There was clearly a 
need to travel to the regions and spread information about the party, but for economic reasons, this 
was proving difficult. In Nikolaev things were easier as the town was already highly politicised. 
In the course of a week, following actions outside the police headquarters, two clubs had been 
established. Zakarpatia fZ U h ad  29 members and activists intended to recruit new members at the 
university. Lviv oblast had 139 members and in Kliarkiv there were 12 full members and 19 
candidate members. The latter would be admitted as full members within the next two months. 
People in the settlements of Liubotiano and Kukhiansk had been very carefully screened prior to 
admission. Kiev oblast had 75 members and in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast four clubs had been set up,
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of which three were officially registered. As part of the membership campaign, it was decided to 
actively seek new members through the association Zelenyi Svit.
PZU  was officially registered on 24 May 1991 as the third political party of the republic^'^. A 
list of some 5,000 members was submitted with the application^^. O f these the Ministry of Justice 
regisrerd 3,421 (at the time of registration, PZU  claimed that it had 10,000 members)^'. In the 
spring and summer of 1991 a series of presentations took place in various parts of Ukraine to make 
the public and also other political parties and movements familiar with the policies and ideas of 
the Green Party^^. Local party clubs continued to be formed throughout 1991 - in Kharkiv, for 
instance, the oblast club was founded on 14 December 1991. Thirty seven people attended the 
founding conference, which elected six delegates to the up-coming PZU  Congress and a leader, V. 
Shylo^A
5.1.3 Early Party Activities 
Environmental Actions
The first nation-wide campaign organised by PZU  was not surprisingly anti-nuclear. On 7 
November 1990, in a symbolic action to unite the politically divided East and West, the Kiev 
branch of the party took their banners and walked to Netishyn, where Greens from all over 
Ukraine had gathered to protest against the operation of the Khmelnitskyi nuclear power station 
(see appendix for details). This action marked the start of P Z U s anti-nuclear campaign for the 
fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. Numerous similar actions would be organised at other 
nuclear power stations before 26 April 1991 and the Green Party also decided to organise a 
‘Chernobyl-Nuremberg’ public process in Kiev. An initiative group would be set up shortly to 
prepare for the Chernobyl anniversary. Other political parties and movements were encouraged to
join forces with PZU on this issue "^ ,^
fZ U  continued to focus on nuclear power also after the fifth Chernobyl anniversary. In 1991, 
the IAEA sent a group of experts to Belarus and Ukraine to analyse samples of the soil and make
4
____________________________
JeieffHH ciiir, no. 1, 1991, c. 3.
In terv iew  w ith A ndrii H lazovy i, K iev , 1 8 .8 .1 9 9 2 . 
rJoJiTHUtic} JiyMKci/Political Thought, no. 1, 1993, c. 125-26 .
T h ese  presen ta tions, labelled  ‘D n iakh narodzhenn ia P Z U ’, w h ich  w ere  attended by  other politica l parties 
such  as the C P U , took  p lace in M u k ach evo , U zhh orod  and C hortkova (T ern op il ob last) and Ivano- 
Frank ivsk. The depu ty  leaders o f  PZU, L eon ty i Sanduliak, O leh la n k iv sk ii, A leksan dr B ag in  and 
V italii K on on ov , arranged sim ilar presen ta tions in C hern ivtsi, O dessa , H orlivka  and K iev . 
rinoTOKn.ri N o  1. v4peAMTe.HLiioro coGnaiimi Xaoi.Koncicoio of.H acriioro k.hv5ü iiaoTMH 3e.nei!bix 
yicoanin.i. r. Xapbicon. 14 nekaGoit 1991 r.
See SeJieuMM cnir. no. 15,1990, c, 1, and 3eJienMH cnir, no. 16, 1990, c. 2, for details.
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the regional council granted the demands of the hunger strikers^^\
i io a iT M H iio l  n e p e o p i E i i T a n i i . . .  iiA epnH H  i i ih t  e i ie  sax n cT O M , a  
cTpaiiiiiM M  T fii'apeM  ;i;ui y K p a ii ic i> K o ro  n a p o j iy .
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recommendations regarding the radioactive fall-out on their territories. Whereas the international
press referred to the objectivity and independence of the IAEA report which emerged in May
1991, Greens in Ukraine and elsewhere disputed its objectivity at a conference they organised on
. . .21-24 May. They sharply criticised the IAEA, referring to it as ‘an organisation that exists on
money donated by the nuclear monopolies and ministries of various countries, including the USSR
_
Min ato menergoprom^ .^
f
At approximately the same time, three members of RUKH anà two members of PZU  went on 
a hunger strike at the Lenin Square in Khmelnitskyi to protest the regional council’s decision to 
continue construction of the second reactor at Khmelnitskyi nuclear station, thus violating the 
moratorium on nuclear reactors passed by Verkhovna Rada in September 1990. The hunger
strikers were fined for having put up tents, but continued their protest all the same. By the seventh
day of the hunger strike, two of the demonstrators had to be sent for réanimation. Shortly after,
The Ukrainian Greens had called for Ukraine to adopt an anti-nuclear status since the late
I
1980s. The Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty, which was passed by Verkhovna Rada on 16 
July 1990, contained a clause stating Ukraine’s commitment to becoming a non-nuclear state^^, 
which was welcomed by the Greens at the time. Not surprisingly, therefore, PZU  (and also 
Zelenyi Svit) greeted and supported the initiative to one-sidedly disarm as a first step towards the 
‘reorganisation of the entire system of international relations towards a new, humanist foundation’. 
In the view of the Greens, this did not contradict Ukraine’s national interests and interruptions o f
ogthe shipping to Russia of nuclear warheads could not but concern P Z u  :
Hac. ra K O A . c r p u B U A u . io  o r o . : io in e i ie  flp e a H A eirro M  ’’'r a .v ia a o o a e  
i ip u i iu n e i i in i"  iiH n eaeiiin i s a  m o a I  ic p a ïn M  r a i c r m m o i  H A e p iio i  s G p o i .
I n o  MO A l i a  p o s K .n iA a ™  hk  c a iy n ie im H  m o a .h m b o i  B i u c i A o r o -
Ja ieiiMfi cni r, no. 9, 1991 , c. 1.
Ukraine Today, Ukra in ian M ed ia D ig est, C om p iled  by R ad io L iberty M on itoring, 2 9 .3 .1 9 9 1 , no. U F -1 12,
p. 11,
P o in t IX. External and Internal Secur ity  reads as fo llo w s; ‘T he U kra in ian S .S .R . so lem n ly  d ec lares its 
in ten tion o f  beco m in g , in the future, a perm anen tly  neutral state that d o es not participa te in m ilitary  
b lo ck s and adheres to three nuclear-free pr inc ip les: no t to accep t, no t to  produce and no t to acqu ire  
nuclear w e a p o n s’ . U nder the head ing VII. E nv ironm en tal S a fe ty , the declara tion stated that ‘T he  
Ukra in ian S .S .R . has the right to ban the construction and to halt the opera tion o f  any en terprizes, 
institutions, organ iza tions and other en tities that constitute a threat to  env iron m en tal sa fe ty ’ . W ith this 
in m ind, the Ukra in ian G reens argued that g o in g  ‘non -nu clear’ m ean t that no t o n ly  nuclear w ea p o n s but 
also  nuclear pow er sta tions had to be rem o v ed  from  Ukra in ian territory. Q uotes taken  from  pp. 10 and  
9 resp ec tiv e ly  o f  leK J ia p a iiia  noo AePAapnHn cvBepeiiiTeT yKPaliiH. D eclara tion on the State  
S o v ere ig n ty  o f  U kra ine (Bepxon iia Pa/ia yKpaîiiCbKOl PGP/The Suprem e Rada o f  the U kra in ian  
S .S .R ., K h ï b . 16 .nuniPi 1990 -  K iev . July 16, 1990).
3ejieuMM cnir, no. 7, 1992 , c. 2.
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The presence of nuclear arms on Ukrainian soil had a destabilising effect on the region that might 
well tie Ukraine to some military-political union, which in turn would make it increasingly 
difficult to disarm in the future:
3 6 e p e A e i i i n i  l u t e p i i o l  s G p o i  S M y c n ib  V k p a i i i y  y n i r r r n  ii o . io k  i a  
jiKHviHC!. ii iu iH .v iw  M ep iiM M u  A e p A a n a .v iw  A .ifi K o o p A H i iy n a i im i  
r io .iiT m iH M X  i c y p c i i i .  H e o G x i A i i i c i ' b  A O TpnM yBaTH C i. G . i o i v o n o l  
AHCUWIIA illM n iABMIUM T!) pH3HK BTÏiryBaUlIA y  i’A o G a .lB I li K O iK p .liK T H ,
vK)A<e c y T i 'E B o  o G m c a c h t o  c y B e p e i i iT e T . flic  m o  a< Y K p a x i ia  iie  
n p n & A iia& T b ca  a o  A co A iio ro  3 i c n y i o a n x  i  v i a G y r i i i x  v iiA ciiapoA U M x 
B iH C b K o r o - i io . t iT m m M X  o G U A iia i ib ,  s G e p i i ’aiOMM a A e p iin iî  c r a i y c ,
B oiia  p o3K ;n iA a 'i'n> ieT bca  cBiTO B apncTB O V i jik  ( jia ic ro p  A e c T a G i . i i a a u i x .  
i ie i ip o r i i0 3 0 B a i i i ( r rb  i l  A i n  BH K A M K arnvie s a i io G iA C ii i  i n i n i a r n B U  3 
5 o k v  i i i r i iH x  A cpA B B , niABHUiVBaTH.vie n a rip v A ^ e iiiC T b  y  c r o c y i iK a x .
A number of points against Ukraine remaining a nuclear power were also put forward;
.Ukraine, for instance, lacked technological facilities for the production and testing of nuclear 
weapons on its own territory. Moreover, a lack of storing facilities for nuclear waste from reactors
working for military purposes would leave Ukraine with no option but to pursue close links with
.Russia in the future. To preserve parity within such an alliance would simply not be possible in 
the view of PZU. If Ukraine’s nuclear status was to be maintained, conversion would have to stop, 
the military industries would have to be modernised and the army would have to grow. All 
spheres of life would then be subordinated to the military-industrial complex; I
„Y A a j i n o  Y i c p u ï n i  e K o n o v i i ' i n o - e i c o J i o r i ' in M M  ’G y M e p a iir o .v i” 
i io B e p n e T b o i  a o  a r p e c o p a .  A r p e c i a  3 G o ic y  G y A b - m c o i  A e p A c a a u  
iipoTM  p o 3 T a iu o B a n o i  b u e m p i  E a p o i in  Y K p a i n n  M a r n M e n e s p i u n m i i  
n a n i r b  i 3  f to p n o G n .'teM  n a c .a ij iK M  K on T H n eH 'ra .r !b n o in  
\ ia o i  I rra G y  ....HeA r p a j i  i ,n a  n e i iA e p n a  Y i c p a i n a  a n n A y n a  m M o
n a n p y A e n i c i ' b  n c e p u i  K O iim n e n r y ,  m o  B iA i i o n i A a  a i i r r e p e c a M  B c i x  
G e3 BM iniTKy E B p o n en cb K M x  i c p a i i i .
All deputies of Verkhovna Rada were encouraged to follow this line^^. PZU  used some of the
same arguments against expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine; not only would it cost a lot, but
.ordinary people would have to pay for it. The Communists and Socialists, argued Serhii Kurykin,
were in favour of closer links with Russia and nuclear power was a means by which to achieve
.this. In his view, the Military-Industrial Complex was standing behind the nuclear power 
programme and people like Bohdan Krawchenko (in 1994 Canadian advisor to the government on 
economic issues) were damaging the Greens’ cause by saying that all countries wishing to be
Statement made on 14.3.1991 by fZ U ’s Political Council.
;
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taken seriously must have their own nuclear industry. His words were grasped by both sides (i.e. 
both the nationalists and the socialists/communists) and would have a damaging impact on 
Ukraine from an environmental point of view^^.
The line adopted by the PZU  was that Ukraine would not become more independent if it 
based its energy sector on nuclear power. Ukraine received fuel for the reactors from Russia and 
also depended on its technology. Besides, there was a considerable safety-risk involved; even 
Ukraine’s nuclear-lobby, generally positive towards nuclear power, admitted that the Ukrainian 
reactors and the condition they were in, made them dangerous. From a political point of view, 
Andrii Hlazovyi found it i.iteresting to see how other political parties ere changing their position 
on nuclear power: initially, everybody was against nuclear power for safety-reasons, whereas by 
1994 it was seen as a necessity. Simultaneously, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the 
Greens to gather people against nuclear power. ProSviia (Kurykin’s organisation) organised a 
demonstration against Chernobyl, but this was only attended by 12-14 people. Such 
demonstrations put the Greens in a poor light, thus causing prominent members of the movement 
to conclude that it was better not to demonstrate, but rather work through existing political 
channels^*.
The Soviet Army was one of the biggest polluters in Ukraine. As seen in the previous chapter 
Zelenyi Svit in Mukachevo was particularly concerned with military issues, successfully 
organising a campaign against the Pristrialivsk radio-compass station and also a military airport in 
its vicinity. Concerned with military installations like those in Mukachevo and also by 
environmental pollution caused by the Black Sea Fleet, Zelenyi Svit set up an ‘Anti-Militaristic 
Commission’ to investigate the impact of the army on the environment. PZU  worked closely with 
this commission and also paid considerable attention to the situation in Mukachevo as the leaders 
o f that movement, Liubov Karavanska and Envhenia Derkach, were both active members of PZU. 
A national environmental conference in Mukachevo on 21-24 December 1990, which was attended 
by several PZU  activists turned into a demonstration of solidarity with the Greens of Zakarpattia^^.
Although PZU  intended to influence decisions regarding the environment by working within 
the forums where such decisions were made, it also made use of actions and demonstrations to 
further its cause. In July 1991 it initiated a nation-wide campaign against air-pollution. Zelenyi 
svit could only confirm that this campaign took place in Kiev, where the most polluted places, 
such as the Leningrad square and the cross-roads of Dorohozhytska, and Klrreshchatyk, were 
picketed. The newly appointed Minister of the Environment, lurii Shcherbak, academician
Serh ii K urykin, K iev , sum m er 1994. 
A ndr ii H la zo v y i, K iev , sum m er 1994. 
3e.ienMfi œ ir,  no. 1, 1991, c. 3.
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Dmytro Hrodzynskyi and deputies of local councils took part in the action as did Kiev road police, 
which assisted the picketeers. Most pedestrians supported the initiative, although some reacted in 
a traditional manner, arguing ‘dont you have anything to do? Or are you being paid to do this?'*^
PZU  also proliferated itself as a party strongly committed to democracy and human rights. In 
connection with the stripping of the parliamentary immunity and arrest o f UAf-member Stepan 
Khmara in late 1990, PZU issued a statement referring to the incident as a ‘provocative act’, aimed 
at creating a precedent for the renewal of the ‘totalitarian-repressive regime’. Khmara should be 
released immediately and a commission set up to investigate the case^ *^ .
Somewhat later, the Greens came out firmly against the death penalty for the coup makers of 
August 1991. An appeal issued by Amnesty International and the European Radical Party and 
signed by the leader of the Green Fraction in the European Parliament, Adelaida Alietti, was 
signed by Serhii Hrabovskyi of PZU s Political Commission^^.
Relationship with the International Green Movement
As pointed out above, contacts were established between members of Zelenyi Svit and Greens in 
several West European countries in 1988/89. Similarly, PZU not only sought inspiration from but 
also sought to establish and develop closer links with Green Parties in other countries. Close links 
were established also with Green Parties elsewhere in the Soviet Union - especially with the 
Estonian and Georgian Green Parties.
Greens in West and South Ukraine had at an early stage established international contacts 
through their Esperanto connections. The international Esperanto society had early on 
recommended its members to join green groups in their respective countries. The Ukrainian 
Esperanto society had, before Zelenyi Svit was established, organised voluntary ecology courses in 
schools and in Western Ukraine (Ternopil oblast) the first Green groups to emerge evolved around 
the Esperanto societies; the first Green group to emerge in Ternopil was called ‘Esperanto and 
Ecology’ and one of the Ternopil party clubs was called ‘Esperanto’. PZU had several Esperanto­
speaking members such as M. Heller (Nikolaev, Lviv oblast), T. Auderska (Odessa) and M. 
Vashchyshyna (Lviv) as well a s j. Pushkar (Ternopil). Through these PZU  had established contact
3a.leiinn cnir, n o .  , 1 9 9 1  ( n . p , ) .  
3atetiHH cnir, n o .  1 6 ,  1 9 9 0 ,  c .  I .
Ib id.. p. 3. T h is resolu tion w as a lso  s ign ed  by other Ukra in ian parties, such as the United Social- 
Democratic Party (OSDP), depu ty  o f  Verkhovna Rada V o lo d y m y r  M o sk o v k a , head o f  the  
Constitutional-Democratic party (KDPE) V o lo d y m y r  Z olo tra iov  and head o f  the Liberal-Democratic 
Party (LDPU) V o lo d y m y r  K lym chuk. Several prom inen t R ussians, such as lur ii A fa n a s iev , O leg  
K alu g in , Arkad ii M urashov, ph ilosopher  L eon id Bakh tin, writer B oris S truga tsk ii, V o lo d im ir  
B u k ovsk ii and other m em bers o f  the cultural in te lligen tsia  and p o litica l c ir c le s  also  s ig n ed  the appeal.
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1with the French Esperanto society and decided to work together. It was also significant that many 
Greens in Europe were using Esperanto as a means of communication'^'^. Pushkar encouraged 
international contacts, arguing that PZU  needed to break its national isolation and establish itself 
as an authoritative party not only in Ukraine but also outwith its borders.
Links between Greens in the West and the (former) USSR would not only be beneficial to the 
latter, but possibly also to the former. Kononov, for instance, expressed the view that the Greens 
in the (former) USSR had something to ‘teach’ the West; their experience had given them a 
different outlook of the world and were in the process of creating their own ‘new’ philosophy. 
The Ukrainian Greens and others might therefore contribute to the widening and improvement of 
the philosophy of the international green movement^^.
i
On 2 April 1991 the Fourth Congress of Los Verdes (the Spanish Green Party) convened in 
Madrid^^. The Ukrainian Green Party attended this Congress as observers, as did die Grünen, 
Greens from Mexico and the leadership of the European Greens - a network uniting Green Parties 
from several European countries. While in Madrid, PZU  formally handed its application of entry 
to the political secretary of the European Greens, Leo Cox. This, argued Hlazovyi, was an 
important step not only for PZU, but also for Ukraine, then if membership was granted, that would 
be an international recognition not only of PZU but also of Ukraine as an independent subject of 
international law. A reply was expected sometime during the autumn of 1991, following a 
meeting of the European Greens, at which P Z U s  statute would be discussed. Only after an initial 
assessment could PZU become ‘an equal among equals’ with the Greens of Germany, France, 
Holland and Sweden. The Green Parties of Estonia and Georgia had already been granted
1
i iT
membership. The European Greens worked fast, however, and already on 18 May 1991 at a 
regular Central Co-ordinating Council, V. Ivanov, announced that the European Greens had
99accepted PZU as a member of the association .
In Madrid it was agreed that the Ukrainian Greens, together with the Estonian, Georgian and 
Catalonian Green Parties would take part in a joint programme - ‘Ethno-ecology’, which would 
open new perspectives from a theoretical point of view. A conference on the topic ‘Kiev-Madrid: 
post-totalitarianism’ was scheduled to take place in Kiev in October 1991. It would be a joint 
venture between PZU and the Madrid Federation of Greens. PZU  was also invited to attend the 
Seventh Congress of the European Greens in Zürich later that year. This was an important step 
towards P Z U s  integration into the European political process. Hlazovyi pointed out that PZU, as 
the only Ukrainian political party, was using the flag of United Europe (blue with golden stars) in
Letter from  Ihor Pushkar to all PZU loca l clubs on the e v e  o f  the Secon d  C on gress, M ay 1991 . 
In terview  w ith V italii K on on ov , K iev , A u gust 1991.
Je.’ienMiï cnir, no. 10, 1991, c. 6.
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its actions. The Greens, he stated, ‘will do everything so that independent Ukraine will be part of 
it (i.e. United Europe)’.
Serhii Kurykin, who attended the Seventh Congress of the European Greens on 1-2 June 
1991, gave an account of it in the same issue of Zelenyi svit. The East European Greens were very 
active during the Congress, trying to define the difference between ‘reactionary elements’ and the
■movement for independence, the latter seeking the right to chose its own future. PZU  and other 
East European Green Parties agreed to meet in Slovenia to exchange opinions regarding the 
activities of the Greens in countries deprived of their statehood.
The newspaper Zelenyi printed quite a lot of information about the Greens in Germany
and also an article on non-violence. These articles were written by Andrii Demydenko, Andrii 
Hlazovyi and Serhii Kurykin - all three of whom had established an extensive network of contacts 
abroad. Knowledge of Green political theory and of the Greens in the West was, however, limited 
among the rank-and-file membership of PZU. Even at leadership level there was a need for more 
information, argued Hlazovyi, who was unhappy that Vitalii Kononov, who took over as leader of 
the Party following the resignation of lurii Shcherbak in 1992, was not very familiar with green 
politics.
The organisation the European Greens was founded in 1984 and by June 1993 united 23 
Green Parties throughout Europe. At a meeting in Helsinki on 18-20 June that year, the European 
Greens transformed itself into the Federation of European Greens. It was also decided that its 
headquarters be moved from Brussels to Vienna. During the meeting discussions continued
'/between the East and West European Greens regarding the special conditions of post-totalitarian 
societies facing the former. Considerable attention was also given to environmental problems in 
these societies and the possibilities for solving military conflicts in East and Central Europe'^'.
As part of the dialogue between Greens in the East and West a so-called ‘East-West
Dialogue’, attended by 35 delegates representing 18 Green Parties from East, Central and Western
!02
1€•1•S.
Europe took place in Irpen (Ukraine) in early December 1993. The ‘Green East-West Dialogue’ 
functions as a forum for the exchange of opinions between Greens in the East and West and 
although it is not a decision-making body, it can make recommendations to the European 
Federation of Green P a r t i e s T h e  meeting'*^"  ^ in Ukraine was co-organised by PZU  and the
IV
.
 :------------------
S ee  for instance Se.ietmn cnir, June 1991, c. 4 . A
S ee  In troduction in T he G reen E ast-W est D ia lo g u e . D iscu ssion  Paper. Central and Eastern Europe: A n  
E c o lo g ica l D isaster A rea. T he need  for an action program m e o f  G reens for e co lo g ica l reconstruction in 
Central and Eastern E urope (K iev , U kra ine, D ecem b er 3-5 , 1 9 93), p. 1.
T h is m eetin g  w a s the third o f  the G reen East W est D ia logu e. Earlier, m eetin g s had taken p lace in 
B ra tislava, S lovak ia  (1 9 9 1 , 1992).
I
Isecretary of the European Federation of Greens, Anne de Boer, and received organisational and A
financial support from the Ukrainian authorities'^'^. Much attention was given to elections in post- A
totalitarian societies. Strategy and tactics were discussed as well as the forthcoming elections to ;'S
.the Ukrainian parliament. The delegates met with representatives of the presidential 
administration and were given an orientation on the Ukrainian energy programme and political
Alternative PZU  - Chukche—
aspects regarding the ratification of the START-1 Treaty. During a meeting with Minister of the
laEnvironment, lurii Kostenko, issues such as environmental protection and nuclear power were
thoroughly discussed. 4|
The ‘East-West Diafogue’ was important for PZU not only as i‘ ""presented a recognition of =«
the party, but more so as it provided the Ukrainian Greens with an opportunity to familiarise
' cGreens from elsewhere with the environmental problems Ukraine was suffering from and thus to |. ■ 4
generate interest and eventually also secure various forms of assistance from elsewhere. An .'ÿ:'
example of a joint campaign was the appeal issued by the Federation o f European Greens together |
with environmental and anti-nuclear groups on 21 October 1993*'^ .^ The appeal, commenting on y f
the recent lifting of the moratorium on nuclear power and the continued operation of Chernobyl, I
I
" '41argued that ‘Europe is too small for the use of RBMK reactors’. Although the appeal in itself yj
changed nothing, it became a starting point for an international campaign against the use of 
RBMK reactors in the former Soviet Union. A
:g
Green Parties in the West in general and die Grünen in particular, can be distinguished from more
traditional political parties not only through their policies, but also in the way they present their
.policies (e.g. die Grünen). The Ukrainian Green Party, although in terms o f policies it does differ A 
from other political parties, is not very different or ‘alternative’ in form. In P Z U s  early days, 
however, some activists based in Kiev, tried to ridicule Ukraine’s political past by means of 
‘staged actions’ and ‘happenings’. An avant-garde sculpturer, ’Volodymyr Ivanov, who was one of 
the pioneers of the Kiev rock music environment (in the past he worked as a producer and v,A
manager) organised such actions together with a youth group referring to itself as Youth Liberal- #
M.Revolutionary Union ‘Luchy chuchkhe’. (‘Chuchkhe’ is a term that was used by Kim II Sung in M
North Korea, signifying his policies of ‘self-reliance’.) Throughout 1990 and 1991, this group y■1 
■ : 3A g reem en t w a s reached on such  support at a m ee tin g  b e tw een  V italii K o n o n o v  and P res iden t L eon id  xy
K ravchuk in O ctober 1992 (se e  Y P -l, 7 .1 0 .9 2 , 20 :0 0 , ”Hoi3H11h”. trascr ibed in Ukraine Today,
8 .1 0 .1 9 9 2 , no. 3 1 2 , p. 3).
n D ec -n e .n i3 . no. 2 0 -1 0 . 2 5 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 . A
A n o ther nam e used for this group w as MPPC: Mo.HO^teTKiiLiH p ec iiy 5 .r iH K a i icK H H  peiiO.!UOUMO iiiib!H coios. . A
■I
staged a number of ‘performances’ in Kiev to ridicule the existing ‘communist' system. This was 
done by a number of ‘red’ happenings, so ‘red’ that they made official events such as the First of 
May-day parade and the 7 November parade look pink in comparison.
The idea was to make people laugh of themselves and their political system by means of 
irony. Only when people were able to confront their rather painful past would they be able to put 
it behind and to start something new. ‘Maybe’, argued a member of Chukche, who referred to 
himself as Oleksandr Chiche, ‘Karl Marx was right in saying that the people must take farewell 
with their past in a laughing manner. Laughter, as shown by psychiatrists, is not a poor provision 
against incidents of paranoia’ By means of irony Chuhkche activists also hoped that they could 
open people’s eyes to the meaninglessness of existing political and economic structures.
On 7 November 1991, Luchy Chuchkhe held its most well-known manifestation: in front of 
the official parade, with a compaternic banner and riding on a horse, dressed in a fur coat, rode 
Roman Maiorchuk, who, according to one of his ‘adherents’, would soon gather larger crowds 
than the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz, on TV. Behind him followed a 
machine-gun wagon and eventually, the chukchisty, armed to their teeth. Slogans such as
#
”C.aaiia LKHO!, ”nai3.ioi3 3 iiavm”, "Jleriiu, iiapTin, KovicoMoa!”, ’’Haiiia 
ue.'tL -  K0\wiyiiH3M!”, ’TIo;3op Bymyl”, "Paborari) iiajio!”
were carried by those attending the parade. The parade made it down Khreshchatyk (Kiev’s main 
street) and vulitsa Chervonoarimiiska and, according to a Chukche supporter covering the incident 
in an article written for Zelenyi svit, ‘increased the revolutionary spirit of the Kiev citizens’. Some 
uninformed onlookers burst out laughing at the sight, but the ‘chuchkhisty walked proudly and 
convinced of their international historical mission’ On another occasion, the theme of their 
happening was how to save the ‘reds’ (i.e. the CPU) from being included in the red book of 
threatened plants and species"'^.
The chiihkchisty also made fun of other political forces. At one point, for instance, they made 
an offer to Vladimir Zhirinovskii through Ukrainian radio, to put him forward as presidential 
candidate for Ukraine. Somehow Zhirinovskii was notified of this offer, and he shortly after 
issLied a statement in which he thanked for and took Chukhche up on the offer!" ' On the occasion
issued a resolution, signed by by M. Polishchuk (commissar of the union) in which all voters were
109
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'
of the December 1991 referendum on the status of Ukraine, the Politburo of ‘Luchi Chukche’
108 - .  — ,Se.ieuMM (JilT, no. 19-20, 1991, c. 3.
Ibid.
3ejieimfi œ ir , no. 9, 1990, c. 3.
Vladimir Zhirinovskii was at this time still a relatively unknown political figure.
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requested to write the following on their referendum bulletins; ‘10,000 years of life for comrade 
Kim II Sung!’ In this manner Chuchkhe would finally be able to establish how many supporters it 
had in Ukraine!"^
These and other actions amused the leadership o f PZU, although some high-ranking members 
of the party like, for instance, Andrii Demydenko, expressed concern that the party might be better 
off distancing itself from the initiative as some people failed to see the irony in the ‘happenings’ 
and ‘actions’ organised by Chukhche and the group might therefore have a negative impact on the 
party.
Political Alliances
From late 1990 the priority in Soviet politics became to keep the Soviet Union together.
Following the Lithuanian declaration of independence, German reunification and the ‘revolutions’
of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev lined up with the hard-liners within the CPSU. Rapid economic
reforms were rejected, a moratorium was proposed on glasnost and Vadim Bakatin, who was
considered a liberal, was replaced by the conservative Boris Piigo as Minister o f the Interior.
Eduard Shevardnadze resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 1990 warning of the
danger o f dictatorship and in January 1991 security forces clashed with democrats in Vilnius and
Riga, resulting in many people being killed. TV programmes like ‘Vzgliad’ and ‘TSN’, which had
given an objective picture of events in the Baltics were banned and in March 1991 there would be
a referendum on the preservation of the USSR"^.
Worried about current political events and concerned about the up-coming referendum,
democratic parties from several of the Soviet republics decided to join forces in their struggle for
political and economic reform. The Democratic Congress held its founding congress in Kharkiv
on 26-27 January 1991 and was attended by both PZU  and Zelenyi Svit, which by the way were the
only Soviet Greens to attend the Congress. Other parties and movements included Saiiidis, RUKIP,
the Democratic Party o f Russia (Travkin’s party), the Latvian and the Lithuanian Democratic 
'Party o f  Labour, the Social Democratic Party o f  Azerbaijan, the Belorussian National Front,
■ 1 1 4several trade unions and a number of Russian and Ukrainian political parties
" ’ G eo ffrey  A, H osk in g , Jonathan A v e s , Peter J.S. D uncan (1 9 9 2 ), p. 99 .
' The declara tion o f  the creation o f  the D em ocra tic  C on gress w as s ig n ed  by 30 parties and m ovem en ts;
I
T he L ithuan ian D em ocra tic  Party o f  Labour, the S oc ia l D em ocra tic  Party o f  A zerba ijan , the L a tvian  
D em ocra tic  Party o f  Labour, the L a tvian S o c ia list Party, PDVU, the U kra in ian L ib era l-D em ocra tic  
U n ion , the U n ited  S o c ia l D em ocra tic  Party o f  Ukra ine, the U n ited  D em ocra tic  Party o f  B elo ru ssia , the  
m o v em en t ‘D em ocra tic  R u ss ia ’, the R ussian  R epublican  Party, the S o c ia l D em ocra tic  Party o f  U kra ine, 
the Trade U n ion  o f  K uzbass, the U kra in ian Studen t U n ion , the R ussian  S o c ia l D em ocra tic  Party, PZU, 
the S o c ia l D em ocra tic  Party o f  K azakhstan , Zelenyi Svit, the L ithuan ian S o c ia l D , S a iiid is, RUKH, the  
U kra in ian Christian D em ocra tic  Party, the D em ocra tic  einocratic Party P latform  o f  Tajik istan , the Party
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The declaration on the creation of the Democratic Congress stated that it was necessary to g
consolidate the democratic forces and liquidate the ‘totalitarian regime’ in a civilised manner. -p.
‘Imperial unitary structures’ had to be replaced by sovereign, democratic states. The Democratic 
Congress, which united ‘parties and movements of a social-democratic, liberal, general democratic 
and national democratic orientation’ would interact on political and economic issues and would 
defend democracy and the republics’ right to self-rule. The Congress opposed a renewal of the
union treaty, wishing instead to build relations between sovereign republics based on parity.
CRather than signing a new union treaty, the Congress favoured a ‘Commonwealth of Sovereign T
,77States’, where each state would conduct its own internal and foreign policy and would have the i?
right of free entry and exit.
As for the environment, the Congress favoured close co-operation between the membership 
states in this area: 7I
f
CoiviaconaiiHe ycH.im i ii Ae.ie oxpaiiia h iioocrauo ii.ieiim i
OKpyîivaiouien cpe;ibi iia Tepnropnn rocyAapcn i-yM acrunK ou. iiic.iioaaii %
paspadoTKy n ocyiuecrii.aeiiMe o 6 m u x  aKo.aornaeoKMx itopn h A
iipoipaxiM, oK asaiine homouim rocyAapcraaM-yaacniMKaM iipn f
'ipeaiibiMaHiibix o5croaTe.ai,cniax^'A y
f
./tThe document also opted for nuclear-free zones in Ukraine and Belorussia, an issue which was |  
high on PZU ’s agenda. T
' -A-'The Democratic Congress opposed the referendum on the continuation of the union treaty not 
only as it opposed this treaty in itself, but also as the treaty, signed in 1922, was between union 
republics and not citizens. Consequently, it was not up to the citizens of the Soviet Union to 
decide the future fate of the treaty through a referendum. The status of each republic had to be 
decided by the free will of their own citizens and by nobody else. The Congress favoured ‘a
Î
nr . . I
■■ÿcoalition of states...not a new state or a super-state’ . Finally, the Democratic Congress also
condemned the crack-down in the Baltics, demanded the retirement o f Gorbachev, Prime Minister i
,7;:Vladimir Pavlov, lurii Kriuchkov (KGB), Pugo (Minister of the Interior), lazov (Minister of '■'(aDefence) and Kravchenko. It also issued a resolution in support of the Ukrainian People’s Deputy A'I
•'Ï
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  I
o f  C onstitu tional D em ocra ts (U k ra ine), the Ukra in ian D em ocra tic  Party, S olidar ic  Trade U n io n s o f  A -
U kra ine, the Free D em ocra tic  Party o f  R ussia, the B elorussian  N ation a l Front, the A rm en ian  Party o f  f  V
N atio n a l and Socia l Justice, the L ithuanian D em ocratic  Party and the L ithuanian W orkers’ U n ion . 7#
Source: 3a;u3.:ieiiue o co^ jia iiU M  A eM O K n aT H M ecicoro  K o i i r p e c a  (n .d .) A
C o iiM ecT iia H  jieic.iapaim a iio. iMrmieoKux n a p i  uM. opraun^auuM h yumxceiiHH v ia c r i i H K o n  I
’’d e .y io ic p a T H tie c K o r o  K o i i r p e c o a ” (n .d .). 7
3 a in i . ! i e i iu e  V M acT U H K on -vaD eim T e.r ieP t d e M ic o i i r p e c c a  o  coio3iiom a o r o i i o p e  h n e A e n e m iv M e t n .d .L  A f
5
7:'
A:'
" A-
Stepan Khmara, who had been arrested and stripped of his parliamentary immunity following an aa
incident thought to have been provoked by the authorities, in Kiev'
The Ukrainian Communist Party was not at all happy with the emergence of the Democratic 
Congress. In a critical comment printed in the CPU’s official organ, Radiamka Uki'aina, V. T
Pavlenko criticised the initiative for being ‘deceptive’ and sharply condemned the use of phrases y
such as ‘the communist crocodile’ and ‘monster’ in references to the CPSU'
Initiatives to unite Ukrainian political parties and movements in a similar block followed. In 
March 1991 Ihor Pushkar in an article in Rovesnik urged democratic minded people to as quickly 
as possible found political parties of a general socialist, national-de'i^'^cratic and liberal orientation
traditions and religion. The democratic forces, however,
‘no’s, around which all democratic parties could unite:
1) N o  to the one-party unitary com m u n ist system .
2) N o  to a union ex istin g  above the states.
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and unite these in a bloc of democratic parties. The political forces of Ukraine could in Pushkar’s 
view be classified in two groups - the communists and the democrats. Whereas CPU had close to ::7two million members, the democratic parties had no more than 20,000 members altogether. The g
Communists were in the process of rearranging themselves, becoming familiar with and endorsing
the major achievements of the national-democratic forces, encouraging the revival of national ! ;
PoO.iJiTb ociiOBiiy onopy iia lu iaciii CM.nn i  iia ch o ix  .iiiiiep iu . Y mo
m  13110 nacra.na iiopa c tb o p h th  icpanony KOiicy-iBTaTHBiiy pa;iy O.aoicy |
jieMOKpa'PHMiiMx iiapTin iia ociioBi piBiioro i  piBiionpaBHoro A
npeAcrBaiiniiTBa napi'in bmxojuimh is  cni.'ibiioi m cth  -  iioOy/iOBM
ne3a.ae>Kiioi YKpaïiici.icoï Aep^ Kann. f:
Suéh a council (rada) could on a temporary basis adopt a minimum programme, based on three ; 7
713) N o  to the pro-C om m unist Ukrainian parliam ent. U
A Union of Democratic Parties should not be lead by any party or political leader in particular, but 
promote ideas common to all its members.
Another task of equal importance, was to establish political parties based on ideas and not
individuals. There was a tendency to create parties along the Asian model - i.e. the creation of idol '■>|1leaders, who people wanted to believe in like gods, and whose parties became one’s religion. A■-M
This, argued Pushkar, was the wrong approach: If
  - |
Ukraine Today. U krainian M ed ia  D ig est , com p iled  by  Radio L iberty M onitoring , 2 0 .2 .1 9 9 1 , no. U F -0 7 0 ,  
p. 2 1 . - " f
PcWiiiChKU yiqmïiuh 3 0 .1 .1 9 9 1 ,0 .  2. |
I:
Oo-iiTHMiia n a p T in  -  ne p e . i i i ’i i i ,  a Tuvn iacone 7i()()[)()iji.ii,iie 
of) ' EXiiaiiiifi aacTMiiH iiare.ie iiiiii. rpyiia , iiovieA. K u ipa linpoB .uiE. 
i iiv n ’pHViyE, af)o iioi’o jm < \£ 'n .(:a  .j ueuiiOK) iio.iirM M iioio iiporpavioio 
poaiîHTK.v i  iiepeÔ.wioBM cynii.ibCTBa...(io.iiTMMiia n a p T ia  -  ne  
in crp yv ie irr ...
Although ideas were no doubt important, it was, however, equally or perhaps even more 
important to have a visible leader for the emerging new political parties - especially as their 
number grew and political apathy started to take hold in society. Opinion polls (see below) clearly 
demonstrated that PZU  had a much higher rating under the leadership of lurii Shcherbak then later 
under Vitalii Kononov. Although it can be argued that there were a number o f objective reasons 
for this - for instance a general fall in the rating of all political parties in Ukraine, a loss of interest 
in environmental issues, coinciding with increasing financial difficulties, it would be wrong to 
claim that the change of leadership within PZU had no significance at all.
Pushkar’s appeal to all democratic parties to unite struck a chord within PZU; although the 
party wished to be an independent political force and an alternative to other established political 
parties (this wish was partly rooted in the generally high rating of PZU at the time), the party 
leadership acknowledged that the democratic parties had to unite against the CPU and in favour of 
Ukrainian independence in order to have an impact on Ukrainian politics.
A coalition of Ukrainian democratic parties was being established in parallel with the 
Democratic Congress. The new initiative, which was named Demokratychna Ukraina, was 
recognised by PZU and at a meeting of the Central Co-ordinating Council on 18 May 1991 it was 
decided that Kononov and Samiilenko would represent PZU vis-à-vis this coalition'
In December 1992 yet another attempt at building a coalition of democratic parties took place 
in Kiev. The coalition, which was called Konhres Natsionalno-Demokratychnykh Sil Ub^ainy, was 
initiated by URP to defend Ukrainian statehood and independence. A declaration passed at its 
constitutional meeting in Kiev warned against reactionary forces in Russia that were trying to turn 
CIS into a new empire. Signing the CIS statute whatever its form, would amount to a betrayal of 
the Ukrainian people. The Council of the Konhres therefore appealed to ‘all democratic parties 
and public organisations, trade unions, national-cultural societies and creative circles to unite in a 
unitary, anti-imperialistic democratic front’ The coalition had the blessing o f President Leonid 
Kravchuk, whose policies it endorsed on the grounds that they were necessary to secure Ukrainian 
independence. PZU representatives attended the inaugural meeting of the Congress but decided 
against joining it as it was considered an authoritarian organisation, dominated by URP and
rtnoTOKO.rt 3ac iaam u i LIKP n S Y . vi. K h ïb .  Bv.n. K in oB a 5A. 18 .05 .1991  p.
"0 Y T -k  2 5 .1 2 .9 2 . YTH, 16:00, 19:00: ’’du iiiD o"  21:00 in Ukraine Today, U kra in ian M ed ia  D ig e s t
compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. 386, 28.12.1992, p. 17.
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nationalist elements within RUKH  and making allowances for democratic infringements 
(institution of presidential representatives - see below) in the name of Ukrainian independence.
A challenge facing all democratic parties was the increase in support for the socialists 
registered from 1992 onwards. As noted by Shcherbak, the socialists had an enormous advantage 
due to the economic crisis the country was in. This crisis was caused by a government that was 
not ready to introduce economic liberalisation and which had failed to predict Ukrainian 
independence. Every enterprise on Ukrainian territory was linked with 50-60 enterprises in other 
of the former Soviet republics. Radical reform was desperately needed, but with the current 
government in charge these were not likely to be introduced.
Acknowledging the need for economic reform, Shcherbak had been among the initiators to an 
opposition movement uniting Ukraine’s ‘!eft-of-centre’ political forces. The new movement, 
which was named Nova UHaina (New Ukraine) had endorsed PZUTs programme. By January 
1992, however, the new movement counted only individuals such as Hrynev, lemets, Filenko, 
Pylypchyk, Lanovyi, Shcherbak, Riabchenko and representatives of Ukrainian industry and trade 
unions.
5.2 Strategy, Tactics and Political Participation (1991-93)
XoBe BiiiuecTH bxa cede i  ciio ix  A iren 3.riO[iicuy T ins Bopnodw.rui, 
xiMiMiioi ra paiiioaKTHiîiioï cviep'i'i, x t o  iiparue daMHTH YKpaiiiy
I
5.2.1 Presentation of Strategy and Tactics 
Second Congress (Ternopil. 1-2 June 1991)
The major aim of PZU’s Second Congress was to adapt a political strategy for the future. The 
First Congress failed to do this as it was preoccupied with party structure and other, more 
organisational issues. Other issues on the agenda were the official registration of PZU, changes to 
the structure and programme and the elaboration of the party’s political platform.
The Congress discussed the aims and tasks of PZU and there was general agreement that the 
Green Party would be a party of the parliamentary type, basing its activities on non-violent 
methods and joining efforts with all other parties of a democratic orientation. The Green Party 
was for those who
*A:I:
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m  16(1010. ic f î i r .v ' io t o ,  iioe iio rK M noR ). r io B i io i i i i i i io i 'o  c y B e jie n i io io  
7iepyivaB oio B e B p o u e ficK o v iy
PZLPs political strategy was outlined in a resolution issued by the delegates towards the end 
of the Congress. According to the resolution, PZU  would conduct independent politics, ‘co­
operating with all democratic parties, whose ideology, principles and common practices do not 
violate the principles and aims of PZU" :
that the IAEA, instead of being an agency to control the proliferation of radioactive materials, had 
been transformed into an agency advertising nuclear power for political purposes. PZU demanded
3u uiJiufy yKpaiiiy, 18.6.1991, c. 2. 
n p o  i [ o . r i i T H M t i v  c i T O T e r i i o  FldY (n.d.).
A ilO M H  c n i . iB iK )  i 3  i i o , i i T n i i i i n \ i H  co io siiH K a .v in  y  c i î p a u i  a o o î i r i i e i i ïu i  
c T p a r e r i a n o ï  v i e i n  -  s v i o d y i  rB Y k - p a l i i o i o  jiep>ivaBBOï i i e j a . t e x v i i o c T i  
i  ci'BopeiBUi n p a B O B ü ï i iep zca B M , H3Y l i o /u io a a c  u iv a c p e c .  u o e  
iip io p M T e 'r i i iC T b  i i n i  ï ï  i i o . i i T n q n o ï  A i a . t b n o o r i  raKMX i ip o d . ie M , Jik 
s a x n c T y  a o B i c i . i . u i ,  iU io p o B 's !  . n o a e n  i  c o u i a . i b i i o r o  i ia x H o r y ,  
pcwBWTK.y r p o v ia a c i iK o r o  c a v io B p ju iy B a in u i ,  ük  d a i in  jieM O K jiaT O M iioro  
c;yciii.ii)CTBa'“^
PZU  would give priority to the campaign for a nuclear-free Ukraine; free from nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power stations and for a full demilitarisation of the country. ‘Only a nuclear-
.free, peace-loving and demilitarised Ukraine can join the European and international concord’,
which was one of the major political aims of the Ukrainian Greens.
.The resolutions passed by the Congress also addressed other political issues, such as the
lAEA-report referred to above, the political status of Ukraine and health. As for the IAEA 
Chernobyl report, PZU  held the view that it had exceeded its own statute when, after having 
examined only seven inhabited areas in the Chernobyl-zone, it drew generalised conclusions for
the population of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to the effect that the fall-out from the accident 
posed no health threat to the people living in contaminated areas. This, argued the Greens, proved
of the Ukrainian government that its grievances be made known through the United Nations. 
What was more, the Green Party demanded that the non-nuclear principles stated in the declaration 
of Ukrainian sovereignty be implemented: ‘Ukraine must be free from not only nuclear weapons 
but also from nuclear energy and nuclear industries (except for the medical)’. Finally, PZU  urged 
the government to observe Verkhovna Rada's moratorium on nuclear power. Related to this, PZU  
favoured the close-down of all nuclear power stations in Ukraine during 1991 in parallel with the 
removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory.
I
490
-123 JaieuMM cniT, no. 9, 1991, c. 6. Resolutions passed on 2.6.1991,
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After the Chernobyl accident the health of children in Ukraine deteriorated. To stop this
trend, PZU  recommended that pregnant women and children be provided with ‘safe’ (i.e.
environmentally clean) food products. To create ecological awareness, it was suggested that
ecological courses be provided from the level of kindergarten to college and that ecology faculties
.be created at all universities. Verkhovna Rada ought to set up a commission to monitor the impact
of Chernobyl on children’s health in all contaminated areas of Ukraine, including Kiev. There was
an urgent need for a complex programme on health care for children affected by the Chernobyl
accident. A part of such a complex programme would be the ‘rehabilitation’ of children through
stays in sanatoriums and holiday resorts in non-contaminated part‘d of Ukraine. Moreover, food
products should also be reinforced with vitamins to ensure a nutritious diet for the young'^^.
By stating its commitment to one-sided nuclear disarmament, PZU  presented itself as not
only an environmental, but also an anti-military party (I will return to this issue below). Other
.political parties, while sharing PZLFs concern for the environment, did at the time not pay much
attention to Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. Their major concern was to secure not only Ukrainian
real sovereignty but also independence. Ukraine could only preserve its independence from
Russia through strength and this, needless to say, necessitated some military capability. Nuclear-
.free zones were an important element of PZW s  nuclear policies; as seen in Chapter Three, Andrii
• -.Ç-Demydenko, for instance, attended an international conference on local governments and nuclear- 
free zones in Glasgow in November 1991 and PZU  members of Kievrada (the Kiev city council) 
gave priority to this issue. P Z V s  anti-military commitment was supported by the anti-military 
commission of Zelenyi Svit, which was uncovering evidence of grave environmental damage, 
caused by military units scattered around Ukraine. The evidence provided by Zelenyi Svit could 
then be used as policy-input by PZU.
Whereas the Green Party was able to outline its policies, it did not really have a concept for 
how to mobilise support for and later implement its policies. RZUhad no deputies in Verkhovna 
Rada. The number of deputies in local and regional parliaments who were elected either as 
Zelenyi Svit representatives or with the backing of Zelenyi Svit during the 1990 elections were 
quite a few. However, only a few of these pledged their support of PZU. Moreover, PZU  found it 
increasingly hard to mobilise the general public in support of its policies. Finally, problems 
emerged within the Green Party due to disagreements over policies, the emergence of fractions 
and the lack of a party apparatus that could take care of day-to-day activities and funding to build 
such an apparatus. Thus, in the early days of PZU  the major focus of attention was with internal
I
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affairs, whereas declarations and resolutions were sent to the press and press-conferences 
organised on a regular basis to make the Green Party’s policies known to the general public.
As for changes in the statute, the Congress decided to reduce the age limit for Joining PZU  
from 18 to 17 years, so that young men could Join the party before going to the army. The 
Congress also endorsed a decision to Join the movement Nezalezhna Demokratichia Ukraina 
(Independent Democratic Ukraine).
5.2.2 Political Participation
iP
Participation in Official Structures
The initiative to Shcherbak joining the Ukrainian government was, as seen in Chapter Three, made 
by Prime Minister Vytold Fokin. In an attempt to fend off demands that he resign from his 
position, he initiated a broad coalition government for reform. In this connection, Vitalii Kononov 
wrote a letter to Leonid Kravchuk, who was at the time president of Verkhovna Rada. In the letter 
he expressed the view that PZU, taking into account ‘the highest interests of the people of Ip
Ukraine’
f
I
■iSF l iu u ia  iia B y crp iB  iia.viarainuiM npevT t p M i i i i c r p a  ii. (D oK ina  
a|)OpviyijaTn Yp>ui i ia p o iu io i  JiOB ipn, iio i’OAMBumcb iipMwiuri'n y s a c r b  b 
nboviy B o c o 5 i  aiviepa i i a p r i l  n. IllepdaKa, b uoB U iA  Mipi :;A
yoBijioM.BOiOBM Boio xwoTK ioi'i. i  BedesuGKy ;t'ui p enov ie  n o . i ir u K a  b 
n e p io ; i  i ie c r a d i . ih i io c T i  i  CKono.viiM iioi KpHsn BBB'rn iia c e d e  
B iA iiOB i;ia.BbtiicT i> sa  raky  BaAc.anay C(|)epy, hk o x o p o iia  AOBKi.a.aa.
Ï
Unfortunately, however, the parliament had ‘failed to understand the situation’ and demonstrated a
lack of respect for a person who was internationally known and who had become a symbol of the : ■
fight against Chernobyl, by not electing him for the post of Ukrainian Minister of the Environment 
during the vote in parliament. This, in Kononov’s opinion, represented a lost opportunity to
consolidate the constructive forces in Ukraine ‘for the revival of the fatherland’. .Ç|'TAs seen in Chapter Three Shcherbak’s candidacy was eventually endorsed by parliament in A
the summer of 1991. Fla If a year later, at the meeting o f P ZU  s Central Co-ordinating Council on 
11 January 1992, Shcherbak accounted for his work in the ministry so far. As a minister he had 
gained access to a wealth of information and had initiated a reform of the ministry’s structures. A 
directorate to control military pollution had been set up and the Law of Environmental Protection 
had been passed. However, the ministry needed assistance as it proved difficult to change staff |
(30% of staff in the regional administrations had been replaced and so had 50% of ministerial 711
staff). Verkhovna Rada had put obstacles in the way for the ministry by introducing a resolution 
prohibiting the closure of enterprises without the consent of the parliament. Moreover, the 
ministry lacked proper laboratory facilities. The doors to the ministry were open to everybody and 
Shcherbak urged the party not to raise itself above the country’s ecological problems.
Pushkar, however, was critical of Shcherbak’s efforts so far, complaining that little had been 
done to protect the river Dniestr. Androsov (Sumy) was sceptical to what Shcherbak might 
achieve, referring to Kravhciik, who had allegedly stated that as long as the economic situation in 
Ukraine did not improve, there would be no ecology*'^‘^ .
Green President? - The Presidential Elections (December 1991).
Following the successful local elections in 1990, during which a number of Greens were elected in 
several of Ukraine’s districts, and Shcherbak’s successful election to the post of Ukrainian 
Minister of the Environment, some members of PZU  wanted to put forward Shcherbak’s 
candidacy for the up-coming December 1991 Presidential Elections. Shcherbak was a well-known 
and respected public figure in Ukraine and opinion polls during 1991 indicated that the Green 
Movement (i.e. Zelenyi Svit and PZU) had considerable support among the country’s electorate 
(cf. Chapter Three). Others voiced their support for Shcherbak’s candidacy while simultaneously 
expressing concern that his election as Ukrainian Minister of the Environment might eventually 
discredit the Green Movement for the reasons mentioned in Chapter Three. If Shcherbak would 
succeed in being elected Ukrainian President, he would step down as Minister of the Environment 
before he could be accused of having failed to implement changes in the ministry and measures to 
stabilise the deterioration of the republic’s environment.
There was, however, also considerable opposition within the Green Party to putting forward 
Shcherbak’s candidacy. Should he take part in the elections, party activists would be tied up in 
campaigning work at a time when it was deemed more expedient to build a more solid 
organisational and material basis for the party. Moreover, PZU  did not really have the financial 
resources to back up a presidential campaign. Yet others were worried that should Shcherbak fail 
to be elected, this would have a negative effect not only on the image of the new party but also on 
morale (within the party).
Shcherbak himself in an interview with Literaturna Ulcraina^^^ expressed the view that he 
found it very difficult to decide whether or not to run for president. As a newly appointed Minister 
of the Environment he had hardly had any time to restructure the ministry. Moreover, if elected
npoTOKO.fl N l .  :iacijiaiiiui LIKP FISY (n .d .). 
Mrepinypim Yiepuïua, c. 1 , 7 .
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president, he would have to start practically from scratch, building up an independent Ukrainian 
state. When PZU  approached him on this matter he was therefore very hesitant. Until 19 A ugust 
he declined the offer. In interviews given prior to this date Shcherbak supported Kravchuk’s 
cand idacy for the post, seeing in him the m ost appropriate candidate and also the person w ith the 
highest chances o f  being elected. In Shcherbak’s v iew  Kravchuk seem ed one o f  the m ost level­
headed politicians Ukraine had. The coup, however, changed things: it provided other candidates, 
includ ing Shcherbak, w ith an opportunity to sharply criticise Kravchuk for his w avering during the 
coup and as a person who emerged from the Com mun ist Party apparatus. Shcherbak therefore 
decided to accept the offer to stand as a presidential candidate. On the issue o f  the cam paign  
itself, he had the follow ing to say:
Ï
3
BnaxcaKj, KOAceii KatuinAaT fioom ieii iie  o f .  m aa ru dpvAOM c a o io  
cyiiepiiH ica, lie  iiaMaraTwca iia d p a rn  omkm y A p ib i i ii ' i  c;n apu i. a 
iipnaep iiyTH y u a ry  n a ixu iy  Y ^ p a iiiH  ao c u o e ï  iipoi'pav iu, ao r n \
.ia x o A ia , h k I  v i i r  Cm SAiHCiiHTH iiic .viaH oyT iiifi OpefiHAeirr 
Y K pax iin ...iI raepA o a n p im H iî B M cynyra cb o io  KanAUAaTypy (TOM iiiiiie,
HK y>Ke v i o B M .  lOCH, lie  a BUcyBaB, a  r ia p T ia )  a .u i ro ro ,  i u o 5  
iipeA craBH 'rw  c b o i o  npo rpa .v iy . c b o ï  i i o i v u i a m  ( h  ne . r r u ie  c n o ï) :  ue
u i . i a  ( |) i.n o c o ( l) iH  f l a p T i ï  :3e.ieriHx Y ic p a ii iM , ne (|)i.ioco(|)iH 
l y m n lB M y .  BMAXHiianna, A e M O K p a r i l ,  h p a ia n iiH  .iiO Aen - ycix. x t o  
A<MBe lia  T e p r iT o p i i  Y K p a i i in .
H aving registered as a candidate, Shcherbak refused to outline his electoral platform, arguing 
that his priority issue w as to gather the required 100,000 signatures needed to enter the actual 
elections. It would, in Shcherbak’s v iew , not be easy to co llect these:
' ■■■■
He p o a y u i io ,  h k  vioAciia craBHTH iia oA ny AoniKy KaiiAHAaTin,
BMcyii.VTMX .'lera.iBiiM.viM, ' . l a p e E c r p o B a i i M M n  napT iaxiM , n t u k  sn an n x  
cavioBM cyBaiin iiJ. riap.aaMeiiTCBica iipaicrnKa i  r.ncreM a, m o i c i i y s  iia 
3 a x o A i .  BiAKHAaioTB raicy vi09K.aHBic.Ti.,
Although Shcherbak would only start a proper election cam paign if  he succeeded in 
collecting the required number o f  signatures, he revealed that a key elem en t in his cam paign  
would be the physical and spiritual rebirth o f  the Ukrainian people, w h ich w as find ing itse lf in a 
state o f  ecological and dem ographic catastrophe:
H e  cCKpeT, m o iio'ia.iocH  BHMHpaiimi iia m o ro  iiapoA y. O co6.;iHBy  
rpMBory bhk.im kbe c u T y a u lH  b ci.aBCbKHX M icueB O crax, a c  
iio cra p iiiiiH  iiace.'ienm i im ce n aO y.io  p o :iM ip in  i ia u io u a j ib iio r o  
KaTaCTpOljlM: BiAll.lMB MO.HOAl 3 CeJia y  V I i C T O  C l ' B O p i O e  Be.i!HMe3l!i
upoS.iie.viH A.HH iiac hk i t a u i i  ipaA M u iH iio a r p a p i io i .  T ukmm mhiiom,
6yA 6 B H c y i i y r a  u i . ' i ic i ia  iiporpav ia eK O .nor i'iiioro  i  JieM orpa ijilH noro  
BiApoAAcem iH Y K pa iiiH .
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Shcherbak also favoured uniting people rather than causing discord. Should this fail, a 
situation in Ukraine similar to that o f  Y ugoslav ia could not be excluded. The president should 
therefore raise h im self above politics and be a president o f  everyone living in Ukraine;
OpesH iieiiT iioiiHiieii crojrrn  iia ;iy9Ke posBa/K .iH uux. uoviipK O B a iinx, 
ueinpHcrcBKHX n o B n i i ia x ;  \ i e n i  iia n i  A BHCOKin i i o a u i i  daMMTBCfi 
.iiOAHiia, HKa 3aAOBO.ibnn.1a  f) i  y k p a i i i i i iB .  K o r p i x o i y n .  dyAVBai'H 
cy iiep e iiiiy . i ie ia . io K u y  AepzvaBy. i  p o o ia n . m o Taico'/K x o iy  ri. a v h t h
B  p o 3 B H i i e i i i M ,  m i B i . i i B O B a i i i n  Y K p a i n i
126 rinoTOKG.n N l.B a c iA a m m  UKP 03Y (n.d.).
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Should he fail to collect enough signatures, Shcherbak would support another candidate 
possessing the qualities outlined above. He also expressed h im self in favour o f  reform ing state 
institutions. With regard to the presidency, a ‘total’ presidential power had yet to be created. 
There w as also a need for a concept for building an independent Ukraine. The sooner such a 
system  could be developed, the more likely Ukraine would be to avoid ethnically motivated  
conflicts. Shcherbak also favoured an active Ukrainian foreign policy, a priority issue o f  which  
would be the creation o f  correct and friendly relations with Poland. A more long-term  goal in 
Ukrainian foreign policy would be for Ukraine to becom e a member o f  the European Com m unity, 
thus bringing Ukraine back into Europe. G ood links with the Ukrainian D iaspora and Israel were 
also desirable.
Finally, Shcherbak em phasised his com m itm ent to the environm ent and disarmament, calling
for Ukraine to take part in talks on what to do with the 120 SS-19 and other rockets stored on
Ukrainian territory. Ukraine, he argued, w as surrounded by several non-nuclear powers. Ukraine
.should therefore declare its intent to achieve a non-nuclear status as stated in its Declaration o f  
Sovereignty:
Y K p a i i ia  ACHTMVie d e s iie m iim e  A .la .v iO A ciiim e, akiieo rie iv iaraM e 
fu ie p ito ï  3 5 p o i .  L ie  a K c i o M a .
5.2.3 Internal Party Developments
1 2 6
Party Funding
The issue o f  funding cam e up at the Central Co-ordinating C om m ittee’s January 1992 m eeting  
K ononov noted in his opening address to the m eeting that not only was there a need to raise the ■:authority o f  PZU  as a party, but also o f  its members as politicians. A  prerequisite for doing this
was to secure funding for the party. Sydorkin (Uman), who was in charge o f the party’s finances, 
argued that since PZU  as a party was not allowed to conduct industrial activities, the party would 
have to finance its work from gifts and donations. In West Ukraine members o f PZU  (Pushkar) 
were earning money for the party by participating in ecological expert assessments and related
•7
I
activities.
Ivanov (Kiev) suggested that PZU  could also collect money through campaigns, whereas 
Holub suggested that PZU  should operate through Zelenyi Svit, using the association as an 
‘economic base’, so to speak. Yet others, like Stepaniak (Ivano-Frankivsk) held the view that 
party activities ought to be funded by membership fees. The size o f the fee could be set at 1% o f 
one’s income. In the end, however, local organisations were recommended to put the membership 
fees as low as possible and fund their activities through concrete environmental work (expert
1,
assessments) and campaign collections. Eventually it was decided to organise work jointly 
between PZU  and Zelenyi Svit locally. Pushkar and Samiilenko were put in charge o f negotiating 
with Zelenyi Svit centrally about co-operation in Kiev and at the national level'^^.
Party Structure - a Reassessment
The issue o f structure was also debated by the Central Co-ordinating Council in January 1992. 
Shulga (Kiev) complained that there were too many co-leaders and that the party organisation was 
not working properly. To give an example, he referred to the August 1991 coup when only one o f 
the nine co-leaders (Sydorkin, who at the time happened to be in Kiev) spoke up on behalf o f the 
Green Party. Sydorkin endorsed Shulga’s view, arguing that the institution o f co-leaders had 
outlived itself. Instead there was a need for a Political Council and a Secretariat. W hereas the 
former would discuss current political issues, the latter would be in charge o f  the party 
organisation and also o f links with other political organisations and parties. A temporary 
resolution was endorsed by the meeting, creating these two institutions. The Political Council was 
composed by all members o f the Central Co-ordinating Council and eight non-members. As its 
speaker, the Council elected Vitalii Kononov. Ihor Pushkar was elected head o f the secretariat'^^.
'^^BuiiHCKa i.i iipoTQKO.iv N l .  saciiLaiiriH UK P f ld Y  II ciH im  1992 p.. .vi. K h x b . c. 2.
P lans regarding the structure o f  the secretariat w ere  h igh ly  am bitious; apart from  a leader and deputy  
leader, the secretariat w o u ld  be co m p o sed  o f  four units (O rgan isation al-finan cia l, Press and 
inform ation , T h eoretic-an alytica l and Fropaganda-redaction), T he secretariat w o u ld  a lso  b e  resp on sib le  
for im plem enting  d ec is io n s m ade by  the C on gress, coordinate a c tiv ities at the ob last lev e l and keep  
control w ith  the party’s m aterial base (sou rce; BaciA aiim i neirrpa.ai.uol KOOpAHtuiiiiHiiol paAU 
i ia p T ii  ae.-ieiiHX yicpaiiiM . no.aoAcenmi npo œ icn eran iaT  n a p T il  scae iiux  y ico a iiiM i. H o w ev er , as 
fin an ces w ere a b ig  problem  w ith in  the party, the secretariat, rather than b e in g  a b ig  and w e ll-o rg a n ised  
unit, cou ld  on ly  cope  w ith  basic  tasks. In A u g u st 1992 at another m eetin g  o f  the Central C oord inating  
C o u n cil, ihor Pushkar w as critic ised  for not havin g  done enou gh  as a secretary. H e refuted  such  
a llegation s by  say in g  that it w as not as s im p le  as to  ju st g iv e  him  a paper file  and say  that he w as the
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whereas Kurykin was put in charge of international questions and links and Kholiavenko was 
made responsible for organisational issues'^'''.
As for party activities so far, Kononov and Shcherbak were highly critical of these;
naprifi lie iinrpMvia.ia ioTMiiy iia oiîoe ioiiynaiiiui. lie iie T i . i hk H  
BHdopaa KaMiiaiiiji, a.ie flSY ne Myriio iia iio.iirHMiioï apeiii, iioiia 
lie peary & iia no.iiiHMni iiOAii.
There were both subjective and objective reasons for this; lack of funding and a general drop 
in interests among the Ukrainian population for environmental issues. Still, the party needed to 
develop its own positions on current issues such as the army and Ukraine’s nuclear weapons and 
against ‘Russia’s chauvinism’. PZU  had to establish itself firmly (and behave) like a political 
party, not as a movement.
Third Congress (9-10 October 1992) and Fractions
The third congress of PZU  gathered in Kiev in October 1992 to discuss tactics, changes and 
additions to the programme and statute. There was general agreement in the Green Party that the 
party structure had to be tightened up and there was also a need to define the tasks of the Central 
Co-ordinating Council, the Political Council and the Secretariat. A lack of regulations had caused 
problems with how to deal with votes cast and there had also been some problems in defining what 
the relationship between the Central Co-ordinating Council and the Political Council should be.
The decision to call a Congress was made by the Central Co-ordinating Council at a meeting 
in Kiev on 23 August the same year and was attended by 97 delegates - 28 of whom were women 
and 69 men - from 16 oblasts of Ukraine and Kiev'"^ .^ It was a relatively young and very well- 
educated group of people that gathered in Kiev: some 40 of the delegates were younger than 30 
years old, another 50 were between 30 and 50 years of age, whereas only seven were older than 50 
years. One of the delegates was a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, six held PhD 
degrees, whereas another 74 had higher education. The remaining 16 had middle specialised 
education
secretariat. Information, funding and a clear division of tasks were also needed. A vote over whether 
to keep Pushkar as the secretary o f PZU was made and whereas six voted in favour o f Pushkar, 11 
voted against and five abstained. Pushkar was replaced by lurii Samiilenko (source: own notes from 
meeting o f Central Coordinating Council, Kiev, 23.8.1992).
‘^ ^ B n iiM C K a i s  iip o 'ro K o .r iv  N I, s a c i A a n i i n  UKP nSY II c i H iu i  1992 p .. .vi. Khïii. c .  2.
The oblasts represented were Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zakarpatia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Kiev, Lviv, N ikolaev, Odessa, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi and Chernihiv.
J 1 i4 H .r ih iia  K O M ic i i i .  riDOTOKO.n no. 2  n o . 10.921 C n H c o ic  A e .r ie r a T in .
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The Congress was opened by Vitalii Kononov, who had been appointed temporary leader 
after Shcherbak resigned from this post following his successful election as Ukrainian Minister of 
the Environment. A children’s choir then sang the national anthem (Shche ne vmerla Ukraina) and 
a religious hymn (Bozhe velykyi, edynyi). Greetings then followed from the deputy leader of 
URP, KDPU  and Nova Ukraina.
Considerable attention was given to Ihor Pushkar, from Ternopil, who had organised a 
‘radical fraction’ within the Green Party. Pushkar justified the existence of the fraction by arguing 
that ‘the party must be workable and united around its aims, although the tactics may vary’.
The ‘radical fraction’ saw national revival as the major task of PZU. It also favoured close 
co-operation with green organisations. PZlPs Political Council had rejected such co-operation. 
As the fraction was opposed by quite a few members of the party, Pushkar accused a part of the 
party’s rank and file membership of being ‘red-brown’. This did not go down well with those 
opposed to Pushkar’s fraction; Evhenia Derkach, from Mukachevo, for instance sharply attacked 
allegations to the effect that this made her ‘brown’ in political terms. Others, like Symus (Lviv) 
were more interested in the Radical Fraction’s platform. Did it have any principal divergences or 
had it simply chosen to work on some concrete issues? If the latter was the case, then the fraction 
could not really be classified as a fraction. Olinchyk from Ternopil objected to the registration of 
the fraction in the first place: in his opinion registering the fraction shortly before the Congress 
contradicted PZU’s statute. The most logical and also correct from a legal point of view, would be 
to first create clubs, then register them and only afterwards gather them into a fraction.
Despite the disagreements, however, Sviatoslav Dudko, who was attending the Congress as a 
guest, thus not automatically having the right to address the Congress from the rostrum, was given 
the podium at Pushkar’s request to read the fraction’s propositions regarding the party programme. 
Pushkar then read out the political platform of the radical fraction to those present. Most o f the 
propositions went down well with those present and Samiilenko proposed that all of these, except 
for a suggestion that the party express a lack of confidence in lurii Shcherbak, be incorporated into 
the Congress’ resolutions. One of the propositions, however, facilitated a sharp discussion on the 
last day of the Congress: Pushkar proposed that the following point be included in the statute:
M.'ieii O d Y  .} 4HC.UI K o .iH iim o i n a p r i i o M e i i K . t a r y p M  i i e  AO iiycKaioThcii 
AO K e p i i i i i H X  ( n u d o p i i M x )  iiocaA  y  i i a p r i i .
Klavdia Khaliavenko (Kiev) wrote a letter to the Congress, supported by Heller, Babinin 
(Nikopol) and Bondarenko (Lviv) in which she stated that should Pushkar’s proposition be 
endorsed.
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ripOTOlCO.ni N o  1 .iliMH.UbllOl I C O M i C l ï  I I I  3'Ï3A V  F l a D T i l  3eJteilHX yicnaïlIH  IliA 11 XCOBTIIH 1992  
pOKV. c.  2.
Letter/note dated 26.11.1992,
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l l o p y i i i a e M  o c i i n a i i i  iipM ii i i i i iH  3 e . i e i i n x :  r y v i a i i i a v i  i  A e v io K p a r H a .
¥
ixpi.vi Toro, OAiia i.i iipMMfurrux ciareiJ cyiiepeMMTB amioviy
aaKoaoAaacray (iiopyM.VE p iB iiic n . iipaa .iiOAevi a raKo^k i i i i i i i A
IipMIiHTiH CTaTI.w).
A majority voted in favour of Pushkar’s proposal, but it failed to be passed, as to change the 
statute a 2/3 majority was required. Thus, although 51 voted in favour of the proposal (29 against 
and seven abstained), this was still short of the 65 votes needed for the vote to be passed'"^^.
Pushkar apparently also tried to register another fraction - the social fraction - composed of 
delegates with many children, at a meeting o f the Central Co-ordinating Council on the eve of the 
Congress (the day before), but this attempt failed.
As was the case in Zelenyi Svit, there was also some conflict between the Kiev members of 
the Green Party and those from elsewhere. Valentyn lankovskii from Odessa PZU  in a letter to the 
central party leadership a month after the Congress argued that it might be necessary to set up a 
liberal fraction for South Ukraine, then although he did not really favour this option:
ft ni.oro lie 5axa io , a.ie rakOAC iie Gaxcaio iipamoBarH 3 TaKUMH
AOKyiVieirraMA, k o rp i ite ypaxoijyioTi. cnenncFiKy p erio iiy  ra ue
AoifOMOAcalo'i’b IIpaiuoiiarA
A deputy from Kharkiv, Shylo, reminded the delegates that the most important thing for PZU  
at the moment was unity. The party should rid itself of personal ambitions and work together. Not 
everything was well within the party; Hrysiuk (Kaharlyk) called for more attention to be paid to |
organisational work. Too much attention had been focused on establishing a party organisation y
(all-Ukrainian) in Kiev, at the expense of local party clubs. Sydorkin (Uman) pointed out that this 
could be explained by the party’s general lack of funds; in order to organise party clubs locally, it 
was necessary to travel to the regions. In the Uman district small villages had two or three PZU  
members each. More important, though, than focusing on numbers was the need to organise the 
party and come up with funding for it. In Uman the Greens therefore focused on the organisation 
of ‘ecological’ enterprises. A programme o f self-financing had been elaborated and so far Uman 
had handed over some 20,000 karbovantsy to the party leadership.
Khudin (South-East), co-ordinating PZU  activities in the Eastern oblasts of Poltava, ICIiarkiv 
and Sumy, informed the Congress that the situation regarding local clubs was very difficult in his 
oblast. No party clubs had so far been set up as he and other Greens had spent most o f their time
;-"7
■working for Zelenyi Svit. In Kharkiv oblast the situation was somewhat better, thanks to the 
efforts of Shylo. In Sumy, however, things were worse. Melnyk (Ivano-Frankivsk) favoured a 
strategy to more actively convince members of the intelligentsia to join the party. Hrytskaniuk 
(Lviv oblast) complained that FZU had failed to prepare beforehand the theoretical justification on 
issues to be discussed at the Congress. The party’s general failure to stake out a clear policy was 
in his view the major reason why the Green Party had started to do badly at ratings. A clear 
strategy was needed for future parliamentary elections (provisions regarding elections were needed 
in the party structure) and a tight structure was required to make the party organisation functional
candidacy.
■iwith the elections in mind.
Bevz (Kiev) complained that PZU  was not being active enough on the political scene. The 
party should analyse the political situation and make prognoses for the future. Besides, it had to
make a stand on whom to support for prime minister and other posts in the government. There
■were two real candidacies for a new Ukrainian Prime Minister, Symonenko and Kuchma. The 
former, who was the outgoing Prime Minister, had declined to fund an ecological programme 
elaborated by the Ministry of the Environment and estimated to cost 15 million karbovantsy to 
implement. Consequently, Bevz drew the conclusion that PZU  should support Kuchma’s
"€
'AAnother Kiev delegate, Moskvin, argued that the Kiev Co-ordinating Club o f PZU  had 
suggested that the party support lurii Kostenko {RUKH) for the post of Minister of the 
Environment to take over after Shcherbak, who had been appointed ambassador to Israel shortly 
before the Third Congress. He urged the Congress to make a stand on this issue; ‘Too often PZU  
is being identified with Zelenyi Svit'. It should, however, be remembered that as party and 
movement the two must approach things differently. P ZU s  problem was that it was not thinking 
politically. This, argued Moskvin, was a challenge the party had to take on.
The delegates were given a brief orientation by the speaker of the Political Council, Serhii 
Kurykin, regarding proposed changes in the programme. Delegates from Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk 
and Kiev oblasts wanted to add a preamble to the programme, defining PZU  as a parliamentary 
party, ‘functioning under the establishment of Ukrainian independence and within a context of 
deep economic and ecological crisis’. The three major directions in the party’s activities should be 
to secure an ecologically safe economy, to demilitarise Ukraine and Ukrainian society and to be a 
defender of human rights.
The preamble and other amendments were made to the programme without any major Î
discussions and with a large majority: for instance a clause on ecological education and for a 
programme to be made for how to achieve this was incorporated into the section on ‘the 
Ecological and Economical Spheres’. Similarly, statements to the effect that Ukrainian troops
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could only operate on other countries’ territory as part of a UN-force and for civil service to be 
offered as an alternative to military service were included. The revised programme also stated as 
one o f PZU’s goals that the state must guarantee the ecological safety of its citizens.
Whereas no significant changes were made to the programme, the statute underwent 
considerable re-organisation. As far as the party structure was concerned, instead of having nine 
CO-leaders, PZU would in the future be headed by one leader, Vitalii Kononov (he was elected 
temporary leader of PZU  after lurii Shcherbak resigned, following his appointment as Ukrainian !.
Minister of the Environment). Although earlier the local party groups had been more or less 
autonomous, party discipline would be strengthened in the future. To co-ordinate work locally, 
the five co-leaders elected by the Congress were each put in charge of the major directions in 
PZU’s activities.
There were two contenders for the party leadership - Kononov and Pushkar -, the latter whom 
put forward his own candidacy. The vote between the two is therefore interesting as it gives an 
indication of the level of support for the Radical Fraction'^^^ within the Green Party. If we are to 
go by the number of votes Pushkar gathered, the fraction was not particularly strong: Pushkar got 
only 11 votes (66 against, eight abstained), whereas Kononov got 82 votes (four against and two 
abstained). People unhappy about the Radical Fraction initiated a vote on their exclusion from the 
party for ‘inaction’. Fifty delegates voted in favour of exclusion, whereas 26 voted against and 10 
abstained. The vote was declared invalid as only 86 of the delegates took part in the vote. It did, 
however, in effect damage Pushkar’s reputation within the p a r t y ' a n d  shortly after, he broke with 
PZU.
Four deputy leaders were elected: Sykorkin (economical questions), Tverdostup (ecological 
questions), Karavanska (social issues) and Kurykin (political links). The secretariat, composed by 
11 representatives from the oblasts, was to be headed by lurii Samiilenko (Kiev). A considerably 
reduced (size-wise) Central Co-ordinating Committee, consisting of nine members, was also 
elected.
A cco rd in g  to llu o r o K o .i nluiemiH KoiKbepeHuil Davimai. ihHOi (bpaKLiii f I 3 y  TeD iioiii.H bCK O i 
ofi. ia c i ' i  (n.d). T h is  co n feren ce  took  place on the e v e  o f  P Z U ’s Th ird C on gress. S o m e  12 groups in 
Ternop il ob last supported the rad ical fraction. R epresen ta tives from  these groups m et to d ec id e  the  
issue o f  w h o m  to send to K iev  to attend the C on gress. It w as su g g es ted  that each  group send one  
delega te , but in the end o n ly  f iv e  n am es w ere put forw ard for this purpose (K liuvan , K obliu k , Pushkar, 
Shtuka and Sok o l).
T he con troversy  around Pushkar started long before the Third C on gress to o k  p lace  in K iev . Sh ortly  after  
PZU w as foun ded , Pushkar w as appo in ted party secretary. Som e p e o p le  thought he w a s no t b e in g  
ac tive  enou gh  for the jo b , and at a m eeting o f  the Central C oord ina ting C ou n c il in K iev  in the sum m er  
o f  1991 he w a s replaced. T he foun d ing o f  the R ad ical Fraction further harm ed P ushkar’s p o s itio n  
w ith in  the party, as this w as seen  by th o se  nega tive  to  Pushkar in the first p lace, as an attem pt at ga in in g  
the upper hand w ith in  the party and as harm fiil to the party itse lf, g iv en  that it w as still y o u n g  and w eak .
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what the Green Party had so far achieved;
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Shortly after the Congress a press-conference was held at which party representatives stressed 
that PZU  was a political party and not an environmental organisation. As a party, PZU  would not 
limit itself to the solving o f strictly ecological problems. This claim was enhanced by the fact that 
five of the nine resolutions passed by the Congress were political rather than environmental. PZU  
sharply criticised Verkhovna Rada for failing to bring the Ukrainian societv out of the economic 
crisis it was in. A draft constitution was proposed. Finally, a positive assessment was made of
r i 3 y  t m a / K a s .  m o  ; j a  v m o b  i i iA T p u v iK H  3 5 o k . v  n p H x i iu H B ' iK iB  i t a p r i l  
B ona  i i e s a d a p O M  p i i i i y a e  ^ u m b u t b  i ip o  c e d e .  f l o p y m y i O B H  b b / K . u i b I  
c o i i i a . i B i i o - i i o . i i T H M t i i  upod-ievB '!  i  r n x .  x t o  ï x  c m o p i o t .  F ld Y  
viüTHMe B i i a ' i i i i  f i i a i i C H  [ f iA  ‘l a c  B u d o p i B  ao u a p . i a u e n T y  iia  
d a r a T O i i a p T i M H i H  o c u o B i ' ’ ^ I
It can be argued that this assessment was slightly optimistic given that the Green Party had 
still not produced a coherent political programme to present to the electorate, but rather issued
statements and press-releases on various issues as they came up. On the other hand, judging by
'the polls, PZU  had a high rating among the Ukrainian electorate. The mistake of the party’s 
leadership was perhaps that it relied too much on the results of opinion polls at a time when the 
methodology for how to conduct polls was still weak and the electorate volatile in that opinions 
changed quickly. Moreover, conflicts were building up within PZU: Pushkar and his group (the 
radical fraction) were excluded at the third congress (personal conflicts) and afterwards some
137people expressed their dissatisfaction with Kononov for having allowed this to happen . Then, 
in the autumn of 1992, a new scandal broke with the Kiev organisation o f PZU.
Sharp criticism of the Congress and o f the Green Paity more generally was voiced in News 
from  Ukf'aine^^^ shortly after the Congress - by people within the party. Volodymyr Tymonin 
(Kiev), for instance, criticised PZU  for opting for self-isolation at a time when the Green Party 
should be actively taking part in building the Ukrainian state: according to one of the resolutions 
passed by the Congress, PZU  would continue to be an independent political force in the process of
state building and in the social life of the country.
In fact, it is se lf-iso la tio n  o f  the party am id a cons iderab le  drop in the  
party’s m em bersh ip  - from  7 ,0 0 0  to 2 ,0 0 0 . A ll this m ight lead to its 
com p lete  fa ilure at the e lectio n s. It looks like a sm all p o ck e t party is 
being  form ed n o w , as before, ju st to  suit its leader (earlier it w as Y uri 
Shcherbak , now  it is V italy  K on on ov). 
____________________________
3e.iennfi cuir, no. 13, 1992, c. 1.
In terview  w ith  Serh ii H rabovsky i, K iev , M ay 1994.
News from Ukraine, no. 46, 1992, p. 5.
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debate. Those who did try to address the Congress were often pressed by the presidium by
time on practical environmental work and encouraging all party members to work for the
Tymonin also complained that PZU was run in an authoritarian manner and that the delegates y
at the congress were generally passive, simply endorsing documents and resolution without any T
At,;
¥5comments such as ‘you weren’t given the floor. Sit down!’, although to some extent this was A
understandable as the presidium had lots of problems with Ihor Pushkar’s radical fraction. #
Sviatoslav Dudko - the co-ordinator of the radical fraction - was also critical, arguing that the 
policy chosen by the party would eventually lead to collapse. The mere fact that membership Ç
figures had dropped so sharply was a clear indication to this effect. In Dudko’s view there were
two major reasons for the heavy loss of members: firstly, party life was over-organised, leaving It
.little leeway for manoeuvring, and secondly, PZU’s leaders were pursuing their own personal 
interests rather than party-goals. The presidium of the Congress, he argued, had clearly infi'inged t |
the party’s statute when it had refused Dudko a mandate due to his radical stands. Instead, he had A
been ‘awarded’ status at a guest, which meant that he had no right to speak from the rostrum. 
Furthermore, the organisation committee had refused to register clubs making up the party’s A
radical fraction. The reason given for this was that it would lead to the splitting up of PZU. S
However, the statute contained no paragraph or clause preventing clubs from forming on the eve l |
''aIof the Congress. Dudko therefore drew the conclusion that the party leadership chose to infringe ¥¥.
its own statute whenever this suited it. The heavy-handed manner in which the Congress was 
conducted, resulted in outbreaks of disapproval against the party leadership; several delegates 
protested by tearing up their party membership cards and mandates.
hiOverall, though, Dudko claimed that the Radical Fraction had succeeded in making public its |
political platform and in winning support for some of its propositions regarding changes to the 
programme and statute. Three of these, however, failed to win the congress’ support: the
Congress did not accept that compensation for ecological damage caused to Ukrainian territory by 
the USSR should be sought from Russia on the grounds that Russia had proclaimed itself the 
successor to the Soviet Union. Neither were the delegates willing to support a vote of no- ¥|
confidence in lurii Shcherbak in connection with his appointment as Ukrainian Ambassador to |l■ AIsrael. The Radical Fraction was not confident that he'would represent Ukraine’s interests in
Israel. And finally, as seen above, the Radical Fraction failed to mobilise a sufficient number of
members in support of preventing former Communist Party functionaries from holding elected g
posts within the Green Party. Dudko finished off his article by suggesting that PZU  spend more
If
environment and not for their own careers.
IfA third assessment o f the Congress was provided by Oleksandr Shulga (former member of :M
A'Zelenyi S v ifs  Revision Commission). Like Tymonin, Shulga held the view that the party U
i
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leadership was not doing enough to implement its own motto ‘To work for a safe natural 
environment for Ukraine’s population’. This motto, he claimed, remained only on paper. PZLTs 
leadership was wrong in rejecting the offer to be part of a new Cabinet of Ministers by refusing to 
propose its own candidates for a ministerial post. This could be interpreted to the effect that the 
Green Party wanted to avoid responsibility. Further, Shulga thought the party was being too 
passive towards the general public; FZUhad amongst its ranks and supporters specialists of world 
calibre in the areas of nuclear power and nuclear biology. These were in a position to explain to 
the public the dangers of Chernobyl on people's lives and health. Even though the Ukrainian 
government had long ago started publishing maps on pollution of Ukraine’s territory, which 
greatly facilitated the task of the Greens, no attempts had so far been made at explaining these 
maps to people. Shulga in this connection referred to Andrii Demydenko, who had allegedly said 
the following: ‘why should we explain if nobody is interested in the information?’ Shulga’s reply 
was that people would hardly be afraid of things they did not understand.
Membership Developments
As seen above, a sharp decline in membership figures had taken place within PZU  since the party 
was registered in 1991. This, together with discord within some of the paity organisations'*^^, was 
worrying not only as it could be taken as a weakening of the party (some people, however, saw it 
as a healthy development: many of those who joined PZU  during its membership campaign were 
neither particularly Green or interested in party work), but also as the Green Party needed to re­
register itself with the Ministry of Justice, following the passing o f the ‘Law on Public 
Organisations’. Although for the purpose of re-registration there was no requirement that the party 
must have at least 3,000 members, things still did not look good.
Kononov in his l e t t e r ' t o  the Ministry of Justice claimed that PZU had 100 registered party 
clubs with 1,863 members. The following breakdown was also provided:
D iscord  w a s reported in the C hern ivtsi ob last organ isa tion of PZU on the e v e  o f  the Th ird C on gress. 
A pparen tly  there w as d isagreem en t on h o w  to  im plem en t the tasks ou tlined  in the party program m e and  
a leadersh ip  struggle  had broken ou t as a result. Further problem s arose w h en  d e leg a tes for the  
C on gress had to be e lected . H ow ever , the Central C oord ina ting C ou nc il d ec id ed  to  deal w ith  the 
situa tion at its first m eetin g  after the C on gress and in the m ean tim e a llo w  bo th  s id es a ccess  to the  
C on gress. P roblem s w ere a lso  reported w ith in  the K iev  C oord ina ting C o u n c il, w h ere T ym on in  w as  
b e in g  ostrac ised  for no t b e in g  su ff ic ien tly  ‘g reen ’.
Letter no. 2 8 , dated 7 .1 2 .1 9 9 2  to the Chairm an o f  the D epartm en t for P ub lic  M o v em en ts  o f  the Ukra in ian  
M in istry  o f  Justice, N , L ukashov.
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Table 5.1 Membership Figures, PZU Oblast Groups
O b la s t N u m b e r  o f  m em b ers N u m b e r  o f  c lu b s
T e r n o p il 4 0 2 21
Iv a n o -F r a n k iv s k 3 32 18
K iev 2 87 17
L viv 2 09 12
Z a k a r p a tia 170 9
C h e r n iv ts i 108 6
K h a r k iv 97 5
R iv n e 52 2
V in n y ts ia 45 2
C h e r k a s y 34 2
V o ly n ia 30 2
R e p u b lic  o f  C r im ea 27 1
O d e ssa 27 1
C h er n ih iv 25 1
D n ip r o p e tr o v sk 18 1
When first registered on 24 May 1991, the Ministry of Justice had registered 3,421 members 
of PZU. According to data on political parties registered by the Ministry of Justice (April 1993), 
PZU  at the time claimed to have 10,000 members on its membership list. The highest figure 
mentioned by members o f PZU  themselves, though, was 7,000. It is therefore not unlikely that the 
number of members was somewhat exaggerated to boost the strength of the pai1y vis-a-vis the 
authorities. In 1991 the political situation was still difficult for new political parties and one of 
PZU’s members, Hrisiuk from Kaharlyk, when asked how many members his local organisation 
had, refused to reveal this information, arguing that it would not be in the interests of the party to 
reveal such information as it could be used against it by its political opponents.
Compared with other political parties in terms of registered membership, though, PZU was 
not doing badly at all. Then judging by data provided by the Ministry of Justice''^', only few 
political parties had more than 3,000 members in the first place. In September 1991 the number of 
members required to register political parties was reduced from 3,000 to 300 as only five parties 
had met that target:
■A
i
s:
■*
s
I
I
I
iIA:
rio.ni'iwiiia jiyMKtl/Political Thought, no. 1, 1993, c. 125-26.
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Table 5.2 Party Membership, Ukraine
P a r ty  N a m e D a te  o f  reg is tr a tio n R e g ister e d
m em b ersh ip
M e m b e r sh ip  
a c c o r d in g  to  p a r ty  list
U R P 0 5 .1 1 .9 0 12,000 12 ,000
U k r. P e a s a n ts ’ 15.01.91 3.193 4 ,3 0 0
D e m o c r a tic  P a r ty
P Z U 2 4 .0 5 .9 1 3,421 10 ,000
D P U 2 8 .0 6 .9 1 2 ,753 3 ,0 0 0
P e o p le ’s P a r ty  o f 2 0 .0 8 .9 1 3,671 4 ,0 0 0
U k ra in e
P D V U 2 7 .0 9 .9 1 2,451 1 ,800
L P U 10.10.91 40 0 4 0 ,0 0 0
S D P U 0 4 .0 3 .9 3 3 ,2 0 0
U k r . C h r is t ia n -D e m . 14.11.91 3 50 7 ,0 0 0
P a r ty
S P U 15.11.91 1,305 2 8 ,0 0 0
P e a s a n ts ’ P a rty 0 3 .0 3 .9 2 1,640
L D P U 17.07 .92 309 1,000
U k r. C o n se r v a tiv e - 2 1 .0 7 .9 2 6 12 3 ,0 0 0
R e p u b lic a n  P a rty
U k r . N a tio n a l 3 0 .1 0 .9 2 1,000
C o n se r v a t iv e  P a rty
RUKH 0 1 .0 2 .9 3 ------ 5 3 ,0 0 0
C h r is t ia n  D em . P a r ty 2 3 .1 1 .9 2 1 ,704 10 ,000
o f  U k r a in e
P a r ty  o f  L a b o u r 2 7 .0 1 .9 3 321
U k r. P a r ty  o f  J u s t ic e 0 9 .0 2 .9 3 — 5 ,0 0 0
P a rty  o f  E co n o m ic 11 .03 .93 -------
R e iin e sa n c e  fo r
C r im ea
Commenting on party membership in Holos Ukrainy in February 1993, Kononov claimed that 
PZU  had some 2,000 members altogether, but that formal membership was not really that 
important to the Greens. The Green Party was a parliamentary party and it was therefore more 
important to mobilise the electorate in support of the party to build a powerful parliamentary base. 
Kononov assessed P Z U s  chances as good, arguing that despite increasing apathy amongst the 
electorate, the Green Party was among the parties with the highest rating. There were two major 
reasons for this: firstly, everybody saw the need to protect the environment on the grounds that 
one had no right to risk the health of future generations for short-term economic gain. Secondly, 
the message presented to the electorate by the Greens was understandable to the average citizen. 
So although a shift in priorities was taking place at the decision-making level, Kononov remained
optimistic about P Z U s  future 1 4 2
142 ro.uoc VK-païiiM, 6 .2 .1 9 9 3 , c. 4.
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7Party Structure and Related Problems
J7|The new  party structure and the com position o f  P Z U ’s leading bodies was confirm ed by the
Central Co-ordinating Council at a meeting on 21 November 1992^"^ .^ The new structure would be 
as follows; the party would be headed by its leader (Kononov) and five deputy leaders, the Co­
ordinating Council, Political Council, Secretariat (11 people), a Statute Commission (four people) Aand a Revision Commission (five members). Each member of the secretariat would be responsible 
for co-ordinating activities in their respective regions'''''. The Political Council was made smaller, 
with only 10 members. Apart from party leader Vitalii Kononov and speaker Serhii Kurykin (he 
took over this post at the Third Congress when Kononov was elected Aader of the Green Party),
eight members - most of whom were from Kiev - were also elected'*'^. Although West Ukraine 'U:
lost influence within the party by having only one representative on the Political Council, which 
shaped PZU  policies on a day-to-day basis, Ternopil was very well represented on the commission 
in charge of changes and amendments to the party statute; three of four members were from y
Ternopil and as the party had its stronghold in the Western oblasts (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk,
Lviv and Zakarpattia), West Ukraine still had some leeway for bargaining. |
, aRelationship to Zelenyi Svit
■ U
As seen above, attempts were made at defining the relationship between Zelenyi Svit and PZU  y
even before the Green Party emerged on Ukraine’s political scene. During 1990 and 1991, 
however, confusion and disagreement as to what exactly should be the relationship between the Ac
two continued. An article printed in Zelenyi svit in the summer of 1991'''^ tried to settle this
‘dispute’ once and for all: whereas Green groups, including those which were not members o f ccÀZelenyi Svit, exerted public control with the implementation of decisions made by state bodies, ci)
■'A:public ecological expert assessments and monitoring in addition to conducting educational C;
activities, and also acted as a go-between in areas such as exchange of experience and the Uj
introduction of new technologies, PZU  focused on the creation of a state structure, which would 
allow the public (not only the Greens) to facilitate the best possible relations between the general 
public and state institutions so as to give them a real impact on the development of the country, i.e. 
the démocratisation of society. The strategic task of PZU  was to achieve Ukrainian sovereignty._________  I
nnoTOico.u no. l .s a c ia a u iu i  UKP f la p T i i  3e.rieunx VicDaliiM iiiJ i2 1  .■rHcroiin/ta !9 9 2 p o ic v . -f;
A , O len ch yk  (T ern op il), R. Stepan iak (Ivano-F rank ivsk), E. D erkach (Zakarpattia), D . Saha idak (K ie v  A
oblast), V. Sh y lo  (K hark iv), M. P ylyp ch uk  (L v iv ), O. V arfo lo m eev a  (D n ip rop etrovsk ), V . H o s iu k  %
(C r im ea), M . H olub (C herkassy), V . la n k iv sk ii (O dessa) and V . V o ito v y c h  (V in n y tsia ). |
I. H a v ry lo v , A . D em yd en k o , O. M eln y k o v , I. Sam iilenk o, A . S iom ina, C hunaev (K iev ), S h y lo  (K hark iv ) 
and KJhlebas (T ernop il).
3e.neimfi cuir, no. 10, 1991 , c. 6. A
: l5 0 7  t{
This in itself would not solve the ecological and other problems Ukraine was faced with, but 
would create the right conditions for solving them. As for the relationship between Zelenyi Svit 
and PZU, this could be described as follows:
...M o/K e\io I'OBOpurn iipo iienuHH p tw iu v ii.!  ( |) \iiK iiiH  \ i i /K  
I'puMaACbicHM p yxovi -  "de.ieiiHM CisiTONi” i  i i a p r i s io .  B on n  A i io ib .
HK iie .M .ie/K iii iia|)TiiepH. caM ocT iM iii sopuAiiMiii o c o d u  (\n>ia 
;iiiavieiiHTHH iipupoA ooxopo!leub  roa. ftep iiib ico  B.K. i  r.Kap>Kiii3r.)i 
K opecuoH A eiiToai " M era iio .iic -E K C iip er .” b y u i u r o  iia p r iu H o r o  
" ie p a p x iE io "  A ym arb rpoviaACiiKy crpyK 'r\'py).
This statement simply reiterated a resolution passed by the initiative group to create PZU  on 
23 March 1990. The resolution made it clear that Zelenyi Svit was not to be transformed into a 
political party:
OiHopeiiuH r ia p T ii  3e.ieuHX V icpalim  ne iiepeAdaaaE T p a iia lio p v ia iiii 
d e.ienoro C n ir y  y iiapT iio. Xona nporpaMiii i i i . i i  i  viexa 
eKO.Hori'iiioro iioparyiiKy y icp a iim  y  3 e ,ie iioro  C n ir y  (hk 
a c o u i a u i i )  i  113Y (hk n a p r ix )  cx m K i. a.ae MeTOAU i  (l)opMu xx 
AiH.Hbiiocri px:H ii. V n a p r ix  noiin c y r o  no.iiTMHUi- 
nap,naMenTCi,Ki. a y  a c o u i a u i i  -  ipoviaACbKi, mo rpyiiTyiorbCH na 
:ia .'iy ien i yio npH pojtooxoponuoi A ia .ubu ocri naûmupiuHX nepcrn 
cycni.Hbcrna, crypfionanux cranoM AOHKi.a.iH i  :3Aupon ' a napouy.
Statements made by both members of Zelenyi Svit and PZU, however, indicated that four 
years on (1994) there was a conflict between the two. According to Viktor Khazan of 
Dnipropetrovsk Zelenyi Svit, there were subjective reasons for this. The Green Party was 
dominated by careerists who were Kiev-based. Locally, he argued, there were often not more than 
two or three members of PZU. In his opinion there was for this reason never a need to create PZU  
in the first place. By law the Green Party was prohibited from receiving hard currency from 
abroad. The party thus needed Zelenyi Svit as a link to gain access to hard currency. As for the 
party itself, it was highly inefficient in Kliazan’s view: the party leadership had no time to work 
with the regions and there were no proper organisations locally. Moreover, there was considerable 
disagreement within the party regarding its political ideas
As for Zelenyi Svit activists’ claims that PZU  sought to take over the leadership of their 
association, divergent views were heard within PZU’s leadership. lurii Saniilenko, for instance, 
argued that if Zelenyi Svit and PZU  pulled together, they might gain some influence. According to 
Samiilenko, it did not take long for Zelenyi Svit to figure out that ecological problems must be
In terv iew  w ith V iktor K hazan, K iev , M ay 1994.
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solved politically. Little could generally be achieved without politics. In order to gain real 
influence, the association had reached the following conclusion: ‘we must try to influence the 
funding (i.e. the budget) and the setting of priorities. In the long run it does not pay off to be 
“bawlers” (national-democrats, nationalists)’. Given that some 15% of the electorate supported 
the Greens, there was a potential that the Greens had to make use of and activate. This could only 
be done if the Greens pulled together. Should they fail to do so, they would only achieve 
discrediting the Green ideals''^^.
To find out what the general sentiments towards PZU  were within Zelenyi Svii, I included a 
number of questions regarding the relationship between the two in my questionnaire. I expected to 
find a divided movement on the issue and was surprised to find that an overwhelming majority 
favoured close relations between the two:
Table 5.3 Desired relationship between Zelenyi Svit and PZU
G r o u p C lo se  re la t io n sh ip N e u tr a l r e la tio n sh ip M in im a l r e la t io n sh ip
T e r n o p il ob i. Z S X
M u k a c h e v o  Z S X
B u k o v in a  Z S X
D n ip r o p e tr o v sk  ob i. Z S X
H o r liv k a  Z S X
L u tsk  Z S X
M a r iu p o l G reen s X
V in n y ts ia  ob i. Z S X
U m a n  Z S
N ik o la e v  o b i. Z S X
D z h a r y lg a c li X
E c o c e n tr e X
O d e ssa  G re en s X
The result can, however, be explained. Firstly, as only one person per group filled in the 
questionnaire, his/her attitude on this issue would not necessarily reflect that of the entire group. 
Moreover, at the local and regional level relations between the movement and party might be more 
amicable than at the top level. It might well also be that Zelenyi Svit members favoured a close 
link between movement and party although they did not approve of the way the two were currently 
interacting. Uman Zelenyi Svit, for instance, referred to movement and party as one whole, but 
with different functions. It seems that dissatisfaction with PZU  and Zelenyi Svit resulted from 
poor definition of these tasks and a feeling o f the former trying to control the latter.
In terview  w ith  lurii Sam iilenk o , K iev , 6 .5 .1 9 9 4 . A s for RUKH seek in g  to in flu en ce  Zelenyi Svit, 
Sam iilen k o  held  the v ie w  that RUKH 'wanted to control the G reen M o v em en t in the hop e that its 
m em bers w o u ld  then v o te  for RUKH. T his, he argued, w as a m isca lcu la tion , as m o st o f  the  
a sso c ia tio n ’s m em bers w o u ld  m ost lik ely  v o te  socia list/com m u nist.
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As a control question I asked the respondents how they would assess P Z lf  s activities vis-à-
vis Zelenyi Svit. As expected, I got a much more varied set of answers to this question than the
previous one. Only four groups were positive, whereas the others were critical or negative.
Vinnytsia Zelenyi Svit complained that the party was often exerting excessive pressure, attempting
to subordinate practical work to some political aims. Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir was
‘exceptionally negative’, holding the view that P Z f /‘is trying to destroy from within Zelenyi Svit's
constructive work’. Dnipropetrovsk oblast and Horlivka Zelenyi Svit judged P Z lf  s efforts as
‘non-constructive’ and ‘at presently negative’. Those who were neither positive nor negative said
they were unable to answer the question as PZU  was so weak in their regions that it did not really
exert any influence at all. Tverdostup from the Ternopil oblast association claimed that the
conflict between Zelenyi Svit and PZU  could be traced back in time to Shcherbak’s departure as
Ukrainian ambassador to Israel in 1992. After Shcherbak left the movement a ‘demarcation’ took
.place between party and movement; whereas earlier they had worked independently of one 
another, their relationship became more blurred and this caused problems, particularly during the
election campaign.
With regard to P Z U \  political significance, none of the respondents found this to be
significant. Although several groups were positively inclined towards the Green Party, they 
acknowledged that it did not really have an impact on Ukrainian politics. As argued by Horlivka 
Zelenyi Svit, the party’s rating had dropped continuously after Shcherbak left the party. Vinnytsia 
oblast Zelenyi Svit pointed out that the activity and authority of the party had fallen sharply as the 
democratic party club structure of PZU  was unable to withstand the growing authoritarian 
tendencies in Ukrainian society. Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir, on the other hand, was negatively 
inclined towards the party on the grounds that it was working too closely with the authorities and 
thus damaging the image of the Green Movement.
Finally, the respondents were asked how large a proportion of their members were also 
members of PZU. We obtained the following result:
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Table 5.4 PZU members who are also members o f Zelenyi Svit
G r o u p P Z U  m em b ers  (in p e r ce n t  o f  to t. m e m b er sh ip )
T e r n o p i l  ob i. Z S appr, 70
M u k a c h e v o  Z S 67
B u k o v in a  Z S 50
D n ip r o p e tr o v sk  ob i. Z S 5
H o r l iv k a  Z S appr. 17
L u tsk  Z S --
M a r iu p o l G reen s appr. 10
V in n y ts ia  ob i. Z S appr. 6
U m a n  Z S 100
N ik o la e v  ob i. Z S 2
D z h a r y lg a c h none
E c o c e n tr e none
O d e ssa  G reen s appr. 60  1
As seen from the table, there are considerable variations between the different regions; 
whereas the West Ukrainian groups have a large portion of overlapping membership, the figure is 
lower for the Central and Eastern areas. If one compares table 4.4 with the other tables, one finds 
a positive correlation between overlapping membership and assessment of PZU; the higher the 
number o f PZU  members in the green group, the less conflict there is between movement and 
party and the more positive the assessment of the party is.
When asked if there was a need for a Green Party in Ukraine all groups, with the exception of 
Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir, answered in the affirmative. The Nikolaev reply was qualified in the 
following way: ‘in the form that PZU  exists today, it is not needed as it is harmful to the Green 
Movement’. With regard to whether or not PZU  should function as the political wing o f Zelenyi 
Svit, however, the respondents were more divided;
Fig. 5.5 PZU as Political Wing ofZS
G r o u p Y es N o
T e r n o p il  o b i. Z S X
M u k a c h e v o  Z S X
B u k o v in a  Z S
D n ip r o p e tr o v sk  ob i. Z S X X
H o r liv k a  Z S X
L u tsk  Z S X
M a r iu p o l G re en s X
V in n y ts ia  ob i. Z S
U m a n  Z S X
N ik o la e v  ob i. Z S X
D z h a r y lg a c h X
E c o c e n tr e X
O d e ssa  G reen s X
■
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other advantages on the Ukrainian market. URP had many of its people highly placed in the state 
apparatus. These positions were given to them in return for supporting President Kravchuk. 
Whereas PZU  did not necessarily look upon it as something negative that the parties, while still
through Shcherbak’s position as Ukrainian Minister of Environment, that such experience could
Vitalii Kononov admitted that it was correct that PZU  wanted to ‘take over’ Zelenyi Svit at its
opinion that Zelenyi Svit should be closer associated with PZU  as also Zelenyi Svit is involved with 
politics (putting forward candidates for the elections, etc.)’. PZU  wanted the head o f its 
Secretariat, lurii Samiilenko, as Zelenyi Svit's leader. When this strategy failed, the party chose to 
have minimal contact with Zelenyi Svit as relations were restrained between Serhii Fedorinchik, 
the leader of the office at Podil, and the party leadership*"^ .^
5.2.4 PZU as an Opposition Party
Interview with Vitalii Kononov, Kiev, April 1994.
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As for the relationship between PZU  and RUKH, the two held different views on key issues
.such as the state and Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. RUKH viewed Ukraine’s nuclear potential as a 
means by which to secure Ukraine’s place in the international community. UK//favoured strong 
structures as in France and Britain. PZU, on the other hand, held the view that it would be a 
mistake to introduce such structures in Ukraine. First reforms were required. Ukraine must earn 
money itself rather than simply ask for them. Most parties in Ukraine were funded by strong 
group interests: lavorivskii’s party, for instance, was supported by the oil complex. The Liberal
'Party could draw on market forces, whereas URP and RUKH  were aetively supported by the 
Ukrainian diaspora. Deputies elected during the parliamentary elections for RUKH  were 
supported from abroad as the Diaspora viewed them as a possible key to securing licenses and
#'I
weak, gained experience by being represented in the state structures, it had itself experienced.
damage it. RUKKPs position on Ukraine’s nuclear weapons clashed with that of PZU. It was 
therefore natural that the two - given that Zelenyi Svit had members sympathetic to both of them - 
tried to gain the upper hand within the association.
last congress: 'PZU  emerged from the movement, but Zelenyi Svit is now in the process of being 
taken over by RUKH. Both Korobko and Fedorinchik are RUKH  representatives. We are of the
I
I
As an opposition party, PZU  criticised official authorities on a number of occasions; it was, for
instance, the first political organisation in Ukraine to make a negative assessment of the institute
of presidential representatives, arguing that it contradicted general democratic principles and
. .constituted a first step towards the building of authoritarian powers. The Green Party opposed the
J
centralisation of political powers and called for the creation of a Constitutional Court to prevent 
this. Rather than appointing presidential representatives, oblast governors, mayors of cities and 
the heads of local councils must be elected by direct, secret ballot. Any violation of this principle 
caused disruption of the social, economic and ecological balance in the country. This view was 
supported by the OSDPU and also some regional organisations of the PDVU, RUKH  and the 
Ukrainian Cadets. Several meetings were held throughout Ukraine in protest against the 
authorities’ failure to take into account candidacies (for the posts of presidential representatives) 
proposed by local democratic organs and councils'^°.
In August the same year, sharp criticism of Verkhovna Rada was voiced in a statement 
prepared by P Z U s  political council. The statement claimed that the parliament had exhausted its 
legislative and state-building potential, having been elected under political conditions very 
different from the current ones. PZU  therefore supported PDVU's initiative to conduct a national 
referendum on whether or not to dissolve Verkhovna Rada and to prepare extraordinary elections 
on a multi-party basis’^ '.
5.3 Public Support and Elections (1993-94)
5.3.1 Public Support
Possibly as a result of P Z U s  initial high score on the public opinion polls, other political parties 
during 1991 started voicing criticism against the Green Party. On 10 October 1991, during 
Verkhovna Rada's discussion of the draft Law on Public Organisations and Parties, the founder of 
the Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz claimed that the Ukrainian Peace Fund had funded the 
creation of PZU  with money ‘earned by workers’ collectives’'^ .^ Moroz’ claims were met with 
initial disbelief and then anger by the leadership of PZU. In a comment printed in Zelenyi svit, 
Volodymyr Tymonin (head of PZU’s revision commission and deputy of Zhovtneva regional 
council in Kiev) refuted the allegation, stating that PZU  was founded on 30 March 1990 and 
officially registered on 24 May 1991 by the Ministry of Justice. The party had received no 
donations or offerings from the Peace Fund. It could be easily established that PZU  was living 
‘off its own’; ‘unlike RUKH, URP and the former CPU, PZU  does not have any employees, no 
premises of its own, no newspaper or even its own group in parliament. The only thing the party 
has is the support of potential voters and the energy of a few activists’.
3e.minti asir, no. 7, 1992, c. 2.
Se.neiiHM emir, no. 10, 1992, c. 1.
Je.miHH ciiir, no. 17-18, 1991, c. 5.
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A slightly different kind of ‘criticism’ was voiced by the deputy leader of URF, O. 
Demydenko. In his view, as all the Ukrainian political parties were committed to the environment, 
there was no real need for a Green Party per se. In an interview with the author in 1991, 
Demydenko said he was against a green party on the grounds that Greenpeace and other 
environmental groups could defend the environment in a much more efficient way than a party. 
Not all states, he argued, had a green party and he had never seen a green party stopping tanks and 
defending a state’s political independence. Moreover, Greens were traditionally anti-something, at 
a time when Ukraine was desperately in need of building up something new. As for ecological 
problems, these could only be solved once a state had been formed. This would take at least five 
years.
PZU  activists, however, refuted such views on two grounds. Firstly, as economy, ecology 
and politics were so closely linked and as the ecological situation in Ukraine had reached a critical 
level, concerns for the environment had to be taken into account already when building the state 
and not simply be postponed until later. At a time when many political parties were pushing the 
environment as an issue down on the list of topics on their agendas, Ukraine needed a party 
committed to both the building of the state and the environment. Secondly, sour remarks by other 
political parties regarding PZU  were taken as political jealousy as the Green Patty was doing well 
in the polls and thus being looked upon as a competitor by political patties such as for instance 
URP and later also RUKH.
_Most of the survey materials available, cover the Kiev region but not other parts of Ukraine. 
The data can therefore not be used to make statements for the level of suppoit of the Green Party
'” lbkLc. 3.
throughout Ukraine. A poll conducted by the Central Ukrainian Division of VTsIOM  in July 
1991 indicated that support for the Greens was higher in Kiev than in other parts o f the country;
'whereas 12% of those polled in Kiev supported PZU, similar figures for oblast centres and other 
cities were 4.5% and 5.3% respectively. In the country-side support was slightly lower, at four 
percent.
During 1990, support for the Greens had been high. Throughout 1989 and 1990, the Greens 
conducted a series of successful anti-nuclear campaigns, culminating with the introduction of a 
moratorium on nuclear reactors passed by Verkhovna Rada in September 1990. These campaigns
had received extensive coverage in the press and people were therefore aware o f Zelenyi Svit.
PZU  also received some publicity as it was among the first new political parties to be created in
_Ukraine and also as people could easily associate the name of the party with the environment. 
Results of polling in Kiev during 1990 indicated that the Greens were the second most popular 
political force in Ukraine and that its support remained relatively stable over the year:
____________________________
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Table. 5.6 Party/movement support(in %) in Kiev throughout 1990 154
P a r ty /o r g J a n u a r y F e b r u a r y J u n e N o v e m b e r
RUKH 2 3 .5 2 9 .0 4 5 .8 5T6
Z S /P Z U 13.4 15.3 13.3 12.5
C P U 19.5 18.4 10.1 10.0
L K M S U  (M D S ) 4.1 4 .7 1.3 0 .4
U R P 1.0 0 .9 2 .4 1.3
D e m . P la tfo r m -- 6.3 1.1
U k r . s tu d , sp ilk a -- -- -- 2 .8
D em . P a r ty -- -- 1.0
O th e r s 17.1 17.2 11.9 2.3
P e r so n  m o re  im p o r ta n t 19.9 14.2 8.9 15.0
A survey conducted by sociologists of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee’s 
scientific research centre in Kiev in January 1991 confirmed this trend, revealing that RUKH  and 
PZU  ranked highest and were far ahead of other political parties and organisations. The 
Communist Party had fallen from fourth to ninth place, bypassed by the Ukrainian Student 
Society, URP, SNU M (Independent Youth Society) and others
Little change could be observed during the first six months of 1991 RUKH  and the Greens 
were still ahead of other political parties and movements in terms of popular support:
Table 5.7 Party/movement support (in %) in Kiev, 1991.
P arty/organisation January July
R U K H 27 46
G reens (P Z U , Z S) 13 13
C P U 20 10
N ation a lists 3 7
Source: Ukrainian A ca d em y  o f  S c ien ces - Institute o f  P hilosoph y
A poll conducted in January 1992'^^ showed that Zelenyi Svit was more well-known to the 
electorate and also more popular than PZU. As pointed out above, this could be explained by the 
fact that Zelenyi Svit was more visible to the electorate than the Green Party. Moreover, the 
association had concrete results to refer to, whereas the party had not achieved anything concrete 
by early 1992. Moreover, as pointed out by opinion poll experts, Ukrainian political movements 
tended to generally poll higher than political parties. People knew less about the country’s 
political parties and they also trusted them less than the movements.
BeJtenMM cuir, no. 7 -8 , 1991, c. 3.
Ukraine Today, Ukrainian M ed ia  D ig e st com p iled  by  R adio L iberty M onitoring , 2 3 .1 .1 9 9 1 , no . U F -0 3 4 ,  
p. 5.
156
157
Ukrainian Reporter, v o l. 1, no. 2 , 1 9 91 , p. 3. 
3e.rieitHM cuir, no. 1 ,1 9 9 2 , c. 3.
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Table 5.8 Assessment of Ukrainian political movements and parties, January 1992.
P ol.
p a r ty /o rg .
d o n ’t
k n o w
a c t iv e ly
su p p o r t
su p p o r t p o s itiv e
to w a rd s
d o n ’t
su p p o r t
d is lik e r a t in g
Z e le n y i
S v it
32.3 14.8 27 .3 17.1 5.9 2 .6 0 .0 6
RUKH 17.8 12.3 21 .3 2 0 .4 16.7 11.4 -0 .5
U k r.
S tu d e n t
S o c ie ty
3 9 .6 10.7 14.7 21.5 8.9 4 .6 -0.11
P Z U 4 4 .8 7.0 14.9 2 0 .8 9.1 3 .4 -0 .1 4
S N U M 38.1 8.4 14.4 21.1 11.8 6.3 -0 .1 6
P D V U 4 5 .4 5.4 14.5 23.1 8.0 3 .6 -0 .1 9
D P U 4 4 .4 3.4 11.6 2 5 .4 11.7 3 .5 -0 .2 3
U k r.
C h r is t ia n -
D em .
P a r ty
5 0 .2 4.0 9.0 13.3 10.4 3.3 -0 .2 4
U R P 3 7 .8 2 .9 11.4 2 5 .4 14.8 7 .6 -0 .2 5
U N D P 4 7 .8 2.3 10.4 2 4 .7 11.7 3.1 -0 .2 6
N P U 4 5 .2 3 .0 10.0 2 5 .0 12.3 4 .6 -0 .2 6
L K S M 3 7.9 4.9 11.2 2 1 .2 15.2 9 .7 -0 .2 6
S e l.D P U 52.3 3 .2 8.0 2 T 2 10.6 4.3 -0.31
O S D P U 57.1 2.1 5.0 2 Z 2 10.3 3.4 -0 .3 2
L D P U 54.9 1.9 5.1 2 3 .4 11.0 3.8 -0 .3 2
U N P 52.7 2 .4 5 .2 23 .3 11.3 5.2 -0 .3 2
C P U 2 3 .7 2.3 8.1 2 3 .4 2 3 .6 19.0 -0 .3 7
I
During 1992, however, PZU’s support began to decrease. The general trend was for all 
political parties to lose support at the expense of independent candidates. P Z U s decline in 
support was, however, more marked than that of other political parties. Generally, the electorate 
was becoming increasingly disillusioned with politics. Despite promises by the country’s 
leadership that things would get better, the economic situation for the average Ukrainian was 
getting worse. High inflation and large price jumps made life harder for most people and the 
initial surge in interest for political issues that took place in the late 1980s was beginning to wear 
off. As life got harder, people were pre-occupied with how to make ends meet and no longer had 
the time to worry about the environment.
Similarly, following the declaration of Ukrainian independence, not only Ukrainian 
authorities, but also other political parties became pre-occupied with issues such as state building 
and economic reform, whereas the environment became a secondary issue to be solved once the 
economy had been stabilised and once the building of a Ukrainian state had been completed. 
Thus, the very issues that concerned the Greens were suddenly no longer all that important to the 
electorate. This what one may call ‘crisis of agenda’ was compounded by the fact that PZU  was 
struggling with internal problems and financial difficulties. On top of this, its membership basis
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was being eroded by people leaving the party. Over eight months, PZÜ  support dropped 
significantly:
Table 5.9 Popularity o f political parties and movements (in %) in Kiev, 1992-95 158
P a r ty  p r e fe r e n c e M a y  1992 S e p te m b e r  1992 J a n u a r y  1993
RUKH 7.5 7 .2 6 .8
S o c ia lis t  P a r ty 12.8 6.1 3.0
P Z U 9 .7 5 .0 1.6
U R P 7 .4 4 .2 2 .6
D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 3.2 2 .8 4 .8
P D V U 6.2 4 .2 1.9
N o v a  U k r a in a 1.9 7 ,0 1.9
O th e r  p a r tie s  a n d  o rg a n isa tio n s 9.6 3 .0 1.6
In d e p e n d en ts 17.8 9 .6 2 0 .3
C o n c r e te  p erso n  ir r e sp e c t iv e  o f  w h eth er  
in d e p e n d e n t o r  b e lo n g  to  a p a r ty
23 .8 4 9 .1 5 5 .5
#
I
£
I
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This poll indicates that the number of people wishing to vote for a particular movement or 
political party had dropped by more than twice from May 1992 to January 1993. The personality 
of the candidate was more important to the electorate than his/her political affiliations.
A poll conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology in August 
1993 confirmed the Kiev trends on a nation-wide scale' P Z U  was still ranking high compared 
with other political parties, but the level of party support was clearly on the decline:
PecnyPjiiKa, no. 2 /9 3 , 2 7 .2 .-5 .3 .1 9 9 3 , c. 3. T his survey w as condu cted  by the independent U kraine  
S o c io lo g ic a l Serv ice.
Inform ation w as gathered at 160 sam p lin g  poin ts through 1 ,197 fa ce-to -fa ce  in terv iew s. For deta ils , se e  
I'lejcWMCMMiiH tmera, 1 7 .8 .1 9 9 3 .
517 I
Table 5.10 Party and Movement Support (in %) in August 1993.
P a r ty , o r g a n isa t io n , p erso n S u p p o r t
RUKH 5 .70
D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 4 .4 8
P Z U 3.88
P a r ty  o f  J u s tic e 3 .26
S o c ia lis t  P a r ty 3 .26
P a r ty  o f  L a b o u r 3 .26
U R P 2.58
P e o p le ’s P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 2 .5 8
P D V U 2 .1 7
U k r. A g r a r ia n  D e m o cr a t ic  P a r ty 1,98
S o c ia l D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 1.90
B e e r - lo v e r s ’ P ar ty 1.09
U k r. A g r a r ia n  P a r ty 0.95
U k r. N a tio n a l  C o n se r v a tiv e  P a rty 0 .54
C h r is t ia n  D e m o cr a tic  P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 0 ,54
U k r . C o n se r v a t iv e  R e p u b lic a n  P a r ty 0 .27
U n ite d  S o c ia l D e m o cr a tic  P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 0 .27
L ib e r a l P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 0.41
U k r . C h r is t ia n -D e m o c r a tic  P a rty 0 .1 4
L ib e r a l D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty  o f  U k ra in e 0 .1 4
V o te  fo r  p erso n , n o t p a r ty 2 2 .5 2
W o u ld  n o t  v o te 2 .0 4
D o n ’t h a v e  th e  r ig h t to  v o te 0 .95
N o  a n sw e r 6.11
D o n ’t k n o w 2 9 .1 7
A poll presented in Uriadovyi kw ier^^  provided PZU  with a very high rating for 1993, 
putting the Greens ahead of RUKH  and the Democratic Paity, which generally tended to get a 
higher rating in polls than PZU. As the size of the sample for this survey is not known, nor the 
way in which the data was processed, I am inclined to see this result as sample-based, rather than 
as an indication of a real surge in support for the Green Party.
ypHAOBHfi Kyp ' sp, 14.10.1993, c. 5.
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Table 5.11 Party support (in %), 1992-1993.
P a r ty 1992 1993
P Z U 10 16
RUKH 7 8
S o c ia lis t  P a r ty 3 6
D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 3 5
U R P 3 5
U k r. J u s t ic e  P a r ty 3
W o r k e r  P a r ty  (p a r t iia 3
p r a tsy )
A g r a r ia n -D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 3
A poll conducted in Dec< niber 1993 by the Independent Centre ‘D ' ocratic Initiatives’ in 
co-operation with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology'*^', seems to confirm 
my suspicion, pushing PZU  down the list with 4% support.
Table 5.12 Party Support (in %), December 1993
P a r ty S u p p o r t
D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 14.3
RUKH 8.4
C P U 4.1
P Z U 4 .0
U R P 3.2
Party support seemed to have stabilised between one and six percent by March 1994" '^ ,^ on 
the eve of elections to Verkhovna Rada. P Z U s  support, however, had fallen even more, to only 
1.3%. This did not look promising for the Greens, as locally, the party organisations were rather 
weak. The party’s stronghold was the West Ukrainian oblasts and Kiev, and members of PZU  
thought their paity might loose ground to the national parties in the West, thus leaving it with a 
chance o f representation only in Kiev.
Table 5.13 Party Support (in %), March 1994.
P a r ty S u p p o r t
RUKH 6.5
D e m . p a r ty 4 .8
C P U 4 .7
S o c ia l is t  P a r ty 4.3
A g r a r ia n  P a r ty 1.6
P D V U 1.4
P Z U 1.3
U R P 1.3
A g r a r ia n  D e m o c r a t ic  P a r ty 1.2
P a r t i ia  p r a ts i 1.2
Fo.noc yKpaïHM, 1 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 , c. 2.
T h is  survey w as condu cted  by C entre for D em ocra tic  In itia tives and A ca d em y  o f  S c ie n c e s ’ Institute o f
S o c io lo g y .
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Judging by the surveys, PZU  had significant support in 1991. This support, however, 
dropped during the next three years. As observed by Serhii Hrabovskyi in 1994, PZU  lost its 
influence and its potential: whereas the party had 15% support in late 1991, this figure had 
dropped to one percent by the summer of 1994. Less than two percent support for a political party 
creates a bad impression. PZU  could, in Hrabovskyi’s view have at least two percent irrespective 
of political system. In his opinion the Green Party started its decline after Shcherbak stepped 
down as its leader'
A contributing factor to the decline was identified by Serhii Hlazovyi, who claimed that 
people’s attitudes towards politics changed since the early 1990s. People had become indifferent 
to politics. Religion and politics had become mixed and everybody was expecting miracles from a 
strong leader. Kravchuk was such a strong leader. The Ukrainian declaration of independence 
was looked upon as a miracle and people thought that once independence had been achieved, 
everything would be OK. They were not ready to do anything themselves, but were rather 
shouting for a strong leader. In 1992, one year on, they were disillusioned. Some of the blame for 
this rested with the parties themselves. The purpose of many of them was to ‘bake their own 
cake’. There was a certain fright for Kravchuk and the communists and very few honest political 
leaders. PZU, in Hlazovyi’s opinion, had one of the highest intellectual levels, but people like 
Shcherbak and academician Hrodzinskyi left the party early on and conflicts soon broke out in 
PZU  as they did in other political parties'^"'.
P Z U 's  Supporters
Green Parties in the former Soviet Union have been accused of being ‘nationalist’ (separatists) by
observers in the West. The VTsIOM  poll, however, revealed that nationality was of little
significance in terms of support for the Greens (5.1% of Ukrainians support them, whereas 4.3%
of Russians and 6.5% of other nationalities do the same). The issue of nationalism is addressed in
Chapter Eight. The fact that there is so little difference in support between the different
nationalities, however, seem to indicate that the Greens, rather than instigating discord between
.the Ukrainians on the one hand, and other nationalities on the other, succeeded in appealing for 
people to protect their environment regardless of national or ethnic origins.
In terms of education, the poll results showed that the higher a person’s education, the more 
likely he/she is to support the Greens (7.2% - higher education, 4.4% - middle education, 3% -
Interview with Serhii Hrabovskii, Kiev, Summer 1994. 
Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.
uncompleted education).
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Table 5.14 Support for Greens by Profession (in %)
Profession Support for Greens
Cultural workers, scientists, environm ental workers 7.0
Econom ic leaders 6.3
Engineers, people w ith technical education 4.8
Students and school pupils 5.2
Kolkhoz workers 1.9
5.3.2 Parliamentary Elections (March 1994)
Pretext to Parliamentary Elections
In the autumn of 1993 President Kravchuk and Verkhovna Rada agreed to hold parliamentary 
elections on 27 March 1994 - a year before the term of the old parliament expired. The pretext for 
holding early elections was to deflect demands for a referendum on confidence/no-confidence in 
Ukrainian leaders following a threat of a general strike by workers in Donbass in the autumn of 
1993165 gp[-gj. ji- been decided that elections be held, the parliament passed an election
law, outlining the procedures for the up-coming elections. Four hundred and fifty deputies would 
be chosen by the single-mandate system. To be elected a candidate needed to receive more than 
50% of the votes in the first round. Runoff elections between the two candidates who gained most 
votes would take place within two weeks in constituencies where no candidate got more than 50% 
of the vote. Further complicating the procedure was a clause in the law, according to which a 
candidate had to get the support of 25% of the eligible voters in his/her constituency to be elected 
(i.e. 50% of 50% of registered voters). Candidates could be put forward by groups o f voters, 
workers’ collectives and political parties. Political parties, wishing to put forward candidates had 
to call regional conferences, attended by no fewer than 50 party members. As most parties neither 
had well-organised regional groups nor enough members to organise regional conferences, it was 
easier for them to field candidates as independents. Not surprisingly, therefore, the law came 
under heavy criticism from Ukraine’s political parties.
Verkhovna Rada's decision to preserve the majoritariaii system caused the most 
dissatisfaction, the argument being that rather than promoting démocratisation and the emergence 
of a multi-party system, the majoritariaii system favoured regionalism and effectively turned the 
country’s political parties into ‘decorative attributes of pseudo-democracy’. A proportional 
election system had the advantage of not only paving the way for strong, nation-wide political
S ta f f  Report N o  A L  62  CC (9 4 ) 2 , N orth A tlantic A ssem b ly  M ission  to  M onitor E lec tio n s to the U kraine  
Suprem e Rada, M arch - A pril 1994 , International Secretariat, A pril 1994 , p. 2.
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The Ukrainian political parties, claimed the Greens, were weak for objective reasons and the 
law would hinder their further development. As a result of the election law, the political parties 
would in effect be cut off from the political process as deputies would represent regional and 
corporate interests. Finally, PZU  demanded that a Constitutional Assembly be elected in parallel 
with the parliamentary elections on 27 March 1994. Alternatively, a referendum could be held on
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parties, but would also make the deputies more responsible as they would not only be answerable
'to their electorate but also to the party: %
BiJi5viîa£TbCM 3vuiraiiiu! iiieu , a lie MiciiCBUx KepiiîiiUKiiî. iiKi | |
[laHBunepeaKM odiumoTb rïMoopiuiM re. mo fi 5e;i aeiiyrarci.Koro
MamiaTN' viaio'ir po5uTn îik iioamoiîi ooodu"^  ^ A
4-iShould no compromise be reached regarding the law, Ukrainian political parties would be left
. . . . ■ uwith no option but to use ‘all legitimate forms of protest’ to secure the immediate dissolution of
Verkhovna Rada and the convening of a Constitutional Assembly to pass a Ukrainian Constitution.
This resolution was passed by a meeting of the Political Parties’ Club {Kluh poHtichnykh ;P
partii) - a consultative body uniting a considerable part of Ukrainian political organisations. The ys
club was set up in April 1993 as a forum within which to discuss political issues. On 1 October
1993 the club met in the headquarters of the UPS to discuss the election law passed by parliament
and the development of a multi-party system in U k r a i n e T h e  resolution passed by the Club was #
proposed by PZU and endorsed by another four political parties: UPS, URP, SDPU and PDVU. A
Throughout November 1993, PZU  and other political parties continued their campaign to
have the election law reversed. It was argued that the law in its original form was insufficient to ?:•
facilitate democratic changes and secure a more efficient future parliament. A press release issued A
3,7by PZU towards the end of the month went so far as to characterise the law as ‘one of the most
I
reactionary laws passed in the post-totalitarian world’. The possible implications of the law were 'm 
outlined in the following manner: A:SI
dviaraiiiui iiiew, iiapTiuimx iu iaT( |)opM iii;iviiuiO£TbC}i d o p o T b d o i o  
ocoducrocreu. Bi;myTiiicTb n a p T i u i i u x  ciiHciciu, hk iiauioua.ibimx,
T a K  i  p e r i o i i a a b i i u x ,  p o s i i o p o i u y s  n o T e i m i a . i  i i a p r i A ,  CTaBMTb 
. j u p i E i i T O B a i i i  lia Be5e;meseiimi 3 a ia . i b i i o i i a u i o n a . i i b i i M x  i i r r e p e c i B  A
o p i ’a n i s a u i i  b  sa.ie/Kiiicrb b I a  Miciieisoï K o i ib io m c ry p H ^ '’^  T
If
3aHBa iio.aiTHMiiMX n a p T il  y icn a lim . 1 ticgbtiui 1993 noicv. 
n u ec -D e -n is  no. 1 4 -1 0 .5 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 .
ripec-pe.fii3 " a o  iiuTaumi npo h o b m h  b u 5 o d m h m  aaicoft ra h m 6 o u u  no Beuxoimoi Paau yKoalim”.
2 5 .1 1 .9 3  11 A |
addressed to the Ukrainian President, was printed in Pravda UHainy on 29 June 1993'^^. The
the need for such an assembly to convene. Details about the election and the tasks of such an
assembly had been elaborated by a working group consisting of representatives from UNKP, PZU,
URP, DemPU, the Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats and the Constitutional Democt^ats
already in the spring of 1993.
Demands for a constitution were fuelled by events in Russia, where President Eltsin in
October 1993 ordered the parliament to be dissolved. The lack of a constitutionally designated
. .balance between the president and the legislative powers in addition to extensive presidential 
powers and poor legislative work of the deputy group was in itself a destabilising element in 
Ukrainian politics. A constriition in which the relationship between ’ j legislative and the 
executive powers was clearly specified as well as a parliament elected through democratic multi­
party elections were, in the view of most democratic-oriented parties in Ukraine, a pre-requisite 
for stability and the building of democratic political structures in the country.
A letter on the issue o f a new constitution, signed by 11 political parties (including PZU) and
parties made it clear that although they had different views on why Ukraine found itself in a ‘deep
political and economic crisis’ and how best to get out of the crisis, they all agreed on some basic
demands essential to achieve the latter: a referendum should be held on 26 September 1993
regarding the convening of a constitutional assembly. A meeting attended by all parties favouring
.such an approach as well as other interested parties should be called to discuss how to pass a new
Ukrainian constitution. The tasks of such a constitutional assembly were outlined in the ‘Act on
the Election of a Constitutional Assembley’, passed by the initiative group. In addition to passing
a new constitution, the Constitutional Assembly must also pass three constitutional acts regulating
the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. A new election law and
the fixing of a date for new parliamentary elections must also be passed by the Assembly as well
as electing the Constitutional Court, passing temporary laws to be operative until the Constitution
.would become operative, and finally, set the date for the Constitution to become operative. 
Elections to the Assembly should be held no longer than three months after the referendum in 
multiple constituencies and proportionally in agreement by a resolution on the election of a 
Constitutional Assembly to be passed by the Ukrainian President. To secure the passing of a 
Constitution maintaining the country’s interests, the initiative group wanted to exclude
_____________________________
Plpaiviii YicpunniJ, 2 9 .6 .1 9 9 3 , c. 1. T he parties that sign ed  this obrashchen ie  w ere  D R U  (the D em ocra tic  
Party o f  U kra ine), URP (the R epublican  Party o f  U kra ine), SDPU (the S o c ia l D em ocra tic  Party o f  
U kra ine), PDVU (the Party o f  D em ocra tic  R ev iv a l o f  U kra ine), KDP (the C on stitu tion al-D em ocra tic  
P a ity ), LPU (L iberal Party o f  U kra ine), PS (the Justice Party), LDPU (the L iberal D em ocra tic  Party o f  
U k ra ine), NKPU (the N ational-C on stitu tional Party o f  U kraine), UPPP (the U krainian Party o f  B eer  
L overs) and PZU.
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representatives o f  the executive at all adm inistrative levels from election to the A ssem bly. 
S im ilarly, the members o f  the Constitutional A ssem bly would be barred from seek ing election to 
the new parliament. The Verkhovna Rada, in the v iew  o f  the initiative group, w as not in a position  
to pass a new constitution as it had been elected ‘as an organ o f  the colon ial adm inistration (i.e. the 
U S S R )’*’^
N o constitutional assem bly was, however, elected, nor was the election law changed and 
eventually, PZU  decided to take part in the elections anyway, on the grounds that the Greens had 
no right to avoid seeking political power at a tim e when so much legislation affecting the state o f  
the country’s environm ent was being drafted and passed by the Ukrainian parliament. Already in 
October 1993 PZU  put forward its candidate to the Central Election Committee'^' and in 
D ecem ber its Fourth Congress convened to discuss the party’s approach and strategy for the up­
com ing elections.
I
Fourth Congress (Kiev. 17-18 December 1993)
The agenda o f  the Congress was set by the Central Co-ordinating Council at a m eeting on 30 
Septem ber 1993. In addition to discussing and passing the party’s election platform the Congress 
would also pass changes and amendments to the party statute and ratiiy the founding docum ents o f  
the Federation o f  European Green Parties
With regard to the up-com ing elections, the Congress decided that PZU  would not field  any 
candidates for the elections from the party as the election law was perceived o f  as discriminatory 
towards political parties. Instead, the Greens would nominate candidates through workers’ 
collectives and groups o f  the electorate. Should any o f  these candidates be elected to Verkhovna 
Rada, they would form a green fraction according to the clause on deputy fractions in the party 
statute. The election platform endorsed by the Congress would be used by candidates representing 
the party as a basis for their own election platforms'
The Fourth Congress also changed the party structure. W hereas this had been very loose, 
giving local and regional party clubs virtual autonomy, the experience over the previous years had 
shown that this was not necessarily the m ost efficient approach. At a press conference in K iev on 
27 April 1994, the Kievrada deputy Orest M elnykov stated that the problem with autonom ous 
party clubs was that they were difficult to gather so as to organise joint actions: ‘too much
3aiiiia n a p T iH -iiii it ia T O D iii  ciciUKaïuni KOiici'HTViiiHUMX s d o n is  (n.d.).
Letter no. 17-10 of 20.10.1993 to the Central Election Commission. PZU put forwards Klavdia 
Kholiavenko, a member o f the party’s secretariat, for this post. 
riuec-peJiis no. 12-09, 1.10.1993. 
ripeC"De.ai3 no. 0/51-12, 20.12.1993.
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dem ocracy is also harmful. What w e are doing now, is to gather ind ividuals and local clubs in a 
structure which w ill hopefully work better. We hope that this w ill help us to act as a united front’.
The party structure had long been an issue o f  some debate within PZU. Iryna Haniukova, a 
member o f  the PZU  Secretariat, already in 1992 pointed out the advantages and disadvantages 
w ith a loose as opposed to a tight party structure: ‘when the Sov iet Union ex isted, people got used 
to the idea that the party did everything for you. If you had a water leakage in your house you 
would call the regional party com m ittee. If  a marriage was experiencing d ifficulties the party 
would get involved. N ow  w e have to decide what kind o f  parties w e want and redefine political 
parties as a concept. As far as structure is concerned, the Republicans {URP) hold the v iew  that 
the Com m unist Party can only be fought by parties choosing a similar (i.e. tight) structure. The 
URP is therefore highly centralised. D irectives from the central party organisation have to be 
follow ed by local and regional party clubs. The URP has also built up strong local clubs, thus 
providing itself with a strong base, on which to conduct election cam paigns. The Green Party has 
chosen a different approach: K ononov holds the v iew  that it is more important to have a central 
organisation that can issue statements and organise protests. This is no doubt necessary, but I 
think it is also important to strengthen the local clubs and build up an apparatus that can be 
m obilised during election cam paigns. The relationship between the local level and the central 
party organs in PZU  is difficult. M any o f  our local organisations do little them selves, awaiting 
instructions from Kiev'^" .^
Y et others, one may add, acted on their own while claim ing to represent the party. This 
som etim es caused conflicts. An incident which took place in the sum m er o f  1992 clearly  
illustrates this dilemma: M ikhalko, a member o f  K iev PZU, who regularly organised
demonstrations to protect the H olosiivskyi forest from illegal log fellin g  got into trouble at an non­
sanctioned demonstration that had not been endorsed by the party leadership before hand. He was 
arrested and fined. Dem ands that the party pay his fine caused som e controversy w ithin the party 
leadership, as it had not been consulted beforehand and som e people therefore thought M ikhalko 
should pay the fine him self.
B y late 1993 PZU  acknow ledged the v iew  held by Haniukova that som e party d iscip line was 
needed for the party to successfu lly  organise its election cam paign nation-wide. W hereas the 
major focus o f  attention o f  the Congress was the elections, other issues, such as nuclear power and 
imports o f  toxic waste were also addressed
Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, August 1992.
175 riDec-i)e.ni3 No. 0-92/12, 21.12.1993.
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Nominations and Election Campaign
The Congress issued a press-release in which it stated that candidates to the elections would not be 
put forward by PZU  as a party, but rather by workers’ collectives and groups o f  the electorate. 
The release repeated demands that the political parties be allowed to field  candidates for the 
elections without having to convene regional conferences, collect additional signatures and secure 
funding’'^'’. PZU  put forward 44 candidates for the parliamentary elections, six o f  whom  would  
stand in K iev.
Prior to the elections several political parties sought to establish coalitions o f  unions to 
provide a maximum result for the democratic parties, the idea being that if  they shared the 
constituencies am ongst them selves, putting forward only the one or tw o candidates who stood the 
highest chances o f  being elected (this would be established through local polls and surveys), then 
the dem ocratic vote would not be split thus increasing the chances o f  beating the 
com m unists/socialists in these constituencies. This idea was first launched by Levko Lukianenko, 
the leader o f  URP, who initiated Narada DemoUatychnykh Partii i Orhanizatsii Ukrainy (the 
Conference o f  Ukrainian Dem ocratic Parties and Organisations). The Central Co-ordinating 
Council o f  PZU  in April 1993 decided the party’s position on political coalitions and unions, 
recom m ending local and regional clubs to unite with other political parties and organisations as 
long as this did not involve the signing o f  written documents sim ilar to a statute or programme.
N ot surprisingly, therefore V italii Kononov signed a petition by the Conference for all dem ocratic 
parties to unite and co-ordinate their election cam paigns. The petition, w hich  w as signed by 16 
political parties and m o v e m e n t s 's ta t e d  that the major aim o f  the parties endorsing the Narada 
was to secure m aximal representation o f  democratic deputies in the new Verkhovna Rada. O nly  
candidates com mitted to political and econom ic reform would be backed up by the Narada as on ly  
reforms could improve the material and spiritual situation for the Ukrainian people. Privatisation  
and the passing o f  dem ocratic legislation were essential for this aim to be achieved as w as a 
com petent and uncorrupted governm ent o f  reformers to secure their proper im plem entation.
The leaders o f  the parties and organisations that signed the petition com m itted them selves to 
m eeting no less than once every two w eeks and their work would be ruled by the d evice ‘ the
__________________________
npec-ue.rii:j no. 0-52/12,21.12.1993.
nnoTOKo.a sacimiiiui UlCP 0 3 7  i s i a  24 K n i  riui 1993 p.
These parties and organisations were as follows: DPV (Democratic Party of Ukraine), RUKH, URP (the 
Ukrainian Republican Party), PDVU (Party of Democratic Revival o f Ukraine), PZU, USDP (Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party), UNKP (Ukrainian National Conservative Party), the All-Ukrainian Society 
for Political Prisoners and the Repressed, The Committee ‘Crimea with Ukraine - Sobornisf, the 
Organisation of Soldiers’ Mothers, the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, the Ukrainian Composers’ Society, 
The Officers’ Union, the Union of Ukrainian Youth, the Ukrainian Students’ Union and the Ukrainian 
Cossacks.
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interests o f  Ukraine are above party interests’. To facilitate the co-ord ination o f  practical work 
prior to the elections an Execu tive Election Com m ittee (Vykonavchyi Vyborchyi Komitet - VVK) 
under the leadership o f  Levko Lukianenko and Serhii Odarych was set up. Parties and 
organ isations that had jo ined the Narada would delegate one representative each to the VVK  for 
full-tim e work until the elections on 27 March 1994'^^.
Although initially there was agreement to cooperate on the issue o f  nom inations, this unity 
was soon broken by RUKH, which decided to put forward its own candidates in as many 
constituencies as possible. RUKHs decision in turn caused other political parties to opt for the 
sam e and as a result, G ree,. candidates had to ballot against a cons ,rable number o f  other 
candidates in the constituencies they were running in.
A report prepared by the North Atlantic A ssem bly M ission to M onitor Elections to the 
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada^^^ disclosed a number o f  w eaknesses in the electoral law regarding the 
election campaign: these were insufficient provisions for the funding o f  each candidate’s election  
campaign (candidates were not entitled to spend more than six m illion karbovansy - less than $ 
200 - on their campaign although one minute on TV cost up to four m illion karbovantsy and a 
page in a newspaper was priced at 200 m illion karbovantsy) thus leaving candidates with no other 
option than to seek other sources o f  funding ‘often on the margin o f  lega lity ’, and ‘the alm ost total 
om ission o f  any provision in the electoral law for campaign financing and access to the m edia for 
the second round’'®'.
A  major problem for the Green Party was therefore how to fund the election cam paign. The 
party was generally short o f  funds and was thus not able to provide each o f  its candidates with the 
necessary funds for the campaign. This being said, though, som e o f  its candidates, as for instance 
the party leader, Vitalii K ononov (14th electoral district, K iev), conducted w ell-organised and 
expensive cam paigns. Kononov, and also other members o f  PZU, provided the electorate w ith  
attributes such as small calendars with their photos on the front and sm all diaries containing useful 
telephone numbers and addresses. They also put up posters to proliferate their candidacies. Vitalii 
K ononov’s poster (A-3 format) contained a green photo o f  him and next to it his name and the 
inscription ‘ Vitalii Kononov. The Greens are bringing a political spring’. Humour w as also a 
part o f  this campaign; a drawing (A -4 format) o f  Kononov as an otaman (cossack  chieftan) and all 
aspects o f  life originating from him read as follow s: ‘Kononov is the otaman o f  the Greens. He 
knows what to d o ’. Kononov also organised a free rock concert and other activities to draw
ViepaïiichKa jiyMKU, 27.1.1994, c. 5.
Staff Report No. AL 62 CC (94) 2, March - April 1994. 
See page 3 for a more detailed list.
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attention to his campaign. H is budget greatly exceeded that stipulated in the election law and left 
him with a 220 m illion karbovantsy debt'®^.
As for the party programme, this was a lot shorter and more spec ific than the programme used 
in early 1992 during the elections o f  som e vacant seats to Verkhovna Rada. PZU  fielded  
candidates for those elections, one o f  whom  was V italii Kononov. K ononov balloted in election  
district N o. 7, which had been represented in parliament by General Dukhov'®"^. For the sake o f  
com parison, 1 w ill first take a short look at the programme used in 1992 and then m ove on to the 
1994 election platform.
K ononov in 1992 issued leaflets which clearly stated that his programme was also the 
programme o f  the Ukrainian Greens'®" .^ Although the Greens had warned about ‘regionalism ' as a 
result o f  the election law, the first point on K ononov’s election platform was that if  elected, his 
major aim would be to represent the interests o f  his constituency and generally m eet up with his 
electorate. Secondly, he would seek to make the parliament pass a resolution giving K iev status as 
a victim  o f  the Chernobyl accident. In his v iew  it was very unfair that K iev, having itse lf suffered  
from the fall-out, had to subsidise other areas that were in the sam e situation w hile getting no 
benefits itself. Protecting the environm ent and the weak (i.e. children, mothers, invalids, 
pensioners) during the transition towards a market econom y was also high up on K ononov’s list o f  
priorities as w as local self-rule. Kononov was in favour o f  a market econom y with m ixed  
ownership forms and based on the understanding that only that which is eco log ica lly  safe is 
econom ically  beneficial. Environmental pollution, he argued, was a violation o f  human rights. As 
for the state, the right o f  the individual ranked higher than the rights o f  the state. Sim ilarly, the 
interests o f  the environment ranked higher than those o f  the econom y, politics and ideology. A  
true dem ocracy would not be achieved unless a real multi-party political system  w as introduced. 
Finally, K ononov wished to so lve the question o f  the Ukrainian army (i.e. what size it should be, 
the question o f  alternative, civilian service, the question o f  the Black Sea Fleet and disarmament.
The officia lly  printed election programme'®^ used by PZU  in 1992 w as som ewhat shorter, but 
contained basically the same points, except for a clause on the relationship between Man and 
Nature, which stated that Nature could not indefinitely ‘await any kindness from M an’. Should  
the living environm ent continue to degrade, Nature would eventually be forced, for the sake o f
____________________
Interview with Vitalii Kononov, Kiev, April 1994.
Mo. lOAh VKpciXiifi, 28.2.1992.
O p o rp a v ia  B . K o u o n o iia  -  h r  iip o ru a M a  A e .a e iiu x ” y ic p a i i iH .  F le u e iiB u S o iy ia  i ip o tp a M a  xan auv iaT a  n 
^ lenvraTM  B e D x o B iio i P a a u  y K p a i t iH  i io  7 - omv. B a.a is itH M iio iv iv . b h S o d b o m v  O K P vrv  m. K u E B a . 
O c ilO B I l i  IIDHIIUHIIH i  reSM.
1 henesiui B h5 odm itapoÆ iux a en v ra T iii yK uaïBH . Koiioiiob. B iT a .n iû  Mnicc.BaHOBiBi. KaiuttuiaT v 
iia p o iiiii vieilvraru Y im a liiu  no 3a.ni:jiiuMii0MV bh6 odboviv okdviw N o 7  v iic r a  K u s b u . 
riepejLBHÔODua riDoroaMa (n.d.).
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self-preservation, to rid itself o f  Mankind. Symptom s indicating that things were m ov ing in this 
d irection were listed as AIDS, Chernobyl and global (nature) catastrophies.
In 1994 Kononov used not only the officially  sponsored pre-election leaflets, but also a 
special almanac, containing the programme besides useful telephone numbers, addresses and a 
short introduction. The almanac, wh ich was 18 pages long, was h ighly environmental as only one
B  i i e u  i i e . î e r K U H  M a c  k o .m u  a c i  m h  s u y i u e n i  o o p o T U C b  s a  B H / i c H » a i i i u i
The programme was also printed in a special issue o f  Vashe zdorovia^'^ (the Ukrainian
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page o f  paper had been used to produce it. During the election cam paign, K ononov wrote, tens o f
Itons o f  paper were wasted (hundreds o f  hectares o f  forest) and the Greens were therefore consc iously  trying to keep their paper-use as limited as possible. K ononov also appealed to those 
people who thought the environment had becom e a secondary issue to be solved som etim e in the 
future:
i i p o h . i e v i H  : 5 5 e p e > K e i i i u i  j i o i S K i . i . u i  ;w u o t i =c j i  i i a v i  j i p . M o p j u u i u v i M  -  a . i e  
l i e  t i e  I ' U K ,  n p o m i e  s o a c i M  i i e h a r a i o  s a c y  i  i i e r a p a i u m  i i n n i o i o  
B o y i o i o .  M M c r u M  i i o n i T p a v i ,  e K o . t o r i M i i o  m h c t h m m  i i p o j i y K ' r a v t n  o r a i i y r i , .  
m e  r o c r p i i i i M M U .  T o v t y  v i a a a n T e  f ) y ; i e \ i o  o d a M i i u v i u ! ' ® ' ' ’
£M ed ical Newspaper). The programme, a photograph and a biography covered the entire first page. 
An article justifying the G reens’ need for a tribune (i.e. the parliament) took up m ost o f  the space 
on page two. PZU, argued K ononov, had made use o f  the entire spectre o f  political action, such as
pickets, demonstrations, m eetings, mass planting o f  trees, the cleansing o f  sm all rivers,
organisation o f  culturological and sport actions such as ‘M usicians against drug abuse and
alcoh olism ’, and the bicycle race ‘SOS - Black S ea’. N ow  the party w as running for elections so.as to protect the ‘sacred right o f  Man to life ’ and to protect the environm ent and the health o f
future generations, the party needed a tribune and this tribune was the parliament..As for the programme, Kononov stated as his major aim the creation o f  a legal base for which  
to secure such priority issues as law and order, prosperity and the right to live a healthy and long  
life. The state was for the people and not the other w ay around for the realisation o f  such issues as 
reform o f  the political power structure, the econom y and laws on the environm ent. K ononov  
favoured a parliament-presidential republic o f  Ukraine, Ukraine being a unitary state and the 
Crim ea being a part o f  this state. A  market econom y would be the best thing for Ukraine and
 ^
Ha s ra ;tK V  iiuo nu6opH-94. m . Kuiii ( K m i b :  I ‘v H £ B 0= C b } i t .  yipyic. 1994). c. 2. This almanach w a s
printed in 2,647 copies.
'^^Baiiie s a o D O B ' a .  yKpaliicBKa vietiHMiia rasera. Ciieuia.'tBiiHH b m i i v c i c . Bi'ta.Miû K o i i o i i o b  -
KamiMMT V iiapotnii iienvTaTu BeDXOBiiox Pajiu yKualiin no rarapiiicBKO.MV b u S q d m o m v  oKovrv 
No. 3. Micra K h e b u .  The special issue is undated and consists o f only two pages.
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reforms should be introduced qu ickly, ‘but without the shock’. Privatisation o f  housing, the land, 
sm all and m iddle-sized enterprises were necessary prerequisites for econom ic reform, as w ell as 
turning large enterprises into stock com pan ies. The aim o f  econom ic reform should be to secure 
the w ell-being o f  the Ukrainian people. H owever, the Greens did not favour an unrestrained 
market; social guarantees had to be given to pensioners, invalids and people with a low  income. 
S im ilarly, children and wom en had to be protected - the latter by a ban on w om en work ing in 
harmful industry. A ban was also required on advertising o f  tobacco products on TV and radio. In 
the field o f  the environment, PZU  wanted the parliament to pass a series o f  laws on ecolog ical 
safety and protection from radiation, on the banning o f  imports o f  toxic waste and on g iving the 
population o f  K iev status as v ictim s o f  the Chernobyl accident.
K ononov’s programme w as an attempt at merging issues important to the Greens w ith issues 
that concerned large segm ents o f  the population, such as law and order (this issue ranked high in 
the polls). One o f  the leaflets distributed during the election campaign thus presented K ononov as 
a defender o f  ‘welfare, law and order and a clean environm ent’. A slightly d ifferent approach was 
favoured by Serhii Kurykin, the speaker o f  Politrada, who balloted in K iev ’s electoral district N o.
22 during repeated elections to Verkhovna Rada on 24 .fuly 1994*®®. H is platform focused more -on the environm ent and the link between the environment and the econom y than that o f  K ononov.
The section on the econom y focused on the link between the econom y and the environment; 
for instance a prerequisite for a more efficient and cleaner industry was structural change. O nly a 
revamped industry could secure a sustainable econom ic developm ent rooted in the device that 
‘only what is ecologically  safe is econom ically beneficial’. This could be achieved through tax 
reform. The introduction o f  a national currency was also required as w as a structural reform o f  the 
energy com plex to facilitate energy saving, modernise thermal power stations and stim ulate the 
creation o f  decentralised energy system s based on renewable energy sources rather than expansion  
o f  nuclear power. Kurykin furthermore wanted a permanent moratorium on the construction o f  
new  nuclear reactors as w ell as closure o f  Chernobyl already in 1994.
The programme also contained headings such as ‘human rights’, ‘social issu es’ and 
‘international relations and safety’. A ll Ukrainian legislation must be in line with the International 
Declaration o f  Human Rights, the rights o f  national minorities m ust be observed and public 
organisations/political parties must be given legal guarantees. M ilitary service should be reduced
Such elections were held in constituencies where no candidate was elected during the second round as the 
turn-out was less than 50% and also in constituencies where the elections were declared invalid. 
According to the election law, people who had unsuccessfully balloted in the March elections could not 
registrer as candidates for repeated elections in the same constituency or in any other constituency.
A?Kononov and other party members were thus prevented from balloting in July, whereas Kurykin, who had not run for Verkhovna Rada in March, was able to do so. p
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24 J iunn îi iioiïTOPiii bhSodh ;io Bcoxomiol PaiiH yicpaiiiM . K a iu iM m i' v jtenvTcvrM  Bepxoniîoi Paiiu 
yKPaiiiH no UeiiTpajiBUQMV bhSodmomv oicpvrv No 22. M. Kuena. K v d h k H i Cepi'in IdcUiobhm. 
lurii Samiilenko at press-conference o f PZU, Kiev, 27.4.1994. A slightly smaller number - 3 1 -  was 
referred to in a Green Factsheet on Eastern Europe, Amsterdam, 26.4.1994, p. 1.
Interview with lurii Samiilenko, Kiev, 6.5.1994.
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and alternative service introduced for those who, for reasons o f  personal conviction, did not wish 
to serve in the army. A gradual ‘professionalisation’ o f  the army was also required. A s Ukraine 
was a neutral state, no foreign troops should be allowed on Ukrainian territory. Relations with 
Russia should be based on parity and Ukrainian foreign policy should g ive priority to developing  
close links with the countries o f  Eastern Europe and the Black Sea countries. Ukraine should aim 
towards a more significant role in international organisations'®^.
Assessment of PZU and the 1994 Parliamentary Elections
O f the 44 candidates put forward by PZU  two made it to the second round (Karavanska in
M ukachevo, Ternopil and another wom an in Zhazkov, Cherkassy), but failed to be elected. Prior
to the elections the spirit was high in the Green camp - judging by the polls, PZU  would get .several o f  its candidates voted into parliament. Follow ing the disastrous result, however, the
G reens did som e soulsearching to find the reasons w hy they fared so badly.
A  major problem, which had a negative impact not only on PZU  but also on other political
parties, was the split democratic vote. According to Serhii Hrabovskyi, PZU  made a m istake by
not reaching agreem ent with RUKH  or others to distribute electoral districts am ongst them selves.
K ononov might have been elected had this been done. A s it turned out, the dem ocrats stole votes
from each other. To give an exam ple, in the Rusalivka electoral district in K iev, the w ell-know n
reform econom ist V olodym yr Lanovyi ballotted against Ihor H avrylov o f  PZU. Several members
o f  PZU, even though they were Green, decided to vote for Lanovyi as com petent econom ists were.needed in parliament. Indirectly this was also a Green argument: on ly if  the econom ic situation in .Ukraine improved could som ething be done about the environment.
Sam iilenko held the v iew  that PZU  lost the elections as the party failed to reach agreem ent 
with the dem ocratic/centre-oriented parties: ‘w e had som e chances, but RUKH  ruined them by 
putting forward its own candidates in every single constituency. Other parties later fo llow ed  suit. 
{PZU  was earlier a member o f  RUKH - when the latter was still an organisation and not a party). 
Prior to the parliamentary elections an attempt w as made to gather the centre parties. ‘Even  
though w e had done m axim ally to gain support, w e could not have beaten the system . W e could, 
however, have exerted more opposition and gained real influence. N ow  the centre parties are 
represented in parliament, but they have little influence. RU K H s  populism  does not result in 
anything other than imbuing people with a lack o f  faith in market reform ’'^'.
MMxaH.rio riaüJKOB, HimBi. Jiin i i  ”nceBiLO[ie3a.rie7iciii. Bfie, no. 2, 1994, c. 105.
PZU Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994.
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Prior to the elections, PZU  assumed that the ‘centre’ would w in the elections. Kononov cited
this as P Z U s  b iggest mistake: ‘our b iggest mistake was that w e assumed the centre w ould w in the
elections. Therefore w e adopted a moderate position. But people chose extrem e solutions for
extrem e cond itions. M aybe w e should have m oved towards RUKH  prior to the elections.
.Internationally, however, w e are very radical compared to other green parties. B esides, w e have a 
tight party structure. The latter is a ‘m ust’ under circum stances like ours, in order for us to 
successfu lly  com pete with other political parties’. K ononov did, however, maintain that the 
elections proved a good experience for the Greens even though they lost: ‘now w e know what w e  
did wrong and w ill not repeat our m istakes’.
M yha ilo Pashkov, a writer on the Ukrainian elections, cam e to a sim ilar conclusion, pointing 
out that the few  centrist parties {PZU, UPS, UPSS, TKU, LDPU, KDP, LDVU, UPShP and PP) 
were particularly hard hit by the election law as they all had few  and weak regional party 
organ isations (A s observed by Artur Bilous, for instance, one third o f  PZUs members were 
concentrated in W est Ukraine). Thus these parties were unable to gather the 100 people required 
to convene regional conferences and nom inate party candidates for the elections. It w as also a
,problem that many regional party structures were not formally registered and thus not in a position  
to field candidates in the first place. M oreover, Pashkov observed that if  a party w as not w ell 
known in an electoral district its candidates, when these were w ell known to the electorate, 
preferred to stand as independents'^^.
Sam iilenko, on the other hand, was som ewhat less critical with regard to P Z U s  choice o f  
strategy: when added together, the vote for the centrist parties was not ail that bad, he cla im ed.
Thus the centrists did not ‘lo se ’ the elections per se, but failed to be represented due to their failure 
to cooperate
K ononov argued that PZU  lost the elections for econom ic reasons. Although K ononov’s
■
election campaign was w ell organised and expensive, other PZU  candidates had less m oney to 
spend and found it much more d ifficult to keep a high profile during the cam paign. Tw o fem ale  
cand idates - Haniukova and Rudenko who both ran for elections in K iev - informed K ononov that 
they would have won had they had more m oney to spend on the election cam paign. W ith a budget 
o f  two m illion karbovantsy Rudenko could only afford to print a very limited number o f  sm all 
notes - listovki - which were distributed to five blocks o f  flats. In her electoral district there were 
31 candidates, som e o f  these were businessm en and others, argued K ononov, belonged to the 
Mafia. These could afford to spend much larger sums on their cam paigns. Rudenko got a total o f  
900 votes in an electoral district o f  100,000 voters and com pla ined that as her ‘listovk i’ had a
À
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draw ing o f  her face instead o f  a photo (she could not afford to print a proper cam paign sheet) A
m any people sim ply did not recogn ise her and were later surprised to find that she had been a 
candidate. " "'AAnother problem, identified by K ononov, was that not all those balloting for PZU  were 
‘G reen’. As an exam ple he referred to Rudenko. In his view  she w as a revolutionary w ith a poor 
perception o f  what it meant to be ‘G reen’. Consequently, she did not mention PZU  in her election Icam paign. Had she done so, she m ight have benefited from it.
F ollow ing the initial disappointment o f  the first round o f  the elections in March 1994, A
.K ononov urged P Z U s members to support the two candidates in W est and Central Ukraine who 
m ade it to the second round. Chervona Ruta, the travel com pany where K ononov worked, found a 
bus and Sam iilenko provided petrol, the intention being to send PZU  activists to Zakarpattia to ’ 
take part in Karavanska’s campaign and then to keep an eye on the elections them selves. It did, 
however, prove rather d ifficult to gather people. Everybody wanted the election to go w ell, but 
few  were w illing to travel all the w ay to Zakarpattia to support Karavanska them selves
The election system  also had to take som e o f  the blame for P Z U s  poor performance. 
H lazovy i pointed out that K ononov’s election campaign was covered by the press, and that his 
poor result could not be explained by democrats stealing votes from each other alone (Lukianenko, À 
by the way, wanted to establish a block o f  all parties). Obstacles were also put in the w ay for the 
political parties through the electoral law wh ich made it d ifficult for political parties to nom inate 
cand idates. In order to do so, it would have to gather 50 people to attend an regional or district 
conference. It was easier for PZU  to gather 10 people to back up an independent candidate. |
Therefore, PZU  did not nom inate any candidates. Instead its candidates registered as | |
independents. Altogether 30 ‘G reen’ candidates were registered in this way. The local elections, A
argued Kurykin, would be easier for the Green Party. A K iev party organisation w ould be created A
for this purpose to register candidates for Kiev. Enterprises and groups o f  residents w ish ing to put 
forward their own candidates would have to gather 300 people at a conference, wheras the 
proceedure for political parties was much simpler. H owever, som e Greens were hesitant to 
nom inate candidates for the local elections on the grounds that it could not be ruled out that the 
local elections would not take place''^"'.
Serhii Kurykin, the speaker o f P Z U s  Political Council, saw the Green Party’s lack o f  success
as a problem o f  image. In his v iew , P Z U  was too often being identified w ith eco log ica l problem s T:'S;and w as by many perceived o f  as an environmental organisation rather than as a political party. T
The reason for thinking so was that in the late spring of 1994 there was some doubt whether the
presidential elections, also scheduled for June, would actually go ahead as planned. Should these be 7|
posphoned, then the same fate was likely to hit the local elections. A
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People failed to see the link between ecolog ical problems and general political and econom ic  
developm ents. Sam iilenko argued that PZU  lost out as it had very few  concrete political actions to 
refer to. S im ply arguing that PZU  is a party in the political centre is not sufficien t to gain the 
support o f  the electorate'
Another reason, related to PZU'5 im age, was the party’s lack o f  w ell-know n and h ighly  
respected politicians such as lurii Shcherbak. Four polls conducted by Sosis-G allup between  
A ugust 1993 and January 1994 showed the popularity ratings o f  Ukraine's political leaders. O f  
the 25 politicians those polled were asked to rate, Kononov ranked 23rd, w ith a general rating o f  
only 0,32%  (Kuchm a and Kravchuk received the highest scores with 2.22 and 2.12 respectively). 
A s pointed out in a com m ent by Lyudmyla Korol, the politicians w ho headed the list were in the 
lead in terms o f  their level o f  visib ility and p o p u l a r i t y A  sim ilar poll conducted in 1991, when  
Shcherbak was still leader o f PZU  gave a very different result:
Table 5.J5 Support (in %) for party leaders, October 799/'^’
Party leader Support
CPU (when existed) 10.51
PZU 10.28
PDVU 4.44People’s Party of Ukraine 4.21
Christian Democratic Party o f Ukraine 1.17
Constitutional Democratic Party of Ukraine 0.93
Social Democratic Party o f Ukraine 0.93People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine 0.93
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 0.47
Agrarian Democratic Party of Ukraine 0.47
A poll conducted in K iev by NDISEP in K iev a w eek before the elections indicated that 
whereas only 12% o f  those under 30 years o f  age had decided who they were going to vote for, a 
third o f  those over 60 had made up their minds. Other polls indicate that older people are 
politically  more active than the younger generation and more prone to vote for the 
socialists/com m un ists. The young, on the other hand, were less interested in politics, prompting 
one observer to conclude as fo llow s ‘m olod obyraie pepsi’ (the young vo te for pepsi)!’ G iven  
that PZU  saw as one o f  its major groups o f  support the young and the w om en, this, no doubt, w as 
bad new s for the Green Party. Poor know ledge o f  candidates, furthermore, m ade it d ifficu lt for the 
Greens to draw attention to their candidates: only 11% o f  those polled said they knew alm ost all 
the cand idates in their constituency. 29% knew som e o f  the candidates whereas as many as 25%
"'IhkL
Ukrainian Weekly, 20.3.1994. 
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cla im ed to have no knowledge whatsoever o f  their candidates. S ixty seven percent intended to 
take part in the elections, 15% were still undecided and 18% would not take part. The latter 
category w as com posed predom inantly o f  people under 30 years o f  age (people serv ing in the 
army, work ing at enterprises and in the social sector)
F inally, the one-man constituenc ies contributed to the Green Party’s lack o f  success in the 
elections. K ononov pointed out that had the elections been proportional w ith a four percent barrier 
for parties to enter the parliament, PZU  would have made it to Verkhovna .
The W est Ukrainian Greens follow ed a different line from that o f  K iev, which proved more 
successful. Accord ing to Kostyslav Tverdostup o f  Tern op 11 PZU, hi organisation supported five  
candidates for the elections. Four o f  these made it to parliament. They were all members o f  Fond 
moia Uh'aina, wh ich is a business organisation. The Greens in Ternopil run tw o small 
enterprises: ELF Lid. and Ekotern Ltd. The latter is run by Iryna Tverdostup and was one o f  the 
founders o f Fond moia Ukraina. This Fund supported reformers (60s generation) who were new to 
politics and com pletely independent (i.e. had not worked in party/local adm inistration under the 
com m un ists). The campaign w as headed by Andrii Olinchyk, who was also responsible for its 
election programme, being the ‘id eolog ist’ o f  the Fund. V ia him, the Ternopil Greens had an 
outlet to TV. Fond moia Ulamina also distributed a free paper, Zapovid (after Shevchenko), wh ich  
printed its general political programme. Thus, although none o f  those elected to Verkhovna Rada 
from Ternopil were actually members o f  PZU, they had the support o f  the Greens and have 
provided these with an opportunity to lobby decisions concern ing the environm ent in parliament. 
The alternative approach o f  co-operation rather than balloting alone thus paid off^ *^^ .
A lthough, understandably, there was considerable d isappointm ent within PZU  regarding the 
result o f  the parliamentary elections, Kurykin argued that the outcom e m ight not be all that bad: 
‘perhaps w e w ill gain politically from not being associated w ith the new  parliament as it w ill be 
d ifficult to make dec isions there. It is therefore possible that we w ill do w ell at the next e lection s’.
5.3.3 Local Elections (June 1994)
F ollow ing the poor results o f  the parliamentary elections, there w as som e d isagreem ent am ong  
PZU  m embers as to whether or not the party ought to take part in the upcom ing local elections. 
Iryna Han iukova in M ay 1994 argued that it was uncertain whether PZU  ought to take part in the 
local elections: those who participated in the first round and fa iled to get elected, were not
Be i^ipnMM Knïih 25.3.1994, c. 1.
The Constituting Conference of the Kiev PZU Organisation, Kiev, 14.4.1994. Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Kiev, 20.5.1994.
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Vitalii Kononov at PZU Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994.
KmcUckmh uecTiiMic 30.4.1994, c. 3.
Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, 17.5.1994.
Vitalii Kononov at PZU Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994 and at Founding Conference o f Kiev PZU, Kiev, 14.4.1994.
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allow ed to put forward their cand idacies in areas where new elections were required. Thus the 
entire leadership o f  PZU  was barred from standing for parliament until the next parliamentary 
elections.
F ollow ing the parliamentary elections, PZU  proposed that local and presidential elections be 
postponed at least until the autumn o f  1994 and that, on 26 June 1994, a Constitutional A ssem bly  
be elected. W ith no Constitution the Greens did not find it adv isable to elect the leader o f  the 
state, then ‘local and presidential elections w ithout a constitution are dangerous; w e risk building
I‘ï's:
" Î
">01what w e do not want to build, facilitating the réanimation o f  the Sov iet U n ion’" . The
Constitutional A ssem bly could have 450 members; 225 o f  the deputies already elected to 
Verkhovna Rada and another 225 whom  should be elected on party-lists. H owever, the Greens 
w ould not boycott either local, nor presidential elections should these take place as planned. 
A ccord ing to K ononov, PZU  was a ‘law-abid ing party. W e cannot allow  ourselves to voluntarily  
d istance ourselves from the political process o f  the country’ *^^ .^
A s for the local elections, there was a possibility that these would be declared invalid as it 
w as summer and people m ight fail to show  up. In H an iukova’s v iew  it might therefore be better if  
the Greens cam paigned against other candidates so that the elections would be declared invalid. 
Sam iilenko, on the other hand, thought the local elections should be held as people would  
d efin itely  elect a president. Therefore, PZU  ought to take part^° .^
Eventually it w as decided that PZU  would take part in the elections. The local elections, 
argued K ononov, were particularly important to the Greens partly as PZU  w as a ‘m un icipal’ party, 
closer to the local than to the central level, partly as there was an urgent need to change p eop le’s 
attitudes towards the environment. The latter could only be ach ieved through concrete action 
locally and by show ing people that their local problems were c losely  linked to global questions^'^' .^ 
f  2 6 /  had few  concrete results to refer to nationally, argued M elnykov, as the party had so far not 
had a chance to work through the national parliament. The path to representation in the future was 
to gain the trust o f  the Ukrainian people and this could only be done by promoting prom ises made 
during the election campaign. In K iev som e o f  these prom ises m ight be im plem ented. The fact 
that K iev was affected by radioactive fall-out from the Chernobyl accident increased the party’s 
chances o f  doing this. A prerequisite, however, w as an improved organisational structure. A t the 
press conference that took place in K iev on 27 April 1994, Orest M elnykov stated that the 
reorganisation o f  PZUPs, structure was to continue prior to the local elections: ‘earlier w e had a
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from getting involved in com m ercial activities. Those candidates put forward by the m eeting
yKpaïHChKM Bicri, 1.5.1994, c. 1.
S ee M i i i i c r e p c r B O  lO c r M U i i  Y ic p a in H . C ii ia o u T a o  ripo  n e s c i ’u a u i io . n o . 2 3 4 .
.loose structure o f  independent party clubs. N ow  w e are in the process o f  tightening our structure, #
organising party clubs at town and city level as the CPSU did in its tim e...’ . . K ononov also 4
pointed out that attempts were being made at tightening co-operation between the local clubs and 
the central organs o f |  
In Kiev this w as to be achieved by uniting and co-ordinating the activities o f  PZU  members US
through a unified K iev party organisation, which would be the only P Z 6/organ isation  to field 'fs
i:"candidates to the Kievrada. On 14 April 1994 its founding conference took place in the Kiev local 
administration headquarters. The conference was attended by 49 o f  the c ity ’s 62 party members. f
Regional party clubs already existed in Kiev (33 regions in K iev), but no unified K iev party club 
had so far been registered. The m eeting elected a leader, deputy leader, a secretary and two
members. The leader was given the task o f  registering the club with the M inistry o f  Justice. This 
had to be done urgently as only when the club had been formally registered would it be entitled to 
put forward candidates for the local elections. Registration o f  candidates would be stopped y
already on 12 May, so the sooner the club was registered, the better. Kievrada consisted o f  75 
members and K ononov suggested that P Z t/sh ou ld  nominate at least 50 candidates.
The K iev party organisation convened again on 5 May 1994, one day before it w as form ally |î
registered by the M inistry o f  Justice^^^ to nominate candidates for the party list. Kononov . '"'Iinformed those present that PZU  had been approached by other parties with a request that their
candidates be allow ed to seek election on P Z U s  K iev list. Independent candidates had made
sim ilar requests. P Z U s  Political Council had already discussed the issue and decided that
independents may be supported by the party if  they support P Z U s  programme and sign a
docum ent com m itting them selves to work within the green fraction if  elected. M em bers o f  other
political parties could naturally not be allowed to seek election through P Z U s  party list. PZU
deputies leaving the green fraction would autom atically be excluded from the party. A s for
independent candidates elected with the support o f  PZU, these w ould be excluded from the green
fraction should they not fo llow  the party rules. A list o f  18 candidates to Kievrada w as presented
to the m eeting. Five o f  these were wom en. The candidacies o f  several independents were also
discussed. There w as som e dispute over som e o f  these, but m ost were endorsed by the m eeting. /  '
Finally, Kononov told every m ember to g ive the K iev organisation 80 karbovantsy w ithin a w eek *.to cover costs in connection with registration, stamp and office as PZU  as a party w as prevented %
I
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‘right’ m ight take on a d ifferent m ean ing when used in a non-western political context. McLaren
Context (Houston: Department o f Political Science, University of Houston, 1995).
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w ould com e together at a later stage to d iscuss the election campaign and how to fund this
W ith regard to the financial side, Sam iilenko argued that the Green deputies and their
supporters were market democrats in a position to render the local election campaign financial
support. Optimists within the party suggested that PZU  might gain 25-30%  o f  the vote in the local 
.elections. This, argued Sam iilenko, was not real. Ten per cent would be more realistic. Prior to 
the elections PZU  had three deputies in K ievrada (Sam iilenko, Kononov and M eln ikov). These 
constituted a PZU  fraction, wh ich had the support o f  independent deputies on a number o f  issues. 
In som e cases the PZU  deputies managed to gather 30 deputies. Som e 20 members o f  K ievrada 
requested that their names be put on P Z U s  lists as independent candidates with the support o f  
PZU^^^.
5.4 Placing PZU in the Ukrainian Political Landscape
5.4.1 Left-Right Continuum and Ukrainian Politics
The Ukrainian Green Party has defined itse lf as a party to the left o f  the political centre. In a 
W estern political context on the left-right continuum this would im ply that PZU  would be lean ing  
towards a soc ialist orientation. H owever, as pointed out by McLaren^^^, the m ean ing o f  ‘ left’ and
argues the point that peop le’s attitudes towards democratic values and level o f  support for 
dem ocratic institutions, support for or resistance to a market econom y and support for freeing the
union republics and Eastern Europe from Sov iet control determine where people and political 
parties place them selves on the left-right continuum. Thus, the ‘ left’ sign ifies a h igh level o f  
support for change, whereas the ‘right’ sign ifies opposition towards such reforms. Thus, although  
the ‘right’ in the W est have w elcom ed the kind o f  changes the ‘left’ in the former U SSR  have been  
the m ost ardent supporters of, at an abstract level the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ d istingu ish those w ho  
favour econom ic and political reform and those who do not.
Several Ukrainian political analysts have also tried to apply the ‘left-right’ continuum  to their 
political context. Haran, for instance, defined ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the fo llow in g way:
Meeting of the Kiev party organisation, Kiev, 5.5.1994.
Interview with lurii Samiilenko, Kiev, 6.5.1994.
Lauren McLaren, Ideology in the Former Soviet Union: Defining Left and Right in a Non-Western I
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V ovk and M ustafin^", on the other hand, apply ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the traditional m ean ing on 
the Ukrainian political context, classifying anti-Communist parties as the ‘right’ and the 
com m un ists/socialists as the ‘left’. A cknow ledg ing the fact that the former favour change, 
whereas the latter oppose change, they introduce a new term, namely that o f  the ‘radical right’ . 
Konchuk^'^ classifies Uxrainian political parties as ‘ left’, ‘right’, j i t r is f ,  ‘left o f  centre’ and
fapaiiL (1991), c. 11.
Bmcrop Bobk. A.iieKceH Mycraiimn, HeMSPecniaa YKpaniia in ffonoe no. 5, 1991, c .  18-19.
n. KonoiBiyK. E raici napT il. i n  Yim/IOBHH Kyp’sp, 31.7.1992, c. 5,
Andrew Wilson, Valentin Yakushik, The Developing Ukrainian Party System (London/Kiev, 1991).
Ibid.. p. 1.
‘right o f  centre’, although he fa ils to specify  which parties can be classified as such.
W ilson and Yakushik^'^ in a paper subm itted to the journal Slovo try to prove that both these
approaches are fraught with problems. For instance, by labelling parties accord ing to their stands
on questions such as the nature o f  the econom ic and social system , or o f  the relative importance o f
.freedom , authority, order and the state, one runs into the fo llow ing problems: firstly, party
attitudes towards these questions tend to disrupt the traditional ‘left-right’ continuum. As an
exam ple, they refer to the Ukrainian National Party, which, w hile favouring a market econom y is
an authoritarian party as far as values and organisation are concerned. Secondly, W ilson and
Yakushik argue that it is extrem ely difficult to classify  political parties in terms o f  their attitudes
to an econom ic system  which does not yet exist and which for this reason has not brought about_the existence o f  social system s providing the traditional support bases for W estern European party 
system s. They therefore end up with classify ing the Ukrainian political parties in the sam e way as 
Haran: ‘either attitudes to the desirability o f  reform are reversed, so that the Com m unists w ho  
w ish to preserve the existing structure o f  econom y and polity becom e conservatives and free 
market enthusiasts becom e radical reformers, or strange paradoxes result’ '^''.
Another problem linked with the usage o f  the traditional ‘left-right’ classification schem e is 
that ‘the fault-lines separating one political ideology from another often fall within, rather than 
between, political parties’. A s exam ples, W ilson and Yakushik refer to the CPU, which contained  
old-style state socialists, authoritarian populists and genuine free-marketers. Sim ilarly, the 
Ukrainian Republican Party united neo-liberalists, populists and Christian dem ocrats as w ell as a 
hard-line nationalist minority. Finally, it was a problem that even w ithin W est European party 
system s many parties escape the classification schem e. In Ukraine parties not falling within the
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classification schem e were PZU  and the Confederation o f  Anarcho-Syndicalists. On this basis 
they drew the follow ing conclusion:
In short, then. Western European labels can easily be found, but have to 
be interpreted in their specifically Ukrainian context. It has to be 
remembered that Ukrainian parties are reviving traditions from their own 
political history, and not just adopting Western European conventions.While it is true that an important part of the Ukrainian tradition has been 
the desire to be a more integral part o f the European mainstream (as part 
of the defining difference between Ukrainian and Russian political 
culture), Ukraine has strong indigenous varieties of romantic Christian 
populism, Western-leaning constitutionalism, utopian socialism, integral 
nationalism and, for want of a better term, ‘hetmanism’ (a hetman being 
a Cossack leader and messianic authority figure). Most such traditions 
are currently being revived, as all fulfil the function o f  allowing 
Ukrainians to reach back to a more ‘authentic’ national past, untainted 
with the failings o f the soviet era, but only those which meet the needs o f  
the future, and develop something of a social base, will prosper"' .^
A slightly different classification schem e was introduced by W ilson and Belous^’  ^ in 1993: 
They d istingu ish between Tiltra-nationalist’, ‘national-dem ocratic’, ‘liberal-dem ocratic’, ‘state- 
bureaucratic’ and ‘soc ialist’ parties. The ‘ultra-nationalist’ or ‘ultra-right’ represent the priority o f  
the interests o f  the nation and the building o f  a strong state with powerful armed forces. The 
‘national-dem ocrats’ w hile supporting national statehood favour supporting private property and a 
market econom y. The ‘liberal-dem ocrats’ favour an independent Ukraine, but with good relations 
to Russia, a soc ial market econom y and dem ocratic political structures. The ‘state-bureaucratic 
b loc’ wants to slow  down econom ic and political reform and also favours Ukrainian membership 
in the CIS. F inally, the ‘soc ia lists’ are against market reform, in favour o f  state control and 
w ish ing to retain the Sov iet Un ion.
C lassifying political parties along a ‘left-right’ continuum is, how ever, useful i f  one keeps the 
points identified above in m ind and account for the peculiarities o f  the Ukrainian political context. 
Various classification schem es for sorting the Ukrainian political parties on the ‘left-righf  
continuum have been offered. Potichnyi^'^, for instance, uses a number o f  variables sim ilar to 
those o f  McLaren. Firstly, there is the issue o f  statehood for Ukraine, wh ich produces three 
general categories; the federalists, the confederalists and the proponents o f  independence. The 
second issue is the parties’ stand on the future econom ic system  o f  Ukraine (categories: liberal, 
soc ial-dem ocratic or com m un ist) and finally, there is the issue o f  political system  (three
Ibid.. p. 2.
Andrew Wilson & Artur Bilous, ‘Political Parties in Ukraine’. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 4, 1993,
p. 697.
3ter J. P
OstwissenschafHche and internationale Studien), no. 3-1992.
Pe otichnyi, The Multi-Party System in Ukraine (Bonn: Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur
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categories: liberal, social-dem ocrat and com m un ist) . B ilous uses Sartori’s diagram to
5.4.2 Issues Determining PZU’s Placement on the Left-Right Continuum
Ibid.. pp. 7-13.
’^^ A. 0 .  Bi.noyc. rioJiiTHMni od'siiitaiiiui AKDaiiiH (Khïb: BmiamiHUTno ’’yicpaliia”. 1993). 
JJi Teparypmi VKpciiim, 25.10.1990, c. I
Iclassify  Ukrainian political parties on a ‘left-right’ axis according to their position on five political 
issues:
1. The international position of Ukraine and the attitude towards CIS.
2. The territorial principle.
3. The organisation of power and degree of local self-determination/self-rule.
4. The economic strategy.
5. The military-political doctrine.
Issues tw o and three correspond to what McLaren refers to as ‘dem ocratic values and level o f  
support for democratic institutions’, issue one refers to her category ‘Sov iet con trol’ and issue four ■corresponds to her ‘attitude towards the market econom y’. The fifth category has becom e  
increasingly important in Ukraine as the d iscussion o f  the future o f  the country’s nuclear weapons
.
- I f
and nuclear power stations intensified fo llow ing the collapse o f  the USSR . Although there might 
be som e variations from party to party with regard to their placem ent in Sartori’s diagram on each 
o f  these issues, these variations are not great and thus gives a good basis by which to classify  the 
parties on the ‘left-right’ continuum.
?
Ukrainian Independence
A s seen above, PZU  from the very start defined itself as a member o f  the larger, international 
green com m un ity. Although PZU  shared the major goals o f  Green Parties elsew here, the party 
also had to take into account circum stances spec ific to Ukraine as w ell as a considerable ‘national’ 
w ing w ithin the party. One o f  the first issues on which fZ f /h a d  to make a stand, w as the issue o f
a union treaty versus Ukrainian independence. In the aftermath o f  the First Congress this w as an 
issue which cam e to overshadow other issues. On 30 September (the last day o f  the C ongress) a 
b ig demonstration took place in K iev against a union treaty and several o f  the delegates joined in. 
Related to this issue w as the question o f  whether or not Fok in’s governm ent was com petent 
enough to get the best possible deal for Ukraine on this matter, and also whether or not it was 
com petent enough to reform the Ukrainian econom y.
lurii Shcherbak spoke at length on this issue in a speech to the Ukrainian parliament in late 
October 1990^^1 which was also one o f  his first public appearances as leader o f  the PZU.
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Shcherbak produced a critical assessm en t o f  the Ukrainian political leadership and made 
alternative proposals on how to stab ilise the ailing Ukrainian econom y. A s for the governm ent’s 
econom ic stabilisation programme, Shcherbak rem inded the deputies that the voting on this 
programme had already started - by the hungerstriking students in Independence Square (1990). It 
w as not the students who should starve, but those who brought Ukraine to the point o f  catastrophe 
in the first place. Everything should be done to save the lives and health o f  the students, as they  
‘are the consc ience and future o f  our peop le’. The future o f  the governm ent was less important; 
other, more crucial issues ought to be given priority: ’■"f
M n c e \ !  iia.M -  .leoi.ivi. iipanuvi, p a iW K a .ia v i , KOiicepisaTopa.vi -  iiav io  
iioiiiiTb, MIX) c n a o iT b  c e ix u iiu i  iiy/Kiio i ie  O T yie.iL iiux  ;u ) .iu < iio c 'r iib ix  .luu, 
lie oTyie.Xbiiyio riapTuio. lie oivieibiioe iipaiiHTe.ibCTBo, n aaxe iie  
5e3iiaiie>iciio y c 'r a p e .i .y io  (|)0])viy rocyyiapcTna. a  iiapoa. e r o  y ie re fl.
Hy 71(110 dopoTbca 3a dno.ioruMecKoe h yiyxoaiioe iibiTKuiiaiine 
viH.i.iHOiioB .tioAew. 14 HMeiiiio Ji'oro crpareruMecKoro iiaiipaij.ieiimi 
iieyiocrae'p iipaBHre.ibcmeiiiioH iiporpaxixie.
As for the econom ic programme itself, Shcherbak was against passing it in its present form  
on the grounds that, w hile outlin ing the state o f  the econom y, it failed to m ake a proper analysis as 
to the cause o f  the problems. The major problem, in the v iew  o f  the Greens, w as that the 
Ukrainian econom y was geared towards the M ilitary Industrial C om plex (M IK). The Greens w ere  
not in any w ay to blame for Ukraine’s a iling econom y:
H l ie  iiy T id io  odB M iuiTb ";ie .ie iib !x ” u roM , m’I’O o i iu  3aicpbi.'iH  iiecK o.xbK O  
MpeAiil)HîiTHH. v ib i.io B ap e iiiib ie  :)aBOAbs. He b 9to m  y ie .io , a  b to m ,  mi'o
Mbl lie lipOH3liOyiMM TOBapOB, liyTldlblX .310AÎIM.
Shcherbak’s recom m endations regarding how to improve the state o f  the econom y are 
interesting in that they can be taken as not only Shcherbak’s personal position on the issue, but 
also the position o f  PZU. Rather than a few  cosm etic changes to stop the decline in the econom y  
in the short term, Shcherbak argued in favour o f  clear, strategic programmes for structural change 
o f  the industry, energy sector and the agricultural com plex. A s illustrations o f  countries where 
structural change had worked he referred to South Korea and M alaysia. There were great 
opportunities for Ukraine in the area o f  m icroelectron ics and other science-orien ted areas. 
Ukraine w as still a producer o f  raw materials. This had to change. The Ukrainian governm en t’s 
hesitation w as a result not only o f  professional incom petence, but also revealed a lack o f  w ill to 
change things. Any governm ent, argued Shcherbak, interested in the creation o f  a sovereign state, 
w ould request that the parliament as qu ickly as possible pass a law on the nationalisation o f  
U kra ine’s property and financial resources and would insist on a constitutional basis to support the
542
declaration o f  sovereignty passed in July 1990. Shcherbak then listed the follow ing five points as 
crucial to establish real Ukrainian sovereignty:
1) The Prime Minister as head of the Ukrainian government must step down.
2) The structure of the government must be changed in line with the Declaration of Sovereignty and the 
change towards a market economy.
3) A coalition mass-party government of public trust (national salvation) must be formed.
4) An anti-crisis committee with wide-ranging powers must be established to elaborate a programme for 
providing children with environmentally clean food.
5) Assistance must be sought from banks such as the EBRD and the IMF to pave the way for a fully 
convertible Ukrainian currency
Thus, PZU  like all other members o f  the Democratic Bloc, fa  ^ ired Ukrainian independence. 
However, groupings w ithin the Green Party were concerned that this issue might overshadow their 
concern for the environment. Thus Hlazovyi^^' em phasised that the environm ent must not be 
forgotten in the struggle for independence: ‘ in our cond itions there is a risk that in the zeal o f  the 
political struggle currently brewing and the ruling coalitions, the young opposition may also forget 
the interests o f  the environment, as w ell as soc ial and deeply humanist concerns. Although the 
strong and correct social policies o f  new adm inistrations in W est Ukraine g ive hope that such a 
scenario is avoidable, w e should g ive priority to the eco logy  over the econom y and put broad 
dem ocratic freedom s above the interests o f  the state. Unlimited market forces can dam age our 
environm ent just as much as the com m un ist system  did. W e must therefore not poeticise the 
market so much. W e are far away from a w elfare state, capable o f  taking care o f  the unem ployed  
and the poor’. H aving said that, though, the Greens had com e to the conclusion that an 
independent Ukraine was a prerequisite for establishing an env ironm entally clean and free, 
humanist society.
A s seen above, there was d isagreement within PZU  on what the party’s position should be on 
the national question. To get a proper d iscussion on this issue and to carve out a platform on 
wh ich agreement could be reached between ‘globalists’ and ‘nationalists’ (i.e. decide P Z U s  
position on what place the Ukrainian nation should have in Ukraine), PZU  arranged a conference 
on nationalism  in K iev in January 1991^^^. Specialists on the national question such as Dziuba, 
Popovych, L isovyi and Skorativskyi were invited to address the conference, enabling PZU  to 
address the issue in an as professional as possible manner.
N ot surprisingly, Svyryda reiterated the position o f  the ‘nationalists’, arguing that
K p iM  npo5;ieM 7iouKi.i.:i}i. nepnioro iipo6.!ievioio iia Y icpaiiii e 
npod.iGMa yKpaïiicLKox i ia u ii ,  aica cboroyuii anviMpaa. YtcpaïHChKa
221
222 .Rirepivrypmi yupaXiiM, 15.11.1990,0.2.K-3, 22:30, 19.1.1991: Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest, compiled by RL Monitoring, no. UF- 
028, p. 9, 20.1.1991.
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:
i i a u i } !  l i e  Biyi'iynaE c e d e  r o c i i o j i a p e M  n i s i  Bevi.ii. I B o i i a  i s
C B O E Ï  Y K p a i l l H  i l O B B O . I H . i a  3 P G 5 m T H  C M i T I I H K .  U j v p a l l l C B K a  l i a i l i J I  
B a r y d H . i a  B i A M y r r n  T i £ i  v i c / K H .  b b  m k o i o  i y i e  B / K C  B H V i H p a i i i i s i  
H o r i v . ' i B H i i .
The link between national consc iousness and concern for the environm ent was acknowledged  
by those who attended the Conference. Towards the end o f  the conference, PZlTs stand on the 
issue w as revealed;
...B es niiipoATKeiiini i ia i i io i ia . ih i io l  C B iA oviocri iieMO/K.iHBO 
BiyipoAHTH yK p aïiicB K m ï iiapo ii b  i im i i u i i i i n  K aTacTpo(|)iM iiiH  
e K o .io r i'iB iH  C H T y a u i ï .  axa  (x . ia . ia c a  b  p e o i y B . i i i i i .
H owever, the Green Party at least officially  adopted a cautious attitude on the issue o f  a new  
union treaty. In a n  interview towards the end o f  1990^^  ^ lurii Shcherbak expressed his 
d issatisfaction w ith the very notion o f  a union treaty, which in his v iew  w as rather od ious. The 
Greens wanted other forms o f  co-operation between the republics o f  the Sov iet Un ion and at a 
m eeting o f  the U SSR  Supreme Sov iet Shcherbak had suggested that a flex ib le decentralised  
system  o f  collective security in the areas o f  the m ilitary, ecology, energy and space be formed. 
H owever, this system  should be polycentric, and not a m onopolist, super-state system . M oreover, 
it should be up to the republics to decide whether or not they w ished to join. I f  they decided in 
favour, they should unite as sovereign states. A s o f  Decem ber 1990, the ecological com m ittee o f  
the U SSR  Supreme Sov iet w as conducting negotiations w ith representatives o f  the various 
republics regarding the sign ing o f  a special ecolog ical treaty (see Chapter T w o) to address 
environm ental problems in the U SSR  at an inter-republican level. Th is w as necessary, then the 
problem s were on such a scale that none o f  the republics - including Russia - could successfu lly  
solve them alone:
ICaTKAbiH iioiiH.viaer, h t q  ecTb ra icn e  iipoB.iieM bi. KOTopue nyTKiio 
peruaTb co o 5 m a . CxaTKeM, iipoS.aeMa BepuoSbiJui. H n ico ry ia  Y icpaM iia  
OAiia n e  peuiMT^ '^  ^ ^ ro n  iipo6.rieivibi. T omiio tbk Ace h Be.riopyccHîu n 
PoccHB. T e v i 6o .îiee, m t o  n e  Y ic p a u iia  HOiipbnja.na sry A3C, a 
M u iia T o v ia iie p ro  CCCP.
H owever, a ‘centre’ was not necessary and i f  a centre was to em erge, it did not autom atically  
have to be based in M oscow . M insk or any other republican capital w as possible. To secure the 
im plem entation o f  dec isions made w ithin this framework, should agreem ent be reached between
K-3, 1:30, 13.12.90 - radio - in USSR Today, Soviet Media News and Information Digest, 13.12.90, no. 
1054, p. 2.
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the republics on the need for a treaty, a co-ord inating body com posed o f  representatives from all 
the republics could be set up. Another possibility was to establish a centre for fighting a new  
ecolog ical catastrophe o f  global proportions, nam ely that o f  the Aral Sea.
iOpMH IHepfiaK. ‘Mi/X necrivfijtiica.Mn Mas 5vth pinHOiipamia vroAa 3 upo5.ie.vi eKO.ftoiTx‘. 
OHKyMGim 2 /9 1 , c. 92-98.
!
When asked if  he favoured absolute independence for Ukraine, Shcherbak was som ewhat 
evasive, arguing that a declaration o f  sovereignty, expressing the highest w ish o f  the Ukrainian 
people already ex isted. H owever, ‘thousands o f  problems' would have to be solved during the 
period o f  transition to secure real independence:
/la H  p a .ju e  v i o x o i o  : j a K f ) b ( T h  r . i a . j a  i ia  vie. 10. i i o i ] ) y ; j H T i . c M  u i i e e o K  n  
C K a;jari,: \ii,i i i e a i i n e u M b i .  H x p y ro M  \ii.i r o .ib ie ,  5 o c :b ie  n \ii.i iie
B lia e v , MTO M KUK M IVIC HUM 116(1)11, 6pan,...nO .IH lT lM eC K M H  CNUepeUHI'CT 
-  3'vo o v u m  vie. 10, a  9KOiiovinMecKHH -  oro i ip o 5 . ie ,\ ia  c i s o f i o v i u o r o  
pa;jUMTH>l 9 K ( ) I 1 0 \ ' 1 H K H  M i!pevu ipm iT H H ...H y7Kii() V i a i ' b  r . i î o 5 o v i \  i u i i i i h m  
[ipevinpHiiTHUM. u y v K iio  c o : j v i a n a T i ,  noubiH pbiuoK. H.vyKiio To.ibK O .
MTofibi 310 iipoHcxoviM.'io 116 HU iipHiiuwiiax ipafievKa, a lia iipHiiiuiiuix 
B:jaMMOi3biroviHbix...(crp. 3) YKpaHua UB.iuercu rocyviapci'BOM, n oiia 
vio.DKiia BOWTM B eBpoiieHc.KHM iipoiiecc.
i
Real independence would not be ach ieved sim ply by issuing declarations; actions were 
required. A s a first step, the union system , consisting o f  56 m in istries and super-m onopolies.
controlling the entire USSR, would have to be fully dismantled and replaced by new structures. 
O nly to replace the Prime M in ister (Ryzhkov) would ehange nothing. Deep structural changes, 
taking account o f  the sovereign w ill o f  the republics were needed to ach ieve real change.
Shcherbak expanded on his position in an article written in Oikumena in early 1991^^^, 
arguing that
M iT K  p e c iiy f i . i iK a M u  vibe  f i y r n  p iB iio iip a B iia  y ro v ia  .i i ip o f t ie M  
C K Q . io i ' i i ,  i  I I i  B uKOViy p a ; j i  lie  v io rO B ip , B u r i / u m u  . in u ie  v in i  
L ie ir i 'p y , 5 o  c i ip o f in  npo iiri'O B X iiyTM  ra icuA  vioKy.vie iiT  y v x e  fiy.MU.
E K O . io r iM i i i  i ip o f i .ie v in .  soK pe.v ia Mopiiofiu.MbCbica, MaiOTb r .io fia .M b iin u  
xa p a ic re p . n o v io . ia i i iu i i x  i io rp e O y s  c n i . i b i i n x  B ycn .ib , i ia u B i io c r i  
o p r a i i i i i  VI. Ill K o o p v iM iu m ii v i in .  i ie ir rp a . ii iJ O B a iii io ro  B u v ii.T e n iiii 
ic o i i r r iB ,  c rB o p e iiin i C o io .B iio ro  ([lo fiv iy  vioiio.viorM.
Disasters such as Chernobyl and the Aral Sea could only be solved with the help o f  the 
international com m un ity. Union funds should be created on a voluntary basis and L ithuania, 
wh ich had already left the union, should be allowed to join if  it w ished to do so. N obody, except 
for the republics involved, should have access to the funds and co-ordinating bodies should
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im plem ent the programmes endorsed. These bod ies did not necessarily have to be situated in 
M oscow , but could be in M insk, K iev, Alm a Ata or elsewhere. Sc ien tific com m un ities in all the 
republics should unite to find the best solutions to each problem. H owever, as long as the USSR  
ex isted, the ‘centre’ (i.e. M oscow ) should pay for such programmes to be im plem ented. As for 
sovereignty,
B e : ?  p e a . i h i i o i o  c \ ' n e p e ! i i T e r \ .  o î o o o a h  b  n  K . i a v i a n i i i  \ r o v u  \
C T B o p e i i n i  ( | ) o n ; i i B .  B O B i i i i i i i i b o e K O i i o M i ' i u i n  a i a . i B U O C T i  i i a m i  
e K o . i o r i a i i i  5 i ; i n  i i o j i o . i a T M  i i e \ i o > K . i m b o . T i . w a o - i  c y B e p e a i i a  K p a l i i a  
\ i 0 7 x e  B v i i n c u i o B a T H  e i p e K T H B i i n n  e K o . i o r i M B H H  k o b t p o . i b  i i a v i  c b o e i o  
TepMTopi£io~‘ .^
In the early months o f  1991, several political parties and m ovem ents in Ukraine were
dem and ing a popular referendum on the issue o f  independence, to help them pursue this issue vis-
à-vis Ukrainian authorities. Shcherbak, however, was not happy w ith such a request, arguing that
.a referendum would be politically not advisable and soc ially  im possible. Rather than solv ing any 
problems, a referendum would sharpen already ex isting contradictions am ong those who requested 
the referendum.
Although Shcherbak was sceptical to a referendum, other prominent m embers o f  PZU  were 
m ore positive. Serhii Hrabovskyi (K iev) tried to justify  Ukrainian Independence from a Green
I
Ipoint o f  v iew  in an interview with Ukrainian Radio a month later^^^, criticising those in the W est 
w ho were sceptical to Ukraine’s and other republics’ w ish to secede from the USSR:
Havi Macro roBOjari: EB[)oiia ofi’eAMiuieTCfi. a bi,i xo'i'HTe paciaiunri,
Be. iHKMH C0103 no iiuuHoua.ibiiw.vi KBapmpa.M. Bo-nepBwx, a tie BHMy 
UHMero li.ioxoix) b  t o m ,  m t o  m uapoaw, m . b o a m  x o i m i t  tkhtb b  
oTAe.xBiihix K Baprnpax, kbk lO B op m B o i, c:o BceMH yAoficrBaMM.
AoBO.ua 10 c  u a c  KOMMyiia.iOK. E apo iia ofi'eAM ueiia icaic p as ua ypoB ue  
iiauMOiia.'ibiiiax Knaprnp. M Biopoe. ripeA.ito>KeiBibiM Bapuairr 
C o!o:îiioix) viotoB opa. no m ocm .v M uennio, iie  w\ieeT nriMero o fiu ie r o  c  
iipHiiHHnaMH o o ’eAH iieiimi nunn.iMBOBainnax c ip a i i .  E aponencK oe  
covipyTKec'i'Bo l a iK - ix )  t k h b b t  n ooGupacToa BiipcAb t k u t b  5e:i 
Bcen. laci'iioix) ueiiTpa. Hbiiie, n K o im e 2 0 - r o  cro.ieTHH, OTinoAb iie  
pa;jMepbi oiipeA e.unoT  MecTo c ip a iib i b Mupe^^U
The Ukrainian Greens were against the continued ex istence o f  a ‘renewed em p ire’ . Instead 
they favoured co-operation between sovereign states, where each state w ould dec ide wh ich
---------------------------------------
''"ibid., p. 98.K-2, 22:15, 19.2.91 in USSR Today, Soviet Media News and Information Digest, Compiled by RL 
Monitoring, no. NF-170, 25.2.91, p. 37.
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relations it wanted with its neighbours. Hrabvoskyi had argued in favour o f  co-operation between  
the Sov iet republics on such terms since the spring o f  1990 and his v iew  was in line w ith a 
dec ision made by the Demohxitichnyi konhres in Kharkiv (I w ill return to this below ), which  
carried Shcherbak’s signature on it. Taking part in a union o f  the (former) Sov iet republics would  
prevent Ukraine from jo in ing the Common European Home - one o f  PZU’s aims - by artificially  
linking it with Kirgizia instead of, for instance Czechoslovak ia, wh ich would be considerably  
better for Ukraine.
The d iscussion continued right up until the coup in August 1991. The coup left the Greens, 
like most other Ukrai> ian politicians, in a state o f  shock. Once initial surprise had worn off, 
however, the democratic forces joined together in a m assive show  o f  strength against the coup- 
leaders in M oscow . The official Ukrainian reaction to the coup was cautious. The Com m un ist 
majority in parliament hesitated to make a decision either w ay and the speaker o f  the parliament, 
Leonid Kravchuk, on 19 August issued a statement to the effect that the parliament would wait 
until the morning before taking sides - in other words awaiting the situation in M oscow  so as to 
make sure to support the ‘right’ side. It was RUKWs Narodna Rada and practically all Ukrainian 
parties and m ovem ents that first cam e out clearly and categorically against the coup. A  number o f  
m eetings took place in K iev and students gathered in Khreshchatyk and outside Verkhovna Rada. 
A s for the Greens, Zelenyi SviPs and P Z U s  co-ordinating bodies had joint sittings. These  
m eetings were attended by everybody who happened to be in Kiev at the tim e. A resolution was 
passed, in which the coup makers were referred to as a ‘junta’ and the putsch referred to as a 
‘putsch’. This resolution was read at m eetings and handed over to the speaker o f  the parliament, 
Leonid Kravchuk. PZU's leader, V italii Kononov, also signed a joint statem ent against the putsch 
issued by the democratic forces.
Andrii H lazovyi described the G reens’ involvem ent in the anti-coup m ovem ent in K iev  
during the putsch in a detailed manner in an article published in Zelenyi sviP'^^: a new  issue o f  the 
newspaper was due on 20 August. H owever, instead o f  printing the paper, the newspaper sta ff  
printed bulletins and other important material against the coup:
Ha viesiKUH a a c  \ i u  npHiiHiniEMo v ip y ic  c a M o p o O u n x  .H H cr iiiO K  i s  
BnevieiiiiJiM H n o i iu i i ,  n o a y m x  n o  s a p y O iT K n o v iy  p a v i i o .  3 a  ; n 3 i  f o a h i i h  
AO BM Xoviy n p y M iiy  BK .'ieroEVio y  n e p in y  n o .n o c y  T C K cr :3aai3M n p o r e o r y
:3e:ie iiH x . I  k o . i m  e r a s  u iA O v io ,  m o  i io v ie p  i i i m o B  y  / i p y i c
p o sd n p a E M O  i  n a x y E M O  p e v ia K u iH u y  r e x n i K y ,  A O T on.m iE M O ca  
i i a c r y n n o r o  p a iiK y  B H B eirm  l i  i ia  n p u B a r i iy  K B a p r n p y  i  roT y n a 'i'H
McproBMW n o v e p  ra \'i...T  n u  a a co M  iia  i i e p n i i n  n o . a o c i  "H paiJA bi 
y K 'p a n i ib f  a v iM ip a . i  X p o n o n y .r io - f to p n o .M O p C b K e  r a p a a e  n iA 'i'p n M y  E i i i v i  
i v i e i i i  (j).ao'ry K o v id a u A H 'r iB  a F K M H . T a d o a a a  r a r iera "  
i iep ev ip y K O B y E  " r a p c iB K y ” s  o a o i o  B a K o . a o T n m c a M .  ’’P a v u iu c b ic a
3e.'lennn c u l no. 15,1991,0.2.
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Y iNipaïiia” n i i a n o  TaiîpvE iie x o p o iiin x  v ie i iy r a r ia  H a p o v a io ï Pavai. 
B K i iienpaan.Hbiio c.eoe iioBOjisiTb iio B iA iio iaeiiiiio  vio "coBeTCKoro„?30pyKoiîOiicTiîa
f
yH lazovyi severely criticised Ukrainian authorities for failing to distance them selves from  events in M oscow; it was actually a paradox that one o f  the tanks that defended the W hite H ouse 
in M oscow  carried the Ukrainian blue and yellow  flag whereas in K iev they were ‘waiting for the 
m orning’ - a morning which might not com e. This was, argued H lazovyi, very political, but not 
very moral. H owever, when it became clear that the putsch had failed, the chairman o f  Verkhovna 
Rada and the CPU suddenly came out in a more decisive and certain way:
...Ivo.iM uyTM npoBa.'iUBCB. lia  Y i c p a l i i i  paiiTOVi noBn iia ioTbC îi ayvieca 
i 'e p o ï; iM y  i  i ia u io i ia . ' ib i io l  a iM O C B iA O M O cri b 5 o K y . . .5 i . ib i i io c 7 r i  
B e p x o B iio i PaviM. A p .v tk i io  h  (|)a iiT acrH i|iiO io  d i . i b i i i i c r i o  
ro .iocyE T bC B  A ic r  H e B a .ie T K iio c r i. 3  m u m  i  B iT a s x io
C I l i B B i T B H B I I H K i B . ■ t
Suddenly the com m unist majority in parliament voted in favour o f  what it had so long been
against: the Ukrainian yellow  and blue flag was raised outside the parliament and they all sang the . .Ukrainian hymn ‘Sliche ne vmerla Ukraina’. H owever, the im plications o f  this sudden change o f  
attitude would not necessarily be desired:
I  iiKino VIÜTH iM  Bo.'iio. dyviyTb ci'BopioBaTH C aM ocriH iiy BaiiaiioBy 
PeciiyS.HiKy Y K paiiiy  -  SaiiaiiOBy, 60 B.riaviy b i i in  Oyvie BaKOpOMeiio 
're.'ie(|)OiiiiHMn a p o tu m h  iia Bce r i u  zee crap i n  o . i t i r a p x i l ,  axa .nume 
iiov iiin ie  Kpicvia b oBicoMax ra pawKoxiax iia ic p io ia  i io b h x  
rociiojiap iB  t k h t t i i  -  vmpeKTopiB ra Kepyioanx -  b k  Byaajio  
iieoviiiopaBoiJo b icp aïiiax  rpcrboro CBiry. He B ipn re?  A.ae iiaiii'rb 
y  H o.ib iu i ra B o .iir a p ii ico.iiniiini icoM yiiicrH Biii B o c h
K o irrp c r iio io T b  G i. ib tn e  iio .mobhhm  G a i iK in  r a  iiiA iipuE M T C B ...
The CPSU had not died, although Eltsin had declared the party illegal. The ‘party M afia’ had 
.everything it needed for survival and influence: close links with those in power, the courts and the 
econom ic structures. With this in mind, H lazovyi argued that it w ould be naive to think that such 
a ‘m onster’ could be crushed with ease. Ukrainian independence could only be safeguarded i f  the
Ukrainian people did not believe in those for whom  independence w as just a m eans by w hich  to 
secure their own positions. I f  this was achieved, there could be real independence and not what 
could be labelled ‘banana independence’.
__________________________
Ibid .. p. 5.
As prerequisites to ach ieve real independence, PZU  favoured a consolidation o f  the 
dem ocratic forces and a d ialogue including all forces in Ukraine. In a statement to Verkhovna 
Rada, Zelenyi Svit, PZU, the Constitutional-Dem ocratic Party o f  Ukraine, the L iberal-Dem ocratic 
Party o f  Ukraine, the Un ited Social-D em ocratic Party o f  Ukraine and Solidaric Trade Un ions o f  
Ukraine called for an end o f  what was referred to as ‘the civil war, wh ich has lasted - in various 
forms - since 1914’. Public peace could be strengthened w ith a national sym bol in the form o f  a 
m onument to all those Ukrainians who perished between 1914 and 1991 as v ictim s o f  political
1 231 struggle .
H owever, rather than a consolidation o f  Ukrainian political forces, a crystallisation took place 
- at least w ithin Verkhovna Rada: the ‘Group 2 3 9 ’ survived and gave birth to several political 
parties such as SPTU, SPU  and 'EdnisP. The soc ialist leader Oleksandr M oroz even argued that 
‘without the ‘Great October’ there would have been no Ukraine; thanks to the R evolution, 
Ukraine had emerged as a state’^^ .^ This caused a sharp reaction in Green circles:
...A.'ie Bce 7K laicH 1991 piK -  lie 1919 i  naniTb ne 1990-n. 
ToMy iiiA MepiionuMH npaiiopaMM An mo viecb TMcaay-viiii K.’iiniMiiHX 
Gi.ubUJOBMKiii. Toviy xenep. iiicrui snaAoMcma 3 iipauvioio ic r o p i i ,  
iioiiipM'i’M, mo 6e;i BOCn iie 5y.no 6 yicpainn, moacc .’iHuie t o A, xto 
nnaAcas. mo 5ea penojuoniï ra icepiiîiioï po.ni KFIPC iie 6y.no 6 
Tnxoro oiceaiiy. Miciimi i  Micra XnTOMnpa. Iftonpanvia. ovmoro 
TOMuo ne 5y.no 5; Hopiio5u.mi. Tate mo y cnonax toiî. IVloposa e 
npamia: TAKA AepTKannicm, aica 5y.na na nacin flocTumena-
Kai anoBM'ia-IRepGniibKOi o i  irri.sM.nacn n an'OMiiiA Tpareviii. Ben
3nepiieiimi. signed 2.9.1991.
3e/ieiiHM cuir, no. 19-20, 1991, c. 3.
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The Relationship to Russia and the CIS
PZUs attitude towards Russia w as very much determined by the country's attempt at forging a 
tight relationship between the former Sov iet republics through the CIS and also by Russia's claim  
to be the successor to the Sov iet Union thus being entitled to m ilitary installations in other 
republics as well as to property abroad and hard-currency deposits. Y et another factor 
com plicating the relationship between Ukraine and Russia were cla im s by som e Russian members 
o f  parliament to the effect that the Crimea w as Russian territory and that Ukraine w as not really a 
separate country but an integral part o f  Russia; M alorossiia (L ittle Russia).
For PZU, h ighly sceptical to any attempts at reviving the Sov iet Un ion, m oves to replace the 
U SSR  w ith the CIS caused concern. When the issue o f  sign ing the CIS-treaty cam e up in the
" 4 /
beginn ing o f  D ecem ber 1993, PZU  urged the Ukrainian President not to sign the treaty on the 
grounds that sign ing it would institutionalise the CIS and turn it into som ething more than a co ­
ordinating body between independent republics:
3 liHiiiHvi piiîiieM iAi.ie/Kuocri. lie  oo'eicmBiio îiiAcn.inri, iKrinnii 
npnxn.ibiiMKiB KOiujieiiepauii cepevi n.ieiiiiî CHA"f
Further, regardless o f  the contents o f  the CIS treaty, sign ing this treaty would take the
C i i i B A p y T K U O C ' i ' i  (J i i O B \ -  B K i c i ' b  -  c T | ) y K T . y p o ] i a i i > '  o j ) i a i i i ; 3 a i ( i i { )  Li 
B n m u v i  p i B i i C M  n o B ' i m i i i i o c T i  ï i  y s a c n i n K i B ' ’ ' ' ,
One year had passed since the referendum on 1 Decem ber 1991 in wh ich the majority o f  the 
electorate supported Ukrainian independence and PZU  claim ed that the lack o f  a conceptual basis 
for Ukrainian dom estic and foreign policy had discredited the very idea o f  Ukrainian 
independence. The CIS had had a stab ilising effect during state build ing in the former Sov iet 
republics, but Ukraine and any other republic that might sign the treaty would in actual fact be 
giving up their right to self-determination to the CIS thus destroying any prospective for 
develop ing their national econom ies and leav ing them with less influence in international politics.
It would be better for the republics, in the v iew  o f  the Greens, to build bilateral links between  
them and co-ordinate the introduction o f  structural changes in the national econom ies, rather than 
institutionalise the CIS, wh ich in terms o f  the econom y would make the conservation o f  Sov iet 
econom ic structures more likely. These structures were dom inated by the M ilitary-Industrial 
C om plex, used natural resources very inefficien tly with outdated technolog ies and linked the 
republics to one another. N on e o f  the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, would be able 
to retain parity with Russia in a tight, inter-state alliance. The CIS w as already to som e extent 
blocking Ukraine's international potential and signing the statute would further reduce the 
country's significance.
From a peace point o f  view , joining the CIS on a permanent basis would increase the likelihood  
o f  Ukraine getting pulled into global and regional conflicts as it w ould transform the CIS into a
confederal state not unlike that o f  the former Soviet Union. Ukraine had no reason to jo in  the CIS 
as
iipoc-i’o p o i i i i ix  yroA  ra y ia c r io  a juii.ihuocn ic i iy io a n x  
viiTKiiapoAHHx op i’a i!i:jan iM '^ U
Sneuuewifi O B Y  a o  iiDesMvieuTa h v d b a v  YicDainH. 7.12.92. 
KoMeiiTüi) AO saiiBM FI3Y bI a 7 rnvvimi 1992 poKV (n.d.).
Î■'.yr
ho lie vuu TUKUX eKoiioMiaiiHx i  iio.iirmiBMX iiepeBar mm iiaAGaiii., 
BIO lie V10IVIH 5  5.YTH lîaBeBiieaeiii a . u i  Y icp a iiin  cyMoio
Ibid.
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The Green Party's activities to prevent Ukraine from sign ing the CIS treaty continued into 1993. 
In a com m ent to the January 1993 m eeting in M insk, PZU  described the m eeting as the 
'continuation o f  the process o f  seperating the republics o f  the former U SSR in a c iv ilised  
nianner’^ *^'. To add weight to its position, PZU  jo ined forces with other political parties and 
m ovem ents includ ing KUN  (Congress o f  Ukrainian N ationalists), w hose activities the Green Party 
remained highly sceptical o f  and in som e cases even condem ned. In an open letter to the 
Ukrainian President signed by representatives o f  PZU, KUN, DPU  and Ukrainian
membership in the CIS was strongly opposed on the ground that
CHA Tpai(a|)0[)viy£Ti,C}[ n .Bauioiyriie ekoiroviiB iie  ciiiisTO B apncm o. ukc 
B iiejia.ieicoMy ManGyTBbOMy ocraroMBo 0(|)0p\iHTbC}i bk Eapo- 
ABiHCbKe EC 3. BCKpaBMM BO.liTH'iBHVI 3a5apB. ICBBB.vf’U
Ukraine, they argued, had to make a choice; it could either becom e one o f  the founders o f  
such a union, as it had been in 1922, or it could seek integration with countries in Eastern Europe 
and som etim e in the future becom e part o f  a united Europe.
With regard to the division o f  Soviet assets between the former Soviet republics, the Greens 
were highly sceptical o f  R ussia’s position on the issue. Declaring itself the successor to the USSR, 
Russia lay claim  to all Soviet property abroad and to the hard-currency assets o f  U SSR  in return 
for taking on the U S S R ’s foreign debts. PZU  held the v iew  that property and assets, in the sam e 
w ay as the Soviet debt, ought to be divided proportionally between the former Soviet republics. 
A s the value o f  Ukraine’s share o f  the property and assets (16.7% ) would probably exceed  that o f  
the debts (16.5 billion US dollar), provided that assets were properly invested, they could grow  
and thus cover the foreign debts'^^ .^ As an independent country, Ukraine, like Russia, needed  
property abroad to house its em bassies and consulates.
During 1993 and 1994 PZU  in many ways becam e a watchdog on issues related to the status 
and the future o f  the CIS. A ny attempt at w idening its powers and more actively  involve Ukraine 
in its activities were ardently opposed by the Green Party on the grounds that this would not only  
infringe on the country’s sovereignty but also ultim ately limit the freedom o f  its citizens. Political 
freedom , dem ocracy and human rights are as important to the Ukrainian Greens as to Greens 
elsew here - perhaps more so as such freedoms and rights can more easily  be infringed in countries
236 y t -1, 21.01.93 YTH 16:00,21:00.
Y K p n ïn c h K i uiCTM, 5.9.1990, c. 1.
No. 0-7, 24.8.1993 p. rinec-De.qi3 i b o a g  un r a B B B  i b j o  n o : 3 B O V i i . B  M a H u a  ra a i c r u B i B  CPCP. Foreign 
experts estimated Soviet property and assets abroad at some 150 billion US dollars. Ukraine’s share of 
this (16.5%) would thus be worth 24.75 billion US dollars - i.e. 8.25 billion US dollars more than the 
debts.
5 5 1
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Iwhich are in transition from one political system  to another. P Z U s  com m itm ent extended beyond y/ythe territory o f  Ukraine. Thus, during the war in Georgia, PZU  issued a statement urging TV
‘democratic forces’ in Ukraine to show solidarity with the Georgian republic, which was ‘forced to
Swithstand expansion ist pressure (read Russian expansion)’. The slogan ‘For Our and Your
Ukraine as an Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Military State
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Freedom ’ had again becom e real and in October 1993 PZU  initiated a m oney collection  
cam paign for the victim s o f  the war in Georgia^''^. Further, the Ukrainian Greens encouraged  
Ukrainian authorities to take actively part in find ing a peaceful solution to the conflict in 
Pridnistrovie (M oldova).
PZ6/aIso opposed Ukrainian involvem ent in foreign wars. Thus, in the very beginn ing o f  the 
G u lf War in 1990, the party issued a statement expressing concern w ith attempts by ‘chauv in ist’ 
forces in the U SSR  to set up units o f  volunteers to fight on the Iraqi side during the war. The party 
w as also worried that due to the Friendship Treaty between the U SSR and Iraq, Ukrainian sold iers 
might be sent to the G ulf to fight and comm itted itself to do everything it could to prevent this 
from happening^"". 1
Î
'I
A s seen above PZU  at an early stage declared itse lf an anti-m ilitaristic party. A t the Second |
Congress in Ternopil a proposition was passed that the Ukrainian Carpathes be dem ilitarised. The 
Carpathes were not only a particularly valuable area for recreation but w as also a m ilitary and
■strategic fbrpost, ‘useful not only for Eastern troops but also for the W est in case o f  w ar’. The
presence o f  troops in the region was ‘firstly a m ilitary threat to the Ukrainian dem ocracy and C
secondly, caused susp icion from the point o f  v iew  o f  Poland, C zechoslovak ia, Hungary and other
neighbouring states’. Bearing this in m ind, PZ6/recom m ended that the authorities stop deploy ing y
m ilitary units in the region and that troops already deployed be pulled out o f  the area..................The in itiative group to setting up PZU  declared that as an anti-m ilitaristic party PZU  w as y
com m itted to elim inating nuclear-, chem ical- and b iological weapons as these were amoral and ir
destructive. Further, the party would seek to d issolve military blocks and rem ove all forms o f
242m ilitarism from public life (education and upbringing) . Although the party members were :f
pacifists, they acknowledged that the tim e had not yet com e for com plete disarmament and yy:d issolving the army. Rather than having a conscript army PZU  proposed to create a sm aller, y
3aiina FIBY. no. 11-09, 30.9.1993.
3nepiieiiini vio rpoMaiuiii YKpainri. 12.10.93. y
P e 3 0 .a io u ia  K o iK b e p e i i i t i l  F13Y. mo niJiGv.riach 20 ciam i 1990 n. a m. KHsni. luoiio n o v i iu  n 
FleDCbiciH 3aToui.K-3 22:30 7.9.1991, transcribed in USSR Today, 8.9.1991, no. 763, p. 64.
stream-lined professional army. The army, KGB and the Ministry o f  the Interior furthermore 
should be made subordinate to the parliament to make them more controllable^'^'^. The presence o f  
a Ukrainian army w as acceptable to the Greens as such an army would pose no threat to any other 
state since Ukraine had no territorial pretensions towards any o f  its neighbouring states. A
national Ukrainian army would thus only serve the purpose o f  defend ing Ukraine from potential
2 4 4aggressors .
O fficial plans to increase the size o f  the Ukrainian army by the beginn ing o f  1995 did 
therefore not go down w ell w ith the Greens:
ApviiJ! iieoB xiiiiia  x p a i i in . iipore K pa iiia iie v i o t k c  iiav ia.ii 
aa.iMiiiaTMCii jiovia'i'Ko.vi vio a p v i i i .  n3y...iipovioiî7i(ye oBcroioiiaTM
iv ie io  A e M i . iiT a p n sa u iï  cyciii.ibCT iia, mo oaiia'iaE ycy iieiim i 
BiHci.KOBHX ad o  BOEiiisoBaiiHx CK.iajinniciB 13 rnx ajiep i  
crpyicryp, mo lie iiomi 'a a i i l  6e3iiocepe;im=o oBopoiioio, KoiiBepoiio 
5 i .  11,11101 aac i’HiiH iiiimpnEMCTiJ BFIK, ckopoBeiimi BBpon iinx U u.i vio 
plBim  oB o p o m io i viocraTiiocTi^^’'^  i;i iioeTaniiMM iiepexoAovi vio 
ix iib o ro  (j)yiiKiiioiiyBam ifi iia iipo(|)eciH iinx :îacaviax, romo'''".
W ith regard to nuclear weapons stored on Ukrainian territory, PZU  was in favour o f  
w ithdraw ing these and having them destroyed. This was justified in the fo llow ing way: w ith the 
collapse o f  the U SSR  and the political changes that had taken place in Eastern Europe the 
polarisation and confrontation between the East and W est which had justified the deploym ent o f  
nuclear weapons in the first place, had disappeared. This had paved the w ay for stab ilising  
relations between the two and also for negotiations regarding the rem oval and destruction o f  these  
w eapons. This v iew  was supported by Greens in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia. By  
rem ov ing nuclear weapons from Ukrainian so il and by making no cla im s on these arms Ukraine 
would reduce the likelihood o f  a confrontation w ith any other country. M oreover, being in 
possession o f  these weapons in the first place did not pose any real threat towards any potential 
aggressor as the threat o f  total destruction was the same on the other side. B esides, should a 
conflict break out between Ukraine and a neighbouring country the conflict would be likely  to 
spread, thus destab ilising the political situation on the entire European continent. Ukraine w as as a 
matter o f  fact due to its large number o f  nuclear power stations and its high population density not 
w ell suited even for conventional weapons, not to mention nuclear arms. The Greens saw  
Ukra ine’s future outside any m ilitary block as a neutral country. The size o f  the army should be
rfpMKüjmiTc.hKii npnnm, 17.3.1990 (n.p.). 
''*‘*3aiiBa 113Y (n.d.L
The t e r m  ' p o s y x m a  A o c r a T i i i c r i f  w a s  a l s o  u s e d  ( s e e  for i n s t a n c e  Kononov i n  F o.ioc YspaïiiH, 6.2.1993, 
c. 4).246 riD ec-n e .B i3 . n o . 2 6 - 1 1 ,2 1 .1 1 .9 3 .
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set with defensive purposes in mind - i.e. just big enough to be able to defend the country in case 
o f  war. Join ing a com m on defence system with the other former Sov iet republics would be a
m istake as this would open for outside pressure and interference in Ukrainian internal affairs in the
The Ukrainian Greens w elcom ed the initiative to transport Ukrainian nuclear weapons to 
Russia for d ismantling, justifying their v iew  as follow s:
Mn BiTasMO BesupeueAen'my b CBiroBin 1 crop i f  in iu ia m B y  
i'ivpaïiicBKUï Aef)7kaBH -  BiJivioBy b I a  juiepiioi sGpol -  (jiaKT. mo 
BaKapGyE'iTOB b k  ii|iHK,iaA a . i b  iiaciiAyBamm na m.iBxy iioBBoro 
po:«5po£BiiB Kpainavi. mo x rrw io T h C B  c b o ï m h  AeviOKpaTHUiinvm 
iiic'i'MTyniBMH; b k  iipriK.iaA Aodpoi BO.ii. mo c b I a b h t b  npo 
BlAcx'TiiicTb y Mo.ioiioi AepA(aBM GyAb-BKHX Mi.ii'rapncTChKnx 
aviGlJilM.
There were also more practical and environmental reasons for g iving up the Ukrainian 
nuclear weapons. In an open letter to Verkhovna Rada, PZU  urged the deputies not to reconsider 
Ukra ine’s com m itm ent to a nuclear-free status^''! arguing that if  Ukraine remained m ilitarised, the 
country would inevitably be pulled into m ilitary-political alliances and allow ing the M ilitary- 
Industrial C om plex to control the shaping o f  Ukrainian soc iety. B y preserving the country’s 
nuclear capab ility and expanding nuclear power, Ukraine would put itse lf in a position where it 
could be put under pressure from other countries and also putting the environm ent and the 
country’s social programmes at risk. The presence o f  nuclear installations - includ ing w eapons - 
posed a real hazard to the environment and given the costs o f  m aintain ing and develop ing these
249installations, social programmes m ight be abandoned as a result . Furthermore, Ukraine could, 
in the v iew  o f  PZU, not sustain its own nuclear weapons as it had no fac ilities for the production o f  
such w eapons, no testing facilities and also suffered from a lack o f  storage fac ilities. A s a
3aBB.ieiiHe IJanTHM 3e.ienbix yKuannbi KacaiomeecB oGonoiinbix b o u d q c o b .  Khcb. 4.9.1991 r. This 
document is handwritten.
This possibility was brought up by the pro-nuclear lobby shortly after Ukraine declared itself independent 
in 1991 due to problems with obtaining oil and gas from Russia. Russia imediately after the collapse o f 
the USSR introduced world prices on fuel and as Ukraine did not have the hard currency by which to 
pay, supplies were frequently interrupted in 1991 and 1992. This factor, com bined with U kraine’s 
dependence on Russia for fuel, led many members o f  parliament to revise their stand on nuclear power, 
not excluding the possibility o f lifting the m oratorium on expansion o f  nuclear pow er in Ukraine they 
had themselves introduced in September 1990. The Ukrainian Green Party formally protested against 
plans to restart construction o f conserved nuclear reactors following talks between the Ukrainian 
president and those ministries and departments in charge o f the country’s nuclear power installations in 
m id-1992 (for details, see yKpuiucbKii jiymKa, 16.7.1992, c. 4). 
yp=p 25.12.92 17:00 T o A u n a  niic”. transcribed in Ukraine Today, Ukrainian M edia Digest,
prerequisite for maintaining its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine would have no option but to seek closer  
ties with Russia and this was not desirable g iven the present political situation"'^.
H old ing the v iew  that Ukraine’s nuclear weapons did not provide the country with added 
security but rather proved a heavy burden on its finances, the Green Party w elcom ed talks 
regarding their removal from Ukrainian territory and destruction in Russia follow ing a 
consultative m eeting in K iev between the Ukrainian and American presidents on 12 January 1994. 
In addition to seeking som e material com pensation for the withdrawal o f  these weapons the 
Greens urged that security guarantees be requested from Russia and the United States. Such 
guarantees might include the follow ing;
nocraiJMTM nepevi O O H  i in T a ii in i npo i io c r i i ie  a le i ic rn o  5 e .i 'i iv ie p n o i 
y ^ p a ï i iH .  HK n e p n to ï  ii c u i r i  ;iep/Kami, luo iîivi\ioii.ni£Ti,c;ii n i a  
s iaep iio l :35poi is P a v m  b e s n e K w  O O H  i s  i ia G y rr im  iieio 
iiiviiloiiiviiinx IiQisilonavKeiiiV^ ‘.
Furthermore, the dem ilitarisation should include the Black Sea Fleet:
F I3y  isisaTicaE iipniinM iioiso butk.mhboio yviOBoio iiA ep iioro ixm G p oE iiiu i 
p o isn ov iia  HopiioM opcBKoro ( f i o r y  i:s iiepeviHc.BOKaniio 
iiiiiiio p iu iK o n a im x  P o c i l  B in a ico B H x  Macrmi :sa .v iexci y ic p a i i iH . B  
T e n e p iiiiiib O M .v  c r a n i  Gasa MM(I) îiB.aas coG o io  ( p o p n o c r  c y c l A i i o l  
ip ie p iio i  naAAepTKauM i  ;sa iieniiHX n o .i iT m i iin x  yvioB movkc 
i ie p e T B o p m ’MCH na iL iaiuiapvi :so B n iin n b o i e K c n a n c i i .
N o foreign military troops should be allowed on Ukrainian territory and this issue ought, in the 
opinion o f  the Greens, to be included in the three-country talks in Moscow^^^. This w as in line 
with a decision made by PZU  earlier, to the effect that all military units on Ukrainian territory be 
subordinated to Verkhovna Rada and that all military installations be made Ukrainian property^^^.
The Black Sea Fleet was the source o f  considerable pollution o f  the Black Sea and o f  the 
territory on which its bases were located. Em issions o f  oil products and o f  untreated water from 
the industry was polluting nature reserves. The storage o f  warheads were also causing problems 
and as PZU  and Zelenyi Svit had com e to experience, it was practically im possible to obtain 
accurate information from the fleet itse lf as it was under the jurisdiction o f  the army, which was 
particularly secretive with regard to such information. Pollution from radar stations were having a
----------------------------------------BiAKpnTHH .mcr no.iiTHBiioi PajLH ri3y Jio BenxoBiioi Pavm 1 rpoMajimi yicnaynu inovio inrmrib y250
H j ie p iio r o  p o 33G p o £1B ü i . m  K h ï b .  1 4 . 3 . 1 9 9 2  p.
Undated address to  Verkhovna Rada signed by Kononov and Kurykin. 
3 a i iB a  n o . i i i  rpavm f lB Y  no. 2 / 1 4 .  1 3  c i q i u i  1 9 9 4  p.
K-3, 22:30, 7.9.1991 transcribed in USSR Today, 8.9.1991, no. 763, p. 64.
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colossal negative effect on people’s health. The Black Sea Fleet Command must im m ed iately  
change its attitude towards pollution and environmental problems and take part in the ecological 
rehabilitation o f  the Black Sea area (Prichernomorie). Accord ing to the Greens it would cost an 
estim ated 17 b illion dollars to so lve problems caused by the military. In 3-5 years tim e it might be 
too late, regardless o f  the size o f  financial input, to successfully  address this problem^^^.
Once it becam e known that Ukraine would be compensated for its nuclear weapons with 
nuclear fuel for its nuclear reactors, PZU  im m ed iately condem ned this m ove as it would be 
detrimental to reducing the number o f  nuclear stations on Ukrainian so il. The Greens favoured a 
restructuring o f  the fuel-energy com plex and as part o f  such a restructuring Chernobyl ought to be 
closed down during the current year^^^.
An important elem ent in P Z U s  policy o f  disarmament was the establishm ent o f  nuclear-free 
zones^^'^ - as a matter o f  fact it was a priority issue for the party. In an article on PZU  and nuclear- 
free zones, Andrii Dem ydenko pointed out that it would not be possible to transform the entire 
country to a nuclear-free zone straight away. Establishing local nuclear-free zones, though, would  
be a step in this direction and the K iev region had the best potential for becom ing nuclear-free. 
The Greens gathered more than 250,000 signatures^^^ in support for turning K iev into a nuclear- 
free zone in the city alone and through P Z U s  three deputies in K ievrada, V italii K ononov, Orest 
M elnykov and lurii Sam iilenko, the idea o f  K iev as a nuclear-free zone w as successfu lly  promoted 
and at a session on 13 October 1992 Kievrada declared K iev a nuclear-free zone^^^, thus creating a 
legal base for rem ov ing all nuclear objects, with the exception o f  rad ioactive isotopes used in 
m ed icine, from the city ’s boundaries^^^. Accord ing to information gathered by a work ing  
com m ission set up by Kievrada to chart nuclear installations in K iev, there were 240 enterprises 
sorting under the Military-Industrial Com plex, that used radioactive isotopes in their production. 
What was more, analyses had shown that the c ity ’s waste tips were contam inated w ith tritium  
exceed ing perm issible levels by 2,5 times^^°. In addition, PZU  also initiated a jo in t Ukrainian-
IÙiïBC,bKHfi BiO!HK\ 31.5.1994, c. 1.
f l n e c - n e . i i s  vio i i iA iiH c a i i in i  r p H c r o n o n n o ï .  ; i o \ i o i c i e n o c r i  n n o  . t i K B i A a u i i o  i u i e p i i o ï  s G n o i  li 
y p ic a liii . No. 3/1. 19 ciBiui 1994 p.
Zelenyi Svit and PZU became members o f the M ovement o f Local Governments for N uclear-Free Zones 
in 1990, when Demydenko attended its fifth international conference in Glasgow. The movement, 
which has been given status as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) by the United N ations was set 
up in 1984, in M anchester and em erged out o f the movement o f local governments. A t the Glasgow 
conference U kraine’s efforts to establish itself as a neutral and nuclear-free country were w elcom ed by 
those present.
riporoKQ.i No. 001. BaciAamiii lipeAcraBnuKin p e rio n iB  11333 .vi. Kiilic iri ;i, 23.11.93 p.
147 deputies voted in favour, 1 voted against and 1 abstained. Source; npec-pe.a l3  O a p 'r i i  3e.iieiiux 
ykpalim I BOBO uporo.iomeinni Ku&Ba 5e3 ' imepiioio .joiioio. 23.10.92 p.
'^ " y P - l  23.10.92, 17:00, ToAMim niiU
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regulation of the safety and administration o f the nuclear industry, passed by Verkhovna Rada and
, 264country
y p -i, 25.10.92 11:00, "Hohmhh”.
Yica.) 0 iieoT. iOTKHbix Mepax no paBBHTHio a roMiiou aiienreTMKM m corvummo luiepiio-TO imuBorQ  
KOMiPieKai 13 Yicpauiie. no. 64/94 o f 23.2.1994.
Statement o f the Ukrainian Green Party’s Political Council on K ravchuk’s edict on nuclear power.
Statement undated.
K'MencKMH neavpfK, 30.3.1994, c. 4.
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American conference in Kiev and Odessa with the participation of anti-nuclear and peace
movements from Chicago and Baltimore. Deputies from local parliaments in various Ukrainian
cities were also invited to attend^*''.
Finally, f  ZD launched the idea of a nuclear-free Black Sea. This initiative coincided with the
worsening of Russian-Ukrainian relations over the Black Sea Fleet. The Central Co-ordinating
Council passed a resolution arguing that while Ukraine had a right to its own defence (army),
including a fleet, the militarisation of Russia could not but cause worry as Russia had no intention
of reducing its number of tactical nuclear weapons. Rather than becoming an area of conflict, the
.Black Sea should be turned into a zone of peace, free from nuclear weapons. To achieve this aim,
PZU  urged the Black Sea countries to unite efforts.
The moratorium on nuclear power was lifted by the Ukrainian parliament in the autumn of
1993. In February 1994 President Kravchuk issued a secret edict^^^ allowing for the completion
and construction of at least six nuclear reactors over the coming few years. Furthermore, the edict
paved the way for the creation of a full nuclear cycle - i.e. the production of fuel and long-term
storage of nuclear waste. The Greens sharply criticised this edict, arguing that it would facilitate
.the impoverisation of the Ukrainian people and fuel hyperinflation as electricity prices would be 
correlated in advance. What was more, Derzhkomatom would be ready to export up to 20% of the 
electricity generated at the country’s nuclear power stations in order to cover the hard-currency 
needs of the industry and of establishing a full nuclear cycle. As Ukraine depended on Russia for 
nuclear fuel supplies, the country’s dependence on Russia would increase rather than decrease. 
Expanding nuclear power in Ukraine would furthermore gravely complicate the social and 
economic situation of the country as well as pose a danger to the country’s natural environment 
and people’s healtll^^.
There was also a legal case for opposing the edict as it contradicted the concept of state
%
also the laws ‘on the protection of nature’, ‘on information’ and ‘on the protection of the rights of
.the consumer’. The Green Party repeated earlier demands for the rehabilitation o f traditional
sources of energy, energy saving measures and the modernisation of thermal power plants in the
265
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Democracy and Human Rights
The Ukrainian Green Party had an ambivalent attitude towards the authorities: on the one hand, as
y;.,
will be seen below, it was highly critical of official policies, whereas on the other, it was i t
represented in the Ukrainian government through lurii Shcherbak and in official political and
,economic structures. Under the leadership of Vitalii Kononov, active dialogue was sought with 
President Leonid Kravchuk and also with representatives of the government. ’■ i
-  -f.i'At a meeting with Foreign Minister Zlenko in January 1993, Kononov praised Zlenko for his 
firm position on the issue of nuclear free status for Ukraine. Agreement was reached with regard y
to possible co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greens and Zlenko U
;promised his Ministry’s support in the organisation of an international green congress in Kiev (see U
section on International Greens)^^! In a similar manner, Kononov and Ivan Dziuba, Ukrainian 
Minister o f Culture, reached agreement regarding co-operation on a campaign labelled ‘Musicians 
against drugs and alcoholism’ in early 1993^^*'.
If-Kononov’s approach was to gain maximum Green influence on the political process. This y3i'::
could in his view only be achieved by maintaining close links with those making the political *
decisions, which was of particular importance to PZU diS it was not represented in parliament. It yj
'was also hoped that such an approach would expose PZU to the general public as a ‘serious’ y
political party and enhance the image of Kononov among the electorate. As pointed out above, 
Kononov was much less known throughout Ukraine than Shcherbak had been.
Such an approach was opposed by others, who feared that the party might compromise itself 
by forging too close links with the authorities. Some people, like Hlazovyi, held the view that A
PZU  should forever remain a party in opposition and avoid too close links with the authorities. U
Others thought Kononov was putting himself in a ridiculous position by forging close links with 
President Kravchuk. Although PZU  was ranked highly in public opinion polls, the party lacked ;|
the political weight and resources needed to exert real influence upon the president. Moreover, Fil-Kravchuk did not need the support of the Greens. Thus, in their view, all Kononov would achieve | |
by such an approach, would be to discredit the Greens in the eyes o f the electorate.
If one looks at the contents of various statements and press releases made by the Green Party y
on a number of issues, however, a majority of these are highly critical o f official policies. PZU  y-
was particularly wary of attempts at strengthening the powers of the executive at the expense of , yij 
the legislative and thus strongly opposed attempts at creating a strong presidency with extensive 
powers on the French model. In March 1993 the Ukrainian Cabinet o f Ministers was preparing a | '
BeHipimfi Khïb, 26.1.1993, c. 1.
ÂkiTi, 10.3.1993, c. 1.
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Law on Presidential Representatives and a Resolution on Local State Administration. PZU  in two
Instead, the Greens favoured the creation o f a system offering efficient counter-weight to 
what was perceived as a
268 (sofJoAci. 17.3.1992,0. 1.
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comments argued against this system on the following grounds:
flpejicraiiiiHK iipe:imieiiTa cy \iiiiia&  iv iio 'io iii  e.ie\ieiiTn 
iipeacrautiH iibK O l. BUKOiiaB'ioi. iipoK ypopr.i,K oi i  c.naoiioï d.ihah. 
floiT) poBiiopajiAœiiiia ii vieA^ax vi.vAxe iiinpoivux nonnoiia>iveiii, £ 
o5oiî ' 5I3K0HM\1M A.Ill BMiv'Cliailim UK OpPaiiaviH MiCiieilOI'O
aivioiipiiAyiianiiii. niK i  iiiAiipusvicTnaMH. rpovuiACbivnvîH :
o 5  ' £Aiiaii}i\iH i  OKpe.MWMM nx)\iaAaiiaviH...TaK .iiiaiie peijiopMyBaiiiiii 
AepAvaniioi B.iaAn viae 5y'ra 3yiiHneiie‘^^
T e iiA e i ii i iï  710 cocepeAAceiiiiii B.iaAn b ovinnx pvKax iii.iiixovi 
CTBopeiiiiii KOiicTM'ryniniioro Cyviy. BaiipoBajiAxeiiini iiocaA o f . ia a in x  
lyG ep iiaTop iB , v iep iii v i ic r  i  r o .i i i i  M icneBO i B.iayin, iiK i 
o5nparMMyTBca iipiiMH.M TaEXiiiHVi iTViGcyBaiiinivi.
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This position was not only motivated by a general commitment to democracy, but also out of 
concern for the environment. Any attempt at strengthening the powers of the executive were 
considered detrimental to the state of the environment. In the view of the Greens, the extensive 
powers of the command-administrative system had made this obvious to everyone. Thus,
Ha uan iy 7iyviKy. rpouajia iioaniiaErBcii 3 .itoAnnn, a jiepxcana 
iioMniiaETBCii 3 rpoviaAM. nop y iiie iina ubofo npniiuniiy Be;ie 3a c o 5 o io  
iinpynieiiiiii conia.'iBnoi, eicono.viiiinoi n eKo.aoiTaiioi piBiioBai n.
.Greens throughout Ukraine were encouraged not to take part in setting up the new administrative 
system as it contradicted P Z Ifs  programme and broke with the principle of division o f power 
between the legislative, executive and judicial. This would not only have negative effects in 
Ukraine itself, but might also discredit the country in the eyes of the international community. 
PZU  proposed that regional governors, mayors of cities and heads of local authorities be elected in 
direct and secret elections. It also urged that a constitutional court be created^^^.
Although lurii Shcherbak was Minister of the Environment in Fokin’s government from 
the summer of 1991 until the summer of 1992 this did not prevent PZU  from criticising the 
government for a lack of commitment to the environment. Such criticism was also directed
____________________________
daiiBa rio.BirMBUol Pavin f l a p r i l  3e.ienHx y im alim . 13.3.92 n.
m,
towards the Ukrainian parliament. In June 1992, for instance, a statement issued by the Political
.Council claimed that Verkhovna Rada had exhausted its legislative and state-building potential: a
‘reactionary majority’ supported the ‘anti-social’ and ‘anti-environmental’ policies o f Fokin’s
government directed towards the ‘transformation of Ukraine into an authoritarian state’. PZU  thus
.supported a referendum on the dissolving of Verkhovna Rada, including a question of the future of 
nuclear power in Ukraine .
LUo .iMiue 3 na.iaiicouaiiMH posijnroK i s  onopoio iia ^lenoicparnani 
iiicTHTy'i'H liHBe/ie YKpaxiiy iia rU iui nn.aiTmiiii la eicoiiOMitiHi
IIO B H U ii B CBiTOBOViy C IliB 'l’O B ap H C rB i^ ^ '.
In October 1992, Fokin stepped down as Ukrainian Prime Minister following wide
protests and a hunger strike by students in Kiev to have him removed. He was replaced by Leonid
Kuchma, who, in an effort to unite the various political currents, opened the door to the cabinet for
Ukrainian political parties and movements. Such an offer was also extended to PZU. In a
statement the Political Council PZU  saw it as an ‘act of goodwill’ that the Prime Minister was
ready to consult with the country’s political parties on the composition of the government.
.However, as Kuchma ‘belongs to the upper echelons of the ‘Military Industrial Complex’, this 
prevents the Greens from taking symbolically part in forming a new government’
Î
It did not take long from the government was formed until the Greens started voicing their
criticism of the new prime minister. Remarks by Kuchma to the effect that the economic
destabilisation of Ukraine were caused by the activities of political parties, were flatly refuted.
The parties’ political activities, on the contrary, were not the cause but the effect of the economic
destabilisation that was taking hold of Ukrainian society and the government’s failure to
adequately address the state of affairs. Besides, attempts at strengthening the executive at the
expense of the legislative powers posed ‘a threat to the future of the democratic process’. The
Greens were also dismayed to find that Kuchma in his speech to parliament failed to address
environmental issues. The link between the economy and the environment was simply ignored
and there was no mention of conversion of the Military Industrial Complex. However, PZU
.wished Kuchma’s government good luck in its attempts to solve Ukraine’s economic crisis, 
expressing the hope that
I
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3aîiBa rio.BiTHMiioi PaiiH flauT iï 3e.BenMX yimaliin, Pax io Yk-naïiia. 21:10. 25.6.92 trascribed in 
Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media News and Features Digest, compiled by the RFE/RL Research 
Institute Monitoring Unit, 25.6.1992, no. UF-255, p. 6.
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Economie Issues
The programme adopted by PZLPs Inaugural Congress in 1990 outlined the party’s stand on issues
such as the economy and social policies. Statements were, however, vague and no coherent plan
of action was provided. Throughout 1991 and 1992 the Green Party on a number of occasions
issued statements and resolutions regarding certain aspects of official economic policies. By
patching together these, a more coherent position on the economy appears.
.As seen above, a priority issue for the Greens was the dismantling of the economic, political
and administrative structures of the former Soviet Union. These structures not only restricted the
possibility of environmental control on the territory of each republic (in Ukraine, for instance,
95% of the industry was controlled by Moscow-based ministries and departments), but also
facilitated environmental pollution due to the lack of accountability on the part of the
.administrative apparatus. To avoid a situation similar to the one in Lithuania, which, after it
declared itself independent in 1990 was put under considerable economic pressure from Moscow
. . .to return to the Soviet fold, PZU  already in early 1991 urged that all Ukrainian industries be
272nationalised - i.e. declared property of Ukraine
PZU  had already in October 1990, at the First Party Congress, predicted that the most
important task in the sphere of the economy was to demonopolise and decentralise the economy 
.and then to privatise a large share o f it. The Ulcrainian economist Volodomyr Lanovyi (Ukraine’s
equivalent to Grigorii lavlinskii in Russia) in 1991 presented the Ukrainian government with a
.coherent programme of economic reform, including the passing of a law on the privatisation of
.  .state enterprises, a law on the privatisation of small state enterprises and on shares. The 
government’s failure to adopt the measures proposed by Lanovyi and its general failure to change 
its monetary policies were in the view of PZU  to blame for the high inflation and stagnation o f the 
country’s economy. On these grounds PZU  urged the Council of Ministers to elaborate a 
privatisation scheme for 1992, order local authorities to do the same for communal property and to 
privatise a considerable number of Ukrainian enterprises by the end of the year. The income 
generated by the privatisation scheme could then be put towards the introduction of a national 
currency in Ukraine^^^.
A major cause of the economic crisis, argued the Greens, was the fact that those people who 
were in charge prior to the collapse of the USSR remained in high positions, actively opposing any 
attempt to introduce required changes:
Peso-iiiouiH K o iK h e n e n n ii flapT ii 3e .i[e iiH x  yicnaiiiH s imTaiih iiauioiia.rii:iauii a c i x  iiHjinpHEMCi’G 
na T e P M T O D ii yicnaiiiH. 20.1.1991.
3a?iBa F13y inojio nmaiiL iinHuaTusauii AeDxcammx ni7iiii)H£Mcrn. ilo Benxoniiol Püah YimaïnM. 27.1.1992.
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1if the enterprises would be free to decide where and when to invest. Finally, regulations of
property and demonopolise state enterprises. Irregularities were observed in the privatisation
Ho.viv 3 e .a e i i i  Y icp a in H  ne 3ro7 in i 3 vpiuiOM. Document signed by two econom ist members o f PZU, S. 
M oskvin and V. Tymonin and undated.
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.An extensive critical assessment of official economic policies was provided by the
economists S. Moskvin and V. Tymonin, both active members of Kiev PZU. In their view
Ukraine had to choose between giving priority to the state over the individual or to the individual
over the state. National-democratic forces in the country favoured the former, favouring some
kind of state capitalism similar to Southeast Asia, Latin America, Israel and other countries. Such
a model offered higher living standards than state socialism, but as the experience of Sweden and
also Greece had shown, it sooner or later would trigger economic problems due to high public
.expenditures. State monopoly hindered economic competition and facilitated stagnation of the
economy. Another problem was caused by civil servants fulfilling the function of enterprise
managers. As they were not personally responsible for the enterprise, they would not seek
.maximum turn-over for the industries. Similarly, investment policies would be less efficient than
economic freedoms would reduce the size of the national income^^^.
The problem with the Ukrainian economy, argued the two economists, was that although the
government was in the process of reforming the economy, little or no attention was given to
structural reform. To the extent such reform was envisaged, it would not be conducted through the
mechanism of stock exchange, but rather through state investments and credits in and to big state-
run concerns, associations, corporations and state enterprises. The development o f Ukraine’s
heavy industry, energy sector, metallurgy, coal-, chemical- and petrochemical industries was 
.therefore given priority. As a result, suggestions had been made to lift the moratorium on the 
.construction of nuclear reactors in the country. Thus, concluded the authors, ‘the heavy and 
polluting structures of the economy should be reshaped in the future’^^ '^ .
Moskvin and Tymonin were also highly critical of the government’s attempts at privatising
This is a som ewhat black-and-white assessm ent o f  how the mixed econom y works. A lthough the 
Swedish economy is riddled with problem s at the moment, it still remains one o f the strongest 
economies in W estern Europe. The same can be said o f the N orw egian economy, which although a 
mixed economy, is am ong the strongest economies in the world. The negative aspects o f a state- 
regulated economy that M oskvin and Tymonin identify can be reduced by adopting a set o f  m easures to 
enhance personal responsibility at the adm inistrative level and to provide state enterprises w ith a 
num ber o f freedoms, such as the right to invest part o f their turn-over the way their leadership sees fit.
Ibid.. p. 3.
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process and the demonopolisation process simply did not work as the state retained the majority of 
shares in those enterprises that had so far been privatised. The state also continued to regulate the 
food market through only cosmetic reforms of the agricultural sector. As for foreign investments 
these were being hampered by a large number of regulations and control mechanisms that made 
foreign investors reluctant to put their money into Ukrainian ventures. Attempts at liberalising 
prices when the state had monopoly on production of industrial and agricultural goods simply 
made no sense in the view of the Greens, as it would not lead to increased production, but rather 
cause production to drop as prices would simply be increased. Finally, something had to be done 
about the country’s social policies. In 1992 it paid off for people to wait for the state to help 
instead of trusting one’s own initiative:
Coi iia.ibiiMH ; i a x i c r  :viiHCiiiO£Ti.cfi y  (|)0 |)\ii iiobhx rpoiuoBMx nn i i .iar.
Lje I? K in i i i  K iim iii  iie aaxnm aE  i iace.ieinn i .  a iie iiocH.ieiiini  
i i u F ' u r n i i ,  iiica o b ep ra eT b a i  i iporu  n a c e . i e i i in r ^ \
The market could only be introduced once certain rights and freedoms were installed. These 
included
1) The right to set up private companies and enterprises.
2) The right to earn and invest surplus according to one’s own judgem ent.
3) The right to own the land, buildings, means o f production, value papers and hard currency.
4) The right to choose production, amount o f  production and the appropriate technologies.
5) The right to enter contracts and form partnerships.
6) The right to fix prices.
In a condensed form PZU favoured the demonopolisation and decentralisation of the 
Ukrainian economy and the privatisation o f most of the country’s enterprises. The creation of a 
market economy was seen as a precondition for improving the state of the economy. Only an 
economy that accounted for the environment was, in the view of the Greens, financially viable and 
efficient. As a first step towards this goal PZU called for the following measures to be introduced:
1 ) Equal rights to different types o f  ownership.
2) Equal and free econom ic partners.
3) A m echanism to protect the poorest, children, youth, the elderly and invalids.
4) Agricultural reform: the creation o f national and regional agricultural program m es (the farmers, 
not the state m ust feed the people)^^®.
From what has been said above, one might get the impression that the Greens had turned into 
market liberalists, opposed to any kind of state regulation or control on the grounds that such
Ibid,, p. 4.
Ibid, p. 6.
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regulation was harmful to the environment. PZU  did, however, from the very beginning 
emphasise its commitment to the weak groups in society. In January 1991, for instance, a 
conference ‘on the protection of the life quality of the poor groups of the Ukrainian population’ 
was held. A resolution passed by this conference stated that the economic policies conducted by 
the authorities was impoverishing the people and reducing average living standards. Expressing 
its support of the Federation of Ukrainian Trade Unions, PZU  urged that prices on necessary items 
not be raised until a programme to protect the financially worse off had been elaborated. Should 
the government fail to do so, the Greens would claim the right to protect these people through 
political and other means as outlined in the party statute^^^. Thus, it is right to say that the Greens 
favoured a market economy with a ‘human face’ - i.e. with proper mechanisms in place to protect 
the poor and disadvantaged.
Ecological Issues
Apart from its opposition to nuclear power and committment to the introduction of nuclear free 
zones, PZU  - although claiming not to be an ‘ecological party’ (i.e. working on environmental 
issues only) has been involved in protecting nature reserves and forests and has also argued 
vehemently against the import of toxic waste from West European countries. Moreover, it has 
provided practical, financial and other support to Zelenyi SviVs Anti-Military Commission, which, 
over the past few years has revealed military sources o f pollution in Ukraine. Below I will take a 
brief look at some of these issues.
PZU  expressed concern with the future of the national parks and preserves from an early 
stage arguing that their existence was under threat following the transition towards a market 
economy. Ukraine’s 15 nature reserves and three national parks had come under heavy pressure 
from local authorities and economic departments, and there was clearly a need for streamlining the 
administration of all protected areas:
T a i c  v i i c u e i î i  p a n p a y m  S a x v a io T S  B i ; i i 6 p a ' r n  ' l a c r n i i y  y
IC ap r iaT C h K oro  sa iiO B iJ U iH K a , y  s a n o B i y a iu i c y  i l y i i a u c h K i  i i .a a B i i i  
r o c n o A a p io io ' i 'b  p u f i x o - i r o c n n  K pH .v icbK w n -  B H K o p H c r y n y e T b C H  h k  
v iic u e  B iA r ioM H iiK .y. A e ic i . ib K a  n o x c e x c  T p a iin .a o cM  b a c K a iiiH C b K O M y  
s a u o B i A i io M y  c r e n y .
To improve the situation, PZU  urged the government to take immediate action and to 
implement Verkhovna Rada's resolution of 16 February 1992, which had so far not been executed.
K o iK b e D e i iu i i i  i in o  . j a x n c r  f i K o c r i  a c h t t b  M a .r iQ 3 a6e3 iieaen H X  B en c rB  f ia c e .n e in in  y i c p a l i m .  2 0 . 1 . 1 9 9 1 .
I
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.Toxic waste is an issue that Greenpeace Ukraine has been working on for several years 
now. In late October 1993 Greenpeace issued a press release, stating that the ship ‘S.S. United 
States’ had been located eight miles off the Crimean coast. The ship would be dismantled in 
Sevastopol and Greenpeace argued against dismantling it on the grounds that it carried large 
amounts of cancerogenic asbestos, which would pose a threat to the health of the many thousand 
people living in the area. The very difficult ecological situation in the areas where the Black Sea 
Fleet was based might thus be further aggravated. PZU, reiterating Greenpeace's concern, argued 
that Ukraine was in the process of being turned into a waste bin for toxic and other dangerous 
materials from the industrialised countries in Western Europe and America. To prevent such a 
scenario the Green Party had proposed that a law banning the import o f toxic waste be passed by 
Verkhovna Rada. This initiative, however, like numerous other initiatives on the environment, 
were being ignored by the government, argued Kononov^^^.
npec-ne-'iis no. 24/18 ('10?'). 16.11.93.
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IA meeting in early November 1993 between Vitalii Kononov and Valerii Hubenko - the 
head of the State Committee on the Protection of Ukraine’s National Borders - proved more 
fruitful. The two agreed on the need to prevent toxic waste from other countries to be imported to 
Ukraine and agreed to exchange information on such matters. Kononov also thanked the 
Committee for having provided information on the ‘SS United States’ and strongly condemned the
practice of dumping toxic waste in Ukraine:
Pe.vioirr aMepMKaiici,Koro Kopad.ia iia Ceiiacrorio.abChKOMy peMoirriioMy 
■lanoAi B 250 pas in  Aeineiiine, iiixc b Cno.ayaennx lÜTaTax. to5to 
>KHTTM cepe/uibocraTMBiioro üMepHicaiimi iiiiiyeTiiC}] b 250 pasiB 
7iopoA{ae. n i x  y iiac. F 1 pica iipaBAaP’
Kononov also met with the leader of the Ukrainian Customs Committee, Eduard 
Miroshnychenko and the two agreed that there was a need to set up control measures to prevent 
toxic waste from entering Ukrainian territory. Although exchange of information between 
Western and Ukrainian environmental groups would make this task somewhat easier, it was a big 
problem that Ukraine lacked special equipment and sufficiently advanced lab facilities for this 
purpose^^^. Thus, unless the Ukrainian government and parliament would introduce measures to 
ban the imports of such waste and to create the sufficient legal and control basis for this purpose, 
the Greens could do little but try to track down the presence and origin of such waste in Ukraine.
-------------------------------------------
Bpec-pe.al3 No 22-10. 29.10.93. 
r i D e c - D e .a i : i  no. 23/10. 3.11.93.282 n x / 1 0 1^11 m
■A
npec—pejiis No. 39-02, 23.2.94. 
ononov, who by February 1993 
Ukrainian nuclear weapons, a c 
F 9.10C YKpnïiiM, 6.2.1993, c. 4, for details.
The issue continued to be among PZlTs priority issues also in 1994. Blaming the dismal state of 
affairs on inefficient environmental legislation, Kononov stated that the
bopoT ifia sa cTBopeuini n a v i iü i io ï  nepeiioiiH iiaviaraiiiniM sax iy im ix  
7 i i . iK in, KopHcryio'iHCb eKonoM iauo io c . i a d k i c n o  YKpa iiii i .
BHpiiuMTu CB0Ï e K o .io l'iM iii iip o 6 .iev iu “®'\
PZLPs position on a range o f environmental issues were either identical or very similar to
those of Zelenyi Svit, Greenpeace Ukraine and other environmental groups. However, whereas for 
.instance Zelenyi Svit at least in the first years of its existence conducted campaigns and organised 
various actions on these issues, PZU  in most cases issued statements and did not have enough 
political influence to push these issues through the decision-making process. Partly due to a 
shared commitment, partly to raise the profile of the party, PZU  on several occasions pulled
■ y v ; - ,
together with Zelenyi Svit, organising joint press conferences (e.g. campaign against presidential 
decree on the development of nuclear power in Ukraine, 1994), actions (anti-nuclear 
demonstrations in Kiev and Khmelnitskyi) or rendering assistance to Green activists. The latter 
was the case with Zelenyi Svit's Anti-Militaristic Commission, to which PZU  provided practical 
assistance in getting its findings published. A joint press conference was also organised in 
February 1994 to present and discuss the findings of the commission^^'*.
Following Shcherbak’s departure for Israel, a member o f RUKH, lurii Kostenko, was 
appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment. Relations between RUKH  and PZU  were, as 
seen above, not the best and some Greens were sceptical to Kostenko as he was not negative to 
nuclear power as such^^^. Others complained that as soon as Shcherbak left the ministry it became 
a lot more difficult for the Greens to work with it on certain issues. Whereas relations between the
Ministry of the Environment and Zelenyi Svit were good, much as a result of the association being 
lead by former RUKH  activists Korobko and Fedorinchyk, relations between PZU  and the 
Ministry were more complex. A letter from V. lankovskii (Odessa PZU) regarding the quality of 
the water in the Black Sea criticised Kostenko as whereas along the Russian coast water quality 
was stabilising, it was deteriorating along the Ukrainian coast. This, he argued, was very much a 
result of poor structures. What was needed was an overhaul allowing for more decisions to be
K had still to m eet Konstenko, argued that as Kostenko favoured retaining 
onflict between the party and the ministry was likely to occur. See
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made locally and for a more complex approach to environmental problems to be elaborated 
centrally. Kostenko, as the man in charge, ought in lankovskii's view to look into this issue"^ '^.
5.4.3 Placing PZU  on the Right-Left Continuum
Above 1 have outlined P Z U s  policies on ail these issues. Btlous' figures allow one to assess - 
taking the Green Party's policies into account - whether or not PZU  can be placed as a party 'to 
the left of the centre' and how we are to Interpret this with regard to the traditional ‘left-right’ 
classification scheme. Bilous' placement of the Green Party is somewhat inaccurate and where I 
do not agree, I have indicated with an arrow where 1 think the party ought to be located.
Fig. 5.1 Ukraine and CIS
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This figure was elaborated in 1993 and as can be seen above. PZU  has been placed in the 
lower upper left quadrangle. As seen in part 4.2, however. PZU  was against the signing of a new 
union treaty and favoured friendly links with the former Soviet states on a bilateral basis. The 
party also warned against the building of a super-national state similar to the USSR on the basis of 
CIS. Although in 1991. PZU  and other Ukrainian political parties that joined the Democratic 
Congress favoured some kind of cooperation between the former Soviet republics, this idea was
Letter No. 12-11. 24.12.1992 from V.L. lankovskii to l.I. Kostenko.
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abandoned shortly after the USSR collapsed, as the CIS was seen as Russian hegemony in 
disguise. Thus, it is probably more correct to place PZU  somewhere next to RUKH  on this issue.
As regards the issue of Ukraine's territorial structure, the position of PZU  has changed over 
the years. Initially, PZU  favoured a federal state with extensive rights for the regions, while 
opposing any attempt to break the unity o f the Ukrainian state. Zakarpatia's wish to secede from 
Ukraine on the grounds that its territories had traditionally never belonged to Ukraine, did not go 
down well with P Z U s  leadership and as relations between Russia and Ukraine soured, the party 
leadership abandoned the idea of a federal Ukraine on the grounds that this might have a 
stabilising effect on the country at a time when the country had to stand its ground against a much 
more powerful Russia. Greens from Ternopil, however, in 1994 revealed that they were still 
committed to a federal Ukraine, but that for political reasons this idea had to be temporarily put on 
ice. Thus. P Z U s  position should be closer to the left-right axis, i.e. somewhere between b) and v).
Fig. 5.2 The territorial structure o f Ukraine.
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As regards the issue of local self-determination and a strong vs. weaker presidency. Bilous’ 
placement o f PZU  is more successful. As seen above, PZU  opposed the introduction of a strong 
presidency and a strong executive based on the French system, favouring instead a parliamentary 
system alongside a president having more limited powers. When the institution of presidential 
representatives was introduced, the PZU  strongly objected on the grounds that these would limit
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the powers of local authorities. The Greens were also in favour of a special law regulating the 
relationship between the legislati\e. executive and judicial organs, rooted in a new Ukrainian 
constitution to be passed by a specially elected constitutional assembly. While not successful in 
this regard. PZU was firmly committed to decentralisation and political accountability.
Fig. 5.3 Degree o f Centralisation o f Ukrainian Political Structures
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Classifying PZU  according to its economic strategy is somewhat difficult as the party is 
vague on this point. The guiding principle of PZU  in the economic sphere is that ‘only that which 
is ecologically safe, is economically profitable'. Based on this, the Green Party favours a 
regulated market economy which provides social protection for the weaker groups in society 
(children, mothers, students, unemployed and pensioners), and with efficient environmental 
legislation to protect the environment. A centralised state-run economy of the Soviet type is 
considered more harmful to the environment than is the market. Hence, the economic strategy of 
PZU has much in common with that of social-democratic parties in Western Europe. A group of 
PZU  supporters working actively within Nova Uh^aina favour a more liberal-economic market 
approach, but with a strong commitment to the weak and to the environment. As regards 
economic relations with Russia. Shcherbak on several occasions stressed that while Ukraine was a 
European state for which it made more sense to have economic relations with the East European 
countries than for instance the Central Asian republics, he also acknowledged the close economic 
and political links the country had with Russia, arguing that it would be a political mistake and 
also economically destabilising to cut these. Thus, Ukraine could benefit more from friendly and
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stable relations with its neighbour than from discord and severing of economic links. While in 
favour of a socially oriented market economy, the Greens were strongly opposed to the Military- 
Industrial Complex on the grounds that it favoured continued militarisation of Ukrainian society 
and that it was one of the major polluters in Ukraine. Thus, PZU does not fit into any of the given 
categories. Placing the party somewhere closer to the 5’UPU probably better reflects the party's 
economic strategy.
Fig. 5.-I Economic Strategy'
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As seen above, PZU refers to itself as an anti-militarist party. Thus, it favours the removal of 
all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory and an army whose size reflects that of defence-
purposes. PZU is also opposed to Ukraine entering any military blocs or alliances. Thus, its y
Fplacement in Bilous' scheme correctly reflects the party's policy on this issue. U
Fig. 5.5 Militaiy-politicai Doctrine
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There is, however, one major problem with the approach used by Bilous: whereas PZU  refers 
to itself as a party ‘to the left of the centre’, it has also referred to itself as one o f the most radical 
parties in Ukraine in terms of its commitment to political change. Thus, classifying PZU  close to 
the centre of the ‘left-right’ continuum is somewhat misleading as concerns the party’s 
commitment to traditional democratic values such as a parliamentary rather than a presidential 
system and to individual liberties. This is a clear indication of the weaknesses with using a 
traditional ‘left-right’ continuum on the post-Soviet political context. Bearing this in mind, 
though, Sartori's diagram is a useful means by which to classify the Ukrainian political parties, 
correctly placing the various parties according to their stands on various political and economic 
issues.
5.5 Conclusion
From what has been written above, it is clear that PZU, like Zelenyi Svit, is in decline. Part o f the 
reason for this can be found in the close relationship the Green Party tried to forge with Zelenyi 
Svit. This proved damaging not only to the Movement, but also to the party, as all the conflicts 
within the Green Movement were time-consuming to its PZU-members. Moreover, the Ukrainian 
Green Party, like most Ukrainian political parties, is suffering financial problems. In addition, the 
party has found it difficult to establish local and regional party units in parts of Ukraine other than 
the West and in Kiev. Finally, the Green Party is finding it hard to mobilise the general public in
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support of its policies due to political apathy among the general population. To some extent, 
however, the lack of support for the Green Party reflects the weaknesses of the party itself. A lack 
of concepts and concrete programs is making it difficult to distinguish PZU  from other political 
parties. The absence of visions and numerous press-releases in response to this or that event in 
Ukraine is turning the party into an ‘office-party’ existing on the newspaper pages only. This 
would maybe have been acceptable had the leadership of the party been well-known. However, 
whereas most Ukrainians were familiar with lurii Shcherbak, very few people - even in Kiev - 
know who Kononov and his deputy leaders are. Personalities are very important in Ukrainian 
politics - maybe even more so than policies. Thus, the Green Party needs either to proliferate its 
‘old’ leadership better, or to attract new, charismatic leaders who can do this for it. Neither seem 
likely to happen in the immediate future and P Z U s  role in Ukrainian politics thus appears 
uncertain.
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6 The Campaign to S ave the South Bug River (I)
I
«
. f t -
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6.0 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have analysed the Ukrainian Green Movement and the Green Party in 
general. I will now proceed to conduct a case study, so as to examine how the ‘Greens’ interact 
with other political actors at various administrative levels and to assess their ‘efficacy’. The case 
chosen for this chapter is the struggle conducted by the Green Movement of Nikolaev oblast in 
South Ukraine against the expansion of the South U krainian Energy Complex (SU EK)^ - so as 
to save the South Bug river from destruction.
As seen in Chapter Two, Ukraine is suffering from a cocktail of dangerous pollutants, most of 
which have been opposed energetically by Greens throughout the country. The priority issue of 
the Green Movement, and also of the Green Party, however, has been the struggle against the 
expansion o f existing and the construction of new nuclear power stations. Serhii Kurykin, the 
deputy leader of the Green Party, has gone so far as to characterise the Ukrainian Green 
Movement as primarily an anti-nuclear movement, the aim of which is to improve safety at 
existing nuclear stations and to prevent new nuclear reactors from being constructed in Ukraine in 
general. This view has been contested by local activists in areas o f severe industrial pollution 
especially in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk in the East of Ukraine. However, it is the struggle 
against nuclear power that has given the Ukrainian Green Movement the most publicity and been 
considered its greatest achievement. It is therefore reasonable, for a case study, to focus on one o f 
the Ukrainian nuclear power stations and the opposition with which it was faced.
From a political point of view it also makes sense to undertake a case study of a nuclear
.power station, as all nuclear power stations in the former USSR operated under the auspices o f all- 
union ministries and departments. This allows us to study not only the interaction between Greens 
and political authorities at the local, oblast and republican level, but also at the Soviet (Union) 
level. Moreover, the advantage of examining the struggle against expanding the SU EK is that this 
struggle started during the Soviet period and has still not been fought to the end, thus providing us
-€
-------------------------------------------
' In Ukrainian the name of the South Bug river is Pivdennii Buh (in Russian: luzhnyi Bug). Thus, the South 
Ukrainian Energy Complex becomes Pivdennoukrainskii (luzhnoulcrainskii) energokompleks (PU 
EK/îuU EK). As previous works addressing this issue and published in the West (See Marples - 1991) 
refer to the river as South Bug, I have chosen to do the same to avoid confusion. In the quotes, 
however, the Russian and Ukrainian names are being used.
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with an opportunity to assess the performance and the strategy of the Greens during a period of 
transition and, eventually, of Ukrainian independence.
6.1 Background
6.1.1 The South Ukrainian Energy Complex (SU EK)
A resolution ‘On the Choice of Site for the Construction of an Energy Complex in the South of 
Ukraine’ issued by the Ukrainian CPU Central Committee and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers 
on 2 December 1971 announced that on the recommendation of the USSR Ministry o f Energy and 
of a special commission created by resolution No. 347 on 3 May, 1969, it had been decided to 
build an energy complex with a capacity of 5,420,000 kW on the bank on the South Bug river by 
the village of Konstantinovka in the Arbuzinka region o f Nikolaev oblast. The complex would 
consist of a nuclear power station equipped with four reactors of one million kW each, the Tashlyk 
hydro-electric power station (370,000 kW) and the Konstantinov hydro-atomic power station 
(1,050,000 kW f.
Construction of the SU EK started in April 1976  ^ and the First Stage, endorsed by the USSR 
Council of Ministers in 1981, consisting o f a nuclear power station (two water-water power 
reactors - VVER-1000 with a capacity of one million kW each and an adjacent cooling pond - 
the Tashlyk reservoir^ - was completed by January 1985. A town for personnel working at the SU 
EK - luzhnoukrainsk^ - was constructed some 1,8 km away from the nuclear power station. Its 
population is currently estimated at 40,000. The Second Stage, against which the Green 
Movement protested, was elaborated in 1985 with the consent of Gosplan (the USSR State 
Planning Committee) and Gosstroi (the USSR Construction Committee). Once the second stage 
was completed, the Energy Complex would consist of four nuclear reactors, each o f one million 
kW, the Tashlyk hydro-atomic energy station (Tashlykska hydro-atomna elektrostantsiia), the
 ^001171 No. 1, onug. No. 10. cnp. 939. apK. 63.
 ^ See The South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant - an information leaflet issued by the Visitor Centre o f the 
nuclear power plant.
This is a different type of reactor from the one used at Chernobyl; the RBMK-1000 reactors (RBMK stands 
for reactors o f the high-power boiling channel type) were moderated by graphite, whereas the VVER- 
1000 reactors are water-moderated, which is supposed to make them more stable and thus safer.
 ^ In Ukrainian the water reservoir is referred to as Taslilykske vodoskhovishche and in Russian as 
Tashlykskoe vodokhranilishche (cf. quotes).
 ^ Both the Ukrainian and Russian name for this town is luzhnoukrainsk (Ukrainian: lOîKiioyicpaliiCbiî, 
Russian: lO^KnoyicpaniiCK), not Pivdennoukrainsk and luzhnoukrainsk respectively as one might
expect. Following Marples’ example, the town is in the main text referred to as luzhnoukrainsk.
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in the original project are depicted in Figure 6 , 'f  (see page 477).
It would, however, also cause radionuclides (high levels of tritium and caesium have been 
detected in the Tashlyk reservoir) to move with the water. If  the three reservoirs had formed a 
closed unit this problem might not have caused so much concern. Originally, though, water from 
the Konstantinov reservoir was intended to serve irrigation purposes as well as to provide people 
in the region with drinking water, of which there was an acute shortage. Since the Konstantinov
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Konstantinov hydro-electric station (Konstantinovska hydro-atomna elektrostantsiia) and the 
Aleksandrov hydro-electric station (Aleksandrovska hydro-eletrostantsiia). Another two 
reservoirs (the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs) were to be built on the South Bug river 
to provide enough water for the hydro-electric stations and to provide a stable supply of water for 
irrigation purposes in an area generally short of water in the summer season^. Also a third stage 
was envisaged, the purpose of which was to extend the capacity o f the nuclear power station by 
increasing the number of reactors first to six and eventually to eight^.
The SU EK is depicted in Figure 6.1 (See next page). As can be seen from this figure, the 
Tashlyk reservoir is linked to the nuclear power station. Cold water from the reservoir is pumped 
into tubes surrounding the reactors at the nuclear power station. As the reactor is very warm, the 
cold water, by absorbing the heat, serves as a coolant. The hot water is then pumped back into the 
reservoir, where some of it evaporates and the rest is cooled down before being pumped back to 
the reactors. The Tashlyk reservoir was designed to serve only the two reactors built as part o f the 
First Stage of the SU EK. It was too small to cool the third and the fourth reactors (Second Stage) 
under construction in the second half o f the 1980s. Another two reservoirs were therefore 
planned, so as to secure a continuous flow of cold water and simultaneously a continuous removal 
of hot water from the reservoir. Hydro-electric power stations would be built near the reservoirs 
so that extra electricity could be generated at peak hours and when reactors were shut down for 
repairs. The flow of the water and the capacity of the hydro-electric power stations as envisaged
By creating a continuous flow of water between the three reservoirs, in addition to generating 
electrical power from the hydroelectric power stations, salinisation problems could be reduced for 
the Tashlyk reservoir in that the water would circulate and salts thus be more easily diluted.
7 Teiiei)i>. aaoDQ sa Coi3.viHiiOM...rn.d.)
y . ;
 ^HoBbie iipo6.rteMhi IOtkhopo I5vra -(n.d.).
 ^ Figure 6.1 is a copy o f the original drawing of the SU EK given to me by the Committee on the 
Environment o f the Nikolaev oblast Soviet. Figure 6.2 can be found in (l)onji No. 1. oriHCi. No. 32. 
cu p .. 233. aoK. 49.
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As was the case at Chernobyl, the South Ukrainian nuclear power station was also riddled
10
reservoir would be built directly on the South Bug river, radionuclides and salts would eventually 
enter the river system and spread further.
%
with delays, inadequate and poor construction'^. Initially, however, it was not so much concern
.for nuclear safety that caused public opposition to the Second Stage of the SU EK, launched in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident: rather opposition was fuelled by concern regarding the 
impact the reservoirs would have on the South Bug river. The campaign against the Danube- 
Dniepr Canal successfully came to an end In 1987, and, as will be seen below, some of the
arguments used against this project by its opponents (predominantly writers and other members of 
.the creative intelligentsia) were also used against expanding the SU EK. The public campaign was 
initiated by Viktor Bilodid, an engineer working at the nuclear power station, in early 1988.
.Following the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986, the Ukrainian Communist Party started
a covert 'campaign’ directed at the CPSU to improve safety at existing nuclear power stations and
to prevent the construction of new nuclear reactors on Ukrainian territory. Unlike the public
campaigns against nuclear power in Ukraine, this ‘campaign’ was not fought in the press: that
would have been ‘subversive’, or ‘nationalist’ - contradicting the principles of ‘democratic
centralism’ and ‘internationalism’. Rather it was expressed in a number of letters addressed to and
speeches presented at the CPSU Central Committee and in the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Energy.
The letters and the speeches, which can be accessed in the Ukrainian State Archives, are labelled
either ‘secret’ (sekretno) or ‘top secret’ (sovershenno sekretno) and they reveal that disagreement
.on the issue of nuclear power in Ukraine caused friction between Kiev and Moscow.
------------------------------------------
See David Marples, Ukraine under Perestroika. Ecology. Economics and the Workers’ Revolt.. Chapter 
4: ‘Ecology: Irrigation and Nuclear Power Projects’, pp 129-131, for more details. David Marples cites 
Literatiirna Ukraina, the Ukrainian Writers’ Union’s weekly newspaper, revealing shortages of f
materials, unskilled workers, etc. Documents now available in the Ukrainian State Archives in Kiev A
give insight into these problems from the point of view o f the CPU. Minutes o f a meeting at the USSR A
Council o f Ministers which took place on 1-2 February 1982 (No. A-428) ‘Questions regarding the A"
Construction of the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station’, set the deadline for bringing the first y
reactor ‘on line’ in October 1982, three years after the original deadline. Despite the assertion of the | |
Director of the Energy Complex, V. Fuks, that this target could be reached, the protocol stated that 
there was still much work to be'done prior to its completion ((Doim N o . 1. onucL No. 25, cnp. N o.
2414. apK. 4.51 The reactor was eventually connected to the electrical grid in December 1982. The 
second reactor, scheduled for 1984, caused Shcherbitskii to write a letter to Tikhonov (No. 2/1, 23 
January 1984), expressing ‘serious concern’ at the interruptions in supplies to the construction sites. He ’ f /
referred to delays of up to nine months and listed a number of supplies needed to meet plan targets, 
urging Tikhonov to order the relevant ministries to provide supplies on time.EDoim No. 1. oriMO. No. 25. A
cnp. No. 2735. apic. 27). Detailed orders regarding supplies were issued by the Deputy Chairman of the '
USSR Council o f Ministers on 24.1.1984 (No. A -195, ibid. apic. 28-29).
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Although this chapter aims at analysing the public campaign against expanding the SU EK, 
the Ukrainian Communist Party’s attitude to nuclear power in Ukraine in general as well as to the 
South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station in particular, is of vital importance when assessing the 
relationship between the Greens and the CPU. A separate discussion on the CPU and nuclear 
safety thus precedes that of the SU EK. The latter has been broken down into three sub-sections: 
Emergence. Strategy and Mobilisation. Campaign and Decision-Making. The three sub-sections 
are rather descriptive. This has been done on purpose to illustrate properly how the campaign was 
conducted, since it differed considerably from the ‘typical’ campaign against nuclear power, 
where the arguments are primarily related to nuclear safety". A short discussion can be found in 
the chapter’s Conclusion.
For reasons of convenience, the case study has been broken down into two chapters. The first 
covers the period January 1988 to 1989 and emphasises the emergence of and the campaign 
conducted by the Green Movement in Nikolaev up to late August 1989, when the USSR Council 
of Ministers decided to partly abandon Stage Two. The second chapter (i.e., Chapter Seven) 
examines the Greens’ performance from September 1989 until June 1994, focusing on their 
adaptability and continued campaigning during a period of great political change.
6.1.2 The CPU and Nuclear Safety
Following the accident at Chernobyl, the CPSU did take measures to increase safety at other 
Soviet nuclear power stations. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the RBMK-reactor was to be 
improved and better security systems were to be installed. But the Communist Party’s trust in 
nuclear power remained unchanged. An ambitious nuclear power scheme was to continue as 
planned, and the Chernobyl nuclear power station was expected to operate normally again within a
;few months.
The implications of the accident and o f Soviet plans for nuclear power on Ukraine were 
outlined by First Secretary of the CPU, V.Shcherbitskii, in a speech presented to the CPSU Central 
Committee on 6 June, 1986. Due to the Chernobyl accident, 12 billion kW hours had been ‘lost’,
' ' See for instance Dorothy Neikin and Michael Poliak, The Atom Besieged. Extraparliamentary Dissent in 
France and Germany (Cambridge MA, London: The MIT Press, 1981). During the first years o f the 
campaign against expansion o f the South Ulaainian Energy Complex, the Greens pointed out numerous 
violations o f existing legislation and various resolutions. The focus was on preserving the river South 
Bug more than on nuclear power and nuclear safety as such. Only later, during the campaign, did the 
focus shifted and nuclear safety became the major concern of the Greens (see Chapter Seven).
579
and it was the CPU’s task to make sure that somehow these hours were made up. Given general 
shortages of energy created by the Soviet economic system itself, this would not be an easy task. 
However, the production targets for coal extraction had been raised and more coal was being 
produced. This was also the case with the production of oil and natural gas. Finally, efforts were 
being made to speed up oil and gas production in Western Siberia - the sites of which were 
constructed by Ukrainian brigades.
(Doiui No. 1. oiiHCb No. 25. cnp. No. 3084. apK.. 60-66.
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.The capacity of existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine would be expanded by 4,4 million :ikW in 1986: four reactors, each with a capacity of one million kW, were to be connected to the 
electric grid at the Rivae (September), Zaporizhzhia (October), imelnytskyi and Chernobyl 
nuclear power stations. In order to have the reactor at Khmelnytskyi ready at the end of the year, 
Shcherbitskii announced that speed of assembly- and construction work was to be ‘no less than 
doubled’. A detailed outline of work to be carried out by USSR Minenergo (Ministry of Energy) 
was then given to the CPSU Central Committee. The CPU, Shcherbitskii said, wanted to stress 
that it was ‘doing everything to facilitate the fulfilment of the Resolution of the CPSU Central 
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to prepare the economy for the winter’' .^
However, despite Shcherbitskii’s assurances, the Central Committee of the CPU soon began
to express its concern about the state of affairs at Ukrainian nuclear power stations. On the
surface, the CPU remained confident that they were safe, but correspondence between Kiev and 
.  .Moscow reveals a Ukrainian party leadership getting increasingly worried about safety at existing 
nuclear power stations in the republic. Such worries had, according to Vitalii Vrublevskii, been
expressed also prior to the accident at Chernobyl. In his biography of the former First Secretary of 
the Ukrainian Communist Party, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, an entire chapter is devoted to the 
Chernobyl accident. Vrublevskii quotes from a letter written by Shcherbitskii to the CPSU Central 
Committee as early as 1983. The letter reported that ‘a series of major accidents, resulting in
increased levels of radiation and serious interruptions to energy supplies’ had taken place. The
.reasons were incomplete project calculations, the poor quality of equipment used and the 
inadequate qualifications of the staff. The letter gave a detailed account of a serious accident at 
Chernobyl which had taken place on 9 September, 1982, at reactor No I, resulting in a six months’
shut-down, and complained that the Ministry of Nuclear Energy had failed to respond quickly to 
the accident. Serious problems had arisen at the Rivne nuclear power station due to karst under 
the site. Unless serious efforts were made to stabilise the karst, safety could not be guaranteed. 
According to Shcherbitskii, the USSR Minatomenergo and the trust Soiuzatomenergo were to
blame for this state of affairs, as they had not taken the necessary measures to secure the safe and
,smooth operation of these nuclear power stations. Even in the aftermath of accidents, ‘they are 
unacceptably slow"^.
The Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party repeatedly urged the CPSU to 
make sure ‘urgent measures’ were taken to secure the safety of the Ukrainian nuclear power 
stations but, according to Vrublevskii, to no avail, as in the spring of 1983 a power struggle was 
taking place in the Kremlin following the death of Andropov (died in February 1994), and 
consequently no one took an interest in Ukrainian matters. This worried Shcherbitskii, and in the
stations’''*.
early 1980s a strategy to introduce energy-saving technologies in Ukrainian industries was being 
.worked out by the Ukrainian Central Committee and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
Vrublevskii’s book aims at giving a positive image of Vladimir Shcherbitskii. It is therefore 
_natural that the author tries to show the Party in as favourable a light as possible when addressing
the Chernobyl catastrophe. Thus, Shcherbitskii is reported to have called the head of the
Politburo’s Chernobyl Commission, Boris Shcherbina, a ‘monster’ in response to his comment on
the accident to the effect that ‘science demands its casualties’. What is more, when Shcherbitskii
.allegedly tried to stop the 1 May parade in Kiev from taking place, Gorbachev allegedly 
threatened to expel him from the Communist Party if the parade did not go ahead as planned. It is 
impossible to verify these statements. There is, however, no reason to doubt the authenticity of 
the letter quoted, since the same issues were addressed by the CPU shortly after the Chernobyl 
accident.
In a letter of 29 October 1986, labelled ‘secret’, and addressed to M. Lukonin, Soviet
Minister of Nuclear Energy, CC Secretary B. Kachura addressed the issue of safety at Ukrainian 
nuclear power stations in depth: ‘It cannot but cause worry that the operation of many existing 
and the construction of new nuclear power stations continue in the presence of a number of 
project-construction defects and even errors (miscalculations), the poor quality of parts of the 
equipment and units, the poor quality of their manufacture and also of construction-assembly and 
maintenance work, which might become the causes of various accidents at the nuclear power
Kachura proceeded to criticise the USSR Minenergo (Ministry of Energy), the USSR 
Minshredmash (Ministry of Medium Engineering), the USSR Minenergomash (Ministry of Energy 
Construction), the USSR Minelektrotekhprom (Ministry of Electrical and Technical Engineering)
Bn'rajiHM Bpy6.neBCKHH. B.naaHMHp IIJenfiH'rcxHH. noanaa n BbiMMc.ni)i. (Kmcb: (Dipivia ’’iloBipa”, 1993), 
c. 204-05.
"  0O1UL No. 1. nnnc No. 25. cnp. No. 43-b. apic. 1.
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and the USSR Minpribor (Ministry of Instrument Making) for failing to introduce measures to 
improve safety at nuclear power stations despite the fact that the CPSU Central Committee had 
ordered them to do so three years previously in response to a letter from the CPU Central 
Committee. Concern was expressed that experts and party officials visiting nuclear power stations 
reported defects increasingly frequently. These defects and flaws were found not only at RBMK- 
reactors, but also at the VVER-reactors considered to be generally safer than the former. At all 
nuclear power stations equipped with such reactors, ‘inadmissible vibrating of the main steam 
valves and (other) installations’ were taking place. Only 10% of 120 items of new equipment for 
the VVER-1000 reactors had been properly tested. Defects in equipment delivered by 
Minergomash to the South-Ukrainian nuclear power station, for instance, required 540,000 work- 
hours to be repaired'^.
In the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet authorities claimed that the 
accident had been caused primarily by human error. Kachura in his letter, however, claimed that 
more than 50% of the accidents at Soviet nuclear power stations were caused by construction 
flaws and poor equipment quality. A list of such equipment was provided. Blurred responsibility 
aggravated the situation, since the main constructor, the scientific leader and general designer of 
nuclear power stations belonged to different ministries, thus making co-ordination difficult. 
Finally, Kachura pointed out that geological conditions in Ukraine had not been properly taken 
into consideration when choosing the site of nuclear power stations. No measures had been taken 
to strengthen the reactors, despite the seismic situation in Ukraine. Taking the necessary measures 
would not be cheap.
Kachura also criticised the poor qualifications of the station personnel, lack of discipline and 
lack of adequate operating instructions. Moreover, due to poor housing and the lack of other 
social facilities, there was also a high turn-over of personnel, which caused additional reason for 
concern.
The solution offered by Kachura was to create special control procedures for equipment 
designated for nuclear power stations and to develop a set of rules and instructions regarding the
Ibid.. apK. 3.
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production of such equipment. Finally, proper housing should be offered to operators at nuclear 
power stations as part of the job-package.
Given the high degree of centralisation of the Soviet power structure, the CPU was in no 
position to give orders to the USSR Minatomenergo. Instead, Kachura expressed ‘hope that the 
remarks and suggestions made would be considered by Minenergo’ when addressing the issue of
 ----------------
how to improve nuclear safety. Still, it is remarkable that Kachura made such a detailed criticism 
of Soviet nuclear energy policies as he did, given that the Ukrainian Communist Party was 
considered to be amongst the most dogmatic in the USSR under Shcherbitskii’s rule. His letter is 
also the best known detailed account of safety at Soviet nuclear power stations shortly after the 
Chernobyl accident. Articles in the press and official statements prior to 1988 stressed that the 
accident was caused by human error, not by technical flaws or inadequacies.
Lukonin, in his response'^, admitted that the problems mentioned by Kachura did indeed 
exist. The Ministry, which was ‘recreated’ after the Chernobyl accident'^, had already started 
working out safety measures, and further efforts would be made.'^
Lukonin’s response, however, did not convince the CPU that nuclear power would become 
safe enough to justify the continued expansion of existing and the construction of new nuclear 
power stations in Ukraine. In a comment on Resolution No. 886, addressed to the Central 
Committee of the CPSU and labelled ‘top secret’, Shcherbitskii expressed serious concern at plans 
to increase the capacity of existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine by 11 million kW between 
1987 and 1990, in addition to constructing another 12 reactors of one million kW each at new 
locations. The total output of Ukrainian nuclear power stations would then reach almost 33 
million kW. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian Minvodkhoz (Ministry of Water 
Resources) and the Ukrainian Mingeo (Ukrainian Ministry of Geology), however, held the view 
that nuclear capability in Ukraine should not exceed 25-26 million kW, as the impact on the 
territory of Ukraine was reaching a critical level. Besides, Shcherbitskii pointed out, water 
resources in Ukraine were very limited - especially in the Dniepr basin, the water of which was 
used for drinking purposes by some 35 million people. The deficit of water in waterless years was 
expected to increase from four to seven billion cubic metres. Still, all new nuclear power stations 
planned for construction in Ukraine were to use water from the Dniepr for cooling. Further, 
according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Geology, almost 90% of the republic’s territory was, for 
geological and hydrological reasons, ‘extremely unfavourable’ for the construction and safe 
operation of nuclear power stations. Shcherbitskii also warned of the combined impact of 
radioactive, chemical and thermal pollution in Ukraine. Finally, he called for a revision o f plans 
to build the Crimean nuclear power station (on the Kerch peninsula), the Chyhyryn nuclear power
'^N o. MA-1352-5C., 29.12.1986.
This Ministry was created in July 1986 and it took over all the functions related to nuclear power stations 
previously exercised by the M inistry of Power and Electrification and other ministries and state 
committees. For more details, see Zhores Medvedev, The Legacy o f  Chernobyl (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), p 23. 
dloiij No. L onuc No. 25. cup. No. 43-b. apK. 1.
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techn ical principles and fac ilities were being used. This situation, concluded Kachura, w as fraught 
with serious consequences. On this basis he urged Lukonin to take the necessary m easures to
improve the situation^^. Lukon in’s reply was that special measures had been taken to secure the 
safety o f  the Crimean nuclear power station^'. ;ii
fWhereas Kachura put pressure on the M inistry o f  Nuclear Energy to m axim ise safety at the . 
Ukrainian nuclear stations, Shcherbitskii continued arguing the case before the CPSU Central
Com m ittee that Ukraine was ill-suited for further expansion o f  its nuclear capability. In a second  
letter (N o. 12/207), o f  13 June 1987 labelled ‘top secret’, he referred to his previous letter in 
which he had asked for plans to expand nuclear energy capacity in Ukraine to be revised. He
21
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station and the Kharkiv nuclear thermal power station as w ell as for more balanced energy J  
schem es in Ukraine in the future'^. iC
In early 1987 Kachura again contacted the U SSR  M inister o f  N uclear Power, N . Lukonin. T
The letter (No. 4 /11) stated that ‘the Central Committee o f  the Ukrainian Communist Party is f .seriously concerned with the current state o f  affairs regarding the safeguarding o f  nuclear power %
stations in the republic’. Keeping in mind that the CPU could not openly disagree with decisions
-made by the CPSU regarding nuclear power, this is indeed a very strongly worded statement - 
expressing genuine worry about the existing situation. Kachura proceeded to point out that not at 
one single Ukrainian nuclear power station had all projected safe.^ measures been implemented:
‘The locations o f  the reactor units...are not marked by signalisation and TV  monitoring. Nor have 
the safety devices o f  outside objects been fitted with TV m onitoring’. The large number o f  ; | |
organisations and people taking part in the last stage o f  construction at nuclear power stations also jr
gave reason for concern. Practically nothing was being done to fit ITsOs (safety devices) on new  
reactors at the South Ukrainian and the Crimean nuclear power stations, which were scheduled to ■ :
begin operation in 1988. Furthermore, experts on nuclear power stations and the U SSR  M inistry o f  (
the Interior had expressed the v iew  that existing safety system s were inefficient, as outdated
I
Î
again listed the arguments used to justify  a revision o f  the project o f  the C PSU Central Com m ittee Vand the U SSR  Council o f  M inisters’ resolution ‘Regarding the Clarification o f  Tasks on the |
D evelopm ent o f  Nuclear Energy in the 12th Five Year Plan and regarding additional M easures on 7%
the Facilitating o f  Security at N uclear Power Stations’. In addition, Shcherbitskii questioned the j s
advisability o f  constructing two new  reactors (N os 5 and 6) at Chernobyl. Although Shcherbitskii
i
(I)oiia No. 1. oriMC No. 25. cup. No. 179. ap K . 1.2. For fiirther information on arguments against nuclear
power in Ukraine, see letter from the Ukrainian Academy o f Sciences to the CPU Central Committee, ;|7
dated 22.5.1987 (No. 11/1344c) in (Doiui No. 1. onucb No 25. cup. No. 3147. apic. 8.9.10.
(Bona No. 1. oiihc No. 25. cud. N o. 179. apK. 1.2.
Letter No. M A-12I3-5c. o f 16.11.87 in (Domi No. 1. onuc No. 25. cno. No. 179. aoK. 1. :¥
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did express v iew s very different from those o f  the CPSU on this issue, the word ing is again very 
cautious. He does not demand, but rather ‘would consider it ind ispensable’^^ .
Shcherb itskii’s letter w as presented to the June 1987 Plenum o f  the CPSU Central Com m ittee, 
and it was forwarded to the U SSR  Gosplan (the State Planning Com m ittee) for further 
exam ination. The reply, addressed to Shcherbitskii personally and labelled ‘secret’, was dated 26 
October 1987 (N o. 7067c). Gosplan announced that as a consequence o f  the accident at Chernobyl 
and taking into consideration requests and suggestions made by various m inistries, departments 
and the Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters, Resolution N o 999-233 o f  21 September 1984 regarding 
the further developm ent o f  nuclear power in the Soviet Union up until 1990 had been m odified. A 
new resolution had thus been passed by the CPSU Central Com m ittee and the U SSR  Council o f  
M inisters on 1 July 1987 (No. 722-162). According to this new resolution, six nuclear reactors 
were dropped from the Ukrainian nuclear power plan (the O dessa nuclear thermal electric station - 
Odesska ATETs), Chernobyl N o. 2, reduced capacity at the Crimean nuclear power station). 
H owever, Gosplan would soon start work on the Soviet Energy Programme up to the year 2005, 
and since gas and oil extraction was expected to stabilise, increased energy output would be 
possible on ly through the expansion o f  already existing nuclear power stations and the 
construction o f  new  nuclear power stations. In the case o f  Ukraine, Gosplan''s expert com m ission  
would exam ine in detail Ukraine’s suitability for nuclear energy.
Given the prognosis for econom ic growth in Ukraine, energy output would have to increase. 
In order to avoid the construction o f  new  nuclear power stations in Ukraine, it was suggested that 
the capacity o f  existing nuclear power stations could be expanded to betw een six and eight m illion  
kW (i.e. between six and eight nuclear reactors at each station). Thus in the period up to the year 
2000, Gosplan envisaged the construction o f  18-19 new V V E R -1000 reactors. Increased security 
measures would make them safe.
At the tim e o f  writing, two nuclear reactors (one at Khm elnytskyi and one at South Ukraine) 
were under construetion with the assistance o f  other COMECON countries. These reactors would  
produce energy for export ‘to fulfil the U S S R ’s obligations’ towards them. As a m eans by which  
to m inim ise the further construction o f  nuclear reactors in Ukraine, Gosplan suggested that 
reactors designed for export w ould in the future be constructed on Russian territory.
Although the letter made it clear that it was for M oscow  to decide how  many reactors would  
be built on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine would be given a say as to where these reactors w ould be 
constructed, then, according to existing regulations, nuclear power station projects and where to
(Don/I No. 1. oriHcNo. 25. cnp. No. 179. apic. 1.2.
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allocate them would have to be agreed with republican and local organisations...’. A. Lalaiants, 
Deputy Chairman o f  the USSR Gosplan ended the four-page long letter with an appeal to 
Shcherbitskii to cooperate in im plem enting the outlined programme so as to secure reliable energy  
supplies in the future^^.
In a letter to the Ukrainian Central Com mittee, Central Com m ittee Secretaries Kachura and
Hurenko compared Gosplan's estimated increased energy output in Ukraine with that projected by
the CPU Central Committee. Although Gosplan agreed with the planned nuclear power capacity
in the current Five Year Plan and with total energy production figures for 1990 and 2005, it
reduced the planned output at thermal power stations by 105 billion kW hours compared with
republican schem es (i.e., by 44%) and increased the planned output at nuclear power stations by
87,7 billion kW hours (46,5% ). Tn this case, the capacity o f  nuclear power stations towards the
end o f  the period must be increased to 40-44 m illion kW, with which it is im possible to agree (my
em phasis)’ '^^ . To avoid such a scenario, the two secretaries called for the Ukrainian Council o f
M inisters, with the assistance o f  the Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sciences and various m inistries and
departments, to prepare and send to the U SSR  Gosplan and the U SSR  Council o f  M inisters’
Bureau on the Fuel and Energy Com plex concrete suggestions on the future developm ent o f  
.electric energy in the republic in the hope that these would be incorporated Into the Resolution on
the increased growth in electrical energy output to the year 1995, currently in the process o f  being  
drafted by Gosplan and the Biuro and to be finished by Novem ber 1988.
In its assessm ent o f  the U SSR  Gosplan's schem e for increasing the nuclear energy capacity in 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sciences provided a series o f  arguments against the continued  
growth o f  nuclear energy in the republic and suggested a more balanced investm ent so as to also 
allow  for energy-saving measures to be introduced in the industry and for alternative energy  
sources to be developed. It was furthermore suggested that payment for natural resources would  
reduce energy consumption and thus the need to build more nuclear reactors. The A cadem y’s 
major concerns remained the same: Ukraine was too heavily industrialised and already excessively  
polluted. B esides, water supplies were limited and 90% o f  the republic’s territory unsuitable for 
nuclear reactors due to difficult geological and hydrogeological conditions.
The Academ y o f  Sciences also pointed out that ‘Requirements regarding the Location o f  
N uclear Power Stations’, endorsed by the U SSR  Council o f  M inisters’ Biuro on Energy were not 
only not distributed to the nuclear power stations, but that none o f  the existing stations fully
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com plied w ith these requirements, which in turn constituted an obstacle to expand ing their 
capacity. Should any o f  the existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine suffer an accident similar 
to the ones at Three M ile Island or Chernobyl, the most important industrial and agricultural areas, 
includ ing the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkassy, ICirovohrad and K iev regions, 
w ould fare badly^^.
Further materials on the formation o f  a concept for energy developm ent in Ukraine until the 
year 2005 were provided by the Academ y o f  Sc iences in early January 1989 (N o. 4 f/26-2). The 
starting point was the proposal from the Soviet fuel and energy com plex to increase energy output 
in Ukraine by building new  nuclear power stations, increasing the number o f  nuclear reactors 
(each with a capacity o f  one m illion kW ) to 44 by the year 2005. At a m eeting with the Deputy 
Chairman o f  the U SSR  Council o f  M inisters, B. Shcherbina, on I June 1988, representatives o f  the 
Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters, the Ukrainian Gosplan and the Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sciences, 
the Ukrainians justified their reluctance to build more nuclear reactors by referring to what was 
labelled ‘objective reasons’ (karst and seisinologically  active areas, lack o f  fresh water) and 
insisted that by the year 2005 there ought to be no more than 28 nuclear reactors in Ukraine. The 
report gave further evidenee to support this stand: a lack o f  security measures for planned nuclear 
reactors, the uncertain future o f  nuclear energy world-wide and the availability o f  alternatives, 
which would not only be considerably cheaper than nuclear reactors, but which w ould also cause 
less pollution (therm o-electric power stations run on natural gas)^^.
The concept developed by the A cadem y o f  Sciences can be summarised as follow s:
1) to stop the construction o f new nuclear reactors in Ukraine prior to the year 2005 until a new generation
of nuclear reactors with greatly enhanced safety had been introduced.
2) to increase electricity output at the expense o f thermo-electric power stations run on natural gas. Old
thermo-electric power stations to be converted to run on gas.
3) to introduce the use o f energy-saving technologies in Ukrainian industries.
4) to develop low-energy industries.
5) to develop alternative energy sources.
D espite repeated requests from the CPU to the Ministry o f  Nuclear Energy that reactor safety 
be improved, Shcherbitskii in a letter to the CPSU Central Com m ittee (No. 1/25) o f  21 June 1989 
noted that m easures to improve safety were being implemented ‘unacceptably s lo w ly ’ . Ten 
reactors were under construction in Ukraine, but due to popular opposition to nuclear power it had
becom e increasingly difficult to defend such construction: ‘after the Chernobyl accident...the 
attitude towards nuclear power am ongst the population, am ongst the intelligentsia and scientists,
--------------------------------------
(Doiui No. 1 onncNo. 25. cun. No. 3347. anic. 21-28.
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deteriorated sharply. A large proportion o f  the population is deeply concerned and a m ovem ent 
against the construction o f  new nuclear power stations is being organised. This year m eetings 
attended by several thousand people have taken place in K iev, Lv iv, Zhytomyr and N ikolaev. 
Several iiundred thousand signatures have been collected against the construction o f  the Crimean 
and the Chyhyryn nuclear power stations
To try to avert this wave o f  protest, the CPU had undertaken propaganda work, but this had 
not been very successful, according to Shcherbitskii. Rather than blame the w ay in which the 
propaganda was conducted, the Party blamed the safety o f  existing nuclear power stations for the 
lack o f  results. The large number o f  accidents, caused by fauity construction, poor quality 
equipment and poorly trained personnel, had led to reactor close-dow ns 319 tim es in three years 
and caused 11 accidents in Ukraine alone! The CPU also had other grievances and blamed the 
U SSR  Minatomenergo and the U SSR  Minenergo for failing to take the required measures. Again  
it w as pointed out that numerous requests from the CPU in 1986 to these M inistries had been 
without results. M oreover, the Resolution o f  1 July 1987 regarding ‘Measures to Enhance Safety in 
N uclear Energy’ was being im plemented inadequately and too slow ly. The only solution w ould be 
to improve the control o f  and the monitoring at nuclear power stations.
Shcherbitskii finally stated very clearly that the CPU, given the grievances it had regarding 
safety at nuclear power stations, was opposed to the idea o f  constructing new nuclear power 
stations in Ukraine prior to the em ergence o f  a new generation o f  nuclear power stations with  
enhanced safety: ‘The solution o f  long-term tasks regarding energy supplies in the republic has 
been orientated towards the developm ent o f  nuclear energy. In this connection the construction o f  
nuclear reactors at the Rivne, Zaporizhzhia, South Ukraine and IClimelnytskyi nuclear power 
stations should be com pleted by the deadlines set...A t the sam e tim e, taking into account the real 
situation, w e hold the v iew  that prior to the invention o f  equipment o f  a new  generation and the 
cardinal improvement o f  its quality, it is not desirable to construct new nuclear power stations or 
to increase capacity at existing nuclear power stations beyond the capacity envisaged for these 
stations in the original plans...In addition, clear decisions must be made in the nearest future to 
reprofile the Crimean nuclear power station’.
Rather than expanding nuclear power capacity, the CPU favoured the developm ent o f  thermal 
and hydraulic energy plants in Ukraine by the year 2005, as w ell as gas driven power stations, 
which could be bought in Italy^^.
CDoiUJ No. 1. onnc No. 32. cnp. No. 407 tit. apK. 1.2. 
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From what has been written above, it seem s clear that the CPU opposed the expansion o f
Inuclear power in Ukraine on objective grounds. The CPSU seemed more reluctant to revise the Ukrainian nuclear programme, as Ukraine was the key republic in Sov iet nuclear power plans.
The CPU, although outwardly com ply ing w ith policies decided in M oscow , used public opposition ;
against nuclear energy to back up its own position. Evidence o f  this w ill be given in the fo llow ing | |
section. The CPSU, however, hit back later, by issuing a resolution offering material rewards to 77:--;7the regions in wh ich the nuclear power stations were situated, so as to create alliances w ith local .7
authorities and thus be able to go ahead with the original plans desp ite public opposition and party
reluctance at other adm inistrative levels. This is also an issue which w ill be addressed below . To :':7summarise, though, it would be too sim ple to argue that the Green M ovem ent faced active 
resistance from the Com mun ist Party on the issue o f  nuclear power, although certain restrictions 
and obstacles were put in their w ay (1 w ill return to this issue below). It is probably more correct
1
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to conclude that they both benefited from the other: on the one hand, from 1988 and onwards the 
CPU w as able to add weight to its opposition to nuclear power by referring to m assive public U
opposition. Towards the Greens they could argue that they agreed with their cause, although not 
necessarily with their methods, but that unfortunately decisions were made in M oscow . Th is, in 
turn, would fuel the G reens’ cla im  that every important decision regarding the environm ent was 
made in M oscow  and that the republic could not exert much influence on such dec isions, thus 
fuelling demands for sovereignty and eventually independence. 7
6.2 Campaign (January " August 1988)
I
6.2.1 Emergence of the Green Movement: Strategy and Mobilisation
The first person to voice opposition to the Second Stage o f  the South Ukrainian Energy  
.C om plex w as V iktor Bilod id, an eng ineer work ing at the nuclear power station and a resident o f  |
luzhnoukrainsk. On 14 October 1988 the newspaper Robitnycha hazeta published an article 'Uwritten by him in wh ich he expressed serious concern regarding the impact the Second Stage o f  À
the SU EK would have on the South Bug river and on plant and animal life in the region. An (y
ecolog ical m ovem ent had already em erged in the oblast, voicing its concern about the D n iepr-Bug  
hydroelectric schem e, but it w as more a loose alliance o f  like-m inded people than an informal
organisation. Preparations to set up a Green group, had already started at the beginn ing o f  the s'■i'/year. M embers o f  the so-called Turistkluh (Tourist Club) in luzhnoukrainsk - a club un iting rock- 
clim bers, rafters and h ill walkers (the river-bank in the vicin ity o f  luzhnoukrainsk was rocky and
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steep, providing excellen t cond itions for such activities) -, were worried that the river bank would  
be flooded and the river destroyed as a result o f  the building o f  the two reservoirs. Therefore they 
started writing letters expressing their concern. B ilod id was not a member o f  the Tnrisfklub, but a 
keen outdoor man. He undertook an analysis o f  the legality o f  the project, which he was fam iliar 
w ith through his work, and by chance got in contact with the Turistkhib, Together they set up 
Zelenyi Mir (Green World) in luzhnoukrainsk, follow ing the exam ple o f  the Russian writer, Sergei 
Zalyg in, who the previous year had set up such a group in M oscow  and wh ich they had read about 
in the journal Nauka i zhizn. A  m ovem ent against the expansion o f  the nuclear power station and 
the building o f  the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs was a'so founded in Pervomaisk in 
early 1988. B ilod id has stressed that Zelenyi Mir was not founded in response to the Chernobyl 
accident, but rather as a result o f  extended glasnost and perestroika, m aking it possible to establish 
informal groups^^.
In his analysis o f  the Second stage o f  the SU EK B ilodid revealed as many as 40 v iolations o f  
ex isting Ukrainian and Sov iet legislation (the Ukrainian Water Code and Leg islation on Rare 
Birds and An im als). In February 1988 he contacted the oblast Com m un ist Party newspaper 
hizhnaia pravda  and sent his analysis to the editor. Shortly after, the newspaper published  
information to the effect that som eone had made an estimate o f  the impact o f  the Second Stage o f  
the EK on the environment. Flowever, the paper fell short o f  publishing the analysis itself. 
Bilod id im m ed iately started look ing for som eone who could publish it. The Ukrainian writer 
Serhii Plachynda was contacted, but nothing cam e o f  this.
The assessm ent was eventually sent to the journal Ribolov (The F isherman) since fishing
would suffer from the Second Stage o f  the SU EK. Ribolov passed B ilod id ’s assessm en t to
Ukrainian Glavvodresiirsov, Ukrainian Minvodkhoz (M inistry o f  Water Resources) and the oblast
procurator’s o ffice  to get their com m ents. All three agreed that B ilod id ’s conclusions were
correct. In a letter addressed to the deputy editor o f  hizhnaia pravda, the head o f
Glavvodresvrsov, O. A. Rusinov wrote that 'Glavvodresnrsov shares engineer V iktor B ilod id’s
concern ...’ He also revealed that on a number o f  occasions the Ukrainian Minvodkhoz had
analysed the developm ent o f  nuclear energy in Ukraine and pointed out to the U SSR
.Minatomenergo that the failure to im plem ent measures to utilise rationally and protect water
resources would aggravate the ecological situation. Rusinov also com plained that the techn ical
project for the SU EK had been endorsed by the U SSR  M inistry o f  Nuclear Energy without the 
.consent o f  the republic. M oreover, building and using the Konstantinov reservoir as a cooling
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pond for the nuclear power station constituted a violation o f Sov iet and Ukrainian leg islation on 
water resources. N o assessm ent had been made o f  the possible impact water from the Tashlyk 
reservoir would have on water quality in the other two reservoirs. Neither had any calculations 
been made on possible changes in water temperature and the chem ical com position o f  the water in 
the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs if  utilised for cooling purposes. Due to sharp 
fluctuations in the water level in the reservoirs (4.7 m in the Aleksandrov reservoir, 4.5 m in the 
Tashlyk reservoir and 2.5 m in the Konstantinov reservoir), all life in the South Bug river would
w as short o f  water supplies. In the year 2000 the deficit would reach an estim ated 220 m illion  
cubic meters. U SSR  Minatomenergo had proposed to close this deficit by withdrawing 26,000  
hectares o f  land from the irrigation system  in N ikolaev oblast. This constituted a violation o f  the
B C /2 1 -2 0 3 . 17.3.1988.
N o . 3 -1 /3 2 8 8 . 5 .11 .1979 and N o . 3 -1 /3 6 7 0 . 20 .12 .1979 .
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.disappear over a 100 km long stretch. Finally, Rusinov pointed out that the nuclear power station
Ukrainian Water Codex, which stated that in that oblast agriculture was to be given priority, not 
.industry. Therefore, the USSR Minatomenergo's proposals had to be labelled ‘unfounded’.
Ukrainian Deputy Minister o f  Water Resources, V. Strilets, in a letter com m enting on
B ilod id ’s assessm ent and addressed to the Ukrainian Gosplan^\ reached the same conclusion.
N ot only had the SU EK been endorsed by the U SSR  Minatomenergo without the consent o f  the
republic: the plans to use the Konstantinov reservoir as a cooling pond for the nuclear power 
.station violated the Sanitary Norm s and Rules 2 .04-03-85 (point 3 .12) and Requirem ents for the 
Location o f  Nuclear Power Stations (points 2.1.5 and 2.1 .6) Other legislation ( ‘Requirements for 
the Protection o f  Surface Waters from Pollution by Sew age’) demanded that the water temperature 
after water escapes must not exceed the last 10 years’ average temperature during the hottest 
month by more than three degrees Centigrade. N o calculations had been undertaken in this 
respect, nor had any assessm ent been made as to what would be the chem ical impact on the water 
in the reservoirs follow ing water escapes from the cooling pond (the Tashlyk reservoir). The
1
anticipated high flux o f  water levels in the reservoirs (see previous paragraph) would violate point 
2.3.1.5 o f  ‘Requirements for the Location o f  Nuclear Power Stations’, as would the shortage o f 'water to cool the nuclear power station (point 2.3.1.6). Finally, the Deputy M inister could not 
agree with Minatomenergo that additional water could be taken from the irrigation project.
Minvodkhoz' opposition to the SU EK was by no means new. Already in 1979, when the
32decision  was in the making, it had voiced its concern . Its arguments were aim ed against the
.planned Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs, which would reduce the annual water flow  o f  
the South Bug river by half, increase water salinisation by 200% , destroy 80% o f  the area’s
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spawn ing places and reduce the fish stock in the river (by 3,000 tons annually for com mercial 
fish). Minvodkhoz bluntly pointed out that the consequences o f  the planned Reactors 5 and 6 at 
the SU EK would be ‘unpredictable’ . In 1985, the N ikolaev obkom o f  the CPU had also expressed  
concern about adding another two reactors, arguing that they would be ‘dangerous’ to the oblast.
The Ukrainian Goskompriroda also came down on the side o f  the ‘pro-environment’ lobby. 
Answ ering a letter from T. Doroshina o f  luzhnoukrainsk, the Deputy Chairman o f  Goskompriroda,
1. Liakh, confirmed that the State Com m ittee on the Construction o f  the SU EK Hydroelectric 
Objects had sent a letter to the Ukrainian Gosplan requesting that the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  
Sciences and the Ukrainian Minzdrav (M inistry o f  Health) on the basis o f  current environmental 
and sanitary requirements assess the possible impact o f  the Second Stage o f  the EK and that 
attempts be made to m inim ise the environmental consequences o f  the project. To facilitate this, 
Goskompriroda suggested that the question o f  cooling the nuclear reactors with water cooling  
towers, rather than constructing the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs for this purpose, be 
considered^^.
In its response to B ilod id’s assessm ent the Procurator’s O ffice confirm ed that ‘his (i.e. 
B ilod id’s) conclusions are substantiated’ "^^. However, as the project for the Second Stage o f  the 
SU EK had been developed and endorsed by organs not under the control o f  the oblast 
procurator’s office, nothing could be done at the oblast level. The Procurator’s evaluation o f  
B ilod id ’s assessm ent had therefore been sent to the Ukrainian Procurator’s O ffice in K iev, with a 
recommendation that it be thoroughly exam ined. The Deputy Procurator, E. Hula, further reported 
that the U SSR Gossannadzor (State Sanitary Inspectorate) had rejected the Third Stage o f  the SU 
EK.
A letter from the Editor o f  Rybolov shortly after briefed B ilodid  on the action that had been 
taken as a result o f  his com munication. Support o f  B ilodid’s v iew s had also been received from  
Zapcherrybvod (The Western Black Sea Coast Fishing Department), which claim ed that the 
opinion and the findings o f  Tsnren (the Central Administration for Fishing Expert assessm ent and 
Norm atives on the Protection and U se o f  Fish Stocks) were being ignored^^.
Factual evidence strengthening the opinion that the Second Stage o f  the SU EK be at least re­
exam ined, appeared throughout the summer and autumn o f  1988: Uki^zemproekt, for instance,
issued a memorandum to the Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters, stating that more than 2 ,000  hectares 
o f  high quality arable chernozem had been removed from the kolkhoz ‘October R evolution’ 
(Arbusinka region) as a result o f  the construction o f  the nuclear power station. The soil rem oved
No. 9-5-65-KO.
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constituted part o f  the ‘national w ealth’ o f  the Sov iet Un ion, Ukraine and the oblast. Another 410  
hectares would be lost in order to build the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs'^^.
A petition organised by Zelenyi Mir in luzhnoukrainsk during the summer o f  1988 
summarised B ilod id’s points as w ell as those referred to above: in his assessm ent o f  the legality o f  
the plans to expand the SU EK B ilod id focused on the implications these would have on the South 
Bug river. He referred to the Resolution adopted in January 1988 by the CPSU Central Com m ittee 
and the U SSR  Council o f  M in isters ‘On Priority Measures to Improve the use o f Water Resources 
in the Country’. This R esolution had been adopted because severe v iolations o f  ex isting  
regulations and laws in a number o f  projects regarding reservoirs had been d isclosed. B ilod id then 
linked this Resolution to the SU EK, arguing that such violations were also taking place in 
luzhnoukrainsk. The SU EK-project, which was endorsed by the CPSU and the U SSR  Council o f  
Ministers in 1979, v iolated the Ukrainian Water Code and several other normative documents. 
Th is had been acknowledged even by the planners, who in the project referred to the EK as an 
‘exception enterprise’ (predpriiatie iskliuchen ie). Bilod id revealed that the project violated both 
the ‘Sanitary N orm s and Rules for the Projecting, Construction and the U se  o f  R eservoirs’ and the 
‘Requirements regarding the Location o f  Nuclear Power Stations’. For instance, using a reservoir 
for reactor-cooling purposes w as inadmissible (point 2.5.1). A lso, water from the cooling pond 
m ust under no circum stances enter other reservoirs (point 5.6), and the temperature in the cooling  
pond must not exceed 28 degrees C in the summer (point 5.8). Furthermore, the water flow  o f  the 
South Bug river was inadequate to maintain normal water supplies for four reactors at 
luzhnoukrainsk (point 2.3 .1 .5), and the anticipated frequent sw ings o f  the water level in the 
reservoirs would damage their lining (point 2.3 .2 .3). Altogether, som e 40 violations were 
recorded^
The petition also pointed out that recreation near the reservoirs would be im possible, given  
the big daily fluctuations in water levels. Once the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs were 
built, a 60 km long stretch o f  the South Bug river would be transformed into a ‘technical’ reservoir 
with increased water temperatures. The unique Canyon o f  the South Bug would be destroyed, and 
with it 30 types o f  insects, 10 types o f  plants and nine birds species, all featuring in the Soviet Red 
B ook o f  rare and endangered species. Ten rare Ukrainian plants would also disappear. In the 
event o f  an accident, or o f  a failure to com ply with operating instructions at the nuclear power 
station, radionuclides would find their way into the South Bug river and pollute the only source o f  
water in the N ikolaev oblast.
No. 05-14-2444 M. 5.8.1988.
See petition B BepxomibiH Coner yKpanncKOH h Coi03a CCP. containing 85 signatures (Bilodid showed 
me a whole box filled with such petitions) gathered in June 1988 in luzhnoukrainsk.
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.The signatories o f  the petition appealed to the Ukrainian and Sov iet parliaments to stop the 
project from going ahead, on the grounds that it was being implemented through inertia, as a result 
o f  Sov iet ‘gigantom an ia’, as had been the case w ith the projects to redirect the flow  o f  the Siberian 
rivers to the Central Asian republics, the Danube-Dniepr Canal and the dam in the G ulf o f  Finland, 
to m ention but a few  such cases. The time had com e to stop pouring m illions o f  rubles into 
doubtful projects, and rather make a thorough scientific assessm ent o f  the project prior to 
im plem enting it. A s for the energy, savings could be made through better use o f  existing energy 
sources, through energy-sav ing technolog ies, reconstruction o f  old enterprises and alternative
", ■energy. A ll these elem ents ought to be part o f  the econom ic perestroika o f  the USSR . Rather than 
bu ilding two new reservoirs (Aleksandrov and Konstantinov), water cooling towers could be 
attached to the nuclear reactors. SU EK Stage Two was labelled ‘m orally outdated’, and despite 
reassurances that the necessary means would be taken to protect the environment, they could be 
expected to have a considerable negative impact on the environment. It would be immoral to 
destroy the South B ug river for short-term benefits - it was already badly polluted w ith oil 
products, etc.: building the reservoirs would destroy it com pletely. Calls were therefore made not 
to go ahead w ith construction until the project had been assessed by an independent scien tific  
expert com m ission, and local authorities were urged to facilitate a broad public debate o f  the 
project in the spirit o f  glasnost and démocratisation.
B y the end o f  the summer Zelenyi Mir had succeeded in collecting 40 ,000  signatures in 
support o f  these points. The signatures were collected primarily in luzhnoukrainsk and nearby 
Pervomaisk. Am ongst the contributors were several engineers and other personnel o f  the nuclear 
power station: even the w ife o f  the person in charge o f  the (personnel) sh ifts at the reactor units, 
signed the petition. Som e not only put their name to the petition, but even added personal 
comments: one V. Shibka wrote that ‘ Anyone can destroy nature and people, but nobody has 
learnt how  to restore them ’. D efectoskopist Sverdeianko referred to Lake Baikal: ‘remember what 
the construction o f  the cellu lose plant resulted in!’^^ . So although Bilod id w as labelled a traitor by 
many, others supported him: to this day he cla im s to be on good terms w ith those w ho work in the 
reactor department - they call him the ‘green bandit’ but not in a pejorative sense^^. The 
leadership o f  the nuclear power station, headed by General D irector Fuks, would, as w ill be seen  
below , argue fiercely against the Greens, cla im ing to speak on behalf o f  all the personnel at
luzhnoukrainsk. A m inority o f  the top staff, though, would openly d isagree w ith them , thus
'
making it clear that there was no unified nuclear lobby at the South Ukrainian nuclear power 
station. Th is was no doubt a factor which served to strengthen the cred ibility o f  the campaign.
V ia party channels, M ikhail Pitushkin, who worked as a deputy chairman o f  the U SSR  
Council o f  Ministers in M oscow , was informed about the petition organised by B ilodid. Pitushkin 
had a summer house in Pervomaisk and there he received representatives o f  Zelenyi Mir, who 
handed him the signatures. Pitushkin had a vested interest in preventing the reservoirs from being 
built, as Pervomaisk would be directly affected. He took the signatures to M oscow  and arranged a 
m eeting between CPSU officials and representatives o f  Zelenyi Mir. The m eeting took place in 
early October 1988. Bilod id recalls that the delegation was received as if  its members had been 
party officials. During a four hour long m eeting they were able to present their view s, and 
Pitushkin later put their case before the U SSR  Council o f  Ministers.
Pitushkin, who was also a Deputy o f  the U SSR  Supreme Sov iet, then sent a letter to the 
Deputy Manager o f  the department responsible for the work o f  its permanent com m issions, L. 
Zlomanov"^^. A s a deputy o f  constituency N o. 498 in Pervomaisk, he had been contacted by a 
number o f  people urging him to do som ething to prevent the Second Stage o f  the SU EK from  
going ahead, on the grounds that the project w as outdated and violated legislation on the 
environm ent and other regulations. Sharing their concern, Pitushkin requested that the issue be 
exam ined by the relevant com m issions o f  the Supreme Soviet.
A  Green Group also emerged in N ikolaev - the oblast centre - in the summer o f  1988. In an 
interview with the author, Anatolii Zolotukhin, its current chairman, recalled the peculiar w ay in 
which the group came into being. Follow ing the XIX Party Conference in June/July 1988, oblast 
party First Secretary Leonid Sharaev addressed a m eeting in the H ouse o f  Political Education  
(Dom  Politizveshchenia), stating that: T am not in a position to save our river’. Ukrainian Party 
representatives, am ongst whom  was Boris Oliinyk, a Ukrainian writer, had expressed concern 
about plans to continue the construction o f  nuclear reactors in Ukraine after the Chernobyl 
accident - to little avail. Shortly after the Party Conference the Soviet Deputy M inister o f  Nuclear  
Energy travelled to N ikolaev and informed the oblast leadership that a decision had been made to 
go ahead with Stage Three o f  the SU EK (reactors 5 and 6). fo llow ing the com pletion o f  Stage 
Two, and that this decision w as fmal" '^. According to Bilodid, the obkom o f  the CPU had already 
in the summer o f  1985, shortly after plans for the Second Stage o f  the SU EK were elaborated,
""No. 1-3/4. 8.9.1988.
See Suslova’s speech at meeting in Nikolaev on 25.12.1988 in flanKa 66: TeKcrbi nhicrvnJieuHM no 
're.aenm[eiiuio. iioioiajioü M.nenon 3A. nuci^ Ma 'rDv;niLiiHxc}i u sanimv nonnoaii u DasvMHoro paiinn'ina 
a'lOMiiOH 3iiepreTMKH. available in the Nikolaev state archives.
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tried to conv ince the Sov iet authorities that four nuclear reactors represented the absolute limit o f
what the oblast could handle, thus arguing against the construction o f  reactors N o. 5 and 6. In his 
.view , though, they failed due to the poor way in which the case was argued.
;The N ikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir was initiated in July 1988 when an initiative group was 
established under the auspices o f  the N ikolaev branches o f  the Soviet Culture Fund (Sovetskii 
Fond Kultury) and the Ukrainian W riters’ Union. The group numbered 25 people, am ongst whom  
were representatives o f  the M useum o f  Local Lore, the N ikolaev Shipbuilding Institute (NK I), the 
N ikolaev Pedagogical Institute, the oblast Environmental Inspectorate, the M inistry o f  Health’s 
Sanepidemstantsia, the local radio and TV, as w ell as the oblast CPU. It is peculiar that the CPU  
was on the list o f  initiators. As shown in Chapter Three, Greens in various parts o f  Ukraine agree
that the CPU was not entirely positive about the em erging green groups. In N ikolaev, though, care
■'I-i:was taken not to irritate the CPU in any way. In order to avoid trouble, oblast CPU First Secretary Leonid Sharaev was informed in due course that Zelenyi Mir was in the making. A s a result, 
Gennadii Lepikov o f  the obkom propaganda department attended the founding m eeting on 22 
September 1988. Greens from Pervomaisk, V oznesensk and luzhnoukrainsk, with whom  contacts 
had been established during the summer o f  1988, were also represented. The writer Vladimir 
B oiko and Anatolii Zolotukhin, representing the Culture Fund, were elected joint leaders"^ ,^ and a 
programme and statute were endorsed. The founders o f  Zelenyi Mir justified  the em ergence o f  
their group by referring to Lenin, according to whom
.Zelenyi M > ’s motto: ’the ideas o f  ecology to the m asses, was also derived from Lenin. Som e 181 
members were registered on 22 September .
The Greens o f  Pervomaisk, V oznesensk and luzhnoukrainsk joined forces with N ikolaev, and 
the N ikolaev group received the status o f  oblast group, o f  which the others were local branches. 
The organisational structure was very loose, though, facilitating co-operation rather than 
subordination. Local groups had and have a great deal o f  autonomy, and links between the oblast 
and the local groups are characterised by an exchange o f  information rather than by orders.
In interviews Zolotukhin has confirmed that at the initial stage they had little contact with 
Greens in K iev. This is partially explained by the fact that Zelenyi Mir in luzhnoukrainsk was
--------------------------------------See resolution from ecological meeting in Nikolaev (25.12.1988) addressed to the oblast TV.
See summary of yMpeiiUTe-RLiioe cobpaiine. 22.9.1988, and flnoTOKoa codnaiimi aicojiormieCKom 
obmecma. No. 1,22.9.1988.
T
■-t’O
registered as early as in Decem ber 1988 - 10 months prior to the First Congress o f  Zelenyi Svit. 
Zelenyi Mir in N ikolaev was also registered early. Contacts had, however, already been 
established with Anatolii Panov (see Chapter Three) in 1988. Bilodid w as put in touch with him 
through Valentin Smaha - a journalist on Robitnychna hazeta, who, together with another 
journalist, Anatolii K olesnik o f  Inzhnaia pravda, had actively taken part in the campaign against 
the proposed Danube-Dniepr Canal. N o closer co-operation was, however, initiated until early 
1989, when Bilodid stood for elections to the U SSR  Supreme Soviet, standing against First 
Secretary o f  the CPU obkom Leonid Sharaev. In order to take part in the elections as a 
representative o f  Zelenyi Mir in luzhnoukrainsk, the organisation had to be registered as part o f  an 
all-Ukrainian organisation. K iev was then contacted, and Zelenyi Mir becam e a collective  member 
o f  Zelenyj Svit. Apart from being a formal member, there was little contaet between K iev and the 
N ikolaev oblast until after the First Congress in October 1989, when Zolotukhin was elected to the 
leadership o f  Zelenyi Svit. A s w ill be seen below, the local Greens them selves obtained relevant 
information for their campaign, and were not provided with such information by the Greens in 
Kiev,
The strategy o f  the Greens in the initial stage o f  the campaign can be summarised as follow s: 
first, valid arguments against further expansion o f  the SU EK had to be collected. Then these had 
to be circulated to the general public so as to gain m ass support for the cause, and, finally, these 
arguments had to be presented to the political authorities in charge o f  decision-m aking.
A major argument used by the Greens at this stage was that the project for expanding the SU  
EK in its present form constituted a violation o f  a number o f  Ukrainian laws, in addition to failing  
to com ply with more recent (i.e. post-Chernobyl) standards for protecting the environm ent and 
securing nuclear safety. Thus the demands made by the environm entalists for the project to be re­
exam ined and assessed against stricter requirements than had been applied when the project was 
originally drafted. Reactor N o. 3 at luzhnoukrainsk was already under construction, so the Greens 
chose - for tactical reasons - to leave this reactor out o f  their cam paign and rather focus on 
preventing the rest o f  the Second Stage o f  the SU EK from being implemented"^"^.
6.2.2 Letter-Writing Campaign, Petitioning and Meetings.
F ollow ing the signature cam paign conducted in luzhnoukrainsk and other areas in the vicin ity  o f  
.the nuclear power station and increasing publicity around the SU EK, various m inistries started
------------------------------------
Zolotukhin has later expressed regret that Reactor No, 3 was not included in the campaign, but at the time 
the Greens concluded that in order to be successful they would have to bargain - thus ‘giving’ up the 
reactor so as to prevent the rest of the project from going ahead.
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receiving letters from concerned locals. On the basis o f  these letters, Derzhkompriroda made it 
clear that plans to build the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs for cooling purposes 
violated the ‘Sanitary Rules and Norm s 3907-857  Furthermore, as the SU EK w as situated in a 
region generally short o f  water, the water deficit would increase. Fish stock in the South Bug river 
would suffer as a result. There was also the possibility that engineering and geological conditions 
in the area o f  the nuclear power station itself might deteriorate as a result o f  the construction o f  the 
Konstantinov reservoir. On the basis o f  such evidence, the Chairman o f  Derzhkompriroda, Dina 
Protsenko, recommended that a re-examination o f  the project be conducted"^^.
In response to all the letters received from locals in the vicinity o f  the nuclear power station, 
the Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters ordered the U SSR  Gosplan together with Ukrainian 
Minvodkhoz, Derzhkomrpriroda, the Academ y o f  Sciences and the N ikolaev obiispolkom  to 
exam ine the issues addressed in these letters. In a letter to Bilodid the Deputy Chairman o f  
Gosplan, V. Antonov, summed up the findings o f  this examination: ‘several republican ministries 
and departments have concluded that it would be desirable to conduct a repeated experts’ 
exam ination o f  the EK project, taking into account current norms and rules’. The Ukrainian 
Gosplan^^ had therefore ‘requested’ the U SSR  M inistry o f  N uclear Energy to exam ine the 
questions raised in letters from worried citizens o f  luzhnoukrainsk and provide Ukrainian Gosplan 
with suggestions based on the ‘Requirements for the Location o f  N uclear Power Stations’ and the 
Resolution on Urgent Measures to improve the use o f  Water Resources in the country
The Green M ovem ent was, as mentioned above, registered through the Culture Fund and the 
W riters’ Union. It was therefore natural that cultural aspects o f  the SU EK were given  proper 
attention. The Greens thus received positive replies from the Academ y o f  S cien ces’ Institute o f  
Archaeology supporting their concern about the Second Stage o f  the SU EK. A  report forwarded 
to Zelenyi Mir by the Deputy Director, S. Kryzhinskii"^^, stated that an archaeological expedition  
consisting o f  experts from the Academ y o f  Sciences had exam ined the area where the Aleksandrov  
and the Konstantinov reservoirs were to be built, in 1969, and that 98 ancient cites from various 
historical epochs had been found. O f these 47 had been partially excavated. These findings were 
o f  particular value as they were located in one o f  the archaeologically m ost interesting and 
significant areas o f  Ukraine; the Central part o f  the Northern Black Sea Coast (Severnoe  
Prichernoinore), situated between the ancient cultures o f  the Balkan-Danube and the steppes o f  
Eurasia. This area had been densely populated for tens o f  thousands o f  years. The Battle o f
No. 9-7-463. 10.8.1988. 
No. 29-7/109. 15.7.1988. 
No. 25-50/119 of 5.8.1988.
Letter of 5.11.1988 in response to No. 36 of 26.9.1988.
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Zaporizhzhia took place there, which served as the forepost o f  the Zaporizhzhia C ossacks. The 
Institute o f  Archaeology therefore held the opinion that the building o f  the two reservoirs would 
cause ‘ irreplaceable damage not only to the archaeology and the history o f  the ancient peoples o f  
Ukraine and to Ukraine’ but would also destroy som e o f  the m ost sign ificant archaeolog ical sites 
w hich could provide insights into how the ancient civilisations o f  the Old World had developed.
The N ikolaev M useum o f  local lore, history and econom y expressed similar views"^ .^ In an 
article in Leninske plemia one o f  its representatives, V. Hrebennikov, in an article printed in 
Leninske plemia voiced concern with the future o f  37 unique archaeological monum ents, m ost o f  
w hich were o f  all-Soviet significance, and m ost o f  which had not yet been exam ined. On this 
basis, he recommended that the reservoirs not be built. In a follow -up, printed as a letter in 
hizhnaia pravda  ( ‘Sokhranim luzhnyi B ug’)^°, Hrebennikov focused on the archaeological work 
that had so far been conducted in the area. Due to a lack o f  experts, inadequate funding and 
technical means and tight tim e-schedules, the unique settlem ent o f  T ash lyk-1 and several other 
sites had been flooded without having been properly exam ined. Sites located in the areas
B. rpebeiiUKOB, ‘CKapbu uavrs n ia  noav’. Jleiiiiichiœ mieMJi, 1.10.1988, c 1. 
lOmmn npmAih 4.1.1989, c 4.
lOmiRH [Jpaim, 13.10.1988, c 3.
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designated for the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs were threatened by the sam e fate, as 
eonstruction work was already scheduled for July 1989.
The zoologists were not positive either about the two planned reservoirs^’. According to S. 
Tarashuk o f  the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Scien ces’ Institute o f  Z oology, up to 50 species o f  flora 
and fauna included in the Ukrainian Red Book o f  rare species (44 o f  w hich were also listed in the 
Soviet Red Book) had been sighted in the area to be flooded. To recreate their habitat elsew here  
would be im possible. N ot only would the flora and the fauna disappear, but so also would the 
entire environment o f  the Pobuzhzhia granite-steppe, with the loss o f  the river’s only rapids.
The Soviet and Ukrainian M inistries o f  G eology also expressed serious concerns about the 
expansion o f  the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. GlavKGU Ukrgeologia held the opinion  
that such an expansion was inadmissible, given the heightened seism icity  in the area and big 
changes in engineering-geological conditions. M oreover, the site chosen for the nuclear power 
station did not fully com ply with the ‘Requirements for the Location o f  Nuclear Power Stations’, 
as there was a high natural level o f  ground water (points 2.3, 2 .6) and also highly developed  
irrigated farming in the area, which contributed to (unacceptable) changes in the ground water 
regim e (point 2.2.3). With regard to the possibility o f  earthquakes, the seism icity  had been 
estim ated at five points on the Soviet scale during planning and construction o f  the First Stage o f  
the nuclear power station. During the last tw o centuries, though, more than 20 severe earthquakes
had taken place, o f  which the most serious ones had occurred in 1802 (7.5 on the Richter scale) 
and 1940 (7 .4  on the Richter scale). The se ism icity o f  the South Ukrainian nuclear power station 
should therefore be raised to between six  and seven on R ichter’s scale. What was more, the 
nuclear power station was located in an anom alous mantle zone o f  the North-Eastern extension, 
which in turn was dynam ically linked to the earthquake zone o f  the Rumanian Vranch mountains. 
Earthquakes o f  more than seven points could thus not be excluded.
From a geological-engineering point o f  view , the area was also not very w ell suited for a 
nuclear power station. The area was prone to landslides and erosion as w ell as flooding. Due to 
the extensive constructic.i work that had been carried out in the are zones were created causing 
the warm ing o f  the ground. Another factor contributing to this problem would be the backwater 
(head o f  water) o f  the South Bug river and the fluctuations o f  the water in the river and o f  the 
ground water caused by the (dynam ic) operation o f  the reservoirs.
Due to these factors, another one or two points on the Richter scale would have to be added to 
the projected seism icity. Serious negative and irreversible changes o f  the regional geological 
environm ent could also be predicted. Based on this, the USSR M inistry o f  G eology recommended 
that the reliability o f  construction work already carried out at the nuclear power station be 
reassessed^^.
Similar v iew s were held by the Soviet Academ y o f  Sciences, arguing that ‘the SU EK is 
situated at the junction o f  the break o f  the North-Eastern and North-W estern extensions, and 
Reactor N o. 2 is situated in the m iddle o f  the seism ologically  active break o f  the Rumanian 
Vraneh-zone, which increases the seism icity  o f  the area to at least seven or eight points on the 
Richter sca le’
,'Tr"
6.2.3 Dialogue: Pro-Environment vs. Pro-Nuclear Lobbies.
A s w ill be shown below , Zelenyi Mir won support for its claim s o f  legal violations and received  
new  arguments in support o f  its cause from several institutions: the Ukrainian Glavvodresiirsov 
(M ain Water Resources Directorate), Minvodkhoz (Ministry o f  Water Resources), Ukrzemprojekt 
(Ukrainian Soil Project Directorate), the Ukrainian Goskompriroda, Ukrgeologia (Ukrainian 
M inistry o f  G eology) and three institutes within the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Sciences: the Institutes
--------------------------------------
See letter from y K p a u iiC K o e  T j ia B iio e  K o o D iiu n a iiH O H iio e  T e o n o r u g e e K o e  y n p a u j t e n u e  N K P r e o j i o r m i ’ of
11.5.1989 tNo. 16/3-LCN) labelled ‘i l .r ia  c a v x e b n o i x )  no .ri]> 3onatiua’ to the CC o f the Ukrainian 
Communist Party in response t o  No. 5/681 of 19.4.1989 ‘f l p e i J io x c e î i H a  ic '.la ia iiO H eiiH io  i ia  
paciuH|3eiiHe lOaoio-yKDaMUCKOH ABC’. 
lOmmn iipanjm, 27.7.1989, c. 2-3.
600
o f  Archaeology, Z oology and Ecology. Trade unions and workers’ co llectives also favoured a re­
exam ination o f  the plans for the Second Stage o f  the SU EK, as did a substantial proportion o f  the 
people o f  the N ikolaev oblast. I w ill refer to these institutions and the Greens as the pro­
environm ent lobby.
The pro-environment lobby was opposed by what w ill be referred to as the pro-nuclear lobby. 
This lobby was com posed o f  the leadership o f  the nuclear power station (General Director Fuks), 
the Ukrainian Minatomenergo (M inistry o f  Nuclear Energy), the Ukrainian Minenergo (M inistry 
o f  Energy), the Gosatom (the State Com mittee on Nuclear Energy), the Gidroproekt Institute 
(Kharkiv), the Atomenergoproekt Institute (M oscow ), the Institute o f  Nuclear Energy and a 
majority o f  the staff o f  the nuclear power station.
These two lobbies appealed both to the public and to party-and decision-m aking bodies at 
four administrative levels: local, oblast, republic and Soviet. Below , I w ill first look at the process 
o f  coalition-building and the debate that took place between the two lobbies. Then I w ill exam ine 
their interaction with party and other political organs and the outcom e o f  these dealings.
Much o f  the debate that follow ed the em ergence o f  the Green M ovem ent took place in the 
local press. In late 1987 Inzhnaia pravda started a colum n called ‘the Nuclear Power Station and 
u s’. The man in charge o f  this colum n was V. K olesnik (referred to above), a journalist who had 
earlier been a leading figure in the campaign against the Danube-Dniepr Canal. Although initially  
the newspaper was som ewhat cautious about what to print, this changed as the Greens won the 
support o f  the A cadem y o f  Sciences, various ministries and departments and were able to refer to 
these. The petition organised in the summer o f  1988 also helped in this respect, as did the fact that 
members o f  the cultural elite o f  N ikolaev joined the Green M ovem ent. After the XIX Party 
Conference at the end o f  June 1988, glasnost expanded and it becam e easier to publish 
controversial materials. Local newspapers like Vechernii Nikolaev, Korablestroitel, Energetik 
(luzhnoukrainsk), and Pribuzhkii Kommunar (Pervom aisk) also started to publish information 
about the actions organised by the Greens. Letters and articles written by Green M ovem ent 
m embers and other opponents o f  plans to expand the SU EK were printed, as w ell as those o f  
supporters o f  these plans.
The first information about Zelenyi Mir in luzhnoukrainsk started to appear in the summer o f  
1988. On 2 June, the local newspaper Energetik published an article by Tatiana Dorozhina under 
the headline, ‘E cology and u s’. Dorozhina quoted Academ ician Borys Sokolov o f  the Department 
o f  G eology, G eophysics, Technology and M ining Sciences o f  the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Sciences, 
who held the v iew  that there was no ecological culture either in Ukraine or elsew here in the USSR. 
Thanks to glasnost, however, information about the destructive attitude o f  Man towards nature was
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being made accessib le. The article proceeded to exam ine the Second Stage o f  the SU EK and the 
impact the construction o f  the two new reservoirs would have on the river and its habitat:
rie |)i3a;i cm peA h ïOüxiio-yKpauJicKOH A 3 C  p a n o ia e r  im ox.ia/isviem ioH  
BOJie Tani.ihiKCKoro n o jio x p a n n .in iu a .a o  ; iu i  ii^ctca BTOpon o'lepejiu  
9T0H BOitu Me xaaTHT. B osnH K aer iieodxoiiM V iocrb crp oM T earcm a  
MOBhix 'rexMMaecicHx noiioeviOB. 3 t o  H:}viennT pe/K n \i. peKn. 4 5  km  
IvoucTaMTHiioncKoro uojioxpaiiii.iH iL ia, iioK psioaer a re  .lec iib ie  b ep era  
peiCH, H csesn er  aacrb yiiMKa.abHOi'o a.iiiimiicKor-o .la iuuua iln-a c  e i ’o  
iienoiiTopnî)iM pacTHTe.'u>iibiM n >KMnoTnbiM viupoM. Bfi.iM su ro p o a a  
ÏO^KnoyicpaniicK mt^KCM iiojiBHTbcii e iu e  oyaiii rexnuMecK iist Bojioevi.
K y ;ia  6 y / i y r  i io a a j ia T b  c d p o c b i  npoM bim .ae iinb ix  iipe;u i]3H aT H ii c  Be]>xoB 
e e  peKM. no^iiiH M aeTCH  y p o n e n b  rp y n r o B i. ix  b o æ  fE v ie n e H u e  j}e>KM.via 
pcK H , Ko.:iMMecTBa BO/ibi, iiO B biujeM ne T e M iie p a ry p b i. M o r y r  np u B ecT H  k  
T fi^Ke.ibiM noc.'ieitcrB H fiM . f lo B 'ro v iy  bcbm  i i a u  iiaAO cep b e ;B io  
:?a;iyviaTiiC}i, icaic c o x p a i m r i .  c y m e c rB y io M iy io  a K o .io i’M aecK yio  
o b cra riO B K y ^ ".
Dorozhina then informed her readers that in order to save the environm ent for future 
generations an ecolog ical com m ittee w as in the process o f  being set up in luzhnoukrainsk. Any  
person w ish ing to take part in the work o f  the com m ittee could becom e a member.
G iven that Energetik was the newspaper o f  the workers at the SU EK and thus had a pro- 
nuclear bent, it is am azing that such outspoken criticism o f  the Second Stage o f  the EK was 
allow ed to appear in print at all. It can be explained by recalling the con text in wh ich the Green 
group emerged: namely as an initiative o f  people working at the nuclear power plant w ho were not 
opposed to nuclear power itse lf but rather worried about the negative consequences that flood ing  
parts o f  the valley o f  the river at luzhnoukrainsk would have. That, however, did not mean that 
Bilod id and his in itiative group, which united nine people, had the support o f  the top m anagement 
o f  the nuclear power station or o f  the local com m un ist party leadership.
Although the Greens were treated sym pathetically by representatives o f  the media, this did
"■ .1not mean that they had unrestricted access to these. A  bulletin - Bhilletin - was launched in the
autumn to inform members o f  what was happening w ithin the m ovem en t and around the SU EK.
.The first bulletin carried ev idence o f  such restrictions. On 10 October, for instance, the 
propaganda unit o f  the oblast TV had planned to air a programme about the SU EK. In the end, 
however, the programme was held back. Instead, a programme about new technolog ies was 
broadcast. A la Korzheva, who reported on nuclear power and the South Ukrainian nuclear power 
station, revealed in interviews with the author that she had several fights with her boss over her 
reports, as he was reluctant to broadcast them. A similar situation occurred in luzhnoukrainsk two
:SiiepremK, 2.6.1988, c 4.
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days later, when the oblast radio did a report on the SU EK. A t exactly 6:30 p.m., when the report 
started, the feeder in luzhnoukrainsk was reported to have short-circuited. Towards the end o f  the 
report, at 7 p.m., the feeder was ‘restored’. This was interpreted by the Greens as no
coincidence^^.
general public and to workers’ co llectives for vocal and practical support. On the other, when  
their access to the media was being restricted, they referred to the 19th Party Conference and to
Tenepb 3a;i,aqa c o c t o h t  b t o m ,  m to 6 i)1 nee ;ie.ia n crpaiie pema.tHCb
55 Biojifiermi ^ 0 . I 'IOacimm (Dpoiir 3eJiein>ix\ c. 1.
This is a quote from the 19th Party Conference, cited by Vladimir Boiko at an ecological meeting in 
Nikolaev on 25.12.1988.
See Bossnanue s a  HHicG.naencKOH o6.naci'u OSpameiiMe k  ^ le J ie ra ra M  o6.aacnibix u pauonnbix oqeTiio- 
nbiBopiibix napTHHiibix KOiKbepeniiMH. April 1989. 
lOmiuH npasAa, 27.7.1989, c. 3.
See Biojmereiib No. 1, 'IOmiuaiî (Pponr 3e.nenbix‘.
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The Greens approached this situation in two ways: on the one hand they appealed to the
the resolution on glasnost, arguing that restrictions imposed upon them contradicted these. All
.information regarding the SU EK should be made available, as the Party Conference had decided  
that
iiap o ;to M  H ero iio.'nioMOMiibiMM iipeitcrai}M Te.uiM M . iiaxoiw.iucb iio ii e r o  
iio.'iubiM  jteH crn e iiiib iM  K O irrpo .ieM ^^.
.On another occasion it was argued that the 19th Party Conference had clearly expressed itself 
in favour o f  the immediate solution o f  such an important task as the protection o f  the environment 
by the Com munist Party and informal groups working together^^. Members o f  the public were 
urged to participate actively in the fight to save the South Bug river on the grounds that 
perestroika provided them with a chance, equipped with the Law on Local Self-governm ent, to 
protect their children from radiation and to defend their right to a future^
To justify  the campaign and to gain support for their cause, the Greens frequently made
references to the new policies o f  glasnost and démocratisation. In the First Bulletin o f  the Inzhnyi 
Front Zelenykh, for instance, appeals were made to people to implement perestroika through their 
deeds:
dae.M nepeci'poHKy iia ;ie.Tc' Üaeiub iioA.nHiiiiyio r j ia c u o c T b !
dKo.ioimaecKMe SeiiCTDua coxpaanor n a iu y  riJianexy. cranuiyio 
C-smuiKOM Teciiou! Bojibi! Bosjiyxa! Bncroro iieSaP
In the initial stage o f  the campaign, the Greens and their supporters found it som ewhat 
d ifficult to vo ice  their concerns through the newspaper Inzhnaia pravda. The workers’ collective  
o f  Ekvator, for instance, found that controversial parts o f  a letter written to the paper had been 
om itted in the published version. A  second letter, in which ihe workers’ co llective urged the paper 
to print the text in full, later appeared ‘uncensored’ in the paper. The workers expressed concern 
that ed iting the letter without their consent contradicted point 5 o f  the ‘Resolution on G lasnost’, 
endorsed by the 19th Party Conference. More glasnost was urged in the case o f  luzhnoukrainsk.
The cond itions for glasnost had been facilitated by the Party Conference:
He MOvKCM cKasaTh, aro ancicyccna concevi iie ue;ieTCii, no uce Æe n
3T0VI nonpoce rasera ;iewcToyeT ueuee aKTHuiio, aevî, uaiipHuep. no 
nonponiM Anenpo-ByrcKoro rmipoys.ta"".
Glasnost and démocratisation very much gained their own momentum in Sov iet politics from  
late 1987 onwards. This was the case also in N ikolaev oblast, where the Greens and other activists 
used these two concepts to justify  and to broaden the debate on the Second Stage o f  the SU EK.
Anatolii Zolotukhin, who worked as an engineer at the Ekvator enterprise, managed to
activate his fellow  em ployees prior to Zelenyi Mir being formally established. On 11 August 1988 
Inzhnaia pravda published an open letter signed by 1,412 workers and carrying the heading ‘N o  to 
Further Construction!’ The workers stated their support for the Greens, arguing that the Second  
Stage o f  the SU EK was inadm issible on a number o f  grounds: firstly, as the region was already 
suffering from an acute shortage o f  water, the South Bug river was unable to provide any more 
water for the nuclear power station for reactor cooling purposes. The situation was further 
aggravated by the fact that high summer temperatures in the area caused considerable evaporation 
from the cooling pond, thus requiring more water. Secondly, due to salinisation, it w ould be 
im possible to use water from the Aleksandrov reservoir for irrigation. Thirdly, there were serious 
moral aspects connected to the expansion plans: according to the Soviet M inister o f  N uclear 
Energy, N . Lukonin, the nuclear power station would operate for roughly another 30-40 years. But 
w ould not destroying the South Bug in exchange for 30-40 years o f  electricity supplies be too high 
a price to pay? Besides, the death o f  the South Bug would also be the death o f  the history o f  the
.area (nashego rodnogo kraia - my em phasis), as dozens o f  archaeological sites o f  global
significance would be lost. The sam e fate awaited the ‘national pride o f  the Ukrainian p eop le’, the
:
See ‘0  paciiiHpeuMM i^naciiocru. BTonoe OTKpuroe nuCLMO paOoTiiuKOB HO BicBaTop peviaKunu raseTi.t 
IQ>kiiqh npaBiibf. in lOmian npmmi, 13.9.1988, c. 1.
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M ihiia cliffs, with which the history o f  the Cossacks and the Haidamaka moveiTient^’’, as well as 
the legend o f  the hoard o f  the native defender Cossack Mamai, captured on the island, were 
connected.
The petition called for a national park to be set up in the area. On the territory o f  the national 
park, archaeological, historical and tourist bases should be created. The Konstantinov and 
Aleksandrov reseivoirs must under no circumstance be built. Public surveys should be conducted  
to check people’s attitudes towards plans to expand the EK and a special session o f  the oblast 
soviet should be called, the decision o f  wh ich should be sent to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. 
F inally, the workers o f  Ekvator appealed to the people o f  Kherson, Odessa, K irovohrad and 
Dnipropetrovsk oblasts for support^^.
Although Inzhnaia pravda published the letter, controversial parts were omitted. The 
workers o f  Ekvator were unhappy w ith the fact that their letter was not printed in full, and sent a 
second letter to the editor, relating their experience to glasnost. The letter appeared in print on 13 
September under the heading ‘On the w iden ing o f  glasnost’. The workers pointed out that by 
ed iting the letter without their consent, the editors o f  Inzhnaia pravda violated point 5 o f  the 
R esolution on Glasnost, endorsed by the X IX  Party Conference. M ore glasnost w as urged on the 
South Ukrainian nuclear power station, the cond itions for wh ich had been facilitated by the Party 
Conference;
He M02K6M CKUSaTb, BTÜ AHCKyCCMH COBCCM 110 OeiieTCfl, 110 BCe x e  B 
3'roM uonpoce r a s e ra  A eucm yeT  weiiee aicrnBiio, aeM, iianpuM ep, no 
BonpocaM A nenpo-B yrcK oro rM2ipoyc.tia"7
The editorial board o f  Inzhnaia pravda, in a note com m enting on the case, wrote that it was a
class lesson for the editorial board. Gratitude w as expressed towards the workers o f  Ekvator for
pointing out this infringement o f  glasnost and people were invited to take part in an open
.d iscussion about the SU EK so that all the points in favour and against could be properly aired.
lOxiioH HpaBiibi’. lOAvmin tipaim, 13.9.1988, c. 1.
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The Haidamaka movement refers to groups of people organised by the Zaporizhzhia Cossacks which 
instigated popular uprisings against the Polish regime, in control of the Ukrainian right-bank in the 18th
century. The pretext for these uprisings were numerous obligations imposed upon ordinary people by Polish 
magnates, nobles and Jewish stewards, and also their abuse of power. Dissatisfaction grew among common 
people, serfs, peasants and impoverished Cossacks, artisans, petty burghers and agricultural colonists, who 
fled from their oppressors into the Steppes and forests. They moved swiftly from one area to another, 
attacking the enemy and disappearing into the wild. They won the general support o f the Ukrainian people and also o f Orthodox monks and priests, prevented from free exercise of their faith. For more details, see 
Volodymyr Kubijovyc (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1988), vol. II, pp. 111-112.
lOmmn npaim, 11.8.1988, c, 2.
See ‘O nacuiHpenHH iMiaciiourn - Bronoe OTKObiToe nncbMO paBoiuMKon HO Bicn^roo neiiaKUHH raaei'bi
■II
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See ‘Ha oaïone oSbeKTHniii.ix PRaJibiiocTeH’. IOmuhsi npiiBAa, 13.9.1988, c. 1.
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The points omitted in the first letter from Ek\>ator were d isclosed: the building o f  a third and
fourth reactor at SU EK caused doubts as to whether or not the Tashlyk cooling pond would be
.adequate for cooling all the reactors. The time had com e to introduce econom ic self-rule in
.N ikolaev oblast. Only then could giants as Minvodkhoz (the M inistry o f  Water Resources),
Minatomenergo (M inistry o f  Nuclear Energy) and Mintsvetmet (M inistry o f  M etallurgy) be
stopped so that local interests could be fully secured. The letter was signed by 28 members o f  the
council o f  the workers’ collective‘s"’.
To em phasise its com m itm ent to glasnost, Inzhnaia pravda printed an open letter from the
workers at the nuclear power station next to that o f  the workers o f  Elevator. The workers claim ed
that the public did not posses enough information about the developm ent o f  nuclear energy and its
global position. This, they claim ed, had resulted in a biased approach towards the nuclear power
station in luzhnoukrainsk. The newspaper was accused o f  contributing to this biased approach by
not passing on facts, but rather interpretations o f  what would be the impact o f  the Second Stage o f
the SU EK. To set the record straight, it was argued that most countries were continuing their
nuclear power schem es follow ing the accident at Chernobyl, m axim ising nuclear safety. This was
also the case in the Soviet Union, where reactor output had been delayed due to stricter safety
measures. A s a matter o f  fact, several countries had stopped building thermal power stations as a
result o f  the harm these caused the environment. The site for the SU  EK was considered the
O ptim al c h o ic e  on th e  b a s is  o f  s e v e r a l  fa c to r s , su c h  a s  p r o x im ity  to  th e  e n e r g y  c o n s u m e r s ,
.geological factors, atmospheric conditions, and others. The cite had been approved by a com plex  
com m ission. To be on the safe side, a State Expert Com m ission had exam ined the Second Stage 
o f  the SU EK in 1985 and sanctioned it. On this basis, the workers recom m ended that Reactors 
N o. 3 and 4 be com pleted and attached to the electrical grid as originally planned. Finally,
... -productivity was linked to the availability o f  electricity; it was not a coincidence that Am erica, 
which had the highest output o f  electricity per capita, also ranked highest in terms o f  productivity 
in industry. Industrial output could only be improved in the Soviet U nion by means o f  expanding  
the country’s nuclear capacity. The readers o f  Inzhnaia pravda were urged to discuss SU EK not 
based on em otions, but based on facts and realities. The letter was signed by seven high-ranking  
officia ls at the nuclear power station, amongst whom  was the chairman o f  the trade union, V.
Podbudnyi^^.
The letter triggered o ff  an indignant response - from workers at the nuclear power station! In 
an open letter sent to the workers o f  Ekvator and to the editorial board o f  Inzhnaia pravda, and
Ibid.
See ‘Or HMeiiH Ko.ri.neKTMna h.bh HcropHfi oaiiOH nv6.RHKaiiHH’. 31.10.1988. This letter was sent to a 
number of workers collectives in the oblast, so as to make the contents widely known in case the 
newspaper refused to print it.
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signed by 61 people, am ongst them V. Belosheikin, whose name had been put on it which  
appeared in print in hizhnaia pravda just shortly before, the v iew  that the letter represented the 
opin ion o f  the workers at luzhnoukrainsk was challenged. Most people at the nuclear power 
station favoured an independent ecological expert assessm ent o f  the Second Stage, and it therefore 
seem ed unlikely that many workers would have signed the letter. As a matter o f  fact, rather than 
risking a poor response by collecting signatures, the leadership appeared once again to have used 
the old method o f  presenting the v iew s o f  som e leaders as the collective view . W hich right did V. 
Podbudnyi have to sign the letter on behalf o f  all the workers? And how com e that V. 
Beloshe ikin, w hose signature was attached to the letter, saw it for the first time when he read the 
front page o f  hizhnaia pravdal
A s for the Second Stage itself, there had been d isagreement as far back as 1979, when the 
project w as exam ined. H owever, in those days it was im possible to d issent, so in the end 
‘agreem ent’ prevailed. The signatories pointed out that it was people in luzhnoukrainsk and 
Pervomaisk who had appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Sov iet with a request to conduct an 
expert inquiry on the project, and that, as a result, the Ukrainian Gosplan had sent a letter to the
I
U SSR  Minatomenergo on 15 July asking it to set the dates and the extent o f  such an expert 
assessm ent. Minatomenergo, though, was in no hurry, as it was more concerned w ith catching up 
w ith the United States in terms o f  energy output. The letter printed in hizhnaia pravda  should 
probably be taken as a sign o f  the bureaucracy trying to operate within the new boundaries set by 
glasnost and démocratisation.
D iscussions in the various units at the nuclear power station revealed clearly that people were 
d ism ayed w ith the letter. Protocol N o. 21 o f  a m eeting o f  the party members in reactor unit N o 1 
on 2 September 1988, at which a draft letter to the Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters regarding the 
re-exam ination o f  the SU EK, was discussed, serves as a good example; the heads o f  the unit 
shifts, the ch ie f engineers and the heads o f  the reactor shifts did not approve o f  the letter. The 
m eeting decided to lobby the party com m ittee and the leadership o f  the nuclear power station into 
writing a letter to the Ukrainian Council o f  Minister requesting that the Second Stage be re­
exam ined with the aim o f  not building the two reservoirs and to im plem ent alternative cooling  
system s at the nuclear power station so as to not use so much water. The m eeting would not 
object to the Second and Third Stages on the condition that the South Bug river remained 
untouched. Finally, the m eeting decided to request Goskompriroda to establish a nature reserve 
along the river in the area o f  Pervomaisk and Voznesensk^*^.
--------------------------------------
The response from the 61 workers, however, did not d iscourage the leadership at the nuclear 
power station from using collective letters as a means by which to challenge the v iew  o f  the 
Greens and the public. On 8 Decem ber hizhnaia pravda again printed an open letter from the 
workers at luzhnoukrainsk. The letter complained that the public was being exposed to a 
m isinformation campaign This campaign apparently also had an effec t on the workers at the SU 
EK, then
Hvieiomaa viecro ;ie3U]i(l)opviauMJi odmeciaeiiiioro viiieuHfi aiiocur 
iiepaoGiocTb M pasyipaxeuaoci'b a Ko.i.'ieicmBbi u crpoH re.ibiii.ix 
Ka/ipoB IT xiio -yK pauH C K oro  SaeproK ouii.ieK ca - a a x i io ro  
iiapoiiiioxoBHHCTBeiiiioi’O odbeK'ra. Taicaji odcraiiouK a iie .viO/i<er 
CUOCodCTBOBaTb MOdM.'iraaLlMH KO.'I.'ieKTHBOB lia BiilllO.llieilHe CBOUX 
o5ji3aTe.Ti.cTB no odeciieMeuHio itaiie>KHOH padoTbi koviii. leKca...
N o matter which parameters were used, nuclear and hydroelectric energy remained safer and 
environm entally much cleaner than other methods o f  generating electricity. Between 1980-85 the 
SU EK project had undergone a series o f  examinations. However, the U SSR  Council o f  Ministers 
had decided to conduct a new expert assessm ent o f  the Second Stage and it was the prerogative o f  
the Council o f  M inisters to do so. Still, the workers felt that the discussion around the SU EK was 
not very precise, especially  in terms o f  technical details, creating som e kind o f  a scare scenario for 
what would be the consequences o f  the Aleksandrov and the Konstantinov reservoirs. By writing 
the letter, the workers hoped to contribute with som e clarity to the debate^^.
A  majority was against further expansion, however. The workers at E h ’ator inspired workers 
elsew here to fo llow  their exam ple, and in the next few  w eeks a number o f  similar letters and 
petitions emerged on the pages o f  hizhnaia pravda. For instance, 1,696 signatures were collected  
in the course o f  three days at the enterprise ‘the 60th anniversary o f  the U S S R ’. T. Kashinkova o f  
the Biuro o f  Estethics, who signed the letter on their behalf, claim ed that nobody remained 
indifferent to Ekvator's appeal. She and her fellow  workers demanded that the oblast soviet as 
soon as possible call a special session with the participation o f  scientists, environm entalists and 
power engineering specialists to discuss the future o f  SU EK. The letter finished with an 
em otional outburst:
XfiaTHTb luic ;ja iioc iioiiHTb. TOBapuiuM yaeiibie h aiiepreTHicu!
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Throughout the late summer o f  1988, letters and articles critical to the forthcom ing expansion  
o f  the SU EK continued to emerge on the pages o f  the local newspapers. Aleksandr Fom in, ch ie f  
engineer at the N ikolaev Institute o f  Shipbuilding and also a member o f  the Presidium o f  the 
oblast Tourist F ederatio i/^  the luzhnoukrainsk branch o f  which was one o f  the initiators to the 
luzhnoLikrainsk Zelenyi Mii\ made an em otional appeal to save the South Bug river, 100 km o f  
w hich would be destroyed were the reservoirs to be built. Fomin also addressed the impact o f  
pollution in the republic more widely:
rioMeviy iipu aii'i'ponoreiiiiGM narpyi^Ke a penny 0. in ice h 10 pa;i Oo.iee 
liMCOKOH. nevi no crpane. 40% yieHCTnyioiuHX n crpaiie A3C 
iiaxojinrcfi iia YicpaMiiey flnneuy iipu ocrpeümuu ;ie(|)MiiMTe iia lOre 
y^pannu nojibi a.'ui opoiiieumi - oiia wiier æui ox.amcAenmi peaK'i'()[)on
Som e 1,000 em ployees o f  the A ll-U nion Project Institute Gidrosndmash sent a telegram to 
General Secretary o f  the CPSU, Gorbachev, U SSR  Prime Minister Ryzhkov, U SSR Chairman o f  
U SSR  Goskompriroda, Morhun and to Marchuk and Trefilov o f  the Ukrainian Academ y o f  
Sciences expressing their opposition to the Second Stage o f  the SU EK from going ahead prior to 
the re-examination o f  the project by an independent ecological expert assessm ent body. A more 
em otional appeal was sent to Gorbachev from the workers collective o f  the Leninskii Komsomol 
enterprise: ‘please save South Bug! In just a few  days it w ill be destroyed forever for the sake o f  
the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power s t a t i o n ! A  driver from V oznesensk, V. Vinichenko, asked 
the pro-nuclear lobby the follow ing question: ‘is not the river necessary to us? Are w e really 
going to sacrifice it? This river is our life, four reactors, two stages - that is already m uch’. Ilia 
Shostak, who added ‘worker’ to his name in a letter which appeared in luzhnaia pravda in early 
June 1989, was less diplomatic:
A Roobiiie y vieini e cr s  icomcperoe iipeAnoxceiiMe ic paSo'niHKaM 
Mniia'i'OMaiieprerMKH CCCP-. name neAOMcmo iio.'m<;iio iiaxoaHTbCJi
b.'iHxe 1C aTo.viiiiiivi a.aeicrpocraiiuHaM. tlo'ieMy 6w MnuaTOMEJiiepro 
lie iiepenecrH a 30-icvi :;ony %pno6n.mi, aro 5i,i.na 6u .riyMiiiaa 
peic.iavia BbinycicaeMon isa.vin iipoayicuHM.
The residents o f  houses N o. 2 and 4 at the Tikhaia Street and house N o. 76a o f  O dessa Street 
sent a letter signed by 202 residents in response to an article published in Pribuzhskii Kommunar
The word tourism (rypusM) in Russian has a wider use than in English. In this case, the Tourist Federation 
was a group uniting people interested in mountaineering, boating and hiking.69 lOMtmn npaoÂLt, 22.7.1988, c. 3.
Text available in the archives o f the Nikolaev Green Movement.
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on 5 July 1989, demanding that the government listen to the vo ice  o f  the people and stop the 
expansion o f  the nuclear power station at luzhnoukrainsk - bearing in m ind the latters’ interests, 
their health and taking into account the alternative project presented by a group o f  young engineers 
at the nuclear power station. The letter com plained that Ukraine already accom modated 40% o f  
the Sov iet nuclear reactors. G iven the fertile chernozem this was inadm issible:
IxoMy iiyjtviia dyaer s.ieKTpoaneprm! lO/tciio-yKpaniicKOfi A3C. ec.iu  
.iiojw, acMByiuHe BmiL lOacnuro Byra 5yji> r oOpeaeiiw iia \iea.ieiiiioe 
yviwpaiiHe? Mw, crapinee noKO.’ieiiwe. iipoiii.m 'iepe:3 viiiorne 
uciibiTaima: m io . io j io m  h  BonnaMM. n paBpyxofi n ;viopOBbe\i c b o h m
iioxBacra'i’bCJi lie Moacevi, no vibi ne x o th v i ,  nroObi iiauin aerii, Biiyicn, 
iipaniiyicM Obi.in .luuieiibi BOBVioaciiocrn nnib ancryio Boay iiainero 
Byra: ne x o th v i .  aroObi ohm  c  aercrna Obi.in oOpeneiibi iia \iea.ien iioe 
ymiaanne. A k aro\iy uaer, r.K. lOaciibin Byr yxce ceuaac aa.ieico
ne TOT, icaivUM Ow.i b iieaa.ieKOvi npoin.iOM^'.
M ost o f  the letters and articles which appeared in the press and on TV throughout 1988 and 
1989 were negative to the Second Stage o f  the SU EK. Those in favour o f  the SU EK published 
their information primarily in Energetik, and as the Greens gained increasing support from the 
general public, the attacks on key members in the Zelenyi Mir gradually becam e more v icious. 
Once the arguments given in support o f  the SU EK failed to w in people over to the pro-nuclear 
lobby, d iscred iting individuals (I w ill return to this below) becam e increasingly frequent. It seem s 
that the leadership o f  the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station in itially thought that d iscred iting  
the Greens would not be very d ifficult. Then in their view , what characterised Greens was 
ded ication fuelled by em otions rather than by rational argument. It soon becam e clear, however, 
that the Greens not only had em otional com m itment but also rational arguments to support their
case. A s a matter o f  fact, the leadership o f  the N ikolaev Zelenyi Mir was even capable o f
justifying its em otional approach in terms o f  ideology: quoting Lenin, B oiko argued that
Mcruiia -  b 3m oum hx. Be:«MGUHOiiajibiio MOîiceT SbiTb ro.'ibKO 
iipe;iai!Hocrb k BeiioMcray^^.
Attem pts were also made to dispute the G reens’ knowledge about nuclear power. During the 
autumn o f  1988, many members o f  Zelenyi Svit and others, opposed to the expansion o f  the
See undated telegram in OaiiKa 65: oBnaxeiimi. BOSSBaiimi 5K o.iio rm tecK O H  a c c o iiu a n M H . T e .u erp aM b i o t  
îKHTe.neH M KQ.BJieKTHBOB iiitetiiipmiTHH fluKO-naeBinHiibi o5 v r p o s e  viimrroîKeimii tO^Kuoro Bvra. 
c rn o u T e .a i)C T B a  4 - 6  6 .ri0K0B IQ^xitovicpauiicKOH A3C u jip .. 1988-90. kept in the oblast public 
archives, Nikolaev.
See Bes ripaiia iia oiunÔKv’. shown on oblast TV, 1989 (n.d.).
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luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, quoted the Sov iet journal Selskaia molodezh (N o. 6) to 
justify their point o f  view . The journal claim ed that world-wide fever and fever nuclear power 
stations were being com m issioned. So why was the Soviet Union expanding its nuclear power 
schem e? General Director o f  luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station com m ented on the issue in a 
rather arrogant manner:
Hy BOT. iiain.iH iia wro ccbi. lan.c/i xcypna.i Ce.ibckaa Mo, loae/Xi.! 
rio.iiTyyfiTecB Go.iee co.iuAnbiMU HCToaiiMKaMHr^
The slandering got worse, the more successful the Greens were. Zelenyi Mir, as w ill be 
shown below , offered alternatives to the Second Stage o f  the SU EK. These alternatives were 
developed by experts from the N ikolaev Shipbuilding Institute (NK I) and by members o f  the 
m ovem ent with a technical/engineering background and their proposals could not easily  be 
disregarded. So attempts were made at ridieuling individuals to defleet attention. Energetik thus 
published a four-colum n long article tearing Zolotukhin’s credibility as an engineer apart. And at 
a m eeting in M oscow , which they both attended, General Director Fuks allegedly threatened 
Zolotukhin, telling him that he would disappear as (people did) in 1937 and nobody would take
74any notice . Zolotukhin later wrote a letter o f  protest to local authorities about this incident.
N ot all the people favouring more nuclear power were that arrogant, though. Academ ician V.
.  .Bariakhtar o f  the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Sciences, for instance, did not endorse dem ands to
prohibit the reservoirs and Reactor N o. 4 from being built. To prohibit w as the sim plest approach,
he argued, and as a rule such demands were made by representatives o f  the creative intelligentsia  
.and by people living in the close vicinity o f  nuclear power stations. H owever, energy 
wasperceived as the base o f  the econom y. How would it be possible to cope without it?^^
Bariakhtar further claim ed that the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Sciences favoured the continued  
developm ent o f  nuclear energy in Ukraine. H owever, sim ultaneously efforts should be made to 
im plem ent energy-saving technologies in the industry. Efforts should be made to see to it that
people working in the nuclear industry be properly trained, and control significantly tightened. 
Attempts should also be made at recruiting personnel locally since locals were em otionally  
attached to the area and would not want to cause it any harm. A lso , there was a need for more 
openness in the nuclear industry. Having said this, though, Bariakhtar claim ed that no technical or 
environmental reasons had been found for rejecting the Third Stage o f  the SU EK.
lOmmn npaujia, 22,9.1988, c. 1.
I was told this story by Bilodid in luzhnoukrainsk during an interview in June 1994. 
See ‘giiepreruKa ceroAiui n 3anrpa’. in lOmtan nptma, 22.9.1988, c. 1-2.
Academician Ligachev o f the Institute o f Nuclear Energy was also quoted:
ATOMitaii siiepre'i'Miva n 1 .500 pa:i 5e:30iiacitee reinoaiiepreTUKU.
4ei9iio6M.acKa}i aoapmi iie oaeiib iaau.ua no ciiouvi iioc.TeAcmuau. B
c.iyaae .iioSou KaTaicmsvihi iia A3C oriaciiocri) .uoasm iie rpo:urr^ .^
M ost o f  the people living in the vicinity o f  the nuclear power station and people w hose lives 
would be affected in connection with the construction o f  the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov 
reservoirs, however, were o f  a different opinion, although few  were opposed to any further 
expansion. A few  w ho argued that i f  the SU EK was not expanded, ec^'^'^mic growth in the area 
would cease. Som e o f  the delegates to the Arbuzinka region party conference thus cam e out in 
favour o f  expansion. When asked by a TV reporter whether or not they favoured the construction 
o f  Reactors 5 and 6, Aleksandr Riazanov - secretary o f  the party organisation in the railway 
department - answered as follow s:
R cBuraio, bto iyui Toro, mi'o6m pasBUBajrai iiam ropo4, mu ao.izoiu 
I^ eLUH'i'b Bonpoc crpouTeai^CTBa 5-ro u 6-ro b.fiOKOo u 
3i[eproKOMn.f[eicca ita Byre. Hiiaae ropoAa ne Gyaer!
Valerii Sam oilov, secretary o f  the party organisation at the Konstantinov assem bly board, 
also favoured the Third Stage, provided that the ecological problems linked to it could be solved  
and the South Bug river could be saved, then
Rro MU Gyaeu Ae.naTb, ec.au niTeicpaxHi'Cii crpoure-BbcrBo rperbeu 
osei)e4 u ABC? Kyaa jieiiyTca naiuu .iiioau? Be/ib Mbi yuce iiOTepa.au 
ero! 0 ‘ieiib Muoro cneana j m am  yin..To nocjie OKonnanua 
CTpoH're.nbci'Ba nepnoü oaepeau^^
It w as not until the autumn o f  1988, though, that Zelenyi Mir started organising m eetings, 
demonstrations and other related activities. The first m eeting w as held in N ik olaev  on 10 
September and it was officia lly  sanctioned by the oblispolkom . The m eeting was organised by the 
N ikolaev Tourist Club, which was contacted by Zelenyi Mir in luzhnoukrainsk. A  few  hundred 
people attended the m eeting, which w as the first public m eeting to be arranged by an informal 
organisation in N ikolaev, and the topic o f  which was the forthcom ing construction o f  the
KopaK/iecrpOHmrib, 23.9.1988, c. 2.
See ‘KoMMVUMCTbi 80-x2 December 1988 (transcript from TV programme), available in FlauKa No. 66: 
Tciccru DbicrvnjiettuH no TeaeBUAeuuio. AOK-rraiiOB q.rienoD 3A. iiucbMa Tpviuimuxcn b sauiuTV 
ripuDOAU u pasvMiioro pasBmmii aTOMiiou aiiepreiuKu. in the oblast archives, Nikolaev.
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Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs. The m eeting took place in front o f  the Constructors’ 
H ouse o f  Culture. Information and facts as to what would be the ecological consequences o f the 
Second Stage o f  the SU EK were passed on to those present, as was information about the m eeting  
B ilod id and others o f  Zelenyi Mir o f  luzhnoukrainsk had w ith representatives o f  the U SSR  Council 
o f  M in isters in M oscow , fo llow ing the collection o f  signatures in favour o f  a re-exam ination o f  the 
Second Stage o f  the SU EK. In the course o f  the m eeting it becam e known that representatives o f  
Minenergetika (the Ministry o f  Energy) had attended talks with the CPU obkom in N ikolaev. 
Calls were made for more glasnost and for the contents o f  these talks to be made public. The 
m eeting adopted a resolution, the major points o f  which were the follow ing: construction works 
on Reactor N o. 4 at luzhnoukrainsk must cease immediately; no further work must be earried out 
on the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs and on the adjacent hydroelectric stations until 
they have been properly exam ined by an independent ecological expert assessm ent com m ission; 
an extraordinary session o f  the oblast soviet must be called by the end o f  September to make a 
decision to halt work at the SU EK prior to the report o f  the ecological expert assessm ent; the 
Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sciences must be requested to produce alternatives to the SU EK to be 
discussed in public, and a national park should be created in the canyon o f  the South B ug river. 
Should construction work continue, the m eeting ruled, a camp w ould be set up in the area to 
prevent such construction from going ahead. An appeal was made to hizlmaia pravda  to publish  
the resolution o f  the m eeting. This was eventually done and it resulted in a large response from the 
general public^^. Six workers o f  Iiizhnoe Proizvodstvenno-tekhnicheskoe predpriiatie^ for 
instance, declared their support for the resolution adopted by the m eeting.
A second big m eeting was held on 22 September 1988 in connection with the Founding m eeting o f  
the N ikolaev Zelenyi Svit, addressed above. At both these m eetings signatures were collected in 
support o f  demands that the Second Stage o f  SU EK be subject to the assessm ent o f  an ecological 
expert assessm ent com m ission. Similarly, the Greens in luzhnoukrainsk organised a m eeting on 5 
October. Organising this m eeting w as not easy, and Bilodid had to persuade his friends and 
acquaintances to attend. Small notes were put up in luzhnoukrainsk to attract a w ider audience:
OGRBHEHME
8 OKTnGpfi 1988 r. n 17 aacoii iia Gepery lOxcnoro Byra y
iiOAiioîKMa CKa.rîLi (flyraM, iî 300 m. iiHXce npo(l)H.naicTopM}i lOY A3C)
Information provided in interviews with Zolotukhin, from the archives o f ZelenyJ Svit (written account o f  
the meeting), and from a letter addressed to the editors o f Vzgliad (a TV programme which became 
very popular in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s for addressing politically controversial issues), from 
Zelenyi Mir giving information about the meeting and the Green Movement, urging them to do a report on the SU EK.
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cocroHTC}! viHTHiir no sKO.iorHMecKHM iipoG.ieviavi I O ïkiio— 
yicpaM iiCKoro ap ioicoM ii.ieK ca.
AccoiiHaiJiMîi 3eaenbnî Mwp
The 280 people who attended the meeting adopted a resolution very similar to the one 
adopted in Nikolaev a few weeks earlier:
M h th iii' KoncraTM pyeT iieyaoB aeT B opem ioe BWUoabneiiHe 
iipupojiooxpa iiiih ix vieponpHfrran iipn c ip o û T ea b cr iîe  TaiiiaMKCKoro u 
AaeKGuu ipoRCKoro BGAOxpaiiuan inax. raKOH iioaxoa c r a a  cucreM oA .
AIhthih’ GiHTaeT, a ro  xa icaa mq cvAbGa OACuAacr u 
KoiicranTM iioBCKoe uoA cxpa iiH am ne.
MuTWur npoTecrryeT npoTwn ii|)eiipam enm i IO îkiioia) h y i a u 
■lexfinaecKHH noAoevi M n iiaroM a iiepro. T peG yev i neM eA.ieiiiio
iipMocraiioiîHTb paGoTbi no coopyA ce iiH io K oiicTa iiTU iioncK oro u
AaeKcaiiApoBCKoro noA O xpanuaum ax ao  iiponeAeiiHJi
uiieneAOMCTBeniiOH gK oaorm iecK ou aiccnepruBw iipoeicra,
CGCTanjieimoro n coraacon au n G ro n ;iy>iuiHx I'paAunMiix anoxM 
sa c ro a .
ripoeKT lOACiiGyFcpaMncKoro BiieprGKOM iuieKca na BcenapGA iioe 
oGcyACAeuHe nap iiAy c  aabTepnaTHBHbiMM napnauTaMM oxaaACAenna 
A3C! T[De6yeM iiapGAonaacTMa! IVlnraiir npM3HBaeT lOAciioyKpanncKHH  
ropoACKGM M HnKoaaencKHH oG aacrnoA  coBexbi napoAHbix AenyxaxGB  
[DeuiHxeabiiG OTcraMoaTb w n en n e x’pyAaïUHXcîi neiteA anitOM 
MHiincTepcrB h  BeAOMcrn.
H ex  -  crpoM're.nbCXBy A ae icca iiA poncK oro m KGiicxanxHuoBCKGrG
BOAoxpanHJimuax!
Amongst the people present were not only locals but also sportsmen from Vorozhilovgrad,
Odessa, Nikolaev and even Kazakhstan. They all appealed for the canyon of the South Bug river 
to be preserved. The resolution adopted was sent to the luzhnoukrainsk gorispolkom and to 
Nikolaev oblispolkom^^.
Whereas the demands made by the Greens were such that they totally opposed the Second
_Stage of the SU EK, especially the Nikolaev group of Zelenyi Mir made an effort to appease its 
opponents and create consensus. A meeting held on 5 October, for instance, explained Zelenyi 
M ips  general attitude towards nuclear power as follows: A':
AccouHanmi (3e.xeubiA Mup) peaabuo oneuHBaex neoGxoAHMOcrb 
paayMHoro pasBHXHii axoMHon aiieprexuKH, Kaic BOBMOXOibiA Bapuaiix 
A.ria fioKpHTHA Ae(l)HUHxa 3.ieKxpoaiieprHH iiapiiAy c BpcAHbiMM 
3ueproc6eperaioiuHx 'rexuo.xorMH, neiDeooAa npGMbiiu.neniiOCTH iia 3 - x
CMeinibiM rpa(|)H K  p aG o x b i m p a s B u x u a  nexpaA M U H O intbix HcroMUHKOB■
"f
-------------------------------------------
S ee  reso lu tion  adop ted by m ee tin g  and article in JJenHHCbKe rinesiii, 1 5 .1 0 .1 9 8 8 , c. 1.
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siiepPMM. CavibiM  MpHopHTexiiMvi w.i iiepe M M c/ia iiiiiiix  iia iip a in e iiM M , no  
iia m e v iy  v iiie iiH jo , ao.itkiiu c i'a r i)  3 n e p i'o c5 e p e ra io n iH e  re x n o . io i ’Hn'’ '’ .
According to official figures used, Nikolaev oblast obtained only between six and 12% of the 
energy generated at the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. One article published in luzhnaia 
pravda claimed that 88% of the energy was exported to Romania and some passed on to Odessa 
oblast. The nuclear power station, on the other hand, took 25% of the oblast’s capacity in terms of 
water and land resources. Oblast Soviet Deputy, L. Chudaikina, claimed that the energy received 
from the nuclear power station (her figure was only six percent) could easily be gained through 
energy saving, so why keep the nuclear power station running at all?^'
Suslova expressed the position of the Green Movement on nuclear power even clearer at a 
meeting in Nikolaev some months later, by saying that ‘we are not against nuclear energy’, but 
why develop it in Ukraine, whose soil was the most fertile in the Soviet Union?^^ Given the 
general shortage of water, it could be used in a better way than cooling nuclear reactors; whereas 
Ukraine accounted for three percent of the Soviet territory, it produced a quarter of its food. To 
grow 50 metric centners of wheat on one hectare of land, an average of 1,500 cubic metres of 
water was required. In comparison, one nuclear reactor of the VVER-1000 type needed 30 million 
cubic meters of water a year for cooling purposes. Maybe priorities ought to change!
Far from just demanding that the SU EK be closed, the Greens made suggestions as to how it 
could be made more friendly towards the environment. The key issue was how to cool the 
reactors. There were two ways of doing this^ "^ : either, one could have a so-called ‘circulating 
evaporative system’, which was being used at luzhnoukrainsk. Or one could install a circulating 
system using water towers and taking up far less space than the former system, which required 
reservoirs. Although the money already invested in the EK would be lost, should the Greens’ 
proposal be followed, the advantages were obvious; firstly, it would require much less water from 
South Bug. It would require no flooding, thus saving the environment, and there would be no 
evaporation, which in turn would have a positive effect on the climate in the area. Due to the 
Tashlyk reservoir, there was so much evaporation during the winter time, that the town of
"'V'
S ee  letter from  public m eetin g  on 5 .1 0 .1 9 8 8  on ‘O rnom enne k IQACuovKpaHiiCKOû A 3 C ’. addressed to  
the Ukra in ian Suprem e Sov iet.
S ee  lOmmn npanjia, 2 7 .7 .1 9 8 8 , c. 2 -3 , and .fleniiiChKe luieM’n, 1 5 .1 0 .1 9 8 8 , c, 1.
See Sus lova 's speech at meeting in Nikolaev on 2 5 .1 2 .1 9 8 8  in flariKa 66: TeKCi'hi nhiCTViuieuHH no 
TejtenHAeiiHiQ. itoKJiaAOB ^.aenon BA. nncwwa TpviuiutHxcii n sam urv iipHpoiibi n pasViVmoro pasiiMTmi 
a roMiiOM 3HenreTHKH. available in the Nikolaev State Archives.
lOxiiasi upaBM, 2 5 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 , c. 2.
S ee  for instance lOsai/a// npa/m, 1 8 .3 .1 9 8 9 , c. 3: ‘CoxpaiiHM nonpo iiv a.ih G v itvn inx noKo.neuHù’. the  
resolu tion adop ted at a m ee tin g  in luzhnoukra insk on 8 .1 0 .1 9 8 8 , and Kopa6.necrpoMTejih, 2 7 .1 .1 9 8 9 , c. 
1. #
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luzhnoukrainsk would always be covered in mist. As a result people were more prone to colds and 
flus.
As for peak hours, extra electricity could be made by gas turbine stations. Local scientists 
had developed a particularly efficient gas turbine, which would utilise the gas much better than 
those commonly in use at various enterprises in the area. Besides, they would be cheap in use and 
they could be produced in the oblast. From an environmental point of view, the gas turbine 
suggested was thus clean. Sergei Shapovalov of Zelenyi Mir and his college from NKI had in 
addition developed methods to clean the water of the Tashlyk reservoir without having to pump 
dirty water into the South Bug river.
A thorough assessment of these alternatives was made in a report which was sent to various 
political decision-makers and the alternatives were taken seriously. Having read the report, oblast 
Party First Secretary L. Sharaev proposed that Reactors No. 3 and 4^ ,^ which were under 
construction be redesigned so that they could be cooled by water towers. Somewhat later 
oblispolkom arranged a presentation where B. Borysenko, who had worked on gas turbines for a 
long time, was allowed to introduce his ideas to representatives of local enterprises. The 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was also positive. The pro-nuclear lobby, though, was not so 
pleased.
Its arrogance prevailed, but in vain: on 23 September 1988 representatives of Zelenyi Mir 
confronted the leadership of the nuclear power station and representatives from the planning 
bodies directly at what turned into a key event for the former. The meeting took place in 
Nikolaev. A large audience had showed up, and both the oblast TV and the local press provided 
extensive cover of an event the pro-nuclear lobby had hoped would win people over to its side. 
According to Bilodid, the leadership of the nuclear power station was confident that the answers 
and explanations provided by its experts would convince the general public that in order to meet 
demands for electricity the second stage of SU EK had to go ahead unchanged.
Leonid Levitskii, chief engineer of the South Ukrainian hydrocomplex, representing the 
Gidroproekt Institute (Kliarkiv), stressed the environmental soundness of the solution chosen for 
the Second Stage at luzhnoukrainsk. Given the acute deficit of electricity and water resources in 
the area, the Second Stage was designed to meet both these shortages. Firstly, the 55 million cubic 
metres of water which would circulate between the three reservoirs on a daily basis would perform 
two functions: having cooled the reactors of the nuclear power station it would be emitted into the 
Tashlyk and Aleksandrov reservoirs, causing the turbines to move and thus produce electricity.
Letter N o. 85 ,1 9 .4 .1 9 8 9 , from  Sharaev to  Shcherbitskii in (Doua N o . 1. o im c N o . 3 2 . crip. N o  2 4 3 . ai)K. 
39.
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This, said Levitskii, was a striking example of water-saving technology. Secondly, the reservoirs 
were designed so as to avoid thermal pollution of the environment. Should it be necessary, the 
water flow from the Tashlyk to the Aleksandrov reservoir could be closed within five to seven 
minutes, thus preventing it from entering the South Bug river. Thirdly, given that five oblasts 
along the river already made use of its water (3,750 water collecting ponds had been built), the 
average water flow was down to 11 cubic metres per second. If the Konstantinov reservoir was 
not built by the year 2,000, Nikolaev oblast would end up without any water at all. Only nine 
percent of its water was intended for the energy sector. To illustrate how serious the situation was, 
Levitskii compared water use in the Nikolaev oblast with that of the United States. Whereas the 
inhabitants of the Nikolaev district would have 800 cubic metres of water at their disposal in 1990, 
the average American would be able to use 6,800 cubic metres of water.
Chief engineer Viktor Kondratev of the same institute argued that the Konstantinov reservoir 
was actually required to save the South Bug river, since in years of little water, the flow would be 
900 million cubic metres, whereas demand would be 850 million cubic metres. Once the reservoir 
had been built and water could be extracted from it, the strain on the river’s water flow would not 
reach a critical level.
Viktor Tatarnikov of the Institute Atomenergoproekt (Moscow) explained the difference 
between RBMK-reactors (used at Chernobyl) and VVER-reactors (used at luzhnoukrainsk). He 
emphasised that the latter were considered much safer than the former and that an accident similar 
to the one at Chernobyl would simply be impossible.
The Greens, on the other hand, were well represented by activists from Nikolaev, 
luzhnoukrainsk and Pervomaisk. Also present were scientists, invited by the Greens to give 
comments to the views presented by the pro-nuclear lobby. The questions asked were critical but 
relevant and rather than give people the impression that they did not really know what they were 
talking about they showed the audience that the Greens could not simply be discarded as a group 
of emotional activists with little knowledge of nuclear energy. Most o f the questions raised were 
related to safety. A couple of days before two airplanes had crashed in West Germany and one of 
them fell down on the territory of a nuclear power station. ‘Was the nuclear power station in 
luzhnoukrainsk designed to withstand the impact of an airplane crashing into it?’ Tatarnikov 
replied that it was strong enough to withstand a light sports plane. And what about emissions of 
radionuclides from the nuclear power station? Had radionuclides been emitted from 
luzhnoukrainsk before, and in case how big had the emissions been? Tatarnikov’s reply was far 
from convincing:
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B iipuHimne aiiapHH iia crauiiHn HMeiOT npaao GuTb...The d isp leased  
reaction h is response caused, m ade h im  add: ner-iter. iiorcwinre
Bo:rvi.yoiaTLai. T o. aro a cîcasa.i, ne osiioaaer. ' ito  vii.i o x  
iipejiycviarpHBaevi npoei<TO\i. Hex. Do iipoeicxy n Gepycx navi 
viaxevia'i’HMecKM. .xorHMecixH AOKasari,, nxo aBapuu 5yxi> lie vio^Ker. 
Ho VlI.I HCXOAMVl M3 XOrO, B'l'O VIOMCeM OMlMGaXbC}!.
In case of even the most serious possible accident, though, emissions would not exceed 30 her 
within a 30 km zone surrounding the nuclear power station.
V. P. Fuks, the General Director of the nuclear power station addressed the issue of safety. Not in 
any case, he said, could an accident of the proportions of Chernobyl happen in luzhnoukrainsk. 
As for how much of the electricity produced at the nuclear power station was used in the Nikolaev 
oblast, Fuks answered that 350 megawatts were produced annually. The station provided not only 
Nikolaev oblast, but also the surrounding oblasts - Odessa, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi and the 
Crimea with electricity. But how come then, somebody asked, that the newspaper Energetik 
claimed that Romania received electricity from luzhnoukrainsk? Evgenii Ignatenko’s (head of 
USSR Minatomenergo’s main scientific-technical unit) answer was as follows:
rioAyM aHxe caiviH: iiy , icaK m oacho b eAMiioH aneprocHcreMe oxAe.riMXB
9.iieK Tpo3neprH io , B b ip a G o xa iiify io  iia lOAcnoyicpaHiicicoH A3C, ox
npoaeH? P a sao x c M rB  ee iia 9.xeKxpoiibi. npoxonu, mxo jim ?
Questions were also raised by the Greens regarding the ecological soundness of combined 
nuclear and hydroelectric power stations. Whereas the planners were forced to admit that green 
algae and the like tended to increase in the adjacent reservoirs, this could not be blamed on the 
energy-industry, but rather was a result of industrial pollution and fertilisers from agriculture 
entering the water flow. In any case, this would not be a problem at luzhnoukrainsk since the 
water would circulate continuously, thus not allowing for still water and algae growth. Arguments 
to the effect that zooplancton in the water (up to 95-98% according to an article in the journal 
Chelovek i priroda) would die as a result of the water being utilised for generating electricity, 
Kondratev used the Kiev reservoir as an example to prove that this would not happen. Then if 
there was no zooplanction for the fish to eat, why were there so many fishermen out there catching 
taran (local fish-type)? Levitskii did, however, admit that the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov 
reservoirs were not intended for fishing purposes. Water from the Konstantinov reservoir would 
be safe to drink, though, after being purified.
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As pointed out above, nuclear power stations in the West do not use open reservoirs or 
cooling ponds to cool their reactors. Rather, closed water towers are used for this purpose.
Tatarnikov, when asked if other options than that of using open reservoirs were considered for 
luzhnoukrainsk, said that water towers had been considered, however;
...TpaAHpuH. K coA':a.ieiiHio, no.iyaaioroi Aopoi'ue - y iiac a.iiovmima 
ne xaaraeT. Koneano ryr npoaayaa.io ciipaaeA.iuaoe aaueaanue o
TOM. i|TO C BOAOH Mbl 110 HepeVIOHMMCB. HGCKOAbK.X OIUI y liaO B
crpane iiuaero ne cronr. 3 to  rax. Ho. kuk 5bi to  nn Gbi.io. b 
G.iHAcaHiuue 10—20 .ler \ibi GyAevi BbsnyAgienubi paoxoAonari, boav 
na anepreiHKy. Hpyrux peinennn ner. Ha nerpe vibi c aaviM ne
npOACHBCM.
A heating physicist, Borys Redkozub, who attended the discussions as a guest of the Greens, 
added that the use of open reservoirs to cool the reactors was primitive, inefficient and wasteful.
...y vieiiH ec'S'b iipoci'bie pacaeTbi: ec.n i nocn iB U 'i'b  na T a in .ndK C K ovi
BOAOxpanu.iMine ipaAupnu (BenTu;iauHonnbie), to ero BOAbi n arou 
c iyn ae xnaTH.io Gbi a-'ui roro, xroGbi ox.iaACAari, Gaokti.
HpaKTHMecKn ne npuGerasi k  ucno.ibsoBanmo boabi vvs Byra.
Redkozub also contested the figures presented by the planners on annual water flows. They
were attempting to make 10.6 cubic metres per second the norm, although such a low water flow
had only occurred once, in the summer of 1959, which had been particularly dry. The average
water flow in dry years was much higher, namely 31,1 cubic metres per second. Should the
reservoirs be built the water flow would therefore be reduced by three times the average, thus
turning the river into a sewage!
As for recreation and the preservation of rare species, despite the high planned fluctuation
levels of the water, special zones would be created, where swimming would be possible. Plants
.would be carefully removed and replanted elsewhere. The latter view was contested by a zoologist
of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Serhii Tarashuk, who claimed that it would be impossible 
_to recreate the special habitat found in the valley of the South Bug river.
Bilodid in his speech focused on the moral degradation that had taken place in Soviet science
. T . ; -over the last decades and related this to nuclear power, quoting Legasov, and the flaws he had
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come across, inspecting construction work at nuclear power stations around the country. Concern
■■ :with what was happening at luzhnoukrainsk was not fuelled only by the Chernobyl accident and 
the glasnost following in its path:
ile.rio euie b tom, hto Bce Go.ribiiie .nioAcü iia'iMiiaior noiiHMaTb; iipn 
tom ypoBiie rpyAOBOM ”Mopa.rrM” pacupocrpaunBi i lenoi
GeBOTueTCTneiniocrH. neAHCuHn.aHHHpoBaHiioCTn, pacx.aaGaunocrn, 
Ko'i'opbie Mbl uMeeM b iTesy.TbxaTe npeAuiecrBOBaBmMX sacroHitbix
rOAOB, -  MM0Tb A6.fl0 C aTOMIlblMH ClclimHllMM A-BB oGmeCTBU MOACOT
6i,rrb ŒMoyGMMCi'iîeiiiio oiiaciio. H aonpoc c.ieAOBa.10 5i>i, vine 
KaAveTca, iiepeiiecrM U3 ii.iockocth "crpoMTb h.th iie crpoHTi, A3C?" b
iiecKo.iBKO Miiyio. ICaK iiepecrpaMBaTb oGiuecriio h ei'o a.ienoB, mtoGi.i
iiayMiio-TexiiHMecKMM iiporpec cooTiieTcrBOBa.i iipaBcrBeiinoviy.
AyxoBiio.viy, ripoOeccHOnaAbnoviy p o c iy  . iioiiefi?
The planners agreed with the Greens that SU EK should not affect the environment 
negatively. They considered it a right step for a public commission to be set up to examine the 
environmental soundness of the Third Stage of the Energy Complex, but did not acknowledge the
need for such an examination to be conducted on the Second Stage, as it was judged to be
environmentally sound in its present form.
This meeting was of extreme importance for the Greens not only since they argued very well 
and convincingly against the pro-nuclear lobby; it was important also due to the wide publicity it 
got, thus presenting the Green movement to a broader public as competent and well-behaved, not 
as a group of villains. Moreover, the Greens won support from both Evgenii Puchkov of luzhnaia 
pravda and of Ala Korzheva of the oblast TV, thus scoring a media victory over their opponents^*^.
Bilodid had made it clear that the issue of whether or not the SU EK ought to be expanded 
was a matter of principle. A number of arguments were, as seen above, presented against any such 
expansion. For the Greens this was not only a matter of ecological concern, but also a moral issue. 
Present generations had no right to destroy the area and thus deny future generations access to 
them. Neither did they have a right to sever the link with the past that the area represented in 
terms of archaeological findings. In addition to destroying the natural environment, the SU EK 
also posed an example of Soviet ‘gigantomania’, which could no longer be tolerated, as it posed a 
threat to the very existence of future generations inhabiting the territory of Ukraine;
lO AC iio-yKpanucKHH 3ueproKOMiiJieKC .viopajibiro ycraiveBuiMH  
npoeicr...IOAciio-yK;paMHCKHH 9HeproxoMn.rieKC M opajibiio 'rpaBM npyer 
uacejieiiue...iiaM  bœm iieoGxoAMivio oco3uarb , 'iro  Mbi y x c e  ceroA in i 
croM.vi iia rpaiiH rn6e.fm  h mto cyAbSbi S y A y m n x  noKOJieiiHfi 
|A3maioTCfi ceA aac, b ch io  MHny'ry!...uH BOAiibie pecypcb i. mh sevuin, iin 
'I’CM 6o .n ee  M opoBbe uacejienH ii iie  MweioT uenbi?!...nbine ACMuyinee 
uoKOJieuHe nnKo.fiaeBueB m  nivieer iiHicaKoro Mopa.fibiioro upaaa  
ocraBABTb CBOHM ACTiiM M GyAyiUHM noKo.neiiHfiM B Aoiio.rmenMe k 
yA ce yuHaTOAceiiiioMy 4 u e n p y  - e u ie  m yiiH'iTOAceuiibie KDACiioro Byra, 
iiriOACpOAUbie aepnoseMbi m ropbi paAMoaKTHBiibix o'fxoaob c  BCKOBOA 
ouac iiocT b io  npeBpam enm i hx b iioBbiA Repno6b i.nb^\
S ee  for instance, the w h o le  page co verage  dlnoTHBOcromiMel  pu blished in IOæiuui upaujia on 1 3 .1 0 .1 9 8 8 , 
c. 3.
S ee  ‘OGoameiiHe b BC yC C P  h CCCPb r. lOAciiovKnaHncK. Hioiib 1988 . 'BosanaiiHe IluKOjiaeBCKOH 
oSnacruoH  9K0.riorMMecK0H ODraiiMsauHM ’"SeJienbiA Mhd” UHKOJiaeBUbi. seMJuiKHl.’in  flaiiK a 65: 
OGnameiiMB. D033DaitHB sKOAorMaecicoH accoiiHauHH. Te.nerpaMbi o t ACH'rejioH h KOAJieicrHBOB 
nneAnPHarHH HHKO.naeBmHiibi 0 6  vrpose vnHMTOAceiiHH lOAciioro Bvra. crpoHTe-HbciBa 4 - 6 5.aoKOB
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The entire Soviet society was pictured not only as a society on the verge of ecological 
collapse, but also very much as a society on the brink of moral collapse. This moral crisis, or 
vacuum, had been created due to (Soviet) Man’s attempt at conquering nature rather than seeing 
himself as an organic part of it. The moral degradation thus caused could only be stopped through 
a harmonisation of the relationship between Man and Nature. The first step for such a 
harmonisation to occur required a more holistic approach towards the environment and long-term 
complex planning rather than planning for the sake of short-term gains. Man had put himself 
above nature (hubris). A reconciliation could only be reached through recognition of the damage 
this had caused and the shaping of a new direction (catharsis). It was therefore natural for Zelenyi 
Mir to include a Resolution on Morality and Ethics in its programme as the ecological crisis was 
not the cause, but rather the result of a deeper crisis in society itself. The resolution was drafted 
by Zolotukhin and was endorsed by the First Congress of Zelenyi Svit in Kiev, October 1988.
The thrust of the moral crisis was described in the following words;
...CeroAHB iiaiuH M  oGiuecrcoM u p a n u r  ABOUiiaa viopaab. H.vieiiiio 
A B o n n a a  viopa.fib iipMne.ia iia p o A  k  G e c n a M irrc rB y ,
6 ec n p H [m H n H a .r ib iio crM , G e c x y j ib T y p io .  H a p o A , B a G i .iB a io m n n  cbohx 
A 6A 0B  M u p a A e A o n , cboh p o A i io n  hbijk, cboh T p a A M n n n . K y .n b T y p y ,  
1'ep iiioi.UH H  B e p y  bo B c e  C B n r o e , n p n n e G e r , n K o i in e  koiihob, F Ip up oA O H . 
a  3naMMT, cbohm G y a y m e M .
i
The aims of perestroika, namely the building of a legal state {pravovoe gosudarstvo), would 
be impossible unless accompanied by a moral perestroika, as the physical existence of a state *
would be impossible without a high moral standard within society. The Greens should set an 
example by imposing on themselves a high standard of moral conduct:
H u m  i iy A c i io  Bo:ipoAH'rb b o G m e c r n e  npHiiUM iii>i n o p j iA O B iio c iH ,  
coB e c iA iH B O crH , o G f i s a T e .B b i io c m . B y B c i’Ba A O .ir a  h o T B e 'r c r B e iii io c i 'H  
iie p e A  o 6 m ecr B O M ...B c eM , G e s  HCK.rno'ieuHB ( i . e .  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  Zelenyi 
Mir) iieoG xoA H M O  H cr io iteA b iB a i'b  3 t h  n p H im n n b i , n o  ic o ro p b iM  n e  
AO.'iAciio Gbi'i'b M e c r a  b n a m e M  o G iu e c r n e  ( i . e .  in Zelenyi Mir) aiOABM  
j ix H B b iM  H .'iHU0 M epn b iM ...C eroA n B  n a w , x a ic  iiH K o r A a , n eoG xoA H M O  
oG beA H H îiTbC ïi BC6M BO K pyt' o G u ie r o  A e.n a  c n a c e i iH B  c e G a ,  
o K p y îK a îo iu e M  cp cA b i h nojiMHiiHT ii 3'1'OMy CBHTOMy A e.f iy  n e e  n a iu H  
BBaHMOOTHO iueuHB. Bcc iia u iH  p a a n o r n a c H B  A0 .riA<:nbi p e iu a r b c n  n a  
o c n o B e  n p H iu iH n a : n a  n ep n o M  M e c r e  B ce rA a  ao.bacho c r o f iT b  A e.rio  h 
I’OJibKO n a  B T opoM  -  B:m M M O O Tnom euM B^\
lOAcno-yigpaHncKOH A3C h ADvrue. 1988-90. available in the Nikolaev state archives. Also see 
lOyKimn ripanAa, 27.7.1988, c. 2-3: TlauiHM actam h nnvxaM — MHcrvio boav. 3eMJiio. neGo’.
S ee  ‘0  MopajtH m iiDaBCTBeniiocrH’. in CoxpauHM npHPOAV A-Bb G vav iuhx noKo.neiiHH!. r. HuKOJiaeB, 
1990).
621
Zolotukhin later expanded his thinking on Man and Nature and published several articles in 
the local press on this issue. Not all of his ideas, however, were endorsed by Zelenyi Svit 
representatives in Kiev or for that matter in Nikolaev. The editor of the newspaper Zelenyi Svit, 
Mikhail Prilutskii, and former director, currently correspondent of the newspaper, Anatolii Panov 
think Zolotukhin goes to far by linking Nature to religion (he has, for instance, rewritten the ten 
Commandments from an ecological point of view). The fact remains, however, that within the 
Nikolaev Green Movement there is consensus on this issue, and Zolotukhin has considerable 
authority within the movement.
Although Zelenyi Svit was trying to prevent the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station from 
expanding, this in itself was not the ultimate aim. Rather:
U,e.Tbio A e îiT e .T b îio c r n  accounauMM m ru ieT C fl rapvioiiHMiioe 
iriaMMOAeMCTBHe M e.ioB eK a c. o ic p y A x a io u ie H  c p c A o n  b H i r r e p e c a x  
iiacroB iuero m Gy ay  m ux noKO.'ieiiHM®^
In arguing that the South Bug river be preserved for future generations to see and enjoy, the 
Nikolaev Greens are very much in line with Greens in the West. The link between the people 
(narod) and nature (priroda), however, is much more direct. If the former is destroyed, then the 
second will also be ruined. And that is why the question of saving the environment becomes so 
important, then Mankind is facing a catastrophe which threatens its own very existence:
npnpoAa lie iiorepMur rpyGoro, neK-y.ribTypnoro OTiioi.iienHii ic ceGel B 
Koiiue KoimoB, o n a  m o a c c t  n o cra B H T b  i ia c  n e p c A  6no.aorH'iecKHM 
(paKTopoM M 3ae3 ii0B eiiM îi n aiM oro ae.'iO B e ica , xaic Guojiorm iecKoro 
B H jia. i i e j i o c i ’O H H oro  MMenu "Hom o Sap iens” - aeiOBeica p a 3 y M iio ro '^ ° .
6.2.4 Response from Official Authorities
Official authorities adopted, as seen in Chapter Three, a two-tier approach to the green groups 
emerging in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident: in some cases, attempts were made at
controlling them from within. If this strategy seemed likely to fail, then alternative groups were in 
certain cases established, to weaken the impact of the groups. In luzhnoukrainsk, the latter 
seemed to be the case. Following Bilodid’s successful signature campaign throughout the summer 
of 1988, during which some 40,000 signatures were collected for the petition to conduct an 
independent ecological expert assessment of Stage Two, Energetik on 1 September announced that
lOmtan npaajta, 1 8 .3 .1 9 8 9 , c. 3. 
r ia i iK a  6 5 .
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a branch of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection had been set up at the nuclear power 
station. Referring to Gorbachev, who at the 27th CPSU Congress had stated that ‘all of us living 
today are answering for nature to our descendants and to history’, people were encouraged to 
actively take part in protecting the environment. No mention, however, was made of the nuclear 
power station and the potential hazard it posed to the surrounding environment'^’.
The Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection was very much considered to be a society 
controlled by official authorities, more concerned with bird-watching and ecological education 
than politically controversial decisions and their impact on the environment. In the case of the SU 
EK, though, members of the Society living in areas that would be directly affected by the flooding 
found it necessary to speak up. Thus, the executive secretary o f the Pervomaisk branch, Oleh 
Lysenko, in a letter published in luzhnaia pravda brought to the attention of the readers that 
already the nuclear power station had a negative impact on its surroundings. The water of the 
Tashlyk cooling pond, for instance, did not freeze during the winter. Consequently, 
luzhnoukrainsk was covered in a damp mist which had a negative impact on people’s health. 
Moreover, the skeletons of fish caught in the cooling pond were deformed. This was explained by 
the fact that the water in the pond was warmer than normal thus causing the fish to grow quicker. 
The impact of another two reservoirs could not be described as anything but harmful. There was 
also a more emotional aspect to the Second Stage of the SU EK:
M.neiibi IlepBOMaMCKOH ropoACKOH opraiiHcauMM O S iiie c i'B a  oxpam .i 
iipupoAbi K p a u iie  oGecnoKoeiib! ripeAcrojiinHM :iaToimeimeM  tu k h x  
Ace.M'iyACMii Kpaa. kl\k f ty S o u a ii pom a, y p o a u m e  K ypm iaH iio ,
M u r u e B C K u e  i i o p o r n .  3 e .a e u b iH  o c r p o B  (on  M M eer y iiM K a .a b iiy io  
p a c r M T e .a b iio c r b , o o b } iB . i e u  naM im iH K O M  npupO A b i .
As far as the campaign against the Second Stage of the SU EK was concerned, though, it was 
Zelenyi Mir that took the lead. At oblast and national levels only an insignificant number of 
writings officially sanctioned by the Society were published. It would therefore no doubt have 
been an advantage for the pro-nuclear lobby had the Society managed to gain the upper hand in 
luzhnoukrainsk.
Whereas the Greens from the start demanded an independent ecological expert assessment to
. . .be conducted on the SU EK, local authorities were more ‘modest’, at least initially. A letter dated 
12 July 1988^^addressed to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences from the Chairman of the
------------------------------------------
91
92 '^nepwmK', 1.9.1988, c. 4.lOmian npaim, 25.7.1988, c. 4.
N o . 0 5 /7 -1 1 6 7 /1 1  'O  crpouTe.riborne lO x o loVKoauiicKoro aneproKOMimeKGi’.
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oblispolkom, V. Ilin, warned that the consequences of Reactors 5 and 6 at luzhnoukrainsk were 
‘unpredictable’. The Academy of Sciences was requested to have a look at the ecological 
soundness of the Second Stage of the SU EK on the background of recent legislation and 
normatives. It was recommended that such an examination be given priority, then;
CMnraeM 3Tot Boiipoc ;i.ui HnKO-iaeBCKOu oG.iacm u lOra YKpamibi 
MpesBM'ianiibi.vi no nos.viOAviiocTM iipoG.ieubi u cpoMiiocrru ee 
paspemeiimi.
The Greens were not happy with the state of affairs - then they had reason to believe that the 
oblast party committee wanted to use the Aleksandrov reservoir for irrigation purposes. Besides, 
they were sceptical of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences conducting the expert assessment on its 
own. An appeal was made to Zalygin in Moscow to lobby their case with the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences in the hope that it would take it on. If the political authorities of the oblast were 
somewhat restrained, though, this was far from the case locally, in the areas that would be directly 
affected by the expansion of the SU EK.
In September 1988^'’ luzhnaia pravda published a report on Pervomaisk, where the fourth 
session of the gorsovet had passed a resolution to contact the executive committee of the oblast 
soviet and the Ukrainian Goskompriroda with a request to petition for the Second Stage of the SU 
EK to be properly examined by an independent ecological expert assessment commission in order 
to possibly abandon plans to build the Konstantinov reservoir and to stop funding for the project 
until it had been properly examined. According to the paper, the gorsovet had addressed 
environmental issues due to repeated requests by the general public to the soviet’s executive 
committee to raise these questions at a session. A number of letters from concerned citizens were 
published in the local newspaper Pribuzhkii kommunar, expressing worry about the Konstantinov 
reservoir. The plans to destroy the Mihiia cliffs and other beautiful parts of the valley of South 
Bug were not welcomed by many and the executive committee was requested to take radical 
measures against them. Some 17,000 people had signed Bilodid’s petition and a letter was being 
drafted to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and to the Ukrainian Goskompriroda.
A month later, the executive committee of the Aleksandrov settlement council prohibited 
blasthole drilling as part of the preparations of the bedding of the Aleksandrov reservoir.^^ The 
reservoir was to be completed by the spring of 1989. One and a half months earlier, the 
Aleksandrov executive committee had gathered all the organisations involved in the construction
lOmmn u}vmAa, 17.9.1988, c. 3.
Decision No. 94. 25.10.1988.
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works to co-ordinate their activities. The constructors asked for permission to do 45 blasts, one of 
which would be carried out every two days. During the following weeks, houses would have to be 
periodically evacuated due to the power of the blasts. The head of the executive committee, Dina 
Nikulova, felt unable to give the constructors such a permission prior to having consulted the 
locals. She therefore visited all the households. The general mood was negative. During the 
summer some blasts had taken place - with for some people disastrous results. For instance, FI. 
Kushir, 92 years old and a member of the CPSU for more than 50 years, had his house partially 
destroyed when a wall collapsed. As a result, he initiated a group against the construction of the 
Aleksandrov reservoir. Nina Pereveznyak had her house destroyed by a granite block, which fell 
onto her roof and landed half a metre away from the bed on which her husband was taking a nap. 
Nina Voznyan had just moved into her new brick house, when the blasts took place. As a result, 
the house crumbled. In compensation, she was offered a place in a 12 m^ house - much smaller 
than her own. The people of Aleksandrov expressed worry that the whole village might be 
destroyed should the blasts go ahead, and refused to evacuate their homes. Some 56 families, 
whose houses were located in the area that would be flooded, had already been resettled. Due to 
the widespread opposition amongst the villagers, the executive committee decided that it could not 
allow the blasts to go ahead. An old man’s dismay at the prospect o f South Bug being flooded, 
said it all;
Bce MOTKiio riepe>KMTb. ro.iLKo iie 6e3UOAbe. flycon cen'iac tie 
XBaraer aixapa - npoAcuaeM. Byyier .via.no rominaa - rouMTb Gyyievi 
KHCHKaMM. Ho Gcs BOAW? Cnoei’o ciniineiiiioro npana na nncryio 
liojxy Mbl ne oryiaymM^ ^
All the publicity around the SU EK, not only at a local and oblast level, but also at a national 
level (see Sharaev’s letter to Robitnychna hazeta and also Borys Oliinyk’s speech at the XIX Party 
Conference, as well as letter from members of the intelligentsia to the XIX Party Conference^^), in 
addition to a request from the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to the USSR Council of Ministers 
dated 3 November to conduct an ecological expert assessment on the Second Stage prior to its 
implementation, did bear fruit. The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on 18 November 
signed by the first deputy chairman, V. Murakhovskii, which ordered USSR Goskompriroda under 
its Ukrainian Chairman, Fedir Morhun, in co-operation with the Ukrainian Council o f Ministers 
and Ukrainian Goskompriroda to set up an expert commission. The commission was given three
lO m m i npaim, 19.11.1988,0.3.
”  See PodiTumna rasera, (n.d.), Oliinyk’s speech printed in lOmian rifxaimi, 10.11.1988, c. 3, and 
‘Q5paiiienHe k XIX n ap T K O iK lie iie im H H ’. /liTeparypiia VKpaina, 23.5.1988(n.p.).
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This, however, did not pacify the eighth session of the Nikolaev oblast soviet, which met on 
22 November. Although the Second Stage of the SU EK would be examined by an expert 
commission, construction continued at the site in luzhnoukrainsk: as a matter of fact it was in the 
process of being speeded up, with three shifts being introduced instead of the previous two. As for 
the request from the Pervomaisk soviet, the oblast soviet endorsed it. The permanent commission 
on the environment made a proposal to freeze funding of construction works at SU EK until the 
expert commission had produced its report on the environmental soundness of the project. This 
proposal was eventually endorsed, and as a result, funding of construction works at the 
Konstantinov reservoir was cut off on the grounds that prior to the ruling of the ecological expert 
assessment, such work would be illegal. Finally, a request was made to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
and to USSR Gosplan to speed up the ecological expert assessment.
Eduard Shorin, first deputy to the Chairman of the oblast executive committee, on oblast 
TV’ ’^’ explained the attitude of the oblast soviet as follows:
05.rmcno.riKOM. kuk h ncex >KHTe.iieu oG.nacTM, ocoGeimo 
nacropaAcmiaeT [leKaaecriiennne iipoexrw crpoHTe.abcrna cranunn.
3i(a‘iM'rejii)iibie K0.riH»ieci'i3a napymennH u 0Tcryn.nennH yiaxce or dtmx,
Aa.iieico ne coBepmeiiiibix npoeicroB. Mi.i Bbiijj.rin c xoyiarauciBOM 
iiepeA CoBMHiiOM peciiy6.rtHKH o iipoBeAeiiMH myGoicoü 
Kna.fiM([)MUMpoBaiuioH, a luiannoe neBUAyMannoH 3KciiepTM;ibi u npoeicra 
H cavioM cjipoHiCM. A iioKa jDenieiiG iipexparuTb o6na.rioBOMiibie 
pafoTbi no noAi'OTOBKe .ioA<:a KoncranTHnoBCKoro BOAOxpannjiniJia.
Reading the statement above, one could easily be led to believe that local authorities and the 
Greens were in full agreement. The former, although they were also coneerned with the SU EK, 
were initially, however, somewhat cautious of the latter. Although they authorised and even 
participated in several meetings and rallies organised by the Greens, there were times when they 
also posed an obstacle to the Greens. When asked to authorise a meeting in Nikolaev on 10
shown on oblast TV 24.11.1988.
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months to produce a report on the SU EK, and USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo were
. . . .ordered to supply all necessary documents to the commission within two weeks of the date of the
,
decree .
.8
'.I 
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October 1988, the Nikolaev executive committee and the CPU gorispolkom refused, arguing that 
such a meeting was non-expedient, since a similar meeting had taken place a month earlier.
lOmiiUi npaDAa, 8 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 , c. 1.
See Biosmereiih 3KO.aorH‘[ecKOH AccounauMM, N o . 2.
See ‘Cecm i o6 .B acruol oaAM ttanoiiiinx yienv'rariB’ - a 30-m inute long  report m ade by O. K utuzov  and
Besides, according to an edict passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August’*^’, 
announcements regarding meetings and demonstrations must be made no less than 15 days 
beforehand. The president of the city executive committee, A. F. Molchanov, therefore declined 
to sanction the meeting'
Initially, the CPU was wary of any movement and group openly expressing dissent towards 
the political authorities. In the case of Zelenyi Mir, although their concerns were similar to those 
of the local authorities, the latter, i.e. the city and oblast soviets and the local party organisations in 
particular, had to follow a more cautious line than the former so as to not cause upset higher up in 
the political hierarchy. Although the XIX Party Conference had called for ordinary people to get 
more involved in the decision making process, local authorities did not want to create the 
impression that they were directed by the informais as this would have implications for their own 
status. Within the CPSU, the doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’ still had to be followed, and 
Ukrainian party organs, as seen above, had to thread very carefully not to be accused of 
nationalism or deviation. Shorin’s assessment of the Green Movement as presented on local TV in 
November embodies both local authorities’ approval of its work, as well as concern that it might 
be too outspoken:
3th  .'iioam AmaiOT Go.nbiiioe h xpaHiie iiyxoioe Ae.no. Ohm aicrnBiibi, 
iianopnc'n.i, noc.neAOoaTe.nbUbi w oneiib iipunuHiiHa.nbiib[. X orm oci. 5bi, 
roJibKO, M'l’oSbi K HX xapaKTepHCTMKe moaoio 6bi.no 6bi iioSauHTb eine 
no .vieribuieH wepe Aue nepTonxH. Bo-nepBwx, no.vieubuje 
lavi'eropHMHocri'H n cbohx rpeSoBanmix. A ro y Mena c.noxcH.nocb 
BneMa'ivienHe. nro na cnere ecrb TO-iibico Ana MiieiiHa: ro. Koropoe
iipMnaA-nexcHT h.vi h - nenpauH.nbuoe. ftyMaerca, nro aro - Aercicaa 
Go.nesb ABHAcenHfi. 14 oiio or 3'I'oh XBopu Sbicrpo HsSaBH'rca. M -  
BTopoe. TpoMKHe yieK.napauMH, AeMoncrpanHH. 'rpeGoBaima sanperHTb, 
npHOCTafiOBHi’b Ae.no, Kouenno uyAoioe h iiaAciioe. Ho bot ro.nbxo 
FJIABHOE .!iH aro Ae.no? Samura otcpyjKaiomeH cincAW rpeGyer Bce- 
raicH B nepnyio onepeAb piiAoiioH, rpyAuoH, iioBceAiieBiioH h nncro 
iienaMernoH paGore pyicaMH. BnponeM, n.neiibi accouHaiiHH c sthm. 
Kaxe'i'CH. cor.naciibi. A ceccHii oG.ncoBera h c<l)opMy.nHpoBa.na aro b 
CBoexî peiiieiiMH. Bce, nro luiaiiMpoBano na 1989 roA npeAcroM'r 
Ae.narb navi. Bcevi. Be.î cAHiioro Mcicjnonenmi. Toiyia ycnex - 
o6ecnenen^°\
See ' Y xan HpenHAHVVia B eu x o n n o ro  C on gra  CCCP o  noniiyiKe onrauHsauHH h  nnoneA enm i coGpaiiHH.
viH TH iiroB . v.nHMiibtx inecrBHH h  A eM oncrnauM M  b CCCP’. published in lOvKimn npaim, 2.8.1988, c. 3. 
See letter from Molchanov to Zolotukhin, No. 1768-1 of 5.10.1988 in response to letter No. 38 of 
28.9.1988.
See ‘Cecmi o6.nacrnoi ua/iH napoAiinx JienvTaroif. broadcast on oblast TV, 24.11.1988.
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The Party’s altitude to Zelenyi Mir also found its expression in a letter to Shcherbitskii from 
L. Sharaev. Sharaev in the letter admitted that for two years large groups of workers, influenced 
by Zelenyi Mir had been voicing their concern about the Second Stage o f the SU EK. As a result 
of this situation, i.e. because of the Green Movement, the party ispolkom and the obkom had 
contacted the Ukrainian and Soviet Councils of Ministers a number of times requesting that plans 
to build Reactors 5 and 6 at luzhnoukrainsk be abandoned and that the Second Stage be submitted 
to an ecological expert assessment. Due to opposition from USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo 
the expert assessment dragged on. This had a negative effect on the general climate in the oblast:
YMacrM.iMCb MHTuiiim. ne:viopoi5i,ie BbicKaBbmaima is ayipec iiapTufiiibix u 
i’ocyyiapcTneiiiibix opranois, 0 Tyie.ibiibix .(uii.
Sharaev hoped that Shcherbitskii be able to intervene and speed up the work of the commission.
Although materials about the undesirability of the Second Stage o f the SU EK appeared with 
increasing frequency during the first half of 1988, it was not until Bilodid’s article ‘The new 
problems of South Bug’ was printed in Robitnychna hazeta on 14 October 1988 that a proper 
debate took place on the pages of the oblast newspaper of the CPU, luzhnaia pravda. Bilodid 
explained this in the following way: although the oblast CPU was unhappy about the prospect of 
expanding the SU EK, it was still cautious about criticism being raised on the matter. However, as 
Robitnychna hazeta was an official organ of the CPU and it published critical materials on the SU 
EK, then the issue deserved to be treated seriously and not simply be dismissed as ‘talk’.
Bilodid’s article triggered off a sour response from the pro-nuclear lobby. V. Osadchuk, the 
Director of Gidroproekt (the Ukrainian branch of the all-union Institute for the Design of 
Hydroelectric Power Stations) and L. Levitskii, the chief engineer of the project, had apparently 
sent a 20 page long reply to Robitnychna hazeta, but the paper, which they accused of siding with 
the pro-environment lobby, published it in a shortened form. The main argument used by the 
planners was that Nikolaev oblast suffered from serious water shortages and eleetricity shortages.
The Aleksandrov reservoir would secure stable water supplies to the region. Moreover, run-off 
waters from the reactors would not enter the South Bug river as they would be located in a special 
circulation system.
On 11 November, another letter expressing concern with the Second Stage of the SU EK
emerged on the pages of Robitnychna hazeta. First Secretary of the Nikolaev Oblast Party 
.Committee, Leonid Sharaev, stated that there was widespread concern about the building of 
reactors 3 and 4 and opposition to the third stage - the construction o f another two reactors (5 and 
6):
■ jfN
628
Mbl iieojuioK pax iio  o o p a in a .in c b  n C o n er  M n im crp oiî CCCP. C o u er  
MH iiHcrpoB yCCP. B AH YCCP c H3.ro>KeiiMeM viiienHfi o  
iieue.3ecoo6pa3i!OCTM crpOMTe/iBcrBa rpei'beA oaeiyeAH, c  iii)ocifiaMH  
paccM orpexb Bce acneK ib i crpoM 'i'e.iiicm a B'i'opoH o'iei)e;ui 
KOMibieKGl...B CBOIO OBepCilb MCIIO.IKOM oG/UlCl'UOrO con exu  liapOABblX 
AeriyraTOB oGpaTHTijCB b I'ocKOViHTe'i' no nayK e n rexiiHice CCCP c  
n p oc ifioH  Aaxb lax .u oaeu M e o  bobmoaviioci'm oi'K asa rijiH 3KC!i.iyarannH  
BTopoM oaepe/w o r  coopyA<enMri Ixoiicrairi'HiioBOKoro h 
A. leKGlIlApOBCKOi’O BCUlOXpaiiM.lHIU.
Bilodid’s arguments that the project in its present form violated a number of laws and 
regulations for the construction and operation of nuclear power stations as well as the Water Code 
were denied by Levitskii and Osadchuk. The cooling system of luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power 
station did not violate the new rules on the Location of Nuclear Power Stations, approved by the 
USSR Council of Ministers in October 1987, they argued. These allowed for a direct-flow cooling 
system . It was also suggested that the Second Stage had been approved in 1984-84 after thorough 
investigations. As for animal and plant life, the reservoirs would pose no threat to these . They 
would simply be transplanted to elsewhere. The fact that it had taken some 10 years (1975-85) to 
develop the SU EK was cited as proof that the plans had been properly examined and that any 
flaws had been eliminated''^''.
At the end of the day, though, the Greens and those who agreed with them got their way. 
After repeated requests from local, oblast and republican authorities and from workers’ collectives 
and locals, the USSR Council of Ministers decided to conduct an ecological expert assessment of 
the Second Stage of the SU EK.
6.3 Decision-Making (November 1988 - August 1989)
Although the decision to conduct an ecological expert assessment on the Second Stage of the SU 
EK was a preliminary success for the Greens, they continued to actively campaign for the South 
Bug river to be saved . A number of meetings were held, petitions, articles and letters were 
printed in the press, correspondence with various official and academic institutions continued as 
did the signature campaign.
The initiative group of the Voznesensk Greens expressed its concern in Radianska pravda 
that as the deadline for the Aleksandrov reservoir to be completed moved closer (work was to be 
completed by the spring of 1989), construction work intensified in the area. Should construction
PoBimMwa nisei'a, 18.12.1988 (n.p.).
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'3■work be speeded further up and the work of the expert commission be delayed or dragged out in 
.time, it might very well be that the river would be destroyed before the expert assessment 
commission finished its work. Representatives from the nuclear power station, on the other hand, 
claimed that they were right to continue construction, as they were doing this in accordance with 
the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1988, which was passed 
as a law and they were legally bound to follow'
This, by the way, was a common phenomenon in the former Soviet Union in the latter half of
the 1980s. A project would be stopped on ecological grounds, but construction work would
continue. Once a project had been completed, the constructors and those favouring the project
would claim that so much money had been spent that it would be impossible just to abandon it. To 
.prevent this from happening in the case of the South Bug, people were encouraged to write letters 
to the USSR and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers and to the Academy of Sciences under the 
heading ‘No to the Construction of the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov water reservoirs!’ and ‘No 
to the Construction o f Reactor No. 4 at the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station!
6.3.1 Re-assessing Stage Two of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex
On 25 November 1988, the commission which would conduct the ecological expert assessment of 
the Second Stage of the SU EK was set up. The commission would be headed by the Chairman of 
USSR Goskompriroda, Fedir Morhun.
A conference on the problems of South Bug was held in Nikolaev on 26 November 1988. 
Representatives of Green groups in all oblasts through which the river passed, attended the 
conference and a joint statement was made'"^. The following day, a meeting attended by some 
300-400 people took place. Demands were made to ban the construction of the reservoirs and the 
expansion of the SU EK.
The Greens protested in a number o f different ways, to attract as much attention and as many 
potential supporters as possible. In Nikolaev, for instance, an exhibition started on 28 November, 
the theme of which was ‘ecology, the living environment and us’. Local artists contributed with 
paintings from the area of the SU EK. Some of the paintings bore black ribbons. Those were the 
ones portraying scenery already lost due to the SU EK. Labels attached to others read ‘this will 
soon not be’, as the scenery would be destroyed should the reservoirs and the hydroelectric power
____________________________
lOmian npmm, 8 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 , c. 1; ‘FIpoAHicroBatio >KH3Ubio’.
BioJiJierem ^iwAorwiecKOH Accoimamm N o . 3 , 3 0 .1 1 .1 9 8 8 .
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stations be built. The exhibition lasted for two weeks and was brought to an end by a seminar 
about ait and ecology' \
The campaigning of the Greens paid off. On the 20 December 1988, the Nikolaev oblast 
Goskompriroda sent a letter to the Chairman of the oblast branch of the USSR Zhilsotsbank, and 
USSR Promstroibank, General Director of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, the Head of 
the oblispolkom biuro of capital construction and the oblast procurator, pointing out that 
construction work at the site of the SU EK was continuing in violation of environmental 
legislation and that soil was not removed from the site of the reservoirs under construction, which 
was a gross violation of the Land Codex of Ukraine"'^. The two banks were requested to 
immediately cut funding for the Konstantinov reservoir and Goskompriroda on the very same day 
adopted a resolution freezing all work at the Konstantinov reservoir awaiting the conclusions of 
the expert commission on the SU EK"^^.
Yet another meeting was held in Nikolaev on 25 December 1988"°. The meeting addressed a
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number of issues related to the work of the ecological expert assessment commission. The
-meeting was arranged by Zelenyi Mir in co-operation with the Nikolaev branches of the Writers’
Union and the Culture Fund and the oblast committee of the Shipbuilders’ Union.
Attending the meeting were representatives of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, the 
oblast executive committee, the Communist Party city committee, the oblast Goskompriroda,
VTOP and others. Altogether some 400 people had gathered outside the Culture House of the 
Construction Works. Those attending the meeting were informed that the Ukrainian 
Promstroibank had stopped funding of construction work at the site o f the Aleksandrov and the 
Konstantinov reservoirs, awaiting the conclusions of the ecological expert assessment 
commission.
Evidence that the SU EK constituted a violation of several laws and regulations was given 
and once again opposition to the Second Stage expressed. The meeting welcomed the ecological 
expert assessment commission, which in the view of those present had been set up as a result of 
co-operation between the public of the Nikolaev oblast and oblast and republican party bodies and 
soviets. It was hoped that the commission would work in accordance with the principle of broad 
glasnost and that the opinion of the locals would be taken into account. Representatives of Zelenyi
lOzKimn Jipaim'. 'Ci vm emiwe K p a c ia f. 1 5 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 .0 .4 .
S ee  appeal by N ik o la i V lasen k o , the Chairm an o f  the V o zn esen sk  G reens ( ‘RpuK /iviJiu MoenA . 
lOuaian npaajia, 2 7 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 , c. 3.
For m ore inform ation about this m eeting , see  Pe30.R[QUHfl Mm'Hiira-iipOTecra acHTejieu HnKOJiaeBCKoA 
nfi.riacrrn nnoTnn cri]OM're.m,orBa A.aeKcaiuiDonCKoro u Koiicrairi'UitOBCKoro noAOxnaiiMJiMiii ita 
lO xn eM  B vre. pacmuoeuH}! MoriiuocrRH IPACiiovKnaHHCicoH A3C n CTDOHTanBorBa beneBOBCKoro 
XMMKOMgniiaTa. r. HHK0 .riaeB 2 6  aeKaSpa 1988 r.
Mir announced that they had so far colleeted 192,000 signatures against construction of the two 
reservoirs and the Reactor No. 4 at the nuclear power station. Criticism was raised against the 
leadership of the SU EK, as work at the Aleksandrov reservoir continued at the expense of various 
nature protection devices at the complex. In this connection, the decision of the Aleksandrov 
soviet to halt construction at the Aleksandrov reservoir prior to the report of the expert assessment 
commission was welcomed. An appeal was made to the construction workers at the SU EK to 
make sure that ecological considerations were followed during construction. Local authorities 
were encouraged to take legal action against those who violated environmental and other 
legislation at the site of the SU EK and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ proposal to establish 
a nature reserve in the canyon of the South Bug river was welcomed. The resolution adopted by 
the meeting was sent to the Soviet and Ukrainian Soviets of People’s Deputies as well as to the 
Councils of Ministers, to TV and to the journal Ogonek, amongst others.
Volodymyr Boiko in an emotional speech told the meeting that not for one single day could 
they take a rest in the struggle to save South Bug. Even if they would succeed in saving the river 
from the reservoirs, no nuclear power station is 100% safe. Thus, the river would remain under 
threat. An almost apocalyptic view of the future o f Ukraine in regard to nuclear power was given, 
through the words of the writer Ivan Drach, who later came to play a prominent role in RUKH:
Ha I’opjie YKpaMiiw -  aiOMnaa rier.rui. KaîKAtin ueiipeAyGexgieiiiibin 
noiiMMaer aro. Ha Y icpaniie noiiMMaioT aro pasyMOM oGpeMeiiuoro.
Bor H croMT ona c  iierJieM ua m ee, h 'i'o.nbi<;o mjieT, Koraa 
BcecoiOBiibie aeAOMcma aTOM in.ivi cariorovi a b in in G y r  msaioa ee  nor  
T a 5 y  l i e r ' " .
Also oblast authorities appealed to Moscow to take into consideration the views of the 
people in Nikolaev oblast when a decision regarding the SU EK was made. These views were, 
according to the Chairman of the oblast executive committee, Ilin, that the Third Stage be 
abandoned and that the Second Stage be redrafted so that Reactors No. 3 and 4 be cooled by water 
towers rather than by cooling ponds. Ilin in a letter to Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov requested 
that he instruct the ecological expert assessment commission to conduct its examination of the EK 
in view of these recommendations."^
See Boiko’s speech, available in IlanKa. 66: Teiccrbi Bbioi'vn.rienHH no Tc.r!enHJieiHQ. AOKJia/tOB 'Uienon 
3A. iiHCbMa r p v A w im x c n  b saiiiU T V  itpMpOAw n p a sv iv i i io ro  pasBnrmi aroMiioH aiiepi^eT H K H . available 
in the Nikolaev state archives.
See ‘CoxnauHM lO^ Kiibiu Bvr!’ in lOmian upasAa, 4.1.1989, c. 4.
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luzhnaia pravda on 21 December"^ carried detailed information as to who the members
of the ecological expert assessment commission were. USSR Goskompriroda passed a resolution
regarding this matter on 15 December, following a four-hour long meeting, which was attended by
representatives of all ministries and departments involved with the SU EK. The composition of
the commission was accepted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the Soviet Goskomgidromet
and other ministries and departments prior to being formally announced. The commission was to
be headed by the Deputy Chairman of Goskompriroda, Evgenii Minaev. Leonid Belashov of
.  .Gosplan was appointed his deputy. Six sub-commissions were set up to address various aspects of 
the SU EK. These would look at economic issues; water resources; water protection and water 
ecosystems; radioecology; engineering and ecological safety; and finally, for the protection of the 
flora and fauna of the South Bug. Out of a total of 50 members 19 were Ukrainians and four of 
these were from Nikolaev oblast; V. Dobrovolskii of the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute, V. 
Bilodid, III. Tomilin of Nikolaev oblast Samepidemstantsia and L. Hodza from the Nikolaev oblast Î
Goskompriroda, All the Nikolaev representatives were opposed to the Second Stage of the SU
.EK. The number of Ukrainians was highest in the sub-commission on the protection of the flora 
and fauna of South Bug (four of six) and lowest in the one on water resources (two of seven). Not 
in one single group, though, were the Ukrainians in a majority. When the members were classified 
as ‘pro-environment’ and ‘pro-nuclear’, I found the following: USSR Minenergo and USSR
Gosstroi, which were the Ministries in favour of the Seconds Stage, held eight seats in the 
commission. Those opposed to the Second Stage (USSR Minvodkhoz, USSR and Ukrainian 
Goskompriroda, Ukrainian Institute of Hydrobiology, USSR Goskomgidromet, the Geography 
Department of the Moscow State University, the Institute of Geology of the Ukrainian Academy 
of Sciences, the Ukrainian Institute of Geology, Professor lablokov and the four representatives
from Nikolaev oblast) accounted for 21 of the 50 members. As for the rest of the commission, 
some were in favour, others were against.
The positions of the Nikolaev representatives were presented in detail in luzhnaia pravda 
a few days later. Kolesnik was reporting directly from Moscow where the initial talks of the 
commission were taking place, and he sent back to Nikolaev speeches presented by its members. 
Dobrovolskii’s major concern was the short-term effects of expanding the SU EK compared with 
the long-term irreparable damage it would cause the environment. In some 20 or 30 years time the 
technology used in luzhnoukrainsk would become obsolete. Safer reactors and safer cooling 
systems would take over, but once the South Bug river had been destroyed, it could never be 
restored in its present form. Therefore he recommended that the development of the nuclear
power station in Iiizhnoukrainsk should only take place based on the Tashlyk reservoir as the 
cooling pond and for Tashlyk to be completely sealed off from the South Bug river.
Tkachenko of the Nikolaev Oblvodkhoz was particularly concerned with the water deficit 
in the area and its impact on agriculture and general water supplies. After the nuclear power 
station and the Tashlyk reservoir were built, the area had suffered a chronic shortage of water, 
especially during the summer months. At present, no figures for how much water could 
reasonably be taken from the river were available, as the ICliarkiv branch of Gidroproekt refused to 
give such figures. Due to the summer shortages, though, several thousands of hectares of land 
were left without irrigation. Taking water from the Tashlyk reservoir would be no solution, as the 
water quality was such that Sanepidemshizhba did not recommend the water to be used for neither 
irrigation nor as drinking water. Still there was a continuos flow of water from the Tashlyk 
reservoir into the South Bug river - up to two cubic metres per second, not to mention the 
emissions of larger quantities of water in one go (produvka). Five regions, however, used water 
from the lower reaches of the river (i.e. below the emission point) for irrigation!
Hodza pointed out the numerous violations of environmental legislation taking place in 
connection with the construction of the reservoir, whereas Bilodid answered questions about the 
damage the two reservoirs would inflict upon the South Bug river. According to Kolesnik, this 
‘sympathetic young man’ (Bilodid) did very well, giving competent answers to the questions put 
forward by professionals in the field.
Kalinovskii, from Ukrainian Goskompriroda, referred to a recent conference held in Kiev 
with the participation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Institutes o f Zoology and Botany) 
and the Nikolaev Pedagogical Institute. The topic of this conference was the effect the second 
stage o f the SU EK would have on flora and fauna in the region. More than 350 types o f plant and 
animal life would be lost should the two reservoirs be built. Thirteen types of plants would 
disappear completely from Ukraine, three of them also from the Soviet fauna. The number of 
insects in the area would fall drastically and this would have a negative effect on agriculture 
output. Scientists, Kalinovskii informed, were lobbying Soviet and Ukrainian organs to prohibit 
the two reservoirs from being built.
Bobina, the Chairman of the Pervomaisk gorispolkom acknowledged the need for 
increased energy output so as to speed up economic growth in Ukraine. However, in this case the 
price to pay would be too high. The people living along the South Bug river and who would be 
directly affected by the Second Stage of the SU EK should decide whether or not the two 
reservoirs should be built, not those who failed to consider the economic value of the land which
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would be flooded as a result. Kolesnik, finishing off his report, wrote as follows; ’it is clear to 
everyone that there are many advantages with this problem, but even more disadvantages’” '’.
On 5 January 1989 the chairmen of the six sub-commissions of the ecological expert 
assessment commission met in the Conference Room of USSR Goskompriroda to discuss the 
group reports. According to the Chairman of the Expert Commission, Evgenii Minaev, most of 
the members of the commission were opposed to the Second Stage of the SU EK:
npeKpaTMTi) IO>icHbiH Byr -  iie.ib3ii, coopyÿîvnrb A. leKcaiuiponcitoe n 
KoiicTaiiTOiioiicKoe aoaoxpaiiu.iuma - iie.ibaii, iiapaumaarb Yioinnocnt 
aiieproKOMri.teKGi -  ne.tbtii!.”^
Some days later, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet discussed ecological questions at its session 
in relation to the plan for social and economic development for 1989. The session came out 
against the Crimean nuclear power station, in support of the expert assessment being conducted on 
the SU EK and it was announced that the Ukrainian Council of Ministers had contacted all-union 
(i.e. Soviet) organs with a request that the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station be 
stopped” .^ In view of the Supreme Soviet session and the general mood of the members of the 
ecological expert assessment commission, Dobrovolskii tried to explain why there now seemed to 
be doubts about the project:
3;.tecb ripeîK4e n cero  mum  iipaKTHtecKaii pea.nM3aum: M/ieu
iiepecrpowKH - mom no.ayau.nu noaMOîKuocrb nwpaaurb o T iio u ie iiu e  k 
crpofiK e, u npai3UTe.abCi'D0 n e MO^ceT ne pearu p on ar i, na M iieime 
o b in ecrn en n o cru  u viecrnibix B.aac'reu"^.
In order to become familiar with all arguments involved in the debate, the commission visited 
Kiev, Nikolaev and Iiizhnoukrainsk and held talks with a number of people not only there but also 
in Moscow. The ecological expert assessment commission finished its work on 8 February 1989 
and its report”  ^ concluded that the Second Stage of the SU EK violated a number of laws and 
regulations regarding environmental protection and nuclear power stations: several articles of the 
Ukrainian Water Code and of the SanPin 3907-65 were violated. Besides, the Aleksandrov
IO?Knaji npiwM, 27.12.1988, c. 3. 
lOmian nijaiMa, 8.1.1989, c. 4. 
lOxnan upaajia, 17.1.1989, c. 3. 
lOxiian npaBM, 22.1.1989, (n.p.)
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3aK.rnowetiHe aKcnepnioH kommccuh r.rianiioH rocvjiapcTBeiiiioH aicojioruMecKoPi 3KCiienTu:ibi 
rocKOMriDHpojibi CCCP no oaioBiibiM npoeKTiibiM peineiiHiiM lOxiio-yKpauncKoro BneproKOMnjieKCxi 
H T3Q na pacutuneiiue lO^cuo-yKpauHCKOu A3C.
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reservoir had not been planned in accordance with the rules for temperatures in a reservoir. For 
this reason, construction could not continue.
USSR Goskompriroda shared the conclusions of the commission, and publicly announced 
that the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs would have a ‘highly negative’ effect on the
, , | p .
South Bug river. Of the two, the Konstantinov reservoir would cause the greater damage, due to f  li 
its size (covering more than 26 square kilometres) and its depth (58.5 metres). The commission A
therefore recommended that the Konstantinov reservoir not be built, and that the Aleksandrov 
reservoir be completed only after proper archaeological excavations had been carried out. The «
commission also came out against further expansion of the nuclear stirion. The third reactor could U
"'Abe completed only provided that a water cooling tower be built to serve it. The fourth, fifth and 
sixth reactors were undesirable.
A
6.3.2 Reaction towards and Debate on the Report of the Expert Commission
The conclusions of the expert commission were supported by the Chairmen of the town executive #
committees of seven regions surrounding the SU EK. The Ukrainian Communist Party and the A
oblast party committee also came out in favour, as did a number of workers’ collectives and the S
210,000 people (every sixth person in the oblast) who signed Zelenyi Sv it’s petition throughout
n1988 and early 1989. Sharaev wrote a letter in support of the conclusions drawn in the 
commission’s report. Dated 24 March 1989 and addressed to the USSR Council of Ministers the f
letter outlined the obkom’s position on the SU EK. The letter accredited the decision to conduct 
an ecological expert assessment on the SU EK to the fact that this issue had been brought up in the 
oblast soviet, where a majority was against expansion of the SU EK, and to the faet that the party 
oblast committee, the oblast executive committee and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers had 
requested that such an expert assessment be earried out. Further, Sharaev made it clear that the 
public and the workers’ collectives in the oblast were waging a campaign against expansion of the 
SU EK and that their attitude was understandable, then the nuclear power station had so far had a 
negative ecological and sanitary impact on the South Bug river, the major source of water in the 
region. Besides, the cooling system envisaged for the third and fourth reactors caused reason for 
concern as they violated the Ukrainian Water Codex. Therefore: À
OoMepîKHBafl TpeSonaima nacejieiimi n Tpyyionbix Ko.ri.HeKrHoou 
o6juictm npoTMn pacumiienmi ÏOîKiio-yKpaHHCKoro sueproKOMiuieKca, 
crpoMTe.HbcrBa Bojioxpaimjium na peice lOzcubift Byr. 3a coBitaiine
iiauMOna.Hbnoro napKa ’TpaiiMTnocreniioe f lo G y x b e ” o6kom i
KoMnapTMU YKpauiibi m Hcno.riKOM o 6 j ia cn io ro  Conera napo4 Hbix 
4eiiyTaroB npociiT ycKopMTi, npniifiTue [reiiieiiMii no BbiBOAaiu u
:
n pe /i;io^< eiiH i!M  a K c n e p r iio A  komhcchm r.iamuiH 3K0, loi'MMecKOH 
3KCHepTH3l)l FocKOMiipHpoyibi CCCP'” .
USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo were not pleased, however, and neither was the 
leadership of the nuclear power station. The latter sent a 44-page long letter to the oblast 
Goskompriroda arguing against the views of the commission. The former sent a joint assessment 
of the expert commission’s report to the Chairman of USSR Goskomrprioda, Fedir Morhun'^^.
The two ministers, N. Lukonin and A. Maiorets argued that the SU EK was intended to close 
the increasing deficit of electricity in the area and to provide the region with sufficient water 
supplies through the Konstantinov reservoir. By 20 March, the third reactor was in the process of 
being completed, the first part of the Tashlyk hydroelectric station was In the making and the 
Aleksandrov reservoir was close to completion. As of 1 January 1989, these objects were 80% 
completed. Due to the already difficult energy situation in Ukraine, they must be finished. What 
was more, according to the ‘Plan for the Development of Electricity in Ukraine up to the year 
2005’, the electricity deficit would continue to increase, reaching 6.5 million kW tons even if the 
Second and the Third Stage at SU EK went ahead! Thus, even though some energy could be 
‘imported’ to Ukraine from the Russian Federation, economic development and growth in Ukraine 
would slow down should construction be stopped.
Furthermore, the commission failed to attack the methods used in the Project for the SU EK 
in assessing the impact the SU EK would have on the environment. Therefore, the report’s 
conclusion that the Konstantinov reservoir would have a negative effect on the environment was 
unfounded. What was more, the estimates made in the project were elaborated by distinguished 
scientists and experts from various ministries and departments. The claim that the Konstantinov 
reservoir would not destroy, but rather save the South Bug river, were repeated. Given the low 
water flow of the river, pollution would destroy it should the reservoir not be built.
As for rare plants and animals, Lukonin and Maiorets argued that only an insignificant 
number of species would suffer from the flooding as only a small part of the territory o f the 
granite-steppe Pohuzhe would be affected. There was more reason for concern for animal and 
plant life in the area outside the area to be flooded, as nothing had so far been done to protect 
them, and the area was deteriorating from pollution. The original plans, which had been supported 
at the time of drafting by Kiev University, envisaged a national park to be set up in the area to 
protect the rare flora and fauna of South Bug, alongside the reservoirs. As a matter of fact, special
See ‘TenePb cjtodo 3a CoBiviunoM...’. in lO xm ii npama (n.d.).
See MA CCCP N 01-555/M and CCCP N AM-2172. 20.3.1989 in (Don/i No. 1. oiinc No. 3. cnp. No. 
233. apK. 4-9.
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care to protect endangered species had been taken since 1982 and the Nikolaev Pedagogical 
Institute was involved in such work. The reservoirs themselves would
"/A
To.ibKO nonbicMTi) TypncrcKO-peKpeanuonnyio ueiiiioc;ri> aroro pe ino iia.
3iiaMHTe.ihH0 pacLiiupwTi) BosMOiniiocTH MciiG.iijSoaauMii ero  ; lu i  3TH\ 
ue.ieH '“'.
Archaeology-wise, the construction of the reservoirs did not pose any obstacle, as excavations
were taking place in accordance with the time-schedules set in a resolution passed by the
Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 30 October 1985 (No. 393). The concerns raised by the expert
commission regarding the possible loss of archaeological monuments were thus unfounded.
.The experts were also wrong, argued the report, in concluding that the technological scheme
of the work at the SU EK would not be in accordance with normative requirements and that there 
would be violations of the temperature regime in the Aleksandrov reservoir. Then according to 
article 19 of the Ukrainian Water Code, only those enterprises which could be reconstructed so as
■■..i
to recycle and utilise its own water emissions, should be changed. This was not possible at the SU 
EK, therefore the article did not apply. A number of experiments had been conducted and judging 
by these the predicted temperatures for the Aleksandrov reservoir were within the ‘Rules for the 
Protection of Surface Waters from Pollution by Sewage’. Besides, the water temperature could be
regulated by reducing the capacity of the nuclear power station in extremely hot periods. Given 
the energy deficit, though, it would not seem likely that the leadership of the nuclear power station
..f
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would reduce electricity-output for the sake of keeping the water temperature in the reservoirs 
within limits. Electricity-output plan targets would probably prevent that from happening.
As for the commission’s arguments that the SU EK constituted a violation of the ‘Sanitary 
Rules for the Projecting, Construction and Exploitation of Reservoirs’ {SaNPiN 3907-85), which 
were adopted in 1985 also did not hold true, then in 1987 the USSR Council of Ministers had 
passed ‘Requirements to the Location of Nuclear Power Stations’ according to which (point 2.1.5) 
direct water cooling could be allowed at nuclear power stations. Point 1.1, furthermore, made it 
clear that any regulations on nuclear power stations would have to be adapted to the 
‘Requirements’. Therefore, when the two normatives contradicted each other, the latter, not the 
former, should be followed.
Figures were given to prove that nuclear emissions from the nuclear power station were 
within the limits adopted by the USSR Minzdrav (Ministry of Flealth) in 1987. This had been 
confirmed by the tests made by the expert commission, which had problems detecting caesium-
Ibid.. apK. 6.
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137 due to its very low levels. And it was taken as proof that USSR Minatomenergo took its 
responsibilities seriously. Still further measures were envisaged to make sure that emissions 
remained within the limits. Particularly safe VVER-1000 reactors were to be introduced for the 
Third Stage of the SU EK
The letter finished off to identify the Ministries’ attitude towards the expansion of the SU EK:
Ha ociioBaiiHH Bnuiens.ioxcemioro MuiBiiepi’o UUCP u 
jVlMiia'i’ONeiiepro CCCP cm mtbiot, mto rrpoHTe. isciBa IO jk b o -  
yKpaMiicKoro 9Heproicoviii."ieKca c.ieayer ^aBepiiiuTh b iig.ihom  ofibevie 
110 yrBepxeitiioviy iipoeicT.v n saKoiniurB corviacoBaiiMe TEO III 
0M6pe4H A3C.
MniBiiepro CCCP u MHiia'iGMgiieprG CCCP iipom oK ar HavieAGiiaiimi 
n o  iia.ihiieMineH \iHiiwviM:iauHM yiuepha oicpy>K;aionieM opeae. b 'I'gm 
MMc.ie M no iiaTypiibivi npoBepicavi pa;ipa5oTannbix nponiocoB, 
pesy.ibTaTbi icoTopux Oy/iyr OesycioBiio yareiibi npn ooopy/Kennu n
3KC1I. lyaTaiiMM aiieproKOMOMiileKca
USSR Goskompriroda discussed the points made by USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo at 
joint meetings with representatives of the Ukrainian Goskompriroda and the Ukrainian Academy 
of Sciences. Following a request from USSR Goskompriroda, the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences, together with Uh^geologia (Ministry of Geology) Ukrgidromet (Committee on 
Flydrometerology) and the representatives from the expert assessment commission produced a 
written evaluation of the points raised by the pro-nuelear lobby. Its conclusions were sent to 
Goskompriroda on 6 April 1989'^^. Attached to the covering letter was a three pages long 
evaluation, addressed to the Chairman of the expert commission, Evgenii Minaev from the Deputy 
Chairman of the Expert Commission of the USSR Goskompriroda and a member of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences, Evgenii Sobotovich, dated 5 April 1989.
The letter sums up the results of a three-day long evaluation of the comments and questions 
raised by various institutions regarding the report of the ecological expert assessment commission. 
According to Sobotovich, none of the objections raised revealed any new information relevant to 
the outcome of the commission’s report. The experts who assessed these were unanimous in their 
verdict. Contrary to what the nuclear lobby claimed to be the case, the Konstantinov reservoir was 
needed for cooling purposes only, not for irrigation and drinking water. This view was backed up 
by documents from Ukrainian Minvodkhoz, Nikolaev oblispolkom and SOPS of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences. Despite the faet that it had taken 15 years to develop the plans for the SU
Ibid., apK. 9.
S e e  N o . 4a/61-Tp A lepii.t. 6 .4 ,1 9 8 9 , in response to N o . 0 6 -1 1 -9 1 . 3 1 .3 .1 9 8 9  in (Doiiii N o . 1. oriHCb N o . 3. 
Clip. N o . 2 3 3 . apK. 96 -9 9 .
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Although the methodology might not be right, this could in no way justify avoiding to make
124 Ibid.. apK. 97.
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EK, those involved in planning it had discovered that it was a ‘complete ecological failure’. 
References to ecological measures developed by leading scientific and research institutions were ‘1
juggled as none of these institutions had made any overall ecological assessment of the project.
A::'Besides, some of the private works commissioned - amongst them the one made by Kiev 
University, to which Maiorets and Lukonin referred, ; A
He uorvT aiuraiboa iiocraTOMiio iiaysno odociioBaiinwviH, r.K. 4.ni y
iiponeiieiimi Hca'iejioiiaiiHA awdpaiibi jurieKO ne nevivinne n muinwx124 ■oo.iacT}ix nayqiibie opranM:^ auHH . i,
I  
:
any prognoses regarding the environmental impact of the SU EK until the decommissioning of the , f
nuclear power station and after. The project did not contain an examination of biological, 
hydrometerological, geological and engineering-hydrogeological factors just to mention a few. As
for the claims that the reactor cooling method chosen did not violate any rules, the commission
■Arefuted these:
Bortpoc o6 oSopoTiiOM BoaociiaGzceitMH A3C iie paccMaTpHBajica m y
oSocnoBaime npaMOToaiiOH CHcreMU npeitcraBJUser c o 6 o h  OTnncicy. t.k . #
iianpHMep, aieproh.itOKu A3C Moryr paSma'i'r, na cyxnx rpaaupiuix. / A
The experts were against a direct cooling system. The figures for radioactive emissions quoted, 
were emissions as they were under a regular regime, but not as they would be if the regular regime 
was violated. More important was the fact that the SU EK project did not contain any estimates of ; |
how high emissions would be in case of an accident. It therefore remained a fact that the SU EK 
was not ecologically sound: 1
HpMBeiieHHLie b viaTepuaaax ccbuiKu na hy^yinue Meponpnarmi no
oxpane OKpyinaïoiueü cpeabi no BaMeaanuaM siccneprnon kommccmm no :S
cym eci'By ue HSMeiuiioT cyrb npooK ia.
TaKMM oSpasoM, im n npocKTiibix, hh b 4ono.anMTeabnbix MaTepna.aax, g
iilieiici'aB.neimbix 3KcnepTH0H kommccwm, ner 3Ko.HorHnecKMx
oSocnoBanHM pacumpenmi MomnocrH lOY A3C. aro npernrrcrByeT T
coiviacoBaiiMio crpoM'i'ej[i,c:rna IO»:no-yKi}aMncKoro aneproKOMnaeicca b M
no.'inoM oSbewe no crrapoMy npoeicry u rcM 6ojiee crpaniibiM 'A
Bbir.aaauT rpedoBanne corriacoBanuii T 3 0  3 -h oaejieim A3C.
3KcnepTiiaa kommcchh ca n ia er , aro ym TpeSonaima aKO.!iorMaecKM ï |
conepmenno nenpHeM.iieMbi. HpoS.aeMa ”MMnMMH:iauHH ymep6a 
OKpymaiomen cixae" n yc.aoBnax lOY A 3C 40.aîKiia peinaTLca iuni
?
i
::
:
-
viaiccHviyM rpex siieproftioK on. Mh o KaKovi paciiiHpeiiHH lO Y  ABC, %
15 iipmiuHîie. lie Yiozxer ftbiTi, h pean^A
'Ï
On 2Î April 1989 L. Sharaev and the First Deputy Chairman of the oblispolkom, E. Shorin, A
sent another letter regarding the ecological expert assessment of the SU EK. The letter was 
addressed to the President of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, B. Tolstikh, 
the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, H. Marchuk and the Chairman of the USSR A
Goskompriroda, F. Morhun. In the letter Sharaev and Shorin expressed concern that since the
expert assessment had been delayed, construction work had continued at the site of the SU EK.
The letter requested that the ecological impact of this work be taken into consideration when the 
issue was debated in the USSR Council of Ministers. The chairman of the Nikolaev oblast 
Goskompriroda confirmed that construction work had continued, despite the fact that the USSR 
Promstroibank had stopped the funding of the SU EK awaiting the result o f the ecological 
commission. This had been possible as means earmarked for the social development of 
luzhnoukrainsk (i.e. for the building of houses) had been used for these purposes'^'’.
Sharaev hoped that Shcherbitskii would be able to intervene and speed up the work of the 
commission. Maybe he tried, but the conclusions of the commission were as disputed a month 
later as they had been before - so all one could do was to wait for USSR Minatomenergo and 
Minenergo to raise all their objections to the commission’s conclusions.
125
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Also the First Secretary of the oblast party organisation, L. Sharaev, was concerned that the 
expert assessment commission’s work was delayed due to opposition from the pro-nuclear lobby.
In a letter to Shcherbitskii, which also revealed his attitude to Zelenyi Mir, 5"Aaraev admitted that 
for two years large groups of workers, influenced by Zelenyi Mir, were voicing their concern about 
the Second Stage of the SU EK. As a result of this situation, i.e. because of the Green Movement, 
the party ispolkom and the party obkom had contacted the Ukrainian and Soviet Council of
Ministers a number of times urging that plans to build another two nuclear reactors at )
P:’Iiizhnoukrainsk be abandoned and that the Second Stage be submitted to an ecological expert 
assessment commission. Due to opposition from USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo the expert 
assessment dragged on. This had a negative effect on the general climate in the oblast: "it
■tysacm.HucL, MHTHiirn, nesiiopoBue BhiCKasbiBauMH b aapec riapTHHiiux u A
rocyaapcn’Bemiux opranoB, o'lyiejibiibix .imu. |
Ibid.. apK. 98-99. y
See ‘Tenepb cjiob o  sa C obm h iiom ...’ . in lOxiian npcWjia (n.d.). T
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In May 1989*^’ the Ukrainian Communist Party received a letter from Uki^geologia regarding 
expansion of the SU EK. The letter, signed by its Chairman, N. Havrylenko, argued strongly 
against further expansion due to increased seismicity and great changes in engineering and 
geological conditions. Rather than building new installations on the site, those already there ought 
to be re-examined for seismicity. The general position of the Ukrainian Communist Party on 
nuclear power, as seen in Chapter Two, became more and more critical following the Chernobyl 
accident. Its general stand and all the arguments produced against further expansion of the SU EK 
made the CPU come out against USSR Minatomenergo and Minenergo's plans. Not only the 
Nikolaev oblast CPU, but also the CPU played a crucial role in facilitating the ecological expert 
assessment of the SU EK.
USSR Goskompriroda sent a report to the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 May 1989. The 
report was meant to be handed over earlier, but due to the delay caused by the dispute with USSR 
Minatomenergo and Minenergo, the deadlines had to be stretched. A Report on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment of the Basie Project Decisions of the luzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex’, was 
produced by the First Deputy Chairman of Goskompriroda, P. Poletaev. Attached to the report 
were three letters; one from the Main Co-ordination Directorate of Ukrgeologia, a second one 
from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and a third from the Ukrainian Goskompriroda. The 
summary conclusions of the expert commission were, however, for some reason not passed on to 
the Council of Ministers.
luzhnaia pravda reported the contents of the report and the letters in detail. Poletaev opposed 
the Konstantinov reservoir, expressing concern that seven types of plants not found anywhere else 
in the world would disappear, as would several plants from the Ukrainian and Soviet Red Books of 
Rare and Endangered Species, should the Second Stage of the SU EK continue unchanged. The 
historical and recreational value of the area would also be reduced. To compensate for these 
losses would be next to impossible. Moreover, whereas in 1974, the reservoir had been planned 
for irrigation and drinking water purposes, at present there would be no need for this. Ukrainian 
Gosagroprom, Minvodkhoz and Nikolaev oblispolkom intended to develop irrigation in the 
northern parts of the oblast with water from other sources. Besides, the irrigation systems would 
undergo thorough repairs so that they would become more efficient and require less quantities of 
water. Furthermore, when the project was drafted, supplies of water for drinking purposes were
Letter from  MmiHCTepcrno Teo.HorHU CCCP, -  yicpan iicKoe n ian iioe  KOOpAHnanHoiino-reojtoimMecKoe 
ynpaBJienue ”yicpreo.normi” N o . 1 6 io 3 -ilC r  to U,K KoMiiapran yicpauusi (npeMoyKenna k 
BaK.ruoiieiiHio iia paciimpeiiue lOîiciioAicpaMiicKOH ABC), dated 11.5.1989 and marked 'Ami 
c.Hyzce6noro nojib30BaiiMa’. T his docum ent can be found in (Doiui N o . 1, onncb N o . 3 2 . cnp. N o . 2 3 3 . 
ap K .1 1-13.
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not calculated in connection with water saving and rationalisation. The USSR Goskompriroda, 
based on the information given above, therefore came out against the Konstantinov reservoir and 
the Konstantinov hydroeleetric power station.
As for the Aleksandrov reservoir, it should only be filled with water on the condition that 
thorough archaeological excavations be carried out first and that protective devices be put up for 
the fish . In accordance with demands made by local authorities, the general public of Nikolaev 
oblast and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Goskompriroda, USSR Goskompriroda also 
favoured the creation of a national park in the valley of the South Bug river.
Supplying water for and cooling the turbine condensators of the nuclear power station 
through a direct connection between the already existing Tashlyk reservoir to reservoirs 
established directly onto the South Bug river, through the system of hydroelectric power stations 
planned on these reservoirs, contradicted the Ukrainian Water Code (article 19) and the ‘Sanitary 
Norms for the Projecting, Construction and Exploitation of Reservoirs, SanPiN 3907-85 (points 
5.6, 5.7). There should be no direct connection between the Tashlyk reservoir and the South Bug 
river and the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station would have to be reduced to three or four 
aggregates, instead of 10 as outlined in the project.
USSR Goskompriroda was, unlike the expert commission, not against reactor No. 4 at the 
nuclear power station. However, it recommended that water cooling towers be constructed for 
reactors No. 3 and 4, so as to minimise the loss of water through evaporation from the Tashlyk 
cooling pond. For reactor No. 4 it was also recommended that a safer version of the VVER-1000 
reactor be installed. As for the Third Stage (reactors No. 5 and 6) this could under no 
circumstance be recommended due to the sharp deficit of water in the area.
The construction of reservoirs on the South Bug river might contribute to further polluting its 
waters, which were already exceeding limits for pollutants due to industrial waste emitted into the 
water. Was dirty water from the reservoirs to enter the water flow of the river, the consequences 
would be serious. Control over emissions as well as measures to protect the environment would 
therefore have to be stringently enforced.
As for seismicity, Ukrgeologia had pointed out that the seismicity of the site of the SU EK 
should be estimated at no less than seven or eight points on the Richter scale. As has been shown 
above, the nuclear power station had been built to endure earthquakes of no more than 6 points on 
the scale. Goskompriroda therefore recommended that Minatomenergo conduct detailed testing in 
the area of the nuclear power station and to estimate the strength of the equipment and buildings 
used, to withstand earthquakes of this scale.
To summarise, then, Goskompriroda based on the report of the expert commission and the 
objections raised against it, recommended that:
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Mouiiiocrh ïO z ^ i io - y iv p a M ir c x o H  ABC A O .i/iv iia  5w 'ii>  o r p a t iH 'ie n a  4  
viM.i.HMoiia.viM K H .io B a r r . i ip e K p a m e i io  c:rpQ H 're.'ii)Cr ijo  
K o iic r a ir P H iio B C K o r o  r H i ip o y s . ia  c  FBC—FABC, K C K /iioM eiia  
r u A p a i î / iH a e c ic a î i  cbîici, c y i u e c r B y i o m e r o  T a in a M K C K o r o  B o a o e v ia -  
o x a a i iH 'r e .u i  c  c o s a a B a e M b iv i A aeK Q itijip oB C K H v i B o a o x p a im .iM in e v i  h  
n e p e p a S o i a i i  i ip o e ic T  T a u iaH K C K O fl FABC” \
The letter from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences attached, is the same letter that has been 
referred to above. The Ukrainian Goskompriroda (letter from the First Deputy Chairman, I. 
Liakh) came out not only against the Konstantinov, but also the Aleksandrov reservoir due to the 
biological, historical and aestethic damage they would both cause. To back up its views, the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute of Biology was referred to:
B t o  eA M H crBeiiH biH  i ia  r ip a B o d e p e x c b e  y ic p a u i ib i  p ey p ia ü n jH H  p e ik y r u y v i  
ica ic  yiiM K a.H btibix .la iiA L u a ip iO B  crennoM  Bo iibi, T a x  n  n e i i i ie H iu e i 'o  
r e u o i l io m ia  (j).iop b i u ( k a y i in .  O T ;te .H enH eM  o b t u e n  f iu o J io r n H  AH 
y C C P  peKOMeiuiyerc}! o T K a o im T b  npoe icr crp o n re- ib c iB a  l O x c i i o -  
y K p a n u c i c o r o  a i i e p r e r n a e c K o r o  K O M iiaeK ca , k b k  a K o .r io r m ie c K n  
lienpnexi.neivibiM'^ ''.
Ukrainian Goskompriroda, unlike USSR Goskompriroda, recommended that the number of 
reactors at the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station be limited to no more than three. Any more
reactors would be ecologically unfounded, as it would pose a serious threat to the environment in
the area.
The fact that the report of the expert commission was never even passed on to the USSR 
Council of Ministers caused anger and disbelief in Nikolaev. Oblast Soviet Deputy, L. 
Chudaikina, and A. Zolotukhin wrote a letter to the Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences, V. Kuhar and to the Deputy Chairman of Ukrainian Goskompriroda, I. Liakh, bringing 
to their attention the following fact:
yi<a3aunbiH AOicyMeuT (n w eercn  b BH4y AOKJia/t C o a e r y  M nuM crpoB  
CCCP) c o S crB en iio  roB opa, n e  îiB.riaeTCîi saiCjno'ieitHeM sK cneprnon  
FCOMHCCMM, TBK KUK cocraB .neii annapaTOM FocKOMnpHpoAW CCCP 
np0M3B0.ribH0, c  MCKJiiOMeHMeM aju/repnaTMBHbix MiieiiHH, BbiCKasaiiiibix
6ojibiiiHHCTBOM aKcnep'FOB, c  o'FcyTcrBHeM cepb03nbix bbibcaob no
Maïepna.naM , niicAcraBJieinibiM AH TCCP m F ocKOMupupoAW 
yCCP...Aoiciiaii CoBMHiiy CCCP iie mto HEioe, k u k  crpeM JieiiHe 
FocKOMnpHpoAbi CCCP noHTH na KoivinpoMHCC c  MnnaroManepio m
128 See ‘ynecTb Bce diaKTODbi’. in lOxmin iipanMa, 8.7.1989. 
Ibid.
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MMii3Hepro CCCP uenoH coxpa iieim H  h iiiiojia b crpoH  in/ipooftbetcroB 
B KOT()pi>ix y>t<e B.iO/Ketibi BiiaMMTe.ihiii.ie cpeA crB a” .^
The Greens were furthermore concerned about the fact that the Tashlyk hydroelectric power 
station would not be able to operate without a direct connection to the South Bug river. Therefore, 
should the station be allowed to operate on reduced capacity (three or four aggregates), a new 
reservoir - Tashlyk-2 - would have to be built. USSR Goskompriroda's report said nothing about 
this.
Also the oblast Communist Party leadership was concerned. In a letter'^' to the Soviet 
Premier Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, Sharaev and IIin argued that the report produced by USSR 
Goskompriroda contradicted decisions made by the oblast Soviet as well as the opinion of the 
public of the Nikolaev oblast:
O Skom  Kov inapTuu yK pan iiw  n ucno.iiKOM o f t .ia c r u o r o  C o n era  
iiapoA iibix AenyxaTOB n iydoK O  sautiTepecoBaiii,! u oCbeicrMuuovi 
pemeiïHM npo6 .aeMbi odecne'ieiiM H 3Ko,norHMecKOH S eaon acn ocrH  
K )îK iio~yK paH itcicoro BueprofcoMnjieKca. OOpaiuaeM  Baiiie BiiHMaiine 
lia TO, MTO B npeAcraB.fieirnoiw 3aK.Mi0 MeiiHM FocKOM iipHpoAu CCCP iie  
yM'reiibi p em eu m i 1 0 -m h  ceccH u 2 0 -o r o  cosbina HnicoJiaeBCKoro 
oC riacT iioro C on exa  iiapoA iibix A enyxaxoB  o x  1 2 .0 5 .8 9  u M iieiine 
obmecrBG iiiiocxM  ofrnacrM.
The Council of Ministers had not been presented with the report of the expert commission, 
signed on 10 April 1989 by 49 of its 50 members.
BbiBOAbi FocKOMnpMpoALi CCCP 110 pipiy npuifUuiiMajibHbix BonpocoB iie 
cooxBexcrByiouiHX saKaioMeiiuio aKcnepxiiOH kommcchm. Miieiinio 
ÀKaAeMHH Hayic TCCP, FaaBiioro icoopAMnanMoiiHOTeoJiornMecKOio 
yiipainieiimi ’’yKpreo.fiornji” Mniireo CCCP, FocKOMnpnpoAbi TCCP.
B M acm ocxH, Oo-ribiUHUcrBO m.mciiob aiccnepxnoM kom hccum  
FocKOMnpnpoAbi CCCP, AicaaeMHH iiay it n F ocKOMiipnpoAM yCCP 
CMMXaiOX neoOxoAMMbiM OrpaUHMHXb m ou iu octh  lOACIIO-yiCpaHUCKOH 
A3C xpeMfl aneproOjiOKaMH..
Sharaev and Ilin expressed the view that the SU EK had not been assessed as a total entity. 
Moreover, the recommendation to preserve a part of the EK (the Tashlyk hydroelectric power 
station, Aleksandrov reservoir) was from an ecological and economic point of view unfounded.
— Ibid.
Letter No. 130 of 6.6.1989.
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This recommendation was not based on an estimate as to what would be the long term ecological
effects of the Aleksandrov reservoir. These were listed in the letter
0 6 k o m  KoMiiapTHM yKpaunhi h mciio.ikovi oft.iacriioio Cosera 
iiapoiuiux iienyraTOB » cbjism c. naioxvennbiu iipocjrr Bar. iipu 
iipuiniTHM pemeiiH}] ConeroM Pvluimcrpou CCCP no IOa'uo-
yKpauncKoro aueiiroicoMineKcy yaecrb are (jiaicropbi orpuuaTe.ibiioi o 
BOSAeHCTiîmi aiieproKO.vin.ieKca na 0Kp\ Acaioniyio cpcA.v, orpaiiuMurB 
vioinnocrM lOAcno-yicpanncKOM A3C rpexni b.ioKavm. ne crponn,
KoncraiiTHiioBCKoro u A.ieKcaiuipoBCKoro BOAoxpaitH.mm .niRo 
iiopyMviTh rocKOMiipupoABi CCCP npoBeci'M noB'iopnyio aKcnepTUBy 
npoeicra. Ao npunam a OKonMare.:Bnoro peuieiimi C obctom 
M miimctpob CCCP c iie.iBio coxpanennji rocyAapcTeniibix rpeacTB n b 
Aono.menne k AenyTaicKoviy Banpocy rpynriw napoAiiux vienyiaroB 
CCCP o r  HuKo.’iaeecKOH oR.iacru. nepeAannoviy CseBAy napoAui.ix
AenyraroB CCCP. npocn\i npuocranoBHTB (|)MiiancupoBanMe paRox na
cxpoMxe.BBCi'Be i'MA]}OoReKroB aneproKovin.ieicca lOyKiio-yKpanncKOH 
ABC na peice IO achbih b y r  m 4 - r o  aiieproR.iOKa ABC.
A deputy from the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, V. Pogorelov (Nikolaev oblast) 
even sent a telegram to the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting that the candidate to the post of 
Minister of Energy and Electrifieation be asked what would happen to the SU EK in the future. 
On 15 June, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in an announcement to the Nikolaev oblispolkom 
said that the SU EK would be considered at a meeting of the Council o f Ministers in July.
Some 65 people, amongst which were two People’s Deputies of the USSR, members of the 
cultural intelligentsia and workers, sent a letter to Prime Minister Ryzhkov on 14 April 1989, 
urging him to block any attempts at expanding the SU EK. A similar letter had been sent shortly 
before by the Chairmen of seven region and two town executive committees:
O x  HVieiiH Ro.xee 4 0 0  xbiaiM  A tu ra n e n  a c b i i x m  p a n o iio B  u ropoAOB. 
pacno.B oxce iii!b ix  b 6 . î i m b m  lO x iio -y ic p a M u c ic o M  ABC, o R p a in a e n o i c  
npocbRoH OAoRpHXb p e in e u u e  9Ko.riorHMecKou BKcnepxHSbi 
rocKOMiipHpoAbi CCCP no lÛAcno-yicpanncKOMy AiieproxoMri.ieKcy” .^
The decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on the SU EK was further delayed, and in the 
meantime construction continued at the site of the Energy Complex. This prompted Ilin and 
Sharaev to write a second letter to the USSR Council of Ministers requesting that funding be cut 
until the fate of the EK had been finally decided. They also used the opportunity to express their 
views on the SU EK, arguing that the capacity of the nuclear power station should not exceed three
See hlaLUHXUM noMnoAV noAiioro icpaii!’ and 'Moiuuocxn ABC ueoRxoAUMO QipaiiMMHXb...’. in lO x m u i 
npmma (n.d.)
646
reactors and that these should be cooled by the Tashlyk reservoir, which in turn should be 
completely cut off from the South Bug river. This was necessary to prevent an ecological 
catastrophe and to preserve the river as the major source of drinking water and water for irrigation 
in the area. Sharaev and Ilin made it clear to Ryzhkov that the delay on the SU EK had social and 
political repercussions in the oblast:
d a ra ru B a n n e  p accv iorpeinn! B onpoa i o  iipeKpaiuenMM p aC or no  
pacn iH peiiH io ABC u cTpoMTe.mcTBy rnjipoK ovin.ieK ca BUSUBaer 
ocT py io  couM a.iiiuyio nanp iOKennocrb. yrpo:jw oRxhbm tb :5aRa(noBKM. 
npuBi.iBbi Bbipa3MTb neaoBepM e pyKOBOAcrny o R .ia o m  h t .a . 
daKAioMeiiHe rocKOVinpMpoAbi CCCP, npeA cran .ie iiiioe b C o b o t  
A Iu im crpoB CCCP (riMCbvio o r  23.05.89 No Op. 02-11-296). Bviecre c  
KoiicrpyicTHBiibiMM vibic.iaubi 0  u e A o n y c T H T e .i ia io c T M  c ip o H x e . nx:TBa 
KoficTanTHnoBCKOio BOAoxpaiinaHma. HCK.'iioaeiiMM npaviori 
I'M A paB.’lMMeCKOH C:BH:5M TailL'lMKCKOlO B O A O X p ailH .IU in a  C peK O H  
IO ach u h  Byr w Ap. coAepxcHT sk o . lornaecKH n 3KC)iioMH'iecKH 
n eo R oc iion an iioe  MpeA.aoAveiine cosA a ix  aacrb  oRbeKiOB 
rMApoKOMibaeKca (A.rieKcaiiApoBCicoe B O A O x p a im .a u iu e  u  T a in .iM K C K V io  
FABC).
Finally, the letter suggested that the ecological impact of the energy complex be properly 
examined prior to any go-ahead for the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov 
reservoir. A request was made that the question of the SU EK be considered in July as Ryzhkov
had promised, given the unrest it might cause in the Nikolaev oblast should the decision once 
again be delayed’^^ .
Throughout the spring of 1989, the Greens arranged a series of meetings in support o f the 
ecological expert assessment commission and its conclusions. A meeting in Nikolaev on 14 April 
was attended by some 2,000 people. Zolotukhin in his speech informed those present that 
Minatomenergo was trying to disprove the conclusions made by the expert assessment 
commission. This caused a stormy reaction. Flowever, the final word was with the USSR Council 
of Ministers and everything should be done to make sure that the views of the people of Nikolaev 
oblast were heard and taken into consideration. Bilodid informed people that work at the 
Aleksandrov reservoir was still progressing as preparations were made for filling it.
Secretary of the CPU obkom, A. Potapenko, who attended the meeting, confirmed that the 
position of the public on the SU EK was identical to the position o f the Party. Therefore, there 
were reasons for being optimistic: This gives a right to hope for a positive solution of the question 
and, I think, we will succeed, with joint efforts, to put the ecological situation under control’. The
See ‘06  vcK0]3eiiHH nDHiiATHii nemeuHa no jia.ribiieHiiieMv pasBHTHio lOAviio-yKnauitCKoro 
3iienroKOMn.rteKca’. in lOxunn npauM, 22.7.1989.
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Greens, however, ought to extend their activities and pay more attention to soil and water 
degradation in the oblast'^'*. It was decided that the meeting would sign a petition and send it to 
Prime Minister Ryzhkov on behalf of the public of Nikolaev oblast.
Similarly, a meeting was held to commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 
26 April. Some 2,000 people, amongst whom were representatives o f the obkom and gorkom of 
the CPU, deputies from the oblast and city Soviet, representatives of workers’ collectives, 
informal groups and Green activists were present. The meeting demanded that a special session of' 
the oblast Soviet be held to consider the future of the SU EK. Such a decision was made shortly 
after the meeting, and luzhnaia pravda on 4 May announced thaï c session was scheduled for 12 
May and that the topic of debate would be the conclusions of the expert commission and how to 
implement these conclusions. First Secretary of Nikolaev gorkom of the CPU V. Matveev, told 
the meeting that an information board would be put up in the city centre, indicating levels of 
background radiation in Nikolaev. The eeological situation in Nikolaev was debated at length and 
A. Molchanov - the Chairman of the gorispolkom - urged the Greens to adopt a broader approach 
to the environmental problems of Nikolaev and not foeus only on the SU EK. He also called for 
more co-operation between the Greens and those responsible for the environment at a political 
level in Nikolaev” .^
6.3.3 The Adoption of Resolution No. 647.
Prior to the USSR Council of Ministers making a decision on the SU EK, one of Ryzhkov’s 
deputies, Lev Riabev, travelled to the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. Riabev had only two 
weeks earlier been appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council o f Ministers in charge of the 
Fuel and Energy Complex by the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Due to the many letters 
and requests that had been sent to the Council of Ministers by the people of Nikolaev oblast, 
Ryzhkov ordered Riabev to visit the area (17-18 July) to get first-hand information about the case 
of the SU EK and become familiar with all the different views regarding the ecological expert 
assessment just completed. A round table meeting was therefore organised in Voznesensk, at 
which representatives from the nuclear power station, official authorities, ministerial 
representatives, Greens and the general public were present.
Riabev - at his own request - first heard the Ukrainian Deputy Minister on Energy give an 
outline of the present situation in Ukraine regarding energy supplies. V. Semeniuk claimed that
See ‘3aiiiMTHM IQaoimh Bvrik in lOxiian npanMi, 20.4.1989, c. 2. 
See lOxnan npama, 4.5.1989, c. 4.
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Ukraine was currently suffering from a 3.2-3.5 million kW hour deficit. This situation would be 
slightly improved by 1990 as new energy generating facilities would be taken into use. By 1995, 
however, the deficit would increase to an estimated eight million kW hours. T, Dotsenko of 
Gidroproekt proceeded to give an account of how the SU EK would work. E. Minaev presented 
the findings of the ecological expert assessment commission. The commission came out against 
Stage Three, and a majority of its members did not approve of the fourth reactor to be built in 
luzhnoukrainsk. The report presented by USSR Goskompriroda to the USSR Council of 
Ministers, however, gave permission for the reactor to be completed and put on line. A number of 
points presented above were raised regarding the Aleksandrov reservoir, which Goskompriroda 
had approved. The long term effects of the reservoir had not been examined. Neither had the 
overall ecological impact of the SU EK seen in total. Zolotukhin, for instance, argued that 
Goskompriroda's decision to approve of parts of the Second Stage (Tashlyk hydroelectric power 
station and the Aleksandrov reservoir) could only be described as an attempt to white-wash an 
ecologically dangerous project. Zolotukhin gave Riabev several collective letters from workers’ 
collectives opposed to the Second Stage of the SU EK. A number o f ordinary people were also 
allowed to express their views on the issue in question. Riabev, on the other hand, tried to justify 
the delay in making a decision on the SU EK by arguing that in April preparations to elect new 
government were being made. Much time had also been taken up by the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies, which met for the first time in the summer'
A protocol was made of the meeting in Voznesensk on 17 July. The protocol’s presentation 
o f events did not coincide with what had happened at the meeting and as a result, several letters of 
protest were sent to Riabev with clarifications and questions as to why this had happened. A. 
Hordienko, Secretary of the CPU obkom, and O. Ilin, Chairman of the Nikolaev oblast executive 
committee presented:
C uoM  3aMeMaiiM!i u  iipeA.HOAceiimi n M acru  i ie p i io u  "IlepcneK T M G U  
pasBH'i'M a l O y  B K ”, b cbhbh c x ev i, mto p m  nyiiKTOB npoM'MiiopeMMr 
iiopyMeiiHBM, AaniibiM i ia  coB euia iiM H . u bbiboaum m n p eA .n o A<:eiiHam 
3K0.M0I'HMeCK0H KOMMCCHM foCKOMIipHpOAW ...
B BaicnioMenue iipocHM npMinrri) bo BiiMMaiiue n p o ie c is i  
ofim ecrBennoci’H, yMacrBymoinen b obcyAcenMH npo6.rieMM 
Aa.'ibiieMijjero c : r p o M T e . n b C T B a  l O y  aneproKOMniieKca, Mie MiieiiHe fibuio 
(j)aKTHMecKM ue yMTeiio, xaïc kbk npeACiciBMTe.MH or ofimecrBeniibix m 
Mecnibix opranoB B.nacTM ne iipHBAeKa.nHCb k  cooraB.neiiHio 
paccMa'i’pHnaeM oro npoTOKO.na.
See Tie TennuT or.naraTe.nbCTBa’. in dOxnaji npaa/ja, 22,7.1989.
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Also Zelenyi Mir sent a letter to R iab ev 'reg ard in g  the protocol LR-3S1. The protocol did 
not present the actual sequence of events and it was biased in that views critical to a partial 
implementation of Stage Two were left out from the protocol altogether:
Mu noiiHViaevi, mto iipomivo.i No. .HP-381 6u.i noAi'oron.ic-Mi Baiimu 
aniiapaTo.vi. Ho aoMe.viy Bu npn ero noAiiHaiiiMn iie iioTpeooiia.m 
coiviaconanHH ero c HuKO.TaeiîCKnviH iiapTHHiiuMM. coiieTOKnMH 
opraiia.vm n obmecraennocuo, lipHiiMViaiîiiiHMH. KaK navi xomctch 
oepMTh, pannonpannoe yMacTne n conemannn. Ilavi upeAcraicnieTcn. 
mto n nepnoii nepecrpoHKM h Aev!OKpaTn:îauHH iianiei'o oGinecrna 
pemeiiHe no AOTineno-naAoiuvi nonpocavi ne ao.iaoiu niDnruviaThcii 6e:i 
yMora MiieiiMfi rex. Mini cyaifta ite.iHKOvi sanncHT or arnx peineimft.
Zolotukhin, Zhuk (Voznesensk Greens) and Stepura (Aleksandrovka Greens) also pointed out 
what information that had been left out of the protocol'
A complaint was also made by three USSR People’s Deputies from Nikolaev oblast: D. 
Lisnichii, V. Lisitskii and V. Opolinskii. They had been present at the meeting and complained 
that alternative views and opinions had been left out from the protocol. Moreover, Riabev had 
failed to keep his promise that the protocol would be discussed with those present prior to being 
passed as an official document. Such a one-sided approach to such a complex problem could lead 
to a wave of protest amongst the population of Nikolaev oblast and break the trust of the people 
and deputies to Riabov, which emerged out of his visit to luzhnoukrainsk and Voznesensk on 17 
July:
B C1Î113H c M3.M0A(eunuM. 'l'jveôyeM nnepeAs ace iipuiinviaeviue Bavin 
penieiiMsi no lOY BR, sarparnBaïoiiine Acnsueniio aaxoiue ninepecu 
liace.MeiiMH, cor. lacoBuaa'i'b c vieci’iiuMH. iiapTnnnuMM, coneTCKHMH 
opraiiaMH inaorn n oGiuecraeiiiiocTb'” .
A second meeting, at which Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Ilin, Hodza, Pitushkin, Dobrovolskii, Lisitskii 
and Lisnitchii attended from Nikolaev oblast, was held in Riabev’s office on 4 August 1989. At
____________________________
NoUOO ,3.8.1989.
The protocol failed to acknowledge the fact that the leadership of the nuclear power station had been 
given three days to make their suggestions regarding the conservation of the fourth reactor, currently 
under construction, regarding the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station and the transfer of people 
from these objects to construction of housing, social and ecological objects. The protocol also failed to 
mention that 400 conscripts had been recalled from construction work at the SU EK, as well as of the 
fact that a suggestion from the public, which was backed up by the decision of the oblast soviet’s 10 
session, 20th convocation (12.5.1989) to set up a public scientific-co-ordinating committee to monitor 
the ecological effects of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. The protocol finally failed to give 
the oblast’s as well as the expert assessment commission’s views on the ftiture of the SU EK.
No. 30.4.8.1989.
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the meeting it was decided to set up a working group, composed of representatives from the 
Council of Minister’s Biuro on the Fuel and Energy Complex, the USSR Minatomemergoprom, 
Minenergo, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, USSR People’s Deputies and the public of
ripoTOKOJi coBeiiiaiimi v BaMnneAceAarejui CoPMHiia CCCP tod. Padena. Jl. il. or 4 aarvcra 1989 r.
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Nikolaev, to draft the Council of Ministers’ Resolution on the SU EK. This could be seen as an f i
acknowledgement of the grievances put forward by the Nikolaev representatives following the 
meeting in Voznesensk. The meeting also decided to investigate alternative energy sources and to 
draft a plan for energy conservation in Nikolaev oblast towards the year 2006. This decision was 
made at the initiative of the Nikolaev representatives. USSR Minenergo, Minatomenergoprom, 
Minsitdprom, Gosplan and Mintyazhmash were ordered to examine the use of gas turbines |
produced in the oblast as an alternative energy source and its future potential from a scientific 
point of view by 1 December 1989. If possible, such turbines could be installed at the SU EK to 
generate electricity at peak hours, removing the need to go ahead with the Tashlyk hydroelectric 
power station. The Nikolaev oblispolkom was given one month to prepare all necessary
documents on this matter. The USSR Academy of Sciences was requested to examine various 
membranes that could be used to clean the water emitted into the river during major emissions y
'%y(produvki). A safety check of all the objects at the nuclear power station was also commissioned. T
The leadership of the nuclear power station was finally ordered to be more open about what was 
happening at the nuclear power station and to report regularly to the newly created ‘Public T
Scientific Coordination Committee for the Observance of Ecological Cleanness and Safe 
Operation of the Nuclear Station (Obshchestvennyi nauchno-koordinatsionnyi komitet •Ç
nabliudeniia za ekologicheskoi chistotoi i bezopasnoi rabotoi atomnoi stantsii) . y
Neither the Greens nor the political leadership of Nikolaev oblast were 100% happy with the 
draft resolution the working group came up with. Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Stepura and Lisnichii wrote a 
statement in which they criticised the fact that the resolution failed to express the USSR Council
■of Ministers’ attitude towards the suggestions of the expert assessment commission. They were 
also against the decision to go ahead with the Aleksandrov reservoir and the Tashlyk hydroelectric |
power station prior to a reworking o f their project, arguing that
CeroAiui C M T y a u H f i  ue AO.'iAciia uouTopurai b  f i y A y u r e v i ,  iie.Tbrui 
BK.:iaAbtnai'b iiapoAUbie cpeACTua b  t o .  m t o  i i g t o m  vioAcer orKasarboa 
9K0.M0l’MMeCKH BpeAUblVl H 3KOI10MHMeCKH yfiblTOMllblM.
Therefore, construction at the fourth reactor, the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the 
Aleksandrov reservoir should stop while they were being redesigned and they had been passed by
1 : #
eiLie Gojiee oGocnoDaimue peuieiiHii o row, mto m x  iiei3wroAno crpoMTi. 
IlH C aKOllOMMMeCECOH, IIH C K^O.MOrMMeCKOH TOMCK' 3peilMH‘'".
OciionaiiHe k iipoeKTv noCTaHonnennA CoBMMiia CCCP "0 iiajibiieHiiieM crpoHTejti.nTRe ofibescrou lOY 
3iÇ(n.d.).
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an economic-ecological expert assessment group. They also reminded Riabev that most of the 
members of the expert commission were in favour of a maximum of three nuclear reactors at
luzhnoukrainsk. Before any discussion regarding the fourth reactor could start, the expert 
commission wanted the ecological problems relating to the cooling system of the third reactor to 
be sorted out. Moreover, geological, hydrological and radiological analyses were required to 
estimate what the possible outcome would be of an accident at the nuclear power station. The 
expert commission had also recommended that the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station be run on 
reduced capacity provided that direct contact between the water of the Tashlyk reservoir and the 
South Bug river could b.; avoided. The latter view had been repeaf oy USSR Goskompriroda in 
its letter to the USSR Council of Ministers. Moreover, the authors of the letter demanded that
I
once the project of the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station had been redrafted, it should be 
assessed against the alternative option of introducing gas turbines in its place.
The Aleksandrov reservoir would have nothing but negative effects. Then according to the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences it would worsen the engineering-hydrological conditions for 
running the nuclear power station. Besides, it would damage the water quality of the South Bug, 
as the water flow of the river would be reduced. This would in turn result in water seeping in from 
the firth of South Bug, the salinisation of ground water and the destruction of the river. Therefore 
the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station would have to undergo repeated ecological expert tests 
prior to being made operative. The contribution of the Tashlyk station during peak hours would be 
minimal and it therefore seemed to the authors that the reason for the pro-nuclear lobby to be so 
keen on the station and the Aleksandrov reservoir seemed to be a different one. Probably the 
Aleksandrov reservoir was intended as an emergency cooling pond in case o f a crisis at the nuclear 
power station, and the hydroelectric power station would be equipped with pumps which would 
make it easier to shift water quickly from the Tashlyk to the Aleksandrov reservoir. The letter 
finished off by saying that
Mbi coniacnbi c neMeAJiennoM KoiicepnanMeM 3thx o6beKTOu, 
iipoBeAenneM iiepepa6oTKH npoeicron, Aono.rinHTe.ribiibix HCC.MeAOBanHH n 
3ico.noruMecKOH atccnepTusbi c tcm. MToSbi npniurrb no sthm o6beicraM
/A
A joint letter was sent to the USSR Council of Ministers from Ilin, Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Stepura 
and Lisnichii on 7 August 1989. They suggested certain changes to the draft resolution, mainly of
____________________________
OT 7 anrvcra 1989 r (n.d.).
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a lexical character. For instance, they would like to see the word ‘suspend’ (priostanovit) replaced 
by ‘stop’ (ostanovit) in the case of construction of the fourth reactor at luzhnoukrainsk, awaiting 
the results of thorough investigations. This as the former would make it possible to use up money 
still left for construction, whereas the former would not allow for any construction work to take
place. Instead of ‘clarification’ (utochnenie) of the construction project, they favoured 
‘redrafting’. The Nikolaev representatives also wanted the resolution to be clear on the future of 
the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir:
H.avteiimb peaaKuuio ny niera (3) na c. leA.yiomyio: ocranonHTi,
crpoHTe.ibCTiio À.ieKœnAponcKoro imiipoy:?. la. Tain.tMKCK’OH FABC u 
nepepaforarb npoeKT FABC na paÔory c rpevni ai'peraraviM npn 
OTcyrcrni'iu rnApan.iUMecKOH ciihsh naiiopnoro facceu iia F.ABC c 
Taiib'iMKCicMvi BOiioxpauM.iuinevi u c yieTovi a.ibTepiiarnBiibix 
iipeA.'ioAvenHH. a xaKAce peay.ibraTOB Mcc.ieAonanHii no reo.torHH, 
rHAporeo.aoruM m BOAuoro Ôa.ianca peixH lO xotoro Byra.
OKon‘iaTe.abiioe peinenue o crpouTe/ibCTBe FABC u A.ieKcanApoBCKoro 
BOAOxpaiiH.rinina npninrrb no pe3y.abTaraM gKcneprnsbi FocKOMiipnpoAbi 
CCCP iiepepaSo'rannoro iipoeK'ra.
The letter also made it clear that it was not desirable for the Tashlyk hydroelectric power 
station and the Aleksandrov reservoir to be subordinated to Ukrainian authorities as the nuclear 
power station was run by Soviet ministries and directories. Consequently, the republic would have 
to consult with the Soviet authorities on any matter which would make it difficult to operate the 
two installations properly. Finally, the authors wanted more of the expert assessment 
commission’s conclusions to be included in the final document'''^.
Resolution No. 647 was passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on 16 August 1989. 
Although the Nikolaev representatives failed to win support for their objections to the 
Aleksandrov reservoir and the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station, the Council of Ministers 
rejected the Konstantinov reservoir and Reactor No. 4 of the nuclear power station. As for the
Third Stage of the SU EK this was also turned down. Lexically, the Council of Ministers bowed 
to demands from Nikolaev to replace the word ‘suspend’ with ‘stop’ with regard to Reactor No. 4. 
This was a major concession, in that the Council of Ministers acknowledged that construction 
work had continued despite officially being stopped, and took measures to try to prevent such a 
scenario in the nearest future. The Nikolaev delegation had no luck, however, in arguing the case 
that not the oblast, but rather Soviet authorities ought to be in charge of the Tashlyk hydroelectric
3aM6MauHA K nnoeK'i'v nocranoD.rieiiHn CoBMMiia CCCP ’’Boiipocbi crnoMre.HbCTBa nfbftKTOP lOV BK’’
■#
station and the Aleksandrov reservoir. This responsibility was promptly delegated to oblast 
authorities, reluctant to take it on due to the opposition to these two objects in the oblast.
If one compares Resolution No. 647 with Goskompriroda^ report to the Council of Ministers 
and the recommendations of the expert assessment commission, one finds that the Council of 
Ministers went further than what was recommended by Goskompriroda as far as expanding the 
capacity of the nuclear power station was concerned. As shown above, Goskompriroda, unlike the 
expert assessment commission, recommended that the capacity of the nuclear power station be 
limited to four reactors. The commission put the limit at three reactors, and the Council of 
Ministers seems to have listened to the commission and the general public on this matter.
Although the resolution had finally been passed, some questions remained. For instance, the 
Council of Ministers gave the go-ahead for three aggregates to be completed at the Tashlyk 
hydroelectric power station. However, only on the condition that water from the Tashlyk reservoir 
would under no circumstances enter the South Bug river. As indicated above, the Greens argued 
that in such a case a new reservoir, Tashlyk-2, would have to be created. The Resolution made no 
mention of this, thus paving the way for another round of campaigning to clear the question. As 
for the Aleksandrov reservoir, it could not be filled until proper archaeological excavation had 
taken place. The Greens and the oblast leadership therefore, although they did not win the 
argument with the Soviet government, at least won time to continue their campaign to abandon the 
Aleksandrov reservoir.
Although the USSR Council of Ministers had only partially given in to demands from the 
Nikolaev oblast to abandon the Second Stage of the SU EK altogether, luzhnaia pravda still 
referred to the Resolution as a ‘victory’. The Resolution itself was given much less attention than 
the ‘struggle’ itself. The author of the article, V. Puchkov, praised everyone involved for their co­
operation on the issue, arguing that this was the major reason for the campaign to succeed:
C 3ai3H7j,ni,!M eAMHCi’BOM M yuopcrnoM 3Ty 5opi,6y bc.mh bcc - o5kom 
ItapTMM M o6.HMCUG.HKOM, TpyAOBI.IC M yH efllh ie  KOjlHeKTHBbi, M ecrub ie  
napTMMiibie m coBercKMC opraub i, caMOAe}iTe.Hbiibie upHpoAOOxpauubie 
o6beAMneiiMA airrysM acroB - ’’sejieub ix”, poAMBuiMeca b x o / ie  
iiepeci'poHKM. BO iv iane c HMico.naeBCKOM aKO-HoruaecKOH accouH auH eH .
The Greens were not entirely satisfied with the outcome, but they were happy that at least 
parts of the Second Stage would not be built. Zolotukhin’s conclusion echoed that of the political 
authorities:
I
yneiibie m aomoxosahkh. uMOiiepbi h rieiicMoiiepbt, mcaokm m iiapoAiibie 
AeiiyraTbi, MiiAcenepy h uMcarejiM...
■
€
, . ï
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Ukraine Energy Complex by local activists such as Bilodid, Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Shapovalov, 
Sus lova and others. It was very much due to their efforts that the issue was put on the political
the Energy Complex, they succeeded in creating awareness of the ‘problem’ and to unite those
(DonA N o.l.o iiM c No. 32. cnnanaNo. 233. apic. 49-51.
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r.ia ijiiun ypoK. K oropyn viu ai>!iiec.in u.i sro il 5opi.5hi; sa .ior  yciiexa - 
B KOIlCO.iMAaUMH CH.U ofbeAMIieUMU yCM.'ÎHÜ pyKOBOACl’Iîa H 
oSmecTiîeiniocrrM, "(|)0pMa.i0B" h ”iie(|)opMa:K)B". ...Pesy.ii/raT noBvioxeii 
'roi'Aa, KOPAa Bviecre Ae.iaiOT Ae.io, a ne BiJAciniior oTno iiieiim i” 4
6.4 Conclusion
A natural question to ask in view of what has been discussed above, is whether or not the 
ecological expert assessment came about as a result of the Greens’ efforts. As Zolotukhin 
concluded in 1989, Zelenyi Mir could not have achieved this on its own. Without the support of 
various ministries, departments, workers’ collectives and the public, no or little attention would 
probably have been given to the Green campaign. Still one should not underestimate the 
enormous amount of time and work put into the campaign against further expansion o f the South I
iagenda. By obtaining and spreading arguments questioning the soundness of further expansion of
opposing further expansion. Had it not been for the Greens, a re-assessment of the Second Stage
.and its impact on the environment might never have taken place, or with a very different outcome.
One might think that, following the passing of Resolution No. 647 the Greens had ‘won’ 
and their campaign had come to an end. According to recent legislation on the environment, the 
rulings of environmental impact assessment commissions were compulsory. As seen above.
i:■
though, work continued at the construction site even after orders were given for it to stop, pending 
.the outcome of the environmental impact assessment. Consequently, the Greens were faced with a 
new problem, once the resolution had been passed: would the instructions of the commission be 
followed, or would they be ignored? This issue and also growing concerns among Greens about 
safety at the South Ukraine nuclear power station, are the topics of the following chapter.
7 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (II)
7.0 Introduction
Although the Green Movement to some extent won a victory when the USSR Council o f Ministers 
passed Resolution No. 647 on 16 August 1989, the struggle to save the South Bug river from 
destruction was by no means over. As stated by the resolution, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power 
plant would be completed at reduced capacity (three aggregates instead of 10) and the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir would be completed following archaeological excavations on site. 
The resolution, although ordering a halt to construction of the fourth reactor at the nuclear power 
station prior to proper geological and safety considerations, was not prohibiting it from being built 
in the future. It was only the Kostiantynov water reservoir and Stage Three of the SB EK (reactors 
No. 5 and No. 6) that were scrapped with the passing of Resolution No. 647.
The Greens thus viewed their task as policing the implementation of the Resolution - making 
sure that the original project of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was properly redrafted 
prior to resuming construction work and to see to it that the site of the nuelear power station was 
properly assessed for seismicity and safety more generally. To minimise the impact of the revised 
project, as presented in the resolution, the Greens also developed and offered alternatives to the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, which would secure a similar output of electricity but with 
much lesser harm to the environment. The campaign against the Aleksandrov water reservoir 
continued, as it was argued that the resolution was contradictory on this issue, and that the 
environmental impact would be much more severe than envisaged by the USSR Council of 
Ministers.
In the second half of 1990 another issue of dispute between the pro-nuclear lobby and the 
environmentalists emerged; due to high concentrations of salts and minerals in the Tashlyk 
cooling pond, the leadership of the nuclear power station sought permission to emit polluted water 
into the South Bug river, while pumping in fresh water from higher up the river. Unless this was 
done, it argued, the salts would cause serious damage to the cooling pipes of the nuelear reactors, 
which needless to say, would have implications for safety at the power station. The pro­
environment lobby argued fiercely against this, as emissions would not only contain salts and 
other pollutants, but also radionuclides (caesium-137 and tritium), the levels of which were higher 
in the cooling pond than in the river. Given that water from South Bug was used for irrigation and 
as drinking water this state of affairs was unacceptable.
The row over these issues has continued up until the present. Coalitions and allegiances 
within the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobbies, however, have changed, due to the general
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political changes that have taken place in Ukraine since 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, decisions regarding the SB EK have become a purely Ukrainian matter. Whereas 
prior to Ukrainian independence, Ukrainian authorities in most cases joined forces with the pro- 
environment lobby against Moscow, now Kiev has taken on Moscow’s tasks and in many ways 
also its views. Of importance also is the fact that as the economic situation of Ukraine has 
deteriorated, the general interest of the public in politics has worn off and been replaced by what 
may be labelled ‘political apathy’. There is a sense of gloom and nostalgia for the old days of 
Communism, when if nothing else, there was stability and no need to worry about how to survive 
the next week or month. As a result, people spend more time trying to make ends meet than taking 
actively part in politics and this has affected Zelenyi Mir in a negative way - although not 
prevented them from continuing the campaign to save South Bug.
In many areas of the former USSR Greens have found this transition-period hard to cope with 
in that the few activists who remained in the movement got increasingly disillusioned with their 
cause (‘it does not matter to anyone anymore’) and also started fighting each other rather than 
uniting behind a common cause. In Nikolaev, although members of Zelenyi Mir are to some 
extent disillusioned, this transition has been easier due to the high level of expertise possessed by 
the movement and also due to the fact that seven of its members were elected deputies o f the 
oblast soviet in 1990, where they have done a tremendous job to save the South Bug river. The 
much used argument that ‘the times of taking to the streets to make our points are gone. Now we 
must get down to working’ has thus not proved so difficult for the Nikolaev Greens to adjust to, as 
it has for Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian association. This is an issue to which I will return 
below.
This chapter consists of two major sections. In the first I examine the continued Green 
campaign to save the South Bug river from August 1989 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. In the latter half I follow the Green struggle during Ukrainian independence 
from December 1991 until June 1994.
7.1 Policing and the Presentation of Alternatives (August 1989-December 
1991)
7.1.1 Politicisation of Zelenyi Mir
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Following the passing of Resolution No. 647 by the USSR Council of Ministers, Zelenyi Mir in 
addition to continuing its campaign also engaged in organisational matters. The oblast leadership 
requested its local member groups to make an account of its members and to introduce formal
1
I
membership as a means of streamlining the association. Lists were sent to Nikolaev towards the 
end of 1989 and early 1990 of members, addresses and telephone-niimbers. Vlasenko, the leader 
of the Voznesensk group, informed Zolotukhin that his group counted 24 people, of which 14 were 
men and nine, women. The Bratsk group was slightly smaller, consisting of 22 members. 
Radetskii, its leader, did however add in his letter to Zolotukhin dated 10 December 1989, that the 
Greens in the Bratsk district were not properly organised. Although 5,000 people had signed a 
petition to USSR Prime Minister Ryzhkov regarding the fate of the SB EK, Radetskii claimed that 
T am the Bratsk Greens’. In response to Zolotukhin’s request, Radetskii promised to set up a 
district group, elect a president (chairman) and form a council. A potential leader had already 
been found; Vadim Tadeush. He was young and had many good ideas. The young people should 
be elected, claimed Radetskii, pointing out that he himself was 64 years old.
Radetskii worked fast. A month later, on 21 January 1990, he informed Zolotukhin that 
membership was up to 50 and that he was trying to gather even more people. Radetskii, as a 
candidate to the raisovet (elections would take place in March), enjoyed free transport in the 
district and could therefore travel to the villages to set up green groups there. Such groups had 
already been set up in Sergeevka, Novoaleksandrovka and Nikolsk.
As has been seen in Chapter Three, Zelenyi Svit in its initial stage made great effort to 
accommodate diverging political views within the movement. As glasnost and démocratisation 
caught on, though, more and more people came out in opposition towards the Communist Party. 
The situation in Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir was somewhat similar. It is therefore interesting to note 
that a substantial number of the people on the Bratsk membership list were members o f the CP SU. 
Radetskii gave the reason for this in his letter:
R 5ectiapTMHiiuH...Ho n KOMMyiiucr no Ayxy, no yGexcAenniiM. H 
Ae.'io nocrpoenHA icoMMynuSiVia - aro vioe ciniToe m tcponnoe Ae.no. 
rioA'ro.vjy, AnaTo.riMH Mnanonun, a nporun Pyxa. He snaio, KaK Bi)i, 
he.ioAeA H Cepren %yK - sa Pyx. R - ner. C umu n KOirrany, k u k  
c ”3eJieni.iMH”, ocra.nuibie ux Ae.na Mens ne KacaioTCA. Ho cam a - 
ner, ne nepenouiy athx rpesybon, A^ earo-CMiiMX ctafob,
Masenun'iyMiibi, 6anAeponuiMiii)i, nerrnoponuiMnbi. R Kpacnwu, k u k  m  
iice npoîKAcniibie m MCKaniibie Spanane. M ”3e.iiei!biû” tq .h lko  c  
Kpacnbix, c Ko.viMyiiHCH'MMecKHX nosMuuM. H6o libicoKaa 3Ko.noruA h 
KOMviynHSM AO.riAciibi buTb nepa3Ae.riMMi)b H noarouy n Moew rpynne 
”3e,nenbix” do.nbuje no.nonnnbi - n.nenbi KflCC.
A reason for tightening the structure of the Green Movement was the forthcoming 
elections to the Verkhovna Rada and to the local soviets in March 1990. To organise a proper
election campaign to the extent this was possible, and also to ease the work of the movement on a 
day to day basis, member lists with addresses and telephone numbers were required.
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In Chapter Three 1 discussed the Ukrainian Greens and the elections in detail. As shown, 
Zelenyi Svit and the Ukrainian Language Society Prosvita were prevented from putting forward 
candidates in a number of constituencies. This was also the case in Nikolaev, where Bilodid had 
to withdraw his candidacy after the local CPU refused to sanction it. Even hizhnaia pravda 
acknowledged it. In an article published in February following an election rally in Nikolaev on 11 
February, the newspaper concluded that
flapTaFtriapaT. vioiioiio.iHSHjiosaB n .iacr i.. A o n y crn .i k p en icrp a iin H  
.innii> yroAU i'ix KaiiitHiuiTOB, OTicayau a  perMCTpauMH tc v i. Koro  
lïhUiBHiiy.i iiapoiF.
As examples the paper referred amongst others to the case of Bilodid. He made an attempt at 
getting registered as a candidate in the Bratsk region, but this failed'.
Radetskii supported the candidacy of Bilodid, despite the fact that the former, who is 
deeply religious, was not positive to the communists. As a member of the Green Movement, 
however, he was widely respected. In the letter referred to above, Radetskii gave Zolotukhin a 
vivid account of the problems Bilodid and he faced with the leadership of the Bratsk regional party 
organisation while trying to get its support for the former’s candidacy. This was crucial, then as 
mentioned above, the party organisation was able to block any candidacy of which it did not 
approve,
BeJiojie;m ji hcbmh cMJiaivm npoTa.uKMBa.B u BepxouiiWH Cone’]' YCCP.
Ho riepniiîM ceKperaps B. BaxoucKMH 5)jj] icareropmiecicn iipo'i'HB. M 
vieil}] 2 Baca yroBapbii3a.ri iie co^ieMcrBOuan, Be.iio;teA.y. Ho axo 
decno.'ieBiio. Ha vieiia ero "aB'ropH'rex” iie viencxRyex. BaxoncKHH - 
aiixnnepecrpOHiuHK, npMBep^eneii KOMaiwno-BiopOKpaxMBecKHX 
viexo/iOB. iiHKxaxopcn'Ba. H xaKux ”i]ano.ROBniiBHKOB” iie .ruo5.nio. H 
eine Ao.iro b ceicpe’rapax iie Sbixij, iioxypnM c K|X3c.na. Ho Be.xoiie;]a 
oiin c[}e3a.TO. noLiJ.riH iia .bijXch, iiapyuieiiMfi saivoiia o nbidopax. H 
BbiilBHXCeilMB lie jionycxM.riH.
B. Be.Boaeii h cavi BunoBen. On becxuxpoBcn. Ha;io bi.uio bohxm k 
3'roviy Bai’KOBCKQ.viy, ciipocMxi) ero cornacmi, iiaobemaxb riobo.iiBUje,
BapyiiHxiÆ}] c o i’.aacMeM ’’xoBiiHiia" p an o iia . a  hoxom  y a v e  m ixn  k 
M accaw, Ko vine. H en p n a’re.na. n a a o  yv iexb nepexHxpMBaxh. rio.BMXHKa 
- 3X0 BOMiia. A  y  B n icxopa iih  coJuiaxcK oro, iin no.nHXHBec!Coro 
oitbixa, H y , y  iiero  e m e  Bce nepejin. BarKOBcicnn u e r o  an n ap ax  
B oob in e-xo  b oaxcf i .aiobbix iieTopv iajioB , i i a x e  tq k h x  viu p iiu x , icaic 
”Be.Fieiibie”. B xo  iice .lenHBaii n besiiapua}] 5paxn}i...Bo.iibno BM4 erb , xa ic  
yna.B an'i'opHxex panonnoA  napxoprauHBauMM b paA one. Æ n i y c n e x a  
riepecrpoAKH na^ o 6 n  na 4Be xi^exH novieirnxb, oSiiOBHXb n a iiirb ie  
pyKOBOÆîiiiiMe Kaapbi. H o  n e yv ien p a b o ia x b ; 3a nop ixliejiu on  A 
uenju iioxc}] ap o crn o . CraBKH xce BwcoKHe, xenepb.
' lÛÆimji npiiBM, 14.2.1990, c. 3.
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Although the Greens did not succeed in having any of its representatives elected to 
Verkhovna Rada, they did well in the local elections andas pointed out in Chapter Six, had seven 
people elected deputies of the oblast soviet. Three of these, L. Suslova, S. Shapovalov and 
Dobrovolskii, ended up in the Commission on Ecology and have done a tremendous job to protect 
South Bug. Suslova, in addition to being a deputy, also worked in the oblast administration for the 
ecology commission, and was thus able to give the Greens inside information as well as pulling
strings when necessary. Shapovalov had previously on a number of occasions spoken on behalf of
■5'Sthe Green Movement. Since he had a higher university degree and was familiar with the issues on 
debate regarding the SB TK, the luzhnoukrainsk Greens provided ' ' '. with information as his ;3 
word would earry weight. Bilodid in an interview in the summer of 1994, praised Suslova, j'i
Shapovalov and Dobrovolskii for their work: To do more than they have done would simply not .'V
 ^Me>Ko6jiacnioH obmeCTneiniHH navMno-KooDaHiiauHüHüüH coner no cnacenuio pexu lD)KiiMM Bvr.
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be possible’.
.13
7.1.2 Campaigns and Issues
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir/the Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station
Zelenyi Mir elaborated a new strategy at a gathering held to hear reports and elect new
representatives, on 15 October 1990. The gathering, which was attended by 170 Greens from 1|Voznesensk (Vlasenko), Pervomaisk (Sosnovskii), luzhnoukrainsk (Bilodid) and Nikolaev A
(Zolotukhin), reelected Zolotukhin as Chairman of the oblast organisation (until then he had held
this post Jointly with the local writer, Boiko) and also elected delegates to represent Nikolaev at A
the First Congress of Zelenyi S v it , due to take place in Kiev at the end of the month. At the same
1
day, an inter-oblast meeting was held in Nikolaev on the future of the South Bug river. The |
meeting issued a statement, saying that A
Ojio5pneM, KaK 1-i.iR mar, iianpaRjieanbifi iia oiaceitHe jieicH
Byr noCTaiioi3,iieiiHe Cooera M mhhctpob CCCP or 16.8.89r No. 647.
...iio.iiGnHiniaTiiGcrrL p e i i i e n n a  a GTiiGUieiiMM iipoAO.nxceima 
crpGMTe.ribcri3a A.aeKcaiijipGBCKorG i304GxpauH.aHuta h 3 ar[)craxG i3 
Tauj.riMKCKGro FA3C...mx C G o p y x œ i m e  n a icc iu iy a ra u n a  c o s j ia iiy r
y r p o a y  c y m e c r t i o i i a n M i o  p e i c n  lO îK i i b in  Byr, i i e / t y r  k  i i e p a u M o n a j ib i i o M y  A
M cno .ab ;30 i3a[iH io  napojiM ux cpe^ci'B.
IAs a first step to monitor the implementation of the Resolution, the Greens called for an inter- 
oblast public scientific coordination soviet to protect the South Bug river^. In addition to the task T:
I
of monitoring construction works at the site carefully, the soviet would also elaborate a scientific 
programme for the continued development of the SB EK. Scientists were encouraged to develop 
an alternative to the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir, 
and an initiative was made to transfer construction workers from the SB EK to housing 
construction for which there was a chronical shortage in luzhnoukrainsk as well as devices aimed 
at protecting the environment in the area. Workers in the oblast were generally encouraged to 
demand that pollution-reducing devices be installed at their enterprises to protect the rivers South 
Bug and Ingul from further damage, and local authorities were requested - hand in hand with the 
general public - to see to it that no violations of Resolution No. 647 were allowed at the 
construction site.
Whereas the pro-nuclear lobby during the environmental impact assessment had argued the 
case that the local communities would benefit from the Aleksandrov water reservoir in that it 
would be used as a source of irrigation and drinking water, the Greens claimed that this was far 
from the case. To gain support for their suspicions, a letter was sent to oblvodkhoz (the oblast 
water inspectorate) with a request that a report indicating what exactly would be the purpose of the 
water reservoir, be produced. In its letter of reply dated 3 October 1989, oblvodkhoz made it very 
clear that the water reservoir was intended ‘solely for the purposes of power engineering’. 
Besides, due to its small radius, much water would be lost due to evaporation, thus putting further 
strain on the water flow of the South Bug river. Oblvodkhoz therefore came out against the 
construction of the Aleksandrov water reservoir^.
Local authorities were also unhappy about the USSR Council of Ministers’ decision to go 
ahead with construction of the Aleksandrov water reservoir. The Aleksandrov settlement sovet in 
a decision made at its session on 26 September 1989 (No. 77) ‘On the Protection of the South Bug 
river’ made it clear that it found the filling up of the Aleksandrov water reservoir inexpedient as it 
would cause a deterioration of water quality in the river, destroy its aerohydrobiological filter, 
which in turn would further worsen water quality, destroy the habitat for rare plant and animal 
species, destroy landscapes of historical and recreational value; make it impossible to create a 
nature reserve; destroy 30 archaeological monuments of international significance; increase 
seismicity at the site of the SB nuclear power station; reduce the water flow of the river, thus 
resulting in an influx of saline water from the Firth of Bug, salinising ground water sources. It 
was also argued that the costs of constructing the water reservoir in connection with the three 
aggregates of the Tashlyk water reservoir would far outweigh the benefits of the additional energy 
which could thus be produced. Moreover, chernozem would be lost and in its place there would
 ^No. 01-488. of 5.10.1989 in reply to a request of 3.10.1989, signed by the Chairman of Oblvodkhoz, H. 
Tkachenko.
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See A.'iRiccaiGiDGBCKHH noce. 11(0131,lA CoBer iianojiiiux jieiivTaToii. BosiieceiicKHH paHoii. HAKOJiaeBCKü}! 
oGjiaci'b. Hcno.riiiH're.:ibHbiA KoxiMTei. Peiiieiine o r 26.09.1989 r  No 77. ”0  BaiiiMTe peicM lOyKiibiA 
Bvr". signed by the Chairman o f the executive committee, N. Andrievsky! and the secretary, L.
Bench ina.
 ^ See BoBiieceiicKAA paAointbiH c q b o t iiapoyiiibix yienvxaxoB HMKO.naeBcicoA ob-rtacrH. Hcno.iiiHxe.ni.>iii)iH 
icoMHTBT. PeiiieiiHO ox 29.09.1989 r  No. 173 ”0  pemoimH Hcno.riKOMa AjiRKcamiPOBCKoro 
iioopjucoBoro Conera ox 20.09.89 No. 77 O  aaniMxe neicn lOxciibiA Bvr”. signed by the Chairman of 
the executive committee M. Fedorov and secretary Shvets.
See letter to rii)e4ceiiaxe.'iio BepxoBiioro Conexa CCCP xob. ropbaueny M.C.. ripe4ce4axe.?no KoMHxexa 
BepxoBiioio CoBexa CCCP no c'rpoM're.xbctBy a  apxMreicxype xob. E.abHHny B.H., fipeitce^a're.fno 
rocKovinpHpo4bi CCCP xob. Boponuoay H.H., 3aMecrHxe.fiio iipe4ce4axe.rt}! KoMAxexa BepxoBiioro 
CoBoxa CCCP no BonpoGt.vr 3ico.aorMM xob. HbjiOKOBy A.B.. ripe4ceiiaxe.rno ixianonoA h bio/iKexnO" 
-<I)HnancoBoA kommcchh Conexa Coioosa xob. KyaepeiiKo B.F., npeitceAaxejiio Conexa MniiMcrpoB 
CCCP 'i'oi3. PbiXKony H.I4., flepnoMy ceicpexapio UK KBY roi3. HnainKO B.A., flpeytceAa'i'ejiio Conexa 
M hhhci'poi3 YCCP ton. Maco.i B.A. ox 3a\i. npe4ce4are.mi HnK0.aaeBCK0A aKOJiornMecKoA 
accouHanHH npn (lioiwe Ky.abxypbi C.B. Udanona.aoB, in (|)Oim No. 1. oiimc No. 32. cnp. No. 243, 
apic 79-90.
 ^ ripo'roKOJt No. JlP-596.
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emerge a water reservoir with extensive organic growth as a result of overheating and evaporation.
The water reservoir would also destroy spawning areas of various kinds of fish and raise ground 
water levels by 6-7 metres. On the basis of this the possovet decided that the South Bug river was 
to flow uninterrupted in the area of the village Aleksandrovka^.
Shortly afterwards, the executive committee of the Voznesensk regional soviet of people’s 
deputies issued a decision in support of the Aleksandrov settlement soviet. A request was made to 
the Nikolaev oblast executive committee to consider the suggestions of the Aleksandrov 
settlement soviet during the hearing of the plan for the economic and social development of the
oblast for 1990^. -In the meanwhile, Shapovalov and Suslova of Zelenyi Mir conducted an assessment of 
Resolution No. 647, which concluded that it was filled with contradictions and vagueness. These 
contradictions were presented and alternative solutions put forth in a report, which, accompanied 
by a covering letter, was sent to the leadership of the USSR and the Ukrainian republic^. The two 
greens argued that although Resolution No. 647 delegated responsibility for and control of water 
levels in the Aleksandrov water reservoir to local authorities, it would be beyond their control to
regulate water levels as the water reservoir would serve the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, 
which would operate under the auspices of Soviet authorities. For the three planned aggregates to 
operate normally, the water level could be no lower than 20.7 metres, as envisaged in the original 
draft.
The authors also referred to the decision^ made following the meetings which took place in 
Riabev’s office in Moscow on 4 and 8 August 1989, to create a nature reserve in the part of South
" 1
Bug filled with rapids. This would be impossible, they argued, as the area in question would be 
flooded once the Aleksandrov water reservoir had been completed.
A pre-condition set for the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be built, was that there would be 
no direct link between it and the Tashlyk cooling pond. This, argued Shapovalov and Suslova, 
would be impossible, given that once the third reactor at the nuclear power station was completed, 
the cooling pond would not contain enough water to cool all the reactors during the summer time. 
Consequently, the planners were faced with two options: they could either build a new pond, 
adjacent to the Tashlyk cooling pond, to service the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric 
power station (a part of the cooling pond could not be ‘cut o f f  from the rest of the pond to serve 
the hydroelectric power station, only as the pond was in itself not big enough to serve the three 
reactors), or they could direct water to the power station via the Tashlyk cooling pond from the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir. As the second option would be much less costly and also less time- 
consuming in that it required less construction-works than the first one, the Greens had no doubt 
that this would be the final result. The fact that construction at the site of the Tashlyk hydro­
electric power station continued unchanged before this question had been settled, fuelled their 
suspicion all the more. Not only the nuclear lobby, but also the USSR Council of Ministers was to 
blame for this, as Resolution No. 647 was so vague that it allowed for interpretation, thus 
providing the constructors with a possibility to eventually complete the power station with 10 
aggregates. The first three ones would be launched according to the original plan, whereas the 
compartment of the remaining seven would be completed and preserved, thus making it easy at a 
later stage to argue that due to large sums already invested in the project, it would be a waste of 
money not to complete it.
To make sure that the hydro-electric power station would be fitted with no more than three 
aggregates, and to avoid any further expansion of the station, the Greens suggested that the 
turbines be run by water from water towers, so as to eliminate the need for either a new water 
reservoir to be built, or for the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be completed simply to serve the 
power station. Since only 0.18% of the total energy output at the SB EK would be generated by 
the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, the Greens proposed to scrap this part of the project 
altogether, as it would cause much less damage from an environmental point of view. This was 
promptly rejected by the leadership of the nuclear power station.
Finally, the Greens could not accept that areas which according to Resolution No. 647 would 
be incorporated into the nature preserve to be established in the valley of the South Bug river 
would be flooded as a result of the high water level required in the Aleksandrov water reservoir in 
order to run the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station.
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Shapovalov and Suslova accused the USSR Minatomenergo of obstructing the revising of the 
project prior to its completion. According to Resolution No. 647 this work was to be conducted 
based on data on the water balance of the South Bug river. Such data had been taken over by 
Minatomenergo in the early 1980s, when the project for the nuclear power station was being 
redrafted. Oblvodkhoz had therefore hired Gidroproekt (Kharkiv) to provide the required 
information, but had so far not been presented with any data. The fact still remained, though, that 
Nikolaev oblast was generally short of water, and that water resources available would be better 
used for irrigating the chernozem than cooling nuclear reactors.
Geological and hydr' -geological research (required according Resolution No. 647) 
conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences indicated that both the second reactor of the 
nuclear power station and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station were situated directly on the 
seismologically active break of the Vranch zone (Chapter Six), which not only had safety 
implications, but also complicated construction a great deal. As a matter of fact, there had been an 
accident in connection with the construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station due to 
this circumstance. Due to movement of the break, a construction had collapsed. Luckily there 
were no fatalities as the workers were away for their lunch break. To stabilise the construction 
site, large quantities of concrete and liquid glass had been pumped into the ground underneath. 
This, however, did not seem likely to protect the construction should an earthquake occur, then 
according to Ukigeologia
...PA3C, lOYASC, XA3C iiaxoyuiTcn i; yii.iax iiepecG ienm i 
jje rnona. ihitsix son .imiaMeiiTOB.... a  no juiittibiM viop(l)o.iioi’HMecKoi'o 
a tia .m sa  oim  jxicno.'iozceiiu  a c k b o s iil ix  soiiax  conpeMennbix 
Kopi.i, iipn 3T0M HvieioT vieci'o pas.aniiiibie CKopocrH iinwAceiimi
5.10 KOB...*
Thus, the question should not be so much about expanding the nuclear power station, but 
rather about how to make the existing three reactors safe in case of an earthquake or surface 
movement. Shapovalov and Suslova asked what other arguments were needed to say a definite no 
to any further reactors and to the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water 
reservoir.
As for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, this would use more energy than it would 
create. During the day-time it was intended to produce energy for the peak hours. However, the 
hydroaccumulating station would require 1.2-1.4 times more energy at night than it would itself 
generate throughout the day. In addition to being environmentally unfriendly, it would therefore
 ^<|)OiUl No. 1. oiTAC No. 32. Clip. No. 243.apK. 86. The three nuclear power stations referred to are the 
Rivne nuclear power station, luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station and the Klimelnytskyi nuclear 
power station.
I
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ripeCTyri-ieiiMeM, HanpaB;iemii>iM, ica te iipoTMB naceaeiiM îi peciiyG anK H , 
raie M iipoTHB peiueuMB npoaoBoahCTiieiiiiOH iiporpa.vivibi c i'p an u  b 
ueaoM^ .
With regard to the leadership of the nuclear power station, Suslova and Shapovalov claimed 
that it was falsifying data and misinforming the constructors and the general public. As evidence,
completed and that for this reason it would make no sense to discuss the question of whether to 
stop construction works. At a meeting at the Council of Ministers in August the same year, Fuks 
announced that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was 95% completed and that it was not needed by
oblast authorities. However, as pointed out above, the oblast could not be in charge of any energy
reservoir. In Voznesensk a potentially critical situation was created when the people there were
664
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also be uneconomic. So as to avoid peaks in energy use and energy going to waste during the
■o
night, it would be a better solution to provide the users with incentives to use more energy in the 
late hours. A number of other solutions were also offered to secure a more balanced use of 
energy.
Finally, a number of reasons were given as to why the Aleksandrov water reservoir must not 
be completed. These arguments more or less coincided with those listed by the Aleksandrov 
settlement soviet (possovet). It was also argued that the water reservoir would be short-lived 
(approximately five to seven years) due to extensive build-up of silt. There would also be a build­
up of silt on the bed of the South Bug river as the presence of the water reservoir would slow down 
the flow of the river and in addition reduce water levels. This would cause problems for the ship 
wharfs in Nikolaev and increase costs in ship construction.
Shapovalov’s and Suslova’s letter concluded that neither from an economic nor from a moral 
point of view would the construction of the Aleksandrov hydro-complex or the Tashlyk hydro­
electric power station be desirable. Consequently, they demanded that construction be halted 
immediately. As a matter of fact, the extensive construction of nuclear power stations in Ukraine 
could only be characterised as
At
they referred to the session of the oblast soviet in May 1990 when the General Director of the SB 
nuclear power station, V. Fuks claimed that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was practically
the ‘atom-mongers’. As soon as it had been eompleted it would be put under the auspices of the
s  
,object. Furthermore, as of 1 September the Aleksandrov water reservoir was only 50% completed.
Only 14,4 million roubles out of a total 28,8 million had been used and construction had yet not■started at the Aleksandrov hydro-electric power station. Finally, the pro-nuclear lobby had 
allegedly ‘arranged’ a letter from the people of the village Kostiantynovka in support o f the water
Ibid.. apK. 88.
advised to sort out their grievances with the constructors directly, since most of the construction 
workers were not locals and since they enjoyed higher salaries and better food supplies than the 
local population, whom they were depriving of the drinking water. Such conflicts were in the 
interests of the pro-nuclear lobby as they would give it time to complete construction works at the 
SB EK.
The position of Zelenyi Mir was thus very clear on this matter: due to its vagueness and the 
lack of clarification of major points, Resolution No. 647 ought to be reassessed prior to its 
implementation.
7.1.3 Actors involved in the Campaign 
The Authorities
Shapovalov and Suslova received a reply to their letter from Riabev of the USSR Council of 
Ministers on 24 November 1989. Sankovskii, Deputy Chairman of the Socio-Economic 
Department of the party obkom conveyed to them that USSR Goskompriroda together with USSR 
Minatomenergoprom and USSR Minenergo had been ordered to examine the questions raised in 
their letter and would in due course inform the authors about the outcome of this examination'^.
Oblast and local authorities, however, shared the concerns of the Greens. The 14th session of 
the oblast soviet, which convened in December 1989, passed a resolution to lobby the USSR 
Council of Ministers into re-examining Resolution No. 647 and to stop all construction work at the 
SB EK until its revised project had been assessed by the State Environmental impact assessment 
Commission".
Furthermore, an extended meeting on the SB EK was held by the oblast Goskompriroda on 
30 January 1990. The meeting was attended by Goskompriroda officials, representatives of the SB 
nuclear power station and Greens from all regions of the oblast. A. Albul, the Chairman of the 
Committee, in an interview with hizhnaia pravda expressed concern that despite Resolution No. 
647, orders made by USSR Minatomenergoprom, USSR Minatomenergo and two decisions o f the 
oblast soviet, the constructors and the projectors had so far failed to revise the SB EK project. In 
the meanwhile, construction continued unchanged, based on the old, unrevised project - despite 
the fact that no permission on special use of water had been given by Derzhkompriroda.
‘^ C n p a n ic a  ic jioK V ivieiiTaM  No. 2 4 0 3 / 1 5 2  o r  1 3  i i o i id p a  1 9 8 9  r o ; ia .  No. 2 5 8 1 / 1 4 5  o r  1 v ie icaG p f i 1 9 8 9  
r o a a . o r  M n c r p y i c r o p a  co u M a .r ib iio -3 K o iiO M H M e cK o r o  OTae.Fia 1J,K K o M r ia p T u u  V icp aH U b i B .  3 y 6 u o i î ,  
1 2 . 1 2 . 1 9 8 9 .  This docum ent is available in ( lio iu i No. 1. o n u c  No. 3 2 .  c n p .  No. 2 3 3 .  a |) ic . 1 0 0 .
'  ^ lOzKuaji npaim, 3 . 2 . 1 9 9 0 ,  c .  3 .
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Therefore, all work related to hydro-electric objects and the South Bug river constituted a 
violation of current legislation.
The oblast Derzhkompriroda passed a resolution ordering construction work to be stopped at 
the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov hydro-electric power station and 
water reservoir from 10 February 1990, as such construction violated not only the Ukrainian Water
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Code and other environmental legislation, but also the recently adopted Resolution issued by the 
USSR Supreme Soviet ‘On the Immediate Measures for the Ecological Revival of the Country’’ .^ 
Point Three of this Resolution said that funding for all industrial projects for 1990 would only be 
given in those cases where the projects had been examined by and passed by a State 
Environmental impact assessment Group.
Given that the project had not been updated and sent to Goskompriroda for re-examination, 
the continued construction work was clearly violating the Supreme Soviet’s Resolution, which in 
turn illustrated the legal dilemma the Soviet Union had faced also prior to the introduction of 
glasnost and perestroika: although the laws and resolutions existed, they were in most cases either 
implemented only half-heartedly or not at all. This was possible as there were either no special 
bodies which could monitor their implementation and the laws and regulations were vague, thus 
allowing for interpretation, or because those in charge of monitoring were understaffed, making it 
physically very difficult to conduct such a task.
The Greens frequently faced this dilemma: on the one hand, their campaign would result in 
resolutions being passed at local, oblast, republican or the Soviet level. On the other hand, these 
resolutions were vague and very often ignored by the pro-nuclear lobby (See Chapter Six). The 
Greens thus formed a coalition with concerned local and oblast authorities to put pressure on 
Soviet decision-making bodies to secure the implementation of their own resolutions and laws.
The Pro-Nuclear Lobby
The leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the workers’ collective o f the Building-site 
Trust. Atomgidroenergostroi called a meeting in luzhnoukrainsk on 13 February to discuss the 
decision made by the oblast Goskompriroda. The major argument of the constructors, was that if 
construction was halted at the site, 4,000 workers and engineers would be made redundant. The 
person in charge of the trust, V. Preobrazhenskii, asked the 2,000 people present in the auditorium 
what these people and their families would then do. A number of those present had brought along 
posters carrying the following text:
Ibid. I
”K t o  .iH iiiH .T v ie iif i i ip a m i  u a  p a O o T y ? ”, ”3 e ; i e u ia f f  iVlup n e v ie x  c r p a i i y  k 
a y M H iie”, ’’n p e K p a iM r h  T p a a a io  9 i ie p r o c r p o H T e . ie H !" , " evio iiM H . y c r y i iH T c  
v i e c r o  p a .iyv fy !" .
Deputy Director G. Sazonov of the SB nuclear power station argued that the decision made by the 
oblast Goskompriroda was in fact illegal, as Resolution No. 647 envisaged the completion of the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir and three generators of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, 
Any decision or action aimed at preventing the construction workers from carrying out the 
Resolution should for this reason not be implemented.
A. Hodza, the Deputy Chairman of the oblast Goskompriroda who attended the meeting to 
explain the decision made on 30 January, was booed at by those present when he explained and 
defended the legal aspects of the decision as well as expressed concerns that as a consequence
CymecFByeT o iiace iine b  i o m ,  b t o  b  i u i . i w i e H u i e M ,  B c . n o y f i c b  
iio.iioBMH‘iaTitoci'bio peuieiimi CoBMHiia, 3iieprocrpoM're.iM a o S b i o t c j i -  
raKM pa3i)e!uenM5T coopyAcarb 4-biH S.aoK A3C u lîcex 10 6.aoi«)B 
FA3C. Flo K p a H i t e u  M e i ^ e ,  b  cn y x a x  c o A e p x c a T c a  r a K w e  npusi.iBbi. B 
3'roM CM'ryanMM Mueiaie FocKOMiipMpoAbi YCCP — ncKaxb 
KOMnpoMHcciioe |)euieiine.
Hodza was able to speak with weight as his views were supported by the general public of 
Nikolaev oblast as well as by the Derzhkompriroda, which in a letter'"^ agreed with the decision 
made on 30 January. The Deputy Chairman of the oblispolkom urged the constructors to await the 
ruling of the environmental impact assessment commission and to think about what they would do 
once the SB EK had been completed. He made it clear that there were a number of construction 
sites in the oblast and suggested a new work front to deal with these.
Locals were also booed at when they expressed their concerns about the Second Stage of the 
SB EK: N. Derzhavets (Leader of the Mechanical Department of Dniprobuhstroi) won little 
support from the construction workers when arguing that
y i!HX-Ae-(i-e. the people of the surrounding villages) ne r yBe[DeniiocrM, 
MTO B pe3y.m/raTe iiejiTejibiioCTU aneprocrpouTejieH h 
3KCiuiyaTauMoniiMKOB BOAa H3 TaLUJiMKCKoro BOAOxpaiiMJiHUia iie 
noBaaer b IOzchbih Byr, U3 KOToporo onu no'r]3e6.ruiioT cuio 
jKHBH're.abCKyio a.aary.
Possibly in an attempt to create general good will towards the leadership of the nuclear power 
station in luzhnoukrainsk itself (i.e. from the construction workers and the locals in
No. 7-1-1-162/9.
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luzhnoukrainsk, many of whom were waiting in a queue for flats), Fuks, the Chairman of
.luzhnoukrainsk gorispolkom, E. Vychalkovskii, and the Leader of the Board for the Construction 
of the SB nuclear power station, N. Stulin, sent a letter to the CPU Central Committee urging the 
paity to pay more attention to the severe housing problems that had emerged in luzhnoukrainsk 
due to its rapid expansion. The authors called for more territory to be provided for purposes of 
expanding the city, as the population was anticipated to grow beyond 50,000 - a maximum limit, 
given shortage of territory'''. The letter made no mention of the fact that the housing crisis might, 
to some extent, be caused by the priorities of the leadership of the nuclear power station itself.
The Greens had for a long time (see Chapter Six) argued that money earmarked for social and 
environmental purposes were put towards construction work at the SB EK when funding for the
■;v;latter was frozen.
The construction workers present at the meeting in luzhnoukrainsk, though, did not bring up 
this issue, but rather unanimously expressed their anger towards the Greens and those supporting 
them. A resolution expressing a lack of confidence in the oblast Derzhkompj'iroda and hizhnaia 
pravda, was passed by the meeting with the following wording;
.. .T p e 6 o [u m  G esyc-xonnoro Bb inojiiieiimi nocranoo.ienM }! CoB.viHiia CCCP 
No. 647 o r  1 6 .8 .1 9 8 9 r ., n o c r a n o a m n m i  CoBMuna YCCP or 
2 6 .1 0 .1 989r;...Bbipa3MTi) neAOBepue o6.riKOMU'rery oxpa iib i npnpOAW. e r o  
npe4ceiiaTe.riio A.A. A.a5y.ny,...; ...TpeSouaTS o r  o5.iiHcrio.îTKOMa :
Tnv/invri'nnMTK f3p^ n;if3nTrinp iijirpnpiiup TGwciinvicn^ H/inrifn npTiiMTt, u s?ITpyAoycrpo Tb G espaG ornoe u ace.n e im e lO xcn oy icp an ucK a, peruHTb b npaBHT0 .aiicrBe B onpoc o BBBi.aare hocoGmh no Ge3pa6 oTnue;...npHinn'b |)e iueiiH e o  crpoH ’i'e.nbci'Be 9Ko.riorH4ecKH nncrb ix  npeAnpHB'ruH, 
oGecneBHBaioiuHX b G;iH5K aA inee BpeMs iieoGxoAMMoe K0 .3HMec'rB0 
paGoHAX MecT....HacroBLuee p en ien n e  oiiyG.riHKOua'rb n neB aru, 
oG.aHciio.3KO\iy u oGKO.viy napTMH â iitl otbct no ncMy i io  25 (Feiipajui 
c.r. B npoTHBOvi c iyM ae npoB ecrn iipeAynpeAHTe.abnyio saG acroB icy  
KO.B.ieicrnBOB crpoHTe.neri h 3Kcn.nya'ranM0iBiMK0B 3n ep roK 0M im eK m '\
Although the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the construction workers 
expressed a willingness to enter a constructive dialogue with the general public and with Zelenyi 
Mir with the aim of finding an ‘optimal solution to the further development of society’, rather than 
paving the way for such a dialogue, the meeting in luzhnoukrainsk resulted in a sharpening o f the 
conflict between pro-environment and pro-nuclear forces.
In a letter to the Chairman of the USSR Goskompriroda, N. Vorontsov, Zelenyi Mir criticised 
the pro-nuclear lobby for deliberately continuing construction of the SB EK at the expense of 
measures to safeguard the environment, also mentioned in Resolution No. 647! What the Greens
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were in effect saying, was that the leadership of the nuclear power station had deliberately
_facilitated tension between construction workers and the Greens by not transferring workers to 
other tasks, thus making it look as though the Greens were after the construction workers per se.
This despite the fact that Suslova and Shapovalov in their assessment of Resolution No. 647 had 
suggested that construction workers be transferred to road construction, for which there was an 
acute shortage in the oblast! Vorontsov was urged to order USSR Minatomenergoprom and USSR 
Minenergo to obey Soviet legislation and thus bring construction works to a halt, awaiting the 
redrafting of the SB EK project and its assessment by an environmental impact assessment
16commission .
The Media
16
I■'Ar 
■ |
.The resolution adopted at the meeting in luzhnoukrainsk also criticised the Editor-in-Chief of 
luzhnaia pravda, A. Samoilenko, for premeditated distortion of documented facts. To the pro- 
nuclear lobby the newspaper came out too openly in support of the Greens and their demands.
Neither the Greens were 100% pleased with luzhnaia pravda's handling of the SB EK. At the 
election rally which took place in Nikolaev on 11 Februaiy, a group of people had gathered behind 
a poster accusing the paper of ‘stagnation’. When asked by luzhnaia Pravda's reporter lu. 
Demchenko why they thought so, the reply was that
C'iMTaeM raic, noToviy nro rasera satiM.Macr OAnocTopoiinioio iiosmuhio 
B Bonpoce pasBUTMa A3C, BpeAOcran.ruiîi cbobo ro.aBKO 
BaMirrepecoBaiiHi.iM b paaiinpeiiMH crponre.tibcrBa lOZcaoyicpaHiiuaM.
MiieiiMe zee "se.aeiiBix" ona iie yMMTMBaeT” ’^.
.To argue that the newspaper was one-sidedly pro-environment or pro-nuclear would be
unfair. As seen in the previous chapter, the editor took the liberty to edit the first letter from 
.Ekvator prior to its publication. It did, however, print its second letter in full shortly afterwards, Iand kept printing letters, articles and documents in favour of an environmental impact assessment
Ito be conducted on the Second Stage of the SB EK. On the other hand, it has to be said that the 
newspaper adopted a cautious position, trying not to openly side with either of the participants in 
the debate. As the organ of the party obkom it could not side too uncritically with the Greens, nor 
could it too openly oppose the nuclear lobby, as that would be equal to opposing central authorities 
in Moscow, which as seen in Chapter Six, the CPU preferred to do not on the pages of the press
See letter to Nikolai Vorontsov ‘0  lOzcno-yicpaHiiCKOM aneproKOVinaeKce’. 
lO m iiui npaim,, 20.2.1990, c. 4.
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the covering of the SB EK. Those expressing a critical view of luzhnaia pravda at the meeting in 
Nikolaev did therefore not necessarily represent the entire movement.
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for a number of reasons. On balance, though, the newspaper allowed both sides to express their 
views. Moreover, as glasnost and démocratisation took hold and gained a momentum of their 
own, luzhnaia pravda made increasingly critical remarks of its own.
To some extent, critical voices on either side may have suffered from the famous syndrome '
that ‘if you are not with us, then you are against us’- or, as one would say in Russian - ‘not our 
man’ (ne nash chelovek). Having said that, though, the leadership of Zelenyi Mir was on good 
terms with the newspaper, and particularly so with A. Kolesnik, the reporter primarily in charge of
On the issue of the SB EK, though, there was no room for compromise for the Greens.
,Kommunarets illustrated this well, quoting a clash between oblast soviet deputy L. Suslova and N.
Stulin of Minatomenergoprom which took place at a session of the oblast soviet in mid-August .
The issue on debate was the continued construction work that was taking place on the Tashlyk 
hydro-electric power station. A. Albul, Chairman of the oblast Derzhkompriroda had confirmed 
the illegality of such construction works and Suslova was trying to get an answer out of Stulin as 
to why this was happening.
Stulin claimed that despite the critical remark the constructors had received from 
Goskompriroda, they intended only to complete three aggregates of the power station, whereupon 
the following dialogue took place:
Cvcnona: no n nuAe.ia Apyroe. CKazcme, noueMy Monmpyeroi
y.iH'i'Ka 4-ro arperara? A Teiie])b ycTanaivinnaioTca erne saKJiaAiiue 
yieTa.riM iia 5-om  h 6 -o.vi aiperaxax?
Crv.mn: Hy, moz-oio tuk 40 GecKoneanocru yioiiMUiarb 4pyr 4pyra
]îonpocaviH...B a iM o e  GjiHZcanmee npewa Mbi no iimm nocropacM Cfi 
o'l’neTMTb KBa.aM(l)MUHpoBanno - noneviy M b i  cranw.vi y.riuTKy 4-ro 
arperara . mvi.
CvQiiOBa: B npmarse no Bame.viy MMiincTepcmy BaiiMcaiio: ”B
G.anoKaumee npexni iipeAcraBHTb nporpaMMy paGor na nee aeaiTb 
arireraron".
O i'vjm ii: Bbb n an ep n oe. MMeere b bm4 .v nprncaa z p y r o r o
MMiiMCTepcrrBa, M n ioiiepreTH K H  CCCP...
Cvcriona: Bbi vieini HSBHMHTe, aro npocïo oGviaii, ripuneM na Bcex
y p o B i n i x . . .
3"I
Zolotukhin joined in the debate and criticised the oblast soviet for just watching construction 
works continue without doing anything to stop these. I. Hrytsai called for restraint, arguing that 
rather than falling foul of emotions, this situation would have to be thoroughly examined prior to
making a decision. If the Greens were right, then a decision would be made to stop construction 
of the fourth and fifth aggregates"'.
With regard to the pro-nuclear lobby, its representatives were never denied access to the 
pages of luzhnaia pravda. Unlike what had been the case before, though, their view was no longer 
the only one presented to the readers. The opposition towards the Second Stage of the SB EK 
must have initially taken the leadership of the SB nuclear power station by surprise and then, as it 
caused them increasing difficulties with having their way, caused much anger and resentment. On 
balance, though, it seems fair to say that luzhnaia pravda throughout 1988 and 1989 adopted a 
policy of airing the different vAws to the extent this was possible, given the restraints the political 
system put on the press.
I
7.1.4 Clash of interests between Ukraine and Soviet authorities
KoMMynapeu,. 16.8.1990 (n.p.).
nocrra i[oi3.rienHe No. 1 o r  19.1.1991 r. 0  Mepax no noBbinienniQ saHHTeix^conaniiocrM viecm bix  
onraiiOB h  MacejienHii b  nas.viemeiiHH ua h x  xepDHTopHH oGseicroB aTOMHon a i i e u m T M K H k  This 
resolution was signed by Prime Minister V. Pavlov. I obtained a copy from Zelenyi Mir.
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The growing opposition towards nuclear power in Ukraine worried not only the pro-nuclear lobby
but also the Soviet government in Moscow. On 19 January 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers passed
a Resolution to counteract such opposition'^. A number of incentives were offered to the people
living within a 30 km radius of the nuclear power stations. Some 10% of the budget to expand
existing or build new nuclear power stations would be earmarked for social purposes such as
housing. Investments would be made in accordance with the wishes of local authorities. Heating
of villages and towns would be provided by the nuclear power station if technically possible and
ecologically sound. Electricity would be provided to the locals at half the normal price and the
government also offered to insure people against nuclear accidents, so that everyone would get
proper medical care and financial compensation in case of an accident. Taxes payable by the
nuclear power stations to the Soviet budget would be limited to 30%, A large sum of taxes
payable to the republics would be channelled into the oblast, regional and local budgets to be used
in the areas surrounding the nuclear power stations. Finally, the government promised to set up
information points where locals could obtain information about the nuclear power station and to 
.provide the local Sanitary-Epidemic Station, Sanepidemstantsii, with proper equipment to measure 
radioactivity in the areas adjacent to the power stations.
The Greens responded angrily to the Government’s attempt at dividing the pro-environment 
lobby with its propositions. A long reply was printed in the Soviet paper Vsem in May 1991.
What the Government and Minatomenergoprom were willing to give those surrounded by nuclear 
power stations in return for what they were taking was nothing but crumbles, then
Bœco!03UüJi rnse’Tci "BceM'\ no. 2, wan 1991 r., c. 6.
The first meeting took place on 6 May, the second one, which lasted for several days, between 13 and 17 
May.
The luzhnouki'ainsk city Soviet, the leadership o f the SB nuclear pow er station, Ukrainian
Derzhkompriroda, Ukrainian Gosplan, Ukrainian Minenergo, USSR Minatomenergoprom, the 
Uki ainian Council o f Ministers and the USSR Cabinet o f M inister’s Biuro on the Fuel and Energy 
Complex.
"1%I
i
Me.'ibKne iioiiaBKH n nn;te yM eubU ieima n.iarb i ;ia a.ieKTpooiiepi n io  m. ih 
crpoMTe.ibCTna a c t c i c u x  ca iia T o p u es n 3o iie, OToGpaii iipn s t o v i  
He;îaMeimvibie m uoToviy G ecneiiiibie. z<M3iienoiia>Kiii>ie pecypr.i)!. raKHe.
KaK sev i.iji n iioza . a c  ühmh n  3iiopoBbe“°.
.could not be said to be a fair exchange. As will be seen below not everyone agreed with the 
Greens, though.
A1;.:-
7.1.5 Implications: The Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station
.Throughout the spring and summer of 1991 a series of meetings were held on the construction 
works at the SB BK^'. The first meeting, which took place in early May and which was attended 
by a number of ministries and departments in addition able to the leadership of the nuclear power
station and oblast and local authorities, discussed the implementation of Resolution No. 647 and
.Resolution 271 passed by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 26 October 1989. The leadership 
of the nuclear power station announced that due to interruptions and delays in construction works, 
caused by USSR Minfin (Ministry of Finance)’s decision to freeze funding for the SB EK from 1 
January 1991 following requests by local and oblast authorities, as the project had not been 
redrafted nor been passed by the environmental impact assessment, the energy shortage in Ukraine 
was increasing. The participants unanimously agreed to resume funding so that the project could 
be redrafted and ecological aspects be properly examined. An ecological assessment of a 
produvka of the Tashlyk water reservoir was also being delayed due to the lack of funds being 
supplied, as were works on nuclear safety at the SB nuclear power station.
A majority of those present^^ held the opinion that construction works be completed in 
accordance with the two resolutions so that the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric 
power station and the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be launched 
and for the socio-economic development of the region to continue. Nikolaev oblispolkom and 
Zelenyi Mir objected to this, arguing that construction works may not resume until Ukrainian
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contact the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the USSR Cabinet of Minister’s Biuro on the Fuel and
Goskompriroda had assessed the redrafted version of the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric
power station, thus keeping in line with Point Three of Resolution No. 647^’'. : |. . . .
It was decided that the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the luzhnoukrainsk 1
gorispolkom in co-operation with a number of scientific institutions prepare a redrafted version of ■ A 
the SB EK project by 5 June 1991 and that this be presented to the oblast Soviet for discussion in A
June. Nikolaev oblispolkom and the leadership of the SB nuclear power station were instructed to
,1. 
ÏEnergy Complex and the USSR Minfin with a request to resume funding for the SB EK in 
preparation for produvka of the Tashlyk cooling pond and for the uncompleted objects at the À
construction site to be preserved in a safe manner, in addition for environmental activities to T.‘A
continue. Social development of the area could then also proceed, in addition to the redrafting of |
'Gthe Tashlyk hydro-electric power station project. Prior to a decision being made regarding ;,:;3
continued funding fi’om Moscow, the nuclear power station was ordered to look for funds so that A
the redrafting of the Tashlyk station could start as soon as possible. A
Whereas the first meetings were primarily informative, examining the implementation of the :§
'■ftgovernmental decisions on the SB EK, the last meeting, which took place in luzhnoukrainsk on 10 
June, and which was attended by representatives of the executive committees of all the regions A
adjacent to the nuclear power station in addition to the leadership of the nuclear power station, S
..A-Uh'gidroproekt, Atomenergoproekt (Kliarkiv branch) and Atomgidroenergostroi, a more precise yy
version of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station project as well as socio-economic issues of the 7
regions were debated at length. The meeting agreed to ask the oblast soviet to speed up the debate
on the preliminary documents on the clarification of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. A
"AThe participants further endorsed the revamped project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power 
station and recommended the constructors and the regional executive committees to produce
funding of social objects in the Arbuzinka region and in the smal 1-town settlement of Arbuzinka,
figures for housing, social and cultural purposes to be included in the project^''. Individual
agreements between the leadership of the nuclear power station and the regions involved were also A
signed. The draft agreement between General Director V. Fuks and the Chairman of the fts
Arbuzinka regional Soviet A. Gorbach, for instance, stated very clearly that in return for the
,permission had to be granted by the Arbuzinka regional Soviet to continue construction of the 'A4\Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Fourth reactor of the SB nuclear power station (my AI
-------------------------------------------
flporoKO.R coBeiuaiiMs no Bonpocavi (I)HiiaiicHponaHnn paGor n 1991 r. no lOzoïo-yicnauiicKOMY jf
3nepro[coMrij[eKCv. 6.5.1991. A
riDOTOKQJT cooeiuaHUH HO Bonpocaivi crpoHTe.riLcrBa QGbeicron lOzcno-yicpaHncicoro aiieproKOMnjteKai. r. .y
lOxnovKDaHHCK. 10.6.1991. ; |
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underlining) based on the redrafted projects, having undergone the ecological-economic expert 
and been confirmed by the relevant authorities! A total of 98,740,000 roubles would be spent on 
social projects in the region. The breakdown of this sum showed, however, that only 34,840,000 
roubles would be shared with regional organisations^^. Furthermore, the regional Soviet 
committed itself to deciding jointly with the leadership of the nuclear power station what this 
money would be spent on, thus limiting the former’s ability to control investment on its own 
territory. Besides, contracts would be signed between the leadership of the nuclear power station 
and the construction organisations involved only - the regional Soviet would only be given status 
as an observer when these contracts were signed. The ‘deal’ thus turned out to be a lot less 
favourable towards the regions than envisaged initially'^*’. According to the protocol of a meeting 
held on 9 August 1991, this agreement and similar agreements between the leadership of the 
nuclear power station and the Voznesensk and Domonevsk regions were to be signed by 30 
October^''.
The decision to include housing, social and cultural programmes in the revamped project, was 
in line with the Resolution that had been passed by the Soviet government in January 1991. The 
newspaper Radianske Pribuzhzhia reported that the sum earmarked for these purposes would 
amount to approximately 150 million roubles. As a result, officials from the regions within the 30 
km zone had adopted a positive attitude to the project and eventually gave their consent to 
complete construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station with three aggregates. Their 
decision constituted a 180 degree turn-around from the position they had adopted three years 
previously, when the seven Chairmen of the regional Soviets had categorically rejected any further 
expansion of the SB EK. When asked to explain this sudden turn-around, Barbunov, the deputy 
chairman of the Aleksandrov small-town soviet, gave the following reason:
Pan bine crpomiu, lie nsupaji na Miietiue Mecriioro iiace.aenmi. ü az te  
9T0 oGcTOjrrejibcriJo vior.no cra ib  iipununon KOialnmicra. Cefniac 
oScraiiOBKa Msvieiin.nacb. Pjuiom c iiocmicovi iipaxTunecKH nocrpoen 
MoimibiH rH4poy:3B.n b cocraoe ociioniibix coopyz<enMû...Mnoro cpeiicrn 
iniozceno b aio  crpoM'reJibcrao, icax nee dto, ne ripmiocfi Ma.rieHineA
iio.rib3i)i, pzcaneer, iipnxo^HT b nero4iioci'b. Hapoiinue Aeiibrn 
iipoiiayiaiOT. Cennac b A.rieKcaii4poBi(e c.FiozcM.nacb raicoe vnienne, nro 
na.vi SyiieT Go.’ibnie rio.rib3bi o r  nocrpoeiiiioro oGbeicra. aevi o r 
;ia5pouiennoH. no3a6biTOH Bcevm crpoHKu. Mbi nunero iie repiievi,
25 Some 5,900,000 roubles would be spent on the project to conserve the Kostiantynov water reservoir, 35 
million roubles would go towards the revamped project for the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station 
and another 33 million towards the redrafted project for Reactor No. 4 of the SB nuclear power station.
Bpoeicr. iloroBop N_ or "771991 r. (as this was a draft project, no number and date were filled in on the 
copy I obtained in Nikolaev).
^^npoTGKG.ri conetnanHfl ”3Ko.norHnecKHe h connajibiibte acneicrbi b vToniieniioM npoeicre TaiiuibiKCKOM 
rA3C”. r. lOzcHOVKpaHticK:. 9 .8 .1 9 9 1 .
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fje4 h ypoBeiM, nario.iiieiiHîi BOZOxpaiiM.iHiua o y z e r  naBHceri) m o t  
iiaiJiero peiiieimst. A e iiie BO.iiiyer conMa.a.noe paaiin'me ce.ia. B 
noG feziiee upevui ace G ioz<aee crp(3UTb nonbie oGbeicn.r^
I. Burdin of the Voznesensk regional Soviet expressed a similar view, arguing that the 
opinion of the Soviet had probably changed as a result of the realities of life. The inhabitants of 
Voznesensk needed to see the social development of the region in a perspective, although far from 
everyone had agreed to allow the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station from being completed.
III. Landau, the Chief Engineer of the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, 
tried to justify the completion of the station on rational grounds. In an a'-ticle labelled ‘Problems 
of the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station’, he argued that the three aggregates were needed to 
supply additional electricity to the power grid during peak hours. Since the station had been 90% 
completed, it would from an economic point of view make no sense to install an alternative gas 
turbine station as this would cost millions of roubles and would require gas, of which there was 
already a deficit in Ukraine. In addition there were the ecologically negative side-effects from 
using gas, caused by emissions into the atmosphere.
Following the decision of the Nikolaev oblast Soviet in October 1990, the project for the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station had been reworked and measures taken to reduce its impact 
on the environment to a minimum. The most serious environmental side-effect o f the project 
would be that 300 hectares of land would be flooded for the Aleksandrov water reservoir. Those 
rare plants found on this land would however be reallocated to the adjacent nature reserve the 
Granite-Steppe Pobuzhe. Prognoses undertaken indicated that the water quality of the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir would not deteriorate as quickly as the Greens argued it would, given 
that there would be a continuous circulation of the water in it. Since the Aleksandrov water 
reservoir would not be connected to the South Bug river, the river would not suffer any further 
pollution. Archaeological research would finish in 1993 and flooding was therefore planned for 
the spring of 1994, when the water level in the river would reach its annual peak, thus reducing the 
impact on the river. The oblast could only benefit from the Aleksandrov water reservoir as it 
would provide a surplus during periods of poor water levels in the South Bug river^^.
The Greens, however, were not ready to compromise on this issue. S. Kolesnikov of the 
Voznesensk Greens were of the opinion that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station would only 
do harm to the environment. Zolotukhin in a lengthy article accused the Soviets o f Arbuzinka,
<-
Voznesensk and Domanevsk of falling prey to the new tactics of the pro-nuclear lobby. The
PajmiChKe ripHÔyzKÆn, 2 5 .7 .1 9 9 1 , c. 3. 
Ibid.
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.arguments against further expansion of the SB EK remained as strong now as before. But in 
addition to feeding the people with half truths and accusing its opponents of incompetence and 
‘emotions’, the pro-nuclear lobby had discovered that it could
...ICyiiHTb ( . l io a e u ) , o p u e iirH p y î ic i)  iia  nu t a e ry ,  a K o ro p o v i o iio
iipeG b iaae r sc. le a c rn i le  o rp a 6 .'te iiH } i e ro  coio3i i 1)Ivih  iseaoM ciiiav iM . i.e. 
ae p iivT b  iia p o z y  aacTb n.TiaiTbix y  i ie ro  ; ie iie r .
Supreme Soviet. Similarly, ignoring Resolution No. 647 and the ban declared by the third session 
of the Nikolaev oblast Soviet on 16 October 1990, the nuclear lobby was tiying to launch the first
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The hard currency earned from exporting electricity from the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power 
station still went straight into the pocket of the USSR Minenergo and Minatomenergoprom, 
bypassing the Ukrainian republic and the oblast. To pay off peoples’ fears concerning nuclear 
power, a mere 10% of the budget would be returned. The resolution passed by the Soviet 
government in .lanuary 1991 could be labelled nothing but ‘amoral’, as after the reunification of 
Germany all the East German nuclear power stations were closed and decommissioning started, 
thus clearly illustrating their inherent lack of safety! Whereas the attitude of the Soviets involved 
was understandable, it could in no way be justified as it endangered not only the health of those 
living in the three regions concerned, but also of the inhabitants of the entire oblast.
Regarding social investments, Resolution No. 647 envisaged substantial sums to be used for
such purposes. The money had been provided, but rather than be used for the intended purpose, 
the leadership of the nuclear power station had put this money towards the construction of six
rather than three aggregates at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station! As for the argument that
G
tthe power station had almost been completed and that leaving it idle would mean that large sums of money would go to waste, this was unreasonable, given that construction had continued despite 
the ruling o f the oblast Soviet to stop it until the project had been reworked and reassessed. The 
only reason why the hydro-electric power station was needed by the pro-nuclear lobby, said the 
Greens, was for the Tashlyk cooling pond and the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be connected. 
The pro-nuclear lobby had admitted that the Tashlyk cooling pond was not big enough to cool 
three reactors. The negative effects of the Aleksandrov water reservoir were well known from 
previous articles published in the press and from assessments made by various ministi’ies and 
departments in addition to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
The pro-nuclear lobby arrogantly continued to defy Ukrainian legislation, not only in the case
of the SB EK, but also at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station, where reactor No. 6 was in the
.process of being completed, despite the moratorium on nuclear power passed by the Ukrainian
aggregate of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and to force through a produvka of the 
Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river^''.
Zolotukhin likened the pro-nuclear lobby’s strategy on the Tashlyk hydro-electric power 
station to a Trojan horse, ready to make its entrance at the upcoming session of the oblast soviet, 
deceiving the local population and violating environmental legislation which ruled that any 
construction projects prior to being implemented had to be passed by an environmental impact 
assessment commission. So
Tan neyz<:e.'tH...iioiiH\îaa, MTO c iiavm iie.iaior, OTiipasjuionau nepsyio 
rmiomiiHiiy rocyjuipcTneiiiiOH iiesaencHMOcrrH YKpaHni.i, iie sa mpax. a 
sa conecTi.. vibi iie orcroHvi caoio se.vi.iio or iiocaraTe.ibcrB coiosiioro 
lieiiovicriia h ito.SBO.iHvi e.vty -  6es paspaboTKH ii|)oeicra m Ges 
npoBeitetiMH ero sico.sorHsecicoH aicciieprMsw -  crpouib Taiii.;ii)iKCKyio 
rA3C?!"
Zolotukhin in pure frustration with the current state of affairs, where the pro-nuclear lobby 
violated existing resolutions and Ukrainian legislation on the environment by continuing 
construction prior to a reworked project being passed by the environmental impact assessment 
commission and against the wishes o f the local population and decisions made by the oblast 
Soviet, concluded that the Ukrainian writer S. Plachynda was right in pointing out that ‘the path to 
survival is for Ukraine to obtain real independence and sovereignty’. Soviet nuclear power 
stations could best be likened to cancer lumps, which for centuries
Byyiyi' iiepzvai'b b oGiarrnax Meracras pa/iMoaKTHimocrH nee iroBbie h 
noBbie BOKQ.senMB iiapoiia YicpaMiibL iianoviHBasi hm o jxacoBbix 
Go.sesnax rora.aHTaprioro pezcHMa. o xajiaTiiocrH h GeszyiuMM .
7.2 The Campaign ”3amHTHM Jlprm or PaaMauHM” and Nuclear Safety
Whereas Zelenyi Mir enjoyed the support of large segments of the population on the issue of the 
SB EK, it proved more difficult to mobilise people in support of other, related, green issues. In the 
spring of 1990 a campaign was undertaken in Voznesensk to strengthen the bank of the river 
luzhnoukrainsk. While people were willing to write letters and sign petitions and it was still 
possible to get them out on the streets to attend meetings and rallies, it proved more difficult to 
gain their support of the work of the Green Movement practically and financially. luzhnoukrainsk
Be^iepimn HMKomen, 28.5.1991, c. 2. 
Ibid.. p  6.
Bcom, no. 2/1991, c. 6.
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of two months Bilodid reported that not a single kopek had entered the fund’s bank account. The 
conclusion to be drawn by this situation was obvious. As Bilodid wrote in his appeal to the 
citizens of luzhnoukrainsk to make contributions to the fund
3 to ejue pas zo icash iB aer, iiacKO.ibKO Gespas.sMsnbi aavi 
3KO.sorHMecKHe iipoG.seMbi, mto m o k c t  iipoGyyiHTb uac or ciin'iKu: 
iiey x e .sM  iioBbin TepnoGu.sb?
This did not, however, ‘put the Greens o ff . The work against the Aleksandrov water 
reservoir, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and to secure Reactor No. 4 of the nuclear 
power station from ever being completed, continued with unchanged intensity during the spring 
and summer of 1990.
To commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 26 April, meetings were held 
ill Nikolaev and elsewhere in the oblast. In luzhnoukrainsk, for instance, the Greens organised a 
piquet in front of the entry to the nuclear power station from 5 to 6 o’clock in the evening. 
Bilodid’s account of the picket was printed in Biulleten No. 14:
llepBbiMM ua Mcci'o iiHKera npnGbum crpazcavin ^eMOKparuH c 
pesHiioBbivin iiyGMiuca.MH. T e rn p e  nnKer'iMKa n ripoTHBorasax u c 
[i.riaKaraMM upnGbuin noszce. /laJiee !ipMexa.a w sp rop o^ a , a xa iczce  m 
or. .ricHTeiiaiiT mh-fimumm c  Fia^aueH iipoBepuTb co iiep zcau H e miaicaTOB 
ua ”cooTBeTcrDne”. floBBuacB yasHK c BueBezoMCTBeuiioH oxpaub i 
A3C, 0  ue.!uix h M aciuraG ax ukumm sa p a iiee  no Te.iie(|)Ouy 
0 CBe4 0 MM.aHCb opraub i ICTB.
Tcm fie Meuee, uniceTHpoBaiiHe uaua.soci,, rioszce npnGbuiM eme I'pu 
iiMKeTBMica MS Bparcfcoro co cbohmm njiafcaraMM. fliioeszcaiomMM iio 
HMKOJiaeBCKOM rpacce m ezymMvi c paGorw co c:rpoHn.rioma4 KH A3C 
x o p o m o  GbbiiM BM/mbi miaKarbi: ’’Her -  BTopoviy 9epiio6bi.nio”, ”PyKU 
upoMb OT lOxuoro Byra”, "lOzcuoMy Byry -  craiyc uai.iHona.abiioro 
napK-a”. ’’Bbipazcaevi iieiionepue pyKOBOvtcruy A3C”, ”Ao.rioH A3C u 
KHCC”.
B siiaic co.riMAapirocm noAMTeneM c riHKer'iHKaMH sBy'ia.UM 
aBTOMo6bi.sbiibie cupeiibB''.
31HiKbODMauMouHbm Bio.rmereub N 14. 3A ’’BejieiibiH Mnp’’, r. lOzuioyKpanucK, aupe.ub-Mau 1990, c.4. Ibid.
j
Zelenyi Mir's Bulletin for April-May 1990 (No. 14), provided evidence for this. Whereas the 
Greens in Voznesensk succeeded in getting people to take part in their campaign, the situation was 
very different in the village of Semenovka, where an ecological subbotnik to clean the river bank 
was announced on the village radio. Only one woman (total population 2,000) showed up to assist 
the greens in their work!^^
In luzhnoukrainsk the Greens established an ecological fund in February 1990. In the course i
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In Nikolaev the whole day was used to mark the anniversary, which the Presidium of the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet had declared the ‘Day of the Chernobyl Tragedy’ through an edict 
issued on 29 March the same year. A rally took plaee in the afternoon.
Smaller meetings continued during the summer. One of these was held in the regional centre 
of Veselinovo (organised by the region Nature Protection Society, the Ukrainian Language Society 
and local members of RUKH), Although the topic of the meeting was the state of the general 
environment in the region, most attention was given to the SB nuclear power station. A Podolskii, 
who worked at the local hospital, urged that a real moratorium on the expansion of the SB nuclear 
power station be adopted and that hard currency earned through export of electricity from 
luzhnoukrainsk be included in the budget of the region so that monitoring and medical equipment 
to protect the health of the people living in the vicinity of the nuclear power station could be 
purchased^^.
The Greens had valid arguments against both the Aleksandrov water reservoir and the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. They had the support of the oblast soviet, the oblast 
Goskompriroda and they were able to claim the support of one sixth (210,000 people) o f the 
population of the oblast, who had signed their petition the previous year in support of an 
environmental impact assessment of the Second Stage of the SB EK. To give credibility to their 
campaign against Resolution No. 647, Zelenyi Mir once again chose to mobilise the general public 
through a signature campaign.
The campaign started with the publication of an open letter signed by 30 informal groups and 
organisations, amongst them Zelenyi Mir, RUKH, the Ukrainian Language Society, the Nature 
Protection Society, the oblast trade union council and Memorial in luzhnaia pravda on 27 July 
1990. The letter, which covered more than half a page, in addition to summarising all the 
arguments so far used against further expansion of the SB EK, addressed the issue of nuclear
safety.
As a starting point for this debate, the authors quoted the Academician N. Dubinin, who 
claimed that ‘any increase in radiation makes an impact on the human genes, corresponding to the 
radiation dose’. Thus the nuclear power station posed a real threat to the health not only of 
present, but also of future generations. In addition, Nikolaev city got its drinking water from the 
river Dniepr, which was not only contaminated with radionuclides following the accident at 
Chernobyl, but into which radioactive cooling water from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station 
was frequently emitted. This water also entered the Ingulets irrigation system, thus contaminating 
crops and soil throughout the oblast. To illustrate the seriousness of the situation, data provided
____________________________
The worst threat of all, though, was the continued expansion of the SB nuclear power station.
by the oblast Sanepidemstantsia was cited; compared to 1985, the level of strontium-90 in the 
drinking water had increased by an average of 47 times. Caesium-134/137 concentrations had 
gone up 67 times. And although these levels were still below the maximum levels permitted, it 
still gave cause for concern. Moreover, no map had so far been made to show how the oblast was 
affected by the fall-out from Chernobyl. As for the Tashlyk cooling pond, its water was 
contaminated with tritium and other radioactive substances. Still, emissions were made from the 
cooling pond into the South Bug river, and fish from the pond was being sold to the population of 
the Nikolaev oblast. Radioactive food products were still delivered to the oblast from areas 
contaminated after the Chernobyl accident. No proper control had been established to monitor 
levels of radioactivity in food products. The enterprise Oktiabr, which produced cheap dosimeters 
for this purpose did not get a go-ahead from the Nikolaev raiispolkom, under whose auspices it 
worked.
ASDespite the fact that the oblast Goskompriroda had passed a decision to stop construction of the
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric 
power station from 10 February 1990, pending the reassessment of the project and a second state 
environmental impact assessment, construction work continued in the name of securing safety at 
the nuclear power station. As for direct measures to secure safety at the nuclear power station, 
including testing of seismicity, the leadership of the nuclear power station failed to find money for 
this. An appeal was made to people’s deputies at all levels to put an end to any further 
construetion at the site:
...Mill xoTHM cnpocMTb y liapoAiibix AenyiaToiî Bcex ypomiefi Coneron - 
lie no pa .:in peiiienHeM oG.riacnioro Coaera ocranoBHib axo 
niiecTyriFioe xosîiHCTBODaime coiosaoro BezoMcma na iiaiueH 3eM.ne? 
He nopa .in npeAXBBHXb KOiiKperiibiM caex MnnaxoManepronpoMy 
CCCP 3a necb iianeceiiiibiH nainen 3eM.ne iienonpaBHMbiü 
sKo.aorxMecKMM ypon a na 9tom ocnoBanuM, no iipuMepy Poctobckoi'o 
oG.:iacrnoro Conexa, b paAonnbix, ropoACKHX u  o6.aacxnoA ceccm ix 
ConexoB npmnixb peuienne ne ro.abKO o iipeicpamenHM bcbkoxo 
oxpoHxe.nbcrBa, b xom 4MC.ae h KoiicepnauuM iienyzoibix oGbeicxon, no 
M 0 noaxannoM BBeaeiiMM us paGoxbi Bcex 6.ri0K0ii A3C?!
As for safety at the existing reactors of the nuclear power station, the letter revealed that 
Reactor No. 1 had a higher incidence rate than was allowed. The protective shields of both 
reactors No. 1 and 2 were emitting more radioactivity than permitted. Moreover, control with the 
running of the reactors themselves was incomplete, and the nuclear power station was not 
constructed so as to withstand earthquakes reaching seven to eight points on the Richter scale.
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Further complicating the situation was the recent decision made by the Russian Supreme Soviet no 
longer to accept radioactive waste from other republics. In other words, radioactive materials 
which had earlier been transported to Krasnoiarsk in Siberia for processing and storage, would 
now have to be stored at the SB nuclear power station itself.
Should a serious accident take place, the impact may be even more serious on the area than 
the Chernobyl accident was, given that within a 40 km radius of the nuclear power station there 
are 45 habitations with a population of more than 350,000 people - seven times more than at 
Chernobyl.
Since the Nikolaev oblast only received 12% of the electricity produced at the nuclear power 
station (most of the electricity was exported to Romania and to Odessa oolast), the authors of the 
letter asked if the price was not too high to pay for ‘hosting’ the nuclear power station on the 
territory of the oblast. What was more, from 1983 to 1989, the SB nuclear power station had 
utilised 25% of the oblast’s capacity in terms of water and soil resources. In the opinion of the 
public, no sum of money could compensate for the loss of water, soil and possibly also people’s 
health - as these were in themselves invaluable. Those receiving the electricity produced at the 
nuclear power station should also take a proportionate amount of the radioactive waste for storage 
- thus paying the real price for this electricity.
The conclusion of the data given above could only be one - namely to close down the nuclear 
power station and to develop alternative sources of energy to replace it. Such alternatives existed, 
and they were not only a few:
M iiycTb n o c .ie  sroro iimkto nac ne y iipeK nex n v iecr iim iecm e , n5o iie  
cymec rayer oGiueiTicyAapcTBeniiuix MUTei^ecoii 5es y ie r a  n 'le.vi Go.iee 
IÎO apcA viecriîbiM HiiTepeai.vi!
The letter ended with the following appeal:
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YnazcaeMbie iiHKO.iaenubi, iiepecrpoHKa Aaer hum ïiiaiic, onupaacb iia 
Saicoti 0  MecriioM arvioynpamreFFMM, sairiMTHTb uauinx Aeren ot 
paAMauHM n o'rcrorm. npaao na GyAyiuee! Mbi oGpamaeMca ico ncevi 
ACMTe.iAM HHKO.'iaeacKon oG.aacrn c npocbGon no^uiepzcaTb AcAcmmi 
oGiuecriiennocrH h iiaiuux AenyTaTou ncex ypoaneA CoaeToa n btom 
nanpaivieiiAM. a.ui aero pasBepnyrb noacioAy cGop iioAnnceA no A 
nacroîiiuMM oGpameiiuev! (kpomo noAiinceA, oGasaTe-Hbiio yicaz^nre 
(jiaviM.aHio, M.vm, o'raecrBo. AOviamiibiA azpec h.fim viecro paGoxbi) a 
nepeci,i.iarrb ux no aA|)ecy: 327001. r. HnKO.!iaeB, y.i. Poai.i
JlioK'ce.viGypr, 54. (Doha Ky.rit>Typbi. aaa aKO.aorMqeacoA accouAanwH -  
3T0 M GyACT riauiHM pecfepeiiAyMOM!
An appeal was made to the Chairman of the oblast soviet of people’s deputies, 1. Hrytsai, to 
immediately set up an emergency commission on the SB EK - with the participation of the 
general public - to elaborate concrete solutions to the questions raised in the letter and to put 
forward suggestions to the Second Session of the oblast and other soviets. The authors of the 
letter demanded that these decisions be made public in the press. A list of seven questions this 
commission should discuss was provided^^.
7.2.1 Response to the Campaign
The letter produced an enormous response. A number of letters and decisions made by workers’ 
collectives were published in luzhnaia pravda and Zelenyi Mir received a large amount of mail, 
following their appeal. Special forms were distributed amongst informal groups, which these used 
for collecting signatures.
Some 309 signatures were collected at the Nikolaev Spetsavtopredpriiatie~\405, and the 
director, the chairman of the trade union committee and STK wrote that
HpoMMTaB oGpameuHe oGmeci'Bennwx opranmaunn Aeren
OT paAMannn!" paSoTiiHKH H C A T n-1405 c o b j ih  c b o h m  AO.riroM 
OTKJiHKuyTbca na aro oGpaineiine. Ha npeAnprnrrnu paGoraer 400  
aejToneK. OGpaineiine noAriHcaJin 309, ocrajibHbie naxoAffrca b 
ornycKax, b KOManAHpoBKax n na Gc.miHaiiLix, no o h h  rax zee, Mbi 
ynepenbi, noAnucaan Gbi a io  oGpamenne. "HAM, HAUJMM 4ETHM  
H BHYKAM -  HHCTYK) BOAY, 3EMJ1I0, HEBO!”^ ’
The issues to be discussed by the emergency commission were the following:
1) to immediately stop irrigation in the Snihirevsk and the Zhovten regions with water from the Ingulets 
irrigation system and in the Arbusinka region - with water from the Tashlyk cooling pond. A ban must 
also be made on commercial fishing in the Tashlyk water reservoir.
2) all kindergartens and schools in the oblast must be provided with clean drinking water and children 
should be put on a diet containing added calcium and calium, which would replace radionuclides 
already absorbed by their bodies. Proper control must be introduced for food-products to make sure 
that they were not radioactive when sold to the population of the oblast.
3) Nikolaev city must be provided with drinking water from the South Bug river and from ground water 
sources. Water from the Dniepr should only be used following a cleansing process to rid it of 
radionuclides.
4) Assistance must be provided to the enterprise Oktiabr and other enterprises producing radiation 
monitoring equipment. Begimiing from the third quarter of 1990, all households should be provided 
with dosimeters,
5) A radiological map must be made of Nikolaev oblast.
6) Construction at the SB EK must be stopped immediately, including reactor No. 4 at the SB nuclear 
power station.
7) Reactors No. 1,2 and 3 must gradually be taken out of use.
‘(DoiiAy Kyjib'rypbi aab sKOJiorHMecKoPi accouuanHM o t paGoTiiMKOB HCAT1T1405’, available in flariKa 
30: Pe30.mo!JHH MHTHnroB. coGpatiMH zcHTeneH. KO.njieKTHBon njieAnpM arM A. oGniecTBR uiibtx 
opraiiH B auM H  o  BanpemeiiHU crpouTeJibCTBe TaiunHKCKoro u A.neKcanApoBCKoro BOAOxpaiiMJtHiii. 4-5 
Gjtokob IQY A3C u ap.
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A similar letter, signed by 5,000 people, was sent from the NHZ trade union conference on 9 
August;
YMacTiiHKH npo(|)C:oio:jiiOH KOii(|)epeiiUHH HF3 peiiiMTe.11,110
iio;uiepîKHnaîüT oOpaïueiiue ooiiiecrijem iwx opraiiHaunuM
oityOanKonaiiiioe b raaere "lO/Ktaui fipaiyuf' or  27  mo.ui 90  r. iioa
iiasBaiiMevi "SaiuvrrHM vrereu o r pajiHaimu". TpeoxcM pacouorperi,
iioAiifi'i'oe li oopa ine iiueM  noitpoci.i iia oMcpeiiiioû cecoun aeny raroB
oG.iacTnoro coaera c oOeaieaenue\i iipjiviofi rpaiic/uinHu ri
0iiy5;iHK0i5aiiHu ci’etioipavivi m pe;iy. ii.raroB iioHviemioro ro.iocouaimji
aenyraroB b raaeie ’lOaciiaji flpaiîjia".■
The letter was signed by the Chairman of the trade union, V. Buriak^^.
The trade union of Ekvator had collected 4,000 signatures toward the end of September, the 
enterprise Zaria sent 12,000 signatures over to Zelenyi Mir and on 15 October the Chairman of the 
oblast 5ov/)ro/(Soviet trade union) V.,Linnikov presented the Greens with very good news:
BoBneceiicKHH paHounbiH coB ei nanojiiibix m nvraroB . I llc e c c m i  XXLU co3i,ma. peiiieiiHe ot 21 
ceirraSpa 1990  r.. s ign ed  by  the Chairm an o f  the regional sov iet, M . M oskalenko.
B ipyviOBB ix KO.:[.'ieK'rHBax 0 6 . 1a c m  iia iip o(l)coio3iib ix  c o O p a iim ix  106 
Ti>ic. rpy.iU[inMxcn oiio6pM.RM cricpBiToe o6pamenue oOiuecrBennux 
opranuBanuM "SamuruM Aeieu o r  paimauuu”.
B no.inoM cocrane 3a nomucanue aroro oGpamenua nporo.aocoBa.au 
vie;tpa6oTnuKu, paOoaue u HTP mcctuoh iipovihiui.aennocrH u 
KOMMyna.'ibiiO'5BiTOBi)ix iipeiinpuaTuu, HuKO.aaencKoro
Tpanc(])opMaTopnoro sanoAa, aicruBiio noMepîKuoa.riu oOpamenue 
cy/rocTpoM're.au, CBBCucru, paboTnuKU Ky.iB'rypi,!^ .^
Altogether, the Greens succeeded in collecting approximately 250,000 signatures in support
of the campaign and much attention was given to the case of nuclear safety in the oblast following
the campaign, thus giving the Greens a boost. Also local authorities expressed their support for
the campaign. On 21 September, for instance, the Voznesensk regional soviet of people’s deputies
passed a decision regarding the campaign, in which it expressed its support. The deputies of the
oblast soviet were encouraged to make concrete decisions on those questions raised in the
collective letter printed in luzhnaia pravda^ .
Not everybody was happy with the campaign launched in hizhnaia pravda, though. Bilodid
in a letter to Zolotukhin dated 6 August passed on extracts from letters received by the
luzhnoukrainsk paity gorkom from people throughout the oblast, in which the Greens were 
.criticised:
____________________________
Ibid.
N o . 0 7 -1 9 /7 1 2 . in flaiiKa 30 , ibid.
40
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Ooc.ie 3aTH>Kiioi'o kphbhgi iii.iraeTCîi iKuiBuri) o cede Hmco-taencKaîi
3.a. ripuMevi. ee pyKOnoAMraib, 3o:i(TryxHn A.M., imiaacb B3!ja.inrb iia 
ce5ii ([)ynKiiMH "obbeiiuiiHTe.iJi” iie(l)opMa;ibHbix jiBHyKenufi, crapaercn 
iiafiTH raxy io npo6.ie.viy, Koropaa 6hi 3aHirre[)ecoBa.ia ncex, Ha 
iiocieAHevi aacetaiiHH a.a. Taxa a npo5ae.via iiaiii.iacb h no.iyuH.ia 
naananne "Bamuruvi nereM or paAMaimM”....06pameiiHe 6bi.io 
paccvioTpeiio iia KOopAHuauHoiniovi conere coaeHCTiîMio iiepecrpofiKe. 
KaicMM 6y;i6T ux aax.iioqeime - lie Hanecrno. Ho 
G6paineiiMe...rioiinMGiHo u Mozcer no.iyaurb nmpOKUH peaoiiauc. 
CeroaiiH noKa yaa.iocb a ’.iaiXHTb KpaniiMe (liopviy.iupouKH m 
'I'peSoBaiiMa obpaiueiiHa. no rapairrnponaTb ro. mto cri'opoiniHivM YPH, 
PyX A  M ;ip....ne noiibiTaioi'ca nepenecm iipeaaoKenMa aico.ioron iia 
viMTunroRbiH aawK, vibi ne \io>Ke\i Hoaroviy o6inecrnennocrb ao.ixviia 
anarb, mto na oSpaiueiiHe Gyiier cooTnercruyiomee penieime 
O ô.icoæ m  M oGxovia Kny...He.ibaa ne aaneruTb. mto nbiiiemubifi 
ncii.iecK no.iHTHMecKOH aKi'MBiioci'M HuKO.iaeBCKOH 3.a. coBna.i no 
BpcMciiH c oGcyjKjiennevi b pecnyG.iMKe njien npeoGpaaoBanua o.a. b 
H 3y. 0 6  31'OM cBMAere-MbcrByeT aoiuiajic oGinecrnennoro Miienua b 
iioc-MeiBieM noviepe neManioro oprana accoiiHanMH ”3C".
Bilodid urged Zolotukhin to adopt a very cautious approach towards those members of 
Zelenyi Mir who were also members of the CPSU as such judgements were made first and 
foremost by them. Throughout 1988 and 1989 Zolotukhin had tried to consolidate different 
political currents behind the campaign against further expansion of the SB EK. As seen above, the 
Pervomaisk Greens were predominantly members of the CPSU. Bilodid had all along been 
sceptical of the communists and as he said:
fl iiaBiio npocM.n sac ne BanrpHBaTb c iihmh. 3 t o  Moxter n.noxo 
KOiiMHTbCJt. HiKpopivmpyio nac, mto no iianiMM CBetieimaM, MMenno 
paboTiiHKH lO y  ropKOMa KOy cpbinaiOT c nauiMX ihhtob ncaicyio ne 
ycrpaunaiomyio nx nn(|)opvianHio.
Finally, Bilodid pointed out that the petition did not gain much support in luzhnoukrainsk, as a 
matter of fact it had put the Greens there in a rather difficult position"^'.
As glasnost and démocratisation took hold it became possible to express increasingly freely 
attitudes critical to those of the Communist Party and official authorities generally. An increasing 
number of informal groups with very different political agendas emerged, and as pointed out in 
Chapter Four, the Greens lost quite a large number of its members to these, and later to political 
parties. Moreover, the Green Movement, like any other informal organisation, became 
increasingly politicised in the sense that people with different political beliefs tried to pull their 
views through as being representative of the movement. From a democratic point of view, this 
could be seen as positive. From an organisational point of view the same was not necessarily the
See letter from Bilodid to Zolotukhin of 6.8.1990.
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difficult task of keeping the movement united and at the same time not annihilate other political 
actors, such as the oblast CPU, since although preferred methods differed, the party organisation 
had more or less the same goals as the Greens in the case of the SB EK.
revaluation of the original project"^ .^
.1
case. There was a lack of political culture, or rather a ‘culture of discussion’, in the former USSR ft
and emotional clashes rather than organised factions promoting their views within the movement ft 
characterised Zelenyi Svit throughout the latter half of 1989/early 1990. Given the difficult task
Zelenyi Mir faced, it would not be in the interests of the Green Movement to lose track of its aims ft
:ftdue to political in-fighting in the movement. Zolotukhin was therefore faced with the rather ftft
■«
7.2.2 The Need to Clean the Tashlyk Cooling Pond
Towards the end of 1990, the pro-nuclear lobby once again provoked the anger and concern of not 
only the Greens but also of local and oblast authorities. The leadership of the SB nuclear power
station claimed that for reasons of safety, it had become expedient to clean the water of the 'ft 
Tashlyk water reservoir, by emitting dirty water into the South Bug river while simultaneously 
pumping in clean water from higher up the river (produvka). This was absolutely necessary as the 
salts, whose level in the cooling pond had reached a critical level, might corrode the cooling pipes
surrounding the reactors, which might in turn trigger off a serious accident. ; /ft
■/;/On 16-17 October the question was debated by the oblast soviet. I.Hrytsai expressed serious 
concern about the new situation, calling for full openness regarding time-schedules and frequency '■■i
of the proposed produvki. He also called for alternatives to produvka, given that the water 
contained in the Tashlyk water reservoir contained radioactive substances. During 1991, he said, 
all households in the oblast should have access to cheap dosimeters for personal use. Hrytsai also
■ ft'i'expressed his concern about the way in which the leadership of the SB nuclear power station was :ft
implementing Resolution No. 647. Despite the USSR Council of Ministers’ demand that the ft
ft/project be reassessed and examined by the environmental impact assessment commission prior to ft
"'X'rany further construction, the old project was being followed unchanged. What was more, USSR 
Minatomenergo was planning to conduct testing of the two main aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro- 
electric power station in 1990-91, i.e. prior to the development of a new project, based on the
Suslova, Chudaikina (also a people’s deputy of the oblast soviet) and Zolotukhin - the latter 
attended the session in his capacity as leader of Zelenyi Mir - pointed out that the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences had stated very clearly its dislike for a produvka. Besides, it was not the 
case that there were no alternatives. Already three years earlier, the Green Movement had
I
------------------------------------------25.10.1990,0.2. §
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proposed other methods for cleaning the water in the Tashlyk water reservoir. Also the Kharkiv 
branch of Atomenergoproekt had offered to develop water cleansing facilities for the cooling
ft
■3;
jj::!:.
pond"^ .^ Why, then, was it so important for the leadership of the nuclear power station to obtain
permission to emit contaminated water directly into the South Bug river?
The answer was found in an assessment of produvka produced by Shapovalov of the oblast
soviet’s Committee on the Environment'''^. The report indicated that there were two ways of
cleansing the water in the cooling pond for salts (natural salts and radioactive substances were
concentrated in the cooling pond due to excessive evaporation caused by large quantities of heated
water entering the pond from the nuclear power station): on the one hand, contaminated water
could be emitted directly into the South Bug river. Or cleansing devices could be installed close
by the cooling pond, removing the salts and the radionuclides, which would later be buried in safe 
.containers.
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Whereas the second option would be safer, given that concentrations of radionuclides in the 
cooling pond were higher than in the river, and given that radionuclides were known to migrate, 
the first option was no doubt a lot cheaper, and therefore favoured by the leadership of the nuclear 
power station. The leadership of the nuclear power station even claimed that there were no 
particular dangers involved with produvka, as the levels of radioactive substances such as tritium 
and caesium 134/137 were well within the acceptable limits. Shapovalov’s report contested this 
view, arguing that the concentration of radioactive substances in the bottom silt layer in the 
Tashlyk cooling pond had not been examined. This was, however, likely to be higher at the 
bottom than in the surface waters. Besides, it was known from the Chernobyl accident that silt 
actively accumulated radioactivity. Finally, it was highly relevant as in case of a produvka, water 
would be emitted through pipes located at the bottom of the water reservoir. Silt would therefore 
also be emitted into the South Bug river.
Flavin g debated the issue at length, the oblast soviet ruled against produvka. A decision 
was passed on 15 October banning produvka without the consent o f the oblast soviet and
./ft45
/ft
I
measures to bring the water quality of the cooling pond in line with the requirements for the
simultaneously ordering the director of the SB nuclear power station, V. Fuks, to take the required
— No. 22146/227-1483. of 7.12.1989, in which Atomenergoproekt in line with Resolution No. 647’s
recommendation that cleansing devices be used rather than produvka when cleaning the water of the 
Tashlyk cooling pond, suggested the SB nuclear power station to develop such devices.
QSociionaune k pemenmo cccchh oGmoruoro CoBexa iiapo;im.ix jienviaroB o iieobxoiiuMocm 
npoitvBKH TaiiiJiHKCKorQ notiQXDaiiM.riHiiia n neicv IO:acuLiH Bvr. signed by S. Shapovalov.
HMKO-rtaepcKHH o S j t a c r t io H  coner napoaiitix ; ie n v r a T O B . Pemeuue o t 1 6 . 1 0 . 9 0 .  3 -cccchh 2l-co3Lma. r. 
MnKOJiaeB ”0  .sanæmenHH npoiivincH TauuiHKCKnrn nojioxpauMmim n dckv IQiikusih Bvr”. signed 
by the Chairman of the oblast Soviet, I. Hrytsai.
exploitation of nuclear power stations. The decision did in effect require the nuclear power station 
to install cleansing devices by the Tashlyk water reservoir.
The response from the pro-nuclear lobby was as expected not particularly favourable towards 
the Greens. Whereas the former could agree with the Greens that there was a need to protect 
nature from destruction, it did not approve of their methods:
Ho KaTeropMMecKue TpeGoaaiimi ";ie.ienbix” iiaKpwn., ;3aiipeTnia ro u.ih 
Hiioe upejuioe iipou3BOircrno o5i>eKTHBUo ro.iKaioT crpaiiy k bejiiKicru. 
He xQi'HM yfce vB.i vKurs auBTpa xvîKe, ceroana? nojrov iy  
ito.iîKiia 5i,iTb oripeae.ieiia cba.iaHCHpoBaiiiia» iiporpaxma. petuaioinaa 
BOiipocw aneprMM., npoaoBO.RhCTBHa m 3KO.iorHH...HatuHM aeravi h 
BuyicaM iieaocraTOMiio ocraBUTL t o . ib k o  qucrbie notty. seM.iio. m iiedo. 
Hm erne iiyxiibi eaa, cbct h 'reri.:io'*ft
The Greens throughout the latter half of 1990 and early 1990 continued their struggle to 
prevent any further expansion of the SB EK and to prevent a produvka from the Tashlyk water 
reservoir. In doing so they were in line with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet’s Resolution ‘On the 
Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures for its Fundamental Improvement’, which was 
adopted by its 12th session in February 1990. The resolution called for the gradual realisation of 
measures to improve the ecological state of the Ukrainian rivers, amongst which were the Dniepr 
and South Bug and also for any further expansion of the capacity of Ukrainian nuclear power 
stations to be banned''^.
7.2.3 Changing Political Circumstances 
The Putsch
Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev was the first informal organisation in the oblast to publicly protest the 
Putsch which took place in Moscow on 19 August 1991. A telegram was sent to the Speaker of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lukianov and two people’s deputies from the oblast, Lisnitskii and 
Opolinskii, as well as to the Speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Ki’avchuk, on 20 August. 
In the telegram''^, Zelenyi Mir voiced its protest against the Putsch:
npo'i'ecryeM iipoTMB airrMKoncrrrryuMonnoro saxRara iniacrH.
TjieSyeM iipeviocraBUTb BosMOîKiiocTb BbicrynuTb nepe;i iiapo/ioM
dnepreiMKi 25.10.1990, c. 2.
dBenaauaraa ceccHii BepxoBiioi o CoBera yicpauiicKon CCP (ojimiaaiiaTbiü coBbin) 16-17 <|)eBpajm 1990 
roaa. CrenorpadiMMecKHH otmct {Khcb: ’HojiMrMBjiar YicpaHUbi’, HsmreabcrBo ”no.riMrmiecKOH 
JlMTeparypbi YKpaniibf, 1990 r.), c. 254-55.
Copy o f telegram text was given to me by Zolotukhin in June 1994.
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The telegram was signed on behalf of the Greens by Zolotukhin.
The leadership of the SB nuclear power station at an early stage of the Putsch voiced its 
support of those responsible for it. This was easily understandable, as all Soviet nuclear power 
stations were run by Soviet ministries and departments, rather than by republican ones. The
49 Copy of this letter (hand-written) was given to me by Bilodid in June 1994.
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saKoimo Msbpaiiiioviy fipe.sM/teiiry CCCP, iVI. Popba'teijy. npeaMvafyxn 
BepxoBiioro CoBera FTpaunn ripoci-iM i!o;uiep>KUBari> name -ft
TpeooBaiine.
introduction of glasnost and démocratisation in the USSR had as far as the administrations of the 
nuclear power stations were concerned, brought with it nothing but interference in their affairs by
Greens and others, sceptical of nuclear power. Promises to return to the discipline and order of the 
Soviet Union of the past, were by the leadership of the SB nuclear power station not seen as a bad 
thing at all.
However, on this matter, as on environmental issues related to the work of the nuclear power 
station, Fuks and his administration failed to get the support of all personnel in luzhnoukrainsk.
On 22 August, he was handed a letter signed by 34 members of staff, with the following content;
KOJIJIEKTHBHOE SAHBJIEHME
B CBflBH c Tew, MTO sa npom.riyio iie4e.nio na A3C npmnuiM pas 
ripHKasGB M pacnopH:»ceiîHH, y>KecroMaioinHH h
onianHMMBaiornHH cymecTBOBaomnH paiiee pacnopHiiOK (npuKas N 376. 
pacnopa^KeiiMe NN 132,464} ortepaTUBiibiH nepcona.ii A3C saaB.rnien
1. /lauiibie npMKasbi n pacnopa:xcenmi iipuiian,! b  nepnoa npaü.Benmi 
crpaiioH xyiiTbi bo  MCiio.iiiteiiMe ee nocrai[OB.iieiiMH. X y in y  
noMep:^ CMBa.iT BfllC. qacrbio KOToporo BB.rmeTca CjDejiMam. Ko.riJieK'i'Hiî 
MABli, iianpaBMBUiaH na lOY ABC Te.rieKc 06-97 o t  19.8.91 raicHce 
(paKTMMecKH noMepxHBa.il nyMHcroB.
2. Mbi CMMTacM, M'l'o M iinue npHKasbi h pacnopaxenHJi npHinrrbi noa 
"naiiyiviaiinbiMM nimaoraMH TMiia ”ycH.nenHa icaMecrna h 
3(])(|)eKTHBU0CTH oSxoitOB” H "MnAMBHaya.MbnOH paSOTbl C .rnO;ibMH”
H.T.Æ M iianpaBJieiiMbix nporuB ...yrposbi SesonacnocTH A3C. HuKaKHX 
o6beKTHB!lbIX npHMHH ÆFIÜ 3T0T0 UGT.
3. Co CBoen cropoiibi Mbi BceMa cMHraan h cMMTaeM desonacnocrb h 
naaexn oc i’b pa6oTbi A3C cbohm  npoijæccHonaabiibiM ao.riroM.
TpeGyew OTMeiibi npuKasoB h  pacnopaxeuMH. nprnnrrbix b nepHoa 
rocyAapci'Beiinoro neiDCBopoTa h nanpaB.nennbix na orpauMMenne npanbi 
M cbo5o4 nepconaaa A3C.
4. OnepaTMBnbiH nepcona.ri A3C pemHTe.i!bno ocyx^aer xynry h 
noMepXHBaBiiiHX ee 4eaTe.neM MKHfl. TpeSyeM pasSHpa'reJibcrna 
pyK0B04HTe.iTflMH, oicasaBuiHMca necnocoGubiMH oueiiH T b mmctbhii 
B i.im ecro a iu H x  HncranuHH c iipaBOBOH tomkh  spenna'* .^
ft:
This letter confirmed what I have said earlier (see Chapter Six) that the staff of the SB 
nuclear power station was not a homogenous group, which in everything supported its leadership. 
There were different views as to how best to secure the safety of the nuclear station and one 
important element in such a strategy as reflected by those who signed the above quoted letter, 
must be the legal commitment and openness on matters concerning nuclear power.
Zelenyi Mir and the Question of Ukrainian Independence
Following the Putsch, Zelenyi Mir intensified its demands for Ukrainian independence. The 
em ironmental legacy of the USSR was stressed in general, as was the particular damage caused to 
Ukraine:
Bee pecriyS.RMKH 603 ucK.iioMeiiUîi iiocrpaAa.iM or craporo Coiosa. no 
yicpaMna ocodeiino; ttepiioSw.ib, XH.viH:ianMfi cejibcicoro xo.RfiHcnia, 
yiiMMToxeiine üiieripa, hepuoro u AriOBCKoro moiich. To.ibko b 
Ko.noHMH M oxno 6bi.no na .nyqiunx •lepiioaeiViax noraanTb 35 Kpynnux 
vieTaa.iiyprMMecKMX KovibniiaTOB, 19 b.noicoB A3C 603 Boasi ypui 
oxjiaxMUHB, B ceHCMoonacni.ix panoiiax. B pesy.nb'rare coiosiioro 
’’xosaHCTBOBaiimi” YKpaHiîbi b gKoaormiecKOM ornoinenMM oKasaaacb b 
nauxy4ui0M cocronnHH U3 ncex rocy/iapcnî Mnpa. Cero^ui 
GviepTiioCTb na YKpaHiie ripenbimaei' poxAaeMocrb, a cinejuuui 
npo4oaxHTeabiiocrrb x h b i ih  0411a m3 caMbix b h s k h x  b Eopone. 
(DaKTHMecKH 3T0 xie'i' ocnoBaiiHe roBopuTb 0 I’enoiiMjie npoTun 
YKpanncKoro napo4a^”.
Great care should be taken to destroy the old economic and political structures which had caused 
so much harm to the environment, prior to any new alliance or union being set up between the 
former Soviet republics:
He no.riyMM'i'Cfl .rh raK. nro fioyio6noe B x o x y ie im e  .laKoncepBHpyeT  
cy m ec i'B y io in y io  3KonoMM‘iecK yio n aKO-Borm iecicyio c n r y a m a o ?  B 
cavioM 40.40 4a.rineHLuee (|)yiiKUHonHpoBanHe cy in ecrn y iorn H x
Me'ra.f[.nyprHnecKHX ii|%4npM4TMH, A3C, F3C ne y.riyMiunr
3KO.norMMecKoA o6cranoB K H , f e n o u m i  napo4a byACT n p o 4 0 .n x e ii.
Concern was raised at the prospect of conservation of Minatomenergoprom and any attempt 
at continuing the construction of nuclear power stations on Ukrainian territory to serve the energy 
needs of any other former Soviet republic.
The Greens’ view of Ukrainian independence was further elaborated over the following 
months. In an article, which appeared in Radianske Pribuzhzhia in August 1993^', Zolotukhin
PajumchKe UpHGyxmi, 30.11.1991, c. 2. 
PajiniiCbKe PIpMdyzKMn, 19.8.1993, c. 2.
I
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I
claimed that any state should be ‘environmentally independent’ - i.e. be in control of its natural 
resources and be able to regulate the emission of dangerous pollutants on its own territory. The 
emergence of the CIS should be seen not as a permanent solution for the former republics of the 
USSR, but rather as a step towards full environmental independence, for which political and 
economic independence were necessary prerequisites;
...Flpano lia iciiynaiuia \iaioTb Gi.iin iipMpoyini ymopeiiiui. n ix  nrryMiii 
aoo iipHviyconi. flKino yioTpH.viynaTMCfi 111,010 iipHnnniiy y 
yiepxanoTBopeiiinu to iiiiiKHX n])o5.ievi iie byyiE, CHd 6y;i£ jiotm 
ijrry'iiiMM ymopeiimm, aokh Koxna yiepxana. Korpa yio x i  iie 
lîxoitHTb. ne crane npupo/ino neaa.iexnoio. Taic cavio Jini yicpaiiiH  
npnpoAiio MaTM aepxanno io vioboio yKpaincbKy \iony. n p0Hiii.no 
AOCHTb nacy, 11106 v ioxna 6y.no iiepeKonaTucsi y nrrynnocri 
cmopenitfi hk K ounaprix, rai{ i  iiepeim xno i Ôi. ibinocTi n. ten in  
Bepxonnoi Payin, i  roviy u o x n a  iineiineno CKaaarn pecypc yioiiipn 
40 nnx napoA.y iiunepnano.
7.3 Ukrainian Independence - Adaptation and Continued Campaigning 
(August 1991 "June 1994)
Ever since it emerged in 1988, members of Zelenyi Svit claimed that the only way in which 
the state of the environment in Ukraine could be improved was by gaining control of its natural 
resources and industries, including the nuclear power stations located on Ukrainian territory. This
:
was necessary as the interests of ‘Moscow’ and of the republic were not matched in the area of the 
environment. Ukraine’s political and economic ‘subordination’ to Moscow thus posed an obstacle 
to environmental reform.
I
Below, I will examine the continued struggle to save the South Bug river following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The key issues remained the same: on the one
'hand, the issue of how better to clean the water of the Tashlyk cooling pond had to be settled. On 
the other hand, a decision had to be reached on the future of the SB EK. The decision-making 
process was initially somewhat delayed by institutional changes required as the responsibility for 
the nuclear power industry in Ukraine was passed over from former Soviet to Ukrainian 
institutions.
I
33-3
i
7.3.1 Institutional Changes
In December a new concern - Uh'atomenergoprom (The Ukrainian Atomic Energy Industry 
Concern) - was established in Kiev to take over the tasks of the former USSR Minenergetiki. The 
concern would be in charge of the five Ukrainian nuclear power stations (luzhnoukrainsk, Rivne, 
Klimeinytskyi, Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl) as well as the industry and the scientific institutions 
supporting these, and would be an independent entity. The major tasks of the new concern, were:
1) to secure the reliable operation of the nuclear power stations
2) to increase safety (my emphasis) at the nuclear power stations and
3) to voice the social concerns of the workers’ collectives at the nuclear power stations^".
Ukratomenergoprom would be directly subordinated to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and 
although it was to operate as an independent entity, would to some extent depend on the 
Minekonomiki (Ministry of Economy), which would fix electricity prices based on a set of
though, the Concern was legally independent.
r.'tamioe ypni iiac - 6e.3onacnaji m iiayiexitaii paSora iicex 
KOJUieKTHBOB 110 oSeciie'ieiiHio uor|)e6H're.rieH aaeicTpoaiieprHeü. 
CnpaBMTLcsi c otoh Bayta'ien ypni nac — ;ie.rio aecrn^ft
Unlike Russia, Ukraine was not blessed with large oil or gas deposits. Oil, gas and mazut for the 
thermal power stations were imported from Russia, whereas electricity from the nuclear power 
stations was exported partly to the European part of Russia, partly to Moldova and abroad. The 
collapse of the USSR and Russian demands that the former Soviet republics pay for its oil and gas
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indicators for fuel- and production costs. With regard to the nuclear power stations themselves.
ft': ft ft-;
Ukratomenergoprotn was to be run by its Chairman and a Council, the members of which
.would be appointed on the recommendation o f the Cabinet of Ministers. Mikhail Umanets (the 
General Director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station during the clean-up following the 
accident there) was appointed Chairman of the Concern, whereas the General Director of the SB 
nuclear power station, Volodymyr Fuks, became Chairman of the Council.
Volodymyr Fuks expressed the priorities of the Concern to the newspaper o f the Nikolaev 
oblast soviet, Radianske Pribuzhzhia, as follows:
1
7.3.2 Energy Situation in Ukraine following the Collapse of the USSR
I
■j:I
i
  ----------------------  : iPaMUChKe rjpndyMPKfi, 30.1.1992, c. 2.
Ibid.
ill hard currency, facilitated an energy crisis in Ukraine, in the sense that it was politically and 
economically undesirable to remain dependent on Russian fuel. Moreover, for security reasons, 
the Ukrainian government would prefer to be supplied with oil and gas from other countries than 
Russia.
Fuks, praising the advantages of nuclear power, referred to this crisis: whereas Ukraine was 
short of fuel for its thermal power stations, and water in the water reservoirs, which provided the 
input of the hydroelectric power stations was scarce, the nuclear power stations worked in a stable 
manner, producing a quarter of the total energy output in the country. Besides, hard currency 
generated from exporting nuclear power would now be controlled by the republic. The only 
problem related to nuclear power, as seen by Fuks, was that the nuclear fuel would have to be 
obtained from Russia, and that current prices as compared to Soviet ones had increased by eight to 
nine times. This was, however, a minor problem. The emphasis should therefore be on nuclear 
power and on energy saving, by making the customers pay a realistic price for the fuel supplied to 
them. So far, neither individuals nor industrial units had had any incentives to do so, as electricity 
prices were set ridiculously low. In the case of certain enterprises, for instance, the price on 
energy were several times below the cost of production.
As for the possibility of expanding the existing capacity of the Ukrainian nuclear power 
stations, this was non-existent, given that the Verkhovna Rada in February 1990 had adopted a 
moratorium on the continued construction of nuclear reactors at existing nuclear power stations, 
and the establishment of new nuclear reactors. This, however, did not prevent the pro-nuclear 
lobby from lobbying the parliament {Verkhovna Rada) and the government to have the 
moratorium lifted on the grounds that only nuclear power could solve the energy crisis in Ukraine. 
The struggle primarily against nuclear power and secondarily for a status quo, which the Greens 
had so successfully fought throughout the latter half of the 1980s and which culminated in 
Verkhovna Rada's adopting of the moratorium, was therefore revitalised. Zelenyi Mir, as will be 
seen below, consequently intensified its alternative energy campaign, in addition to continuing the 
struggle against produvka and any further expansion of the SB EK.
7.3.3 Campaigns and Issues
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir and the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station
As seen in the first section, despite restrictions on capacity, attempts were made at constructing for 
full capacity, i.e. in accordance with the original plans. The Greens tried to stop this as well as 
arguing the case that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was not strictly needed. Water towers could
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replace the Tashlyk cooling pond and excess electricity for peak hours could be generated by gas- 
powered turbines rather than by a hydro-electric power station.
Although construction continued at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and at the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir - where local opposition had been swept away with the adoption of 
Resolution No. 1 by the Soviet Government in January 1991 - Green pressure to have the original 
projects revised did eventually pay off. In October 1991 Zelenyi Mir received a letter from 
Derzhkompriroda, informing the Greens that the original project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric 
power station had been revised by the planners^''. The revised project, which also contained an 
impact analysis on the environment, had been sent over to the leadership of the nuclear power 
station. Prior to submitting the revised project to USSR Goskompriroda for an environmental 
impact assessment assessment, the project would be made accessible at oblast level for discussion. 
A final decision would then be made by the government, taking into account the result of the 
environmental impact assessment and the opinion of those living in the area of the SB 
hydroelectric complex. The economic interests of sovereign Ukraine would also have to be 
considered.
The Greens’ position regarding the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was presented in a 
detailed assessment made by Zhuk and Bilodid and dated 16 October. The two Greens referred to 
Resolution No. 647 and to the decision of the oblast Soviet of one year before (16 October 1990), 
which prohibited any continuation of the construction and funding of the Tashlyk station as of 1 
January 1991. The Greens’ position remained firm: there was no need for the Tashlyk hydro­
electric power station and to the extent the extra electricity would be needed, this could be 
achieved at a considerably lower economic and environmental cost by setting up gas-driven 
turbines at the nuclear power station.
The very idea of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was outdated as far as the Greens 
were concerned, given that in the original plans it was projected to cover for peak-hours for six 
operating nuclear reactors - not for three, as was the case in the autumn of 1991. The Tashlyk 
station would generate electricity during the night, which would be stored and fed onto the 
electricity grid when needed. Excess electricity from the nuclear power station would power the 
turbo generators of the Tashlyk hydro-electric station during such night hours, as a drop in energy 
consumption at night-time was envisaged in the project. However, according to information 
provided by the dispatcher at the nuclear power station and Odessaenergo at the time of the
This work was conducted by the Ukrainian Branch o f the Institute Gidroproekt. The letter refemed to is 
No. 6/2-10/3-32 of 11.10.1991 ’TIdo SviiiDtiHUTBO Tai[j.riuu[>KOi EAEC i O-aeKaiimpiBCKoro„BOJtocxoBHiua . written in reply to letter No. 70 o f 17.9.1991, and signed by First Deputy Chairman of  
Goskompriroda, V. Ribachuk.
Î
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writing of the assessment, no such drop in consumption had been registered. Rather, there was a 
general energy deficit. Consequently, the economic efficiency of the hydro-electric station would 
be dramatically reduced and would be problematic even if electricity prices would be doubled or 
tripled. Moreover, the energy output at the Tashlyk station would be insignificant compared to the 
size of the required economic investments. As a matter of fact, no such analysis had yet been 
conducted by Goskompriroda, only by USSR and Ukrainian Gosplan. The economic benefits of 
the nuclear power station itself were indeed questionable in the opinion of Zhuk and Bilodid:
f t
Hmctmh e(l)eKT iiiii e iv c n . iy a r a n i i  iiy c K  c K . ia M  20 v t.iii. Kp5. iia  
p i ic .  ” UeM e ijie ic r o a e p x a im u  npu  y M O n i, m o  u iip o e K T iiy  a a p T ic r i ,
AEG lie BKmo'ieiia i ia p T ic r b  bcbopo aTOVino-enepi'eTHMiioro iiMK.iy,
BK.RioMaioMiiH :m xopoiieiiim  peaicropiiHX S .to k I b  i i i c i f i  sa K iim en im  
cp oicy  ÏX  e ic c n . iy a T a u i i”, iian iT i) i  4 a.1 l :  ”neM eclieici’ e r a  s
Bi4B£MiiMvi, iiKLUo BpaxyBaTM 6X0110X11 Mill ouliiKM  Bi'paT la  paxyiiOK  
BH.iyMeiiiiii 3eM6.lL B l4  npoMMC.ione 6y4lBiiMHTi3o”.
A second, no less valid reason for not going ahead with the hydro-electric power station, they 
argued, was that the project envisaged the seperation of the deepest part (depth close to 50 m) of 
the Tashlyk cooling pond by a dam so as to supply the Tashlyk station with water (to run the 
latter’s upper hydraulic pump). In this way water from the cooling pond would get into direct
contact with the South Bug river. Given that water quality in the cooling pond did not comply ■
with sanitary norms for a number of substances and that tritium and other radionuclides were
accumulating in it, this was inadmissible from an ecological point of view. Furthermore, cutting
off the deepest part of the cooling pond would greatly reduce its reactor cooling capacity.
Consequently, new cooling facilities would have to be created (sprinkle ponds), which in turn
would require further investments. Such a solution was not logical and could only be explained as
an attempt, on the side of the leadership of the nuclear power station, towards the complete
implementation of the original project for the SB EK.
Zhuk and Bilodid could also not see how the Aleksandrov water reservoir could be justified.
.From an ecological point of view it was clear that it would cause great damage to the South Bug 
river. The ecosystem of the river was already almost completely destroyed as a result of severe 
pollution. Existing cleansing facilities were in a pitiful state and the flow of the river was greatly 
reduced by more than 3,500 ponds built on the river, some of which were attached to small hydro­
electric power stations. Should the rapids of the river be flooded the unique natural 
.aerohydrodynamic filter of the river would be considerably reduced. No artificial enrichment of 
the river water with oxygen would be able to replace this. Flooding the river would therefore be a
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■//ft
crime in the opinion of Zelenyi Mir. The whole point of creating a nature reserve {Granitno- 
Stepnoe Pribnzhe) would thus fall apart. I
Due to its reduced water flow, the water temperature in the South Bug river was already .I
- ftreaching critical levels during the summer months (28 degrees had been measured, whereas the 
absolute temperature limit was 28.2 degrees). It seemed obvious that the presence of two big ft
water reservoirs on the river (the Aleksandrov and part of the Tashlyk) could only contribute to a T
further temperature increase due to the continued slowing-down of the river’s water flow. As ft|
noted previously, there were also archaeological and aestethic reasons for not building the two
See Taiu.imubKa TEC-FÀEC. signed by Zhuk and Bilodid on 16.10.1991. Document provided by Bilodid. 
Peineime 5 -ro  oS-Fiacmoro coSpanmi HmcojiaencKoA o6.nacmou 3xo.RorMMecKoü acconuauHH ”3e.iiem.m 
Mup”. 22 aeicaSpfl 1991 r., r. HnKo.riaen, Point 3, p. 3 and point 2.7, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 2.
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water reservoirs: far from all the registered archaeologically interesting sites had been examined
./ftyet, and the destruction of some of the most beautiful and significant parts of the river could be G
defended neither from an ecological, nor from a moral point of view. Besides, South Bug
remained the only river in Ukraine of a considerable size not to have been destroyed by ‘artificial
oceans’ or rather by ‘stinking marshes’. For this reason alone, it should be protected for future ftft
'./ftgenerations to enjoy. ftlFinally, Zhuk and Bilodid drew the following conclusion; ;|
■laxHM 'iHHOM iiaiipoiiiyeThCJi bhchgbok: sarparn , noB w m ux d
T e x iio re iF iio io  4 i £ i o  KOMimexcy i  iieuepetiSaMeuuMn aoBrocrpoKOBHMn ft
iiac.a i4K aM W  M oro  e x c r u iy a r a n i  i  i ia c r iJ iB K H  a n a M iii,  m o  | :
iiepeK]}ec.riio io 'rB  r i  e x o n o M iM ii i  B H im m , a x i  p e c n y f in ix a  v ia iM M e / f t
4 0 4 a rx o B o ro  B M po 6m iirrna  e . ' ie x ' ip o e i ie p r i i . ft'i:y.s.
ft:All the objects of the SB EK ought to be transferred to local authorities for them to put them into
55 "'‘ftother use . ft
■ft;;'The issue of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir 
was debated at length during the Fifth oblast meeting of Zelenyi Mir in December 1991. The ftft
meeting issued a resolution in which, once again, concern was expressed that construction work at .ft:
the site of the hydro-electric power station continued unchanged. On the basis of the conclusions 
provided by the environmental impact assessment commission of the SB EK in 1989 and recent |
information made available, Zelenyi Mir recommended that construction of the Tashlyk station
56 ft-and the Aleksandrov water reservoir be prohibited . ft
The campaign to stop construction at the site of the SB EK continued throughout 1992. More 
arguments were provided by Zelenyi Mir in Radianske Pribuzhzhia on 18 January 1992^’ . The
request of the leadership of the SB nuclear power station^^ that the revised project be submitted to 
an environmental impact assessment commission so that construction works could be continued, 
contradicted Resolution No. 258 passed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 14 October 
1991, which introduced a moratorium on further construction at the SB EK. The Green Movement 
therefore found it necessary to bring up the these points.
Not only had the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station been designed to supply additional 
energy for six reactors, whereas in actual fact there were only three reactors operative at the SB 
nuclear power station; there was also a general energy deficit in the oblast. Consequently, there 
was no nightly surplus of electricity available, to feed the turbo-generators at this time. To create 
such a capacity by creating an independent water reservoir, by sealing off a part of the Tashlyk 
cooling pond was, in the view of the Greens, absurd, given that it could cool three leactors only 
during the winter season, but proved unable to do so during the summer months, due to extensive 
evaporation. Should the Aleksandrov water reseiwoir be completed, some 2,000 hectares of arable 
land would be flooded as would the village Bremenchug and parts of Buskoe and Aleksandrovka. 
The water in the reservoir would be polluted, due to the already serious pollution of the South Bug 
river, not only threatening the quality of irrigation and drinking water, but also threatening to 
pollute the ground water. This would be the case as the pressure created by the water reservoir 
once filled, would cause the ground water to raise and thus possibly mix with water from the 
reservoir.
Other factors also ruled against the two objects: while the project for the Tashlyk hydro­
electric power station was being reworked, all funding, including that for research, was also 
frozen, thus preventing geological, hydrogeological and seismic research from being completed, 
such research was vital to establish the characteristics of the site of the SB EK and according to 
Resolution No. 647, the go-ahead for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir, was made conditional, pending the outcome of such research. Such 
work should have been completed in 1989-90.
As for the promises of economic benefits given by the leadership of the SB nuclear power 
station to the local Soviets to ‘buy’ concessions to build parts of the SB EK on the territory of their 
villages and regions, they could no longer be said to be valid, given that the Soviet Union had 
ceased to exist and USSR Minatomenergoprom, which was supposed to pay for these concessions, 
was no longer existent:
He .RHKBMÆHpoiîaiia h  i ip o A O .R x a e r  jieHCi'BOBaTb c u c r e M a  
403141 KliopM auHH H o Ô M aiia  ]iace.rieiiM 4. (Within the 40 k m  zone of the
No. 06-0/1181-5437 of 24.10.1991 addressed to Derzhkompriroda.
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nuclear power station people were promised) obhexTou conKy-ü/ifibiTa, 
4opoi\ ra3H(l)HKaiiHîi cea, npu ycaoisHH hx coraacHa iia aaaiaieHinee 
pa3BMTMe lOY A3C w crpoHTeabcmo siieproxoMnaexca. B npoeKxe 
BKaioaeiibi Bce npeiiaoxeima na'i’H panoiioB 40 km 30iibi u o5beMe 
295,2 Man. pyGaeA, na Koropbix 81,5 Man. pyG.ieA - cyMMa ao.ieBoro 
yiiaci’Ha paAonoB h oOaacrM. Oxoao 143 MMaawoiioB pyS.ieA - 
noayMMTb H3 nenTpaan30Bannbix HCroanHKOB. n tom MHcae 70 M.in. 
pyS.'ieA na pa3BMTHe r. lOxnoyxpaHncK. HaceaeuMto 40-km 30iibi 
cyaaT Bce mm neoOxoaHMoe 6e3 peaai>iibix B03MoxnocreA Bbino.ineiiMe 
obeinanHH h 5e3 yicasanMa cpoKOB. rpeSya 3a 3to iieMeaaennoro 
coraacMB na OKonnaiiMe crpoMTeabcma iTiapoBnepi oKOMnaexca, a 
raxxe na npoexTMpoBanMe h OTpoM'reabcrno 4-ro peaicropa lOY 
ABC.
On the basis of the information given above, Zelenyi Mir accused the leadership of the SB 
nuclear power station and the Minister of Nuclear Energy, V. Gladush, of adopting an immoral 
approach to the solving of the energy problems with which the republic was faced. The Ukrainian 
energy programme should also include a section on energy saving technologies, the cutting of 
energy-demanding enterprises belonging to the military industrial complex and the closing of 
other environmentally harmful enterprises. Finally, the Greens supported the decision of the third 
session of the oblast Soviet as well as the decisions made by the Voznesensk regional and 
Aleksandrov small-town soviets not to allow flooding above the natural water level of the South 
Bug river (i.e. eight metres) so as to protect the river.
The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences supported Zelenyi Mir in its claims that further research 
surrounding the ecological ‘soundness’ of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was required 
prior to allowing further construction. General Director Fuks had been informed about this 
following his request that the Academy of Sciences give the reworked project a positive 
assessment. Only after such research had been carried out, could the project be submitted to an 
ecological-economic expert commission to work under the auspices of M inpriroda^.
No. 9g/50-12 of 24.1.1992, addressed to Zolotukhin and signed by the Vice President o f the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences, I. Lukinov.
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The pro-environment lobby’s opposition towards an expert assessment of the revised project 
for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station did not, however, prevent the pro-nuclear lobby from 
trying to organise such an environmental impact assessment. Although the Ukrainian Law on the 
Protection o f the Environment ruled that no environmental impact assessment could be undertaken 
prior to the agreement of local authorities (Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, lurii 
Shcherbak, had also made it clear that without such consent there would be no point in asking him 
for an environmental impact assessment), the administration of the SB nuclear power station still 
requested such an assessment to be conducted. The oblast Soviet saw no reason for conducting an
environmental impact assessment assessment as the environmental impact of the revised project 
was so obviously negative. However, through a connection in Minpriroda (former Deputy- 
Minister V. Lipinskii), the pro-nuclear lobby in secret managed to obtain an order for an impact 
assessment to be conducted.
When information of this reached the ears of the oblast Soviet, it sent representatives to 
luzhnoukrainsk to clarify the situation. There they were told that an impact assessment consisting 
of employees of a scientific institute in Kharkiv had been set up already the previous year! Such a 
gross violation of existing environmental legislation had not even taken place during the Soviet 
period, argued Zhuk in Visti Vozrtesenshchiny'^. To some extent Zhuk conceded that the nuclear 
lobby had got away with foul play due to the weakening of the Green Movement:
Ha xa.iL 7K)ii04HTbCji KoiicraryuaTH. mo i i i  iieiioyiodcma "aToviiinro 
- lo b S i” CBiji'iaTb iipo iiamy tioraiiy podory. A.ie, iikiuo nijmepTo. 
ro iipo jiKy aKTHBiiy a ia .ib u ic ib  ”3e.ieiiHx” v ioxe h im  vioaa 
viopa.ribnoi in Marepua.abiioi iiiirrpuMKH iiace.ieiimiV Oranca ciiaa 
rpoviaiicbKOï aicruBiiocri iiace.aenmi i  ne airroMaTimiuü BiiiGn.iocfi na 
c n a 4 i  a icrHBM ocri "3e.ReiiMx”. HenpneMiio ue KoncrarynaTu. a/ie 
(jiaicT £ (paKT.
Still, the Greens had conducted a considerable campaign against any further construction of 
the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station together with the oblast Soviet. Nikolaev oblast had 
made its own propositions and suggestions to Kiev (see report signed by Bilodid and Zhuk 
referred to above), and local authorities and activists could not be blamed for the ‘inertia’ and the 
‘corruptness’ of Kiev in reaching a decision on the issue.
A joint meeting held in Nikolaev by Soiuz Chernobyl and Zelenyi Mir to commemorate the 
Sixth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 25 April 1992 reiterated the concerns expressed a 
few months earlier. The situation was portrayed as a tug of war between the Ukrainian 
Government and local authorities, where the former completely ignored the opinion of and 
overruled the decisions of the latter:
npauwTe.RbcrBo YicpaMiiu nporna bo.hu iiacejieiiuii HuKO-iiaeBCKou 
o6.nacru, pemeiiMU od.'iacrnoro u pauonnbix coiieroB iiapomibix 
4eny'raT0B iipo40.rixaeT fl>MiiaiicMponaiiue paSoT no npoexTupoBanuio u 
BBQjiy B MHCi'Bue Tam.ribiKCKoro FA3C. tpoijsimeu yiiuMTOxeiiueM 
pcKH lOxiibiM Byr. flpu aroM x e  {punancupyioTca paSoTW no 
co34aiiMio ra30Typ6oreiiepaïopoB HuKOJiaeBCKUM ’’MamiipoeKTOM". 
ajii/repiiaTHBnbix FA3C u A3C. BesnpaBcnjeiiiio 4euorB0Ba.no 
iipaBUTe.fibcrBO, icoiyta 3iiaMUTejibno iiOBWcu.io oicjia4bi aiiMuiiHCTpauHU 
A3C M3 (l)omia. nocrna/iaBmux oi' HeDtio6bi.mi. (my emphasis)
60 27.2.1992, p 2.
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The meeting demanded that funding for the drafting, construction and conservation of the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be stopped and that the question of how to reprofile its 
equipment and buildings be solved. Finally, funding for the elaboration of the gas turbogenerator 
should be provided to the Nikolaev Mashproekê^. This is an issue to which I will return below.
During 1992 the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobbies fought primarily over whether or 
not to allow a produvka of the Tashlyk cooling pond to go ahead. From early 1993, though, the 
focus again turned towards the EK. In early February the oblast ispolkoni received a telegram 
from Minpriroda informing that experts from Minpriroda would visit luzhnoukrainsk between 8-9 
February. No officials from Nikolaev oblast knew about the expert commission referred to above, 
prior to the arrival of the telegram. What was more, no experts from the oblast had been included 
in the commission. This naturally caused anger in the oblast and on 4 March the Voznesensk 
branch of Zelenyi Mir sent a telegram to the Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, In. Kostenko, 
arguing the view that ‘the commission is incompetent. Such an impact assessment will not 
remove the emotions with regard to the nuclear power s t a t i o n T h e  Chairman of the oblast 
Soviet, I.Fliytsai, also voiced the protest of the oblast Soviet in a telegram dated 7 February:
05.ripa4a n iiepxajiMHiiMcrpauiï iiMc.fiOBiJiH cboe iieraTHBiie GTaB.neiimi 
40 iie|)epo6.rTeuGro iipoeK'i'y TannmubKol EEC ra BKa3a.riM iia 
neMOXJiMBicFb l i  6y4iBiiHUTBa, a raicox npocH.nu npunHUMTH 
opraiiiii:3ani[0 BcuiiOKOx 4iaJibU0cri. cripfiMOBaiioi b o5xi4 piiueub, 
ripvjHiniTMx vjicueBMMH G])ranaMH xa Mopaxopiio KaGuuexy MiiiHcrpoB”.
Following the meeting in luzhnoukrainsk, Zhuk, Zolotukhin and FIryhorenko went to Kiev to 
argue the case against an environmental impact assessment of the SB EK. They attended a 
meeting with the Minister of the Environment, lurii Kostenko, and told him that in the view of the 
Greens it was so blatantly obvious that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station would have a 
negative impact on the surrounding environment that no assessment was required. Besides, as 
pointed out in several rulings by the oblast and local Soviets, it would simply be impossible to 
operate the power station without the Aleksandrov water reservoir first being completed, which 
contradicted decisions made by the oblast soviet and the Voznesensk regional soviet as well as 
local soviets. To separate a part of the Tashlyk cooling pond to provide water for the hydro­
electric power station would in turn require new cooling systems to be installed for the nuclear 
power station, thus considerably increasing costs for the hydro-electric power station. However,
P en ie iiH e coSpauun oSiuecrBeHitocrH HnKGJiaeBCKGfl o6.nacTH. nGCBiimeiiiiGe m ecroH  ro40B iiiH ue  
9enuo6bi4bCK:Gn KaraGmG(|)bi. r. H nK oaaeB, 2 5  an iiem i 1 9 9 2  ro4a , c . 2 .
S e e  ‘PvKU rexb Bin r iiB 4ein ioM V  B vrv!’. PajimrchKo npHÔyjKX^n^ 2 3 .2 .1 9 9 3 .
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to the Greens the most weighty argument was that as a result they would lose their only own 
source of precious water,
Kostenko agreed with the Greens and promised that Hryhorenko’s alternative gas turbine 
facilities would be properly examined at a meeting in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers as a real 
alternative to hydro-electric power stations ‘attached’ to nuclear power stations'^^, Zhuk gave a 
positive assessment of the meeting with Kostenko praising him for his unorthodox and business­
like approach to the issue. For the first time when attending meetings in Kiev the Greens were not 
just told that the situation was ‘non-state’ (nederzhavna).
While local and central authorities negotiated over the environmental impact assessment 
commission, construction work continued. This provoked an angry outcry from Zelenyi Mir in 
April 1 9 9 3 then
rioK a [vie-To nbf'raioTCfi xots mto-to cu a c iH , y n a c  no HnepuMn 
nonyTMTe.'ibCTiia c ip o irr . y n p a n .ie iin e  "yicpreo.R orm i’' saauM.to 
oanosnaM iio: lO x u b iH  Byr -  rjerMona.ai4ioro 4 pena noMe.viiibix i3o;i.
A.ieKcaiuipoBCKoe i3040xpaiiM jm iue no^nuvieT n x  yponenb, iiapyuiMT 
aK ocucrcM y peKH. A imApo-XHMM'iecKoe co cT o a n u e  l O x i i o r o  B yra  
y x e  c e n n a c  onenb T p e n o x n o e , 40 iinb ie  OTiiouieiiMfi e r o  OTpan.aeiibi.
One deputy of the oblast Soviet, lu. Flalat, commented that by continuing construction despite 
the moratorium, the leadership of the nuclear power station risked losing the last little bit of trust 
the local population still had in it. Such trust was particularly important for the pro-nuclear lobby 
in 1993.
The pro-nuclear lobby, however, once again argued its case on legal grounds, turning every 
little loophole in the relevant legislation to its advantage. The Aleksandrov water reservoir and the 
hydro-electric power station could, it argued, be completed without violating the moratorium on 
further construction at the SB EK. In the words of the General Director V. Denisov,
T o t  ru4poy:3e.M. jiecKUTb. B ooS iue oGbeicr kuk 6bi caivi no c e d e , h ou 
lie  I3X04MT 13 3130110 ru^poKOMiLneicGi. lia icoTopwH iia .n o x e i i
MOpaTO])MH...A 3UaMM'r. CTpOMTb MOXHO.
P e iiie iin e  co d p a u n a  odiiiecTiieiiitoCTH HHKO.naei3cicon o5.nacrH . iioca m u e iiiio e  lu e c r o ü  I'oaoauiM ue 
MeoHodbiJibCKOH KaTacrpod)!)!. r. H n ico.aaeu, 25 anpe.aji 1992 roAa. c..2 .
PcumiiChKe fIpH6y?K?Kn, 13.4.1993,c. 3. The Greens also argued that the continued construction o f the 
Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electrical power station constituted a violation of the Resolution 
passed by the Ukrainian Cabinet o f Ministers on 14 January 1991, which had ruled that construction 
cease at the site the previous year, as well as decisions made by the Aleksandrov poselkovy Soviet, and 
the Voznesensk raisoviet, which had in September 1989 decided that the Aleksandrov water reservoir 
not be filled. Finally, a decision made by the Nikolaev oblast Soviet in October 1990 to prohibit the 
construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station was being violated.
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Besides, finishing the Aleksandrov complex could be justified by referring to a deal struck earlier 
between local authorities and the pro-nuclear lobby. The President of Goskomatom, Umanets, thus 
argued that there could be no talk about the preservation of the complex, given that
B ciîoe upeMJi od.iHciio. ikom  Jia.i Aodpo iia viocrpofiKy
A.ieKTTUfjipoBCKoro T3C -  axo cy.iM.iO oT .iacrn iiobijIH \iocr. 
cBBSuBaioiuMw BosiieceucKMH H ilovianeBCKMH panoiihi.
mpaiiTMpoBannoe ciiaG xeiiH e BOiiou iio.iMBiioe aevi. seae. m e
iipH.ieraioLUHX k  peixe xosiiHcrBe-.rocKOvia'ioM yKpauiibi CMuraer 
ueodxoAMvibivi saBepiuMTb b arovi I'ojiy cTponTe;u=crBO rm ipoys. ta n 
BBecrn ero b aKcii.iyaTaiiHoiniijiH pexuvi. coiviacoBatinbiFi c  \iecTiiOH 
ayiMMiiHcrpauMeH.
The Greens were unbendable in their views, however, arguing that what was happening at the site 
of the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric power station was a gross violation of 
existing legislation and political decisions made. Zhuk concluded that
...Hi iiepxaB iti opraiiM B.aaAU. i i i  iiace.'ieuiui me tie npoHnK-nnai 
posyviiiuiJiM Toro, mo eKo.aoriHiia CM'ryania iipocro BMMara 
AOTpMMyoaTHca saKoiiiB i  npnnmiTMX pim eub tia B c ix  piiim ix  
ayimmocfi iia KoiiKpeTimx ([)aKTax.../lonyCKaio'rbCft iiopymeiimi iia 0  
TEC. I  pim eiim i npeiicraBUHKa rii)e3M4eirra A. K inaxa npo 
npnnHtieitmi iieaaKotmoro dyjtiBiiMUTBa Moxna Ti.nbKM B iiaru^ft
Assessment of the revised Project
Two Commissions were set up during the first half of 1993 to assess the Aleksandrov complex and 
the revised SB EK project respectively. The first one, of which In. Halat, the man in charge of the 
ecology department at the oblast administration, was appointed Chairman was to decide the list 
and the extent of work to be conducted for the construction of the dam in connection with the 
Aleksandrov hydro-electric station. The dam was to be erected in the form of a bridge crossing 
over the South Bug river in the Domanevsk and Voznesensk regions. The Commission was 
ordered to hand in its assessment to the President’s representative in the Nikolaev oblast, A. 
Kinakh, by 7 June 1993^^
Becrn Bodueceuamim, 17.4.1993, c. 2.
HnKo.fTaeBCKcUi o5.Racriiait rocviapcrBem ian aiiMuimcTPauHib Pao iopiixeiiH e npejicranMrejui npe:m;ieirra 
yicDaHBbi 0 co3jiaiiHH KOMHCCHH 110 oripeaejieiiHio neneami h oSbeMOB pa6or no coop vxe im io  
njiOTHUbt AjieKcaiiaooBCKoro imjipovs.na b Bannairre MocioBoro neoexojia. signed by the 
representative of the President in the Nikolaev oblast, A. Kinakh on 23.4.1993, No. 194. The 
Commission counted 19 members, of which four were members of Zelenyi Mir (Suslova, Shapovalov, 
Zolotukhin and Zhuk).
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As for the second Commission, which had been set up by hdinpriroda without the consent of 
oblast authorities and to the great anger of Zelenyi Mir, oblast authorities in the end were left with 
no option but to endorse it, given that it was not dissolved and since construction continued at the 
site of the SB EK and the only way in which it may be stopped, was for this commission to rule 
against it. In return for its endorsement, the oblast Soviet demanded that experts from the oblast 
be included in the commission. It then endorsed a list of Nikolaev experts to be included in the 
commission, amongst whom was Zhuk. In an angry letter to Vesnik Vozhesenschint^, Zhuk 
complained that although he could see no reason for the expert commission to assess the project, 
he was forced to participate in its work, since his name was on the list of oblast representatives 
sanctioned by the oblast leadership! In his view it was
Cyui.ibuuH a6cyp4 posr.uuiaTM npoeicr. hkum BiAXH.ieiiMH opr'aiiaMM
B.aajm i  iie v ioxe  b y rn  pea.iisoBanuH. 60 i c i i y s  sabopoiia 
sanoBneiiiui O.ieKcampiBcicoro BOAocxoiîui.ua. 6e.i aKoro rE C -P A E C  
iipauioBaTH ue Moxe.
The only explanation for the Cabinet of Ministers to insist on an expert assessment could only 
be that experts from Kiev and Kharkiv held completely different views regarding the hydro­
electric power station than did the Nikolaev experts, thus possibly hoping that the conclusions 
drawn by its members would be in the Greens’ favour.
The difference between the Kiev and Kharkiv specialists and those from Nikolaev was 
fundamental. The former favoured the completion of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station with 
three hydroaggregates and wanted to fill up the Aleksandrov water reservoir with 16 m of water. 
The Nikolaev group, as expected, came out categorically against both objects, as although from an 
economic point of view they were considered inexpedient, they would cause serious 
environmental damage. The Chairman of the Commission justified the Tashlyk water reservoir by 
arguing that it made sense to complete construction as, ‘bearing in mind the economic situation in 
Ukraine...it is inadmissible to let go of the enormous sums invested in the construction, and time to 
gain (from them)’. In other words the Greens seemed to be right in that once something had been 
almost completed despite official decisions to bring such construction to a halt, it would be very 
difficult to justify construction from not being completed. In other words, attempts would be 
made at sneaking a project into use through the backdoor.
The revised project assessed by the Commission had been completed by early 1993. The 
difference between the original project and the revised one was that the number of 
hydroaggregates had been reduced from ten to three (First Stage) and six (Second Stage). A
BecruMK Bosueceimmiibi, 5 .6 .1 9 9 3 , c. 2.
7 0 2
- -  -  - '  - .'j ' ''46'!'}".
number o f  other m od ifications had also been made to safeguard the environment in the area. A 
Kuzin, the Deputy Director o f  the Ukrainian Scientific Centre for the Protection o f  Water, which  
operated under the ausp ices o f  Minpriroda, was appointed Chairman o f  the Com m ission. Between  
25 and 26 M ay 1993 the members o f  the Com m ission gathered at the SB nuclear power station to 
d iscuss materials provided by sc ien tific and project institutes, laboratories and the laboratory o f  
the nuclear power station itself. The controversial objects were view ed and expert opin ions 
provided by experts representing Uh^gidroproekt, which had revised the project for the Tashlyk  
hydro-electric power station.
A report prepared by a work ing group w ithin the Com m ission was also debated at length, and 
16 out o f  39 pages were agreed by the members o f  the Com m ission. The N ikolaev representatives 
also signed the summary conclusions, although they prepared their own addendum, which was 
included in the final report presented to Minpriroda. The final decision regarding the future o f  the 
SB EK was with the Ukrainian Cabinet o f  M inisters.
The N ikolaev group - com posed by 18 experts, among whom were Greens and symphatisers 
o f  the Greens like Bilodid, Hryhorenko, Dobrovolskii, Zhuk, Zolotukhin, Suslova, Shapovalov, 
Tarashuk and Shehlov - prepared a substantial alternative report, setting out their case^^. The 
addendum ( ‘a special v iew ’) suggested that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be redesigned  
for other purposes, to be decided jo intly  by local authorities and the administration at the SB 
nuclear power station. The same conclusion was reached by an expert group on econom ics and 
the environment set up by the oblast Soviet. This group, which consisted o f  leading scientists 
from N ikolaev, was established in M ay 1993 to exam ine the revised Tashlyk project. Shortly 
afterwards, the oblast Soviet passed a decision to support its own expert group and to g ive its 
agreement to the addendum prepared by the N ikolaev delegation within the Com m ission set up by 
Minpriroda^^.
Although the oblast had been negative to the com m ission and although the majority o f  the 
com m ission’s members cam e out in favour o f  com pleting the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station 
and the Aleksandrov water reservoir, Minpriroda exam ined the C om m ission’s report carefully and 
in the end decided to support the opinion o f  the N ikolaev group. On 9 September it passed a 
decision not to endorse the revised project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station on the 
grounds that it was environm entally unsound. The ecological and other inadequacies o f  the
Pojumn npnpoMU no. 6, June 1993, p 2.
Peiiieiine UnesMrnvMa HuKOJiaencKoro o6.fiacruoro concTa No. 17-11 or 7 mioii?i 1993 r. "O
3aK.riioMei!HM nneacraPHTeneH HHKO.naecK’OH oRjiacrn. 4.neiion oKCiiepTiiOH komhchu rjui npoBeyienmi 
rocvAapcrBeiiiiOH 3Ko.aorHMeci(oA 3KcnepTH3bi VTOMitenuoro ripoeicra Taijj.rmKCicoio f  A3C".
703
revised project were summarised by lu. Tom in, a member o f  the Ukrainian Ecolog ical Academ y  
o f  Sc iences in Rodnaia priroda^:
Ana. IMS .MarepMa.ROR iip o eK 'i'a  r l i r r h . i  e r o  snaR U Te.R w iw e iie A o c ra T K u . 
r i p e x i i e  R cei’o  o 5 i i a p y x H . i a c i .  aKoiiGM M 'iecKafi i i e o b o c i io R a i in o c ih  
i ip e A .ia ra e M o i’o  p e iu e iiH Ji. d a i i u x e i m e  v i i io r u x  oipmiareaiaihix 
n o c . ie 4CTRHH n p o e K 'ta  u  s a R w m e n n e  i io . io x n T e a L i i i a x ,  O T c y T c m u e  
oG oaiO B aiiH }! iiop\iaTHB iiO M  b a s h i .  iieco B ep n ieu cT R O  w ciio .ii.30B aii!iow  
vieTO A oaorM H , n e i i o y a e ï  v n io r u x  B a x i i u x  (liaK TopoB  -  B o r  i i e n o . i i a iu n  
iiepeMeiiB saMeMaiiMH, c a e . i a n u w x  aK C iiepraM H  -  KOiioMHCTaMH.
( F in a l ly ,  t h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a n )  OTcyTCRHe b i i p o e x r e  o S o c iiO B a in io i 'o  
n p o n io s a  B a n a n u B  T a u iau K C K O H  EA3C i ia  c a iiH T a p iio -rH i’H eiiH M ecK yio 
H pay tH oaorM M ecK yio  o S c x a n o R ic y  b p e r u o i ie .
On the basis o f  Minpriroda's dec ision and previous dec isions made by the oblast Sov iet, the 
18th session o f  the oblast Sov iet, which com m enced on 13 October 1993 passed a decision to 
redesignate the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station for other use^'. The dec ision recommended 
to the regional sov iets o f  Arbuzinka, V oznesensk and Dom anevsk that they withdraw the 
perm ission for flood ing in connection w ith the filling o f  the Aleksandrov water reservoir and for 
the construction o f  objects o f  the SB EK on their territory. The Sov iet also wrote a letter to 
President Kravchuk w ith a request that funds be made available for the redesignating o f  the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station for other purposes. The letter was signed by Chairman o f  the 
oblast Sov iet, 1. Hrytsai.
Shortly after the decision o f  the oblast Sov iet was made public in the press, the Verkhovna 
Rada lifted its moratorium on the construction o f  nuclear power stations, thus in theory 
underm ining the argument o f  the greens that given the total capacity o f  the SB nuclear power 
station (three reactors instead o f  the six envisaged in the project) it would make no sense to go 
ahead w ith the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. The position o f  the oblast Sov iet, however, 
remained firm: N ot under any circum stances would the decision referred to above be changed,
7.3.4 Nuclear Safety and Implications for Health 
Nuclear Safety
W hereas initially, the Greens aimed at limiting the size o f  the SB EK, the 1990s brought the issue 
o f  nuelear safety on top o f  Zelenyi M ir's agenda. The change in focus w as caused by a number o f  
close-dow ns at the SB nuclear power station and increased fears that produvka and poor
™No. 10, October 1993, p 3.
‘PeiJieime XMIII c ccch h  oSjiacrnoro coBera 21co3BiBa No. 33 "0 nepenpo(l)H.fiHnoBatiHH opLeicroR 
Taui.RMKCKOM T3C -rA 3C "\ Pojumn npHpoAuMo. II,November 1993, p 2.
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maintainance in combination w ith the unfavourable location o f  the nuclear power station (see  
Chapter S ix) would have a negative impact not only on the environment but also on peop les’ 
health in terms o f  exposure to radiation. ft;ftA s seen above, the Greens were outraged by M oscow ’s Resolution N o. 1 to provide local ft
authorities with incentives in return for allowing nuclear facilities on their territory. Follow ing the 
collapse o f  the U SSR  there was no longer a centre - M oscow  - to provide these financial 
incentives. Still, the pro-nuclear lobby stuck to the original offers made. Zhuk and Bilodid, 
however, questioned its ability to pay for the bargain and the conditions under which they would  
be made:
...r io n e p e iin iM  c o io s iin u  y p iw  (a (j)aKTM‘ii io  M in a T o .v ie iie p ro iip o .v i). 
npHHiuiB J iocra ifO B y N 1  b I a  19 c iM iu i 1991 p. npo  saxoAH
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-:,r:
ft
asaoxoMenini viicueBux opraiiiB b .tü a h  a o  posTaitiyBaiBui na ï x  TepH’r o p i ï  obseicTiB aTovinoi enepreTUKu, h I e i o  riocTanoBoto Biiepiiie 
iiepeASaMaeTBcsi BUAlnenna s ik h x o c b  k o l u t I b  a .u i 30-km soiim  iiaBKO.TO 
AEG. Ajie X  >bc1 yvionn BHcyBaioTi.ca npn nbovty! K o ih tm  
BMAi.amoTBca T i.i ix u  niA  noBi enepreTHMiii oSbeKTU, t o 6 t o  no 
crapiH  cxeMi; ôyAyioTbca iion i 6 a ok m  - ^inancyeTbcn 3ona.
riponopuia 10 a o  1-ro. Hac.'ilAK0M ra x o i no.TiTMKH, aic nenaxKO y
iiepeAbaMHTH, dyAyxb h o b I  enepjttTM'ini oSbeKTw. a b naBKOJiHinniH
3oni - (fyiFAaMeiiTM neproBoro AonroSyAy. Pe3y.r»,'i'aT ni.BbKOM ft/
npoTH.aexnHH Towy. bkm h Aeic.aapyBaBca cnonaTKy - viaTHMeMO b o b h h
n p H B lA  A.RB sarocrpeinm co u ia jiw io i oScranoBKH^^ fti//■5,
Given the faet that Ukraine had adopted a moratorium on the construction o f  new  nuclear 
reactors (see Chapter Two) these conditions could no longer be considered valid. Regardless o f  y
any expansion, the nuclear power station should take on responsibility for the econom ic ft.'ftldevelopm ent o f  the 30-km  zone surrounding it. Since there were no longer any upper lim its for 
electricity prices, cost calculations ought to include expenses in connection with the developm ent ft/
o f  the 30-km  zone, too. As for the size o f  such investments, Zhuk and Bilodid found it reasonable ft f  
that the total sum ought also to include a coefficient for the deductions o f  the total sum o f  
investm ents already undertaken at the site o f  the SB EK. It also m ade sense to m ake available 
m oney for future investm ents towards the upkeep o f  the zone. Such investm ents m ight include
ftcom m unications, fuel, roads, a proper monitoring system for radioactivity, a proper information 
service, proper health service facilities etc. Certain measures to protect the environm ent should ftft
73also be paid for by the nuclear power station . ftft/
1
doBOBlAua 3anHcica. flDonosMuil eKO-rioruiMBOï acouiau il MnicojiaiBCbicol oSjiacri no 30-km 30iii /ft
iiaBKQ.no AEG, signed by Zhuk and Bilodid on 16.10.1991. I
""Ibid. ft
A s regards safety at the SB nuclear power station, this was questioned by the pro- 
environmental lobby follow ing a series o f  technical problems wh ich in turn resulted in un-planned
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reactor shut-downs throughout 1991^ '' and 1992^^. Follow ing an accident at Chernobyl in late 
1991, the eause o f  which was a defective cable line, an article published in Radianske 
Prnbiizhzhia^,<\vQw the readers’ attention to the faet that similar problems had been detected in the 
reserve cables o f  Reactors 1 and 2 at luzhnoukrainsk, however no measures had been taken to 
resolve with the situation:
y nac lia lOV ABC iia l - \ i  h 2 - m  b .io K e  c o  jimi nx iiycKa 
p e a e p B iib ie  ic a G e . iu  C M .io B o ro  i i m 'a i m a  n  y n p a B . i e i i m i .  iia x o A iiiU H e c H  iia  
O T M ei’K e  -4  u  6  u e r p o B  n o A B e p x e i i r i  iio ii/ieüC T B M io  c r o M ii r ix  
n p o v ib i i iL ie i i i ib ix  BOA t a k ,  m to  c t o h k h  MX iip o p x a B e .M M . P y K O B O A c riio  
o 5  3 'roM  : i i i a e r .  n o  x ie p  l i e  ripriiiM M aer. b h a i i o .  x a c t .  k o c a u  c;iyM H T C B
aBaiDMib
This, and other w eaknesses regarding the construction o f  the nuclear power station were addressed 
at the fifth annual m eeting o f  Zelenyi Mir, wh ich took place in N ikolaev in Decem ber 1991:
I
i
üajibiieHLuaH padoxa lOY ABC no-npexiieMy xanx b  cede yrpoay 
anapMM: no-iipHMHiie BaiuMineiiiiocrH S ao k o d  Bcero jiMiiib o r  Jiencoro
ciiopxMBiioro caMo.nera. nx iim3icoh ceHCMocrouKocTH. n3-3a 
OXCyXCTBMB CKBOBIlOH flOBCpiCM lipudopOB O X  AAXMMlCa AO M3MepHXe.!lîl
CHCxeMbi Koiixpo.nui BiiyxpHpeaKxoptibix iipoueccon, H3-3a 3axoiuieiimi 
xexiiHMecKOH BOAOM 110X16111011 MM lia oi’xiexKe -4  -6  M. 1-ro m 2-i'o
d.MOKOB, Mepe3 icoxopbie npoxoAfix KadejiH pesepiiiioro ch.mobopo 
iiMxaiimi M yripaB.MeiiHii peaicxopoB^’ .
Zelenyi Mir demanded that the cable problems be sorted out im m ediately, and that measures
also be taken to secure the normal function o f  the Public Scientific Co-ordination Soviet on
M onitoring the Environment and Safety at the SB Nuclear Power Station (established by
R esolution N o. 647). Regional o ffices should be opened, and the Soviet should inform the people
o f  N ikolaev oblast o f  any mishaps at the nuclear power station. To g ive the Soviet teeth, .representatives o f  the oblast Prosecutor’s o ffice and o f  Radianske Pribuzhzhia should be directly  
involved in the work o f  the Soviet.
_________________________See for instance SV, 29.3.1991, p.l or Izvestiia o f the same day, p. 1.
‘OcratiOBKH d j i O K Q B  na lOxiio-yKpaMiiCKOH ABC TUkrinform/TASSf 29.5.1992, published in Ukraine 
Today (Radio Liberty), 29.5.1992, p. 12, 'floa il tia niBAeiiHO-yKijaiiiCbKiH AEC’. YP-1 18.08.92, 
17:00 ToAHiia nik’. Ukraine Today (Radio Liberty), 20.8.1992, p.7.
30.11.1991, p. 2.
PenieiiHe 5 -ro  od.riacriioro codnaiiHA HnKOJiaeBCKOH od.nacrnoH aKOJiorHMecicoH accoiiMauHM "dejieiBiiu 
Mhp”. r. HHKO.riaeB, 22 AeKadpn 199lr.
An issue related to the one above, and brought about by the collapse o f  the Sov iet Un ion and 
w ith which the pro-environment lobby got increasingly concerned, was the storage o f  nuclear 
w aste from the SB nuclear power station. During the Sov iet era, such waste had been shipped o ff  
to Krasnoiarsk in Siberia, where it was reprocessed and stored at the Maiak facility. W ith Russian 
independence Greens and the people o f  Krasnoiarsk, however, had vo iced their opposition towards 
the Maiak facility and raised demands to the effect that no waste be accepted in the future. In the 
Resolution referred to above, the Greens thus questioned the future o f  waste produced at 
luzhnoukrainsk, as they had strong reasons to believe that no proper fac ilities for the storage o f  
such waste existed there.
Their concerns prompted the pro-nuclear lobby to respond through an article in Radianske 
Pribuzhzhia on 25 February^®: whereas it was correct that public pressure had forced through a 
deeision by the local authorities to limit the adm ission o f  nuclear fuel from all nuclear power 
stations, including the Russian ones, there were no objective reasons for this, as the Maiak facility  
was in an excellen t cond ition and bound to loose billions o f  roubles should the decision be 
implemented. What was more, the em ployees o f  the facility had not even been consulted prior to 
the decision being made. The facility would be able to handle nuclear waste for another 15 years 
and this was not an issue o f  dispute with the general public. Its concern had primarily com e about 
in a response to poor food supplies to Krasnoiarsk. A Ukrainian delegation had solved this 
problem by offering food supplies in return for continued adm ission o f  nuclear fuel from 
Ukrainian nuclear power stations.
A s for the SB nuclear power station itself, it had own facilities for the short-term storage o f  
nuclear waste and could store its own waste until the end o f  1992. A s a matter o f  fact, the waste 
was shipped to Krasnoiarsk only after having been kept at luzhnoukrainsk for three years to cool 
down in special cooling facilities. The cassettes containing used nuclear fuel were then put into 
special iron railroad containers for long-term storage in Siberia. A vo id ing the issue o f  whether or 
not such a long transportation o f  nuclear waste was in itself safe, the SB EK adm inistration 
adm itted that Ukraine would in the com ing few  years not be able to provide such a fac ility on 
Ukrainian territory, not to m ention local storage facilities. Accord ing to experts, Ukraine would  
not be able to provide proper long-term storing facilities for nuclear waste until the beginn ing o f  
the 21st centiu'y^^. Thus an argument frequently used by the pro-nuclear lobby to the effect that 
nuclear power was the only reliable independent energy alternative for Ukraine (gas and o il were 
imported from Russia and it was therefore argued that Ukraine would becom e dependent on 
Russia for its fuel supplies), was underm ined. Whereas oil and gas could be obtained from
PuAnucbKe npMdyÆACfi, 25.2.1992, c. 1. 
PitA/iucbKe PIpMdyACAAk 6.8.1992, c. 2.
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elsew here should Russia fail to deliver or cut o ff  supplies, it would prove a lot more d ifficult to 
negotiate delivery o f  nuclear fuel to other countries, where opposition towards reprocessing  
fac ilities was much more fierce.
The debate on nuclear safety peaked in early 1992, when it becam e known that there had been 
a fire at the SB nuclear power station. N ot so much the fire in itself, which was considered 
relatively harmless, but more so the poor manner in which it was handled, angered not only the 
Greens but also local authorities. The accident, which took place during the loading o f  fuel at one 
o f  the reactors was follow ed by silence from the leadership o f  the nuclear power station and in an 
inquiry at the 11th session o f  the oblast Soviet, deputies Shapovalov, Suslova, Tolstykh, Ignatenko 
and lakubenko demanded that operative and objective information regarding the circum stances 
surrounding and the extent o f  the accident be made available. Shorin responded that only a cable 
line had short-circuited, so that one could not really talk about a proper fire. The oblast Soviet still 
adopted tougher measures regarding information follow ing accidents or em ergency reactor shut­
downs at the SB nuclear power station. For instance, the administration o f  the SB nuclear power 
station were ordered to provide the mass media with systematic information regarding its safety. 
The press, on the other hand, was ordered to publish such information.
The decision o f  the oblast Soviet cam e about as a result o f  numerous rumours w hich emerged  
fo llow ing the accident on 27 January and the lack o f  information regarding the accident. Due to 
the fire reactor N o. 1 was shut down for 52 hours as repairs were conducted. The Greens linked  
this accident with a number o f  previous accidents - altogether there had been 15 em ergency shut­
downs at luzhnoukrainsk during 1991! References were in this connection made to an article 
which had appeared on the pages o f  Izvestia and which claimed that there had been a record high 
number o f  shut-downs at nuclear power stations on the territory o f  the former U SSR  during 
199180 situation would get even worse for 1992, were one to go by the fact that during
January alone, there had been as many as four shut-downs at the SB nuclear power station! 
Norm al average figures for shut-downs were one per reactor during the course o f  two months. 
Three out o f  the four shut-downs in January had taken place at reactor N o. 1 and this clearly was 
not normal. What was more, pollution levels (i.e. em issions into the air o f  radionuclides) 
increased with the shut-down and start-up o f  the reactors. Although the cable fire could be 
classified  as a minor incident, it revealed a disregard on the part o f  the leadership o f  the nuclear 
power station, to take seriously warnings regarding safety, since the Greens had already warned 
them about the danger o f  fire breaking out in the cables follow ing two such fires at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station. Even not the fire served as a proper warning to the leadership because the
80Mjuecjwf, 11.3.1992, (n.p.).
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reactor was not exam ined properly afterwards, wh ich in turn led to another three incidents during 
March 1992:
...B n a 'ia n e  M apxa c.r, i ia  to m  /x e  s.ioiio.TyM iioM  iiepiîOM d.TOKe no  iie 
lîi.iHciieniibiM npntiHiiaM n p o a u n a c i, pavm oaKTHSiiaa tJo;ia Ta x , ‘ i r o  
y p o u e iib  pa iiM oaK TH unoro  (|)ona iioubicH.Tca ay rs a n  ne n 100 pas! 
B yacM  noMUMTii. m to o r  hp h b u m k h  on cH ju n ina  a u a p n n  a o  d o a h tn o n  
5 e jii) i - i3cero O iin ii mar...®'
As f  )r the ab ility o f  the nuclear power station’s own information centre to provide reliable 
information regarding the January accident, a deputy o f  the oblast Sov iet, A. Sheglov, questioned  
this. An analysis o f  the incident provided by Atomnadzor was qualitatively d ifferent from the one 
provided by the Info service at the nuclear power station;
He iipnnoaaTCH (paKTiii xaaarnocTM n iieKOMiieTeimiocru iiepconaaa. 
aonycTHBLnero cncreMarnaecicoe nonaaaiine napa na nsoaaunio 
icadeaa, n apyrne iiapynienna. C t o ' i k h  speima nncnexurni 
AT0Miia;i30pa coBepmenno oaeBMAny npHMniibi anapHH, b m iio b iih k h  
napyiiienHji, Aonymeniibie iiepcoiiaaoM npn JinKBMAanHH aron 
anapHM-.CoBepuieiino oaeBMAHo. m to niupopMauna b neMaTM Aojooia  
pacripocpainiTbCB c iioaumm nesaBHcuMbix KOMnerenTniiix h c to m u h k o b . a 
lie BeAOMCTBeniibix cay?ic6®l
During 1992 more ev idence appeared about accidents at the SB nuclear power station, thus 
d iscred iting the v iew  o f  its adm inistration to the effect that there was no reason to worry about 
safety. Holos Ukrainy w as able to reveal that during the first 10 months o f  1992 there had been 24  
incidents in luzhnoukrainsk - an increase o f  nine compared to the previous year.^^ Seven o f  these  
had occurred as a result o f  breaches o f  safety instructions. A t all the other Ukrainian nuclear 
power stations only three incidents were caused by such breaches, thus putting the leadership o f  
the SB nuclear power station in a poor light. Moreover, it turned out that the nuclear power station 
generally failed to inform about incidents or it gave incomplete information about them. A  report 
produced by the State Nuclear Inspectorate o f  Ukraine {DANU), gave a sad picture o f  the state o f  
affairs:
HesBa^xaioMM n a  BHMorn A A H Y , 3 B l r  n p o  n o p y u ie n iu i i ie  o(l)opM .iieiio, 
a6o nopyuieniui ne posoilAynano, Aoicopinny npuMuny r io p y iiie n n a  iie 
BCTanoBJieno t o iu o .  A o c h t b  m b cto  saxoA U  Juui y c y n e n iu i  n o p y u ie iib  
BACHBaioTb jiHiiie nicju i narioJierJiHBHx bhm oi' AepxaTOivinaivmAy. Ta
PaAmiCLKe rJpMffy:^Æiin 17.3.1992, c. 3. This information was provided by Zolotukhin. 
Ibid.
Fojfoc yKpaMiibk 8.12.1992, c. 7.
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H cuMMX iiopyiueiib iiiSuTO ne noviinaiOTb, aokh ï x  ne naAMÔaiorb 
incncKTopM.
A s an exam ple, the article referred to an incident which occurred in March, when radioactive 
substances were em itted from reactor N o. 1 and spread over an area o f  200 square metres. The 
leadership at the nuclear power station tried to hide this and failed to inform the Inspectorate. 
Tests, which were conducted at the initiative o f  the Inspectorate, were not conducted properly and 
no plausible explanation for the incident had so far been established. D espite this, everything was 
done to maintain work at the Reactor, which in turn was only possible through the violation o f  
rules for the operation o f  the SB nuclear power station.
In July Reactor N o. 2 w as started up irregardless o f  flaw s in the seism icity  control system. 
Three w eeks later, when the Reactor was inspected by the DANU, the flaw  had still not been 
eradicated. The electricity targets were obviously more important than safety - in other words the 
situation remained as it had been during the Soviet era. And more importantly, the general attitude 
towards safety at nuclear power stations did not seem  to have been changed fo llow in g  the 
Chernobyl accident.
On 15 October, during a planned control o f  the safety system  o f  the hermetical zone, 
surrounding the reactor, c lose to 80 tonnes o f  solvent boracic acid were spilled. A lthough the 
leadership o f  the SB nuclear power station had received a warning beforehand to check the 
herm etical zone, it had ignored the DerzhatomnagliadA advice to shut down the reactor for 
testing. After the accident, orders were given to continue operation o f  the reactor. A  com m ission  
to investigate the accident was only set up fo llow ing pressure from Derzhatomnagliad. Even after 
this, the Greens claim ed that Reactors N o. 1 and two were not herm etically sealed^" .^ They based  
their claim  on the report produced by the environmental impact assessm ent com m ission from  
1989. Claims were also made to the effect that the safety cooling system  was flawed.
Finally, a rather serious incident occurred on 8 Novem ber, during the loading o f  reactor fuel 
into the reactors. One o f  the fuel cassettes got stuck on a foreign object, which turned out to be a 
piece o f  wire. The wire was pulled out and loading continued, w ithout a proper check for more 
foreign objects being carried out. When, at the insistence o f  the Derzhatomnagliad a proper check  
w as eventually conducted, another piece o f  wire w as found inside the reactor!
The circum stances exam ined above support the G reens’ claim s that the production o f  
electricity was given  a higher priority than that o f  safety at the nuclear power station, thus
PajimcbKe [JpnGyiKÆsi, 12.1.1993, c. 3. See also PajinuchKe PîpH^y^Kmi, 28.9,1993, c. 2,
-?
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justifying their position that the leadership o f the nuclear power station sim ply was not reliable in 
securing safety. General D irector Fuks’ statement to the effect that
OnpoKM iiyTb MA6I0 aroMHOH aiieprcTHKH iie.Mbsa, kiik b ec iio .'iesn o 5bi.fio 
KorAa-TO OTsepra'i'b n ap o n y io  Mau.mny...C.3eAyeT iie  orp u u a rb  A3C, a 
CAPJtaTb MX 6 o .a ee  iiaAe^ icnbiMH. cosjiaTi^  vc-toan a  hx besonaciiO H  
aKCir.nvaTaimH finv emphasisf ,
thus seem ed a bit out o f  place to put it mildly! Whereas the Greens fully  agreed that som ething  
had to be done to improve safety at luzhnoukrainsk, they did not want to leave the responsibility  
with the leadership o f  the nuclear power station but rather would prefer clear orders to be 
introduced and an independent m onitoring system  to be set up.
M eanw h ile the incidents continued to occur at the nuclear power station: on 27 January 1993 
an electric cable in the transformer o f  the second safety system  at reactor N o. 2 short-circuited and 
as a result o f  falling pressure due to the short-circuit the system  was put on manual control instead 
o f  being on automatic control. During the investigation into this incident, the valve in the level 
regulator for the first stearagenerator turned itse lf  off,
CM riia .n na  saicpbiTue KOToporo apopM H poB aaca H3-3a iiajiHMMa 
iieiipoeicTnoH nepeMbPiKH b i.iiKa([)y ynpaBaeuMB. T e x iio jio rH M e cK O H  
saiitHTOH no CHMAceitHio y p o B iif i B naporeneparope 0TK.ii[0'iH.rica nepBbifi 
rJ iau iib iH  uHpKyjmuHonnbiH nacoc h MOiUHOCi'b aiiepro6.noKa No. 2
OTKAlOMHJtaCb OT 3HeprOCMCT6Mbl.. . : I
The incident reached Point One on the International Seven-point scale for nuclear incidents,
caused by human error^ *^ . A  similar incident occurred in mid-February^^.
At its Sixth session^^, in early April 1993, seven deputies (Shapovalov, Suslova, K uzovev,
Tolstykh, Drobilko, Podhurenko and Shehlov) claim ed that the major reason for the recent
incidents was the lax attitude towards safety depicted by staff^^ and raised the question o f  the
responsibility o f  the leadership for these incidents. F ollow ing the session , the oblast Soviet
.contacted Derzhatornenergonagliad with a request that it assess the incidents and the actions o f  
staff and the administration at the nuclear power station.
The lax attitude towards nuclear safety at luzhnoukrainsk could not but worry, particularly 
after the Verkhovna Rada lifted the ban on the construction o f  nuclear reactors in October 1993,
--------------------------------------
Ibid.
PiiAmichKe UpMFyÆÆa, 2.2.1993, c. 1,
PamiCbKe PIpMSyMZKn, 25.2.1993, c. 1.
PoAiiaji npMpoAa,V\o. 4, April 1993, c. 1.
The deputies backed up their claim by information published by 'Financial Times’ on 1.12.92.
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thus open ing up for a possible expansion o f  the nuclear capacity also in N ikolaev oblast. The 
position o f  the oblast Soviet, however, remained firm; no expansion could be accepted at the SB  
nuclear power station, even the lifting o f  the moratorium could not change that. When the issue o f  
whether to build reactor N o. 4 at luzhnoukrainsk cam e up again in the spring o f  1993, both the 
oblast Soviet and the Presidential Representative in N ikolaev oblast, A  Kinakh, strongly opposed  
this. They referred to the decision reached by the expert com m ission in 1989, and which was 
supported by Uh^geologia, that it was undesirable to build reactor N o. 4. This was reiterated by 
the Ukrainian Council o f  M inisters on 26 October 1989 (Resolution N o. 271). B esides the people 
o f  N ikolaev oblast were opposed to any expansion o f  the nuclear power station. Having exam ined  
the Presidential Decree ’On the Urgent Preparations regarding the D evelopm ent o f  Nuclear Energy 
and the Formation o f  a N uclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine’ (No. 64/94 o f  23 February 1994, point 2) 
and also the ‘Protocol o f  the Council o f  M inisters’ M eeting o f  27 April 1994 regarding the 
Construction o f  reactor N o. 4 at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station and the H ydrocom plex  
on the South B u g’, the oblast authorities found it im possible to give their consent to expand the 
Energy Complex^®.
The issue o f  safety at the SB nuclear power station had been discussed by
Derzhatomnagliad’s C ollegium  at the end o f  1992 (see section above). On 11 N ovem ber 1992 
additional checks were conducted o f  the safety system  at Reactor N o. 2. Although this incident in 
no w ay matched the accident at Chernobyl in extent and seriousness, Derzhatomnagliad w as not
satisfied with the administration o f  the nuclear power station:
...Ko.iieria AepzcaTOMiiar.niuiy yKpaiiin, posivuiiiymiin po6oTy 
craiiijil II iJ,i.iiOMy. BMSiia.ria AiajibiiiLTb aAM iiiicrpanil BO "HY 
AEG” no opraiiisaniï becnequoi poboTH craim il HesaAOBiJibiioio i  
iionepeAHaa l i .  mo n pasi neripMHnTTii icoiiK[)eTHMX saxoAiD no
iiiABMmeiiiiio 6e3iieKH eKcrmyaTanii flY AEG. Aep>Ka'roMiiarAflA Syjie 
BHMyLueiinM npHHiuiTM pimmenna npo ayiiMiiKy eKcririyaTani ï  i ï  
6.ri0Kiif V
At the end o f  D ecem ber 1992, Ukrainian radio reported that personnel from Chernobyl, 
Zaporizhzhia and luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power stations had been invited to train in Japan as part 
o f  an international programme to enhance safety at nuclear power stations^^. The Spanish
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com pany Unidad Electrica S.A. also got involved in this work, by m eans o f  providing the 
_________________________
Letter from Kinakh to the Ukrainian Cabinet o f Ministers (First Deputy Leader Zvyagilskii) written sometime in April - copy o f letter obtained from Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev. Date not on copy, 
PaAnncbKe npMÔyÆAcn, 8.4.1993, c. 1.
YD l ,  22.12.92. "üiiinpo”. 21:00. printed in Ukraine Today. 23.12.1992, p. 13.
:i
A
luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power plant with proper equipment^^. Although these measures were a 
step in the right direction, in them selves they were not sufficient to solve the problem o f  poor 
safety at the nuclear power station.
Throughout 1992 and early 1993 the newspapers o f  N ikolaev oblast continued to print letters 
written by concerned locals with regard to safety at the nuclear power station. A s noted in a 
feature article in Radianske Pribuzhzhia, a majority o f  these letters expressed a negative attitude 
towards the nuclear power station, thus indicating that the information campaign conducted by the 
leadership o f  the nuclear power station to convince people that nuclear power could not be avoided  
given the difficult econom ic situation and the general shortage o f  energv in Ukraine, did not have 
the intended effect on people. Every now and then, though, the odd letter in support o f  the station 
emerged, lu. Panachev, a doctor by profession, for instance, voiced his support in the follow ing  
way:
(H) no.riHocrn>io noAAepACMGaio Ae}iTe.nbiioarb aconnauMM 3C n Ae.ie 
oxpaiibi npnpoAbi. flpMiiMMaio aicTMBiioe yiacrue ii ee n n. ABC 
lie AOJiAciia ocranaTbcii 6e:i BiiHMaima iipHpoAooxpaHiibix opraiion n 
obmecruenuocTH, no m nacroiimee !$peAH're.riH npupoAbi ne AO.FiAcnbi 
6biTb o6Ae.aenbi nnuMaiiMeM. Ho roMy a nimnaraio: iiaBafl're
O'l'SpOCHM BCaKMC AOMblCJlH 0 B03M0ÎKIlblX BSpblBUX Ua A3C M
paAHoaxruBnbix sarpiisnenmix. fl, icax BpaM-rnruenMCT, CMH'raio: tot
crpax, KOTopbiH BiieApiieTca b .rnoACKHC Aymn, npnnocHT crpaAaiiHu 
M0.rioBeKy boJibuie, iieAcejin ABC^'l
The campaign, nonetheless continued. In D ecem ber 1992, the press-centre o f  the luzhnoukrainsk  
nuclear power station released an anniversary issue o f  its information bulletin Press-Fakt in 
celebration o f  the 10th anniversary o f  the power station^^. The bulletin featured several articles 
praising the achievem ents o f  the nuclear power station, whereas no m ention was m ade o f  the 
numerous incidents and violations o f  safety procedures which had taken place over these years:
noM im iiib. TooapnuB A exaSpb 1982 ro/ra! M ecsm  B ceo b m ero  iiOATeMa 
H paAOCTM o r  BpMMacTHOcrH K Be.BHKHM ACJiBM crp au b !...n p ecca  
3ax .ae6i.iBaaacb o r  Bocropra...CeHM ac iia iu a  craH una - a r c  M om noe  
aiiepreTHMecKoe npeAnpuBTne, Aaiouj.ee ueBaBMCHMOu YicpaMiie oaeiib  
iiy îK ity io  aueprnio... auepi'm i iiaiUHX cepACU BBHBaeTcn b MOujuiiBï 
aiiepreTHHecKMM n oT ox lOAcno-YKpaM iicxoH A3C...^®
yKpalncbKi aicrm, 8.8.1993, c. 1. 
PaAaucbKe npM&y?K?KH, 29.4.1993, c. 1.
ripecc-(I)aKT, no. 24-25, December 1992 (n.p.). 
Ibid., p. 1.
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The bulletin also carried information regarding the advantages the nuclear power station 
brought with it not only for Ukraine as such, but particularly for the local population in areas 
adjacent to the nuclear power station. Only one small column out o f  eight pages dealt with safety  
at the power station. Som e faulty equipment had been detected during Novem ber 1992, but did 
not cause any major problems at the site - only slightly reducing the capacity during shorter 
periods o f  time^^.
To gain public support for their cause, the administration o f  the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear 
power station encouraged people to visit luzhnoukrainsk. In the June issue o f  Rodnaia priroda, 
for instance, free excursions to the information centre were offered. Experts from the nuclear 
power station would explain, with the help o f  m odels, how the nuclear power station worked, and 
a list o f  telephone numbers were provided to which questions regarding radiation, safety and 
health could be directed^^. Judging by the overall response to nuclear power in N ikolaev oblast, 
however, it seem s clear that the Greens clearly won the ‘propaganda war’ - not purely as a result 
o f  their knowledge and campaign skills, but also due to the SB administration’s unw illingness to 
address issues such as poor safety and the lax attitude towards safety at the nuclear power station, 
thus providing the Greens with evidence to the effect that luzhnoukrainsk was not safe.
Nuclear Safety and Health
A s seen in previous sections o f  this chapter, there was growing concern am ongst the local 
population regarding the impact the SB nuclear power station m ight have on their health. Several 
letters published in the local press alleged that people were falling ill with increasing frequency  
and that this should be accredited to the presence o f  the nuclear power station. The Trade Union 
Com m ittee o f  the sovkhoz ‘Akm. Stavki’ voiced  its concern in a letter sent to Zelenyi Mir^^, 
arguing that
yCHTOMM ccjT OxraGpcxoe. CaAOBoe, Haccxa, npnGyxcbe 
AKMeMorcKoro ce.BbCKoro conera lOY A3C no 6ei)ery lO x iio ro  By sa 
oiny'rM.riH BosAeAcTBMe A3C erne no Hepno6bmi,CKOM anapMM, a 
ocobenno n uocnejiyiomMe 2 roAa. Ms icpacMBoro, MHcroro lOzcnoro 
Byra ocra.!iocb rpaanaa .nyAca, ta b  oriacaioTca Aa^xe a b t h  xynaTbca. 
B o sa b m c fb m b  A3C h  BbiTexaiomue 3a6o.iBBanmi M3Becrnbi Aaîxe 
Ma.neiibXHM a b t a m . HacBJieime jk h b b t  b  i io c i 'o jiiiiio m  cipaxe - acm bbt  
ceroAiia, c h u b m  a h b m , Miiorne bc b  Gpocaior m ye35xaiOT. Mnoro
Ibid.. p. 2.97
PoAftan npnpoAa, no. 6, June 1993, c. 2.
See letter stamped ripO(I)XOM coBXOsa "Axm. CTanxn". No. 35. 8.8.1990.
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(lace-'ieiiHJi G o.ie ior , o c o 5 e n i io  abtm. O rcyTCTnyeT MiKpopviann}! o 5  
o cr a i io n x a x  5 ; u ) k o i b  o  p a A M a u M o i m o M  ([)one. E c : i h  5 w  O n.ia Mama 
no;m - A3C n e cym ecrB O oaaa.
Ilp ocb S a  Bcero n a cea em m  n a m ero  ce.tbCKoro c o o e r a  n e  n iT expam a ii,
5opb6y 3a noabiiyio aHKBMAauMio lOY A3C.
G iven the poor safety at luzhnoukrainsk it was natural for Zelenyi Mir to be concerned w ith 
the possible health im plications this may have. In late July 1992, Zolotukhin thus contacted the 
N ikolaev Zdravookhranenie with a request that he be given access to data on the demographic
.'iV,.:
situation as w ell as health statistics for the 30-km  zone surrounding the nuclear power station.
In a covering letter, sent to Zolotukhin together with the requested information, A.
Stadnichenko, the chairman o f  the Health Department o f  N ikolaev oblast, wrote that the data had
been com piled from statistical accounts provided by hospitals and profylactic insitutions as w ell as
from the oblast department o f  statistics. H owever, ‘data on som e o f  the areas in the given regions
are not available to the department’
F ollow ing the Chernobyl accident there was a continued growth in m ortality figures for the
oblast as such. Statistics on the cause o f  death showed a marked increase in deaths caused by
illnesses o f  the blood and lymph system s in grown-ups (no figures were provided for children),between 1984 and 1988 (no data was provided for 1986 - the year o f  the Chernobyl accident). A  
further break-down into regions and areas showed an overall slow , but not marked growth in 
m ortality rates in the 30 km zone. Mortality rates in luzhnoukrainsk itse lf  were distinctly lower 
than elsew here and no comparative data was given from 1980 to 1987. This m ay be due to special 
procedures for recording deaths and to the high turn-over o f  personnel (see  Chapter Six), as w ell
for instance in Pervomaiskl In Pervomaisk, Voznesensk, Vradievskii and Elanetskii regions, a 
further doubling was registered from 1990 to 1991 for grown-ups. Data for luzhnoukrainsk was 
only provided for 1991. For the oblast as such, the number o f  blood-related illnesses registered 
doubled for both grown-ups and children between 1988 and 1991. I f  the data provided by 
Minzdrav are reliable, there is a clear indication that such illnesses were more frequent in the 
regions surrounding the nuclear power station than for the oblast as a whole.
There was a noticable increase in deaths from cancers in the period 1988 to 1991 in all the 
regions. This w as also the case for cancers being treated. Figures for the oblast were once again 
lower than in m ost o f  the regions adjacent to the SB nuclear power station. Since no information
No. 85/02. of 19.8.1992.
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as the relatively young population o f  luzhnoukrainsk compared to the surrounding villages and
towns. A s for blood-related illnesses, the figures for most o f  the areas alm ost doubled between.1988 and 1990 for grown-ups and increases were registered o f  up to more than 400%  in children.
w as provided regarding types o f  cancers recorded, it is not possible to indicate a direct link
between certain types o f  radionuclides and types o f  cancer. Tritium is known to affect the blood
system , though, and it is therefore not unthinkable that the sharp rise in blood-related d iseases may
be contributed to em issions o f  tritium (see above). Statistics provided for tritium readings also
show  a marked increase between 1989 and 1992, thus suggesting a correlation between blood-
related d iseases and tritium em issions.
R ely ing on data obtained from the oblast Minzdrav, Zolotukhin in April 1993 claim ed that
there had been an increase o f  child leukaem ia in N ikolaev o f  359% and that the number o f  cancers
was generally on the increase. W ithin the 30 km zone, there were 1.5 tim es more cancers than in
the oblast as such'^'. Follow ing the publication o f  these claim s in Radianske Pribuzhzhia, the Info.Centre o f  the SB nuclear power station decided to conduct its own investigation into the matter. 
Its findings were published in Rodnaia priroda in September the sam e year'°^. The Health 
Department o f  the oblast administration w as consulted, and the oblast paediatrician, O. 
K ozhushchenko, expressed surprise with the figures presented by Zolotukhin, He promised to 
provide an objective report within ten days on the number o f  leukaem ia and cancer cases in the 
zone and oblast fo llow ing the launch o f  the SB nuclear power station in...One and a half months 
later, however, no such report had been produced and the Information Centre contacted the 
regional and town health departments. It w as told that
B nacToiimee iiitcmii n lOxciioyKpaHiicKe c.Myiaen sabojieBaiiHH Aeren 
.fieHKeMHeu ite yGTauoB.neiio. OpornBOiieMMBafr HiKjiopMauMfi no.iiyqena 
no paüonaM TpMAuaTHKHJioMeTpoBOH 3onsi. flpoBecrM cpaBnMTe.m,nyio 
xapaKTepHCTHxy no 9Toh n|)o6.!ioMe ”ao” m "rioc.rie” iiycxa A3C 6e3 
Aannbix ob.nacrnoro apxnna ne n]7eACTaB.Biie'i'Oi BOSMOXCiibiM.
Figures for cancer during 1991, did, however, show  a higher frequency w ithin the zone, with the 
exception o f  luzhnoukrainsk itself, where the figure was more than 50% lower than for the rest o f  
the oblast. Compared with figures for 1985, there had been an increase in som e areas within the 
zone, but a decrease in others. Still, it was right to say that the number o f  cancers was 
considerably higher than for the rest o f  the oblast. This, however, could not be contributed to the 
presence o f  the nuclear power station, argued the pro-nuclear lobby, but rather ‘independently o f  
the nuclear power station, due to natural causes’. The article did not clarify what these m ay be. 
Still, the Information Centre maintained that the difference was not 1.5 higher for the zone, as 
claim ed by Zolotukhin.
PajumchKe flpMÔyMZîcn, 21.4.1993 (n.p.). 
PoAfiaji npHpoMa, no. 5, September 1993, c. 1.
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Knowledge about the impact o f radiation on health was, however, restricted by poor
o f  N uclear Energy, M. Umanets:
Although it could not be proved directly that the nuclear power station had a negative effect
103
monitoring facilities, as acknowledged in a letter from A. Bobicheva - deputy C hief State Sanitary 
Doctor o f  Ukraine - in a letter to the President o f  the Ukrainian State Com m ittee on the Utilisation
1  
I
yMMTLiuaa oTcyTcrnHe isosMoxoiocrM opraiiM3auMH u ocyinecrii.teiiMfi 
MOiiHTOpHiira 3a a.iHaiiHe.vi ABC iia cocroanHe SAopoaiai itaceaeiimi 
(oTcyTCTBHe iiayaiio-MeAMUMiiCKoro obeciieaeiiHa viarepMa.iBtio- 
([iMiiaiicoBbix rpyAuocTeu MnuBApaBa YKpaHina) paspaboTaii iipoeicr 
rocyAapci’BemioH nporpa.vivibi vieAUKO-caiiMTapiioro obecneaeiiM}! 
oSbexTOB axD'aiOM siiepreTHKM u iipoMbiiiiaeaiiocrM, npn pf^ n iuBaunn 
KOToporo oi>i.iH 6bi pemenbi KOiixpeTnbie Boiipocbi. Kauiioi,UMeca 
oueiiKM BOSMOAciiocTen 5e30iiaai0H paSoTbi a'loviiibix crauuHfi h 
npeAOTBpaineuHîi BaManua na cocrojiiiHe sAopoBba nace/ieiina, 
npoACHBaiouiero b peruonax pasMemenna A3C'“f
on peop le’s health, the statistical data analysed above do indicate that there w as a link, thus
supporting demands made by Zelenyi Mir that the relationship between the two be properly 
exam ined by indicating that their worries m ight w ell be founded.
'
7.3.5 Cleaning the Tashlyk Cooling Pond
The fight to prevent salinated radioactive water o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond from being emitted 
into the South Bug river continued unchanged follow ing the collapse o f  the Soviet Union. 
W hereas both the pro-nuclear and the pro-environment lobbies agreed that for reasons o f  safety  
the water o f  the cooling pond had to be cleaned, there were, as seen below , major differences 
regarding how best to achieve this goal w hilst causing minor harm to the surrounding 
environment. The pro-nuclear lobby continued to put pressure on official authorities, local as w ell
I
as central ones, for perm ission to em it water from the pond on the grounds that w as this not done 
.in the near future, the im plications for safety at the nuclear power station could be disastrous -
whereas the Greens further developed their alternatives.
In support o f  its position, the pro-nuclear lobby referred to the recom m endation o f  Ukrainian
Goskompriroda that a produvka be allow ed on safety grounds, thus com pletely ignoring the
various alternatives suggested by Zelenyi Mir. One o f  these was to keep only two o f  the reactors 
.operating on a continuous basis, and keep the third reactor available for particular needs. At first .hand, this may seem  like a recipe for reducing electricity output at the nuclear power station. Data 
---------------------------------------No. MCX. 7.11/74. of24.2.1993.
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TaiiiriHUbKa rEC-FAEC. signed by S. Zhuk and V. Bilodid on 16.10.1991. 
No. %pti/112 o f 15.7.1992.
1
available from the nuclear power station did, however, indicate that running two reactors 
continuously compared with running three reactors, each o f  which was being frequently shut down  
for repairs or in em ergency, gave the same energy output. Thus there was no reason to believe  
that there would be any real improvement in energy output given that the third reactor had been 
put on line. Since the Tashlyk cooling pond had been designed to cool no more than two reactors, 
the first solution was obviously preferable to the second. As a matter o f  fact, the w hole nuclear 
industry ought to be given a proper overhaul. Rather than em phasising expansion, more attention 
should be given to the modernisation o f  equipment, bringing Ukrainian reactors up to international 
safety standards where possible. Increased output could be achieved through the introduction o f  
computers and more efficiency in the production process itself'
The Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sciences supported the v iew  presented by the Greens earlier (see  
above) that it would be possible to clean the Tashlyk cooling pond without a produvka. In a letter 
to Zolotukhin in the summer o f  1992"*^, the V ice President o f  the Academ y, A cadem ician V. «
Bariakhtar, claim ed that although em itting salinated and radioactive water into the South Bug river
w as an option, it required a substantial technical and econom ic justification. A ssessing the impact 
o f  such a produvka on the total radiation dose to which the population o f  the oblast was exposed, 
was required. In doing this, it ought to be kept in mind that according to the International
Com m ission on Radiation Protection (1990), the share o f  this dose emanating from any technical
installations was not to exceed 10% o f  the background radiation from the natural surroundings.
B esides, a proper exam ination must be conducted at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station.itself, so as to establish which technical objects emitted what levels o f  radiation. The impact o f  
radiation emanating from the nuclear power station should then be related to health data o f  the 
local population to determine its impact. Information so far obtained from the leadership o f  the 
nuclear power station was insufficient for working out concrete suggestions, but the A cadem y o f  
Sciences still held the v iew  that the Tashlyk water reservoir could be used as a closed unit cooling  
pond. ■A m eeting held two days prior to the Chernobyl anniversary in April 1992 demanded that the 
A cadem y o f  Sciences work out alternatives to produvka, so that in the future, there w ould be no 
secret and illegal, nor any legal em issions o f  water from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South 
Bug river. Zolotukhin claim ed that, given that there had been no demands for a produvka from the 
leadership o f  the nuclear power station previously, this in itse lf indicated that em issions had earlier
,
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been made in secret"'^. To find the best possible solution for clean ing up the Tashlyk cooling  
pond, the Greens suggested that an environmental impact assessm ent com m ission be established
Pemenne 5 - r o  objiacrnoro coSpaiimi HnKoaaeBCKOH objiacnioH aKO-riormiecKOH accoimaiiMH 
M ejieiihiH M h p”.
P e u ie n n e  co b o a iim i oS iiiecT P e in iocrH  HniconaeBCKOH o b j ia c r n . n o c in in iem ioe  iiie c r n u  rojiOB inn iie  
MeDitoSbiJBiCKOH Ka'racrrpo(l)hi. r. HuKOJiaeB.
PüAJiHChKe [JpHÔyÆÆH, 12.1.1993, c. 3.
1
and consulted.
A s for Minprirodo's recommendation that a produvka be allowed for safety reasons, the i
Greens expressed their d ism ay at the m eeting in April, by demanding that I. Liakh, its Deputy 
Chairman, be sacked from his post on the grounds that Derzhkompriroda by recom m ending a 
produvka not only com pletely ignored the opin ions o f  the public in N ikolaev oblast, but also 
violated the Law on the Protection o f  the Environment. The State Com m ittee had already broken 
this law by allow ing a produvka at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. Water from the 
cooling pond there had been emitted into the Kahovsk water reservoir on the Dniepr river, which
supplied the area with drinking water and water for irrigation p u r p o s e s T h e  relationship 
between the Greens and the M inistry generally deteriorated, as w ill be seen below , dramatically 
throughout the latter half o f  1991 and early 1992. What was more, the confrontation between pro­
environm ent and pro-nuclear forces sharpened considerably, fo llow ing Zolotukhin’s allegations 
that produvki had been conducted in secret. _In an interview in Radianske Pribuzhzhia in January 1993, Zolotukhin claim ed that he 
possessed  information to the effect that eight such secret produvki had taken place so far"'^. The
leadership o f  the nuclear power station responded angrily to these allegations in an article printed 
in Press-Fakt, the nuclear power station’s own news bulletin. The article, which carried the 
headline ‘D o not believe Zolotukhin’, questioned Zolotukhin’s right to be taken seriously as an 
opponent by arguing that secret produvki were sim ply not possible, given that this would affect 
water levels in the cooling pond, which were measured on a daily basis, and recorded in a special
log book. The authors o f  the article, lu. Ruban (Head o f  the OT iTB - Department) and V. Sem enov
(Head o f  the Environmental Protection Department) claimed that only two produvki had taken.place during the ten years the South Ukrainian nuclear power station had been operative. The first 
em ission occurred in 1985, whereas another one was undertaken in 1988. Both o f  these had been 
sanctioned by Ukrainian Minvodkhoz. Since 1988 no produvka had taken place.
Zolotukhin’s allegations were nothing but
fiMcreHiueM boaia AesMiKjiopMauHii o iioaoAfeuHu Ae.n iia
lÜAciioyKpaMiicKOH ABC. He B nepB sie a K o n o rm iecK a a  accounaumi 
”3e.rienBiH Mup" b .riuue CBoero niTeAceAai'ejui 3o.rioTyxMiia A.M.
71 9
■!1
iihiTcieTcn lîiîeci'M n saô.iyxiieuM e o5iiiecrueinioe Miieiivie m saiiyraTh 
nace.ieiiMe pernoiia yrposoH Kaiacrpo(|)hi. Hpn 3tom iie creciinioTCH 
01'KpoiîeiiiiOH K/ieaeTbi m iioATacoBXM
yK'ixiïfiCLKlH riim enh , 27 .1 .1994 , c. 7.
From 1992 onwards, the Greens fell out with the editorial board oïhizhnaia Pravda, and started
720
3
,:37
I'
A. Harashuk o f  the SB nuclear power station added to the criticism  in a lengthy article 
published in luzhnaiapravda He tried to ridicule Zolotukhin, by question ing his integrity as an 
engineer. Then pumping dirty water from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river and 
then pumping clean water back, he argued, would sim ply not be possible, given the big height 
d ifference between the two (approxim ately 90 m etres)"'. The article rhetorically put the 
fo llow ing two questions to Zolotukhin:
1) icax noAiifiTh iiojiy Tam.rfLiKCKoro BOAOxpa!m.aHina c otmctkm 25 m na OT.vieTxy 122-125 vi (a iM .y io  
lîi.icoKyio TOMKy BOAopa3AG.ua)..., mtoOm boab m;î BOAOxpaiiMjiniua iioiia.aa b pexy?
2 ) icax nacocbi iiacocnoA cranuMU ot BOAsnoro cro.ri6a bijIcotoh bo.aee 100-110 mgtpob?
Zolotukhin’s reply appeared in Ukrainskii Pivden on 27 January 1994 The reason for the 
delay in replying, claim ed Zolotukhin, was the unw illingness o f  luzhnaia pravda's editor, A. 
Sam o ilenko, to publish his reply. Such a reply had been presented to Sam o ilenko a w eek  after 
Harashuk’s letter appeared in print. Tw ice - one month later and then two m onths later - 
Sam o ilenko had personally prom ised Zolotukhin to ensure that his reply would appear in the 
paper. W hen this still did not happen (Zolotukhin claim ed that the SB EK leadership had ‘bought’ 
luzhnaia pravda, by being one o f  its major sponsors"^), Zolotukhin was left w ith no other option  
but to publish his reply elsewhere, thus making sure that the pro-nuclear lobby could not accredit 
the lack o f  reply to the Greens being dumbstuck by Harashuk’s claim  and having no arguments by 
w hich to respond.
A s for the fact that secret produvki had taken place, Zolotukhin referred to a soon-to-be- 
published report produced for the oblast S ov iet’s Presidium by an expert group' (the president o f  
which had been appointed D obrovolsk ii o f  the NK I). The report concluded that
Î
--------------------------------------
‘He BGDbTe 3ojiorvxHUv’. Fli?ec€-(l)aKT, Februaiy 1993 (n. p.).
A. rapainyx, "Xotb men h saMaiiMMBa...’. lOMimn npitnjia, September 1993..
' ' ' This point was also made by A. Novak, the leader of the nuclear power station’s own inspectorate, in an 
article published by 3//e/?/iemv, 21,1.1994, c. 2.
cooperating closely with Radianske Pribuzhzhia instead. I still do not know the exact reason as to why 
this happened.
This group was set up as a result o f a decision made by the Nikolaev oblast Soviet (No 17-11) on 7 June 
1993, following Zolotukhin’s continued claims that hidden produvki had taken place at the SB nuclear 
power station. See decision, printed in PoAnan npnpoAa, no. 7, July 1993, p 1.
CiieuHaaHci'M K3Y ABC, iJonpexM iiyG.iHMUbiM BafiB.qeiiHîiM, pacieniwx 
AoxaBarc.iBCTB orcyrcTBMn npoiiyaoiv Taui.aHXCKoro iipyAa-ox.'uuiMTeJia 
lie iipeAcraBM.iH...rio pacMeTHbivi AaiiiihiM coaeuocrb boabi b iipyAe- 
oxAaAHTeae Aojixciia 3na'iMTe.nbiio iipeBocxoAWïb (liaxTuaecicyio. 
noayqeiiiioe pacxoACAeiiHC iie moacgt SbiTb no/iiiocrbio oTiieceiio iia 
iiecoBepiueiicrBO pacMera, 5oaee BepoiiTiiOM iiphmhiioh aBJuiercfi 
pacco.ienHC boabi, b qacniocTM, :ia caer ripoAyiîKH BOAOxpaiiM.TMiiia.
The allegations that it would be im possible to pump water from the South Bug river to the Tashlyk
water reservoir given the big d ifference in height, were also refuted by Zolotukhin
rieiJeJiHBaioiuM. beiisHii mb 6axa aepes aepxiiee OTiiepcTHe b - "'"Mcrpy.
BcraBAnn oahh xoiieu ar.nybi, 5eii3Hiia mjim BOAy pTOM, iiaiipaBHTb ii 
icaiiMCrpy, imAciio, mtoSbi oiia bBUia iiMA^ e baxa. To'iiio Taxjxe 
pabo'raei' iiacociiaa craimHa, Kax tojibxo iiacocbi iiei^ecTaio'r xaaarb 
BOAy M3 |)6KM liaBCpX, B TaUJAHXCXOe BOAOXpatlHJlHlUe, CTOJlb BOAbl B 
rpybax noA 'laiAcecrbio cxarbiBaeroi biim3 h3 iioAoxpaiiHJiHiua h aro 
byAGT npoAOAAvaTBca ao 'rex nop, noxa aarnybjieiniaa b 
BOAOxpaiiMAMme rpyba iie orxpoerca aah Aocryna b iiee B03Ayxa. a 
MTobbi AO 3'1’oro lie aoboahtb (iie yMenbaiaib yponeiib boabi b
BOAOxpaiiM.BMine). Aocraroaiio n pauoiie nepxiiero riei)e.riOMa rpyb 
ycrpoMTB OTxpMBaioineeca OTBepcTBMe, mtoSij aeixîB nerd sanycrMTb 
B03A.YX M TorAa Bca BOAa M3 rpyb cxaTMTcn bums, b i^exy, h aacrbio - 
B BOAoxpanHAHme. /(jia roro, m'I’oSbi ciioua fiobtopmtb iipoAyBxy, 
iiyAciio BaxpbiTb oTBepTHe A-aa Aocryria B03Ayxa (Miiaie qe|)e3 aero 3pii 
byACT Bbirexarb boau), itaqarb saxa'iMBaxb noAy a BOAoxpaiiM/iHme, a 
nocae BbixaioMeiiHn iiacocoB npoAyoxa cnoBa noBxopM'rca ao xex nop, 
noxa lie byAex oxxpbix Aocryn BosAyxa....
To argue that techn ically it would be im possible to conduct a hidden produvka in
Zolotukhin’s op in ion thus did sim ply not hold. W ithin the Green M ovem ent, though, there was 
not com plete agreement that secret em issions o f  water from the Tashlyk cooling pond had actually 
taken place. B ilod id, when asked by the author in luzhnoukrainsk, whether it w as likely that such 
em issions were carried out, expressed scepticism  to Zolotukhin’s allegations. W hereas Zolotukhin  
could not actually prove that hidden produvki had taken place (a number o f  factors supported h is 
suspicions), the leadership o f  the nuclear power station could not d isprove it. What eveiyth ing  
thus boiled down to was who one wanted to believe in and support: Zolotukhin and the Green 
M ovem en t or the pro-nuclear lobby, represented by the leadership o f  the nuclear power station.
The Public and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond
A  number o f  war veterans from luzhnoukrainsk had no doubt as to where their alleg iance lay. In 
an open letter labelled To trust one another’ and wh ich appeared in print in luzhnaia pravda on 10
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grounds that it would pollute the South Bug river, from which they collected their drinking water
station were felt daily, as headaches and feebleness. Besides, the number o f  people falling ill with  
cancer had risen dramatically. The conclusion could only be one, the SB nuclear power station 
must be closed down, then
/liH cito, ne Tax - mh sajioîxiiMxa n i a i  c r a n u i l  i  qexaewo neci> sac  
'iorocL CTpaniHoro. Lifo sexa naiuHX A iren i  Biiyxiri? X to 
sanHTyBau iiac. xto paAHOca 3 iirmh. xojim i i  byAOna.riH? f l ia r  iiaM 
iiiaxn x . 3a CBiT.fio irnaruMO, ax i  B ci, npOAyxTH A opori, Towy mo 
aTOMumxH 0Aep:®:yi0Tb Bapruuvry Gi.abiiiy i  na 6a3ap i pinnaioTbca 
ira iiHX.
lOmmn npanjia, 10.6.1993. c. 2.
PaMiAUiCbKe npMÔyMAcn, 29.6.1993, c. 3.
June 1 9 9 3 "^, they expressed their concern that attempts were being made at d iscred iting the
leadership o f  the nuclear power station and causing a rift between those working there and the
local population. G iven the d ifficult energy situation in Ukraine, the nuclear power industry
needed all the support it could get, not further d ivision and upset.
.As for the safety issue, the pensioners argued that the people o f  luzhnoukrainsk, like any.other person living in the vicin ity o f  the nuclear power station wanted it to be as safe as possible.
H owever, unlike the activists o f  Zelenyi Mir, they had no doubt that the nuclear power station was.safe. Was it really true, they asked, that those placed in offices in N ikolaev could see better what 
was happening at the nuclear power station than those living and working there?
With regard to the Tashlyk cooling pond, those signing the letter held the fo llow ing opinion:
•;,X,
He byABM BAaoa'i'bcri b i io a p o 6 i i o c t h .  ;jAeci) .lyquje [lociyiiiaii) 
3xcnep'iOB MHii3Apai]a, MuiiiipupoAbr. Ho iiajio yau'rbiBaTb m t o .  m to  
Miiorne 133 nac ne npoMb ripoBecTU iiecxo.Mbxo MacoB c yAOMXOiJ iia 
bepery B0A0xpaiiHJtHma...HB0ivra b o a .y  bepevi h3  Tam.awxa a . t a  tio.-iHBa 
oropoAOB. H xax BHAWTe, iiMMeio c naMM ne (vryMMAOcb. HauiH 
Biiyxu T05xe rro.TiobM.riM uoAoxpaiiMJiMme. 0'i'Abixaio'r :rAecb m 
3anMtMai0TCH cnoproM.
A rowing club had even had its base at the Tashlyk cooling pond for several years!
N ot everyone in the close vicinity o f  the nuclear power station shared the v iew s expressed in 
this letter, though. Forty one teachers from the neighbouring v illage o f  K ostiantynovka expressed  
their deep concern regarding the safety o f  the SB nuclear power station and its in their v iew  
dam aging impact on peoples’ health in a letter published in Radianske Pribuzhzhia a few  days
■-xx, 
1
later' The teachers were categorically against any produvka o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond on the
   :    :  ..............and which was used for recreational purposes. The effects o f  radioactivity from the nuclear power
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M. Dzudzelo from Arbuzinka, held similar v iew s, arguing that the attitude o f  locals towards 
nuclear power had changed in the aftermath o f  the Chernobyl accident; whereas previous to the
accident they were positive to the SB nuclear power station, they were now getting increasingly
concerned about safety at the site and their own personal safety. M oreover, they had reasons to 
believe that their health was affected in a negative manner;
f i x  lie AHBiio, MU, c e .iB iiu ,  B ip u .'iM , 1110 3 iip o b y B a iiiiiiM  a r o M i i o i
e .T e x T p o c T a i iu i ï  n a  i i iB A i i i  Y x p a iH H  y iia iuoM .y p e r i o i i i  c i ip a B / i i  
5 y A e  x p a iu e  5x h th . . .A  b c r p a x i r . iU B O io  x a r a c r p o i l i o io  n a  MAEC t h  
3 p 0 3 y M i.iH , m o  ACHBeMO iio p m i 3 aroM iiM M  A p ax o n o M , i ix u u  i ip r ix o n y s
B iA  mupoKoro aar .m iA y  iieBHAUMy cMepTB...A y  .i io A e ù  iic e  M a c ru m e  - 
io .:iO B iia b i . i B ,  c . i a b iC T b .  c o im u B ic T b .  mM 'iOBUAxa A a r  n p o  c e d e  
Biiai'M TpuBa.THM x a iim c M  i  i ie  n p o  ro M y , mo p a A i a n i u n u H  ([ion n e  
iiepeB M iuyE  A oriycrw M H x iiopM . H x i  xce A o i iy c r u M i  iiopM u - i i i x r o  
A o c x o n a .r io ,  M a b y ib  i  n e  3iia& " A
Both the letter from luzhnoukrainsk and D zudzelo’s letters triggered o ff  indignant responses 
from the Greens and the adm inistration at the nuclear power station respectively. Suslova, 
Shapovalov and Zolotukhin replied to the first letter in luzhnaia pravda on 26 July 1993"^. 
Refuting the allegations that the Greens were trying to cause d ivision between the people o f  
luzhnoukrainsk and others living in the area, they expressed concern w ith the seem ingly blind 
faith the authors had in the pro-nuclear lobby’s arguments that the SB nuclear power station was 
safe. D esp ite the fact that Fuks, the General D irector o f  the SB nuclear power station, frequently 
used words like Tack o f  faith in the specialists’, ‘attacks on the co llective’and ‘the circulation o f  
incorrect information’, and similar phrases to describe the activities o f  the Green m ovem ent, it ■■remained a fact that the leadership o f  the nuclear power station had not only several tim es publicly
.,x-
dece ived the people o f  the oblast, but also on a number o f  occasions actually v iolated Ukrainian 
leg islation. The authors dwelt on nuclear safety, but considerable space w as also g iven to the 
alleged ‘safety’ o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond. Although the levels o f  rad ioactive substances 
measured in the cooling pond were w ithin the limits o f  the ‘highest perm issible lev e ls’ (PDK ), 
these levels were from two to 15 tim es those o f  the natural background radiation. M oreover, high 
levels o f  tritium had been detected in the cooling pond - up to 400-700 tim es higher than those in 
the river Arbuzinka! The effect o f  continuous low -dose radiation on p eop les’ health w ould be 
long term - cancer, for instance, takes years to develop, so naturally, not everyone w ould fall ill 
im med iately. Therefore, rather than blindly believing in anything being said by the leadership o f
the nuclear power station, people should check any information prior to believing in it.
PoAiia/i npnpoAu, no. 12 (46), 1993, c. 2.
lOyKuan npdBAih 26.7.1993, c. 2.
723
The leadership o f  the nuclear power station also favoured properly checked and sanctioned 
information as a basis for any d iscussion regarding safety at the nuclear power station - only it 
cla im ed to have such knowledge and information, not the Greens and defin itely not Dzudzelo, 
whom  it accused o f  ‘d ilettantism ’. Such ‘d ilettantism ’ and downright misinformation could only  
harm the nuclear power industry, and it was therefore demanded from the newspaper that these 
allegations be w ithdrawn w ith an official apology, to be printed by the paper:
H eK opeK T iib ie . iiH .T e ïa irrcK ’He saiiB .'ie iiuH  o 'n io cH T e .ti.iio  lO Y  A3C no h 
BBiibiH BbiMbice.T, Ae3uiK|3Gp.viai.iHii MHTaTe.Teu. B n a c i'O B iiiee  Bpevui. 
mrjiLi Y x p a u iia  Hcni.iTHBaeT 9nepreTHMecKHw k ja ib h c , c ra 5M .rib iia j[ h 
S e s o iia a ia a  a .u i O K p y in a io iiie H  c|)eAbi p a fo r a  Y icpaM iicK nx  ABC 
oSecneMHBaeT b o .ie e  30: neodxoA U M bix a iiep i'ov io iunoC TeH . K)Y ABC 
ra xA ce  biiocmt cbom 3iiaMHTe.abiibiH Bx.najr a riopoH  h x.'ieBe'rnuM ecxM e 
MaTepHa.Tbi i ia iio c jiT  MopaAbiibiH  y m e p 6  x a x  xo .T .'iexrM By F lO  ” 1 0 Y  
ABC” ra x  m MHTaTe.3ii.vi H n x o .ia e B c x o H  o6 .aacrH ...4 -u i BO craiiO B .ie iiM îi 
H c i’H iibi no  noAHBTbiM BBTopaM 43.yA3e.ao BO npoaiM  npOCHM 
o n y b .a u x o B a rb  b BarneH ra 3 e re  b buac oiipoBepxce iiH A  o(l)HUHa.abiibie 
A a iiiib ie  xo M n e T e irn ib ix  cnenHa.riM croB, noAroTon.aeHHbie b otboi' na 
iiHCbMO ”B oÔ u iüM ax M n p n o i’0  a r o M y "^ .
The Pro-Environment Lobby and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond
N ot only the Greens, but also various ministries and departments as w ell as local authorities cam e 
out against a produvka. Minzdrav (the Ministry o f  Health), for instance, having exam ined the 
Project on the Produvka o f  the cooling ponds o f  the Zaporizhzhia, luzhnoukrainsk and 
K lim elnytskyi nuclear power stations prepared for the Ukrainian Government by the State 
Com m ittee on the U se o f  N uclear Energy, found it could not put its support behind the project as it 
had no possibility o f  organising and conducting a survey o f  the impact o f  the nuclear power station 
on p eop les’ health due to a lack o f  scientific-m edical facilities at the nuclear power stations'
The oblast soviet also had strong reservations against a produvka. Its Chairman, I. PIrytsai, in 
a letter to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk informed the President that the oblast Soviet had made
a decision to transform the SB nuclear power station into a non-produvka regime'"^' and that the I
The letter was signed by lu. Novak and S. Kiiashko - Head of the Monitoring Service and the Information 
Centre at the SB nuclear power station, respectively. The letter appeared in Pa/uincbKe UpMÔyMrKn, 
13.1.1994, c. 2, in response to Dzudzelo’s letter, which appeared in the same newspaper on 4.12.1993.
No. hcx.7.1 1/74 of 24.2.1993, singed by O. Bobyleva and addressed to the President o f the Ukrainian 
State Committee on the Use o f Nuclear Power, M. Umanets.
The decision referred to, No. 26, f‘Q i^ e m è n n u  T p e T b en  c eccu M  21- c o 3biBa no B o iip o c v  npoAVBXH 
T a iU A b ix c x o r o  BOAOXDaHUJtHUta’) was adopted on 7.7.1992 by the 13th session of the 21st convocation and 
stated that the issue of a produvka would be further considered at the October session o f the oblast Soviet 
‘n p u  ycJioBM H npeA ocraB JieiiM A  HO lOY ABC oipM U M ajibno o iliopM Jiennb ix  AoxyMeuTOB BOAOMcrBa o 
BBeAeiiHM B n ep cn ex T M B e  S e c rip o A y n o M iio ro  pexcH ivia p a b o T i.i  u t o m h o h  c ra im u M  c y x a B a iiu e M  c p o x o B
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leadership o f  the nuclear power station had been instructed to introduce measures to cleanse the 
Tashlyk cooling pond for salin ity and radioactive substances as w ell as replacing condensators. 
D espite this, and despite the fact that the environmental impact assessm ent com m ission had 
written in its report that: ‘from the point o f  v iew  o f  water protection, the existing project’s schem e 
for cooling o f  the nuclear power station by circulating water...was inadm issible’, the leadership o f  
the nuelear power station tried to introduce and legalise permanent produvka o f  the Tashlyk water 
reservoir into the South Bug river. To facilitate this, testing o f  a so-called  ‘high water spillway  
fac ility ’ (pavodkoe vodosbrosnoe ustroistvo) com m enced. This fac ility could em it not only the 
‘active water o f  the water reservoir, but also a two meter thick layer o f  its so-called ‘dead water’, 
due to the high speed by wh ich it emitted the water (two cubic metres per second).
Follow ing a request by the leadership o f  the SB nuclear power station in June 1992 to allow  
for a produvka to take place, the oblast Sov iet contacted the Ukrainian President with a request to 
conduct an independent environmental impact assessm ent assessm ent under the leadership o f  
Academ ician Hrodzinskyi (one o f  the few  remaining scientists to be trusted by the general public). 
On the orders o f  the President such a com m ission was established and the first step o f  work had 
already been conducted. H owever, desp ite the fact that also the Deputy Prime M inister, lu. Ioffe, 
had expressed the need for this expert to be conducted/completed, work had been stopped, as the 
leadership o f  the nuclear power station refused to take part in the funding o f  the work o f  the 
expert. The oblast Sov iet sim ply had no funds available to put towards the work o f  the expert 
com m ission and such work had therefore been halted.
A com plete environmental impact assessm ent re-exam ination o f  the nuclear power station 
w as required also as the environmental impact assessm ent conducted by U SSR  Goskompriroda in 
1989 had concluded that reactors N o. 1 and 2 be reconstructed due to cracks in the protection  
shields o f  the reactors. Besides, reactor N o. 2 was situated directly onto a seism ically  active seam, 
connected to the Vranch zone. The oblast Soviet therefore urged the President to provide funding 
for a thorough ecological assessm ent to take place.
nbfrio-fnieuMfl pa 5 o T  ho saMene K O itA eiicaTopoiî, p a c u m p e iin to  o6ecco.riHBaHrotnHX yc itU io B o rc  n ro p o r o  
K O üTypa, iipoBeAeiiMB pacM ucrKM  h p a c c o jie iiH ii T a m jiH K C K o ro  npyAa-ox.TaAHTe.Fui, HcrroHiiMxoB 
(j)H iiaiiCMpoBaiiM }i 3TMX paboT , a raxH ce A a iiiib ix  o  iipoiîeAenMM iiesanMCMMOH K O M iieT e irn ioH  op ra im sauM eH  
Aono.riiiHT6.Tbiibix Mcc.iieAOBaHHH AOHHblx OT.noAceiiMH H.Jia B iipyAe-oxAaAM Te.ne m b.fihîiiima i ia  
3KOAorH‘iecK:yio c H c re w y  lO îK nb iM  B y r  x a x  npoAynxH T a ïu A b iK c ico ro  BOAoewa, ra x  h ca'oxob OMMcriibix 
co o p yxc e iiH H  b f je x y  A p b yB M iixa  m T a m .n b ixcK o e  BOACxpaiiHAMiue 6litobom m HpoMbiiii.rieiiHOH 
xaiia.riH3auMM r. IO » : i io y x p a H iic x a ’ .
It was also decided to request the Academy of Sciences to provide an official assessment regarding the 
question o f produvka o f the Tashlyk cooling pond. The decision was signed by Chairman o f the Soviet, I. 
Hrytsai. A similar decision had been made at the oblast Soviet’s third session in October 1990, which 
prohibited a produvka of the Tashlyk water reservoir on the grounds that the former Soviet 
Minatomenergoprom had failed to take adequate measures to find alternatives to a produvka as a means by 
which to desalinise the water o f the Tashlyk cooling pond.(See Pojumn npMpoAU, no. 5, September 1992, c. 1,
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The leadership o f  the nuclear power station, however, continued its cam paign to gain 
acceptance for the need to conduct a produvka at the central political level in K iev. N ot only did it 
challenge the data Zelenyi Mir provided the members o f  Minpriroda’s expert com m ission with, 
w hen it carried out an in-depth analysis o f  the state o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond and its impact on 
safety at the SB nuclear power station in M ay 1992'^^: the April 1993 issue o f  Press-Fakt, the 
nuclear power station’s information bulletin, was addressed to the Ukrainian Cabinet o f  Ministers 
and carried the follow ing headline, ‘The produvka o f  the water reservoir is a precondition for the 
nuclear power station’s s t a b l e ' T h e  pro-nuclear lobby also referred to lu. Ioffe to justify  its 
claim s that a produvka o f  the Tashlyk water reservoir was required. At a m eeting at his office  
w hich took place on 14 April 1993 and which was attended by representatives o f  Minpriroda, 
Gosatom, Gosvodkhoz, Minzdrav, oblast soviets, the state administration o f  the N ikolaev and 
Zaporizhzhia oblasts and the leadership o f  the SB and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, it was 
stated very clearly that the state o f  the water in the cooling ponds at both nuclear power stations 
had deteriorated considerably and that this would have im plications for safety at the two nuclear 
power plants unless som ething w as done to improve water quality. The situation also had 
eeonom ic im plications in that less energy w as produced (due to safety considerations) and that the 
environm ent would suffer irretrievably as a result. U nless a solution was found quickly, both 
nuclear power stations would have to be closed towards the end o f  1993/early 1994 for security 
reasons. It would be im possible to replace the energy generated at these nuclear power stations 
from any other sources.
The m eeting, after careful considerations, allowed a produvka at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear 
power station and ordered thorough investigations to be started into the possibilities o f  conducting 
a sim ilar produvka at SB. The com m ission which was set up, was com posed o f  representatives 
from Minpriroda, Minzdrav, Gosvodkhoz, Gosatom and the Ukrainian A cadem y o f  Sciences. lu. 
Ruban - the Deputy M inister o f  Minpriroda - was appointed Chairman o f  the com m ission. The 
com m ission w as instructed to exam ine the ecological and the econom ic im plications o f  a 
produvka o f  the Tashlyk water reservoir.
A cadem ician Hrodzinskyi had earlier put forth alternatives to produvka for the SB nuclear 
power station and these would be exam ined by the State Com mittee on Science and Technology. 
Hrodzinskyi had suggested that the water in the Tashlyk cooling pond be cleaned with water 
plants, membranes and other facilities.
See ‘CKOAbKO Ace oaa ’’pbinaDHAH” Taiu.nbnc?’. Poahujt npnpoAa, 1992, c. 2.
ripecc-(I)aKr, (Hii(|)opManwoimbiH 5io.iuie'reub npecc-nein’pa HO "lOxo lo -  Y Kpanucxaa ABC”), No. 29, 
anpe.rib, 1993 roA, c. 1-2.
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OpMBOiiMT K 'lacriibiM iiapyineiiHevi lîOAO-xHviHMecKoi’o [jezvMvia 
iîToporo KOH'rypa m , k ü k  C A e A c r a n e .  aa.uieroi o a i i h m  w;i ociioaiibix 
iipHMHH lîbixoAa h : î  crpoii ociiomioro o6opyAonanHH iia lOY
1,646 mg/1, wh ich could in itse lf (again in the opin ion o f  the pro-nuclear lobby) be taken as a 
confirm ation that the cooling pond was actually a closed water pond. As a result o f  evaporation,
a
The work ing group concluded that due to the high mineralisation o f  the water in the cooling  
pond i•xx 
:
As a result, Gosatomnadzor demanded that water quality in the Tashlyk cooling pond be
Aimproved im med iately. In the opin ion o f  the pro-nuclear lobby this could only be ach ieved by a 
produvka. The leadership o f  the nuclear power station was allowed to start testing o f  equipment 
used for such a produvka. Should the results o f  this testing be positive, then the working group 
would contact the oblast Sov iet to have the ban on produvka lifted. During testing, the water 
quality would be regularly monitored by those in charge o f  water quality in Ukraine.
The water quality o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond was thoroughly checked by the working group
and the find ings were not reassuring: the average registered concentrations o f  salts for 1992 was 'x|
the level o f  salin isation in the cooling pond would continue to rise. Y et the concentration o f  heavy i
Fy:m etals was lower in the cooling pond than in the South Bug river and the values for radioactive 
substances were w ell w ithin the upper perm issible limits'^^. B esides, accord ing to the leadership 
o f  the nuclear power station, m ost o f  the pollution in the South Bug river stem m ed from industrial 
and agricultural sources, not from the nuclear power station.
The em ission dev ices which had been put up at the Tashlyk water reservoir in 1992 to 
facilitate the produvka were, in the opin ion o f  the pro-nuclear lobby, environm entally sound, in 
that they would em it surface water, rather than bottom water containing radioactive silt, at a depth 
o f  27 m into the South Bug river, thus reducing to a m inimum any negative impact on the i
environment. M oreover, the water, prior to entering South Bug, would first pass through a filter y
and then through two drains. The water would be em itted into the bottom layers o f  the river at a ||
rate o f  two cubic metres per second (see above). Substantiating and supporting this v iew , the #
leadership o f  the SB nuclear power station referred to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station,
  £
'“ i h i i ,  p. 1.
Concentrations of salts from heavy metals were 1.7 times lower, various chemical nitric substances were
eight times lower and various oil substances six times lower. The level of strontium-90 was 46 times i
lower than the upper permissible levels and 1.1 times lower than in the South Bug river. As for 
caesium-137 the levels were 1,400 times and 1.5 times lower respectively, and for tritium 3,500 times lower than the maximum permissible levels. The maximum permissible levels for various radioactive 
substances were, however, justified following the Chernobyl accident, so the given values therefore say 
little about the potential impact they may have on the South Bug river and on the local population. The 
same data was also presented in Mapimifi aroM, 9.6.1993.
I
727 >
where a produvka had taken place in March 1992, and where no sign ificant negative impact had 
been registered in the Kahovsk water reservoir afterwards'^'’.
.'î‘S
S|■.?
The Greens, on the other hand, remained firmly opposed to produvka. Firstly, they were 
opposed to it for legal reasons (g iven that the oblast Sov iet had decided against produvka, it was 
not acceptable for the pro-nuclear lobby to try to push Ukrainian central authorities (Cabinet o f  
M in isters) into overruling the decision o f  the oblast political authorities. Serhii Zhuk o f  the 
V oznesensk Zelenyi Mir also expressed the follow ing v iew  in a local newspaper when asked what 
his position on the prospect o f  a produvka o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond:
ripoBOAHTT, npoAyBKy B nm ne BOAOhviHLue? B iiiiioB iA i uevia i  no 
cboroAiii'"^
■The oblast Sov iet acknowledged that it would have to chose between clean ing the water o f  
the cooling pond or close the nuclear power station altogether for reasons o f  safety. The latter 
option was not desirable, g iven that the oblast obtained 90% o f  its energy from the nuclear power 
station. There was still overwhelm ing support for Suslova’s proposition not to allow  produvka o f  
the Tashlyk cooling pond, thus reiterating the decision o f  the oblast Sov iet already m ade tw ice.
Fuks, the General D irector o f  the SB nuclear power station, stated that the personnel o f  the nuclear 
power station w ould fo llow  any decision made by the authorities, whereas Hrytsai (Chairman o f  
the oblast Sov iet) made it clear that it w ould be preferable not to have to chose between either o f
the two options but rather find alternative solutions. Should no acceptable alternatives be found, 
though, the nuclear power station would have to be sacrificed'^^.
Radianske Pribuzhzhia in early M ay 1993 carried a feature article on p r o d u v k a 's e e k in g  
out d ifferent opin ions on the issue, fo llow ing the round table that the oblast Sov iet had held on the 
matter on 29 April that year. The basic positions o f  the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobb ies 
remained unchanged: W hereas the former argued that there were other, more env ironm entally  
friendly w ays o f  cleansing the water o f  the Tashlyk cooling pond than a produvka, the latter held 
the v iew  that there was a cho ice between a) a produvka and b) clos ing the nuclear power station 
altogether. Few new elem ents were added in the article.
The pro-nuclear lobby argued that since 95% o f  the energy consum ed by N ikolaev oblast was 
generated at the SB Energy Com plex and in the neighbouring oblasts (O dessa, Kherson), it would  
be an econom ic disaster to c lose the nuclear power station. B esides, more than 2 ,500 specialists
‘HpoAVBKa lia Banopoacbe’. in PoAuan npnpOAa, ceiiTîiOpB, 1992, c. 4.
Becm Bomeceimmmj, 17.4.1993, c. 2.
PaAnucbKe 29.4.1993, c. 1.
PaAAUCbKe npMâyACA<;AA.5A993, c. 3.
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working there would lose their jobs should it be closed down, and the 40 ,000 Inhabitants o f  
luzhnoukrainsk would face a bleak future. Zhuk’s position that people in the oblast received their 
drinking water from the South Bug river was also refuted. Drinking water w as primarily provided 
from the Dniepr river. This v iew , was however challenged by the C h ief Doctor o f  the oblast 
Sanepidemstantsia, who claim ed that som e 200,000 people depended on water from South Bug for 
drinking and other purposes.
G iven that a cho ice had to be made between clean ing the Tashlyk cooling pond or closing  
down the SB nuclear power station altogether, the Greens - when they fa iled to win support at the 
central political level for alternative ways o f  clean ing the pond thus avo id ing a produvka - once 
again em phasised the alternatives to nuclear power suggested to them earlier. Th is is an issue to 
which I w ill return below. Suffice it here to say that gas turbines could replace nuclear energy in 
the N ikolaev oblast over a relatively short period o f  time, as all the equipment needed could be 
produced in the oblast itself.
At the round table on 29 April 1993, it was suggested to conduct a referendum on the future 
o f  the SB nuclear power station prior to making a decision regarding produvka or a c lose  down. 
Readers o f  Radianske Pribuzhzhia were encouraged to write letters to the paper, expressing their 
opinions on this issue. The demand o f  the leadership at the SB nuclear power station that a 
produvka be conducted, continued to be met with widespread disapproval. Four deputies o f  the 
oblast Soviet, A. Ignatenko, A. Tolstykh, lu. Drobilko and A. Shcheglov found it very difficu lt to 
agree w ith the leadership o f  the nuclear power station that it was eco log ica lly  clean and that a 
produvka would have no significant negative impact on the South Bug river. Then, according to 
data available to the oblast Soviet, cleansing facilities used to treat sew age and other em issions 
from the nuclear power station and from the town luzhnoukrainsk w ere not inefficient. Such 
em issions were made into the river Arbuzinka and as a result had polluted the river. The 
concentration o f  caesium -137 therefore remained system atically higher than the control value for 
this nuclear substance for the river Arbuzinka. Thus, caesium  and other radioactive substances 
had been concentrated in the silt layers o f  the rivers Arbuskinka, M ertvovod, the Trikratskoe and 
the Taborovskoe water reservoirs. The concentrations o f  these radioactive substances did not 
exceed  the m aximum  lim its in the sew age emitted. Given that water from the water reservoirs 
were used for irrigation, radioactive substances w ould eventually enter the food chain and affect 
p eop les’ health. This negative impact on peop les’ health would be further aggravated should a 
produvka go ahead
PaAfiucLKe npM6yÆÆ/i,22Â.l993,c. 1: ‘nocKOAbKy OMHCiTca xaiiajiHsanMOHiiLix h npoMhiuiiieunhix 
croKon ocraeTCJi b niiexciiew ica'iecrBe, to  nepeSpocKa cfokob b Taiu.BbiKCKoe BOAOxpaiiHJiHiite 
yAyMiuacT coCToaune pex ApSysmiKa, MepTBOBO/t, BOAOxpaiiM.Finiu n nojiHBiiOH boabi b 3thx
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In June 1993 rumours were spread to the effect that the leadership o f  the SB nuclear power 
station had installed equipment to facilitate a produvka"'. It turned out to be im possible to verify  
whether or not this was the case. The oblast Sov iet, however, was very clear on the issue o f  a 
produvka. As long as the leadership o f  the nuclear power station failed to carry out those 
preparations requested by the oblast Sov iet there would be none.
Radianske Pribuzhzhia reported that on 3 June a h igh-water em ission o f  water from the 
Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river had taken place. W ith regard to the legality o f  this 
em ission, the oblast Prosecutor, lu. Bondar, could inform the readers that the em ission was illegal 
and did not only pose a threat to the life and health o f  people in the v icin ity  o f  the nuclear power 
station but also put state interests at risk'^^.
Em issions from the nuclear power station started already in late M ay. Between the 26 and 30 
M ay the em ission fac ilities which had been set up in accordance w ith the W orking Group 
instructions (see Protocol N o. 114/149 o f  26 April the sam e year) were tested. W hereas the 
working group had given the clear for two cubic metres o f  water per second to be em itted, the 
nuclear power station had emitted between 2.22-2.35 cubic metres per second - a clear violation o f  
existing test programmes'^^. The em issions continued during the 27 and 28 M ay despite the fact 
that increased concentrations o f  m agnesium  salts were found in the test sam ples taken from the 
water being emitted (the m aximum  perm issible level o f  such salts was 50 m g per litre, whereas the 
emitted water contained between 51-53 m g per litre)'^"'- which could be taken as p roof that the 
em ission facilities had not been properly installed prior to their use. Furthermore, test sam ples 
were then collected in the absence o f  the oblast Sanepidemstantsia inspectorate'^^ and those in 
charge o f  the tests failed to take sam ples o f  the water from the main water collection  point, which  
was located below  the control range. This was o f  importance, as the main water collection point 
w as down-river from the em ission point'
p a n o iia x , OAiiaxo yxyA u iaeT  cocron iiH e Tai.iJ.riMKCKoro GOAoeMa-ox.FiaAHTe.iiH h  y c y r y b ju in r  
npoôJWMy ero  iipoAyGXH n p e x y  I O t k i i w h  B y r ’.
P o ju m n  npupoAci, n o . 6 , Ju n e 1 9 9 3 , p  1.
S e e  A r t ic le  51 o f  th e  U k ra in ia n  L a w  o n  E n v ir o n m e n ta l P ro tec tio n , a c c o r d in g  to  w h ic h  ‘g n p o n e c c e  
3Kcii.TyaTauHH AeHcrnyioiUMX iipeAupMHTHH, coopyxceiiH H  h oSbeKTOG obecrie'iHBaeTCH 
aico.TOFH'iecKaH 5e30iiacH 0crb  .iiioAen. panHona.ribiioe Hcno.Tb30GaiiHe ripHpoAiibix pecy[3C0G, 
cobjiioA eiiH e iiopMarHGon G|3CAHbix GOSAeHcrBHH na o icpyA caiom yio  ripHpoAuyio cp cA y ’. (q u o te d  in  
P iu m iC h K e fIp M 6 y ? K ? K A ,5 J A 9 9 3 , c . 1).
S e e  p o in t  4 .1  in ‘flporpaMMbi KOMnaeKCiibix HCiiHTaiiHH...’ A lto g e th e r , a c c o r d in g  to  th e  le a d e r sh ip  o f  th e  
n u c le a r  p o w e r  sta tio n , 5 4 4 ,9 4 7  c u b ic  m etr es  o f  w a ter  w e r e  e m itte d  fro m  th e  T a s h ly k  c o o l in g  p o n d  in to  
th e  S o u th  B u g  r iver  in  P iW iu cb K e  P IpH F yrK xn , 2 3 .9 .1 9 9 3 ,  c . 2 .
T h is  c o n st itu te d  a  further v io la t io n  o f  th e  p ro g ra m m e s referred  to  in th e  fo o tn o te  a b o v e  (p o in t  4 .2 ) .
T h is  v io la te d  p o in t  6 .2  o f  th e  sa m e  p ro g ra m m e s.
PdAimcbKe PIpMÔyACAen, 2 3 .9 .1 9 9 3 ,  c . 2 .
730
On 23 May increased levels o f  sulphates had been detected in water sam ples taken from this 
point"^. The leadership o f  the nuclear power station should have fo llow ed  up this data, but that 
was never done. A number o f  further violations on rules and leg islation for water em issions were 
also registered. On this basis, the oblast Prosecutor recommended that no further em issions be 
conducted from the Tashlyk cooling pond until the violations referred to above had been properly 
investigated and until the leadership o f  the nuclear power station had comm itted itse lf to 
conducting the em issions in strict accordance w ith current rules and legislation and w ith proper 
m onitoring taking place. The oblast Sov iet follow ed this recommendation, when on 7 June 1993 it 
passed a decision (No. 170II) which suggested the N ikolaev branch o f  Minpriroda and the oblast 
Sanepidemstantsia to exam ine the experimental em ission facilities at the nuclear power station 
close ly  to make sure that they met the requirements o f  the programmes referred to above"^.
For the Green M ovem ent, the Procurator’s ‘verdict’ just confirmed what they had claim ed all 
along: that the leadership o f  the nuclear power station was not trustworthy and that a produvka 
w ould have a negative impact on the state o f  the South Bug river as w ell as carry with it a possible  
damage to the health and w ell-being o f  the people o f  N ikolaev oblast. The leadership o f  the SB 
nuclear power station, however, was not at all happy with the criticism  raised against it for failing  
to fo llow  existing programmes and procedures for produvki.
Repeated test em issions were carried out on 15 September 1993. Oblast authorities did, 
however, remain sceptical o f  the prospect o f  a proper produvka, fo llow ing the results o f  the 
experim ental em issions. At its 18th session in October, it w as once again decided to contact 
President Ki-avchuk with a request that a proper ecological assessm ent be carried out on the SB 
nuclear power station in general and the Tashlyk cooling pond in particular, so as to decide from a 
technical point o f  v iew  how to operate the nuclear power station without produvki and also to 
assess the future prospects o f  the nuclear power station itself"^.
Decision: Go-ahead for produvka
G iven the critical content o f  salts in the Tashlyk cooling pond a decision had to be made quickly. 
On 23 March 1994, the Republican Com m ission on Em ergency Situations in Ukraine held a 
m eeting in K iev. The m eeting was headed by General Kapustin - the C om m ander-in-Chief o f  the
126.3 mg per litre: maximum permissible levels were 100 mg per litre. Normally levels o f between 50- 
70 mg per litre were found at the control point.
‘PeujeiiMeNo. 17-11 o t  7 h io iu i 1993’. Pojumjf ripMpoAaMo. 7, uio.rib 1993.
Pim enim  18 c e c c i l  21-cxjiHKaniui o r  13 OKTaôna 1993. No. 32 ‘0  n e iu e n H H  T o e T b e u  h  
T p H iia iu a T Q H  ceccHH 21-co3bma no Bonpocv u d o j iv b k h  TaiiutbiKCKoro n o A o e M a -o x jia im T e ju i ICY 
ABC’.
"vî
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Ukrainian C ivil D efence. The Com m ission d iscussed arguments in favour o f  and against a 
produvka and finally agreed to allow  a produvka to go ahead.
The decision was met with anger and d isb elief in N ikolaev. Sergei Shapovalov, representing 
the oblast soviet, in a com m ent stressed that tests o f  the water quality in the Tashlyk cooling pond 
clearly indicated that the levels o f  various salts, chem icals and radioactive substances were much 
higher in the pond than in the South Bug river. He further referred to the decisions previously  
made by the oblast Soviet against a produvka for these very circum stances, which the decision  
m ade in Kiev arrogantly overruled:
Ho ripai3HTe.ihcmy yxpaMnw nyAcna sneprmi .iioGoA uenoM. H nor 
Kommccmj] no iipe3Bi>iMaHiii>iM obcTOirre.ibcrnaM npenpamaeroi n 
TpesBUMaHiiyio kom hcchio. B napynieiiHe saicoiioB YKpaMin,! KoMHCcmi 
npeABMcwnaeT cbohvi peineiiMevi 25.03.94 r. lOY ABC na'ia'i'b 
iipoAyBxy BOAoeMa-ox.TaAHTe.nl. HrnopHpya h .th  OTMeinni tokhm  
obpasoM pemeiiHe ceccuH HnxQ.iaeBcxoro ob.iac'rnoin Conera 
napoAHbix AenyTaTOB, iiainHiuaiomee Hii'repecbi AOTi'e.TeH o6;iacrH.
Komhcchh K a b H n e T a  Mhiihcapob l ie  B n p aiie  oi.M eiiM Tb p e u ie i iH e  ceccH H  
o6.Tacruoro CoBCTa n a p o A iib ix  AenyTaroB h Cobct o n p o r e c r y e r  ee  
p e m e n H e . n o  S y A e r  .th bobiajmh o c r a n o B a e u a  iip cA y m ca
140 See f t e a x o i i H o e  p e in e iiH e  nnaB H T eabC T B a tn.d.t.141 This article was either written prior to the decision made by the latter or prior to the decision of the
140
Zelenyi Mir also protested the decision made by Kiev in harsh words. A  lengthy article 
signed by Suslova and Shapovalov appeared in Radianske Pribuzhzhia on 8 April 1993. The 
article was written after it was brought to the attention o f  the two deputies o f  the oblast Soviet that 
the Representative o f  the President in N ikolaev oblast and the Chairman o f  the oblast Soviet had ’given in to intense pressure from the leadership o f  the SB nuclear power station and made a 
request to the Chairman o f  the C om m ission on Nuclear Policies operating under the auspices o f  
the Ukrainian President B. Bariakhtar and (former) Premier M inister L. Kuchina to include the
question o f  an experimental produvka o f  the Tashlyk water reservoir on the agenda o f  the
forthcom ing m eeting o f  the Com m ission. It w as also requested that the C om m ission  on
Em ergency Situations by the Cabinet o f  M inisters consider the question'"". Thus, the leadership.o f  the oblast had turned against the oblast Soviet and com e down in favour o f  a produvka despite 
fact that the oblast Sanepidemstantsia could not g ive its support and despite the fact that the levels  
o f  several chem ical and radioactive substances in the cooling pond exceeded  m aximum  
perm issible levels'"'^. Thus, a long process, which started in 1990, when the question to allow  a
commission becoming known to the two deputies - i.e. sometime in late March.
‘Ho iiG ijiT enpoA yxT aM  -  b 20 p a s .  no c o A e p A c a iim o  A ceneB a -  b 7 p a s  h a p - , K O H n e in p a ijH ii 
paAMOiiyK.THAOB no n e 3 H io -1 3 7  -  b 10 p a s ,  a  no tphthio -  b  50 pas n p e B b im a io r  r a ic H e  x e  
n o K a aaT e J iH  b  jie ice  IOachwh Byr’, PajmiChKe npMf)yÆÆBAAA994.
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third produvka (as mentioned above, such prodiivki had taken place in 1984-85 and 1986-87) 
surfaced, had come to a preliminary end.
The cause of the problem - the critical levels of salinisation of the cooling pond - had, 
however, occurred due to a flaw in the project of the SB nuclear power station. The project, which 
envisaged that the condensaters of the nuclear power station be cooled by running water from the 
river with a salinisation of 0.5-0.7 grammes per liter, had failed to take into account that the South 
Bug river was a major source of drinking water and irrigation for a majority of the people of 
Nikolaev oblast. The project had therefore turned the river into a technical water reservoir for the 
nuclear power station and
O ocK Q .ihK y T a m .iU K C K o e  noAO xpaiin.aM iue iio n o . iiu i. io c h  n o iio f i 
M unepa .:iH 3H poBaniioro  p y a w i T a iu . iM K  m i30AoeM-ox.aaAUTe.il. i ie  b i i . i  
p yc .io n i.iM , ripoTom !i.iM , np u  iia .iM iH M  u n T e iic u n iio ro  u c iia p e iiu a  
c o . ie iio c i i.  n p y A a -o x .ia A u re . ia  c  nepai.ix  Aneu p a S o n .i ABC 6 h i. ia  m iiu e  
npeAycM O TpeiinoH  npoeieroM . Ta icuM  o b p a io M  no n i.im e iin a a  
M H iie p a .iH ia u u fi n p y A a -o x .ia A u re A a  - 3T0 o inn O K a  iip o e ic ra  ABC...
As for produvka in itself, this was not the only way in which the salts in the cooling pond 
could be removed. As a matter of fact, most nuclear power stations were situated along the sea, 
using salt water to cool its reactors (salt content: 26-29 g/litre). Also nuclear submarines made use 
of salt water. In such cases higher quality rust-free steel or titanium was used for the eondensators. 
By using cheaper steel the leadership of the nuclear power station wanted to solve the subsequent 
problems at the expense of the environment and the health of the local population. What was 
more, judging by the results of the two previous produvki, they did not reduce, but only stabilised 
the salt levels in the pond'"^ .^
As in 1990, the oblast Soviet also in June 1992 said no to a produvka and ordered work to be 
undertaken to facilitate the operation of the nuclear power station without produvki. The 
leadership of the nuclear power station had already in 1990 been instructed to develop measures 
towards such a transition. The report handed over to the oblast Soviet in 1992, however, did not 
envisage any such measures before 1998'' '^ ,^ when water towers would be introduced as an 
alternative to the open cooling pond. The pro-nuclear lobby focused all its attention on the need 
for a produvka, which according to Chief Engineer of the SB nuclear power station, B. Koriagin, 
would last for 22 months! Confronted by scientists and deputies present at the 13th session of the
‘ f l o  AaniiL iM  n o  TOY ABC”, m ace ro A i.i a K cna ya rau M U  ABC npoMSOunio noBb iu je iiM e c o j ie i io c i ’M 
BOAi.i B npYAe ox.riaAM Tejie k  1992 ro A y  A o B6.nHMMHbi 1,62 r /A H ip  h  3a 1993 roA AO 1,77 r /.f!H 'rp ’ . 
neneM e iii. Meponnm iTM U. iieoS xoA H M Lix  ajt« B e/ie itm i 6ecnDOAVDoqiioro |3excHMa naSoThi lOY 
ABC, signed by the Deputy Leader of the PO SB AES, V. M. Gurko o n  10,6.1992.
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oblast Soviet that a produvka would not really solve the problem of salinisation of the cooling 
pond, he was unable to provide an adequate response. What a produvka would do, though, was to 
violate the Ukrainian Water Code. Besides the expert commission set up by USSR 
Goskompriroda had said ‘no’ to produvka already in 1990.
The 13th session of the oblast Soviet decided to consider produvka only when the pro-nuclear 
lobby had developed a plan to introduce other cooling methods in the perspective, with a detailed 
outline of dates and equipment to be installed, costs, funding etc., as well as found alternative 
methods for cleansing the saline water of the cooling pond'"^ .^
On the request of the oblast Soviet, the Ukrainian President in the summer of 1992 set up an 
expert group composed of members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to find an acceptable 
solution to the problem of how to cleanse the saline waters of the Tashlyk cooling pond. The 
independent expert group (headed by Academician D. Hrodzinskyi) was, however, due to a lack of 
funding unable to complete its work. Some 10 million roubles were needed. Such money could 
be found at Minatorenergoprorn but it did not want to allocate any funds for the work of the expert 
commission. However,
O rpo iiT S e s  ro cy A a p cr n e im o ro  (IiHiiancHpouaiiMii, 3a c iion  cp eA cn ia  
A.iieKGuiApoBCiCHM rMApo.Y3e.IT, 'raic Kaic sanoA neuH e AjieKcaiiApoBCKoro  
BOAOxpaiiM.UHUia - a ro  3a.rtor Aa;iLueHLuero yBe.riMBeriMa Mom iiocrM lO Y  
A3C‘^ ^
On the basis of this, Suslova and Shapovalov could not accept a produvka, because any 
produvka, be it a short experimental one or a full-blown, would have a harmful effect on the South 
Bug river, the surrounding environment and the population of the oblast. Moreover, the 
experimental produvka which had been suggested by the leadership of the nuclear power station 
constituted a violation of the decisions made by the third and 13th sessions of the oblast Soviet
The decision o f th e  13th session o f the oblast Soviet read  as follows: ‘noripoc o npoAyBxe Taiu.BWKCKoro 
BOAOxpaiiH.iiHma paccMOTpeTi. Aono.rB!HTe.rHAio npH yc.riOBHH itpeAOCi'aBAeiiMM 0 0  lOY ABC 
o(l)HUHa.in.iio o(|)opM.net!iibix AOKyMeiiTon BeAOMCina o BBCAeiiMM b nepcneKTMne 6eciipoA.YBOBHoro 
pe>KMMa paSo'ru  aTOMiioH cranuMM c yicasaiiMeM cpoKOB padoT  no saM ene iie  KOHAeiicaTopoB, 
pacLUHireiiHio o5ecco.rtHi3a!oinMX ycra iioBO ic n ro p o ro  K o irrypa, nponeAeiiMsi pacMHCTKH h paccojienH fl 
TaniAUKCKoro npyAa oxjiaAM Tena, HcroBUHKOB (l)MiiaiicMpoBaiiMa a r u x  padoT , a  'raicxce A a iin u x o  
npoBeAenuM iieaaDHCHMOH KOMnereirrnoM o irra im sauneH  Aono.rinHTe.aBHwx MCcrieAOBaiiHM AO iniux 
OTAOAcenHH MJia B KpyAe-oxAaAHTene, BAHaiiHJi iia 3Ko.norH>iecKyio cM crew y p e x n  IO a î i i l ih  B y r  kuk  
npoAyiîKM TauiJiLiKCKoro BOAoewa, rare m c t o k o u  oBM crnnx coopyxe iTH M  dbiTOBOH m npoMbnujieiinoH  
icauajiHsauHM lO x n o y K p a H n cK a  n pe icy ApGysMnica u TauiAbiiccKoe BOAOxpanHJiHme. OpocMTi. 
AKaACMMio Hayx Aari, 0(I)HUHaAbHoe o S o cn o B a im o e  liaKAionenMe no B on p ocy  npoAyoKM npyAa- 
ox.riaAHTe;i}i’, q u o te d  in PiwuiChKe flpHÔy^KÆH,^  A .199A.
Ibid.
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(21st convocation). The authors encouraged people to voice their protest and to come forward 
with their views on the SB nuclear power station generally.
Suslova’s and Shapovalov’s article triggered off a sour response from the SB nuclear power 
station. A reply by V. Denisov, its Deputy General Director, was published in Radianske 
Pribiizhzhia on 1 July 1993 under the heading ‘(It) does not correspond with reality’. In his reply, 
Denisov argued that the figures given by Shapovalov and Suslova were not real. He refuted them 
by quoting his own*"^ .^ Contrary to what Shapovalov and Suslova had argued, the levels of 
caesium-137 and tritium in the upper flows of the South Bug river were 1.8 and 1.7 times higher 
than in the Tashlyk cooling pond respectively. The conclusion must therefore be that
Mto paaipocTpaneiine itoAodiuax oiiCAeiinH n iieaarn. iie 
cooTneTCTByfomMx AeHcriiHTe-'ibiiocrM, iiopouuT MecTi. u AocroHiicriio 
npeAiipmiTHJi, ueiipaan.ai.no (liopMupyer odniecTBeiuioe Miienue rpaxAaii 
no Boripocy desonaciiou padoTbi lOY ABC. B.tmiiiue ee iia 
o tc p y x o io n iy io  n p u po iiy  u sAopoBbC M ecrnoro nace.nenufi.
Ha ocnonaiiMM Ms.aoxeimoro h crarwi 37 3aKoiia Yicpaunbi "0 
cpeACTBax MaccoBoPi MiKliopMauuH (neaaru) b Yicpaune” 'rpeSye.vi 
npnsnarb pacnpompanenue cBeAeiiua b crarbe "OrmTb o iipoAynKe 
TauiAbiKCKoro BOAOxpauM.auiua" (oBTopbt C. llIanoBa.aoB u Jl. Cyc.noBa 
’’PaAancbice n p H S y x x a ” No. 40 o r  8 an|ie.ni 1993 ro;ta) nopoaaruMMM 
aeci’b M AOcronncTBo 0 0  "lO xi lo-Y Kpaui icicaa ABC” w iie 
cooTBeTCTByiomHMH AeHcrBMTe.rib[iocru H onySjiHKODari, nacrantnee 
0(|)MUHa.ribiiee oiipoBepxeime.
Shapovalov and Suslova’s response was printed in the same issue of Radianske Pribuzhzhe. 
As for the figures they had used, these were official figures, collected by a number of laboratories, 
amongst which were the oblast Sanepidemstantsia. Levels of caesium-137 and tritium in the 
cooling pond were compared with levels in the South Bug river. Although the latter did not 
exceed the maximum permissible levels (this had not been argued by the authors in their previous i
article), they were closer to levels registered in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident than to 
those found prior to the accident. It should be obvious to anyone that these levels would be further 
increased should a produvka take place. With regard to levels measured in the Tashlyk cooling
A radiological control o f the water in the Tashlyk cooling pond in 1992 gave the following results:
‘cpeJBUiJT Be.BH<iMiia coAepxaumi paAuonyKJiHAOB no ue3Mio-137 cocraBAîier b TaiiiAbiKCKOM 
noAOxpmiMjiMiue 0,25 riHKoKropn/A, no rpurnio -  2,43 nanoKiopn/A. B pexe IOxhwh Byr nbiiiie 
no TeneiiMio or ABC cpeAnaa Be.umiHna paiiMonyic.riMAOB no ue3uio-137 cocraB.naeT 0.45 
riHKoICiopM/.ri, a no rpuTuio - 1,37 nanoKiopM/ji: n n x e  no re'ienmo no ne3Mio-137 -0 ,1 5  
nnKoKiopM/A, no rpHTMio - 0,96 !ianoKiopH/ji...ilannbie no rpuTHio iipeAcraBJieiibi Yrq)aMiiCKHM 
iiayMiibiM neirrpoM 3KO.norHW Mopa OAeccbi, a no ue3Mio-137 Bsarbi H3 ornera o6jiacrnoü C3C 
(fiMCbMO rnaBBpa'ia B. BasAwpena N o. 1026/6-6 or  10.08.92 roAa k HCJI CBC CMC4-2). TaicM.vi 
o5pa30M. (JiaKrHnecKHe :3naMenu}i KonuenrpauHM ue3Ma-137 m rpHrna - ne niJeBbiuiaior 
ycranoBAeniibix snaiieiiMH aaa TaiiuibiKCKoro noAOxpaiiMJiMiua’.
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article, Suslova and Shapovalov based their arguments on the maximum levels registered. The 
maximum levels had been registered by the oblast Sanepidemstantsia and presented to the oblast
' f
pond, these varied greatly. Whereas Denisov used the lowest levels measured as the basis tor his T
Soviet’s commission on the environment, of which both Suslova and Shapovalov were members. T
According to the data presented by the oblast Sanepidemstantsia the levels of caesium-137 were 7f
10 times higher in the Tashlyk cooling pond than they were in the South Bug river. Other test data T.
gave similar results. Although more testing was needed, it was unacceptable to use the minimum
,slevels found as the leadership of the SB nuclear power station did. 7
As for tritium, all test results, including those measured by the Odessa OGOI, indicated that T;
'ifthe Tashlyk cooling pond was polluted with this radioactive substance. Whereas the average 
level found in the South Bug river was between four and six bequerels per litre, the tritium : ;
contents in the biological pond, which directly received sewage from the nuclear power station, A;
were from 700-1,000 bequerels per litre. As a result, the Trikratskoe water reservoir, which 
supplied the irrigation system with water contained levels of tritium from 650 to 1,180 becquerels 
per litre, as did the Taborovskoe water reservoir (between 220-240 bequerels per litre). Levels
',7measured in the Tashlyk cooling pond itself were between 50 and 140 bequerels per litre. Where 7|
the sewage from the nuclear power station to be redirected from the river Arbuzinka to the
Tashlyk cooling pond, this was likely to reduce the levels of radionuclides in the rivers Arbuzinka,
Mertvovod and the two water reservoirs, but would no doubt worsen the situation in the Tashlyk
cooling pond considerably. Therefore the authors demanded that the issue of a produvka be 
.properly examined by the independent commission set up on the orders of the Ukrainian President 7
and composed of experts from the Academy of Sciences.
With regard to the honour of the SB nuclear power station, Shapovalov and Suslova
.•ifsuggested the following:
ripeA .ioi aew  FlO lO Y  A B C ’ Mopa.fibiio u M aT epuajiu io n o m e p x a r b  
paG ory  rpynribi yae iib ix iioa pyKoaoAcraoM  A-M. LpoAsu iiC Koro.
anT op u T ernoe saKA ioaeiiMe icoTopbix. xaic u peicoMeiiAauHM aah  | f
n ace.ae iiu a . itphmom h npusiiaeivi a ce  HMCcre m 5yA6M hmh 
p y  KoaoAcraoBai'bCfl.
B TOM aHc.rie G yAcr o6oc iiO B a iu ioro  peu iena npoSjieM a b o sm o x iio c i'm 
MJiM neB03M0x[i0CTM ucnojib30B a iim i TauuibiKCKoro BOAoeua-
o x .iaA u re.aa  luin iiercK o ro  c n o p r a  u no.auBa no.aeu (cm. cn rrb io  a |
”1 0 0 ” N o . 102 o r  10.06.93 ’’A oneparb  jip yr  A p yry”).
,
Suslova and Shapovalov finally reminded the readers that the so-called experimental produvka 
which had taken place towards the end of May 1993 (see above) was in actual fact a proper 
produvka and constituted a violation of existing regulations and legislation. Even worse, it was
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conducted when the fish in the South Bug river were spawning. And it violated decisions made by 
the oblast Soviet regarding produvka;
...Be3 KaKOi’o-.'iMÔo o(|)MUMa;u,iioro iTaspemeima. d e s  iieodxoAMvioro
KoiiTpo.iJi ne T o .iix o  co cropoiibi odinecraeiniocrM. no u
rocyAapcTaeiiiibix KOiiïpo.'ibnbix opranoa u npoaeAenua n\iu  aaMepoa,
iiaxe npu na.imiHH nporecia o5.iC3C. Taxue Aeûmami
aAMMHHCi'pauMH ABC neAonycTMMbi m AO.ixabi dbiri, naKaaanbi.■
The leadership of the SB nuclear power station, though, was by no means happy with such
accusations and with the unwillingness of Radianske Pribuzhzhia to apologise for having printed 
.the first article signed by Shapovalov and Suslova. Consequently, il sued the Editor-in-Chief, E. 
Hutsenko, Suslova and Shapovalov for having discredited the honour and reputation of the nuclear 
power station. The statement of claim (‘on the Defense of the Honour, Dignity and Professional 
Reputation of the Enterprise’) reiterated the data quoted by Denisov in his article to prove 
Shapovalov and Suslova wrong in arguing that the levels of caesium-137 and tritium in the cooling 
pond were 10 and 50 times higher respectively than in the South Bug river.
According to Article 37 of the Ukrainian Law ‘On the Mass Media in Ukraine’, Denisov’s 
letter should have been printed in the same size of type as the article to which it responded. 
Besides, it should have been printed under the headline ‘Refutation’. However, it was printed in 
small letters and not given such a prominent place in the paper. Moreover, no such headline had 
been provided. Rather, an impression of the exchange of opinions was created, as below
Î
Denisov’s article, a reply by Suslova and Shapovalov was published. Thus, the newspaper
,TIcontributed to the spreading of wrong information about the nuclear power station.The three pages long justification for taking the newspaper (considered to be pro- 
environmental) and Zelenyi Mir (although Shapovalov and Suslova had written the two articles in 
their capacity as Chairman and Secretary of the oblast Soviet’s Commission on the Environment
respectively, they were Green Deputies and amongst the most fierce opponents with which the 
pro-nuclear lobby was faced. If the nuclear power station could have them sentenced for 
Spreading disinformation about the nuclear power station, this would no doubt contribute to the 
discrediting of Zelenyi Mir and thus also to the weakening of the pro-environment lobby) to court 
concluded as follows:
I
n o  " t o y  ABC” c'lMTaer, s t o  peAaKuuii raserb i "PaAimcbKe 
r i p n S y x x n ” cbom m h AefiCTBTiiMM a io c o d c r n y e T  nenpaiiMJibiioMy 
(popMupoBaiiHio oSiueCTBeiiHoro Miieiimi rp a x A a ii  no Boiipocy 
6e3onacHOM paSoTbi ABC, B.riH}iuHio ee iia o K p y x a io n iy io  n]m poAy u 
3AopoBbe M ecrnoro n acej ien m i.
Ha ocnoBaiiMH u sA O x en n o ro  n crareu: 7  fp a x A a n c K o r o  KOAOKca 
Ycpauiibi, 4 7  Sa icon a YKpaniibi ”0 6  HiuliopMaauM”, 3 7 , 41  SaK ona
:-':7
J
VicpaHiii,! 0  neMaiiihix cpeAcraax viaccoiîOH HiKpop.viauHH (iieaa'in) n
Y ic p a H i ie ”,
n P O L U Y :
1 . r ip H sn a T i)  p a c i ip o c T p a n e i in i> ie  c a e A e im n  u c r a r b e  " O m iT b  o  iip o A y u K e  
T a iü A b iK C K o r o  B O A O X p a itn .iH iu a" . iio p o a a u iH V iH  a e c i b .  A o c r o M i i c m o  n  
A C A o n y io  iT e n y T a u H io  n p o H S B O A C T B e iiiio ro  o5 b eA H n en M } i " l O x i i o -  
Y ^ p a m iC K a a  A B C ” h  n e  coo 'm eT ca'B y io iu M M V i A e H c r B H T e ib iio c r H .
2. SanpeTHTb Aa.ibiieMinee hx paeiipocrpaneuMe.
3. oSîiaaTi. peAaKUHio raseTbi "Paarnicbice n p u d y x x a ” onpeBepniyr!. 
nopoMamwe F IO  ”I O Y  A B C ” cneiieiinH, b iieaarH.
4. KovinencHpoBaTb F IO  " ïO Y  A B C ” npMUunennbiM viopa;ibni,iH ymep5.
5. B3bicKaTb c OTBCT'iMKOB noiieceiuibie no Ae.iy cyaeSubie pacxoAbi'*^®.
Although 110 sum was mentioned in the claim which was presented to Suslova and 
Shapovalov, informally they were informed that the nuclear power station would sue them for 500 
million karbovantsy’"*^. To get this confirmed in writing, Zolotukhin contacted the court in 
Nikolaev and was told by a court secretary that a new claim, including the sum, would be issued to 
them. The new claim, however, also failed to mention in writing any sum. This was by the 
Greens interpreted to the effect that the leadership of the nuclear power station wanted to 
safeguard itself, should it not win the court case. Since it would be difficult to prove the nuclear 
power station wrong on figures - So many and diverging figures regarding the levels of 
radioactivity in the South Bug river and the Tashlyk cooling pond were available - Suslova and 
Shapovalov issued a counter-claim to the effect that the leadership of the nuclear power station 
prove them wrong, which would be equally difficult and which put the burden of providing 
evidence on the complainants. Thus Denisov, representing the pro-nuclear lobby, could no longer 
so easily assume that he would win the case. A number of court meetings to clarify figures and 
levels referred to had been held by the autumn of 1994, but the actual court case had not yet 
started.
7.3.6 Alternatives: Enhanced Safety and Improved Environmentability 
structural Reforms as a Means of Enhancing Nuclear Safety
Rodnaia priroda also carried an article submitted by Minpriroda, which addressed the concept o f 
nuclear and radiation safety elaborated by the Ministry. The starting point, as seen by Minpriroda,
See HcKOBoe saiiBAeitHe o sauiMTe mrcth. ;ioCTOHiiCTBa h AeJioiiOH penvraiiun npe;inpMiiTHii. signed on 
behalf o f the Deputy General Director o f the SB nuclear power station by V. Bykov and addressed to 
HapOAiTBiH Cyy.i Ueii rpajibiioro panona r. HnKOJiaeBa. Copy given to me by Zolotukhin.
‘9oniio6H.nb -  nosnhnTu YKpaiun’. PaMfiiicLKe PlpnÔyÆtacn, 26.4.1994, c. 4.
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was that ecological reform must be linked to a more general economic reform and that nuclear 
safety must form a key element of ecological reform. The existing system for nuclear and 
radiation safety did not meet international standards and Ukraine was therefore not guaranteed 
from future accidents similar to the one which took place in Chernobyl. Following the collapse of 
the USSR, Ukraine suddenly found itself in charge of 30% of the nuclear power capacity of the 
USSR, as well as considerable areas of territory contaminated by radionuclides, nuclear waste and 
the sarcophagus at Chernobyl.
The Ukrainian nuclear power stations were riddled with problems and a substantial number of 
these were rooted in poor or faulty planning. The sites chosen to accommodate the stations were 
in most cases made based on political rather than geological and technical considerations. Thus, 
the luzhnoukrainsk, Rivne and Klimelnytskyi nuclear power stations were situated in areas with a 
water deficit. What was more, the Rivne station was as seen in Chapter Six, standing on karst 
ground. Moreover, the VVER-440 reactors at Rive did not have hermetical covers.
Minpriroda recommended that the reactors at Chernobyl be shut down as they would not even 
be considered safe were they to be reconstructed. The Verkhovna Rada had already passed a 
Resolution (‘On the Urgent Measures regarding the Closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power 
Station’) to close down Chernobyl. A problem common to all the nuclear power stations was the 
poor state of equipment crucial to s a f e t y ^ S a f e t y  problems, particularly at the RBMK and the 
VVER-440 reactors of the first generation, were frequent and the anxiety o f the Ukrainian people 
about nuclear power was therefore fully understandable.
Another problem related to nuclear power was the lack of a concept on what to do with 
nuclear waste from the power stations. As a result, the storage facilities at the nuclear power 
stations were almost completely full and something would have to be done quickly to sort this 
problem out. The collapse of the Soviet Union, at least from the point o f view of safety at nuclear 
power stations, had not improved the situation for Ukraine, but rather worsened it:
Oco6.riHBo TpeSa iiaro.nocMTH iia Toiviy, mo iiicjn i posiiayty CPCP i  
iiepeopMEiiTauiï MiiiaTOMenepronpoMy iia P o c iio  yKpaïncbKiM AEC 
H inL iii ni;tnpH£MCTBa u I e I  r a a y s i  3a.RHUiMAMca 6es oprany 
iiepxaB iioro ynpaB.aiMiin. a raK ox 6e3 nayicoBO-TexiiiMiioï i  
npoeKTiio-Koucrp.vKTopcbKO i  n i  at'Pmmkm (opraii i s a n l  ï  roAOBuoi'o 
KOHCTpyKTopa. iiayKOBoro KepiBitHica 1 I’enepaAbiioro ripoercraiiTa 
:3a:iMmH.aHcii b P o c ii} '^ ‘.
These w e r e  lis te d  as follows: ‘ n a p o ren ep a ro p n , aBTOMaTMSOBaiii cmctcmh y n p a n A in i ia  Texiiojioi'iniiM M H  
npouecaM H, san u ip iio -p eryA io ioaa  a p w a ry p a  Tonto..
' ' ' ib id ., p. 3.
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There was also no clear structure for the regulation of the utilisation of nuclear energy, as the 
concern Ukratomenergoprom was not responsible for the exploitation of nuclear power, thus 
putting the administrations of the nuclear power stations in charge of this. They, on the other 
hand, were ill prepared for this. In most countries making use of nuclear power, one Ministry or 
Department would not be in charge of both the production and the safety of nuclear power. What 
was more, in most countries the Ministry of the Environment would be responsible for monitoring 
safety at the nuclear power stations - which again, was not the case in Ukraine.
To put the situation right, Minpriroda recommended that a concept of nuclear safety be 
elaborated, involving various Ministries, the Parliament, scientific establishment and public and 
political organisations. The parliamentary commission on Chernobyl could co-ordinate such 
work. Until a proper concept had been developed, it would make sense to trust the State 
Committee on the Utilization of Nuclear Energy with the provision of scientific and technical as 
well as project and construction support to enterprises serving the nuclear industry. In addition, 
the new committee would be responsible for finding solutions to problems regarding the utlization 
of radioactive waste and the decommissioning of nuclear power stations. Derzhatomnahliad, on 
the other hand, should be given responsibility for ‘on-site’ inspection, thus making sure that rules 
and regulations were being adhered to. Minpriroda, on the other hand, should be put in charge of 
the state regulation of nuclear safety as a part of ecological safety in Ukraine. Unwillingness to 
incorporate nuclear safety into a wider environmental reform could only aggravate the situation, 
until finally, another accident would take place.
Safety-Enhancing Measures at the Nuclear Power Station (Pro-Nuclear Lobby)
The pro-nuclear lobby could not easily overlook the fact that a number of incidents had taken 
place at luzhnoukrainsk over the previous few years. They therefore based their agenda on the 
energy problems Ukraine was faced with, arguing that there were not really any alternatives to 
nuclear power in the nearest future. As for safety, it was emphasised that a number of measures 
were being taken to improve safety at the nuclear power station.
Why was there no real alternative to nuclear power? In an article published in Mirnyi 
atoni^^, the administration at the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station argued that due to the high 
prices on Russian natural gas, the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, which provided not only 
the Nikolaev oblast, but also the Klierson, Odessa, parts of Kirovohrad oblast and the Crimean 
peninsula with electricity, would remain the major energy source for the South of Ukraine, To
MnpiiLiH aroM, 5.3.1993, c. 2.
■7!"
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a‘prove’ their point, the article pointed out that during 1992, 18 billion kW hours of electricity had 
been generated at luzhnoukrainsk. This equalled six million tons of oil, which would have to be 
bought from Russia at world prices. Due to the fact that Russia now charged world prices (in hard 
currency) both for its oil and gas, the administration of the nuclear power station claimed that at 
present nuclear power was two to three times cheaper than power generated from oil or gas. 
Prices on nuclear energy would have to be raised following the introduction of new, safety- 
enhancing measures, but at least Ukraine would not have to depend so heavily on Russia for 
energy. Given the tensions in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine this would no doubt be 
to Ukraine’s benefit. E tsides, exports of nuclear power would ah '  live Ukraine highly needed 
hard currency.
The article also mentioned the need for regular produvki to be carried out so as to limit 
contents of salt in the Tashlyk cooling pond. Salt levels in the South Bug river would, according 
to the authors of the article, not be affected if a limit of two cubic metres of water were emitted per 
second. To make the nuclear power station work efficiently, this exercise would have to be 
conducted regularly. The salts emitted from the cooling pond would be flushed straight into the 
Black Sea (South Bug emitted 2,9 billion cubic metres of water annually into the Black Sea).
As for safety, no proper rules had been worked out so far, but this did not mean that they 
would not be elaborated in the future. Safety and the future of ones’ grandchildren were no doubt 
important factors to keep in mind. However, one should also keep in mind that during the past 
nine years, 13 superheaters had been taken out of use. These were made in Russia and cost 
millions of roubles. Simply switching from nuclear energy to gas stations, as favoured by the 
Greens, did thus not necessarily make such a lot of sense from an economic point of view.
A more lengthy justification of nuclear power emerged in Energetik on 13 March 1994^^^. In 
an open letter from the collective of the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station to the people, 
official authorities and the press of the Nikolaev oblast, the amount o f energy generated at 
luzhnoukrainsk and how the oblast had benefited from this, was once again emphasised: 
following the start-up of the third reactor at the nuclear power station, more than 127 billion KW 
hours of electricity had been produced, which equalled the burning of approximately 30 million 
tons of oil at thermal power stations!
The pro-nuclear lobby’s commitment to safety was once again reiterated;
K oji.'ieKTM B a ro M iio H  c r a n u n n  n c e iv ta  o6ecneM HBa.Fi B i,in o Jin e iiH e  
ro c y A a p C T B e iii io ro  ^ a ic a s a  u a  B u p aO o T K y  n  o r n y c ic  3.neicrpM M ectcoH  h  
Ten.ri0B 0H  3 iieprH M , 6 e 3 0 i ia c i i y io  3 K cn .n y a T a n H io  a iiep ic i 'M 'ie cK H X  
y c ra n o B O K , co 6 .n iO A enH e n p H p o A o o x p a n n h ix  nopw arH B O B , n o c r o a n n o
SnepremK, 1 3 .3 .1 9 9 4 , c. 3.
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iipMHHMaji viepiii ii.iJi riOBbULieiiHH iiaAexiiocru paSoTbi oSopyAoiianHîi. 
B iiacroainee apeMH npOAO.ixaiOTCH pa5oi'bi no peKoncrpyKUMH m 
MOAepimsauHH, mto nosno/aiT no yponnio najiexnocPH oOopyjioBaiiMii 
cooTneicrBonaTb viexAyiiapoAUbiM TiieOoimnmiM.
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Furthermore, the pro-nuclear lobby raised harsh criticism towards certain public organisations (i.e. 
the Green Movement) for putting the nuclear industry in a negative light at a time when the 
industry needed all the support it could get, due to the difficult energy situation in Ukraine:
I:Mbi ne Moxevi cor.iacMTbon c tcm orpMuaTe.ibnbiM o5pa:io\i aiiepreTHKa-aTOMUiHKa. KOTopufi nbrraioTca co:wrrb n co:Miannn 
XHTe.:ieH yKpannbi oTjie.Tbnbie oSmecrneniibie ABMxenmi, neKOTopue 
Aeny'ra'f'bi HnKOJiaeBCKoro o6.'iacnioro Conera. ciieAcrna viacconoH 
Mii(|)opManMM. Yneiienbi. mto nonbrricn npoTUBOcroHiina, narneranm i 
oScraiioBKM, sanyrnBanmi naceaenHJi yrpo:ioR icaracrpocl) ncno.absyioT 
B CBOMX Ue.MflX -TIOAM, KO'l'Opbie lia TOM CPpOHT CBOH liporpaMMbb 
Mnoime h3 hmx npoxoAitoH 6a.ri.i, iio3BO.'uiioniHw naBoenaTb Aonepne 
nacejieiiMB oSjiacrn, nojiyan.rin 3a cmbt nanieTaima aiiTHHAepubix 
iiacrpoeiiHH b iioc.neMepno6biAbCKMH nepnoA. 14x oTAeJibiibie 
BbiCKasbiBaiiMJi na MMTunrax m coSpaiimix, b laserax, paAHO- m 
Te.nene|3eAaMax unorAa npoTHBopcMaT SApanoMy CMbic.ny m co3AanmeHC5i 
oScraiioBKe.
To balance this ‘negative criticism’, the pro-nuclear lobby found it necessary to draw to
everybody’s attention certain points which ought to be properly considered once a final decision
was made with regard to the luzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. There were six such points.
.Firstly, it should be remembered that the nuclear power station was the major energy source for 
South Ukraine. Its task was to provide individual consumers as well as the industries of the region 
with energy. Consequently, its work was far too important to be decided on by meetings and
rallies and in certain cases, also by local Soviets (my emphasis). The latter is particularly
interesting as the pro-nuclear lobby earlier committed itself to following any decisions made by
the oblast Soviet. The workers’ collective made an appeal to, amongst others, the local authorities,
only to denounce their right to make decisions regarding the power station a few paragraphs into
the text. This may explain why so many decisions made by local authorities (see above) were
completely ignored. And it also is a good indicator regarding the work of the Green Movement.
Whereas Greens in the West once they manage to have a decision made or altered, in most cases 
. . .can rely on these decisions to be implemented, in the former Soviet Union a decision, however 
good it might be, would in most cases not be implemented as no apparatus existed to see to it that 
it would actually be executed. Thus, to have a favourable decision made was only half the work 
done. Then there was the long process of having it implemented, fighting the inertia which had 
developed over the last 70 years, and which it has proved to be very difficult to get rid of.
;"7|
The second point on the pro-nuclear lobby’s list was safety at the nuclear station. This, it 
admitted, was closely linked with the qualifications of those working there. Given the bad 
publicity in the press and the campaign fought against them by the Green Movement, the prestige 
of the nuclear power workers was on the decline, thus facilitating a high turnover and in turn less 
safety. Some of the workers were allegedly losing faith in what they were doing and could no 
longer see the point in nuclear power. The fact that the administration of the nuclear power station 
itself ignored orders and suggestions made by Atomnahliad was not mentioned in the letter, nor 
was any mention made of the numerous breaches and violations of rules and regulations for how 
to operate the nuclear power station safely. If the letter was to be taken at face value, the most 
appropriate conclusion to draw would be not to ban any debate around the issue of nuclear power, 
but rather to close the station down as quickly as possible, given that the issue of safety was 
directly related to negative publicity, which has surrounded the industry internationally from its 
very beginning, and which does not seem to be a security problem in any other country than 
Ukraine.
The workers of SB nuclear power station also called for demands made by the Greens that the 
station be closed down or that capacity be reduced to be ignored when making decisions regarding 
nuclear power. The only reason why the Greens made such demands was that they hoped to 
benefit politically from spreading anti-nuclear sentiments amongst the population o f the oblast. 
What one should remember was rather that 30% of all electricity made in Ukraine was generated 
by nuclear power stations. Furthermore, 90% of the energy consumption in Southern Ukraine was 
covered by the SB nuclear power station. Should capacity be reduced at the existing nuclear 
power stations, Ukrainian industries would suffer badly and the social consequences would be 
unpredictable.
The pro-nuclear lobby was happy to inform the people of Nikolaev oblast that systematic 
monitoring was being carried out to make sure that both the environment and people’s health were 
not being harmed by the nuclear power station. According to the letter, the state monitoring 
services were able to confirm that the environment was not suffering from the nuclear power 
station. Again, the letter conveniently failed to make mention of all the criticism raised with 
regard to the incidents at the nuclear power station generally, and the fact that 100 square metres 
were covered with radioactive substances following an accident in the early 1980s. The increase 
in the sickness rates for the oblast and for certain regions could not be explained as a result of the 
nuclear power station’s work. As a matter of fact, it was argued, the fact that the workers at the 
station did themselves live in luzhnoukrainsk should be taken as a guarantee that operation was 
safe.
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Fifthly, the leadership of the nuclear power station did everything it could to make sure that 
the equipment used was in excellent condition and that only highly qualified personnel was taken 
on. Thus:
TexiiMHecKoe ocriaiiienne nraiuinn, ypoiiens noAroTonivM ee iiepcoiia.ia 
Aaior ociioiianmi rapaiiTHponarb 6e:ioiiaaiyio n iiaAexiiyio paooT\ 
Bcero aiiepre'L'HMecKoro o5opyAOBaiinii.
The letter also stressed the need for a produvka and reiterated that such a produvka would not 
pose any dangers in terms of radiation. Finally, Zolotukhin’s allegations that secret produvki had 
taken place were once again categorically dismissed as nothing but the results of his own vivid 
imagination and technically unfounded. As for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station 
construction work to properly conserve the construction site was required, due to cracks on already 
completed objects and corrosion. With regard to the Aleksandrov hydro-complex, construction 
was currently being undertaken - in agreement with the oblast Soviet - to provide a bridge over the 
South Bug river.
On the basis of this, the pro-nuclear lobby urged constraint in the decision making-process 
regarding the future of the SB nuclear power station and requested that decisions be made only 
following thorough examinations of all arguments raised. The decisions made should not only 
reflect the interests of the people of the oblast, but also Ukrainian state interests.
Alternative Energy (Pro-Environment Lobby)
The approach adopted by the Greens already from an early stage differed markedly from that of 
the pro-nuclear lobby. Given the dangers of nuclear power and the extensive implications it had 
not only on the surrounding environment but also on people’s health, the Greens favoured a 
gradual move from nuclear power towards safer, environmentally cleaner, cheaper and equally 
efficient alternatives. Whereas we have presented some of the alternatives offered by the Greens 
above, below we will examine the gas turbine project more in detail and also look at the way in 
which Zelenyi Mir tried to ‘sell’ its alternative package.
The first mention of an alternative to continued expansion of the SB EK was made in a report 
Zelenyi Mir produced following the information that Stage Three of the SB EK had been agreed. 
The r e p o r t c o v e r e d  the history of the energy complex, an assessment of the environmental
Ofiocnonanne neuejiecooSpastiocrH crpoMTe.nhci'na 4 -ro  aiiRproS.iOKa lOxnovK-paniicKOH A3G n 
rM;ipo3HenrQKOMn.aeKca na [jckc lOxiibin Bvr
744
implications should the Third Stage be implemented unchanged (this assessment made references 
to expert opinions received by the Greens from various ministries, departments and scientific 
institutions at the initial stage of the campaign) and finally, an alternative approach. The report 
was produced by Zelenyi Mir in co-operation with scientists of Nikolaev oblast and was eventually 
co-signed by local authorities. The latter also produced a report with similar conclusions, although 
this report did not elaborate any alternatives.
During the summer of 1992, Zolotukhin contacted President Kravchuk as well as various 
ministries to get their views on the alternative programme the Greens had developed. Following 
the Ukrainian declaration of Independence in 1991, the issue of it .ear power once again came to 
the forefront in Ukraine. On the one hand the Greens and Ukrainian authorities had, in the late 
1980s, protested against Moscow’s decision to continue the nuclear power programme unchanged, 
thus extending nuclear capacity on Ukrainian territory. On the other hand, there was serious 
concern regarding the alternatives Ukraine was faced with given its newly gained independence. 
Whereas nuclear power in itself was not so desirable from an environmental point of view, from 
the point of view of independence it was a better alternative than expensive gas and oil imports 
from Russia - particularly given the strained relations between the two countries due to the issues 
of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. Thus, Ukrainian authorities in Kiev were changing their 
attitudes towards nuclear energy, revising plans for expansion.
The Greens, however, argued that the situation was far from ‘black and white’. Whereas it
was not desirable to become independent on Russia in the energy sector, nuclear power was also
not the only means by which to become more or less self-sufficient on energy. Thus, Ukraine had
a historical chance to become a leading nation in the development of alternative energy.
.The official response to the project launched by the Greens varied. Whereas local authorities 
welcomed it with open arms (see. TV-programme), central authorities were far more sceptical. 
Ukratomenergoprom, replying to the letter presented to President Kravchuk, rejected the Greens’
long time, and given the difficult economic situation Ukraine was currently faced with, there were 
no alternatives to nuclear power, as the existing nuclear power stations just about covered demand 
in Ukraine:
- npHViepiio 30 . le r , a Kpovie roro - FiiiasHTeiihiirix MaTepua.abfibix 
p ecy p co ii, KO'ropiax c e n a a c  iip o cro  iier.
No. 331/3. 3.6.1992, signed by Ukratomenergoprom's President, M. Umanets.
':'T7
proposals as being unrealistic*^^. To restructure the energy industry of Ukraine would take a very
S
ne[3ecrpoH K a crpyKTypbi siiepreTHKM iio rp eS y eT  AJiMTe.iibiioro upeMeiin
I
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Ub'atomenergoprom did, however, admit, that vapour gas facilities''^ did have several positive 
qualities;
Ciiopy net' -  nFY  od/iatiaior ptuioM aoci'ohiic'I'b -  aro bbicokhh 
K.W.JU 3T0 HX 3K0.t0rHMeCKa}l MHCTOra H.TJl. Ho, BOil[)eivH
yTBepxaeiiHio lilanoBa.iOBa, y iiac net' iipoMwui.ieniibtx cepHfiKwx
5; 10 KGB nrY...
To create such blocks, a whole industry would have to be developed. This would not only 
take time, but also cost money, of which Ukraine was generally short. Besides, Ukraine did not 
possess its own gas deposits. Therefore, gas would have to be bought abroad, which would in turn 
require gas pipes and gas-compressing stations. What was more, according to experts o f MIREK 
from the beginning of the 21st century oil and gas extraction would start to decline. Consequently, 
prices would rise and it would therefore be impossible to predict the future of gas-generated 
vapour energy in Ukraine in 30 years’ time. Given that
3 a n a c H  o p ra iiM M ec K o ro  TorrnHBa orpaiiHMeiibi. a  aiieiireTHMecKMH 
110'reiiUMa.a B oso O n o B -n a ev iL ix  HcroM iiHKO u xia.uM, hcxojui m 
co B p e M e if itb ix  s iia i iH H , To.ribK o a r o M H a a  a iiep reT M tca  c i io c o O i ia  u 
S y A y u ie M  oG ecneM M Tb i io T p e S u o c r M  iie .r ioB e‘iecrrBa. H o a r o M y  o i x a B  o r  
a'l'OM iioH aaep reT H K M  c e r o A i ia  'ip eB a 'r . mto m n o c n e u i i i o c r b  c  pasBU Tne.M  
aTOMiiOM B iiepre'i'H KM  iieA O iiy cT H M a {xotii mu CMHTa.riM h CM uraeM  
I ieobxO A H M U M  M XOIIOMHMeCKM BbirOAHblM liyC K  COBjieMeilFlblX  
6 e 3 o n a c n b ix  au ep roG .n oK O B  N o .  6  3 a n o p o x c K o n .  N o .  4  P o B e iiC K o n . 
N o .  2 X M e.TbiiH iiK O H  A3C).
Whereas the need to develop alternative energy was acknowledged, it was more important to 
build storage facilities for nuclear waste.
Minekonomiki (the Ministry of Economy) was more favourable to Zelenyi M ir's suggestions, 
given that it had no vested interest in nuclear power. The Deputy Minister, lu. Nechaev, also 
responding to the letter presented to Kravchuk, informed Zolotukhin that a group of experts from 
various ministries and departments was being set up to work out a national fuel and energy 
programme. During its work, the group would discuss alternative energy as well as a concept for 
the further development of nuclear energy in Ukraine. A lifting of the moratorium on the building 
o f nuclear reactors made by Verkhovna Rada in February 1990 could not be excluded. As for 
Shapovalov’s ideas, these were known to Minekonomia's specialists and would be discussed by
157the group .
n a p o r a 30B F » ie  y c r a i F O B K H  (HFY). 
No. 15-66/584. 17.6.1992.
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Following the elaboration of the energy programme referred to above (and officially labelled 
‘Energetika’) Zelenyi Svii's Commission on Nuclear Power Stations and Alternative Energy, y
headed by Zolotukhin, produced a report containing a thorough analysis of the programme and 
providing an alternative approach. The energy programme envisaged a reconstruction and further |
development of traditional energy sources, like nuclear power, thermal power and hydro-eleetric 
power. As for energy saving and gas-generated steam power stations (parohazovye stantsii) these v|
would constitute 16.5 and 7.25% respectively of total energy production. To replace the three 7
reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, the programme envisaged the construction of one
"IVVER-1000 reactor at the Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power stations 
respectively. Between 1994 and 2006 all VVER-reactors would be reconstructed. In this J
connection, each of them would be closed for an average of three years. Reconstruction would be 
costly. The total cost was estimated at three billion roubles. y
Zelenyi Svit's report criticised the official programme for failing to take into consideration the | |
Chernobyl accident and construction flaws in the VVER-reactors when planning the future energy 5||
situation in Ukraine. As a result of the accident at Chernobyl, Ukraine could not under any
v'llcircumstances ‘afford’ yet another accident. Even if the VVER- reactors were reconstructed, they 
could never be 100% safe. In Germany, for instance, eight VVER-reactors in the former GDR 
were decommissioned as there would be no point in reconstructing them. Costs of reconstruction,
furthermore, equalled the price of one new reactor. Thus, from an economic point of view, such V 
reconstruction would be a very expensive solution.
What was more, nuclear power stations, thermal and hydro-electric power stations were to a 
large extent to blame for the environmental crisis in Ukraine. To further expand their use thus 
made no sense also from an environmental point of view. The costs of implementing the 
programme would, according to calculations made by Zelenyi Svit equal the cost o f three 
Chernobyls, thus leaving little if no means by which to research alternative energy sources.
Arguments to the effect that nuclear energy was a precondition for Ukrainian independence, 
said the report, were deceptive, then the
I
;
PeK oncT pyK L iiîi I aIh AEC is y w o is a x  iiiA c y T iio c i 'i  is .iia c iin x  i iA e p i io l  |
npoM H C .iO B O cri, iia.riH B H oro HHK.'iy, c x o B u iii  p a A io a K T n isH u x  liU ixo jiiB ,
M 036aB .'u i£  lia  su a M u n n  a a c  n e 3 a .a e x u o o r i  y K p a i i i y .  B y A iB im n T B O  
H A e p iio r o  K O M iirieK cy n o r p e S y s  3 iiaa iiM X  K o iiiT ia , b k h x  u iK o .a n  n o  f
6 y A e  n o B e p n e i io .  5 o  A ia  AEC e i c o n o M ia n o  sS y T K O u a  y  is c lx  K j x i i u a x
C B i iy .  7
I
Only the loss o f valuable water resources to serve the nuclear power stations equalled the value of 
.the electricity generated by them. Besides, costs of radioactive substances and radiation as well as
747
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proper storage facilities remained to be calculated. According to data provided by Greenpeace, it 
would cost some 30 billion American dollars to decommission one reactor. Thus, the three 
reactors envisaged to be built in the programme, would only be able to ‘earn’ one sixth of total 
construction and decommissioning costs and make it a very costly alternative.
The Greens suggested that an international commission be set up to calculate the likelihood of 
accidents at the existing VVER-reactors by international standards. Prior to the full eradication of 
nuclear contamination caused by the Chernobyl accident and prior to the solving of the issue of 
radioactive waste, a moratorium should be introduced on the construction of any new nuclear 
reactors on Ukrainian territory. The programme should not be adopted in its present form prior to 
a referendum on nuclear power having taken place. Should the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers fail 
to make any changes to the programme, Zelenyi Svit, together with other political organisations 
and parties would have no choice but to collect signatures in support of a referendum on nuclear 
power. Should a referendum take place, people should also be asked about their attitudes towards 
alternative energy.
As for alternatives to nuclear power, Zelenyi Svit's report revealed that Ukraine was one out 
of five countries in the world which possessed current up-to-date gas turbine technology. Based 
on this, the Greens could offer the following alternative:
flpoiiOHyerboi iia 5 a : ii  KOiiBepTOuaiiHX a u ia n iu n H x  Ta icopa6e.ibHHX 
c ep iH iio  BHpoS.TiieMMx raBOBHx T y p S iii paspoG.'urru no.a ien ep reT H 'iiii 
ra:ioT .yp5 in i e .ieK T p o cra iiu ii (n E r T C )" \  H ici. oK pivi 
e.teK Tpoenepri Ï  ôyviyrb BHpo6.riiiTH: I'opaa i BOiiy A iioB irpa , xo.:ioa. 
iiapy, ci'Hc.ie noB irpa , K iceiib, asor. Boviy 3 iiO B irp in io î BO.ïiorM ra 
iiim e . A IB CBOEÏ poSo™ , Kpivi rasy, FIEPTC v io x e  BXUBa ru:
iiaijrry, rasiijiiKO Ba iie Byri.T.ia. 6 io .v iacy , B uxjion iii I'asM y c i x  mjiiu 
BHpoduMLvrB i  iiau iTb co inriuy e iiep r iio . flETTC x io x e  Gyru 
uaS .nuxena ao  c n o x u B a ' i iB , eKOJioriaiio aucTa, eKOiroMiMiio BuriA iia  
(viaE 1-H pOKM O K yn iiocri), MaiieapoBa, y T i .a i3 y £  BHX.Ton. iie 
iiorpeby E. a Bupo6.nn a BOAy 3 n o B ir p iiiio i boao th , ne uorpedya
K'airiTa.Tbiioï ô y A iB .'ii a.-ui ce6e. lliAroTOBica a o  BHnycicy flETTC 
sauME 1-2 poKM, saBABicH BunycKy IIEPTC Y icpaliia M o x e  mopiM iio 
BBOAMITI 7 M.lll. I c B t  e . T e K T p i M I I H X  i  2 2  M.rill. k B t  TeilAOBHX
iiO'ryxHoci'eH. K o e iliiit ie irr  BHKopMC/raniui najinna b  flEPTC 5 i.stbiiie  
90%.(Point 4.4.)
r ip o iio iiy  ETbCB ua iiiAcrasax BBOAy flEPTC ao 1997 po ixy syn u iiu T n  
y c i  Be.BMKi TEC, PEC, PAEC i  u ep ea ecrn  eiieprerH K y Y K p a ïu u  iia 
peuTa6e.ribiiMH p e x u v i  podoT u. A o  2010 po icy AOBeciu BAK opucraïun i 
riEPTC AO 54:, AEC ira iioiion.nioBaeMux A x e p e a a x  ao 16%,
e i ie p r o s d e p e x e i iiu i  ao 25-35%, 3a paxyiiOK i.iboro iiepeATH bIa OEC 
AO per ioiia.M b iinx eueprocncT eM . H pn nbo.viy BMicopHcraiiini 
opraiiMMiioro iiaauB a O yae CKOpoaeiie ripoTU 0 ( | ) i u i A i i o i  riporpa.viH, 
iiaB iT b 3 BpaxyBaiiiiiiM A i ï  AEC. 3ai3ABKU r ipudyTK iB  Ta u p o A a x y
riEFTC 3a KopAoii. bk iio N -x a y . m o x iio  5y;ie iipHcryiini'M ao 
Ae v io iiT a x y  ueiMKHX AEC, TEC. TEC la  EAEC. (Point 4.5.)
The proposals made by the Green Movement, consisted of two parts, both produced by the 
Nikolaev Greens. The first part, ‘Programme for the Development of Energy without Nuclear 
Power Stations in Ukraine’, was written by Zolotukhin, whereas V. Hryhorenko (Senior Lecturer 
at the MKBI (Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute) was responsible for the second; ‘Polyenergy Gas 
Turbine Facilities as the Basis of Ukraine’s Future Power Engineering’. The report was submitted 
to the First Deputy Prime Minister, I. lukhnovskii, in January 1993*^ .^
A detailed list""^ of suggestions regarding the ‘Power Engineering’-programme was produced 
by the same Zelenyi Svit Commission in March the same year, to complement the report of 
January 1993. The list contained four main priorities, which the Greens thought the official 
programme ought to reflect. According to this list, the programme should:
EfiepremKâ YKpaXifH, 19.1.1993.
riDono3Huiï AO KOMnjteKcuoi nnoroaMH ’’EitepreTHKa". signed by Zolotukhin, 17.3.1993.
161 No. 02/32-367. 13.5.1993.
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1) Prevent any repetition o f global catastrophes (o f the scale o f the Chernobyl accident)
2) Secure the moral and physical health o f both the people and the environm ent o f  Ukraine.
3) Facilitate profitable energy production in Ukraine, taking into account care for the environm ent, the 
reprocessing o f waste and the removal o f  old facilities and soil recultivation. N one o f these priorities had 
been included in the official programme, as far as the Greens could see, given that the governm ent’s aim was 
to expand the ‘unified energy system ’ - i.e. a combination o f nuclear power, therm al pow er and hydro­
electric power, in the future.
The list also addressed alternative energy options more thoroughly than the report quoted 
from above. Due to conversion of aviation, ship (Zaporizhzhia, Nikolaev and Krivyi Rih) and 
industrial (Kliarkiv) GTU  (gas turbine facilities), it would be possible to produce seven million I
kW hours of electrical and 22 million kW hours of thermal power annually, within the next one or 
two years. In comparison it would take 15-20 twenty years to build between seven and 10 nuclear 
reactors and the costs would be much higher.
The propositions made by Zelenyi Svit directly to the then Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, 
and the propositions made to the programme ‘Ukraine’s Power Engineering to the Year 2010’ 
were examined by Minenergo and a written reply was given to Zelenyi Mir in May 1993*^*. The 
Ministry expressed interest in the alternative programme developed by Hryhorenko and was ready 
to take on all its ‘rational elements’. With regard to the suggestion that nuclear, thermal and 
hydro-electric power stations, accounting for 90% of the total energy production in Ukraine, be 
replaced with PEGTS, the response was rather negative:
  --
Boiii}oc...xoTi) H HMeer iipauo iia paccviorpeime o/maico a O.iHxaHiiiHe 
10-15 .ler pea.iH3ai.iHH sTOH Hjien a 'ipeOyevioM MaiuTafie 
via.'iOBepojiTiia, no o&bevia.vi HiuiecrrHUHH, creiieiiH roToaiiociH 
npoMbim.aeimocri'H k abinycK.y o6opyAonaiiHH h oOecneMeiiHio cio.ib  
LiiHpoKoro ({ipoina snepreTH'iecKoro cipoMTe.ibci'Ba iiai.iHoiia.'ibiibi.MH 
pecypaiMH.
As seen above, it is clear that neither Minenergo, nor Ukratomenergo were able to refute the 
PEGTS project in itself, but rather rejected it based on the time-scale and costs - although cost- 
calculations made by the Greens indicated that it would be much cheaper than to expand the 
capacity and enhance safety at the existing nuclear power stations. Moreover, the time-scale 
estimated by Minenergo differed markedly from that of Hryhorenko and Zelenyi Svit, the latter of 
whom was more familiar with the possible production sites for the PEGTS than was probably the 
Ministry. It thus seems that the objections to the PEGTS raised in Kiev were rooted more in 
inertia and a lack of willingness to radically change the energy structure of Ukraine, than in 
objective reasons for not introducing the PEGTS. This was later to make the situation rather 
difficult for Zelenyi Svit and local authorities who favoured the Greens’ idea, but who depended 
upon Minenergo for funding, which the Ministry was unwilling to release. Zolotukhin drew the 
following conclusion following Minenergo's and others’ hesitant response:
O ' t ' x e  a.iT bxepnaT H B a i c i i y e ,  i i o T i ) e 5 n a  .rm u ie  A o S p a  boah A ioAefi, 
no36aB.rieu»Hx cinApoM y aiviopaAbMGcri. bhiuhm iiiAcyMKOM akoi.ii ci'an 
hopuoÔHAb. B icocb  B. P io r o  bhcaobhb: ’’FlaM’ATaTH-ue osna'ia  
r iep eA b a q a T H !” T o x i y  iia M ’ ATaHMO, t u o  iie p io A  n ia p o s n a A y  ftop iioÔ H JK O
m e  'I’p H B a e  i ckopothth H o r o  mh w a s  mo ahiuo a e p e s  r iiA ite ce iii iA. 162i i a m o i  M o p a A b ito c 'i 'i  i  saaAAKH l î A a c n o i  boai...
It was, however, the pro-nuclear lobby which succeeded in shaping Ukrainian energy policies 
centrally. On 18 .Tune 1993 Verkhovna Rada lifted the moratorium on construction of nuclear 
r e a c t o r s a n d  Umanets claimed that it would not be possible to close Chernobyl down in 1993, 
as Ukraine was short of energy and the three reactors at Chernobyl could not immediately be 
replaced by any other energy-producing facility. The Parliament even learnt that its moratorium 
had not been followed, as construction on nuclear reactors had continued during the period it 
covered. Coinciding with the session of Verkhovna Rada, an international conference on 
Strategies for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex in Ukraine, organised by the 
World Bank and the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers took place in Kiev. The World Bank offered
'^^AiiaTOAHH 3o.riOT.yxHU, flepiOA niBPosnaAV ftopnoSRaA. 22 .5 .1993. c. 4.
PajiJHiCbKe npHÔyoKmu 20.7.1993, c. 3. For further details regarding the PEGTS, see also PayjmiChKe
npH(TyÆ:Æa,2\.\2.\993, c. 3, and 23 .12 .1993 , c. 4.
750
«funding to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station and 400 million American dollars towards 
the construction of new reactors (six were envisaged in the Ukrainian Energy Programme). In 
order to secure this arrangement, Umanets, even prior to the lifting of the moratorium by 
Verkhovna Rada, assured the World Bank representatives that once an agreement was reached, the 
moratorium would be lifted!
.Zelenyi Mir, however, continued its campaign in favour of PEGTS. Given that industrial 
production, according to figures produced by the World Bank, would continue to drop until 1996, 
when energy consumption would have fallen by 30-35% compared to 1990, it would not cause an 
energy crisis to dismantle all the Ukrainian nuclear power statio is and introduce alternative
energy sources. Besides, Russia was under an obligation to stop deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel to
'Ukraine since Ukraine had not yet signed the non-proliferation treaty. Secondly, in accordance 
with the Law on Environmental Protection adopted in 1992, Russia would no longer accept 
radioactive waste from Ukrainian nuclear power stations, and Ukraine had yet not developed its 
own storing and reprocessing facility. The introduction of the full nuclear cycle in Ukraine would 
cost much more than the use of any organic fuel. Fourthly, Ukraine’s own uranium deposits 
would only last for another 25 years or so. These arguments, combined with poor safety at the 
Ukrainian nuclear power stations as well as the fall-out from the accident in Chernobyl, from 
which the people and the environment of Ukraine were still suffering, should be a sufficiently 
good reason to switch from nuclear power to alternative energy, in the opinion of the Greens. By 
introducing various conservation measures, experts estimated that 50% of the electricity currently 
being used could be saved.
Given that Ukraine was self-supplied with gas turbine engines and could produce a large 
quantity of these annually"''^, it made sense to set up a number of the poluenergy gasturbine 
s t a t i o n s - based on Hryhorenko’s ideas'*'^, in combination with a method developed by
751
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Borysenko to burn fuel in units filled with heated steam (which at that time allowed for 30% of 
fuel to be replaced by water at the thermal power stations), which also resulted in virtually no 
pollution. Moreover, PEGTS made much better use of its fuel (the coefficient for the utilisation of 
fuel, KPD, was 90-94% for the PEGTS, as compared with 20% for the Unified Energy System - 
OES). Thus, with the same amount of fuel, the PEGTS could produce up to four times more 
energy, than could a traditional thermal power station. As for the nuclear power stations, the KPD
Gas turbine facilities were produced by the luTZ ‘ Zaria’, disel generators in Pervomaisk (zavod ini. ‘25 
Oktiabria) as were boilers (at ChSZ), that could be utilized in the production of electricity and heat. 
The Greens suggested that an oblast fuel and energy company be established and given the name 
‘NOTEK’, PaAfUiChKe f l p n ^ y 23.9.\993, c. 4.
For a more detailed, technical account on how the PEGTS works, see EKOAoriMiia nporpaMa "Curnajf.
obtainable from the Nikolaev oblast TV station.
These ideas were based on the so-called ‘KapiiOTMBHpoBaiiiiriH TepMOAHiiaMMMeacMH ijhkji’.
#
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was slightly higher, at 31%'^^. Given this circumstance, it was fully realistic to renew virtually all
the facilities within the Unified Energy System with PEGTS by the year 2000 - or at least replace
the nuclear power stations and the outdated thermal power stations by that time. Unlike the PGU,
which Minenergo was currently considering, the PEGTS also had the advantage that it required
neither steam turbines or water, both of which there was a shortage in Ukraine. The water needed
during the burning of fuel, could be made from moisture in the air, thus protecting the rivers of
.Ukraine. What was more, since small PEGTS were just as efficient as bigger PEGTS, loss of 
energy due to long-distance transportation could be avoided, thus making it a very efficient source 
of electricity.
The pro-nuclear lobby had raised two objections to the PEGTS', one - that Ukraine did not
have any gas deposits and two - that the PEGTS could never become a basic facility, like the
nuclear power stations. Zolotukhin refuted both these objections, arguing that gas, like nuclear
fuel, would have to be obtained from somewhere. However, whereas nuclear fuel could only be
obtained from Russia, Ukraine could chose between three to four different suppliers as far as the
gas was concerned. Secondly, calculations indicated that the gas Ukraine was already importing
for its thermal power stations would be sufficient to replace not only all the nuclear power stations
but also more than half of the thermal power stations. Finally, gas hydrates (gazogidraty) had
been located in the Black Sea. If the estimates were correct, these deposits were much larger than
.any other energy source on Ukrainian territory (estimated deposits: 20-25 trillion cubic metres).
167
‘::ÊAs an indication that Zelenyi Svit was a serious force in the alternative energy debate,
Zolotukhin informed the readers that its suggestions had been discussed and approved by a general
meeting at the Academy of Sciences on 22 March 1993. Goskomitet po naiike i tekhnologiiam
(the State Committee on Science and Technology), Minpriroda, Minmashprom (Ministry of
Mechanical Engineering), Minenergo and Verkhovna Rada's, Ecology Commission (2 June 1993)
had also approved of the suggestions. After the two Deputy Prime Ministers 1. lukhnovskii and lu.
Ioffe were urged to do the same, they left their posts. This was by Zolotukhin interpreted to the
effect that they refused to support the alternative position of the Greens. Zolotukhin demanded
that Zelenyi Svit's propositions be included in the Ukrainian Energy Programme and that the 
.moratorium not be lifted until an environmental impact assessment group had examined the
existing nuclear power stations.
The Greens were unable to prevent the deputies of Verkhovna Rada from voting in favour of
.lifting the moratorium on construction of nuclear reactors and in favour of reopening the 
Chernobyl nuclear power station on 21 October. In an Appeal made the following day, Zelenyi
PajlHUChKe npi46y:avmu 25.9.1993, c. 3.
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Svit criticised the decision in harsh words, arguing that it was illegal, since there was no quorum in 
the parliament when the decision was made. Besides, the vote was secret, whereas the Greens 
claimed it should have been open, given the importance of the issue. Local and oblast Soviets 
were encouraged to refuse any expansion of nuclear power stations located on their territory and to 
demand that the oblasts were given their fair share of the income from sales of electricity to other 
countries. The Appeal also demanded that the income of the nuclear power stations be put under 
public control*^^. Those who voted in favour of lifting the moratorium should be banned from 
standing for elections to the Verkhovna Rada in the future and finally, it demanded from all the 
people’s deputies that they gather signatures in their constituen ;s in favour of conducting a 
referendum simultaneously with new parliamentary elections on the future of nuclear power in 
Ukraine. As for the implications of the vote in Verkhovna Rada on the future of the PEGTS, 
Zelenyi Svit could do nothing but express its disapproval:
C av ie  KepiiîiiHUT iîo M ii ie i ie p r o , noSaquH iiiH, m o iiepAcaiia AOBiio.ui& 
lie  paxyBaTHcii 3 ipoMaACbKOio AyM icyio. BiAKH iiy.îio KO iiKpe'riii, 
o G rp y iiT o n a iii n p o r io 3 H u il ”3e.rienoro C B ix y ”, iiesBaxcaioHM iia re, m o  
BoiiM 6y.rm iiiA T pH M an i ÀK aA eM i& io iiay ic, 4 K H T , M iiiiipH poA H , 
M ifiMamnpoMOM, moAO lUBwrmoro, iiiA v A.mi AEC, poBiiMTicy i  
IUBMAKOÏ O K y n iio c r i, a o r o  sobcIm iie  Moxce S y x n  ii AEC, M a.no- i  
cet^eA iibonoTyxciiHX no.nieiiepreTUM iiHX ra30T yp6 iiiiiM X  cra im in"^ ^ .
The pro-nuclear lobby in Nikolaev oblast tried to ridicule Zelenyi Svit's alternative by arguing 
that it was merely a set of ideas. Zolotukhin could, however, confirm that gas turbine stations 
already existed in the United States, producing 63 million kW hours of electricity annually. Also 
Ukraine made use of such gas turbines. If one were to compare the costs of running a gas turbine 
station compared to the costs of a nuclear power station, the former was 10 times lower! What 
was more, fuel could be bought for hard currency earned from exports of electricity produced at 
the very same P E G T S T h e  argument so often used by the pro-nuclear lobby to the effect that 
big cities and towns could only exist based on a powerful and stable energy source, the source 
being nuclear power stations and thermal power stations, simply did not hold true. Then from an 
environmental point of view
HM eiiiio 5o.nbi.uoM MomiiocrM A3C, P3C h T3C, Hcqepiian 
3KOJiorMMecKHe eMKOCTH perMOHOD MX pa.3MemeiiHii, ripuBenH Y icpaH iiy
’ Figures were not released. This demand was made again by a meeting of the Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir on 17 
November 1993
yKpaXnchKMH niivieub, 19.11.1993, c. 3: d u e n t ie i i im  YEA ”3C” ao iiao o A V  YKpaiun 3 hdhboav 
C K acvB auiiA  Beuxomioio PaAoio M o p a r o p i i i  ua SvAiBiiHUToo AEC ra uppA O B A ceiim i A i l  9AEC. 
Pa/mibCKe TIpHÔyyKtaen, 26.4.1994, c. 4.
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K 3Ko.'iorHMecKOH KaTaci’po(l)e, nopoAHJH pacrparnoe noTpeo.ieuHe 
3.ieKTpoaiieprHM Ô.iarojiapîi mcm.v "ubiroAiiee" cra.to oToii.mrrb Aovia 
a.ieKTpHMecrreovi. mcm KOTe.ibiibtvtH'^ '.
Following the elections to the Verkhovna Rada in March/April 1994, Zolotukhin met with the 
new deputies from Nikolaev oblast, demanding that they seek to reintroduce the moratorium on 
the construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine, as well as that they initiate the closing of the 
Chernobyl nuclear power station. Finally, the deputies were urged to bring Zelenyi Svit's 
proposals regarding PEGTS up in parliament for discussion. Locally, at the oblast level, the 
Greens had the support of official authorities for its alternative energy programme. The 
President’s Representative in the Nikolaev oblast, Kinakh, in a letter to the First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Zviahylskyi, following the lifting of the moratorium referred to above, referred to 
decisions previously made by the oblast Soviet and claimed that the oblast was categorically 
against the completion of the fourth reactor at luzhnoukrainsk. To secure stable energy supplies in 
the future, Kinakh recommended
BuKopMcraTH npoMMc.HOBHü noTeimiaa naiuoi o6.ttacri no
BHÔopiiHUTBy ra30'ryp6inuHx e.HeKTpoci'aimiM, iie noT[De6yioMHx a-hh 
CBOEÏ po6oTH BOAM. OpaicTHMiio SesiieMiiHx, eKO.HoriMuo MHcrimnx.
6i.ribiii eK o n o M iq u H X , S i J i b u i  TaiieBpeAUHX. T c p iv iii i OyAiBJii akhx 
y'rpM M i icopoTU iH H , iiiA C  AEC.
As seen above, then, the Greens offered a real, cheap and environmentally friendly alternative 
to nuclear power and to thermal power. Due to the strong influence of the pro-nuclear lobby on 
the decision-making process centrally, in Kiev, and also due to a lack of flexibility and a wish to 
try something new, the PEGTS was not even introduced as a pilot project in the Nikolaev oblast 
despite the interest local authorities had taken in such a project. Zolotukhin in an interview with 
the author in Nikolaev in June 1994 requested that information about the PEGTS be passed on to 
anyone interested in alternative energy abroad, in the hope that a sponsor might be found so that a 
test station could be set up. Once the feasibility of Hryhorenko’s and Borysenko’s project has 
been proven, it will be much easier for the Greens and local authorities to get financial support 
from Kiev and to put pressure on the Ukrainian government to shut down the luzhnoukrainsk 
nuclear power station, which, as has been shown above, is far from safe.
yKpüïncLKMH niUMiih, 27.1.1994, c. 7.
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7.4 Conclusion
Although the campaign to save the luzhnii Bug River was successful in that a decision was taken 
not to go ahead with the third stage and to implement the second stage of the SB EK in only a 
limited version, it is hard to say whether or not the Greens have in the end been successful. 
Whereas Zelenyi Mir succeeded in lobbying and pushing local and regional authorities into 
passing resolutions and decisions to prevent the original project from going ahead, these have been 
undermined by the pro-nuclear lobby, which has simply not implemented them, or disputed them 
so as to win time. The closer an object is to being completed, the easier it is to argue that it is 
economically unacceptable to abandon it. Earlier local and regional authorities were on the side of 
the Greens. If  this ‘alliance’ will last also in the future remains to be seen. The economic 
difficulties of Ukraine have hit the regions particularly hard and various incentives as well as 
pressure from ‘Kiev’ may therefore be hard to ignore. What is more, the Greens are tired: It takes 
time and effort to maintain the campaign and there are growing signs of disillusion that despite the 
effort and despite the achievements, the expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex has 
still not been halted.
Last year, Zhuk, a prominent member of the Voznesensk branch o f Zelenyi Mir was killed 
in a car accident. Zolotukhin argued that this was not simply an accident, indicating that the pro- 
nuclear lobby might be behind it. It is of course impossible to verify his allegations. What seems 
clear, though, is that although Nikolaev Zelenyi Mir compared to other Ukrainian Green 
Movements is a big and strong group, it is losing members. In Nikolaev, as in other parts of 
Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly difficult to mobilise the population and to organise 
campaigns. As seen above, the Nikolaev Greens have successfully lobbied local and regional 
authorities for their cause. Compared to other Greens they managed the transition from pressure 
group to lobby group very well - much thanks to the skills and qualifications of those people 
working actively within Zelenyi Mir. Paradoxically, though, it now appears that a return from 
lobbying to campaigning and mass actions is needed to secure the implementation of those 
decisions made and to keep an eye on the site of the Energy Complex in the future. Whether or 
not Zolotukhin and his fellow Greens will succeed in achieving this, remains to be seen.
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8  T h e  U k r a i n i a n  G r e e n s  in  a  C o m p a r a t i v e  P e r s p e c t i v e
8.0 Introduction
Whereas there is no doubt a need for more thorough studies of the Green movements which emerged 
in the former USSR following the introduction of concepts like ‘glasnost’ and ‘démocratisation’ in 
the late 1980s, it is of equal importance to place these Green movements in a broader, international 
perspective. The comparative study of Green Parties and Green Movements in Western Europe is 
already a well-established discipline and is therefore appropriate to include the Soviet Greens into the 
overall analysis. At the practical level, though, this poses a number of problems.
Firstly, comparative analyses are in most cases based on surveys (attitudinal data), which have 
been conducted in a number of countries at approximately the same time. The aim of these surveys is 
to establish for instance whether or not Inglehart’s hypothesis that the Greens were a post-industrial 
phenomenon, who the Green voters are and what characterises them*. To extend such research to the 
former USSR presents a number of difficulties. In order to establish trends, one needs data collected 
over a relatively long period o f time (say, over a period of minimum four to five years). Surveys 
containing an identical set of questions should therefore be distributed in the given area at least on an 
annual basis and closely resemble those of similar surveys conducted elsewhere to be valid for 
comparative purposes.
In the case of Ukraine (as holds true also for the other former Soviet republics) such suiweys 
have only started to be conducted recently. Opinion polls to establish what are people’s attitudes to 
various political movements and parties, political preferences, etc. have been conducted since the late 
1980s. However, as these polls rarely cover the entire country but only parts of it, samples are small 
and methodologies sometimes poor (not random samples and/or leading questions) such surveys 
cannot be used as a basis for hypothesising on the national level. Surveys conducted at the early 
stage are also often unreliable as a data source given that people viewed them with general 
scepticism, not always wanting to reveal their real opinion or trying to figure out how the surveyors 
wanted them to respond and give answers accordingly. During the Soviet period opinions other than 
those matching official views were better left unspoken and 70 years of totalitarian rule left its 
imprint on the general public making people cautious with regard to revealing political attitudes to 
strangers. Finally, opinions change quickly in the former Soviet Union. Polls therefore tend to 
quickly get outdated.
' For a detailed list of such studies, see Philip D. Lowe and Wolfgang Rtidig, ‘Review Article: Political 
Ecology and the Social Sciences - the State of the Art’. British Journal of Political Science, vol. 16, pp. 513- 
50.
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Secondly, comparative research is complicated by the fact that the Green Movement in the 
former USSR is much younger than its counterparts in Western Europe and the United States, in 
addition to having emerged under political and economic conditions very different from those in the 
latter. The planned economy of the USSR was, as seen in Chapter Two. like the capitalist economies 
of Western Europe highly industrialised, but yet riddled with shortages and deficiencies due to its 
emphasis on economic growth (output). Heavy industry was given priority over light industry and 
there were fewer consumer goods available to the general public than in the West. Although people 
were not poor, materially they were not as well off as people in the West, where living standards 
were much higher. Mo cover, the Soviet economy had started to '^-"gnate before the beginning of 
Gorbachev’s tenure as general secretary of the CPSU^.
Despite of the methodological and practical difficulties involved - a comparative study 
incorporating the Ukrainian Greens is desirable, as the Green Movement has since the late 1970s 
grown into a world-wide movement. Revealing the differences and similarities between the various 
movements and demonstrating how cultural factors as well as unequal political and economical 
structures have contributed to these differences, is thus useful.
In this chapter I will examine three fundamental elements of the Ukrainian Green Movement, 
determining its major features. First, I will look at its theoretical framework, link it to the concept o f 
eco-culture outlined in Chapter One, and relate it to Green political theory in Western Europe. I will 
then try to establish how this framework manifests itself through the formation of Green policies. 
Secondly, I will discuss the validity of explaining the emergence of Green Movements/Parties in 
industrialised societies as a result o f ‘post-materialist value change’. This notion, which was first 
introduced by Inglehart has become a popular - though controversial - starting point for analysing 
Greens in the West. In the Soviet context, however, as will be shown below, it does not easily Tit’. 
Thirdly, I will look at how a different theoretical framework and different political context has 
shaped a Green political agenda somewhat different from that of similar Green Movements/Parties in 
Western Europe. Finally, I will examine the support basis of the Ukrainian Greens and also try to 
establish whether the Ukrainian political system is restricting the Greens’ access to the country’s 
political arena.
8.1 A Comparison of Theoretical Frameworks and Policies.
In Chapter One I outlined a Slav eco-culture, which existed in pre-Revolutionary Russia and then was 
kept alive as a sub-culture during the Soviet period. I argued that the roots to the present Green
 ^See for instance Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) and Anders 
Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform TLondon: Pinter Publishers, 1989).
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 ^Robyn Eckersley, Environmentatism and Political Theory . Towards and Ecocentric Approach (London: 
UCL Press Ltd., 1992).
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Movement of Ukraine could be found in this sub-culture, providing a useful tool for explaining the 
emergence ofZeJenyi Svit, in addition, of course to the general political changes which took place in 
the USSR following the coming to power of Gorbachev.
In this section, I will look at the theoretical framework of Zelenyi Svit and PZU, and the link
between this framework and Slav eco-culture. I will then contrast this framework with various g
theories on the environment developed by Greens in the West, and try to establish what they have in â '
common and in which ways they differ. ÏK
'1
8.1.1 Classifying Western Thinking on the Environment
Greens are often classified along a practical, as well as along a theoretical scale. In the latter case, a
■ .wdistinction is made between eco-socialists, eeo-liberals and eco-eonservatives. Another distinction
frequently used is that between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecologists, or between ‘pragmatic’ and g;
‘dogmatic’ Greens (in Germany the two groups are referred to as ‘realos’ - realists - and ‘fundis’ - 
fundamentalists). A
Robyn Eckersley^ classifies various currents of green political thought along a continuum | |
moving from anthropocentrism on the one end, towards ecocentrism on the other end. Her 
classification scheme is more suitable for my purposes and below, I will look at where to place the 
Ukrainian Greens (i.e. Zelenyi Svit and PZU) on this continuum - theoretically as well as practically.
,ï'First, however, I will give a brief outline of the currents included on this continuum (see next page), L
Fig. 8.1 Classification scheme for Green Political Thought
Anthropocentrism_________________________________________________________ Ecocentrism
Resource
conservation
Human welfare 
ecology
Preservationism
Animal liberation
Ecocentrism
Figure derived from Eckersley’s classification scheme (1992)
Resource Conservationists have an anthropocentric outlook on Nature in that they regard it 
primarily as a factor of production. Their aim is to improve economic productivity by achieving a 
maximum sustainable yield of natural resources. Thus, waste and depletion of natural resources are 
undesirable elements of modern produetion. By aiming for minimal waste, they therefore seek to 
conserve nature for development and to maximise economic growth. This current can be traced back 
to the last century and to Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the US Forest Service, although its origins 
are much older, dating back to Plato, Mencius, Cicero and the Bible, getting a boost by the rise of 
modern science in the 16th centuiy. Eckersley sees this movement as the first step away from what is 
labelled ‘the unrestrained development’ approach.
H um an Welfare Ecology emerged only recently, in the second half o f this century, in response 
to numerous environmental problems following the end of the Second World War and as a result of 
the emergence of the ‘post-materialist’ values of the so-called ‘new middle class’. The major focus 
o f this current is environmental quality, which can be achieved by sustainable development, i.e. 
sustaining the natural resource base for human production and reproduction. Not only are the 
physical limits to economic growth, but also ‘soft’ limits - in terms of health, amenity, recreational
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and psychological needs of human beings. Human Welfare Ecologists are critical not only of 
economic growth, but also of the notion that science and technology alone can do away with the 
present environmental crisis. As Man is very much seen as being in charge of Nature, a new 
stewardship ethic is called for - biological support systems must be protected and nurtured not 
because they have intrinsic value in themselves, but because we depend on them for our living. This 
new stewardship ethic should include appropriate technology, ‘soft’ energy paths, organic 
agriculture, alternative medicine, public transport, recycling, re-evaluation of human needs and more 
ecologically benign lifestyles. ‘We must look after nature because she looks after us. We must do 
this "for our children", "our future generations", "for o ü i  health and am enity"’. The German ‘die 
Grünen’ can be placed within this current. When criticised for not adopting a more radical, eco­
centric approach, human welfare ecologists respond that there is no reason to challenge the public 
and lose the support of politicians with ‘radical’ or ‘utopian’ ideas like ‘nature for its own sake’, 
when the same as what the ecocentrists want, can be achieved by adopting a more moderate 
approach.
Preservationists, like resource conservationists, want to preserve nature from destruction. But 
rather than preserving it for development, they want to preserve it from development. For them, 
nature is a subject of reverence and enlightenment in addition to representing a set of threatened 
values. Wilderness is worth preserving in the sense of the aesthetic and spiritual attributes it holds. 
Also the preservationists are predominantly anthropoeentric in that they justify preserving selected 
parts of Nature due to the aesthetic and spiritual experiences they give Man, not because they are 
worth preserving for their own sake. Fox distinguishes between nine kinds of arguments in favour of 
preserving wilderness"^. The preservation movement can be traced back to the latter half of the 19th 
century and to the opening of the Yellowstone National Park in 1872. This movement has been 
criticised by ecocentrists for not being a ‘total’ approach. To them it makes no sense to preserve 
small areas of wilderness as sooner or later environmental degradation will also affect these. 
Flowever, Eckersley draws the conclusion that ‘in its most radical form Preservationism should be 
valued not only for its instrumental value to us but also for its own sake. In this respect it can be seen 
as a predecessor to ecocentrism’ .^
Anim al Liberationists hold the opinion that all sentient beings should be considered equals 
regardless of what kind of species they are. Any living being capable of feeling pain and joy is 
considered to have interests in the same way as human beings have. Thus, adherents of animal
 ^ ‘The life support’, ‘early warning system’, ‘laboratory’ (i.e. scientific study), ‘silo’ (i.e. stockpile of genetic 
diversity), ‘gymnasium’ (i.e. recreational), ‘art gallergy’ (i.e. aesthetic), ‘cathedral’ (i.e. spiritual), 
‘monument’ (i.e. symbolic) and ‘psychogenetic’ (i.e. psychological health and maturity). See Eckersley 
(1992), p. 41.
 ^Ibid.. p. 42.
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liberation are opposed to ‘speciesism’ or anthropocentrism and they advocate a ban on hunting and 
slaughtering of all sentient beings, prohibition of vivisection and factory farming. Animal liberation 
is as its name suggests an emancipatory movement in that it calls for the liberation of all sentient 
beings. The animal liberation movement dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries and the societies 
for the prevention of cruelty to animals and represents a revival of the arguments developed by the 
modern utilitarian school of moral philosophy founded by Jeremy Bentham. A number of criticisms 
have been raised against this current by the ecocentrists. To mention but one, animal liberationists 
have been criticised for their failure to give any value to non-sentient beings. Thus the animal 
liberationists simply replace ‘homocentrist rationalism’ with ‘zoocentrUi sentientism’ .^
Ecocentrism  is concerned with protecting ‘threatened populations, species, habitats and 
ecosystems wherever they are situated and irrespective of their use or importance to human beings, in 
other words it is a more wide-ranging and more ecologically informed variant of Preservationism that 
builds on the insights of the other streams of environmentalism’  ^ outlined above. In addition to 
recognising the full range of human interests in the non-human world, ecocentrism also recognises 
the interests of the nonhuman community and of future generations of humans as well as non­
humans. Finally, ecocentrism adopts a holistic rather than atomistic perspective. Within the Western 
tradition of ecocentric approach it is possible to distinguish between three different types of 
ecocentrism. These are: m/topoietic intrinsic value theory, transpersonal ecology and ecofeminism. 
Since ecofeminism is not an issue either for Zelenyi Svit or for PZU, 1 will focus on the two former 
types.
Autopoietic Intrinsic Value Theory attributes intrinsic value to all entities that display the 
property of autopoiesis (i.e. ‘self-production’/ ’self-renewal’), i.e. to entities that are ‘primarily’ and 
continuously concerned with the regeneration of their own organisational activity and structure. 
Since these entities can be seen as ends in themselves, which is also the definition of intrinsic value, 
they can be said to have intrinsic value®.
Transpersonal Ecology is more concerned with cosmological and psychological aspects of 
ecocentrism. Transpersonal ecologists emphasise the way in which we understand and experience the 
world. Their primary concern is the cultivation of a wider sense of self through the common or 
everyday psychological process of identification with others. The transpersonal ecology approach is 
cosmological in that it regards all living phenomena on Earth as leaves on a ‘tree of life’. Whereas 
such an approach may help us identify with other living beings, however, it fails to address the non-
' See ibid., pp. 42-45. 
See ibid., pp. 45-47. 
See ibid., pp. 60-61.
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living phenomena which also help sustain life (for instance rain, warmth/heat and minerals), and in 
addition, it fails to place the Earth in a larger picture, namely that of Cosmos in a wider sense^.
Above I have outlined the major currents of environmental thought in a ‘Western’ context. 1 
shall now proceed to examine the theoretical framework of Zelenyi Svit and PZU  within this context. 
Robyn Eckersley views the ecological crisis as an ‘unexamined flip side o f our Western (my 
emphasis) humanist heritage. In the face of accelerated environmental degradation and species 
extinction, environmental philosophers are now asking: are we humans the only beings of value in 
the world? Does the world exist only for our benefit?’
As pointed out in Chapter One, these questions were being addressed in the Russian empire 
already in the second half of the 19th century by the ‘Cosmologists’. Moreover, there is in Slav 
cultures and in Slav Orthodox Christianity a more closely knit relationship between Nature and Man 
than what is the case in West European cultures. This relationship not surprisingly, is also reflected 
in the theoretical framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement.
8.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement/Party
In the Zelenyi Svit office in Kiev there are two portraits on the wall. One is that of the Ukrainian 
national poet, Taras Shevchenko, the other that of the scientist Volodymyr Vernadskii. When asked 
what is the theoretical framework on which the Greens base their work, people point to Shevchenko 
and V ernadskii'\ stating that they are the fathers of the Green Movement in Ukraine. Others also 
include the Ukrainian philosopher Skorovoda, and some members of Zelenyi Svit at one point tried to 
set up classes for children to teach them the learnings of Ivanov, an ascetic living in Eastern Ukraine 
who taught people how to get back into contact with Nature. No names of Western Green thinkers 
have ever been mentioned by Ukrainian Greens as having influenced their movement, although 
Andrii Hlazovyi, who has since left Zelenyi Svit, at one point admitted that the idea to set up a Green 
Party emerged partially as a result of hearing about the German Greens and the success they had'^.
To begin with Vernadskii,. he is in Soviet/post-Soviet science often referred to as the father of 
the ‘noosphere’. 1 will return to this concept below, but will first give a brief account of Vernadskii’s 
life. Vladimir Vernadskii was born in 1863 in St.Petersburg as the second son to the famous
 ^See ibid.. pp. 61-63.
Ibid., p. 2.
" A ls o  Z e /e n y t  S v / f s  p r o g r a m m e  iSamnMM Cuir, FIoorpaMa (K m ïb , o icn iftpb , 1989)] e x p lic i t ly  sta tes  
th e  c o m m ittm e n t  o f  th e  G r e e n s  to  th e  id ea s o f  V e r n a d s k i i  : P o in t  7 . s e c t io n  1 . rea d s as follows: ‘a i i  
"3e.aenoro CBtry” noBu iiui cnupaTH ca na n iJ iicny cu creM y c y a a c n n x  eKO.noriBnnx siiaub, Baeiimi B. 1. 
BepiiaiicbKoro npo itoociliepy ra na npanteinui sabesne'im 'M  y  M audy riibOMy aB'ionpoijaEicrb ri.fTanerapi[Hx 
iipoeKT iii .niOACbicoi A iîiJibnocri’ ( s e e  p. 5 ).
Interview with Hlazovyi in Kiev, Summer 1992.
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professor and econom ist Ivan Vernadskii, a Ukrainian by descent. When Vernadskii was still a child, 
his fam ily moved to Kharkiv, where his father was appointed director o f  the local branch o f  the 
(Russian) State Bank. During childhood, Vernadskii spent much time with and was greatly 
influenced by his grandfather. Through him he developed an interest in the natural sciences. Having 
completed the Classical Gymnasium in St. Petersburg, to where his fam ily returned when he was 14, 
Vernadskii decided to study at the department o f  natural sciences at the Faculty o f  Physics and 
M athematics o f  the University o f  St. Petersburg. There he became a student o f  M endeleev and 
Dokuchaev, studying geology and m ineralogy. Vernadskii took an interest also in other subjects and 
read extensively. Upon com pleting his Masters degree in 1885, he was given a job at the 
M ineralogical Cabinet o f  the University, set up by Dokuchaev.
In 1890 Vernadskii went to M oscow, where he was appointed a lecturer at the university. 
Having been awarded his doctorate in 1895, he soon established h im self as a prom inent scientist in 
both Russia and Ukraine. Vernadskii specialised in crystal logy and m ineralogy, and he was the first 
to discover that the com position o f  minerals is not simply a question o f  chem ical reactions, but a 
question o f  the specifics o f  the atoms, o f  which they consisted. To do so, he had to draw on three 
until then separate branches o f  science - geology, chem istry and physics. After som e ten years o f  
research, Vernadskii introduced a new scientific discipline - that o f  geochem istry - to the 12th 
Congress o f  Russian Natural Scientists and Doctors in 1904.
The follow ing years Vernadskii continued his research on geochemisti'y and the evolution o f  the 
crust o f  the Earth. He then proceeded to study the role o f  living creatures in the developm ent o f  the 
surface o f  the Earth and the biosphere, which resulted in a second new scientific branch being 
introduced, namely that o f  biogeochemistry. Based on his findings, Vernadskii in 1922 re-defined 
the concept o f  the ‘biosphere’ as defined by the Austrian geologist Zjuss. To Zjuss the biosphere 
eould be defined as the plant and animal life on the Earth’s surface. Vernadskii, the only one to 
accept this terminology, specified the definition: by the ‘biosphere’ he understood the ‘naturally 
determined organisation o f  the movement o f  matter and energy under the influence o f  living  
matter’’ .^ Man, through his work and his conscious relationship to his surroundings, reshapes the 
crust o f  the Earth - the geological part o f  life - the biosphere, thus leaving it in a different geological 
shape'"'. To Vernadskii the implication o f  this thought was that
%rioneK. iiecoMireitHO, nepaspbinno cBiisan c >KHnbiivi iieLuecniOiVi, c
coiiOKyriiioCTbio oprannm oB , o/iFionpeMeimo c  iihm cymeCTiiyioiuHx wm
S ee r .n .  AKceuoB (pea.), BjiaaniviHp BepiiaacKHH. OTKptJTuii u cvai>6n. (MocKBa: ’’CoBpeMeiniMK”, 1993).
c. 156.
Ibid.. p. 4 2 8 .
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cyiiiecrBOBaüLLiHX a o  iiero . O p eacae Bcero. on  CBîiBaii c  iih.vih cbohm  
npoM3xo)KaeiiMeM'\
To illustrate his point, Vernadskii distinguished between two types o f  life - ‘avtotropnost’ and 
‘geterotropnost’. Whereas the former could sustain life on its own, w ithout the use o f  other species, 
the latter depended on others to sustain itself. Man thus falls into the second category. Man was in 
Vernadskii’s v iew  different from all other species in that he possessed reason (intellect). This could 
be used both in a constructive and in a destructive way. Thus
B reo.'iornaecKOH Mcropnu 5 H0C(j)epi)i iiepea ae-ioBeaecrnovî 
oTKpuBaeTCii orpovinoe 6 y a y m e e , ec.in on iionvieT aro h iie d y a e i  
yno’rpe6.BfiTb cbom pasyvi n cboh xpya na caMOMCTpeh.'ieiiHe"^ .
When Mankind came to realise this, it would enter the so-called ‘noosphere’, which Vernadskii 
defined as
C o rj ia co n a n iio e  c npnpoAOU pasBHTue o d m ecrB a , o i'BeT crBe in iocrb h 
3a n p n p o j iy . h 3a e e  6 y ; ty m e e  n oT p efiy ior  cneunaabnoH  opra iiusauH H  
o b m e c iB a , cos^aanna cneuMa.nbUbix c ip y K x y p , Koxopbie 6 y ; iy r  
cn ocod n b i ofiecrtenM'ib a ro  coB M ecxnoe coraiacoBaHHoe paaBHxne.
3naBHXb, iioocEpepa - axo  raK oe c o c r o a n n e  finoap ep i.!, Kor.aa e e  
pasBMXMe npoM3xoAM'r n eaen an p aB ae iiiio , K oraa paayM MMcex 
B03M0»:H0crb nanpan.xaxb paannxwe dHOCcjiepbi b n i ix e p e iiix  fieJioBeKa. 
e r a  6 y a y m e r o ‘’ .
The ‘noosphere’ would not be reached automatically, but involved a long and painful process, 
including the elaboration o f  new principles to agree one’s actions and new principles for human 
behaviour - in other words, a new morality'®.
In Western green political thought, Man’s intellect and reason are often seen as something 
negative in that it has so often been used to destroy rather than consolidate. Vernadskii differs 
considerably on this point. G iven that Cosm os not only consists o f  matter and energy but also o f  life, 
he drew the follow ing conclusion;
K ocmoc 5 c3 MaxepMM n 603 aneprexuKH iie mojkci' cymecrBOBaxb. Ho 
aocxaxoBîio .nu waxepuH h  aiieprMH - 603 npoBBJieuMB î k h s b h  -  a.nn 
noCTpoenHH icocMoca, xoh BceaeiuioH, Koxopaa w cry im a  
MejiOB0iiecKGMy pasyiviy, x.e. naym 10 iiocxpoflewa? Eci’b jih acHBoe n
'^ Ib i4 ,p 4 6 3 . 
Ibid.. p 514. 
Ibid.. p 14. 
Ibid.
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'lacnoe aa.ieiiMe a ncropnM MaxepHM m 3ne])ruH, itoiiB-iaioiiieeoi 
BpevieiiaMM. n cro.ii. -Ace 6eccae;uio HCMeaaiomee?''^
Critics o f  Vernadskii have raised two major points against his idea o f  the ‘noosphere’. Firstly, it 
has been argued that behind the idea o f  the ‘noosphere’ lies an anthropocentric attitude to Nature in 
than Man is given the role o f  controlling its surroundings rather than place h im self as an equal to all 
other species/living beings, as seen in the above quote. However, Vernadskii’s theory is more 
com plex than such. Fie sees the human intellect as a composite part o f  Cosm os in the same way as 
matter, energy and life. For Man to make use o f  his/her intellect thus does not have to be a negative 
thing, but rather a natural one - provided that it is not used to destroy Eure and other forms o f  Life. 
By acknowledging that Man is dependent on other species to sustain life, Vernadskii thus explicitly  
acknowledges that there are limits to the use o f  the human intellect. A  second argument, linked with 
the first one, is that Vernadskii through his positive view  on science actually encourages the 
destruction o f  the environment, as it is science that has created for instance nuclear power and other 
sources o f  pollution. If one reads Vernadskii’s works with care, it seem s clear that Vernadskii 
favoured neither capitalism nor communism, as to him they were both incompatible with his ideas:
Miie HyîKji KaiiHTajiHci'HiiecKHH crpofi, no ayîK4  w rueniiiwH. 
Uapci'Bo MOHx Hiieu BnepeaM... °^
Vernadskii disagreed with the socialists’ focus on Man and its failure to place Man in a wider 
context;
He.xbsn o'raoîKHTb saSory o Be.nHKOM h  b c h u o m  iia t o  Bi^ eMii, icormi 
S y iie r  a o c r n n iy T a  Aim Bcex BOSMO^xiiocib y A O iu iew o p etim  c b o h x  
3.FieMeiiTapnbix iiy:;«a. Miia% G y a er  no;viuo. Mu a a a m m  
MaTepHa.TbHbie Gaara b  pyicn .n ioaeu, H/ieajioivi icoropux G y w r  -  
”x ;te 6 a  h spejininb”. Ecrb, riHTb, iim iero  iie  jieJiaxb, nac.aaïK aaT bai 
.ri!o6oBbio. Xopouio %:HTb BO HMi[ Hero? Ham HCKaxb 6 o .n ee  
fibicoKHX n aeaaoB . ”Jlio6oB b k q eaoB eaecrB y” -  MaaeiibKUH wmaji, 
Koriia îKMBeuib b  Kocjvioce '^,
In this connection, he criticised Engels for having failed to understand the natural sciences. In 
E ngels’ works he could see a philosopher and a humanist, but Engels particularly failed to understand 
comparative natural science and the concrete observing sciences on Nature. Having read E ngels’ 
work ‘The D ialectics o f  Nature’, Vernadskii concluded as follows;
Ibid.. p. 138.
Quote fi-om Vernadskii’s diary of 1931, cited in ibid. p. 298.
Vernadskii wrote this in his diai-y in 1918! The quote is referred to in ibid. p 171, and the original can be 
found in the ApxuB AH CCCP. (f). 518.
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E c i’b Koe-'iTo HiiT’e i ie c iio e . a b oGuieM b XX Beice K.iar;ri> b ocn oB y  
MbiuiJieBMîi, oco6eiino iiaym toro , TaKyto "Kiinry” -  coBepiueinioe 
cyM a iaecrBH e. J lio a n  ^aicpbinaioT raa^a iia o K p y x a io iu e e  h  xM uyT  b
CBOBM MMPKC^ .^
He also maintained that Communism was incompatible with the ‘democratic nature o f  science’.
For Vernadskii a precondition for creating the ‘noosphere’ was for Man to unite as a species. 
The idea o f  different races and nationalities as separate entities were foreign to him:
llepBOH flBaaeTcii eAuiicrBO u paBencTBo no cym ecT B y. b iipH iiunne  
B ce x  .aiOAen, B cex  pac. Bno.riorH'tecicM a ro  B b ipaA cae i'cn b 
reoaorm iecK O M  n p o n e c c e  n cex  .niOAefi kbk eAM iioro u e jio r o  no  
OTiioiiieiiHio K ocrajibuOM y ^oiBOwy n a c e a e im io  n.rianeTbi^®.'
Vernadskii envisaged a ‘future, towards which w e will all strive - towards peaceful coex istence  
between the people’ "^'.
Whereas Vernadskii adopted a global approach towards Nature, Taras Shevchenko, on the other 
hand, represents Zelenyi Svifs, link to Ukrainian culture and traditions. M ost countries have a 
national poet, and Taras Shevchenko is to Ukraine what Pushkin is to Russia and Goethe to Germany. 
What is more, he has com e to sym bolise ‘Ukrainianness’ in a very unique way to m ost Ukrainians. 
George S.N. Luckyj holds the v iew  that without Shevchenko, there would not have been a Ukraine; 
‘he is not only a great literary genius, w hose poetry possesses unsurpassed beauty, but a national 
prophet w ho definitively expressed the quintessence o f  Ukraine’s existence as a nation. In fact it may 
be said that he created modern Ukraine, for without Shevchenko it might still be what it had been 
earlier - Little Russia’^^ .
Taras Shevchenko was born in the South Ukrainian village o f  Kerelivka in 1814. A s the son o f  a 
serf, he had to work for the Russian magnate V asilii Engelhardt, who owned one town and 12 villages  
with 8,500 serfs in the Zvenyhorod district^^. Although Shevchenko’s fam ily was poor, his father 
was literate and w ell known as a good wheel-whrigt. It soon became clear that Shevchenko was a 
bright and curious child, and his father’s reading loud from religious books and his grandfather’s 
stories about a peasant rebellion, in which he had taken part, encouraged him to take an interest in life 
beyond the village and issues beyond serfdom. Having completed the village school he assisted the
Quote from Vernadskii’s diary o f 25.3.1938, cited in ibid., p 236.
"  I b ü ,  p 494.
Ib i4 ,p  192.
See ‘Introduction’. Pavlo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko (Toronto: Univ. o f Toronto Press, 1988), 
p. vii.
Ibid.. p. 3.
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Cantor in fulfilling religious rites and also did all kinds o f  odd jobs for the landowner. As he showed 
great talent in drawing, Shevchenko was chosen to accompany Engelhardt first to Poland and then to 
St.Petersburg, where the latter spent much o f  his time. There he was g iven limited possibility to 
paint, but did not get a chance to learn painting properly, until he became a free man in 1838. The 
poet V asilii Zhukovskii and the famous Russian painter Karl Briullov, who both realised how  
talented Shevchenko was, raised 2,500 rubles by selling lottery tickets for a painting Briullov did o f  
Zhukovski for this particular cause. Tickets for the lottery were bought by the imperial fam ily and 
the tsarina eventually obtained the painting^^.
Shevchenko was awarded a scholarship by the Society for the Promotion o f  Artists to study at the 
Academ y o f  Fine Arts, and spent much time with Karl Briullov, his major teacher. Through Briullov
Î
and other artists and writers, Shevchenko soon became a well-known figure in artistic circles in the
Russian capital. In 1837 he started writing poetry and it is primarily as a poet and not as a painter he
is famous, although he continued to paint and receive praise for his paintings until the day he died. It
was also earnings from the sale o f  paintings that kept him afloat when m oney was tight. Som e o f
Shevchenko’s paintings are exhibited in the National Gallery in Kiev. Shevchenko, w hose native
tongue was Ukrainian, and who had to learn Russian once in St.Petersburg, wrote his poetry in
.Ukrainian. For this he was scorned by Belinskii, the famous literary critic, who claim ed that ‘Little- 
Russian’ (i.e. Ukrainian) was merely a dialect o f  Russian and a language o f  the peasants, not to be 
used for literary purposes. Serfdom, works on the history o f  Ukraine prior to the pact signed between 
Russia and Ukraine by Bohdan IGimelnitskyi in 1654, and a longing for and pride in Ukraine and 
everything Ukrainian seem s to have fuelled Shevchenko’s writing o f  poetry. He felt that the 
Ukrainian upper classes had betrayed their country by adopting Russian and abandoning their native 
Ukrainian language as something inferior. Through his poetry Shevchenko became the founder o f  
modern Ukrainian literature.
Shevchenko’s dislike for the Russian empire and his hate towards serfdom appealed to Ukrainian 
nationalists, not only in the last century, but also in our own times. It was precisely for his close links 
with members o f  the Brotherhood o f  St.Cyril and Methodus, which envisaged an independent 
Ukraine, that Shevchenko was arrested and exiled to the Urals for ten years (1848-58). Shortly 
afterwards, in 1863 (Shevchenko died in 1861) the Russian Minister o f  the Interior, Plotr Valuev, 
issued a secret circular claim ing that the Ukrainian language had never existed, did not exist, and 
never would exist. In 1876 Tsar Aleksandr II then issued a decree branding the publishing o f  
Ukrainian books as a state crime. The edict also defined the production o f  plays and concerts in 
Ukrainian as w ell as any form o f  instruction in the Ukrainian language as state crimes. Shevchenko  
and other Ukrainians’ writings and ideas about Ukraine facilitated this change o f  attitude towards the
Ibid.. p. 35.
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Ukrainian language from what ‘a few  years before had seemed to the government like a more or less 
interesting ethnic experim ent’, but which had turned into ‘something considerably more threatening, 
more d ifficult to understand and therefore to control’. The threat in this case, was to the unity o f  the 
Russian empire.
Although Shevchenko h im self made no direct demand for Ukrainian secession from the Russian 
empire, Bohdan Rubchak holds the view  that Shevchenko, although he did not sym bolise the 
‘conflagration’ o f  the Ukrainian spirit in the decades follow ing his death, he was certainly its 
‘spark’"^®: ‘H is life and work raised many Ukrainians’ awareness o f  their place in their nation and 
their responsibilities towards it: the old-fashioned patronising attitude towards Ukrainian culture 
among older Ukrainian writers like Kotliarevskyi - writers who, as it were, experimented with the 
"alternative possibilities" o f  Ukrainian - was no longer morally viable. Although the way towards 
the rebirth o f  Ukrainian consciousness had been indicated vaguely by the early romantics, 
Shevchenko’s own radical cho ices forced many o f his compatriots into crucial decisions about their 
own liv es’.
It is possible to find a pantheistic notion o f  God in Shevchenko’s writings (i.e. God embodied in 
the beautiful Ukrainian scenery - Nature), but the Greens, like most other political m ovem ents and 
parties in Ukraine, consider Shevchenko one o f  their major inspirations primarily due to his thinking 
on Ukraine, and for making people take pride in their country and in their language. For my 
purposes, it is thus important to take a closer look at Shevchenko’s ‘nationalism ’ since, as w ill be 
shown below, the Ukrainian Greens have been accused o f  Greens in the W est for being ‘nationalist’ 
and the former find such a criticism unjust.
Due to the claims made on Shevchenko and his works not only by the ‘nationalist’ camp, but also 
by the ‘socialists’ (whereas the former claim ed that Shevchenko was a ‘champion o f  Ukrainian 
interests across the social strata o f  his nation, i.e. a Ukrainian emancipator’, the latter saw  
Shevchenko as a ‘defender o f  the oppressed across national borders’). Thus, F. Priyma in the 
introduction to his work ‘Shevchenko and Russian Literature in the XIX Century’ (1961) could claim  
that Shevchenko was a ‘revolutionary’, who ‘sympathised with all the people who were suppressed 
by Russian autocracy, in their struggle for freedom. In his literary and revolutionary activities he 
expressed and popularised the idea o f Ukrainian friendship and also friendship o f  other people with 
Russia and the great Russian people’^^ .
The Ukrainian literary critic Borys Hrinchenko in 1892 wrote an article with the title ‘What were  
Shevchenko’s National Ideals?’. Hrinchenko claimed that Shevchenko during his entire literary
Bohdan Rubchak, ‘Introduction’, in George S.N. Luckyi (ed.), Shevchenko and the Critics 1861-1980 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 11.
(D.B. HpuHMa. -llleivieiiKO n uvccKaa . r tn T e p a r y p a  XIX neica (MocKna-JleiiMfirpaA: H;vtaTe.rii>aisa 
AKaAeMMM Hayx CCCP, 1961), c. 3.
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career addressed one basic question: ‘who has taken Ukraine’s freedom?’. The answer to this 
question triggered o ff  his ‘antagonism to the Tsar’ and ‘genuine Ukrainian patriotism’ '^'. Shevchenko 
held the Cossacks and the hetmanshchyna in high regard. Once the Cossacks, the hetmans and the 
freedom o f  Ukraine was gone, Ukraine, ‘like a ragged orphan, weeps beside the Dn iepr’®'. Bohdan 
K hm eln itskyi’s agreement with M oscow  was by Shevchenko seen as a betrayal o f  his country. Well 
read on the history o f  Ukraine, ‘...Shevchenko’s national awareness made him a genius, and his 
immeasurable importance in the national rebirth o f  his country made him a phenomenon unique, 
perhaps, in the entire world. A t a time when his predecessors hardly dared mention Ukrainian 
independence in their work, and if  they did, understood the notion not as a national independence but 
as the very limited independence o f  a part o f  the “united and indivisible Russian people”, an 
independence contingent upon the good grace o f  that “united” nation, that “elder brother”, 
Shevchenko in his work clearly presented our independence as a nation’®®.
Shevchenko was a Pan-Slavist in that he regarded all Slavic peoples as a fam ily. However, he 
also held the view  that each Slav people had a right to complete national independence, and he 
stressed the Ukrainian people’s right to such independence: ‘he fiercely defended this independence 
against interference from either the Russian or the Polish side and the spectre o f  the “one and 
ind ivisible” people did not hold him back in any way. He began as a supporter o f  Pan-Slavist unity 
and brotherhood but soon perceived that unity with one brother, the M uscovite, would be not 
brotherhood but slavery®®.
Shevchenko opposed simple-minded patriotism, and recognised the rights also o f  people other 
than the Ukrainians: ‘Shevchenko had a com pletely original conception o f  (national
independence)... As he understood it, a nation was a fam ily o f  brothers endowed w ith equal rights and 
only when all (and not only a few ) are truly free can their nation also be free’®"'. Thus, the Ukraine 
Shevchenko envisaged would have no masters and no serfs. Ukrainian national independence would  
only be possible if  the people were free. A  w ide-ranging reform o f  social relations was thus also 
required. As such, Shevchenko’s ideas were neither chauvinist nor provincial patriot:
Throughout, Shevchenko saw the Ukrainian people as an independent 
nation and he demanded for them the rights that belong to every nation 
as a matter of course. His independence and hatred of slavery made him 
despise it eveiywhere he saw it, even when his enemies were enslaved. 
Shevchenko harboured no hostility towards the Muscovites as a nation, 
nor to the Poles as such. He rebelled against Muscovite oppression but 
not against the Muscovite nation. He rebelled against Polish oppression
Ibid.. p. 115. 
Ibid.. p. 116. 
Ibid.. p. 117. 
”  Ibid,, p. 118. 
®‘' Ibid.. p. 121.
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in the past but not against the Polish nation...Shevchenko was the first to 
express clearly the idea of Ukraine’s complete independence as a nation, 
and along with this he maintained a consistent tolerance of other nations; 
he expressed something completely new and previously unheard-of in 
the Ukrainian writers who preceded him. The poet dispersed the tissue 
of lies which until then had obscured the issue of national independence.
He was the first Ukrainian with a real national awareness and no one 
assisted as he did in the creation of a healthy Ukrainian national 
outlook...Ukrainian literature will surely produce many more writers as 
talented as Shevchenko but never again will there be one as significant 
for the national renaissance; there will be other great writers but never 
again a prophet®®.
The third person to have influenced the theoretical framework o f  Zelenyi Svit is the Ukrainian 
philosopher Hryhoryi Skorovoda. He was born in the Poltava province in 1722. After studying at the 
Kiev Academ y he was taken to Russia to sing in the choir o f  Empress Elizaveta (1740-60). Two 
years later he returned to Ukraine, where he studied for another six years. N ot having com pleted the 
Kiev Academ y, he went to Hungary, where for the next two and a half years he was in charge o f  the 
Russian winefields. Upon the return to Ukraine, Skorovoda was hired to teach poetry at the 
theological seminar in Pereiaslav. He did, however, not get on with the bishop there due to his idea 
o f  wom en being equal to men, and was forced to resign. Skorovoda then took up a post as a house 
teacher with a rich fam ily o f  landowners. After a few  months, however, he also lost this post. In 
1754 he therefore went to M oscow  for a while to see friends, whereupon he returned to Pereiaslav, 
and was reinstalled as a house teacher - a job he held for the fo llow ing four years. In 1759 
Skorovoda stopped teaching, but was persuaded to teach poetry at the Kharkiv Collegium . In 
Kharkiv he also taught Greek. After a brief visit to Kiev, Skorovoda returned to Kharkiv. For a 
w hile he was forced to teach ethics at the ‘School for the Young N ob les’. Besides teaching, however, 
Skorovoda devoted his time to writing poetry and philosophy. For days and even w eeks on end, he 
would be walking - either in the forest or to visit friends (he once walked as far as to Taganrog by the 
A zov Sea). From 1769 until he died in 1794, Skorovoda spent all his tim e walking and developing  
his philosophical ideas, which had a starkly natural touch to them.
Skorovoda’s philosophy and poetry is permeated by two major currents: firstly, his love for his 
native Ukraine, and secondly his closeness to and fondness for the Ukrainian nature. Dmitri 
Tschizhevskij in his biography on Skorovoda explains the latter’s love for Ukraine in the follow ing  
way:
Skorovoda lebte in der Ukraine und hielt hartnackig an seinem 
heimatlichen Boden fest. Die Ukraine wird aber gerade in der Zeit seines 
Wirkens ans ihrer Stellung als Vasallenstaat Russlands zu einer bloôen
Borys Hrinchenko, ‘What were Shevchenko’s National Ideas?’, in George S.N. Luckyi (1980), pp. 126- 
27.
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Provinz des russischen Reiches herabgewurdigt...Petersburg zieht iin 
Laufe des 18. Jahrhunderts alle lebendigen Krâfte ans dem ganzen 
Reiche in sich bine in; so entsteht in der Provinz eine geistige Leere, die 
auch nicht dürch die Schaffung lokaler Kulturzentren aufgehoben 
werden konnte. Und so versichert der Strom der von Skorovoda 
ausgelosten geistigen Bewegung in der Unhemilichen geistigen 
Sandwuste des immer mehr und mehr provinzialisierten Landes...®^
Ukraine, and particularly the Poltava district, where also the writer Nikolai Gogol and the 
Ukrainian/Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovev were born, were in Russian, Ukrainian and also 
Polish literature throughout the 18th and 19th centuries often referred to as ‘ein schones und 
idyllisches Land’, as ‘das Land der Lieder und der üppig-schônen Natui, Auch in der Dichtung 
Skorovodas leben die Erinnerungen an diese schone Landschaft an’®®. Although Skorovoda, unlike 
Vernadskii, had a religious faith, his pantheistic interpretation o f  God to the extent that every living 
thing was imbued with God and that all G od’s creations had equal worth through God, precedes 
Vernadskii’s idea o f  the interconnectedness between all living things. Skorovoda often referred to 
God as ‘Nature’, justifying this in the follow ing way:
In der Bibel heiBt Gott Feuer, Wasser, Wind, Eisen, Stein, und wird mit 
anderen unzahligen Namen bezeichnet. Warum darf man nicht Natur 
(Natura) nennen? Was meine Meinung betrifft, so finde ich, dab man 
keinen besseren und passenderen Nahmen fur Gott fmden kann als 
diesen. Natura ist ein lateinicshces Wort. In iinserer Sprache: Natur 
Oder Wesen. Mit diesem Wort wird allés das bezeichnet, was in der 
ganzen Maschine dieser Welt geboren wird, auch dasjenige, was nicht 
geboren wird, wie z.B. Feuer...Gott ist uberall, dürchdrinkt und halt die 
ganze Ki'eatur^®.
This idea reflects itself in Skovoroda’s great respect for Nature and his ideas as to what should be the
relationship between Man and Nature:
Wenn die weise und selige Natur allés baut, ist dann nicht sie allein es, 
die lehrt und verbessert? Jede Sache reift, wenn sie es leitet. Verhindere 
sie nur nicht, und wenn du kannst, so beseitige die Hindernisse und ebne 
der Weg: wahrlich wird sie selbst allés rein und gliicklich vollziehen. 
Eine Kugel wird von selbst vom Berge herunterrollen: nimm nur den 
hinderen Stein des Anstobes weg. lehre sie nicht zu rollen, hilf nur. 
Lehre nicht ein Apfelbaum Apfel tragen: die Natur selbst hat ihn gelehrt. 
Schütze ihn nur vor Schweinen, schneide die wilden Zweige weg, 
sauben ihn von den Raupen, leite das schmutzige Wasser, das auf die 
Würzeln fliebt, weg usf. Lelirer und Arzt sind nicht Lehrer und Arzt,
36 Dmitri Tschizhewskij, Skovoroda - Dichter. Denker. Mystiker (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag - Harvard
Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 18, 1974), p. 9. 
Ibid.. p. 12.
Ibid.. pp. 96, 99.
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sondern nur Diener der Natur, die die einzige und alleinige Arztin und 
Lehrerin ist..?^
Tschizhevskij interprets Skorovoda’s idea to the effect that the Ukrainian rich and beautiful 
nature to him was so wonderfully structured in itself that it did not need to be improved upon, but 
rather assisted. Thus, the task o f  agriculture, as understood by Skorovoda, was more to help Nature, 
rather than improve it, change or harm it. Put in a wider context, it thus seem s reasonable to argue 
that Skorovoda, like Vernadskii, would see Man as part o f  Nature, having no right to inflict harm 
upon it. But whereas Vernadskii did not necessarily see any harm in improving Nature, provided that 
this was done with care and could be justified morally, to Skorovoda Nature as G od’s creation was 
perfect enough in itself and should therefore not be improved, but only assisted for its own benefit as 
to the benefit o f  Man. In this sense, Skorovoda preached the idea o f M an’s stewardship over Nature, 
rooted in the teachings o f  Christianity.
Nationalists in Ukraine hold Skorovoda in high regard as to them he is one o f  the first 
nationalists, committed to Ukraine rather than playing up to what they see as Russian imperialism. 
Skorovoda was, however, far from a nationalist in a narrow political sense. His ‘nationalism ’ was 
more fuelled by a fondness for the Ukrainian Nature than by any political aspirations towards 
Ukrainian secession from the Russian Empire per se. H is understanding o f  Nature and the 
relationship between Nature and Man, exem plifies the traditional Slav outlook on Nature and also the 
Russian Cosmisni current in Russian philosophy and literature during the second half o f  the last 
century (see Chapter One), As such, he is worthy o f  being referred to as one o f  the inspirational 
sources o f  the Ukrainian Green Movement.
Another philosopher who has also inspired som e members o f  Zelenyi Svit is the Teacher Ivanov 
(uchitel Ivanov). Porfirii Ivanov, as his real name was, was born in the Russian village o f  Orekhovka 
in the Luhansk oblast in 1898 in a miner’s family. He only attended the wandering church school for
1four years, but continued to educate him self. He held a number o f  different professions to make ends
meet, as a miner, loader and cleaning steam engines to mention but a few. Until the age o f  35,
Ivanov lived like any other person. But, in his own words ‘in the spring o f  1935 Nature imbued me
.with consciousness and I started thinking seriously on why man lives on Earth’. The answer Ivanov
came up with, was that the meaning o f  human life could only be found in the unity with Nature, or to
be more precise, with the ‘three living bodies’ - the air, the water and the soil, which can give Man
.energy for life in Nature independently o f  such things as food, clothing and housing.
Civilised life - or the ‘warm’ life, as he also called it - not only made Man comfortable, but also 
weaker and more likely to fall ill. It was Ivanov’s idea that rather than trying to fight Nature and fear
Ibid.. p. 182
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its harsher sides, Man ought to go out and w elcom e Nature and becom e one with it. Man could 
overcom e the negative aspect o f  Nature, namely death and illness, by re-establishing the direct link 
between him self and Nature and receive energy from her rather than trying to control her.
Ivanov therefore decided to live in Nature, follow ing 12 simple rules""' for how to keep in good 
health and live simply with only a minimum o f  needs. For this he came into conflict with official 
Soviet authorities and spent 12 years in prison and in psychiatric wards"". The psychiatrists 
diagnosed him as schizophrenic. Consequently, in addition to being deprived o f  the right to work, he 
was also not allowed to serve in the Red Army during the Second World War. In 1942, the Gestapo 
held Ivanov for 27 days. On the night o f  22 November, they undressed him and put him into the side- 
wagon o f  a motorbike, driving at high speed through Dnipropetrovsk. Ivanov did not fall ill and after 
this the Germans referred to him as the ‘Russian G od’"'®.
The Soviet journal Radiiga in an article which appeared in the autumn o f  1989 described him in 
the follow ing way:
...3'I’G (1)M.TOCO(I) CO CBOHM BIiailHeM JKH.3BH, C ApyCOH -  BUflOBeK 
.nercB A a, oGiiaAaBiuHH iieoSbiKiiOBeiniLiMH b o s m o a o io c tb m h . niiTBAeorrb 
ACT HBailOB X0AH.B B OAHHX TpycaX, doCHKOM, KBACAblH ACHb
oftaHBaacB x o j io a i io h  b o a o h ,  ro.BOAa.ii aei'bipe a h a  b ueAe.ino. Mor
o6xOAMTbC}I 003 0Ab( CIO C JlHUJUblM AH0H, M3 HHX nnTbAeCB'I' -  003 
BOAbl, GKGJIO IieAeJlH 0pOAHTb IlG 3HMH0My .lT0Cy G TOAblM l’CpCOM, 
doCHKOM: A0.ar0 liaXGAHTbCa 003 AblXaUHB nOA BOAGfi. yBHAGB ei'G
BnepBbie, ncnbrra.ii oiuyiuciiHe, dyATO Mena GnaaHJio Gruew, -  Taicaa 
Moinb McxoAHJia o r  atofg iie.BGB0Ka. OKasa.iTocb, >rro on od.aaAaer 
0ecn]]0Ae.BbBOM .aiodoBbio kg BceMy AvHBOMy, Kpo'i'ocrbio, 
cnocodiioci’bio k caMOiioAcepTROBauHio...''®
Although one o f  the aims o f  Ivanov was to overcome disease by follow ing a strict set o f  rules
'and this in particular appealed to several o f  the large group o f  followers he eventually attracted -
som e even referred to him as the ‘Conqueror o f  Nature’ - it in no way meant that he wanted to gain 
the upper hand over Nature. What he wanted to reach beyond was death and human destruction - but
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only by striking a balance with Nature and by living in harmony with her:
MbI AO.IlACIll)i AOdHTbCH or ripHpOAbl H UO.RyqHTb CM.RbI JIAB dopbdlR c 
0o.ri03BBMM. Oua, flpHpoAa -  caMoc nnaBBoe, h nee Ae.BaercB no ee
The 12 mles formed a system called ‘Detka’, or ‘child’ and were intended to be followed from an early 
age, providing children with instructions for how to live a healthy life. These rules can be found in ÜMH'i'po 
JlniiieiiKO, ’’CucreMa HnanoBa”. 29.4.1994, c. 3.
See pp. 3-4 in i^H3iib b ejntneiiHM c h d h d o a o h  c i i c r o M a  ecrecTBeiiiioro OBAOOGnjteiimi v m m t g j u i  HnaiioBa 
(Kh0B, 1991).
Ibid.. p. 6.
Pajiyra, no. 9, 1989, cited in ibid.. p. 3.
, î « 5
SciKoiiavi. a Mbi iiB.'inevicîi aacTHueH ca.vton UpHpoAbi h  a ch b c m  to a v C  
no ee BaKonaM, m re Ace mubie cn.abi AeHcrayiOT h Biiy rpn nac^ '^ .
An important part o f  Ivanov’s teachings was therefore also to take care o f  and protect Nature:
OcoGoe BiiHMaiiMe odpaiitaeTcn na depeAcnoe OTiioineiiHe k npHpoanoH 
cpeAe M (l)op.viHpoBanHe bcaoihboctm ko Bce.viy a<hbom,v BOicpyr.
BKO.'iorHA nyncTB c AercKoro noBpacra ne Aaer paBBuruio 
iioTpedHTeJibCKoro OTiioiueiiHa k npHpOAe'’®.
Love and compassion towards other fellow  human beings and a desire to do good things for 
others was also an important element o f  Ivanov’s teachings. He can thus also be described as a great 
humanist. Towards the end o f  his life, his teachings were finally accepted by the CPU, and the first 
officially  printed booklet on his teachings appeared in 1990 under the auspices o f  the Luhansk 
raikom"'^. Ivanov’s ideas are gaining increasing popularity not only in Ukraine but also in Russia and 
other parts o f  the former USSR. In Zelenyi Svi f s  Kiev group there are several adherents o f  Ivanov, 
and som e o f  them have started classes for children to make them familiar with his teachings.
Another source o f  inspiration in the theoretical aspect o f  Zelenyi Svit is the Orthodox Church"'®. 
Although many Greens would not characterise them selves as Christian and som e have reservations 
against the Orthodox Church, the Green M ovement, like most other political m ovem ents and parties, 
invited representatives o f  the Church to conduct masses at their Congresses and to bless their office 
in Kiev, prior to m oving in. One non-believer explained this to the author by saying that it had 
becom e ‘politically incorrect’ to keep the Church at a distance, given that it had becom e part o f  the 
‘independence’ parcel. This, however, has not prevented Zelenyi Svit from bringing old nature- 
centred rites o f  the Church back into use. In the spring o f  1994, for instance, the Greens initiated the 
blessing o f  one o f  the oldest trees in Kiev, thus continuing an old tradition o f  blessing trees. The 
blessing o f  the fields prior to laying the seeds and prior to harvesting were also initiated by the 
Greens and is com m on in many smaller villages throughout Ukraine.
y
44 Ibid., p. 3.
"  BneAeune b npaKTUKV npupoAnoro 03A0D0BaenHJi ynuTeiui Mnanona. MeTOAHnecKHe i^eKOMeiiAanHU no i
OMcreMe AvxoBnoro u diusmiecKoro coBeDiiienCTBonanufl ne.rioBeKa cmaumm nuMpoAbi. (J lyran cK , 1 9 9 0 ), c.
20. The booklet was prepared by the voluntary society ‘Istoki’ im. Ivanova, the scientific laboratory 
‘Zdorove’ and the Kuibyshev pedagogical institute and rewieved by a lecturer at the Kuibyshev pedagogical 
institute as well as by the person in charge of the ideology section of the Luhansk party raikom.
Ibid.
As seen in Chapter One, the Orthodox Church advocates a close relationship between Man and Nature.
Although the main reason why the Green Movement endorsed the church was as much political as religious, 
the Greens tried to revive old religious rituals such as blessing old trees and fields, on the grounds that these 
combined environmentalism with ancient cultural traditions.
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Although Zelenyi Svi f s  programme only makes direct reference to Vernadskii, it is, as w ill be 
seen below, permeated by the ideas o f  all four philosophers referred to above and also to the Church.
. W ith regard to political ideology, as pointed out in Chapter Three, the Greens do not condemn 
socialism /com m un ism  as such, but criticise ‘industrialism’ for causing disharmony between Man and 
Nature, which, in turn resulted in an exploitative approach to the environment. The Ukrainian 
Academ ician Dmytro Hrodzinskyi, one o f the founders o f Zelenyi Svil, in an interview with 
Sovetskaia Uh^aina put it this way:
Mup sdepoAceMO .iH uie lOAi, k o .ih  sdepeAveMO, a  noA exyA n A 
niAiioBMMo ripHpoAy. Ha macra, x en ep  u e iioMuiiaioTb posyviTM 
ABA ajii 6 i.f ib m e  .moAeM.
OraB-nemui a o  npnpoAM a x  a o  Rorocb c b a to i’o  6 y .n o  npHTaiViaiiiie b cIm  
nonepeA iii.vi JiioACbcxHM cyciTi.ribcm aM . T exno.norin iinA  Ace B ix  
npu3B iB  AO T o r o ,  m o mh, BoneBMAb, :iac.niiiJieiii c b o e io  M o r y T iiic n o . 
noRMuaEMO pyAnyBaTM ACMBy upupoA y. ceineA a x o i  .niOAUiia 
([)opMyBa.nacb ax bha upoTaroM co'reiib T u c a n  p o x iB , ua iv ii  axom 
BiAdyaaAOCb (fopM yBaiina .nioACbxoi CBiAOM Ocri, (|)i.fioco(I)iï,
BCHXixH, 3pemTOio, CBiTocnpuHMaiiiia'*®.
The causes o f  this ‘break’ or disharmony between Man and Nature are explained as a result o f  
the Soviet econom ic system , which was not friendly towards the environment, and w hich due to its 
strong centralisation and thus lack o f  sovereignty to Ukraine facilitated the ‘plundering o f  the natural 
resources o f  Ukraine by all-union and republican ministries and departments’. Technocracy and the 
low  technological and production culture which was prevalent in the USSR stressed industrial output 
at the expense o f  a sound use o f  natural resources. The ‘dehumanisation’ o f  society and the 
deformation o f  the value system brought about ‘an excessive "industrial" life sty le’. As a result o f  
this approach, Ukraine is on the verge o f  catastrophe, facilitated by the increasing gap between 
‘general cultural level, the moral state o f  the population and the growing technologization o f  life ’. 
The state o f  the environment was therefore nothing but a mirrored image o f  the current cultural state 
o f  the nation, its spirituality and its econom y.
To improve this sad state o f  affairs, the Greens called for a revival o f  traditional Ukrainian 
values - i.e. a moral rebirth (cf. Vernadskii’s idea o f  a new morals), and thus, towards a 
harmonisation o f  the relationship between Man and Nature"'^. The very essence o f  the Slav eco- 
cultural heritage outlined in Chapter One, was what needed to be re-established - Academician  
Hrodzinskyi, for instance, called for the revival o f  ecological morality:
CouercKciH YKpaniia (n.d.) found in file containing documents from Zelenyi Sv i f s  Inaugural Congress in 
the Green Office in Kiev.
49 3e.miHM C n ir, OporoaMa (K hxb , oxTBÔpb, 1989), c. 4.
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KoAoioviy 'I'peSa iieiieriiiiiyTH cboio cHcreMy uiiiiiocreH, BiMaBiiiM 
iiepenary nouiaiii ao iipMpoAH, cnoftoAi aiMOBMpaAvemuu cripan>KiiiH 
MOpa.ibiiocri, mo rpyirry eTbca ua icrMuiio napoAiiHX CBirromax -  
AioSoBi AO 3eviAi, AO BCboro AvHBoro i cyuioro. Hama CBÎAOMicrb. 
iiama bojui noBHiiiii 3viiiiHTM 3ai(oim cycni.ibcrBa. aîh hkhx npH3Be.'ia 
AO iiHBimnboro KaTacrpo(l)iRiioro craiiy npupoAne ce|]OAOBMme^ °.
Only those, who love Nature and who are not indifferent towards their children, their people 
(narod) can bring the environmental destruction to an end^'. To achieve this aim, Zelenyi Svit 
committed itself to the ‘revival o f  folk traditions (narodni trad its ii), songs and rites, containing the 
moral basis o f  compassion and a ‘cautious’ attitude towards Nature (priroda), in which there is a 
sense o f  unity with all the living and to the unbroken chain o f  the generations’ '® Compassion  
towards one another and towards Nature thus are the core values o f  Zelenyi Svit. As the Orthodox 
Church preaches both o f  these, Zelenyi Svit in its programme expressed its support o f  the Church’s 
work to reimbue people with such values®®.
Although, as w ill be seen below, Zelenyi Svit is humanist in outlook - som e o f  the ideas 
expressed in its programme com e close to being anthropocentric - its vision  o f  a society in which 
Man lives in harmony with Nature goes beyond shallow anthropocentrism. Nature should not only be 
protected for the sake o f  Man, as Man by not taking properly care o f  Nature would warrant his own 
destruction, but because it has intrinsic value in itself. N ot only the human gene fund, but also that o f  
the flora and fauna must be fully preserved®"'. Industrialisation and econom ic developm ent must be 
permitted only in cases where they w ill not have a damaging effect on the ecosystem . As a matter o f  
fact, the veiy  notion o f  love towards Nature is logically incompatible with wishing to destroy it, as 
one w ishes to nurture and protect those and that which one loves.
That Zelenyi Svi fs  programme focuses on the implications o f  environmental destruction on 
Man, is understandable as the Chernobyl accident took place on Ukrainian soil and thus in a dramatic 
w ay revealed how vulnerable Man is to the side-effects o f  his own industrial creation®®. In the worst 
case, an apocalypses could take place, in which case Mankind would becom e distinct. Consequently, 
environmental protection is not only about protecting Nature for the w ell-being and happiness o f  
Man, but is also an essential prerequisite for his and Nature’s physical survival.
Although, as w ill be seen below, Zelenyi Svit activists have generally used anthropocentric 
arguments in their campaigns, they are still deeply committed to a more ecocentric approach towards
Ibid,pp. 2-3. 
Ibid..p. 4. 
Ibid,p. 8. 
Ibid.
Ibid,p. 9. 
Ibid, p. 2.
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Nature. When addressing the First Congress o f  Zelenyi Svit in October 1989, Shcherbak explicitly  
underlined the association’s commitment to Vernadskii and his concept o f  the ‘noosphere’:
Hauia (|)i.'ioco(l)i>i -  ue (j)i.Toco(])i}i iiooaliepH. C(l)op\iy.i]>oi5aiia nauiu.vi 
ae.iuKUM ci[iG(3iRM,3UMKO.vi aKaAe.viixQ.vi BepiuiACsicHvi''’.
In Nikolaev, the leader o f  the oblast Zelenyi Mir, Anatolii Zolotukhin, rewrote the Ten 
Commandments, replacing God with Nature, thus stressing the importance o f  radically changing our 
attitude towards her. Rather than thinking that she is there for Man to use, Zolotukhin encouraged 
people to look upon Nature as something more, with a spiritual value o f  it wn, worthy o f  worship®®. 
References to a new ‘green’ morality were made Chapter Five. Academician Hrodzinskyi also called 
for the ‘revival o f  ecological morality’. This was a prerequisite for improving the state o f  the 
environment and it put the Greens in line with Vernadskii’s thinking on the ‘noosphere’ - for which a 
new morality was a precondition®^. Although Zolotukhin’s approach has been criticised within the 
Green M ovem ent for being blasphemic, there is still widespread support for the new relationship with 
Nature that he calls for, indicating that Zelenyi Svit is not entirely anthropocentric in its outlook.
In Chapter One, 1 introduced the concept o f  ‘eco-culture’. It is interesting to note that Zelenyi 
Svit has chosen to incorporate into its theoretical framework elements o f  this eco-culture which are 
firmly rooted in pre-Revolutionary eco-culture (the ideas o f  Skorovoda, Shevchenko and Vernadskii) 
and derivations o f  this which existed as a sub eco-culture during the Soviet period (Vernadskii and 
Ivanov). The theoretical framework o f  the Uki'ainian Greens is thus much older than som e o f  the 
ideas and concepts on which their W est European and American sister movem ents base their work - 
which in most cases have been developed over the last thirty years as a point o f  departure from 
traditional growth-oriented ideas viewed as being incompatible with protecting Nature. Given the 
interest in Ukrainian culture that surfaced in Ukraine follow ing the collapse o f  the U SSR  and the 
ideological vacuum that it created, the Greens have an enormous potential for recreating the 
ecoculture that existed in Ukraine prior to the introduction o f  Bolshevism  and which w as partially 
destroyed during the Soviet era, but whose roots remained. Such an approach may strike a more 
positive chord with the general public, than sim ply importing ‘Green’ ideas from the W est, given that 
there is considerable scepticism  and suspicion to Western ideas among people.
As regards PZU, both the party programme and statements made by spokesmen o f  the party, are 
pulling in different directions, on the one hand indicating that the party is committed to the 
environment due to the effects pollution has on human health and happiness, and on the other, that
JJirepaTypim YKpaïim, 14.12.1989,0.2. 
Conversation with Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, June 1994. 
ConercKan YKpanua (n.d.).
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the party is not purely anthropocentric but ecocentric in its approach. The party programme, which 
was endorsed by the First Congress in 1990, states that the PZU  is:
. . . n o . l i T H R I I M H  C 0 1 0 3  O J U l O A y V I U i B .  Q f ) £ A I i a i l H X  C l l i . l W l O I O  3  ) T p a i I 1 0 1 O  
Ao.ieio i  c n p a B O l O  : i a 6 e 3 n e R e i i i u i  KOACiiin .iioiinni i i p a s a  i i a  :i/iopoR'a,
A O B r o . i i T T a  r a  A C H i r f i  b  e x o . i o r i R u o  . 3 A o p o B o \ i y  c e p e y i o B M i u i ® ^
Anyone ‘loving the native Nature’ may become a member o f  the P Z U . Man is by the party seen 
as ‘G od’s creation and the most responsible part o f  Nature’, thus indirectly bearing the responsibility  
for its future and serving as steward o f  Nature. Nature is also seen as a creation o f  God, and must 
therefore be preserved not only for the sake and the well-being o f  Man, but because it has value in 
itself:
BaAcaioRH noic.iacTU icpau ocraTORHoviy Runmueiinio p ij ii io i
yK paiiicbxoi npMpoAM -  naiiiux creiiin la  r ip . p i'iox  la  . l i c iB .
iiaujoi Ky.Rivrypnoi la  icropH Riioi ciiavauMiin -  ychoro roro. mo e
bI kobI riimm, sanoBiAaiiHM uavi BoroM, poahhiihvi BoranBievi
yK paiiiC B K oro iiapoAy^'’
See nooroaivia napTii sejieuHX YKiiaiuM. riOHUiuiTa vcrauoBRUM :f iSAOM nSY. 28-30 1990, c. 3. 
Man 1(1)601' nauT il sejieuux yxpaiHH. adopted at the First Party Congress in 1990.
Ibid., p. 2.
See ypO R H oro  nnoroA O tuvE M O  orBOpeniui naPT il seaeHUX yKoalnu.
flpornaMa napT li 3e.rtenux yxoaiUM. npHHiuiTa voranoBRMM b’I baom fl3 y . 28-30 1990, c. 7.
'A
ÎThis quote explicitly says what has been argued elsewhere in this thesis, nam ely that for the Slav
people, the three concepts o f  rodina, narod  and priroda  are interlinked. To the Greens there can be
no nation and no native people if  the environment in which these two exist has been destroyed, To
.seek the survival o f  a single one o f  these notions thus explicitly also im plies the survival and 
protection o f  the others. The idea o f  the PZU  programme, ‘THE SURVIVAL o f  mankind, o f  the 
(Ukrainian) people and the ecological protection o f  our future*®' must be a priority issue’, therefore 
im plies ‘the harmonic unification o f  M an’s interests with the highest biospheric laws o f  Nature’'®®.
Life on the Planet and the people living on it is an absolute value for the Greens’ ®^. P ZU  in other 
words explicitly voice the idea o f  Vernadskii’s ‘noosphere’, where the conscious and intelligent Man 
seeks developm ent which does not clash with the limits o f  the biosphere. This commitment to 
Vernadskii’s concept o f  the ‘noosphere’ is stated on page three in the pai*ty programme. A lso  
Shcherbak, addressing the First Congress o f  Zelenyi Svit mentioned the ecocentric approach o f  the
Greens:
P
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EKO.ioi’i î i  \iycMTb 6yTH BHiiia sa eKoiioviiKy. Buiua aa Bci 
iAeo.ioriMiii ra iio.iiTMRUM jior.viH i  60  cbaiuiuimh ;ui])
Acriri'fl £ riaHBMiiioio uintiicno na a ev ia i. iiaHriepiiiHVi Ai a Bcix 
ypiiAiB i  HoaiTHMHMX napTiM^\
Although PZU  in its programme states its commitment to improving the environment in Ukraine 
not sim ply due to its impact on Man but also as it is considered to have intrinsic value, statements 
made towards the general public stress the anthropocentric side o f  this commitment. Whereas Green 
activist, Andrii Demydenko, in an interview with the Ukrainian Weekly'^ stated that ‘the Green Party 
o f  Ukraine recognises that ecology takes precedence over the econom y, politics and ideology, and
p tthat individual rights are more important than the rights o f the state’. And Kononov on the pages o f  
.Holos Ukrainy made it clear that ‘w e have no right to risk the health o f  future generations’ and that
for this reason, ‘(one must) save the environment and form new attitudes in people (providing them 
with) a new consc iousness’ ®^. Similarly, Kononov in his programme for the local elections in 1992 
made it clear that the most important task o f  the PZU  was to protect people’s right to life and the 
quality o f  life. Environmental pollution constituted a violation o f  human rights, then everyone has 
the right to a clean environment. Andrii Hlazovyi explained PZUs com m itm ent to L ife in the 
follow ing way:
r i 3 y . . . n a p T i H  p a A M K a j i b u o - A e M O K p a T H R i i o r o  i i a n p a M x y .
T la H iien a p T iH iiim o i n a p T i i”, h k  iiasaajia "sejieiiMx" flerp a  
Ke.R.rii...riapT ii sa x u cry  tie npocro npnpoAn, a  h ACM'mi -  achti'îi 
iiJiaiieTH i  .niOAHHH, sa x n cry  siieAcaeiiHx i  AHCKpHMiiiOBaiiMX BepcTB 
cyciiiJibCTDa, saxH cry b  iiaHUiupmoMy po3yM in n i ' a c I i i o k ,  A ir e n .  
crapMX, iiiBajiiA iB...®’
.Should attempts at protecting the environment fail, the future o f  Man as a species would be 
endangered, then
n p u p o A a  l i e  3 M 0 A c e  i i e c K i i i R e n i i o  A O B r o  ’’ ‘ l e x a T H  M u j i o c r r e M ”  b ± a  
j i i O A e u .  H x m o  x H T T e a e  c e p e A O B u m e  n p o A O B x y B a r n M e  A e r p a A y B a x u ,  
r i p u p o A a  3 M y u i e n a  S y A e  s a p a A U  c a M o s d e p e x e i i i u i  s B i J i b i i u T H C b  b I a
JllOACTBa'^ \
;-:i'
As regards the Green Party, it was initiated and is still dom inated by Greens in the Kiev-area and
.in the Western parts o f  Ukraine. These people are better informed about the green m ovem ent abroad
JlirepaTypna VKpuXm, 14.12.1989,0.2. 
The Ukrainian Weekly, 11.11.1990 (n.p.). 
“  Pojioc yKpaïiiM, 6.2.1993, c. 4.
J l i  r e p a r y p i ia  V K p a lf/a , 15.11.1990, c. 2.
See Kononov’s election programme, 1992.
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than is the case in Zelenyi Svit, they are younger than the average member o f  Zelenyi Svit and more 
leftist than Zelenyi Svit. Both PZU  and Zelenyi Svit, liowever, are deeply comm itted to Ukrainian 
independence and to the revival o f  the Ukrainian cultural heritage. Whereas, initially, PZC7 basically  
cop ied its programme from that o f  die Grünen in Germany, several members expressed their 
reservations about such an approach, arguing that the situation they were faced w ith, differed
radically from that o f  the German Greens. The programme has therefore, as seen in Chapter Five,
since been considerably changed.
A s pointed out in Chapter One, there has since the beginning o f  the last century in
Russia/Ukraine been two currents o f  political thought: on the one had, there were the Westerners,
. .who endorsed Western political thinking as more ‘progressive’ than the thinking rooted in the Eastern
or Slav tradition. The adherents o f  this current view ed the Western humanism and enlightenment as
.preferable to Slavophilism, whose key idea was that the Slav countries may be industrially and 
econom ically backwards compared to the West, but that this had been compensated for through 
vision and purity, and that the Slav countries should therefore save the ‘decadent’ W est from its own
destruction. It is interesting to note that the very same questions that Western philosophers and 
political theorists have only recently begun to address were raised by Russian and Ukrainian 
philosophers and natural scientists more than a century ago. It may o f  course be argued that thinkers 
also in the Western tradition (for instance St Thomas Aquinas) developed similar ideas. Still, in 
Russia towards the end o f  the last century, a w hole new school o f  thought - ‘C osm os’ (cf. Chapter 
One) - emerged to address the issue o f  relations between Man and Nature in parallel with the 
em ergence o f  Socialist and Communist ideas which were imported from the W est at this time. To 
Vernadskii, both Capitalism and Socialism  were ‘ideas preoccupied with human concerns’. His idea 
o f  the ‘noosphere’ went beyond both o f  these ‘ism s’ and would, he firmly believed, be the only  
acceptable idea to fo llow  in the future. When related to Western ecocentrist thought, the Slavophile
notion that Russian thought would save the world thus holds true in the sense that it preceded 
ecocentrism  with 50-60 years. However, it did not influence ecophilosophers in the W est directly, as
■
they sim ply did not know Vernadskii’s ideas to begin with.
8.1.3 Classification of the Ukrainian Greens’ Theoretical Framework
Vernadskii’s ideas quite obviously fall within the Western ecocentrist approach and yet it goes 
beyond it, in that Vernadskii does not confine his concept to the Earth (or Gaid) as such, but looks 
upon the Earth and all physical entities (animate/inanimate) as parts o f  a much larger context, namely 
that o f  the entire Cosm os itself. Like the ecocentrists, however, also Vernadskii stresses the 
interrelatedness o f  all organisms not only amongst them selves but also with their environments. But
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he is also concerned with the way in which the Earth and all animate and nonanimate entities interact 
with Cosm os, by which we are surrounded and o f which we are a part. With regard to human 
relations, Vernadskii’s theory stresses that which humans have in com m on as a species (homo 
sapiens), rather than the aspects in which they differ. Thus, Vernadskii’s idea o f  the ‘noosphere’ is 
also emancipatory in that it stresses the unity o f  the races and takes a stand against racism.
Both Vernadskii and the ecocentrists have a positive outlook on sc ience. Eckersley points out 
that ‘ecocentric theorists have also pointed out how new scientific d iscoveries have served to 
challenge long standing anthropocentric prejudices’ and that ‘in modern tim es the credibility o f  any 
Western philosophical worldview is seriously compromised if not at least cognisant of, and broadly 
consistent with, current scientific know ledge’. ‘Prem ises o f  ecocentrism (i.e. the model o f  internal 
relations) are actually more consistent with modern science than the premises o f  anthropocentrism, 
which posit humans as either separate from and above the rest o f  nature (or if  not separate from the 
rest o f  nature then nonetheless the acme o f  evolution). In this respect, ecocentrist theorists, far from 
being anti-science, often enlist science to help undermine deeply ingrained anthropocentric 
assumptions that have found their way into many branches o f  the social sciences and humanities, 
including modern political theory’®^ . Vernadskii used the same argument against both capitalism and 
socialism . Neither o f  the two, in his view , had a sufficiently thorough understanding o f  M an’s 
interrelatedness with Nature and his surroundings and they were both too concerned with the welfare 
o f  Man at the expense o f  Nature. Moreover, in the case o f  socialism , it did not allow  for freedom o f  
thought. Without far-reaching democracy in the scientific sphere there could be no progress - and not 
progress defined as econom ic development, but progress in the sense o f  getting closer to discovering  
the essence o f  Cosmos and the role o f  life in it.
Vernadskii’s strong faith in science may be mistaken for anthropocentrism in the sense that he 
marvels the human intellect. To Vernadskii, however, the human intellect was a tool with a potential 
to be used both in a constructive and a destructive way. Used in a positive way, it could allow  Man 
to improve the geophysical surface o f  the Earth. Such an improvement is to Vernadskii not a bad
■
I
:thing as long as it takes place within the framework o f  sustainability. Human beings like all other 
species have equal worth. Human beings have been equipped with intellect and to Vernadskii the 
intellect thus also has intrinsic value and a purpose, which is to create the ‘noosphere’, which means 
the sustainable development o f the biosphere and the aim o f  unravelling the secrets o f  the Cosm os 
and M an’s place in it. Human history, however, clearly illustrates how capable the human mind is o f  
inflicting destruction not only upon Man but also upon Nature. Thus, Vernadskii envisaged som e 
kind o f  international scientific board which would stake out a series o f  guidelines within which 
science should be conducted. Generally, he also envisaged more international co-operation as Man
® Eckersley (1992), pp. 50-51.
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would realise that only by acting as one, united species would it be able to secure the survival o f  
Earth, and w ith it, Man’s own survival.
Vernadskii did not develop a political theory to accompany his concept o f  the ‘noosphere’. This 
question was neither addressed by Russian philosophers o f the ‘C osm ist’ tradition, as they were more 
concerned w ith M an’s place in Nature than the political aspects o f  sustainable society. As pointed 
out in Chapter One, though, the mir o f  the Russian countryside was very much a sm all-scale 
sustainable community which coopted Man and Nature without the former doing damage to the latter. 
One o f  the things Vernadskii found hardest to accept after the Bolshevik Revolution was the 
destruction o f  the farmers and the culture o f  the mir. Skorovoda also did, as seen above, stress that 
Man should assist rather than improve Nature. From Vernadskii’s point o f  view , information and 
free thought were prerequisites for securing a sustainable development. Both o f  them would require 
som e kind o f  democracy where consensus would play a significant role, it was Vernadskii’s belief 
that once Man reached the “ noosphere” (reaching it would be a difficult process and take possibly  
decades or even centuries), then Man would him self realise that only by building a sustainable 
society would he be able to m ove closer to understanding Cosm os. This, however, leaves room for 
different interpretations o f  how best to achieve this aim and thus for potential political conflict, 
particularly on the international arena. What seem s clear, however, is that in Vernadskii’s v iew , the 
social sciences - and particularly political theory - would have to adjust to the hard sciences so as to 
avoid becom ing overtly anthropocentrist
Eckersley claims that there is ‘much greater elective affinity and hence a much greater potential 
for theoretical synthesis between ecocentrism and communitarian and socialist political philosophies 
than there is between ecocentrism and individualistic political philosophies such as liberalism ’®". As 
seen above, Vernadskii considers both liberalism and socialism incompatible with the concept o f  the 
“ noosphere” as they are both too preoccupied with Man and centred around the idea o f  happiness for 
Man, thus failing to see beyond him. The very notion o f  socialism /com m unism  in the Soviet 
experience has discredited itself as a system o f  thought capable o f  accommodating the interests o f  the 
environment. The environmental legacy o f  the U SSR  can best be described as a disaster. An ‘eco- 
socialist’ approach may be successful (as indeed it has been in Germany) in the W est where the 
political context is different and where socialism  and its relation to the environment has been under 
revision for some time. In Ukraine, however, the collapse o f  the U SSR  (and socialism  the w ay it was 
practised in the USSR) has brought about a moral vacuum. Although elem ents within the Green 
M ovem ent familiar with the Western Green M ovements and their theoretical frameworks (H lazovyi, 
Kurykin) are positive to ‘eco-socialism ’ as an idea, the majority o f  Zelenyi Sv i f s  members are 
opposed to this concept. Rather than trying to modify socialism , the Ukrainian Greens have
Ibid. p. 52.
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therefore adopted the eco-cultiiral legacy o f  the past as an alternative to the socialist notion o f  
econom ic growth at all costs and capitalism without limits.
A s seen from Chapters Three, Four and Five, though, Zelenyi Svit and particularly P Z U h m e  not 
utilised the ideas o f  Vernadskii to the full. This is to some extent understandable in a soc iety in the 
process o f  being transformed from socialism  to capitalism and where the notion o f  capitalism to 
many has fairy-tale properties. To others, who live on the brink o f extinction due to the collapse o f  
the Ukrainian econom y, ideas o f  Man and his relations to Nature or for that matter Cosm os, are ol 
little use when they are struggling to get by and to feed their fam ilies. Thus, the Greens have 
genei ally adopted a more pragmatic approach, which can be placed somewhere between h u m a n  
w e l f a r e  e c o l o g y  and p r e s e r v a t i o n i s m .
As seen in previous chapters (particularly in the case study on the campaign to save South Bug), 
the arguments used by Zelenyi Mir to save the river can be put in two categories; on the one hand, 
there are what may be called the anthropocentric arguments. South Bug and the canyon must be 
saved Tor our children’s sake’, ‘for our future generations’. Nuclear power must be replaced because 
it poses a threat to ‘the population o f  N ikolaev oblast’ , to the ‘gene fund’ and to ‘Ukraine’ as a 
nation. To the N ikolaev Greens it was also important to save landscapes o f  an aesthetic, historical 
and recreational value (cf. the Canyon o f  South Bug again) for M an’s sake, thus placing them firmly 
within the Ukrainian/Russian conservation movement.
However, it is possible to identify also what I w ill call moral arguments in the campaign 
conducted by the N ikolaev Greens, The actions o f  the pro-nuclear lobby are frequently being 
referred to as ‘amoral’ and ‘dishonest’, revealing a lack o f  respect not only to the people living in the 
vicinity o f  the nuclear power station and to future generations, but also a lack o f  understanding and 
respect for Nature. Zolotukhin’s rewriting o f  the Ten Commandments is not motivated out o f  
anthropocentric concerns, but reflects a new thinking on Nature itself (I w ill return to this issue in 
more detail in Chapter Nine).
Is Green ecocentrism in Ukraine different from that o f  the W estern world? It seem s reasonable 
to argue that in many ways it is different - although there are also similarities - because it draws on a 
consistent cultural, religious and philosophical framework developed in parallel with Western 
‘industrialism’ (socialism  and capitalism) but with a very different understanding o f  the relationship 
between Man and Nature. Where the Western Greens try to develop new theoretical concepts o f  
Nature and constructing com plex critiques o f  capitalism as an idea, the Ukrainian Greens - although 
there are o f  course exceptions - look to the past and try to revive those ideas and traditions that had an 
ecological side to them. In terms o f  offering political solutions to the environmental crisis, the 
Western Greens are more ‘advanced’ than those o f  Ukraine. A  big thing in Western Green thinking
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at present is the concept o f  democracy and what democracy should look like in an ecolog ical society  
(cf. John Barry). The Greens are also trying to develop a ‘Green’ econom y at a theoretical level.
In Ukraine, on the other hand, the Greens claim commitment to democracy as an idea, although 
failing to specify what such ‘democracy’ should entail. Similarly, their ideas on the econom y are 
vague and unstructured. W hile responding fast to political events in their country, P Z U has failed to 
provide a w ider concept for how society should develop. And wh ile remaining firmly committed to 
Vernadskii’s ideas, the Greens have yet to com e up with a more spec ific programme for how they 
envisage the “ noosphere” to be brought about. Initially, there were people with visions and ideas in 
the Green Movement (Hlazovyi and the political scientist and philosopher Serhii Hrabovskyi 
belonged to these). Due to infighting both o f  them left the movement in the early 1990s. In order to 
turn the trend and regain at least some o f  the support they have lost, the Greens must try to attract 
people with visions and ideas to the movement. Otherwise P Z U  could be in danger o f  becom ing a 
permanent ‘resolution-issuing’ party only.
8.2 Does Inglehart’s Hypothesis of the Greens being a Result of ‘Post- 
Materialism’ hold true in the Case of Ukraine?’
8.2.1 Theory of Post-Materialist Value Change
A substantial amount o f  research on the Green M ovements/Parties as a phenomenon has either 
assumed or tried to prove that the Greens have emerged as a result o f  ‘post-m aterialism ’. This 
concept was first introduced by Ronald Inglehart (1971,1977, 1981), who in his research found a 
‘w idespread shift away from the unquestioned predom inance o f  econom ic and basic security values 
towards an increasing emphasis upon what M aslow had characterised as ‘higher order’ needs’ This 
phenomenon could in Inglehart’s v iew  be explained as a ‘post-materialist value change’ and rested on 
two key propositions: firstly, basic needs have to be met before non-material needs can play any role, 
and secondly, value systems are acquired in the formative years o f  childhood and youth and tend to 
remain relatively stable thereafter. A third assumption, ‘the scarcity hypothesis’, which Inglehart 
introduced later (1979, 1981), proclaimed that people give a higher priority to whatever needs are 
least met.
Inglehart did not initially link the emergence o f  the Green M ovem ent to his theoiy o f  ‘post­
materialist value change’. The first to do so were Hildebrandt and Dalton (1977). Their study was 
follow ed by others - for instance that o f  Barnes and Kaase et al.(1979), who focused on
Lowe and RUdig. ‘Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences’. British Journal o f  Political 
Science, vol. 16, p. 515.
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Tinconventional political participation’. Inglehart then incorporated this idea in later papers (1979, 
1981, 1983), arguing that post-materialists ‘furnish the ideologues and core support for the 
environmental, zero-growth and anti-nuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top 
priority to re-industrialisation and re-armament constitutes a distinctive and persistent dimension o f  
political cleavage’^^ .
Lowe and Rüd ig list several works that emphasise the ‘post-materialist value change’ as a major 
explanatoiy factor for the emergence o f  Green Movements, although not all uncritically accept 
Inglehart’s concept wholeheartedly (see for instance, Watts 1979; Watts and W andesforde-Sm ith 
1981; M üller-Rom m el and W ilke 1981; Handley and Watts 1981; M iiller-Rom m el 1982a, 1983b). 
Survey data com pliled by these authors suggest that ‘post-m aterialists’ are more likely than 
‘materialists’ to;
- support environmental protection measures;
- be opposed to nuclear energy and ‘stronger military defence efforts’
- have a high opinion of the environmental movement (Inglehart 1981, 1983a)
- support actively the ecological, anti-nuclear energy and peace movements (Müller-Rommel 1984a, 1985);
- vote for a green party (Müller-Rommel and Wilke 1981; Müller-Rommel 1983b, 1984b; Schmidt 1984)^^
Watts and W andesforde-Sm ith (1981), however, distinguish between various expressions o f  
environmentalism similar to that o f  Eckersley, arguing that only the more radical expression o f  
environmentalism can be classified as ‘post-m aterialisf :
The ideological shift characteristic of post-materialists is not found 
among all environmentalists, some of whom are quite comfortable with 
the dominant values of the system. The overlap is rather between post- 
materialism and those recently developing elements of the environmental 
movement that have begun to articulate a critique of the techno-scientific 
rationale of industrial society^'*.
Others (Dunlap and Carton 1980; O ’Riordan 1981; Dunlap and Van Liere 1978b; Cotgrove 
1982) have identified radical environmentalism as ‘being motivated by a distinct world v iew , termed 
the N ew  Ecological (or Environmental) Paradigm, at odds with many o f  the core values o f  industrial 
society, such as econom ic growth, material progress and technological o p t i m i s m L o w e  and Rüdig  
also identify a m ove away from what was originally labelled ‘post-materialism’, such as ‘protecting
Ibid.. pp. 515-16.
Ibid.. p. 516.
N. Watts, G. Wandesforde-Smith (1981), ‘Post-Material Values and Environmental Policy Change’, in D, 
E. Mann (ed.), Environmental Policy Formation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), cited by Lowe 
and Rüdig (B.J.Pol.S., vol. 16), p. 516.
Ibid.
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freedom o f speech and giving people more say in the decisions o f government over the protection o f  
order in the nation and the fighting o f prices’ (Inglehart 1971) towards a tool with which to 
characterise a ‘generic set o f  values and attitudes which include environmental ones’ (Fietkau 1982a; 
Fietkau et al. 1982b)^^.
Inglehart has been attacked on two fronts: on the one hand, a number o f  weaknesses and flaws 
have been detected in his theoretical framework, on the other, empirical studies conducted in Western 
Europe do not necessarily back up his assumptions^^. On these grounds, Lowe and Rüd ig conclude 
that ‘it appears questionable to make Inglehart’s theory o f  value change the basis o f  environmental 
soc io logy’’ .^ It is their view  that this model in addition takes little or no account o f  other explanatory 
factors o f  equal or possibly greater sign ificance in explaining the Green phenomenon, such as 
ecolog ical problems, people’s relationship to their surrounding environment, the education system, 
the media, historical ideas and cultural tastes.
B elow  I w ill exam ine to which extent the Green M ovement/Green Party o f  Ukraine fit in the 
framework o f  ‘post-materialist value change’ and identify other factors, which may be o f  more 
sign ificance in this connection. I w ill then proceed to discuss whether or not these factors match 
those mentioned by Lowe and Rüd ig and also, which o f  them is more significant.
8.2.2 Post-Materialist Value Change and the Emergence of the Ukrainian 
Greens
Prior to beginning the analysis o f  the Ukrainian Greens and post-material value change it should be 
pointed out that Inglehart’s theory was developed to explain political developm ents in a Western 
political context. Writers who used this theory as a tool by which to explain the Greens, tried to 
explain the emergence and the peculiarities o f  environmental groups and parties as a phenomenon in 
affluent capitalist societies. As these writers did not state clearly, however, that their analysis was 
restricted to a certain geographical area (Western Europe, and in som e cases also the US, Canada and 
Japan) and to a certain type o f  society (capitalism), and since the theory o f  post-materialist value
Ibid.. p. 517.
Three major arguments have been raised on a theoretical level: Firstly, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, or 
Inglehart’s use of it, is far from universally accepted (Herz 1979; Fietkau 1982a; Flanagan 1982). Secondly, 
the assumption that values acquired during adolescent socialization remain relatively stable throughout life 
has been seriously questioned (Lafferty 1976; Herz 1979; Lehner 1979). Finally, some see a contradiction in 
Inglehart’s combining of the hierarchy of needs/scarcity hypothesis with the socialization hypothesis; the 
former assumes that people change their values according to the relative fulfilment o f different needs, 
whereas the latter proclaims the stability of a value system once it has been acquired. As for empirical 
studies, they have shown that worsening economic conditions led to dramatic swings in value orientations 
among all age cohorts during the late 1970s (Boltken and Jagodzinski 1985; Van Deth 1983). Ibid.. p. 517.
Ibid.. p. 517.
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change has gained some popularity as a means by which to explain the em ergence o f  the Greens more 
generally, it is therefore justifiable to apply Inglehart's theory also to Ukraine so as to determine 
whether or not it is valid also in the Soviet/post-Sov iet case.
Basic Needs vs. ‘Higher Order’ Needs.
A t first sight, it seem s that the Greens in the East do not differ that much from their counterparts in 
the West. The Ukrainian Greens, like the Greens elsewhere, stress issues like more democracy 
(grassroots democracy), and deflation o f  political power. PZU, moreover, has on a number o f  
occa; ions emphasised its place in the larger, global green movement and the issues (political and 
econom ic) on the latter’s agenda. The context within which these demands are made, though, is very 
different. The Greens in the former USSR emerged in a socialist/com m un ist society in transition and 
now have to find their place and define their issues in a post-Soviet/post-totalitarian environment. 
This in turn, affects their agenda, bringing in a number o f issues which are not addressed by similar 
movements in, for instance. Western Europe.
Socialism  and communism, like capitalism, can be said to be materialist in outlook. Both 
emphasise industrial production and econom ic growth and both types o f  society referred to 
them selves as ‘developed’ societies. In terms o f  living standards, though, the citizen o f  capitalist 
societies like Germany, France or Britain was clearly much better o ff  than was the average Russian or 
Ukrainian. Whereas the former could also be referred to as a consumer society, producing a w ide 
range o f  consumer products for the individual (thus emphasising light industries and quality), the 
latter emphasised industrialisation and heavy industries, the aim being to catch up with the more 
affluent and capitalist West, which was seen as a major competitor.
At the time o f  the com ing to power o f  Gorbachev, it had becom e clear that the Sov iet econom y  
was in a decline and that, unless a thorough overhaul was carried out, problems would soon reach 
crisis proportions. Adding to this situation was President Reagan’s introduction o f  the so-called  
Strategic D efence Initiative (SDI), in the 1980s, which would be able to destroy incom ing m issiles 
before they reached US territory. This project, which has later been referred to as a hoax, aimed at 
pushing the Sov iet Union into accepting a stop to the arms race, would be so expensive to match that 
the Sov iet econom y simply would not be strong enough to carry the cost. To concentrate on internal 
econom ic reform, Gorbachev thus in the aftermath launched a series o f  proposals for arms reductions 
to the Americans.
In terms o f  environmental pollution, the Sov iet Union was much worse o ff  than the capitalist 
countries o f  Western Europe. A s pointed out in Chapter One, although legislation to curb pollution 
did exist, no proper enforcement procedures were in place. Besides, the system favoured quantity 
rather than quality, which in turn encouraged industrial waste and pollution. It was, however,
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realised that the econom y and the environment were closely linked to one another and that econom ic  
reform would also have to take account o f  the environmental legacy o f  the USSR.
Follow ing the collapse o f  the Soviet Union, the econom ic situation in the former Soviet 
republics, including Ukraine, deteriorated sharply. The number o f  unemployed is soaring, and due to 
high inflation the average Ukrainian is now econom ically much worse o ff  than (s)he was during the 
Sov iet era. Although people were, in terms o f Western standards, materially not that well o ff (a 
much higher percentage o f  people’s salary was used to cover basic needs such as food, and it was 
d ifficult for people to afford clothes and other material goods, o f wh ich there was an acute shortage 
anyway and whose quality could not match that o f  Western products), they were at least able to feed  
them selves.
Thus, although in terms o f  living standards, people in the W est were materially better o ff  than 
were people in the East, both countries in the capitalist West and the socialist East shared one 
common feature; they were both highly industrialised. Russia was prior to the October Revolution 
much less industrialised than the West, but in the 1930s, Stalin launched an ambitious 
industrialisation campaign intended to catch up with the West as quickly as possible. Although the 
Sov iet econom y was centred around the heavy industry and econom ic growth was given priority 
rather than innovation and quality, (the latter were emphasised in the W est and resulted in a shift 
from heavy to light industry), both societies favoured econom ic growth. A s such, they both fit into 
the wider notion o f  ‘industrialism’.
In both societies, the negative effect o f  industrialism - namely environmental disruption - 
became more v isible during the 1970s and 1980s - especially in the USSR, where a lack o f  innovation 
and old production facilities led to serious environmental pollution. Although, as pointed out in 
Chapter One, criticism was raised regarding this matter by writers and scientists, protest remained 
limited and limited information about the scope o f  such pollution was available to the general public. 
The Chernobyl accident dramatically changed this situation as did glasnost, which for the first time 
revealed the full extent o f  environmental pollution and its impact on public health.
It is worth noting that the Chernobyl accident triggered o ff  a value change and an accompanying 
policy change in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s new thinking in Sov iet foreign policy resulted in a 
change o f  Soviet doctrine from ‘mutual coex istence’ to ‘mutual interdependence’ - the thrust o f  
which was that the class struggle between capitalism and socialism  had, follow ing the Chernobyl 
accident, become secondary to the issue o f  M an’s survival as a species. The accident had clearly 
illustrated how small the world had becom e and how vulnerable one country was to events taking 
place in another. The Chernobyl accident also clearly illustrated how even the ‘peaceful atom ’ could 
be harmful to Man. Follow ing the launch in the United States o f  the Strategic D efence Initiative, the 
Sov iet Union felt it could no longer sustain the enormous costs o f  the arms race. Tactical concerns.
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but probably also a genuine concern for the potentially damaging effects o f  environmental pollution, 
thus made Gorbachev state on a number o f  occasions that environmental problems and the struggle 
for disarmament were both global issues which illustrated interdependence and which could be 
solved only through international co-operation (see Chapter Two)’ .^ Thus, at least on a theoretical 
level, Gorbachev acknowledged M an’s ex istence as a part o f Nature, thus m oving away from 
traditional communist thinking on the environment (cf. Chapter One) which held that Nature was 
there to be used by Man, towards the idea that Man, by destroying Nature may ultimately also destroy 
him self. This shift in Soviet policy and the Chernobyl accident, in addition to information revealed 
follow ing the introduction o f  glasnost, proved crucial in shaping the general public’s attitudes on the 
environment. Whereas in the West, such attitudes changed gradually over a relatively long period o f  
time, in the Soviet Union it came about as a result o f  one major catastrophe and several smaller ones. 
The environment eventually contributed to the fall o f  the Soviet leadership.
Although som e measures were introduced to stop the negative general trend in the sphere o f  the 
environment, these were, as shown in Chapter Two, far from sufficient. A s a result o f  frustration and 
anger with a political leadership that failed to address the problems o f  the Chernobyl accident and 
environmental problems more generally, a number o f  informal groups emerged, addressing these 
issues. They received broad public support. Initially, they called for a more radical overhaul o f  the 
econom ic and political system than proposed by the official authorities. Soon, however, many 
realised that the system was beyond change and that the only way in which matters could improve 
was to replace the old system  with a new one, where bureaucratic control would be replaced by 
decentralisation and démocratisation.
Thus, it seem s that a widespread value change took place in the Soviet Union follow ing the 
introduction o f  glasnost and démocratisation - although due to econom ic hardship there was a shift 
towards the socialists in later elections in Russia and to a lesser extent in Ukraine. This change did, 
however, com e about on premises very different from those underpinning post-materialist value 
change in Western Europe. People reacted against a regime that had discredited itself in the way it 
handled Chernobyl, and in favour o f  more openness and individual political (democratic) rights. 
They also reacted against an inefficient econom ic system in need o f  radical changes not to stagnate 
com pletely and the environmental legacy brought about by this system.
The environment became a key component in the larger struggle for survival - at the individual, 
environmental, local and national level. As the state o f  the environment in the U SSR  had reached 
crisis proportions it posed a direct threat to peoples’ health and surroundings. As such environmental 
improvement became a prerequisite for a basic need in M aslow ’s hierarchy o f  needs - nam ely that o f
It was thus natural that the Ukrainian Peace Fund actively assisted Zelenyi Svit (see Chapter Three) in the 
early stage of its development.
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physical survival - and not a ‘higher order’ need, as generally assumed (explicitly) by adherents o f  
the theory o f  post-materialist value change. Consequently, one o f  the two major assumptions upon 
which this theory rests, does not apply to the Ukrainian (Sov iet) context^°. To illustrate this point, I 
w ill exam ine Zelenyi SviPs  and P Z l f s  position on the issue o f  survival, which clearly indicates that 
the basic need o f  survival (human as well as non-human) is closely linked with the higher order need 
o f  democratisation/Ukrainian independence, which by the Greens were considered a prerequisite to 
stop environmental degradation in Ukraine and to improve the state o f  the environment in the future.
First, however, w e w ill have a look at Inglehart’s second assumption, namely that value system s are 
required in early childhood and remain relatively stable throughout a person’s life.
Tor Bj0rklund of the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, reached a similar conclusion 
having studied the Estonian Green Movement. See The Green Orientation among Estonians Compared with 
Scandinavians (Paper presented for Presentation at WAPOR Regional Seminar: Eastern Europe, Tallinn, 
Estonia, June 11.-12. 1993), p. 1.
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Stable Value Systems
■As pointed out in Chapter One, official Sov iet thinking did not com pletely eradicate pre-Comm imist 
thinking on the environment. Rather, what I referred to as ‘traditional eco-culture’ continued to exist
as a sub-culture. It was upon this culture the first ‘environmentalists’ arguments rested. Although
'the Sov iet education system tried to socialise the children already in the kindergartens, many fam ilies
'preferred not to send their children there, but rather let the grandparents take care o f  them. Often,
'they were religious and would take their grandchildren to church and fam iliarise them with 
alternative values. Although these were not necessarily adopted by the children, at least they were 
aware o f  their existence. Furthermore, during the Sov iet era, pre-Revolutionary literature was highly  
popular and people were generally well-read. Russian literary works in many cases depicted the
environment in a way very different from the official Soviet view  that Nature had no value in itself
.but was a means by which Man could improve his lot - in other words, it was there for Man to use.
K elley et al. (1976), claim that ‘general public awareness o f  environmental problems has been 
limited both by restrictions imposed until recently on discussion o f  the question and w idely held
attitudes which de-em phasise environmental concerns. Although early polls show that workers living 
near polluting industries were clearly aware o f  the problem, w ide-scale public attention was not 
focused on the deteriorating quality o f  the environment until the 1960’s (Kaliuzhnyj, 1961; 102- 
114)’. Flowever, ‘deeply held public attitudes on man’s relationship to nature and the pressing desire 
to enjoy the consumer benefits o f  industrialisation have also dulled the environmental awareness o f  
the average Russian. The view  that nature’s wealth is virtually inexhaustible and that it is man’s fate 
to conquer and reshape nature is w idely held. Moreover, the average citizen undoubtedly places the
I :
satisfaction o f  his own material desires well above environmental considerations in ordering his 
personal priorities; in a work-now, consume-later econom y, the argument that increased production, 
espec ially o f  consumer goods, must be even further delayed in the interests o f  environmental quality 
is destined to be unpopular’®*.
Although K elley et al. are no doubt right in saying that there were restrictions on d iscussions on 
this issue, it is the case that the environment as an issue faced fewer restrictions than were other 
issues, as it did not constitute a threat to the authority o f  the CPSU (see for instance DeBardeleben, 
1985). As regards people’s general attitudes towards the environment, it is virtually im possible to 
argue that they were positive or negative, given, as we argued in the introduction to this chapter, that 
w e do not have sufficient or reliable data on this issue. To the extent people were not aware o f  the 
state o f  the environment, this can be explained very simply: there just was not enough information 
about the harmful effects o f  pollution for people to become aware o f  the dangers it posed to their 
health. And, if  they were aware o f  the negative effects o f  pollution, it was difficult to do something  
about it as there were limitations on political participation in the USSR. With the introduction of  
glasnost in 1986, the link between environmental pollution and health (primarily on average life 
spans) suddenly became a key issue in the press. The accident at Chernobyl and the failure o f  official 
authorities to address its impact adequately as w ell as their failure to do som ething w ith other 
environmental disaster areas caused a public uproar. Whereas the early environmental protests were 
largely NIM BY-actioiis (not in my backyard-campaigns), in the republics they also becam e a symbol 
o f  the threat the current regime posed to the nation as such.
The media and political reform, making political participation less restricted, thus both 
facilitated a radical change in public perceptions o f  the environment and their readiness to actively  
take part in actions to save the environment. D isillusionm ent with the CPSU and a wealth o f  
information about the past (the Stalinist purges in the 1930s) as well as the real state o f  the econom y  
and the environment made people question dominant values o f  the Soviet system and eventually to 
reject this. When even Gorbachev distanced him self from the CPSU and its legacy banning the 
CPSU follow ing his return from the Crimea in the aftermath o f  the coup in August 1991, the last 
bastion o f  communism crumbled and created a vacuum. People started searching for new  values and 
new beliefs, and as a result - not only out o f  curiosity - many turned to the church for moral guidance 
and to the past for alternative ideas.
Several polls conducted in the latter half o f  the 1980s and the early 1990s show  that the 
environment either ranked first or among the first issues on a list o f  m ost important issues/questions 
to be addressed, amongst the Soviet public. A  study conducted by VTsIOM (the A ll-U nion Centre for
See D.R. Kelley et al., The Economic Superpowers and the Environment, the United States. Soviet Union 
and Japan (San Francisco: W.FI.Freeman and Company, 1976), pp. 134-135.
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the Study o f  Public Opinion) in 66 towns and 34 rural centres in seven regions o f  the former USSR  
(W est and East Siberia, North-W est o f  the European part o f  the USSR, the M oscow  oblast, 
Kazakhstan, the Urals and North Caucasus) produced the follow ing results in response to the question 
about which issues were the most pressing in the USSR:
Table 8.1 Issues causing the most Concern among People
Issue Percent
poor supplies of industrial goods and their poor quality 55
lack of and poor quality of food products 51
widespread use of bribes, unfair distribution of goods 49
low incomes, high prices 47
environmental pollution 47
housing problem 35
poor health care 31
dependence on civil servants to solve (all) questions of life 27
low level of training and education of the younger generation 24
inadequate concern about the elderly 22
Source: VTslOM (1989)
When asked which single issue was the most pressing in the USSR the ranking o f  issues changed, 
placing the environment third, after the housing problem and low incom es/high prices:
Table 8.2 The most important Issue o f  
Concern among People
Issue Percent
Housing problems 17
Low incomes, high prices 16
Environmental pollution 14
Issue Percent
Environmental Pollution 87
Shortage and poor quality of food products 82
Housing problem 79
Poor supplies of industrial goods and their poor quality 74
Widespread use of bribes and unfair distribution of goods 73
Low incomes and high prices 67
Low level of education and upbringing of the young generation 63
Poor health care 63
Inadequate concern about the elderly 61
Dependence upon civil servants in the solving of (all) questions of life 56
Source: VfsIOM  (1989)
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Source: VTsIOM (1989)
With regard to the question o f  which problems must be solved immediately and w hich problems 
may be addressed later, the follow ing pattern emerged:
Table 8.3 The Single Issue that needs to be solved most urgently
s
I
*
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The fact that the environment ranked highest could be explained, as
OdiuecrBeniioe viueime iiaxoAH’i'CJi no;t n.insiiiuevi npecchi, re.ieBnjieiimi. 
paiiHO, nmio MAyuiHx u poor ;iBHîKeiiHfi u BaiUMTy OKpymaioinefi 
cpeiibi, BTo. ecrecrBem io, cnocodcrByer iipoueccy ”B3poc.ieiiMn” 
sKonomaecKoro coBuauHH naceneumi®^.
Possibly the most thorough survey of environmental attitudes at this time (1990) was conducted 
by Ozhegov and Nikonorova, who looked at such attitudes amongst Soviet youth. The survey was 
conducted with the support of the Komsomol committees over a period of two years (1988-89) in 
seven regions of the USSR (Moscow and the Moscow oblast, Astrakhan, Irkutsk and Tula oblasts, 
Magnitogorsk, the Chernivtsy oblast in Ukraine and the Karakalpak autonomous republic in 
Uzbekistan). All these areas are heavily polluted. Some 2,500 young people were surveyed and the 
results compared to results from a similar survey conducted in 1984 in Moscow, Irkutsk and Tula
oblasts, Georgia, Latvia, Tadzhikistan and Ukraine with a sample of 2,800 young people®^. When
asked what place the environment had in their lives, more than 86% answered ‘important’. When 
broken down into very important and fairly important, the answers were 49.1% and 37.2% 
accordingly. Only 3.1% claimed that the state of the environment was unimportant to them and 2.5%
rather unimportant. 0.6% thought the environment was not at all important®"*. a
The suiwey also revealed that concern with the environment increased with age:
Table 8.4 Concern fo r  the Environment and Age (in %)
Up to 17 17-19 20-22 23-25 26-28 Older than 28
46.9 51.1 55.0 58.1 63.9 70.2
Source: Ozhegov/Nikonorova (1990)
Furthermore, Ozhegov and Nikonorova found that those adults who consciously perceived of
Nature as a part of their lives showed a particularly concern for the environment and first o f all for
.the state of the environment in their own area® .^
The response was predominantly positive when asked whether or not information with regard to 
the protection of the environment had become more accessible during the last two-three years and 
whether their interest in environmental issues had increased during the same period. Some 53.4% 
and 66.6% respectively answered in the affirmative®* .^ A majority - 45.2 percent - answered that the
(I). CorOjM OiioB, A. Tojici'bix, - ”0  iiamnx BaSorax". KoMMynMcr, No. 9, 1989, c . 74-75. 
lO.n. O îK e ro B , E.B. H n K O H o p o B a , - dK O JioruM ecK H H  h m u v jib c . r in o S jie M B i (bopiyiM POBanmi a K O Jio ru B e c K o ü  
K vaBTVDbi ivtQ.rioaexcM (M ocK B a; M o jiO A aji T B apyruB , 1990), c . 16.
Ibid.. pp. 18-19.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid.. p. 26.
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one single factor which had influenced their ecological consciousness was the real ecological state of 
the environment where they lived® .^
Another survey, conducted by the Department of Ideology of the CPU Central Committee®® in 
various parts of Ukraine to test public opinion on the environment in the country. This survey was 
carried out shortly before the collapse of the USSR and motivated by the high importance given to 
improve the state of the environment by the CPU® .^ Unfortunately, only chosen parts of the suiwey 
are referred to, thus making it difficult to get a full picture of public opinion and the environment. 
However, it seems clear that a large percent of the population is concerned with the dismal state of 
the Ukrainian environment. For instance, 64.9% of those interviewed supported a statement to the 
fact that ‘we must sacrifice economic growth to preserve and protect the environment’. As many as 
57.3 percent of the city respondents did not favour the construction of ecologically ‘clean’ enterprises 
needed to improve living standards, in their area. The percentage in rural areas was even higher - 
69.0%. On the other hand a majority of the respondents expressed the view that the construction of 
housing, the provision of food, industrial goods, improvement in health care and public transport 
were issues that must be given priority. Stepiko explained this in the following way:
3  oiiiioro 6oKy, ueSajKantniM i iieroroBnicno HacrHiin iiacejieiiim ;io 
KcrÜTicoï poSoTM no 3Be;iennio iio MiiiiMywy uiKWiMuoro BiuiHBy 
.iiioiiHiiH iia iiaBKO.FTHiiniE ce[ie40UMme, nipoio n ivioxcjiHBÎcrb onpirnnTM 
BeCL KOMIUTCKC CKJiajUIMX eKO.noriMHHX npoSjlCM ’OiUIHM MaXOM” (îlK 
noTK.naii - ’’enUeMia” bqkphttji pm y BHpoOnnuTB ra nUnpHEMCi'B 
MiitMeiiSionpOiViy), s iipyroro, npaniennaM nepenecTH nerarmiiMii inimn  
BHpodiiMUTna Kyjincb nem n i Biji ceGe^°.
Amongst the more interesting findings of the CPU survey is the data on nuclear power. 60.6% 
of the respondents were negative to the construction o f more nuclear power stations in Ukraine. As 
many as 43.6% favoured the closure or reorientation of existing nuclear power stations. Attitudes on 
nuclear power practically did not differ amongst members and non-members of the CPU, nor 
amongst social or professional groupings. The survey also indicated that the CPU was losing 
authority due to its failure to adequately address environmental issues; 69.7% were not satisfied with 
the work o f the party obkoms in this area. Similarly, dissatisfaction was expressed with local and 
regional party committees, although the percentage was slightly less - thus supporting the view that
Ibid.. p. 133.
®®fpyna no bmibibuhio rpowavicKOi jiyMKM iiieojioriMiioro BhwUy ra ceicropoM eicojiorii couiajibiio- 
eKOHOMiaiioro BWiiJiy UK KflY.
See MnxaHJio CxerinKO, f  noMaacbKa avMKa npo eKOJioriaiii nnoGaeMU Decnv6.riiicH. (1992), given to me 
by Verkhovna Rada’s advisor on the environment, Viacheslav Oleshchenko.
Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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the CPSU was not only responsible for the environmental problems of Ukraine due to its economical 
and political policies, but also to be blamed for the failure to solve these problems.
A survey referred to in Zelenyi Svit^^ and which was carried out in Kiev by a group of 
sociologists produced similar results: 41% were against construction of new and favoured the closure 
of existing nuclear power stations, 32% favoured a gradual close-down of existing nuclear power 
stations, 17% wanted to ban nuclear power in Ukraine. Only 3% were positive to the further 
development of nuclear power. Female respondents were generally more sceptical to nuclear power 
than were men.
As seen above, people expressed serious concern with the state of the environment in the 
USSR/Ukraine in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Consequently, if we assume that the large majority of 
the Soviet people were brought up to perceive of the environment as vast and inexhaustible, neither 
Inglehart’s second assumption applies in the Soviet case. What is more, the Ukrainian Greens as well 
as a majority of the public do not criticise industrialism and technologies as such. The economic 
policies of the PZU  come close to those of the social-democrats in the West, and it is thought that the 
market - with some restrictions - is better suited to address the environmental problems of the former 
USSR than a socialist economy. Many people also believe that only the market economy can cover 
the material needs of the population.
The ‘Scarcity Hypothesis’
As regards Inglehart’s third assumption, added later, that there is increased attention to securing basic 
needs, this assumption seems to hold true in the case of the former USSR in general and Ukraine in 
particular. Following the collapse of the USSR the economies of the former Soviet republics 
stagnated, as links between republics were severed and the struggle for economic and political reform 
started. The dismantling o f the Soviet-type economic system met with fierce opposition, as did the 
introduction of the market economy. Moreover, demands from the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development that certain requirements be met prior to the allocation of 
loans and economic support, resulted in harsh monetary policy means, of which the general public 
had to bear the brunt. Soaring inflation rates, unemployment and reduction of social benefits made 
the physical/economic obstacles to survival more urgent than the environmental problems. When 
faced with the choice of whether to eat tomorrow or fall ill with cancer from radiated food products 
contaminated with pesticides and herbicides in the future, people chose immediate survival. 
Moreover, as the struggle to make ends meet take precedence, the fight for the environment becomes 
secondary.
dejienMM Cfiir, no. 7-8, 1991, c. 3.
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Economic figures for 1993 and 1994 illustrate the problem: In 1993, industrial production
dropped by close to 20 percent. It deteriorated by another 30 percent in 1994. High inflation quickly 
reduced the spending power of people’s salaries and savings: during the last six months of 1993, 
inflation was 100 percent per month and in 1994, inflation reached 400 percent^^. Faced with severe 
financial problems, taking actively part in protecting the environment simply became a luxury 
activity for most people.
A survey published in Visti z Ukrainy in June 1993^^ indicated that the environment was being 
pushed down on the list of urgent tasks to be addressed at the expense of the most elementary needs 
of physical survival, such as law and order, higher salaries and reduction in price increases and the 
provision of food products, thus reflecting the deteriorating economic situation and its impact on the 
general public in Ukraine. Whereas 73-79% of the respondents considered material issues to be 
urgent, the percent for ecology, housing, industrial goods, transport etc. was down to 40-60%. The 
sui-vey, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences also revealed 
that a majority of the respondents held the opinion that their living standards were dropping (In 
January/February 1993 75% said that their material conditions had deteriorated during 1992, 13 
percent said they remained unchanged, whereas 6% thought they had improved). Figures for May 
1993 showed little difference: 75% said they were worse off, 14% that their situation remained 
unchanged and 6% thought they were better off than before. Results for June indicated an overall 
deterioration in living standards, following the price increases of May: 83% now thought they were 
worse off, compared with 10% unchanged and 3% improved). Consequently 4/5 of the population 
were not satisfied with their financial situation.
However, a survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences and the company Sotsis-Gellup in 1994^ "* showed that there was still widespread concern for 
the environment: as many as 84.7% of the respondents held the view that ‘every citizen in our 
country must be particularly aware o f the environment and take actively part in solving 
environmental issues’. As far as nuclear power was concerned, though, people were less inclined to 
favour a closure of nuclear power stations than before. This could in the opinion of the newspaper be 
explained as a result of the ‘catastrophic state o f the energy transmitters and from the fact that people 
had understood that the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power station would not solve the vast 
number of problems caused by the accident’.
See Nikolay Churilov and Tatyana Koshechkina, ‘Public Attitudes in Ukraine’ , in Richard Smoke (ed.), 
Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments In Europe’s New Democracies 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 190.
B ic in  3 YKpaxim, no. 26, 24-30.6.1993, c. 3.
Fomc yKpaïHM, 2.2.1994, c. 8.
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Although there are of course also political reasons for moving the environment down as an issue 
on the national agenda - in political circles in Ukraine there is widespread consensus that prior to 
addressing the environmental problems the country is faced with, Ukrainian statehood must be 
secured and a stable economy and a stable political system built - the worsening of the general 
public’s material lot during economic reform seems to have affected their immediate priorities, 
shifting the emphasis from the environment to issues related to their financial situation.
All political parties in Ukraine are committed to the environment and this is fully understandable 
given that most of them emerged directly or indirectly as a result of the Chernobyl accident. RUKH, 
for instance, in its programme has a separate section on the environment. This section is very similar 
to the programme of the green movement. It calls for a state programme of measures for ecological 
safety and considers it essential that constitutional and other judicial guarantees be developed for the 
protection of a sound environment for the people of Ukraine. RUKH  calls for a fundamental review 
of energy policy in the republic and demands that the construction of new units at existing nuclear 
stations be halted. Chernobyl must be dismantled and alternative, ecologically safe technologies for 
utilising energy sources should be introduced together with an expansion o f a network of ‘secondary 
energy sources’. The entire population of Ukraine should be medically examined to determine its 
state of health after the Chernobyl disaster. Long-term monitoring must be set up and foreign 
equipment obtained for this purpose. A programme of rehabilitation should be set up for the 
population suffering from the effects of the disaster. Full compensation should be given to people for 
losses caused by the disaster. Agriculture must be ‘ecological’, new nature conservation zones 
introduced, and finally, the regular publication on data should be initiated. Environmental education, 
states the programme, is essential^^.
A similar programme was developed by the Ukrainian Republican Party. Whereas all political 
parties are in favour of and supportive to the Green Movement, there is some scepticism as to the 
need for a Green Party. An official representative of the Republican Party, for instance, in an 
interview with the author claimed that there was no need for it as all parties have committed 
themselves to the environment. This view should be taken as a statement that the Green Party enjoys 
considerable support in the Ukrainian society and thus poses a threat to other parties^^. Unlike some 
other political parties, which hold the view that the environmental problems can only be properly 
addressed within an economically and politically stable framework, PZU  emphasises that the building
The Popular Movement in Ukraine for Restructuring - RUKH  ; Program and Charter (Kiev: 1989), pp. 25- 
26.
^^ ^YKpaïiicbKa PeciiySjiiKatiCbKa flapriii, - flDorpaMni aoicVMeiiTH (Khïiî, 1991), see section LlJo;[o oxodohh 
iianKajiHitniLoro cepeiioBun ia. c. 5-6. The same view was epxiessed by the leader of the URP secretariat at 
the time, O. Demydenko, in interview with the author, Kiev, August 1991.
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of the Ukrainian state must take place within the limits set by Nature - i.e. economic development is 
acceptable only to the extent it is sustainable.
Assessment
To conclude, although a change of values has definitely taken place with regard to the environment in 
Ukraine/the former USSR, this change cannot be explained by the theory of post-material value 
change. As shown above, other factors, such as political developments within the USSR and the role 
of the media, facilitated the emergence of the Green Movement and public awareness of the 
environment, thus lending support to critics of the post-industrial value change theory. Thus it 
cannot be stressed often enough that models aiming to have universal application must be treated 
with the utmost care. Local differences are very important in explaining political phenomena in 
geographical areas whose political, economic and cultural/historical traditions differ and, as attempts 
at fitting Soviet reality into political/sociological models developed in the West for a Western 
political context, indicate, by applying such models one often risks overlooking factors crucial to a 
proper understanding and/or explanation of a phenomenon. So although the former USSR and the 
capitalist West both have environmental problems in common, the extent and seriousness of these 
problems differ substantially, and the factors which triggered the Green Movements into existence 
very different.
8.3 Different Political Context - Different Issues: The Ukrainian Greens’
Struggle for Survival.
Having discarded Inglehart’s theoiy of post-material value change as non-applicable to the case of 
the Ukrainian Greens, I will now proceed to discuss Zelenyi Svit and PZU'% campaign for survival to 
illustrate how a different theoretical framework, different history, culture and values as well as a 
different political and economic context have influenced the agenda in Ukraine - making the Greens 
there look rather different from their West European counterparts. Yet, as regards core issues of the 
global green movement - e.g. decentralisation, diversity, démocratisation, the Ukrainian Greens do 
not differ much from other Greens. The peculiarities of the national context have, in my view, not 
only by political analysts (e.g. Goldman), but also by Greens in other countries, been misread and 
misinterpreted.
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8.3.1 The Greens and the issue of Ukrainian Independence
In a paper presented at a conference on the Soviet Environment at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem in early January 1990, Marshall Goldman argued that whereas the Greens in the West are 
‘internationalist’, the Green Movements emerging in the Soviet Union were ‘separatist’ (nationalist) 
in character; ‘inside the Soviet Union environmentalists tend to be separatists...In contrast, the 
environmental issue in most of the rest of the world tends to be anti-nationalistic, almost ‘one world’ 
in outloolc’^^ . Representatives of green circles in the West have also expressed views similar to those 
of Goldman. The Greens in the former Soviet Union, though, are not at all happy with being referred 
tc as ‘nationalists’, and have on numerous occasions stated their commitment to the principle of 
‘thinking globally and acting locally’.
In an interview with the Ukrainian weekly Molod Ukrainy in February 1992 Vitalii Kononov, 
currently the leader of the Green Party of Ukraine, voiced his dissatisfaction with this situation, 
stating that ‘the Greens in the West do not perceive of us in the way we would have liked them to. 
We are being accused of nationalism’^ ®.
Below I will demonstrate that the situation is much more complex than argued by Goldman and 
that, although the national question is an issue on which the Green Movements have been forced to 
make a stand, the motivation behind what will be referred to as ‘national sentiments’ amongst the 
Greens in Ukraine, is qualitatively different from nationalism in its negative sense (i.e. territorial 
expansion and the primacy of one ethnic group over another). It is argued that ‘national sentiments’ 
have been adopted by the Greens only in as far as they are required to stabilise and improve the state 
of the environment and that, like their sister movements/parties in the West, the (former) Soviet 
Greens, too, are deeply committed to the principles of the international green movement. The 
attitudes o f Zelenyi Svit and PZU  on the national question are backed up by those reflected in a 
statement issued on nationalism by the Green Parties of Georgia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia and the 
Armenian Green Movement - indicating that the Ukrainian Greens are in line with the view of the 
Greens in other parts of the (former) Soviet Union in their perceptions of this issue.
As seen in Chapter Three, Zelenyi Svit initially stated that it was a non-political movement 
whose only concern was with the environment. Rather than divide people along ideological lines, it 
would seek to unite people for a higher course, namely that of bringing an end to environmental 
destruction in Ukraine. However, the Greens were soon forced to realise that the environment and 
politics were inextricably linked with one another. As a result, they recognised that the Greens had to
Marshall Goldman, ‘Environmentalism and Nationalism: an unlikely Twist in an unlikely Direction’, in 
John Massey Stewart (ed.) : The Soviet Environment: Problems. Policies, and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-10.
HiiTepBbio nenea i t b i r i o p a i v t H :  3e.rteubi upoSjieMu - j j i n  c m o r o  c v c n H J t b c r B a .  Mojioæ VkpcIïhm, 28.2.1992 
(n.p.).
799
take an active part in the political process to influence the decision-making process directly, in 
addition to putting pressure on the decision-makers through ad-hoc activities. It was therefore 
decided to set up a Green Party as the ‘political wing’ of Zelenyi Svit. The Green Party in its early 
days was also very cautious. lurii Shcherbak claimed, as seen in Chapter Five, at one point even that 
the PZU  should not be considered an opposition party in the traditional sense, as ‘we cannot possibly 
talk about a confrontation with the Communist Party’. Besides, the Green Party initially allowed for 
dual membership (i.e. membership of both the CPSU and the Green Party).
To reiterate what has been said in previous chapters, the political implications of environmental 
reform were brought to the surface by the debate on economic reform. The Stalinist command- 
administrative economic system aimed at maximising economic growth. By stressing quantity 
(output), hardly any room was left for quality (innovation), thus facilitating the inefficient use of 
natural resources and, consequently, causing pollution. The centralist character of the Soviet 
economy further aggravated the environmental costs of industrial pollution.
As noted in Chapter One, most sources of pollution in the republics were controlled by 
ministries and departments in Moscow. These were not particularly concerned with the 
environmental aspect of their activities as fines for pollution were set ridiculously low and control of 
emissions was poor. Their major concern was to fulfil production targets set in their annual 
production plans. A failure to reach these targets had serious consequences through a loss of 
bonuses.
The Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986 and the secrecy by which it was surrounded 
highlighted the need for more glasnost not only on the environment but in Soviet society as such. 
Besides, the authority of the Communist Party dropped considerably, due to its inability to take the 
measures required to minimimize the impact of nuclear fall-out on the population and on the 
environment. The accident created a more general awareness in the Soviet population of the link 
between environmental pollution and health and it also demonstrated the helplessness o f individual 
republics faced with environmental disasters inflicted upon them by Moscow through industrial and 
energy policies upon which they could exert little or no influence (see Chapter Two). Furthermore, 
they were given only restricted access to data (kept in Moscow) revealing the extent of the accident - 
in terms of contamination of the soil as well as in terms of the direct impact on people’s health. 
Besides, it was difficult to uncover the full impact of the accident, given that information was 
gathered by a large number of bodies and not collated afterwards. In Ukraine, and also in other 
former Soviet republics, the question of environmental protection eventually became a question of 
physical survival not only of the people living there, but also of the land on which they lived and of 
the cultures that had been developed by these people on this land over the centuries. Terms like 
‘genocide’ and ‘national destruction’ were used to describe the ultimate effect of Moscow’s (non-
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environmental) policies towards the republics. Ecological reform was linked to economic and 
political reform more generally, the argument being that a healthy environment was a prerequisite, 
accompanied by the restoration of national languages as official languages in each republic and the 
rebirth of national culture and alternative values, for national survival.
As seen in Chapter One, in Slav cultures the relationship between the nation (the ethnic group 
and the land on which it lives) and nature is closely linked, not only emotionally as reflected in their 
literatures and cultural traditions - but also etymologically. Above, we saw that the words in Russian 
for Motherland, People (nation) and Nature all have the same etymological root, namely rod, which 
means birth, origin: rod in a. narod and priroda. The equivalent in the Ukrainian language is rid/rod, 
which can be translated as lineage, descent, origin. Ridni krai (one’s native land, motherland), 
narid/narod. and priroda in Ukrainian correspond to the Russian words quoted above. In addition, the 
Ukrainian word for family/kin is rodina. This link finds its expression in the following quote by the 
Russian writer, Mikhail Prishvin: liubif rodinu. znachit berech’ prirodul (To love the Motherland is 
to protect Nature!)^^.
Also the Orthodox Church emphasises, as seen in Chapter One, the close relationship between 
Man and Nature to a much greater extent than the Protestant and the Catholic churches do. The link 
between nation and environment, then, was not a result purely of the political situation in the Soviet 
Union. It was triggered off by it, but it is also deeply rooted in Slav culture. One should also 
remember that the first informal groups to emerge in the former Soviet Union were concerned with 
eco-culturai issues.
As shown in Chapter Three, the first informal groups to emerge in Ukraine were also concerned 
primarily with culture and the environment. It was argued that culture is veiy closely linked to the 
environment: A culture can be preserved and developed only within a healthy natural environment. 
If this environment is damaged, it will inevitably pose a threat not only to areas of cultural 
significance, but also to the people living in this environment. It is understandable, therefore, that 
groups to promote Ukrainian culture also took a keen interest in preserving the natural environment.
In the spring of 1987, Tovarystvo Lev (the Lion Society) was set up in Lviv. It described itself 
as an ‘independent, community eco-cultural youth organisation’*****. The Ukrainian Culturological 
Club, which was formed in August 1987 in Kiev, was primarily concerned with those aspects of 
Ukrainian culture which also had a national aspect.****. Nuclear power and the environment were thus 
linked to the survival not only of Ukrainian culture but also to the survival of Ukraine as a nation*** .^
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100QuotedinIO.fi. Oxeroii, E.B. HnKoiiopoBa, dKOJiormiecKMM h m u v j i b c  (MocKna: Hayica, 1991), c. 146. Taras Kuzio, Restructuring from below. Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev. 1985-90
(London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1990), p. 6..101Ibid.. p. 4. 
***^ Ibid.. p. 5.
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The nationalist movement (RUKH) was also concerned with the link between ecology and 
national survival. Mykhailo Horyn, the chairman of RUKITs Secretariat, addressing the National 
Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC in 1990, expressed this concern in the following way: 
‘ecological consciousness became part of our national consciousness...demonstrations against nuclear 
power were part of the larger protest against the (Soviet) empire itself'**^. However, whereas 
independence for the national movement was a goal in itself, for the Greens it was primarily, as will 
be seen below, a means by which to facilitate an improvement in the state of the environment in 
Ukraine.
The National Question and the Environment - The Green Perspective
The Greens, like virtually every political movement and party in Ukraine in the late 1980s/eariy 
1990s, called for Ukrainian sovereignty or independence. Their stand on the national question was 
developed through a series of steps: first, they tried to identify the sources of environmental
pollution in the USSR. Secondly, they examined the impact of this pollution, and thirdly, they 
offered a solution to the problem: namely economic and political independence.
Section Two of Zelenyi Svifs, programme (endorsed by the Inaugural Congress in 1989) 
addressed the causes of environmental degradation. It stated that the centralist character of the Soviet 
economic system as well as its stress on economic growth, facilitated a criminal exploitation, a 
plundering of nature by all-union and republican bureaucratic structures. The ecological crisis had 
reached catastrophic proportions and threatened not only Nature but also Ukraine with extinction - 
not only the territory of Ukraine, but Ukraine as a nation***"*. In this connection, several references 
were made to the historic and eco-cultural legacy of Ukraine. Zelenyi Svit stated that its major 
priority is ‘the native Ukraine, the Fatherland of the peoples who inhabited this ancient Slavonic 
land’. Nature - the steppes, forests and mountains - were described as ‘the beauty and the pride of 
Ukraine’.
Shcherbak, when addressing Zelenyi Sv i fs  First Congress on 28 October 1989, spoke about the 
environmental destruction of Ukraine in very emotional terms:
YKIiaiiia II orn i eKOJioriMuoï Karacrpo(])u! Kojinci, KniTyinn i  
h.iarojiaTiiMH Kpaw aap iiiiio l npHpoiiw, ocn iiia iio l iioKo.riiiiiiJiMH 
iiaiiiHx nijeAKiu, Yicpaïiia iinpHTy.n iia5.iiM:iM.naca ao eKQ.noriBiioro 
AiioKaaincHcy. Tpe5a 6 h t h  na cno.nox, rpefa sSnpai'H iic i :iaopoai
***^ Cited in Feshbach & Friendly Jr., Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege (London: Aurum 
Press, 1992), pp. 232-33.
3e.fiermfi Cuir, npornaivia CKneii. OKTfiGps, 1989), section 2
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CM.iM i i a i i i l  lia 6opOTt>6y m  CrpaTcria imavMBaiiiai
C h oroju ii -  EAHiio viozc.iHiia c r p a r e r ia
He finished his speech with the following words: ‘Ukraina hula! Ye! Bude! Narod zhytyme. Na 
svoii zemli. Vichno’. (Ukraine was! Ukraine is! Ukraine will be! The people is alive. On its own 
Land. Forever)"** .^
This link between Nation and Nature has been further developed on later occasions'**^. The 
thrust of this issue is that when a nation no longer feels that it is the master of its own land the sense 
of responsibility for this land is lost, and the result is, amongst others, environmental degradation. 
Only by reimbuing people with a love for their historical-cultural heritage and for their native land is 
it possible to save not only the nation but also the physical territory it occupies.
The Greens thus acknowledged Ukraine’s right of existence as a nation. Compared to nationalist 
forces which demanded outright independence, though, the Greens were initially more cautious when 
discussing this issue. In a speech recorded in Zelenyi Svit (the newspaper) of May 1990'**®, 
Shcherbak drew a restrained conclusion from the view presented above, stating that the only way in 
which Ukraine could successfully fight for survival was to be given direct responsibility for its 
natural resources:
Ty ivia io, m o lo x e  ci>oro;iiii ; io u iJ ib iio  S y j io  6  iipHHunTM, fiKiuo lie  
sa 1( 011. 10 ripMiiaMMiii ACK J iapau iio npo cyB ejje iiiT eT  Y icp a ïiiH  b y c i x  
f io r o  BM iinax- M i)K ua]io;iilo- upaiiOBOMy, eKo iioM ia iiO M y, no.iiiTHMiiOMy, 
eKOJioriMiioMy, cliiiiaiicoBOM y ra iiiiiiM x. He impiuiMBuiM iipoSaeM y  
cy B ej^ in io ro  K oiiTpoa io s h o icy  Y K p a iiicb K o l p e c n y 6 j i i i (H  na il 
npoMHc.aoBMMH oS'E K xaM H , lie  M o x iia  A iiy.viaïH  npo jikccb  
noK pam eiim i eK O J ioriM itoi CMTyaiiii'*^^.
After the Declaration of Sovereignty was endorsed by the Ukrainian parliament in June 1990, 
Shcherbak discussed the implications of Ukrainian sovereignty in an interview with Ukrainian 
radio"**. When asked whether the Greens now favoured self-rule, he responded that there could no 
longer be any doubt on this issue as there already existed a Ukrainian declaration o f sovereignty 
(1990), expressing the wish of the Ukrainian people. However, he went on, at a session of the USSR
lOpHH lU,ep5aK, "Boxce ppnTVH YKpaïiiv”. 3e.muMM cnir, no. 1, 1990, c. 2.
‘*’^ I O p H H  I l f e p S a K ,  3 K h t h .... 3e.neHMfi cnir, 2 8 . 1 2 . 1 9 8 9 ,  c .  2 .
'**^ Cf. Oleksandr Svirida in interview with Ukrainian Radio ( K - 3 ,  2 2 : 3 0 ,  1 9 . 1 . 1 9 9 1 )  or see ‘CvBepeuHTeT: 
Ei(oaormi n iiojiuTUKa. Beaeuhix 3a BhixcHBaiine’. B ic m  ,? VK-païiiM, 12.3.1991.
Y d o m h c t o  nporojrocvEMo cmoætiiifl flapTi ï  Beneimx YKpaiiiH. Maiindiecr FÏ3Y. 3e.mrMfi œ i  r, no. 
2 ,  1990, C . 2 .
Benetmfi cbIt, K B i r e i i B  1990., c. 2.
"**K-3, 1:30, 13.10.1990.
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Supreme Soviet he had suggested the creation of a system of collective security in the military, 
ecology, and energy fields set up horizontally between sovereign states (former Soviet republics).
On numerous occasions representatives of Zelenyi Svit stressed that a prerequisite for improving 
the state of the environment in Ukraine was the right of control of its own resources. However, the 
extent and severity of environmental damage on the (former) Soviet territory was such that it could 
be addressed successfully only by all the republics together. Initially, at least, a loose federation of 
former Soviet republics was thus favoured by the leadership of Zelenyi Svit and the PZU.
As can be seen from the quotes above, officially the Greens went to great length to justify their 
position on Ukrainian sovereignty in terms of care of the environment. This, however, does not mean 
that Zelenyi Svit and PZU  were completely devoid of nationalist elements, using the green cause to 
advance other political goals. It is possible to identify two nationalist currents amongst the Greens: a 
Ukrainian one and a Russian one. The first manifested itself in the draft programme of the PZU  
developed by Oleksandr Sviryda from Kiev. The programme was discussed at the First Party 
Congress, but was eventually rejected. The second one was prevalent amongst the Crimean Greens, a 
substantial proportion of whom seek Crimean reunification with Russia. These elements were 
promptly excluded from Zelenyi Svit, though, and do not enjoy much support amongst its members. 
The central leadership of the PZU  rejected the arguments used by these groupings, maintaining that 
the views of extremist activists were in no way representative of the general mood within the PZU.
However, nationalist sentiments within the Green Party created considerable problems for the 
party leadership in the sense that it has had to make an effort to achieve consensus on the national 
question. This question was debated at length during the First Party Congress in Kiev. A summary 
of the Congress, given to me by Kononov, suggests that ‘a large majority’ of the delegates from the 
Western oblasts of Ukraine (Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk) supported the idea o f a federal 
Ukraine, acknowledging the substantial historical and cultural differences between the various parts 
of Ukraine. The Carpathian delegation even went so far as to state that Carpathia ‘never belonged to 
Ukraine’. A conciliation committee headed by a USSR People’s Deputy, Leontyi Sanduliak, was 
given the task of mediating between the ‘nationalists’ and the ‘globalists’. In the end the following 
view prevailed: If one gives priority to national revival/rebirth, rather than ecology, then it is easier 
to join up with one of the already existing parties and senseless to create a new, green one..,'" 
Consequently the Green Paidy is not hostile to nationalist sentiments, but only in as far as these can 
be utilised in a positive manner to secure the protection, and in the long run also the improvement, of 
the natural (Ukrainian) environment.
Although a compromise was reached, the national question remained an issue of some dispute 
within the Party. A Conference on National Polices was therefore held shortly afterwards, in Kiev,
Summary of First Party Congress, given to me by Kononov (n.d.).
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on 20 January 1991. The Conference adopted a resolution which synthesises the national ethos with 
the survival of Man and indirectly therefore also the survival of the natural environment. The idea of 
Ukrainian federalism, favoured by the West Ukrainians, was also endorsed: ‘the PZU  holds the
opinion that the stable future of Mankind and the renewal of a harmonious coexistence between Man 
and Nature are possible only provided that the uniqueness and the ecological value of any ethos of a 
nation, the preservation of all its diversity and the granting to each nation the right of independence, 
are recognised. It is possible to attain all this on the territory of the USSR only provided that 
authority is decentralised and a complex of democratic reforms implemented in the colonial empire. 
We think that the first and essential step in this direction is the building of a sovereign Ukraine’s real 
statehood...the PZU  favours the renewal of a future federate Ukraine, which will guarantee the 
harmonious development of all its regions’"^.
Justification: the Principle of Decentralisation
The Ukrainian Greens tried to justify their position on the national question to the international green 
community also by referring to traditional green concepts. They claimed that their views were in line 
with the green principles of decentralisation and diversity. Moreover, it was argued that, rather than 
violating the principle of ‘think globally, act locally’, this was exactly the principle they were 
following, by calling for Ukrainian independence.
For the Greens the (Ukrainian) nationalist movement - at least in its early stage, - ‘is doubtless 
progressive’ (bezumovno progresivnim) as it is aimed ‘not against other nations, but against an 
empire, the last of its kind in our w o r l d . T h e  Soviet past is rejected as something horrid, forced 
upon the people of the USSR with devastating effects, particularly in terms of the environment: 
‘more than 70 years of totalitarian rule which was created on the ruins of the Russian empire - “the 
people’s prison”, and continuing its traditions, has put Ukraine on the verge of catastrophe. The ruin 
of the natural and cultural environment, which reached a peak with the Chernobyl accident,
PesoJTiouHn KondiepeuLiHM ÏÏ3Y :i iiauHOiia.ribuoH nojiHTHKM. 20.1.1991. 
Summary from First Party Congress, given to me by Kononov (n.d.). 
nporoaMiii nDMimnnn flSY. 15.7.1990.
Summary from First Congress given to me by Kononov.
facilitated the popular democratic movement in the name of survival of Nat ure and Man’""*. 
‘Therefore, the Greens cannot possibly not endorse this movement, although in developed, 
democratic societies similar coalitions are impossible’ Moreover, the Ukrainian Greens were not 
against co-operation with Greens in other republics and between republics on environmental issues. 
PZU  co-operates closely with the Green Parties of Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Armenian
Green Movement, and has on a number of occasions issued joint statements with them. Such a 
statement was made on the national question in September 1991. In it the Greens tried to 
conceptualise their stand on the national question in terms of ideology. ‘The Greens’ understanding 
o f sovereignty follows naturally from the ethno-ecological principles of diversity, identity and the 
eco-system, expressing also the right to life and self-determination of ethnic groups and nations in 
order to carry out their ecological responsibility, to control their own destiny and to secure a green 
path of survival and development. The highest expression of sovereignty is state sovereignty and 
complete independence of the nation, this nation having its own historical community in the form of 
a culture, a language and a distinctive relationship with Nature and Life in the region it inhabits’"**.
The declaration concluded that State sovereignty is an inalienable natural right and an 
expression of true human rights, to which the Greens are deeply committed. It is also the belief of 
the Greens that environmental problems affecting more than one republic can more effectively be
addressed between national and state formations than between smaller units within an empire.
Independence and the Minority Issue
The Ukrainian Greens are deeply committed to the International Declaration o f Human Rights and 
favour a democratic Ukraine, giving extensive rights to all ethnic groups living on its territory '". It
Tis made very clear that the majority must not harm any minority’s rights. The PZU  Manifesto 
emphasizes that the majority must not harm any minority’s rights and also makes it known that the 
Greens are opposed to ‘dividing Ukraine into separated societies, creating discord between those 
people who live on our land’. Rather, they seek to ‘unite all peoples o f Ukraine...behind the idea o f
the survival of Humanity, the nation, and ecological revival in the future’"®.
Harmony is a key concept for the Greens, who eventually hope to create what they call an eco- 
solidaric community ‘where the interests of the individual as well as the interests of every ethnic and 
social group and every nation unite with the highest (ultimate) laws of Nature’."^ To the extent that 
there is disagreement between political groups in society, consensus should be sought where possible.
.1
'
r . ----------------------------------------CoDMecxiioe 3afiB.rTeime namnn 3ejteiibix rpvsHH. JImtbu. yicDauHbi. 3crrouHn h 3ejreut>ix
ApMeiiHH. TSjihcm, cetrrnSpb, 1991.
CvBepeuM'ren dKoaormi u nojiHTHKa.. Bicru 3 VKpaXiiM, 12.3.1991, c. 1.
MaiiHdiecr flBY. in SeiieuMfi cair, Man 1990, c. 2.
First Programme of Zelenyj Svit - endorsed by the First Congress in October 1989.
■M
Independence and the Relationship to Neighbouring States
Ukraine has recognised all new independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union. It has 
also made it clear that it has no territorial claims either towards these countries or towards any o f its 
neighbouring countries to the West. Ukraine favours extensive co-operation with the former Soviet 
republics - also on the environment - to make the transition towards capitalism smoother. However, 
there is considerable scepticism to the CIS, as this is thought to be a continuation of the former Soviet 
hegemony under Russian rule. Consequently, Ukraine has decided not to sign all agreements made 
within the framework of the CIS - including an agreement on environmental protection, signed on 
February 1992 - favouring agreements directly with the respective republics.
The Greens were against signing the CIS Agreement on the grounds that it allowed for Russian 
hegemony over the other former Soviet republics (see Chapter Five). The statute of the CIS, for 
instance, was labelled a ‘diplomatic game of Russian politicians’"** and was thus unacceptable. Ever 
since Ukraine joined, the PZU  has called for the withdrawal of Ukraine from the CIS framework. 
The Ukrainian Greens have also expressed their anger towards Russia for claiming with some kind of 
natural right, that which belonged to the Soviet Union and which should be shared by all the former 
Soviet republics. There is also considerable fear of what has been referred to as ‘Russian 
chauvinism’. In as statement issued to the Russian parliament in 1992 the Greens denounced the 
Russian claims to the Crimea as interference in internal Ukrainian affairs. They also rejected the 
Russian demand that it be given half the Black Sea Fleet with a right to operate it from the Ukrainian 
port of Sevastopol, as ‘Ukraine has the right to possess everything which is located on its 
territory’" ' .
Although the Greens consider themselves to be ‘anti-militant’ (they have called for a withdrawal 
of troops from the Western parts of the republic on the grounds that neighbouring countries might 
perceive these as a threat. They have also called for the destruction of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine 
and a ban on the production of any kind of mass-destructive weapons) - they still favour a Ukrainian 
army, on the grounds that such an army will not pose a threat to anyone, given that Ukraine has not 
laid claims on any other state’s t e r r i t o r y S u c h  an army is required to protect Ukraine from 
possible attacks from Russia and to deter Russia from ever considering such an attack. Given the 
tense relationship that has prevailed between Russia and Ukraine for some time, even Greens have
*^** UT-1,21.1.1993, UTN, 16:00, 21:00, transcribed in Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe. Ukraine Today 
21.1.1993. Fear that Ukraine will be turned into a Russian satelite in 3aapa nSY : rnSHinta Jtoriica  
iiaroMHCbKHX ;j0 M0 BJTei[QcrreH iiejie ao BTiirvBaniui Y io ta lu v  v B icbK oro-uojiiT H B iiv  o d 6 h t v  P o c c i i .  
Pajiio yKpaliia, 21:50, 7.7.1992.
OTKDblTOe riHCbMO n 3 y  K BepXQBtlOMV CoBCTV POCCHHCKOH (DeiippauHH (n .d .) .
'^^3ajiBa n s y  B cDflSKV 3 naCTifinHMH cnpoGaMn p oc iH C b K o l iiepxcapn  VTPeDiiMTH cn o e  ocoSjiH B e iinaBO 
lia  a p M iio  K ojinu ib iîoro CPCP ra posB iisa iiv  sacoSaM H m ucoboh iiK boDM aulH  a i iT i -v K p a in c b K V  
KaMFiaiiHio. See a lso  3aiiB.BeuHe H BY. K aca iom neca  og o p o n iib ix  BonpocoB (n .d .) .
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been sceptical about sending Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia to be dismantled. Russia is not 
considered to be reliable in its relationship to Ukraine.
Î
daana WSY-. rnSmiiia jioriKa aaroMUChKHX jtoMonjienocreH aejie a o  BTnrvnafiini yicpaiiiv v 
o i C b K o r O " r i o . a i T H M H v  o d S h t v  PoccLl.PcUio YKpaïna, 21:50, 7.7.1992.
Are the Ukrainian Greens Nationalist or Globalist in Outlook?
In sum, then - in so far as one chooses to refer to Green ‘nationalism’, this is a tolerant nationalism in 
that it allows for ethnic minorities and the granting of extensive rights to these minorities. It is a 
constructive nationalism in that it wants to rebuild what a ‘dictatorial empire’ has destroyed. It is 
anti-Russian only in as much as there is fear amongst Greens that Ukraine will develop into a Russian 
satellite'^^.
The Greens’ stand on Ukrainian independence was motivated primarily out of concern for the 
environment. Any nationalism that cannot be justified on Green grounds, is rejected by Zelenyi Svit 
as well as the PZU  (against West-Ukrainian independence or Crimean re-unification with Russia). 
Territorial expansionism is denounced outright - on the occasion o f the war in Yugoslavia, PZU  
issued a statement against Serb and Croat expansionism in Bosnia.
‘Green nationalism’ - deeply rooted in traditional Slav eco-culture - is as far as I can see 
perfectly compatible with a more global commitment. The fact that the PZU  is a member of the 
European Greens and that they are working closely with Green Parties and groups in Western Europe, 
Canada and the United States gives further evidence of this commitment.
When referring to the (former) Soviet Greens as nationalists we should remember that the 
Western Greens emerged in stable democratic national states, which had existed for a long time and 
whose right of existence was never questioned. Greens in the West should acknowledge these 
differences. They should also realise that because the political context within which the (former) 
Soviet Greens operate is so different, views held by these ‘Soviet Greens’ may differ from their own, 
and yet be motivated by a commitment to the very same international green principles. i
8 .4  G re e n  P o te n t ia l  a s  a  C o m b in a t io n  o f  P o lit ic a l  O p p o r tu n i ty  S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  
M o b il is a t io n  P o te n t ia l  - t h e  C a s e  o f  U k ra in e .
A number of studies linking the popularity of the Greens in West European democracies with the 
degree to which existing political parties have incorporated environmental issues on their agenda (i.e. 
if existing political parties fail to take on such issues, then the Greens are more likely to score high on 
opinion polls and in elections, serving as an outlet for people who find that existing parties do not 
represent their views and interests) and on the political system within which they emerge. Greens
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have generally fared much better in multiple constituency elections (Germany, Sweden) than in 
single candidate constituencies elections (Britain).
In the Ukrainian case, the Greens tend to score high on public opinion polls. As seen in Chapter 
Four, in the first presumably free local elections in 1990, Zelenyi Svit had a number o f people elected 
deputies to local and oblast soviets, whereas in the presidential elections of December 1991 and the 
parliamentary elections of March 1994 they fared less well (see Chapter Five). The Green vote in the 
June 1994 local elections dropped compared with the 1990 elections. In polls regarding attitudes to 
political parties and movements, the Greens still score high, though, and below I will try to explain 
this phenomenon using the political system of Ukraine and the general political and economic 
situation in Ukraine as a reference.
As seen above, a large proportion of the Ukrainian population is concerned with the state of the 
environment in their country. Not surprisingly, Zelenyi Svit and PZU  also score relatively high in 
polls conducted by Ukrainian newspapers since 1991. A survey conducted by the Institute of 
Philosophy attached to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, for instance, found the following for 
January and July 1990'^" .^
Table 8.5: Party Preference, January 1990 (in %)
Party/Org. January July
RUKH 27 46
Greens 13 13
CPU 20 10
Nationalists 3 7
Source: Ukrainian Reporter, vol. I, no. 2, 1991, p. 3.
Table 8.6: Party Preference, 1990 (in %)
Party/Org. January February June Novembe
RUKH 23.5 29.0 45.8 53.6
Zelenyi Svit/Green Party 13.4 15.3 13.3 12.5
CPU 19.5 18.4 10.1 10.0
Komsomol 4.1 4.7 1.3 0.4
Republican Party 1.0 0.9 2.4 1.3
Democratic Platform of CPSU 6.3 1.1
Ukrainian Student Society 2.8
Democratic Party of Ukraine 1.0
Others 17.5 17.2 11.9 2.3
Person more important than party 19.9 14.2 8.9 15.0
Source: Zelenyi Svit, no. 7-8, 1991, p. 1.
Ukrainian Reporter, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3.
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As seen from the table, whereas the support of other political parties was volatile, Green support 
seemed to have stabilised around 10-13%. A sociological survey conducted in Kiev in October 
1991 showed similar results;
Table 8 .7; Party Preference, 1991 (in %)
Party %
CPU 10.5
Green Party 10.3
PDVU 4.4
RUKH 4.2
Christian Dem.Party 1.2
Constitutional Democratic par. 0.9
Sodal-dem. party 0.9
National-dem. party 0.9
United social-dem. party 0.5
Dem. farmer’s party 0.5
Source: Zelenyi Svit, no. 16, 1991, p. 3
This survey, however, also revealed that a large proportion of the people surveyed, would not 
take part in elections were they to be held in the near future (20.3%). An equally large group (36.7%) 
had not yet decided if they would take part were such elections to be held. Consequently, only 
around 50% of those polled would take part in elections, and of these, only 34.3% held a particular 
party preference. This could be explained, as indicated in Chapter Four, by the fact that the notion of 
‘political party’ in Ukraine as well as in other parts of the former USSR carried a negative 
connotation. The CPSU was not a party in the West European sense, but rather an organisation 
regulating every sphere of a person’s life. The CPSU had discredited itself by failing to address a 
series of important issues in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the low percent in support of CPU (before 
it was banned) can be taken as an indication of public dissatisfaction with the Communists.
Not only ambivalent feelings towards political parties, but also poor knowledge of what each of 
these parties actually stood for, can be attributed to the low percentage of support they scored in polls 
and surveys at this time. A poll published in Zelenyi Svit in January 1992'^^ clearly gave an 
indication o f this poor state of affairs:
s
iv
'€
s3'.
S e jien M H  C B iT ,x io . 1, 1992, c, 3.
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Table 8.8: Party Preference, January 1992 (in %)
Party/Org. Don’t
know
Actively
support
Sup­
port
Positive
towards
Don’t
support
Negative
towards
Rating
Zel. Svit 32.3 14.8 27.3 17.1 5.9 2.6 0.06
RUKH 17.8 12.3 21.3 20.4 16.7 11.4 -0.5
SUS 39.6 10.7 14.7 21.5 8.9 4.6 -0.11
Green party 44.8 7.0 14.9 20.8 9.1 3.4 -0.14
SNUM 38.1 8.4 14.4 21.1 11.8 6.3 -0.16
PDVU 45.4 5.4 14.5 23.1 8.0 3.6 -0.19
DPU 44.4 3.4 11.6 25.4 11.7 3.5 -0.23
UKhDP 50.2 4.0 9.0 13.3 10.4 3.3 -0.24
URP 37.8 2.9”^ 11.4 25.4 14.8 7.6 -0.25
UNDP 47.8 2.3 10.4 24.7 11.7 3.1 -0.26
NPU 45.2 3.0 10.0 25.0 12.3 4.6 -0.26
LKSM 37.9 4.9 11.2 2F2 15.2 9.7 -0.26
SelDPU 5Z3 3.2 8.0 2T2 10.6 4.3 -0.31
OSDPU 57.1 2.1 5.0 22.2 10.3 3.4 -0.32
LDPU 54.9 1.9 5.1 23.4 11.0 3.8 -0.32
UNP 52.7 2.4 5.2 2T3 11.3 5.2 -0.32
Kolitsia
KPU
23.7 2.3 8.1 23.4 23.6 19.0 -0.37
Source: Zelenyi svit, no. 1, 1992, p. 3.
Although about a third of those polled appeared to have no knowledge of Zelenyi Svit, the 
movement scored higher than the other parties and movements for support and lower than the others 
on disapproval. Compared with the latter, relatively more people had heard about Zelenyi Svit than of 
the other political parties and movements - only RUKH  and the Communist Party scored higher on 
this variable, thus clearly indicating that the general public was aware of environmental issues and 
Zelenyi Svit as being an actor in the struggle to improve the state o f the environment. The fact that 
fewer people had heard about the Green Party, although, as mentioned in Chapter Four, it was the 
third political party to be registered in Ukraine after the CPSU agreed to reformulate Article Six of 
the Soviet Constitution in February 1990 (thus allowing for other political parties to be set up and 
compete with the CPSU), can be explained by the fact that the Green Party tried to somewhat 
distance itself from campaigning and direct action and focus on influencing decision makers through 
political channels. Another reason may be that the local units of the PZU, except for those in West 
Ukraine, one of the party’s strongholds apart from Kiev, were and still are generally weak, thus not 
enabling them to attract as much public attention as they may wish at local level. Besides, as 
indicated by a poll referred to in Ub'oine Today knowledge about political parties seems to be 
poor in the d istricts - in Nikolaev, for instance, about 60% of the respondents to a sociological survey 
did not know which political parties operated in their city. A similar survey conducted almost a year
126 Ukraine Today, 23.3.1993, p. 6.
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before'^^showed that those respondents who had heard about the political parties in Ukraine (a 
quarter did not know most of these) found it difficult to assess them and also decide whether or not 
they trusted these parties. The survey, moreover, revealed that the public knew more about the non- 
political movements than about the political parties, thus explaining why Zelenyi Svit generally scores 
higher in surveys than PZU.
To summarise then, the public has limited knowledge about the political movements and parties 
in Ukraine for reasons referred to above and for other reasons, to which we will return below. 
Relatively speaking, though, more people have heard about the Greens than about most other 
movements and parties, and a higher proportion of those polled are more sympathetic to the Greens 
than to the others. The question thus remains as follows: who are these ‘Green sympathisers’? Until 
recently, we had limited knowledge about this, as only small surveys had been conducted with this in 
mind. Some information appeared on the pages of Zelenyi Svit, some data was gathered by the CPU 
(cf. survey referred to above). In 1993 a survey on public opinion in the former USSR (Russia, 
Ukraine) and East Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic) was conducted by the Politics Department of 
Glasgow University. SOCIS (Kiev) carried out the actual survey in Ukraine. Professor Bill Miller, 
who, together with Professor Stephen White and Paul Heywood were responsible for this project, 
cross-tabulated the various variables with those who expressed a preference for the Greens in the 
survey and allowed me to use the data for this thesis. The results of this survey, and o f a similar 
survey conducted amongst Ukrainian MPs in late 1994, combined with the data referred to above, 
thus form the basis for my attempt to establish who the Green supporters are.
8 .4 .1  T h e  G re e n  E le c to r a te  in th e  W e s t
A number of studies conducted by Western scholars have tried to establish who the Green electorate 
is and what are the differences and similarities between different West European countries. Thus, 
Wilhelm Biirklin (1987) found that the Green electorate in (West) Germany is:
1. Young (about 50% of the Green electorate is below 35 years of age, compared with 
a quarter of the electorate of traditional parties) and non-established.
2. Located within the better educated of the middle and upper middle class.
3. To the left of centre in the political landscape (a large majority of roughly 75% report
a social-democratic partisan identification and another 15-20% identify with the Christian 
Democrats and Liberals).
4. Male (there is more Green support from the male than from the female electorate).
5. Unable to identify the Green party on a traditional left to right continuum, as are also 
the Greens themselves.
6. Have post-materialist value orientations.
SemuHff CDiT,ViO. 16, 1991, c. 3.
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Bürklin does, however, see the Green vote as primarily a ‘transient protest vote, basically by the 
new educated classes’ Flanagan (1982, 1987) argues that the typical green voter belongs to ‘the 
younger generation of highly educated middle class respondents, whose families have traditionally 
supported the Right for economic reasons...(who) may now be induced to voting Left as a result of 
their socialisation into libertarian-postmaterialist values’. Betz (1990), on the other hand, disagrees 
with Flanagan on what motivates the Green vote. He questions the assumption that educational 
attainment is strongly correlated with affluence and thus social background and position, and vice 
versa, hypothesising that highly educated young West Germans support the Greens more for 
economic reasons than for a commitment to post-materialist values. To back up his view, he 
presents data according to which, in 1986 more than half of the Green electorate was without gainful 
employment. Abandoning the commonly held view that the Green electorate is a homogenous bloc 
(the new middle class) Betz identifies three major groups of green voters, which he classifies as 
follows:
1. Highly educated men and women between 31 and 38 who live in material security.
2. Young men/women with middle-level degrees, but materially insecure.
3. Highly educated young men/women who are between 18 and 30 and whose material 
circumstances are bleak^ ^^ .
Betz is supported by Alber (1989), who has come up with similar results: ‘the bulk o f green 
party support comes from students and other groups outside the labour force. In Germany, about two 
thirds of the green followers are not economically active. Roughly one third are students, almost 
another third are either unemployed or do not belong to the labour force...the majority of green party 
supporters may thus be characterised as groups living in social distance to the routine of everyday 
economic Iife’.'^°. The percent of unemployed academics voting Green turned out to be seven times 
higher than for the population as such. Alber also found that the propensity to vote green diminishes 
with increasing age. With regard to issues, two basic demands motivated the Green vote: equality of 
opportunity and quality of life. Poguntke’s (1989) work reveals similar results as far as motivation is 
concerned: ‘younger age groups, and particularly those with higher education and a new middle class 
background amongst them have been socialised in a way which makes them emphasise social and 
self-actualisation needs - like less impersonal society, participation at the workplace and in political
Wilhelm Bürklin, ‘Governing Left Parties frustrating the Radical Non-established Left: the Rise and 
Inevitable Decline o f the Greens’. European Sociological Review, vol. 3, no. 2, September 1987, p. 109.
Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Value Change and Post-Materialist Politics - the Case of West-Germany’. 
Comparative Political Studies, July 1990, p. 245.
Jens Alber. ‘Modernization, cleavage structures, and the rise of Green Parties and Lists in Europe’, in 
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (éd.), New Politics in Western Europe - the Rise and Success of Green Parties 
and Alternative Lists (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 124.
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decision-making, freedom of expression, beautiful environment and the appreciation o f creativity ,131
Jahn (1991) found that most green voters lived in big cities 1 3 2
'
8 .4 .2  T h e  G re e n  E le c to r a te  in U k ra in e
As has already been established, the Ukrainian Greens cannot be labelled a ‘post-materialist 
phenomenon’ with the same ease as this category has been applied to the West European Greens. It 
thus follows that the potential Green electorate in Ukraine may differ from capitalist countries in the 
West. Although the survey conducted by Glasgow University’s Politics Department aimed at 
studying political opinions more generally, the respondents favourable to the Greens formed a big 
enough sample to use as a basis for cross-tabulation.
In the case of party support, the Greens scored high in this survey as they had done in previous 
Ukrainian surveys:
Table 8.9: Party Preference, 1993 (in %)
Party % N=
None 30.7 304
RUKH 9.4 93
Comm.party 5.5 54
Democratic paity 4.6 45
Greens 2.6 26
Party of Justice 2.5 25
Socialist party 2.4 24
Republican party 1.8 18
Pai-ty of Labour 1.4 13
People’s Party 1.3 13
Peasant’s Party 1.3 12
Party of Crimean Tartars 1.2 12
Peasant Democratic Party 1.2 12
Constitutional Repubican Party 1.1 11
Liberal party 0.7 7
Party of Democratic Revival 0.4 4
Party of National Democrats 0.4 4
Party of Free Peasants 0.3 3
Free Beer Party 0.3 3
Uki‘. Christian Party 0.3 3
Social-Democratic Party 0.2 2
Liberal Democratic Party 0.2 2
Constitutional Dem. Party 0.2 2
National Conservative Party 0.1 1
Party of Solididarity 0.1 1
Hromadskyi kongres 0.1 1
Poguntke in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (1989), p. 177.
Detlef Jahn, New Politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany: Resource Dependence and New 
Social Cleavages (Paderborn: University of Paderborn, 1991).
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Workers’ Congress 0.1 I
Other 1.0 10
Vote for candidate 
rather than party
5.4 54
Dont’ know 23.2 230
Column total 100 (% 989
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
However, party support in Ukraine remains small and this holds true even for the biggest 
political parties like RUKH  and the Communist Party. (It seems to be the case that the more political 
parties drat emerge, the more support for political parties in general, dwindles - with the exception of 
the 5-6 biggest parties, amongst which is the Green Party, and whose support has dropped since they 
appeared in 1990, but now seems to be in the process of stabilising).
With regard to geographical area, the Greens has the highest support in the Kiev, Western and 
Central areas, whereas support is lower in the North, East and the South;
Table 8.10: Geographical Support for the Greens (in %)
West Kiev North Central South East Crimea Row Total
Favour. 46 47 22 39 25 36 38 356 (36)
Neither 52 47 74 55 67 48 54 543 (55)
Unfav. 2 6 4 6 8 17 8 90 (9)
Col.Tot. 167(17) 42(4) 82 (8) 139(14) 139(14) 347 (35) 74 (7) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
As regards sex, there is little difference between men and women favouring the Greens:
Table 8.11: Green Support by Gender (in %)
Male Female Row Total
Favourable 37 35 356 (36)
Neither 54 56 543 (55)
Unfavourable 9 9 90 (9)
Column Total 458 (46) 531 (54) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
Age-wise, though, the highest level of support for the Greens was expressed by people in their 
40s and 50s. This is in line with what I found when talking with and attending meetings in the Green 
Movement and Green Party in Ukraine. One explanation is that the generation currently in its 40s 
experienced the thaw under Kliruschev and thus was more eager to participate in politics once this 
became possible. Another explanation frequently referred to by Greens themselves is that whereas 
younger people are busy establishing themselves, slightly older people tend to have grown up
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children, a job and more sparetime for taking part in politics. This explanation remains feasible 
although participation has generally fallen as inflation and financial hardship has increased.
Table 8.12: Green Support by Age (in %)
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s Row Tota
Favour. 30 37 43 45 30 355 (36)
Neither 56 55 48 49 61 539 (55)
Unfavour. 14 8 10 6 9 90 (9)
Col.Total 126 220 185 149 305 984
(13) (22) (19) (15) (31) (100)
Source: Miller, Wh he, Heywood (1993)
People favourable to the Greens in Ukraine, as in Western Europe, tend to come from urban areas. 
Support in rural areas is considerably lower:
Table 8.13: Green Support in Rural/Urban Areas (in %)
City Town Rural Row Total
Favour. 39 37 34 356 (36)
Neither 48 58 58 543 (55)
Unfavour. 13 5 9 90(9)
Col. Total 269 (27) 255 (26) 465 (47) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
As for class identification, there was much higher support for the Greens amongst intellectuals than 
was the case amongst workers and farmers:
Table 8.14: Green Support by Profession (in %)
Workers Farmers Intel­
lectuals
Mana­
gers
Busi­
ness
people
Others DK Row Total
Favour. 34 25 48 56 25 35 25 356 (36)
Neither 55 69 45 32 75 56 65 543 (55)
Unfav. 10 7 8 12 10 10 90 (9)
Col. Tot. 513 (52) 142(14) 199 (20) 39(4) 17(2) 51(5) 28 (3) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993).
These results coincide with data for Western Europe, where the Green electorate is 
predominantly intellectuals/people with a higher education. As for unemployment, though, as 
pointed out, most of those active in the Green movement are highly educated and employed. 
Although I do not have any data on this variable and attitude towards the Greens, the fact that most of 
their supporters seem to be in their late 30s, 40s and 50s indicates that also those supporting the
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Greens are in employment. With regard to their attitude to unemployment, a high proportion of those 
positive towards the Greens hold the opinion that unemployment is not necessarily such a bad thing:
Table 8.15: Green Support and Attitude towards Unemployment (in %)
Unacceptable Unavoidable Necessary DK Row Total
Favourable 31 67 55 62 211(54)
Neither 47 26 38 136 (35)
Unfaourabie 22 8 7 38 46(12)
Col.Total 98 (25) 149 (38) 137 (35) 10(3) 393 (100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
Although I do not know whether the respondents holding the opinion that unemployment is 
necessary are talking about structural or long-term unemployment, this result is consistent with the 
respondents’ attitude towards the market economy. Whereas the majority of those to the left in the 
Ukrainian political landscape tend to be against the market, a majority of those favouring the Greens 
came out in favour of the market economy:
Table 8.16: Green Support and Attitude towards the Market Economy (in
Right Wrong DK Row Total
Favourable 49 23 23 356 (36)
Neither 45 63 69 543 (55)
Unfavourable 6 15 8 90 (9)
Col. Total 498 (50) 291 (29) 201 (20) 989 (100)
I
i
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Î
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
The fact that most supporters of the Greens favour the market economy is perhaps the clearest 
evidence that it would be inappropriate to label the Ukrainian Greens a ‘post-materialist’ 
phenomenon. However, one should be careful not to interpret such a result to the effect that the 
electorate o f the Greens is ‘materialistic’. As seen above, the Greens hold the view that the socialist 
command-administrative system was inherently anti-environmental. Thus, the market economy is to 
the Greens a means of breaking the structures of the old system and generally a better system for 
curtailing environmental problems, although they are perfectly aware that also the market has its 
weaknesses with regard to the environment. As seen from the theoretical framework of the Green 
Movement, its thinking on the environment is largely ecocentric. Given the serious environmental 
problems of Ukraine and the importance of exerting direct influence on the drafting of legislation and 
passing of decisions likely to effect the environment as these are being made, the Greens cannot 
afford not to be pragmatic. To call for some model which is beyond both capitalism and socialism 
would not go well down with the electorate and may therefore prove more harmful to the 
environment than a pragmatic attitude.
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The Green Paity has defined itself as ‘to the left of the centre’. Results from the survey 
conducted in December 1993 seem to confirm that this is also how the Green supporters view the 
party:
Table 8.17: Green Support and Placement of Greens on Left-Right Scale (in %)
Left Centre Right Don’t know Row Total
Favourourable 56 49 38 25 356 (36)
Neither 35 40 51 67 543 (55)
Unfavourable 9 11 11 8 90 (9)
Col.Total 104(11) 286 (29) 70 (7) 529 (53) 989 (100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
When asked the same question in the autumn of 1994, a majority of MPs favourable to the 
Greens classified PZU  as a centre or a rightist party. This may partially be a result of a change in 
policy from the left of centre towards the centre in the months between the two surveys. It is 
probably also a result of the composition of parliament. Given that most MPs represent either the left 
or symphatise with the left, they are less likely to classify the Greens as a party of the left:
Table 8.18: Classification o f Greens on Left-Right Scale by Ukr. Mps (in %)
Left Centre Right Don’t know Row Total
Favourable 29 61 76 100 211 (54)
Neither 51 29 24 136 (35)
Unfavourable 20 10 46 (12)
Col.Total 122 (31) 209 (53) 59(15) 393(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1994)
When asked whether or not they believe in the ideals of communism a relatively large 
proportion of those favourable to the Greens answered in the affirmative, thus confirming a 
commitment to social justice.
Table 8.19: Green Support and Attitudes towards Communism (in %)
"Î
" i
i
Yes No Don’t know Row Total
Favourable 36 39 18 356 (36)
Neither 51 53 75 543 (55)
Unfavourable 13 9 7 90 (9)
Col. Total 141 (14) 732 (74) 117(12) 989 (100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)'
It is interesting to note that the proportion of the Green electorate which did (and did not) 
believe in Communism has not changed much following the collapse of the USSR. When asked if 
they did believe in communism the following result emerged:
I
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Table 8.20: Green Support and Belief in Communism (in %)
Yes No Don’t know Row Total
Favourourable 36 40 15 356 (36)
Neither 54 52 77 543 (55)
Unfavourable 11 8 8 90 (9)
Col. Total 457 (46) 453 (46) 79 (8) 989 (100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
Somewhat surprisingly, when asked what was the worst feature of Communism, pollution came 
long down on the list amongst those who were favourable to the Greens:
Table 8.2.1: Green Support and Worst Feature of Communism
Pollution Bureau­
cracy
Stagnation Corruption Oppressed
Rights
None Don’t
know
Row
Total
Favour. 30 41 60 26 43 24 26 356 (36)
Neither 58 54 33 58 52 65 55 543 (55)
Unfav. 11 5 7 16 5 11 19 90 (9)
Col.Tot. 104(11) 275 (28) 63 (6) 162(16) 206 (21) 137(14) 43 (4) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
As for the best feature of Communism those favourable to the Greens scored low on all 
accounts, although somewhat higher for ‘no ethnic conflict’ and ‘job security’. The fact that ‘no 
ethnic conflict’ is mentioned as a good feature of Communism by people supporting the Greens, 
reflects the Party and Movement’s strong views on the national question: As seen above, while 
favouring Ukrainian independence, the Greens were wary of the (possible) negative aspects of 
independence, such as limited rights of minorities and aspirations towards the territory of other 
former Soviet republics.
Table 8.22: Green Support and Best Feature of Communism (in %)
Equality No ethnic 
conflict
Stable
economy
Law
and order
Job
security
None Don’t
know
Row Total
Favour. 31 42 31 19 37 62 21 356 (36)
Neither 63 48 58 72 54 36 65 543 (55)
Unfav. 6 10 11 10 9 2 14 90 (9)
CoLTot. 73 (7) 182(18) 310(31) 77 (8) 246 (25) 81(8) 20(2) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
When asked in polls which time was the best for the country, a majority of respondents tended to 
answer the Brezhnev era. It is therefore interesting to note that those favourable to the Greens scored 
highest on the ‘now’-category:
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Table 8.25: Green Support and Best Soviet Era (in %)
Tsars Stalin Brezhnev Gorbachev Now Don’t know Row Total
Favour. 45 10 33 36 64 34 356 (36)
Neither 48 54 57 55 36 62 543 (55)
Unfav. 8 36 10 9 ^ 4 90(9)
Col.Tot. 67 (7) 34 (3) 678 (69) 21(2) 94 (9) 106(11) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
Although this survey was conducted in December 1993 and as the economic situation in Ukraine 
has worsened and nostalgia for the stability of the past has increased, these results are still significant. 
Combined with the data on market economy and unemployment they give an indication that the 
Green support group favours economic and political change and seem to accept the hardship by 
which they are accompanied, as a better alternative to improving the environment than returning to 
the past. Those supporting the Greens are also very interested in politics, as the tables below 
indicate;
Table 8.24: Green Support and Interest in Politics (in %)
Very
interested
Quite
interested
A little 
interested
Not at all 
interested
Don’t
know
Row Total
Favour. 60 46 32 20 51 356 (36)
Neither 34 45 59 73 39 543 (55)
Unfav. 6 10 10 7 11 90 (9)
Col.Tot. 84 (9) 249 (25) 504 (51) 147(15) 5(1) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
Table 8.25: Green Support and Participation in Political Debate (in %)
Very often Quite often Occasionally Not at all Don’t know Row Total
Favour. 57 45 33 22 356 (36)
Neither 31 45 58 70 100 543 (55)
Unfav. 12 10 10 8 90 (9)
Col.Tot. 91(9) 218 (22) 517(52) 161(16) 989(100)
Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)
To summarise, then, the Green supporters in Ukraine are predominantly intellectuals in their late 
30s, 40s and 50s, they live in the West of Ukraine or in Kiev, in cities and towns rather than in the 
countryside, they are positive towards the market economy, highly interested in politics and think the 
present period is better than any other period since tsarism. Although the data above must be treated 
with care, given that we do not have similar surveys to compare it with for trends over a period of 
time, it serves as a useful starting point for such studies in the future and allows us to conclude that 
the Green Party in Ukraine as is the case in Western Europe seems to be a party for the intellectuals 
and the city dwellers. Unlike what has been done in the West, though, the Green Party in Ukraine
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cannot be labelled ‘post-materialist’, but emerged rather as a response to the very serious state the 
Ukrainian environment was in following the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the failure of the 
existing political system to successfully address this issue through established channels. However, 
the Greens were part of a larger protest wave, which culminated with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and following Ukrainian independence, became one of several alternatives to the legacy of the Soviet 
past. And although the Greens favour sustainable development, they want to achieve this by 
following a centrist/left of centre policy, not calling for a complete overhaul of the emerging political 
system, but rather for modifications to make the system more democratic. In doing so, though, they 
are not alone, but in line with demands made by most of the other political parties o f the so-called 
‘democratic opposition’.
8 .4 .3  P o lit ic a l  O p p o r tu n ity  S t r u c tu r e s
This takes us to the next issue of this section, namely that of political opportunity structures - or 
access to the political arena. A number of studies by sociologists and political scientists in the West 
have used the political system as a variable to explain why the Greens are either radical or moderate 
in single countries. Jahn (1991), for instance, has argued that whereas in Germany, where the 
Communist Party was banned following the establishment of East Germany, the radical left had no 
outlet for their political aspirations and therefore channelled their efforts through the Green Party, 
once this was established, thus radicalising it considerably, in Sweden where access was easier and 
where already established political parties incorporated the environment in their programmes as an 
issue, the Greens were less radical and had less support among the Swedish people.
In the case of the Ukrainian Greens, as seen above, they have had relatively high and stable 
support in the population since 1990. In the local elections of 1990, the Greens did not do too badly 
(cf. Chapters Three and Four) and gained deputies in areas where there were serious environmental 
problems and where the Greens had actively (and successfully) mounted campaigns to solve these 
problems. This gave reason for the leadership of the PZU  to be optimistic before the elections to the 
Ukrainian parliament in March 1994. The leader of the Green Party, Vitalii Kononov, conducted an 
expensive and original campaign in Kiev, printing leaflets, posters and even small calendars carrying 
his photo on the front. A rock concert, for which entrance was free, was also organised. Several 
people from the leadership of the PZU  balloted in Kiev and numerous candidates were produced 
elsewhere to contest the elections. The result, however, was as seen in Chapter Four, dismal.
When asked why the Green Party fared so badly, the Greens blamed the electoral law. Although 
as many as up to 30 people would contest seats in the parliament in one single constituency, only one 
person was elected from each electoral district. If  one single candidate gained more than 50% of the
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votes cast ( a minimum of 50% of those on the election lists had to vote for the election to be 
declared valid), he/she would automatically be elected. Should none of the candidates win an 
outright majority, the two candidates with the most votes would go to a second round, where the 
person with the most votes would be elected, again provided that 50% of the electorate turned up for 
the elections.
Iryna Haniukova of PZU  (Kiev) who stood in these elections herself, argued that the large 
number of candidates in the capital’s constituencies clearly made it more difficult for a candidate to 
be elected, as more money would have to be spent on the election campaign to be heard and seen - 
money that neither the Green Party nor most of the other political parties had. Unlike the case in 
some West European countries, for instance West Germany, the political parties contesting elections 
do not receive any funding for the campaign from the state. Moreover, during the campaign there 
was a lot o f dirty campaigning going on; Haniukova claimed that in her constituency the deputy 
attorney who also stood for elections had paid campaigners to remove the materials of the other 
candidates from peoples’ mail boxes once these had been distributed.
Although the international observers monitoring the March 1994 elections and the second round 
which took place in early April, claimed that the elections were predominantly democratic and fair, 
some violations of the electoral law did take place. As an unofficial election observer in Irshava I 
myself registered several violations of the law, such as multiple voting (i.e. voting for the whole 
family, not only for oneself), failure to cross people out of the electorate list once the ballot had been 
handed out and repeated voting by the same person. As seen in Chapter Five, Karavanska balloted 
against Ustich of the regional administration. When confronted with facts, the head o f the election 
committee made no attempt at denying that violations did take place. He willingly admitted that 
everything was not done by the book, but that it took a long time to change people’s habits and that 
everyone knew each other anyway, so that there was no need to cross out people’s names from the 
lists once they had voted or to deny one member of a family the right to vote for the entire family. 
Only in Kiev and in bigger cities where this would be impossible would the new election law be 
relevant, he said.
It seems obvious that a party of PZUs. size, and for that matter most o f the Ukrainian parties, as 
they are all very small by West European standards, do not benefit from the present electoral law (see 
Chapter Five). All these parties would fare better if elections were proportional. What is more, as no 
state subsidies are given to those political parties or candidates contesting the elections and as it is 
illegal for Ukrainian political parties to receive any kind of funding from abroad, parties like RUKH  
and the block of socialists/communists who enjoy high support and who are able to raise money for 
their campaign with relative ease, or who are so well-known that they do not need to conduct 
expensive election campaigns for people to become familiar with them, the smaller parties have no
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other options but to either conduct amateurish cam paigns or to risk breaking their necks on borrow ing 
m oney in the hope that this w ill allow  them to conduct a campaign successfu lly . Rudenko, who stood 
for the Green Party in K iev, told me that she had to borrow m oney for her campaign and still she 
could only afford photocopying an A 5-size machine typed leaflet sum m arising her election platform  
and w ith a draw ing o f  her face. B e ing a teacher she later met former pupils o f  her constituency who  
were unaware o f  her efforts as the leaflets had either been rem oved from their mail boxes or they did 
not recogn ise her from the draw ing. Others also ran up personal debts and were worried about how  
to pay them back.
PZU  did get som e m oney for its election campaign from local businesses and from Chervona 
Ritta, a travel agent operating a cruise ship on the Dniepr R iver and the B lack Sea serv ing foreign  
tourists. H owever, although K ononov spent a lot o f  m oney on his cam paign he failed to be elected. 
The survey conducted in Ukraine in Decem ber 1993 indicate that a com b ination o f  policy and person 
is d ec isive when choosing for whom  to vote;
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Table 8.26: Green Support and Policies/Personality Preference
policies personality other don’t
know
row total
favour. 40.5 42.9 33.9 16.8 356 (36.0)
neither 48.7 46.0 59.1 78.0 543 (54.9)
unfav. 10.8 11.1 7.0 5.2 90 (9.1)
col.tot. 361 (36.5) 241 (24.4) 243 (24.5) 145(14.7 989 (100.0
Source: Miller, White, Pleywood (1993)
A  clear illustration o f  this is the second ballot which took place in Irshava on 10 April 1994 
between Karavanska and U stich, the candidate o f  the oblast adm inistration. W hereas Ustich was 
generally w ell-know n to the farmers in the area and the people o f  Irshava, Karavanska originally  
cam e from neighbouring M ukacheva and she was a woman. In the former Sov iet Un ion fem ale  
politicians are generally v iew ed w ith som e scepticism . The fact that Karavanska w as an artist and 
tw ice married did not make matters better. A number o f  v icious rumours were spread about her 
personal life'^^. Whereas her programme focused primarily on the environm ent and on soc ial 
equality, Ustich - h im self a former member o f  the Ukrainian Com m un ist Party - prom ised to build a 
new church in Irshava should he be elected. This offer had w ide appeal in Irshava, where people are 
generally very religious and where the local church had becom e too sm all to locate all the
S
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Some of these rumors were revealed to me while driving between Irshava and local polling stations to 
collect observers from these stations. The driver, who was a /?f/K//-election observer, took up some 
hitchhikers, two of whom were workers from a local factory, and who wanted to know from the driver if the 
rumors about Karavanska circulated at their factory were tme. These rumors included information that 
Karavanska was opposed to the church.
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parishoners. A s a result o f  UsticlTs prom ise, the local priest - who h im self stood for elections in the 
first round - encouraged his parishioners to vote for Ustich. He even accom pan ied som e o f  them to 
the ballot box after the Sunday morning prayer. M ost o f  those w ho fa iled to make it to the second 
round o f  the elections in Irshava chose to put their support behind Ustich, and the local newspaper, 
wh ich was run by the regional/local adm inistration chose also to support Ustich. Faced w ith such 
odds, and w ith a b ig electoral district to cover, Karavanska did not stand much o f  a chance and lost. 
Consequently, a m ixture o f  personality and policies facilitated her defeat.
The Greens are not represented in the present parliament, nor was the outcom e for the Greens at 
the 1994 local elections as good as that o f  1990. As regards the parliament, though, PZU  is held in 
h igh regard by the MPs elected in 1994. The surveys conducted in 1993 and 1994 respectively found 
the follow ing:
Table 8.27: Attitude towards Greens among General Population/Ukrainian MPs (in %)
General Public MPs Row Total
Very Favourable 8 3 88(6)
Favourable 28 51 479 (35)
Neither 33 30 447 (32)
U nfavourable 5 12 96 (7)
Very unfavourable 4 4 1 (3 )
D on’t know 22 3 228 (17)
Other I 5 (0 )
Column Total 989 (72) 393 (28) 1382 (100)
Source: Miller, White, ITeywood (1993, 1994)
Although the Greens are not represented in parliament, M Ps seem  to be generally sym pathetic 
towards them. Thus, PZU  may thus be able to exert som e influence on the decision-m aking process 
through lobbying. Although, having said that, as the econom y and the process o f  statebuilding 
continues, environmental issues are likely to drop further down on the priority list o f  the parliament 
and the public in general. Being sym pathetic towards the Greens and agreeing w ith the points they 
rise thus does not necessarily mean that other parties and groupings are w illing to act on their behalf 
where the environment m ay be at stake.
Given that it has been relatively d ifficult for the Green Party, and for that matter other small 
political parties, to access the political arena through elections, w hy is the Ukrainian Green Party not 
more radical? A s pointed out above, there are objective reasons for this. What is more, one has to be 
very careful with how to use the term ‘radical’ when talking about Green Parties. In the W est, radical 
has becom e synonym ous with ‘red’ (socialist-green) and the German Greens have been referred to as 
the prime exam ple o f  such radicalism. In the Ukrainian case the Greens were not red, but indeed 
very radical when they founded P Z U  in March 1990. Ukrainian independence soon becam e an issue
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on their agenda, and this w as still several months prior to the collapse o f  the USSR. The Greens also  
at an early stage demanded that the old adm inistrative-command system  be dem olished and replaced 
by a market econom y. W ithin the Ukrainian political context, these demands were close to 
revolutionary, though shared by large segm ents o f  the politically active population o f  the country. 
Although, as has been seen from the case-study on the SB EK, som e members o f  the Green 
M ovem en t never denounced their membership o f  the CPU and remained firmly conv inced that the 
environmental problem s had to be addressed w ithin a soc ialist framework, these were in a m inority. 
M ost members Zelenyi Svit and later also o f  PZU  felt that only by provid ing an alternative political 
setting could these problems be successfully  addressed.
A s for P Z U s  lack o f  radicalism vis-à-vis other political parties, this can also be explained. In 
the aftermath o f  the Chernobyl accident all political m ovem ents and parties as soon as they emerged  
declared their com m itm ent to the environm ent and against expand ing nuclear power on Ukrainian 
territory. Thus the primary issue o f  the Green Party was coopted into other parties’ political 
programmes. Som e people therefore felt that there was no need for a Green Party, partly as everyone  
cla im ed to be environmental, partly as they were o f  the opinion that the state o f  the environm ent in 
Ukraine w as so bad that there could be no com prom ise, and com prom ises would have to be made by 
a political party. In these peop les’ v iew  it would be far more efficien t to concentrate all efforts to 
protect the environm ent through Zelenyi Svit and ad-hoc, issue-specific activities. H ow ever, whereas 
the nationalist parties and also the socialists have m oved away from their initial position on the 
environm ent, arguing that only once Ukrainian statehood has been firm ly established and the 
econom y put in order w ill it be possible to address Ukraine’s environm ental problem s, PZU  remains 
firm on this issue; Ukraine’s political and econom ic problems m ust be solved together w ith rather 
than separately from the environmental problems for such reforms to be successful. A s the 
parliament has backtracked on its own moratorium on the construction o f  nuclear reactors at 
Ukra ine’s nuclear power stations and as the oil terminal in Odessa, wh ich env ironm entalists and the 
local population have opposed for environmental reasons, can now  be justified on the grounds that it 
w ill make Ukraine independent o f  Russia as far as o il is concerned, P Z U s  principal stand on the 
environm ent remains firm. It may therefore be possible to say that the Green Party is becom ing more 
rad icalised v is-à -v is other political parties by w ays o f  sticking to its original policies o f  a sustainable 
econom ic developm ent, within the lim its set by Nature herself, rather than abandoning this 
com m itm ent to the environm ent at the expense o f  securing Ukrainian statehood.
Som e m embers o f  the Green Party admitted that the em phasis on the environm ent at the expense  
o f  issues perceived o f  as more urgent by the general public may have contributed to the poor election  
performance o f  the Green Party. W hereas this may be the effect in the short term o f  the G reens’ 
political strategy, it m ay pay o f f  in terms o f  political support in the long run. It w ill take tim e to
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transform the Ukrainian econom y from a command to a market econom y. The environmental 
problems w ill not go away by them selves and as people grow increasingly d isillusioned w ith the 
prom ises o f  those parties represented in parliament, the Greens may benefit from a political com e­
back for the next elections - particularly if  they succeed in having the current election law changed so 
as to introduce proportional representation. Th is, however, w ill depend on how successful the Greens 
w ill be in projecting them selves as the green alternative. So far it is the Green M ovem ent - Zelenyi 
Svit - and increasingly often Greenpeace Ukraine wh ich highlights environmental concerns, whereas 
P Z U  has very much, as pointed out in previous chapters, turned into a press-release organisation.
8.5 Conclusion
As seen above, the em ergence o f  the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent cannot easily  be explained by 
Inglehart’s m odel o f  post-materialist value change. Environmental protection in the former U SSR  
becam e a ‘b asic’ need, rather than a ‘higher order’ need: environmental destruction (wh ich, by the 
way, w as far more extensive than in the cap italist W est), compounded by the Chernobyl accident, 
w as in Ukraine perceived as a threat to the very existence o f  its people, culture and natural 
environment. A s seen above, Green support for Ukrainian independence, w as rooted in the idea that 
the Sov iet political and econom ic structures were by definition anti-environmental, and that the only  
way to secure Ukrainian survival from environmental destruction, was to gain control over its 
territory and its resources.
Secondly, it is not possible to talk about ‘stable values’ on the environm ent in Ukraine. A ccess  
to information about the deteriorating state o f  the environment and its impact on human health, 
caused large segm ents o f  Ukrainian soc iety  to change their attitude and values on this issue (I w ill 
return to this in Chapter Nine). The Greens, drawing on pre-Revolutionary thinking on the 
environm ent, provided a theoretical framework within which people could red if! ne their values and 
thinking on the environment. Inglehart’s ‘scarcity hypothesis’, however, seem s to fit better with the 
Ukrainian experience. During the last one and a h a lf years, the Soviet econom y w ent into decline. 
This trend continued in Ukraine fo llow ing the collapse o f  the USSR, pushing the environm ent down  
on the list o f  basic needs: H ow to feed on e’s fam ily becam e a more urgent problem to so lve, than 
how  to protect on e’s health from pollution.
A lthough the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent in m any w ays differ from sim ilar m ovem ents elsew here, 
there are also sim iliarities: the potentially Green voters in Ukraine share several com m on features 
with W estern Green voters. This is particularly interesting, given that those people w ho originally  
joined  the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent cam e from very different backgrounds and had very different 
ideas about how  to so lve environmental problems. A s more and more political parties have em erged  
in Ukraine, it seem s that the potential Green vote has stabilised, and that whereas the Greens earlier
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picked up a general ‘protest’ vote, the supporters o f  the Green Party are now found am ong a 
relatively sm all group o f  people firmly com mitted to environmental reform. These people m ight be 
more open to the theoretical framework o f  the Greens, outlined in the first part o f  this chapter, than 
the general public. So far PZU  has very much been a main-stream party. Although com m itted to 
environm ental reform, its policies - as expressed in programme and statements and press releases - 
have not differed very much from those o f  other political parties. It might w ell be that the Green 
Party, by adopting policies different from those o f  other parties - a Green alternative - so to speak, 
m ight benefit from this in the long run. The future o f  the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent is am ong the 
issues addressed in the follow ing chapter o f  this thesis.
1
*
I
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9 Conclusion
9.0 Introduction
A s seen above, in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections o f  March 1994, the Green Party o f  
Ukraine did not get a single representative elected to the Verkhovna Rada desp ite scoring h igh in 
op in ion polls conducted during the months prior to the elections. O nly later - in Decem ber 1994 - 
Zelenyi Svit split in two. The majority Zelenyi Svit supporting c lose  links w ith the Green Party, 
the minority accusing PZU  o f  trying to take over the m ovem ent so that the party could benefit 
from its o ffice  fac ilities, equipment and expertise. So far no accom m odation has been reached by 
the two groups, w hich are at present fighting each other to retain the right to the name and the 
equipment o f  Zelenyi Svit. What is more, as seen above, environmental issues have been pushed  
down on the political agenda o f  Ukraine to be replaced w ith other issues, such as the econom y and 
nation building. A  natural question to ask is thus the following: W here does this leave the
Ukrainian Green M ovem ent? H ave Zelenyi Svit and the PZU  outplayed their role in Ukrainian 
politics or do they still have a role to play? What went wrong for the Greens and how  - if  at all - 
can they make a com eback onto the political arena?
B elow  I w ill t iy  to assess the Green M ovem ent {Zelenyi Svit) and PZU  based on the 
information g iven in the chapters above. First, I w ill look at the period 1986-94, scrutin ising  
general political and inter-m ovem ent developm ents in an attempt to determine how successfu l the 
Greens have been so far and w hy over the past nine years the Green M ovem en t has lost its 
m omentum. Secondly, I w ill look towards the future and tiy  to identify various possib le scenarios 
for Zelenyi Svit and PZU. F inally, I w ill conduct a brief d iscussion on the concept o f  eco-culture 
introduced in Chapter One and try to assess the potential future role o f  this concept in creating 
awareness o f  environm ental issues am ongst the Ukrainian population - a factor which in turn w ill 
determine not only the future state o f  the environment in Ukraine but also, I believe, the future o f  
the Green M ovem en t itself.
9.1 Assessing the Ukrainian Green Movement (1986-95)
9.1.1 Zelenyi Svit
Anatolii Panov, the former Director o f  Zelenyi Svi f s  K iev office  has sum m arised the 
activities o f  the association since it was founded as follows:
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3 a  Mac ic iiy iia i iiu i 3e.ieHMH CbI t  :iop ra iii3y iîa iî c o n i i  a ic u iA  - 
jieMOHcrpauiM, v iiT M iir iii. n iK e x iB , KO!i(])eiieiiniM i  n i j i ir p a B  BuaMuy 
po.ib  y  npH nH iienn i eK oaor iM iio  iieSeaneMHHX o 6 b £ i a ’iB...ripoTM  
cr iopyA xeH na K pnvicbKOï AEG viicuenMM B iM iiie iiiiH v i se.MeiiHx 6 y j io  
3 i6 p a i io  3 3 0  t h c h m  n i iu iM c in , m o 3MycM.io ypjui i i p h h u h t h  p iu ie iB ifi 
iipo saKpHTi'fl u i £ i  uaH xce n o S y iio B a n iH  e a e ic r p o c r r a in i i i .  3 a  
BMMoroio 3eaeuH x M M KoaaiiiiuHBH A icaaeM ifl HayK  Y K p a ib lH  
npoB caa eKcnepTMay iia FÏiB a e m lO-YKpa11icbK iA  AEG. aica noK a3aaa. 
m o n o a a a b m e 6yaiBiiM UTB0 u i s i  c r a i m i i  C K oaor iM no  
iieoS rp y irroB a iie . M a c o a i  a e M O i ic r p a u i i  n p oT ccry  iipoM.viaaM b  
paHO iiax P in e iic b K O i , XM eab iiH Ub icol 'ra 3 a i io p i3 b K o l AEG. m i b k h x  
aiOiiH aicTHBiio BH crynaaH n p oru  po3i.!iMi)eiimi umx c r a n u i f l ' .
In addition to these actions, the Ukrainian Greens were also successful in having the third and 
fourth stages o f  expand ing the Ghernoby! nuclear power station scrapped (1987), in hav ing the 
planned Danube-Dn iepr Ganal stopped (1987), in banning the O dessa and Kliarkiv nuclear power 
stations (1987), chem ical plants in Crimea and Zakarpatia (1988), a bridge over Dn iepr to the 
nature reserve island K lioitytsa (1988), and the Crimean and Chyhyryn nuclear power stations 
(1989). A t m eetings wh ich took place in K iev in Novem ber 1988 and April 1989, more than 
100,000 people protested against a decision to build another 15-17 nuclear reactors on Ukrainian 
territory (see  Chapter T w o) and demanded that a referendum be organised on the future o f  nuclear 
power in Ukraine. These demonstrations, together with the anti-nuclear cam paigns organised by 
local chapters o f  Zelenyi Svit, helped facilitate the moratorium on nuclear reactors adopted by the 
Verkhovna Rada in September 1990, fo llow ing a session to which representatives o f  Zelenyi Svit 
were invited (see Chapter Two). This list could be extended. The G reens’ success in attracting 
the support o f  the general public m anifested itse lf not only in m ass m obilisation against 
environm entally harmful projects, but also in poll results. Since such polls were introduced in the 
late 1980s, the Greens have consistently polled v e iy  high (see Chapters Three and Four).
W hy w ere the Greens at the initial stage (1987-90) so successful in pursuing environm ental 
issues? To answer this question 1 w ill point out general political and organisational factors as well 
as take a closer look at the case study on South Bug.
General Political and Organisational Factors
A s pointed out in previous chapters, the Greens were initially able to benefit from widespread  
anxieties regarding the Chernobyl accident and its potential impact on p eop le’s health as w ell as
 ^ See Aiiai'OiiiH IlanoB, - Beaeiinû Pvx b  yK paiiii. c. 2. This document is not dated, but was written in 
1992 and may be obtained from Zelenyi Svi f s  office in Kiev upon request.
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the natural environment. Although the CPU was considered one o f  the m ost dogm atic republican 
party organ isations in the U SSR and the introduction o f  glasnost and dém ocratisation was slow er  
and more cautious in Ukraine than in for instance the Baltic Republics, lead ing public figures - 
writers and academ icians - addressed Chernobyl as an issue and by link ing up w ith other groups 
who felt the need for setting up som e kind o f  environmental organ isation, were able to form  
Zelenyi Svit. Another factor, which no doubt made the birth o f  Zelenyi Svit easier, was the Peace 
C om m ittee’s decision to take the m ovem ent under its ausp ices, thus not only provid ing the Greens 
w ith som e legitim acy v is-à-vis the CPU, but at the same time provid ing resources such as 
prem ises, o ffice  equipment and funding to the activists o f  the m ovem ent.
In the early days o f  Zelenyi Svi f s  ex istence, members o f  the Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sc iences  
who were affiliated w ith the Green M ovem ent (Dudko, H rodzynskyi and others) organ ised  
independent ecological expert assessm ents o f  controversial projects such as the plans to build a 
bridge from the mainland to the island o f  Kliortytsa and the Chyhyryn nuclear power station. In 
this sense, the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent w as not purely a protest organ isation, objecting to 
offic ially  sanctioned projects, but also a h ighly constructive organ isation, provid ing serious 
alternatives that could not sim ply be ignored. B y presenting the authorities and the general public 
with a m ixture o f  w ell-founded arguments fused w ith references to the cultural and national 
heritage o f  Ukraine and the need to preserve this heritage, the Greens were able to m obilise large 
segm ents o f  the Ukrainian population and exert real influence on the Ukrainian dec ision making 
process.
O f importance in this connection was the fact that once the initial clashes w ith the police and 
fear caused by the early demonstrations were over, people were generally curious to find out more
about Zelenyi Svit and the other politicised m ovem ents which em erged from 1987/88 onwards. 
There w as also a sense o f  optim ism  and a b e lie f that ordinary people could influence politics in the 
country - particularly at local and regional level, where campaigns to reduce the extent o f  nuclear 
power in Ukraine were h ighly successful. Another factor o f  som e importance in this respect was 
the chang ing attitude o f  the CPU to nuclear power more generally. I w ill return to this factor 
below , suffice it here to say that although the CPU was wary about keeping the Greens under its 
control, it to som e extent shared the aims o f  the m ovem ent to restrict future developm en t o f  
nuclear power in Ukraine.
H ow ever, towards the end o f  the 1980s the Greens paradoxically becam e v ictim s o f  their own  
success. A s the Green M ovem en t was am ongst the first informal groups to em erge on the 
Ukrainian political arena - the environm ent was initially considered to be a non-political issue as 
opposed to the national issue - many people who wanted to take part in the political process did so 
using the Green M ovem ent as a ‘cover’. Once it becam e politically possib le to set up other, more
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overtly political groups and from February 1989 onwards also political parties - several activists 
left and becam e lead ing figures elsewhere. Yet others left to pursue their own careers. It also  
soon becam e clear that there were as m any different opin ions on what should be the tasks o f  the 
m ovem en t and how it should be run, as there were members o f  the m ovem ent. W h ile Shcherbak 
w as the leader o f  Zelenyi Svit the conflicts that emerged from these disagreem ents were more or 
less contained. Shcherbak was an authoritative figure not only w ithin the m ovem ent but also in 
Ukraine as such and was held in high regard for his work on Chernobyl after the accident - trying
Flowever, this attempt failed. The political leadership o f  Ukraine maintained its position that 
Ukraine needed to expand its nuclear power industry for two reasons: F irstly so as to not becom e
f
to establish w hy the accident took place and what its real impact had been.
Once Shcherbak resigned as Chairman o f  Zelenyi Svit fo llow ing his appointment as Ukrainian 
M in ister o f  the Environment (1990), the situation could no longer be contained. Leontyi 
Sanduliak, who replaced him, did not remain in office for long as he was appointed Ukrainian 
Am bassador to Rom ania and then a power struggle was unavoidable. The establishm ent o f  PZU  
further sharpened the conflict within Zelenyi Svit, as w ill be seen below . A s a result o f  these 
conflicts, which dom inated the agenda o f  m eetings in Mala Rada and Zelena Rada, sc ien tists and 
other experts left the m ovem ent as they felt it becam e increasingly d ifficult to work with  
environm ental issues from within the m ovem ent. Many h igh-profile activists also left to 
concentrate their efforts on the Green Pa ity and those who remained found it increasingly d ifficult '
to keep it together as local chapters left, the general public becam e increasingly d isillusioned  
about politics in general and the days o f  m eetings and demonstrations cam e to an end. W hat was 
more, as the econom y went into a decline and inflation started to soar, the econom ic situation o f  
the m ovem en t worsened. D isputes also broke out over equipment obtained from abroad.
It was thus a weakened Zelenyi Svit that w elcom ed the Declaration o f  Ukrainian
%
Independence on 24 August 1991 - and the decline continued throughout the 1990s with more 
people leaving the m ovem ent and conflicts intensifying. Furthermore, once Ukraine gained its 
independence, the environmental issue suddenly was not considered that important any more. It 
could only be adequately and successfully  addressed, it was argued, once the country had built a 
stable political and econom ic system  and not, as argued by the Greens, as part o f  this stab ilisation. 
A  grim exam ple o f  politics and econom ics clash ing w ith the need to protect the env ironm ent was 
the Presidential Decree signed by Leonid Kravchuk in the spring o f  1994, pav ing the w ay for 
further construction o f  nuclear reactors in Ukraine and preparing for nine such reactors to be
::,;3
com pleted at existing nuclear power stations - thus underm ining m ost o f  the G reens’ ach ievem en ts 
in this field. An attempt w as made by Greenpeace Ukraine together w ith Zelenyi Svit, PZU  and 
other Green groups to have this decree annulled - as it was not issued properly in a legal sense.
11
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dependent upon Russia for gas and fuel supplies, and secondly, so as to earn more hard currency 
from exporting electricity generated by nuclear power stations to other countries. S im ilarly, plans 
to build an oil terminal in Odessa, wh ich had been opposed for a long tim e by Greens and locals in 
the area, got the all-clear from the Ukrainian parliament as w ell as the vocal support o f  nationalist- 
minded forces, in late 1994 - the justification being that once an o il terminal was built, Ukraine 
could buy oil from other countries than Russia, thus further reducing its dependency on its 
powerful neighbour.
Still, I think it would be wrong to say that the impact o f  the Green M ovem ent due to changes
w ithin the m ovem en t and political and econom ic changes in Ukraine more generally has com e to
nothing. Zelenyi Svit, as shown above, w as h ighly successful in pursuing its agenda in the late
1980s both through its activists and through its deputies in local and regional parliaments. What is f
more, the Greens managed to influence public opinion to the effect that som ething had to be done
to improve the state o f  the environm ent in Ukraine. Although the Greens find it harder to m obilise
the public into action now than in the late 1980s, the M ovem ent is still held in high regard by the y
general public - at least if  one is to believe the opinion polls, accord ing to which the Green rating
.is high, compared to other political parties and m ovem ents. This potential support proved d ifficult 
to m obilise into votes during the local elections in June 1994 - but this was not only due to the 
Greens, but also to the electoral law and the democratic parties and m ovem en ts’ lack o f  ab ility to 
agree on one candidate in various constituenc ies, thus politically k illing each other and public 
ind ifference towards politics.
If one is to draw any conclusions as to what has been the greatest ach ievem en t o f  the Green 
M ovem en t in Ukraine during the last nine years, it is not only the fact that it m anaged to 
successfu lly  put the environm ent onto the political agenda in the late 1980s, but m aybe even more 
so that in doing this, it contributed to the eventual collapse o f  the Sov iet Un ion through its 
defiance o f  p olicies initiated in M oscow  w ith little regard to the potentially damaging im pact they
may have on the republic. Another not less im pressive ach ievem ent is the impact Zelenyi Svit has 
made on the general public o f  Ukraine, wh ich gives it a stable 10% in op in ion polls, thus making 
the Greens one o f  the m ost popular political m ovem ents (and parties) in the country. M oreover, 
Zelenyi Svit has succeeded in creating public awareness o f  environm ental issues and this 
awareness can be turned into action i f  and when the political and econom ic situation in Ukraine 
stab ilises. F inally, Zelenyi Svit has played a very important role in Ukrainian politics as a political 
school for its own members as w ell as for other political m ovem ents and parties. The experience 
gained by these people constitutes a great potential for further action in the future - provided that 
personal scores can be settled w ithin the m ovem en t and provided that the Green M ovem ent, w hich
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by now has becom e rather fragmented, w ill again jo in behind a strong leader and concentrate on 
what it was established to do - nam ely to protect the environment.
Particular Factors: The Case of the Nikolaev Greens - An Assessment.
A s seen in Chapter S ix, the activists o f  Zelenyj Mir from the very beginn ing aimed at creating as 
broad an alliance as possible against expansion o f  the SB EK. B y writing letters to various
South B ug. Thus this campaign could be portrayed as a continuation o f  the cam paign to save the 
Siberian rivers (see  Chapter One) and the Ukrainian campaign against the Danube-Dn iepr Canal, 
wh ich had been successfu lly  concluded only shortly prior to the launch o f  the South Bug
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m inistries, departments as w ell as the Ukrainian Academ y o f  Sc iences and getting their support for 
the Green cause, they gained what would soon turn into a key asset - nam ely cred ibility and 
weight. Whereas those favouring continued construction at the luzhnoukrainsk site would be in a 
position easily  to discard the v iew s o f  a handful o f  unknown activists, it would be a lot more 
d ifficult to refute the v iew s o f  official bod ies and Ukrainian sc ien tists, possessing expert 
know ledge o f  the case. Be ing able to claim  the support o f  official institutions also made access to 
the media much easier, as once official v iew s - and not merely the v iew s o f  activists belong ing to 
informal groups - were involved, these would easier be acceptable to official authorities and less 
likely to be met with criticism  or punishm ent from ‘above’.
The Greens no doubt also benefited from the fact that the cam paign to stop expansion at the
SB EK w as not presented as a campaign against nuclear power, but as a cam paign to save the river
%
cam paign, and in wh ich activists in N ikolaev had actively taken part. In addition to being a 
relatively ‘sa fe’ issue, those involved in the latter campaign were also able to benefit from the 
cam paign skills and access to the m edia obtained from the Danube-Dniepr cam paigners. The 
Journalist K olesnyk o f  hizhnaia Pravda, for instance, had taken actively part in that cam paign. 
The Greens also at an early stage established links with the regional TV  - A la Korzheva, one o f  its 
journalists, becam e a member o f  the initiative group o f  Zelenyj Mir and later made a series o f  
critical reports on the SB EK, which were broadcast locally. F inally, the initiators o f  the SB EK  
cam paign must have been encouraged to believe that also their battle could be won given  the 
positive outcom e o f  the Danube-Dniepr campaign.
To add more weight to the campaign and thus also the arguments presented in the debate that 
follow ed, the Greens sought not only support from the m asses (people o f  N ikolaev oblast and the 
w orkers’ co llectives), but also from the official authorities. A s shown in Chapter Six, the oblast 
CPU party com m ittee was informed about the intention to set up a Green M ovem ent in N ikolaev
from an early stage, and the obkom propaganda secretary w as even made a m ember o f  the 
initiative group!
1
local branches o f  the CPU and Zelenyj Mir benefited from each other in the initial stage o f  the
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T h e  r e la t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  Zelenyj Mir a n d  th e  C P U  w a s  a m b iv a le n t ,  h o w e v e r .  O n  th e  o n e
hand, as seen above, the party obkom had strong reservations w ith regard to the third stage o f  the 
SB EK, and was not very happy w ith the second stage either. Its concerns had been expressed as 
early as 1985, but in very m ild terms and w ith no result. The attitude o f  the CPU as such towards 
nuclear power changed, as seen in Chapter S ix, follow ing the accident at Chernobyl on 26 April 
1986. W hereas the CPU had fully endorsed the C P SU ’s ambitious nuclear power programme 
prior to the accident, it becam e increasingly sceptical in its aftermath, eventually vo ic ing its #youtright opposition to M oscow ’s plans. This opposition was never expressed in public - all letters 
changing hands between M oscow  and K iev on this matter were either labelled ‘secret’ or ‘entirely as
secret’. Play ing up to M oscow  in general and on such an important issue as nuclear power in 
particular w as a gam ble from K iev ’s point o f  v iew , even w ith the expansion o f  glasnost and
fdém ocratisation, as any attempt at challeng ing the authority o f  the CPSU from below, could easily  
be branded ‘nationalist’ or ‘d ev ia tion isf and have repercussions for those people involved (cf.
conversation between Shcherbitskii and Gorbachev referred to in Chapter S ix). Thus, the CPU  
could use the public fear o f  nuclear power wh ich follow ed the Chernobyl accident to back up its 
view s: i.e. cla im ing to speak on behalf o f  the people, and thus avoid being branded ‘nationalist’.
..■yOn the other hand, the CPU had to be careful so as to avoid a situation where the Green M ovem en t 
would gain the upper hand and put the party in a position where it could be seen as m erely  
respond ing to a powerful Green M ovem ent. A s the campaign took on, it becam e clear that Zelenyj 
Mir w as efficien t in making known its v iew s and gain ing public support for its demands. It would  
therefore be in the interests o f  the CPU to keep the M ovem ent under som e control, so as to avoid a . ® 
‘sp ill-over’ effect from purely environmental to politically more ‘sen s itive’ issues (for instance, 
challeng ing the supremacy o f  the CPSU and demanding Ukrainian independence.
The Greens, on the other hand, could do w ith the approval and in som e cases also the support 
o f  the oblast CPU. I f  the obkom w as positive to the case made by Zelenyj Mir it would be less 
likely to interfere in its activities and more likely to sanction m eetings and rallies as w ell as 
provid ing the Greens w ith prem ises and other necessary facilities. B esides, play ing on the same 
team as the party would no doubt make it easier for the Greens to v o ice  their concerns to A
Ukrainian and Sov iet authorities. On the other hand, it would not be in the interests o f  the Green |;
II:M ovem en t to be too c losely  associated w ith the CPU as glasnost and dém ocratisation gained |
m omentum and the political clim ate becam e more radicalised.
A s seen in Chapter S ix, although in luzhnoukrainsk attempts were made at w eaken ing the I'Greens by setting up a local branch o f  the Ukrainian Society for Environm ental Protection, and yA'although the Greens had applications for m eetings to be sanctioned turned down, the oblast and
campaign. Pitushkin proved to be a very useful contact for the Greens to present their case 
d irectly to party and official authorities in M oscow , and the party obkom - together with the oblast 
Sov iet - took the demands o f  the pro-environmental lobby into consideration when making
dec isions on the SB EK.
A lso o f  great sign ificance to the Greens was the expert know ledge possessed by the activists 
o f  Zelenyj Mir. Whereas B ilod id, as an engineer em ployed at the SB nuclear power station, 
possessed first hand knowledge o f  the situation there and was in a position to provide his fellow  
members o f  Zelenyj Mir with valid arguments, there were also a number o f  h ighly skilled  
engineers and scientists am ongst the ranks o f  the m ovem ent. Zolotukhin, as the head o f  the
•;A;4
N ikolaev branch o f  the Soviet Culture Fund and as an engineer o f  the enterprise Ek\>ator not only  
gave credibility to the m ovem ent through his cultural links, but also proved vital in the G reens’ 
cam paign to gain the support o f  the general public and workers o f  N ikolaev in particular - as he 
succeeded in getting the support o f  his co-em ployees and through them, in reaching out to other 
workers’ collectives. Soviet authorities claim ed to make decisions in the interests o f  the workers. 
By claim ing their support the Greens no doubt had a trump card, w hich they played w ell by 
appealing to local authorities that they take the workers’ opinion into consideration before making 
decisions on the SB EK (see Chapter Six). In doing so, Zelenyj Mir differed from Zelenyi Svit, 
w hich produced a number o f  letters and appeals signed by prominent members o f  the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia in support o f  its case.
Zolotukhin’s tireless com m itm ent to the m ovem ent resulted in numerous articles and letters
regarding the SB EK appearing on the pages o f  local newspapers. H e also maintained an 
im pressive correspondence with a number o f  m inistries, departments and scientific institutions.
Although criticised by som e for being rather authoritarian, he succeeded in keeping the m ovem ent 
unified and issue-oriented rather than falling prey to infighting and d ivisions as did Zelenyi Svit in 
K iev, and w hich  has alm ost destroyed the organisation. Support from keen activists locally, who  
w ould be directly affected by the second stage o f  the SB EK, should it go  ahead, turned Zelenyi 
Mir into a highly efficient organisation. Unlike what was the case with Zelenyi Svit, Zelenyi Mir 
succeeded in keeping scientists and experts in the m ovem ent, avoiding the m ass exit w hich took  
place in K iev and which no doubt weakened the Ukrainian Greens as such.
Zelenyj Mir also from an early stage showed considerable political skill in pushing the limits 
o f  glasnost and dém ocratisation and w idening the agenda o f  the Green M ovem ent. Quotations 
from L enin’s works and frequent references to the Resolutions o f  the X IX  Party Conference were 
m ade to justify  the v iew s and the means used by the pro-environmental lobby as w ell as to ensure 
the publication o f  controversial materials (cf. for instance the ‘row ’ over the second collective
■letter from the workers’ co llective o f  Ekvator, Chapter Six). Thus the Greens adapted them selves
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to the chang ing political situation rather than seek ing a confrontation, gradually expand ing and 
rad icalising their campaign. Whereas the radicalisation wh ich took place o f  m ost political 
m ovem ents in the late 1980s proved a double-edged sword to particularly Zelenyi Svit (cf. Chapter 
Four) as the political d ifferences between the members becam e more clear-cut and large numbers 
left the m ovem ent as a result, Zelenyi Mir to a much greater extent succeeded in reconciling these 
d ifferences, em phasising the struggle to save South Bug as a uniting factor and downplaying  
personal political d ifferences (see Chapter S ix). It is in this connection interesting to note that the 
N ikolaev Greens were predominantly negative to the establishm ent o f  the Green Party o f  Ukraine 
(PZU in N ikolaev only has som e nine m embers) and that Zolotukhin has put much effort into 
lim iting the influence o f  PZU in Zelenyi Svit in Kiev. Although with tim e the general public 
support for Zelenyj Mir wore o f f  to som e extent, a dedicated group o f  activists remained, m oving  
the cam paign to save South Bug away from the streets and squares and into the o ffices and 
decision-m aking bodies to which the Greens succeeded in being elected in 1990 (seven deputies o f  
the oblast Soviet were linked to Zelenyj Mir).
A bove I have analysed Zelenyj M ir's strategy and found it to be efficient given the political
restraints within which the Greens operated. A s for Resolution N o. 647, though, only one o f  the
demands made by the cam paign to save the river South Bug was taken on: whereas the
K onstantinov water reservoir would not be built, the Aleksandrov water reservoir w as to be
.com pleted, although the proportions would be less than envisaged in the original project.
Sim ilarly, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was to be com pleted, although the capacity
demands, which were basically that the entire Second Stage o f  the SB EK be scrapped. H owever, 
when seen in connection with the general political situation in the Soviet U nion in the summer o f  
1989, the fact that such a resolution was passed at all was in itse lf a major achievem ent. A s seen  
in Chapter Six, there were a number o f  obstacles that had to be tackled in the process and Zelenyj 
Mir was successful in bypassing these as w ell as in limiting the ‘dam age’ done to the original 
report o f  the expert com m ission prior to U SSR  Goskomprirodo's m odified version reaching the 
U SSR  Council o f  M inisters.
USSR Goskompriroda’s reworked version is thought to be a result o f  its w ish to reconcile the 
position o f  the pro-environment lobby with that o f  the pro-nuclear lobby - which, although it was
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w as significantly reduced from what had originally been envisaged. The planned fourth reactor at
the nuclear power station would for the time being not be com pleted, pending the results o f  a re­
exam ination o f  its project. The original projects for the Aleksandrov water reservoir and the 
Tashlyk hydro-electric power station were also to be redrafted and sanctioned by an ecological 
expertise group prior to construction works recom m encing.
At first sight, the Greens seem  to have gained little from Resolution N o. 647 - given  their
unable to match the Greens in gaining public support and the support o f  local and oblast 
authorities, remained very influential in decision-m ak ing circles in K iev and M oscow . Securing a 
temporary status quo was therefore an ach ievem ent and a great challenge to Zelenyj Mir. A s 
pointed out above, there was no proper apparatus to see to it that political dec isions were being  
im plem ented in the former Sov iet Union. M oreover, new laws in many cases contradicted already 
ex isting laws, and wh ich laws one chose to go by depended on wh ich side one belonged to in the 
environm ental debate. Industrial projects which were either put on ice or banned on 
environm ental grounds therefore very often continued unchanged. The challenge the Greens faced  
by A ugust 1989 was thus com plex: on the one hand, they had to police the im plem entation o f  
R esolution N o. 647; on the other, they continued their campaign to have the entire second stage 
eventually scrapped. F ollow ing the Ukrainian Declaration o f  Independence the situation was even  
more com plicated by the introduction o f  a new  issue, namely that o f  a produvka o f  the Tashlyk  
water reservoir and structural, political and econom ic changes more generally. On top o f  this, the 
early 1990s saw  a general decline in public interest in politics in general, which also affected the 
Green M ovem ent.
Follow ing the adoption o f  Resolution N o. 647, Zelenyj Mir succeeded in m aking local and 
oblast authorities adopt a number o f  decisions and resolutions against the Aleksandrov water 
reservoir and to secure that only three aggregates be installed at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power 
station. The Soviet Law on Local Government, which was introduced in 1987, allow ed for more 
decisions to be made locally. Soviet authorities, which remained com m itted to the nuclear power 
programme adopted in the late 1980s, were thus faced with the dilem m a o f  how to bypass local 
opposition to the SB EK. A s seen in Chapter Seven, the problem w as solved when P avlov’s 
governm ent introduced a law providing local authorities with incentives to accom m odate nuclear 
or other installations linked w ith nuclear power stations on their territory. The new  law worked, 
thus w eakening the G reens’ campaign and also clearly illustrating the lim its o f  Soviet dem ocracy  
- M oscow  w as still in a position to override decisions made locally sim ply by adopting a law to 
bypass them or to put local authorities in a position where they sim ply could not afford not to 
fo llow  its directives. G iven the generally difficult econom ic situation in Ukraine, w hich w as felt 
strongly in areas close to the SB nuclear power station, econom ic incentives replaced coercion  
with the sam e outcome.
Ukrainian independence did not prove to be the solution to the environm ental problem s in the 
N ikolaev oblast and in Ukraine per se as the Greens had hoped. A s pointed out above, given the 
difficult energy situation in Ukraine in the aftermath o f  the declaration o f  independence, the pro- 
nuclear lobby succeeded in convincing the central authorities in K iev that Ukraine had no 
alternative but to pursue nuclear power to avoid an energy crisis and a hard currency deficit o f
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large proportions. So whereas the ‘centre’ - M oscow  - was gone, K iev sim ply replaced it, thus 
leav ing the Greens faced w ith the same opposition as before. As seen in Chapter Seven, whereas 
Zelenyj Mir was largely successful at the local and regional levels, its activists banged their heads 
against the wall in the case o f  K iev. And K iev was in a position to override dec isions made 
locally, just as M oscow  had done before. The moratorium on nuclear reactors which had been 
adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in February 1990, was, as seen above, revoked in 1993, thus 
increasing the likelihood that reactor N o 4 would be com pleted and possibly a further one or two
Tashlyk water reservoir, to be funded by the SB EK. A ll claim s for com pensation from the Greens 
were dropped.
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reactors at a later stage. From a strictly political point o f  v iew , the Ukrainian independence 
brought with it som ething o f  a setback to Zelenyj M ir's campaign - although it could, o f  course,
conduct its campaign much more freely than had been the case during the Soviet period.
In terms o f  providing good arguments for their cause and in terms o f  providing alternatives.
the pro-environment lobby did a very good job in the 1990s: it not only proved that the
. . .Aleksandrov water reservoir even with limited proportions and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power 
station fitted with no more than three aggregates would have a severely negative impact on the 
environment. M oreover, the Greens succeeded in getting authoritative support for the v iew  that a
I
produvka o f  the Tashlyk water reservoir w ould be harmful to the environm ent and possibly also to 
peop le’s health. A s for nuclear safety, the administration o f  the Y U  nuclear power station failed to 
refute the G reens’ arguments to the effect that the reactors at luzhnoukrainsk had becom e unsafe 
due to poor safety standards and failure to fo llow  safety instructions on site. F inally, it got 
recognition for its alternative gas turbine technology from the scientific establishm ent o f  Ukraine 
and from a number o f  m inistries, including Minenergo. D ecisions made locally on the SB EK  
clearly reflected the v iew s o f  the Green M ovem ent, for w hich the Green deputies in the oblast 
soviet were largely to thank, due to the tremendous job they did in the soviet. Local authorities 
also favoured tests with gas turbines, but had no m oney to start such tests. K iev refused to provide 
funding for them and also gave the clear for a number o f  experimental produvki to go  ahead. 
R esult-w ise, it is thus probably correct to say that the Greens were successful in arguing their case 
and in influencing decision-m aking in N ikolaev oblast, but that the pro-nuclear lobby got the 
upper hand in K iev, w hich becam e possible primarily due to the vei*y difficult political and 
econom ic situation Ukraine has suffered since independence in 1991. P ossib ly as a result o f  the 
changing political and econom ic situation, the pro-nuclear lobby decided to try to crush opposition
'in N ikolaev oblast once and for all by taking Sus lova and Shapovalov to court and having them  
pay com pensation for slandering its reputation. They were, however, not successfu l, in the end
■f:;
com ing to a settlem ent with the Greens to conduct an ecological expertise on water quality in the
By the summer o f  1994 the Greens were faced with the fo llow ing situation: The leadership 
o f  Zelenyj Mir had fallen out with two o f  its allies - hizhnaia pravda and oblast Minpriroda. The 
former w as accused o f  adopting a pro-nuclear profile in return for econom ic assistance rendered to 
it by the leadership o f  the SB nuclear power station. It is generally known that the newspapers in 
Ukraine as in the other former Sov iet republics ran into d ifficulties in the 1990s as prices for 
paper, ink etc. rocketed and stocks went down due to lower demand, wh ich again reflected the 
generally d ifficult econom ic situation in the country. As seen above, Zelenyj Mir found it d ifficult 
to publish its writings in the newspaper as a result. This was not such a b ig problem, though, as 
K ole;nyk, w ho m oved on to Radianske Pribuzhzhia, and other journalists in the sam e newspaper 
adopted a favourable position towards the pro-environment lobby. Probably m ore harmful to 
Zelenyj Mir was the conflict which developed v is-à-vis the oblast Minpriroda. Its Chairman, A. 
A lbul, w as accused o f  fa iling to make the appropriate decisions in connection w ith illegal 
construction at the SB EK and for v iolating environmental leg islation on a number o f  occasions by 
not prohibiting environm entally harmful projects from going ahead. Zolotukhin in a letter to 
Ukrainian Minpriroda demanded that his report be properly investigated and that Albul be 
rem oved from his position. Minpriroda did adm it that there had been som e m ishaps, but did not 
find this sufficien t to rem ove Albul. A t the tim e o f  the com plaint Shcherbak w as M in ister o f  the 
Environm ent and Zolotukhin probably counted on his sid ing w ith his ow n m ovem en t on this 
matter. Zolotukhin’s allegations did, however, trigger o ff  a very negative response at oblast level, 
and much criticism  against Zolotukhin fo llow ed  from em ployees o f  the oblast Minpriroda who  
attacked him for his authoritarian leadership style, and for acting as though he h im self w as the 
Green M ovem ent and not ‘m erely’ its representative.
Albul, however, was not only criticised by the Greens, but also by the pro-nuclear lobby (see
Page 12). A s for the conflict w hich em erged between the Greens and Minpriroda, from a strategic 
point o f  v iew  it might better had been avoided. G iven the present very d ifficult political and 
econom ic situation the Greens are faced w ith, they can ill afford to lose allies in their struggle to 
protect South Bug. On the other hand, Zelenyj Mir is a m ovem ent com m itted to high moral 
standards and to principle. A s far as the environm ent is concerned, there can be no com prom ise. 
The state o f  the environment in Ukraine is on the verge o f  disaster and m ust be protected by any 
means. N eedless to say, those who fail to com ply with this aim w ill have to put up w ith the 
criticism  resulting from it. Having said that, though, there were not only subjeetive, but also a 
number o f  objective reasons as to why the oblast Minpriroda at tim es failed to com ply with
instructions and rules according to which it based its activities, su ffice it here to m ention poor 
staffing, inadequate facilities and lack o f  m oney. The sharp exchange o f  accusations should be
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taken as a sign o f  the sharpening o f  the conflict and the increasingly ‘personal’ and to som e extent 
also ‘dirtier’ campaign wh ich emerged as a result.
If one compares the campaign to save the river South Bug and to avoid expansion o f  the SB  
EK with cam paigns against nuclear power in the West, it becom es obvious that there are numerous 
d ifferences. Firstly, whereas campaigners in Western Europe and in A m erica have the advantage 
o f  operating w ithin stable dem ocracies, the N ikolaev Greens have since their campaign started in 
1988 had to deal with changing political and econom ic conditions in addition to addressing their 
own agenda to save South Bug. This has limited the results o f  their cam paigning in a number o f  
ways: continuously having to adopt to a changing framework takes energy and tim e. B esides, 
such changes are often follow ed by confusion as to w ho is in charge o f  what and to general delays.
-There is also the legacy from the Soviet period o f  poor im plem entation o f  political decisions  
made. Another effect o f  the unstable political and econom ic situation is that people have less time 
and m oney to put into political activism , thus putting an enormous burden on a relatively small 
number o f  activists.
Secondly, due to the old fashioned technology and the gigantom ania which characterised 
Soviet industries, the issues surrounding the SB EK have been som ewhat different from the core 
issue o f  anti-nuclear cam paigns in the W est - namely that o f  safety and health im plications. In 
N ikolaev there were the added issues o f  environmental damage, due to the projected water 
reservoirs and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, o f  radioactive contam ination as a result o f  
produvka and finally, o f  potential accidents due to the poor safety at the nuclear power station.
The issue o f  nuclear power thus links up with the wider issue o f  ecological culture and the need to 
protect Ukraine, its people, environm ent, history and culture from destruction. The cam paign  
fought in N ikolaev oblast can thus be seen as a continuation o f  opposition in Russia to flooding in 
connection with hydro-electric power stations and the water reservoirs created to serve them (cf. 
Rasputin and M ikhalkov - Chapter One) and is an ethical and moral struggle just as much as it is 
an environm ental one.
In conclusion, it thus seem s fair to say that the Greens conducted a largely successful 
campaign to save the river South Bug but that the political and econom ic framework within which  
they operated and still operate put several obstacles in their way, thus lim iting the outcom e o f  their 
cam paign. Given the general political apathy and the fact that the number o f  deputies in the oblast 
Soviet w as reduced, it seem s likely that the Greens w ill continue to struggle unless som e kind o f  
support with equipment can be obtained from Ukrainian /foreign sponsors. More helpful than 
anything, though, would be funding for the gas turbine project from w hich the entire former U SSR  
as w ell as W estern countries could benefit and w hich would give Zelenyj Mir a powerful card to 
play in its future struggle to save the South Bug river.
;:ÿ::
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9.1.2 PZU  (1990-94) - An Assessment
W hen the First Congress o f  Zelenyi Svit voted to establish a Green Party as the political w ing o f  
the Green M ovem ent it probably could not have predicted that this dec ision would even tually  
break up the very m ovem en t on w hose behalf PZU  was supposed to act. A s described in greater 
detail in Chapter Four, there was som e controversy regarding the party issue, but in the end the 
v iew  that not only a strong extraparliamentary m ovem ent was required to set the record straight on 
the environment, but also a party that could work from w ithin the dec ision m aking structures was 
required. Has the Green Party lived up to the expectations its founders had in 1990 and in case not 
- why?
A s shown in Chapter F ive, local branches o f  the Green Party were set up prior to the First all- 
Ukrainian Congress o f  the PZU. These local organisations were largely responsible for preparing 
the paity docum ents and organ ising the congress. H owever, whereas the K iev and W est Ukrainian 
local groups were large and strong, this w as not the case in other areas o f  Ukraine - i.e. in the East, 
South and the North. This som ewhat limited PZU  in the parliamentary elections o f  March 1994, 
and later in the local elections in June the sam e year. (Greens did not contest local/Ukrainian  
elections in 1990) Tn som e areas it was difficult to put forward candidates, in others there w as no 
party organisation to back up those candidates put forward. M oreover, the electoral law, as shown  
in Chapter Eight, did not favour the sm all dem ocratic parties o f  Ukraine - for a candidate to be put 
forward by a political party locally a party conference attended by at least fifty  local party 
m em bers had to be held to approve o f  such a candidate. Given the size o f  the local party 
organisations this proved very difficult, and m ost o f  the people who stood for election  and 
represented the Green Paity thus stood as independents. H aving put forward candidates, 
cam paigning proved difficult for econom ic reasons (lim ited funds, large electoral districts.) and 
for lack o f  unity am ongst the democrats. B esides, many o f  the candidates were not w ell known to 
the electorate and dirty election cam paigns thus com plicated their cam paigns. The Greens also  
failed to pay enough attention to the econom ic problems o f  Ukraine as w ell as issues such as 
crim e. Large segm ents o f  the electorate were concerned with these issues, and the leadership o f  
the PZU  later acknowledged that the party had failed to com e up with a com prehensive election  
platform.
Another w eakness was the high level o f  trust the Green Paiiy  put in results from polls 
conducted prior to the elections. PZU  polled high on these and the party leadership m ay thus - at 
least in K iev - have taken it for granted that people would vote Green. A s pointed out above, 
however, there is a high degree o f  scepticism  am ongst people in Ukraine towards political parties 
and little trust in politicians per se. A lthough the Green Party, compared to other political parties, 
polled high in the months leading up to the elections, the share o f  people expressing their
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preference for independent candidates constituted around two thirds o f  those polled. B esides, 
expressing sympathy to the Greens in polls does not automatically mean that one would also cast 
on e’s vote in favour o f  the Greens. The Green Party does not have strong local party organ isations 
and w as also not in a position to fund election campaigns locally. M oreover, PZU  tended to put ■•A..'.forward candidates in those constituencies which already had several other candidates from the
dem ocratic opposition. Compared to parties like RUKH  and URP, PZU  does not have w ell-know n
leaders like Chornoyil or Horyn. To the extent K ononov is known am ongst the electorate, he is
not considered to be as solid as these two. Thus, PZU's candidates would not necessarily be
favoured due to their party affiliation, but due to their personalities - who they were, so to speak.
In the two constituenc ies where PZU  did make it to the second ballot, the cand idates had
problems covering huge electoral districts and had the added d isadvantage o f  being wom en
running against apparatchiki. Although a bus load o f  Green activists w as sent to Zakarpatia to
cam paign and watch over the elections for Karavanska, they were sent there too late to influence
the outcom e o f  the vote. B esides, the K iev activists did not speak the language o f  the village-
people they m et with. The d ivision between countryside and town in Ukraine is much bigger than
.in m ost W est European countries. Telling people to vote for Karavanska and distributing paper
for locals to sm oke tobacco in just w as not enough to make them change their mind. To be o f
som e help, these activists should have been sent to Zakarpatia straight after the first round o f  the
.elections in March 1994 and the party leadership (K ononov, Kurykin etc.) should have jo ined  in.
B esides, they should have gone to Zakarpatia w ith som e kind o f  cam paign strategy. In April the
.party leadership was busy attending an international conference in Lv iv, when where it should
have been, was Zakarpatia. To som e extent it may be unfair to criticise the party leaders for not ...
join ing in w ith Karavanska for her continued campaign. PZU  spent lots o f  m oney and effort on 
their initial campaign and not succeed ing in K iev, where the PZU  is quite strong, must have been 
an enorm ous disappointm ent to its leadership. Besides, travelling in Ukraine is still m uch more 
com plicated than elsewhere. To get to M ukachevo/Irshava the Kiev activists spent som e 15 hours 
on a bus each way. Thus, it would be very d ifficult for the party leadership to get back to K iev  
quickly and this o f  course com plicated matters.
In 1990, the Green Pairty had the advantage not only o f  having a w ell-know n leader, lurü 
Shcherbak, but also o f  hav ing several sound political analysts and strategists am ong its ranks. 
People like Andrii H lazovy i and Serhii Hrabovskyi had v isions and a sound understanding o f  
green politics and o f  the Ukrainian political context within wh ich PZU  operated. The two  
balanced each other w ell as H lazovy i wanted to build a Green Party sim ilar to that o f  W est 
Germany, w as w ell read on green politics generally and had contacts abroad. H rabovskyi, on the 
other hand, w as a political sc ientist and could see things from the Ukrainian point o f  v iew . The i
I
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W est Ukrainian Greens were also innovative: Puskhkar, for instance, suggested that various
political fractions be set up in the paity. This, however, was opposed by the Kiev leadership. At 
present PZU  is in a situation where it has a charismatic, outgoing leader, V italii K ononov, who  
does not have a deep understanding o f  the theoretical side to Green Politics, and an ‘ id eolog ist’ 
deputy leader, Serhii Kurykin, who is not very charismatic but som ewhat withdrawn and who  
seem s to have a m onopoly on shaping party policies. What the PZU  really needs is - as pointed  
out in Chapter F ive - a front figure w ho can com b ine these two qualities and a broad infra-party 
debate on what should be the policies o f  PZU  and wh ich strategy to apply for the future.
9.1.3 The Relationship between Zelenyi Svit and PZU
The idea that a m ovem ent needs a political w ing to speak on its behalf where the political 
dec isions are made is not new. In m ost European countries labour parties em erged from the trade 
union environm ent to maintain the interests o f  the labour m ovem ent in parliament. In N orw ay, for 
instance, Landsorganisasjonen (LO) has until present maintained close  links with Arbeiderpartiet 
(AP) - the Labour Party - supporting the party econom ically in return for M Ps or governm ental 
ministers representing the trade unions. On a number o f  important issues, LO and AP have 
consultations prior to AP deciding its future policies. This close relationship between LO and AP  
remained firm for several decades until the late 1980s when the membership figures o f  LO started 
to decline, as other trade unions were established to represent those segm ents o f  the em ployers 
w ho w ould not necessarily feel any loyalty towards the Labour Party. M oreover, from within LO 
critical voices began to question the traditional relationship between LO and AP, arguing that they  
neither voted for the Labour Party, nor did they automatically want to becom e m embers o f  the 
Labour Party through their membership o f  the LO. Similarly, som e members o f  the Labour Party 
felt that the Party ought to change its name and image, as in terms o f  p olicies, it w as m ore a Social 
Dem ocratic Party than a Labour Party. To capture votes from the political centre, it w as thought 
that the Party m ight gain from loosening its ties with LO.
To som e extent the conflict which has em erged between Zelenyi Svit and PZU  has sim ilarities 
to the conflict m entioned above in that the m ovem ent, which is com prised o f  several ‘groups’ - the 
nationalist-democrats, the left, environm entalists and members o f  PZU  - have diverging v iew s  
with regard to the PZU  Som e people do not approve o f  PZU  for political reasons. This is the 
case for a small group o f  com m unists/socialists, w hose allegiance is with the Socialist/C om m unist 
Party. Others, like the national-democrats, w hose political allegiances are w ith parties like RUKH, 
URP and others (as seen in Chapters Three and Eight, even more extrem e party allegiances could  
be found within Zelenyi Svit: members supporting KUN  and OUN  were later expelled  for their
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extrem ist v iew s) and som e people, w h ile committed to the environment, do not necessarily  
approve o f  a Green Party (the environm entalists).
Those members o f  Zelenyi Svit wh ich are opposed to PZU  claim  that the Party is trying to 
take control with the m ovem ent so as to make it act in a way w ith which the Party w ill approve - 
i.e. as a back-up and support group to PZU. This, they say, is required as the Party is poor and 
does not have a proper party organisation. Zelenyi Svit, on the other hand, has a big o ffice  and 
m eeting room at Podil, it has an execu tive director and a number o f  volunteers running a by 
Ukrainian standards w ell equipped office, and it has international connections from wh ich the 
Party hopes to benefit.
Party representatives, on the other hand, are ambigous in their assessm en t o f  this conflict. 
V italii K ononov, for instance, says that PZU  never has, nor w ill it ever, try to gain control o f  
Zelenyi Svit. PZU  has its own equipment, its own international contacts and its own source o f  
incom e. It does not need Zelenyi Svit, wh ich as an organisation has exhausted itse lf through 
internal bickering and quarrels. To prove this point, Serhii Kurykin and Andrii H lazovy i, both 
former members o f  Zelenyi Svit, in 1994 initiated EkoMisiia - a loose association o f  environmental 
NG O s, which do not subordinate them selves to a centralised structure and leadership, but which  
exchange information and, whenever required, m eet to organise jo int action. A  conference 
form ally establishing EkoMisiia w as arranged near Kiev in M ay 1994 and was attended by green 
N G O s from W est Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk, the Crimea and K iev. A lso  present were 
representatives from N G O s in the West. The NG O s which joined EkoMisiia are advanced from a 
technical point o f  v iew  (have access to em ail, various green networks and fax m achines) as w ell as 
connections in the W est. The fact that ISAR and Milieukontakt Oosteuropa, which are offering  
grants and other technical/organisational/fïnancial support to N G O s in the former U SSR , as well 
as representatives from the Ukrainian M inistry o f  Environmental Protection, were present at the 
M ay 1994 Conference, may be interpreted as a shift in power within the environm ental m ovem ent 
o f  Ukraine - from what remains o f  Zelenyi Svit to those organisations that have either left Zelenyi 
Svit or are no longer very active within it.
Other members o f  PZU, though, such as lurii Samiilenko, head o f  PZU's Secretariat, has 
stated bluntly that Zelenyi Svit has becom e an inefficient association with little impact on the 
environm ental scene in Ukraine. Sam iilenko, Haiiiukova, Hrekov, Panov and Preobrazhenska (all 
prominent members/supporters o f  PZU) have all been involved in heavy infighting with the 
nationalist w ing o f  Zelenyi Svit - a fight which culminated in the effective split o f  Zelenyi Svit in 
Decem ber 1994, when Sam iilenko replaced Korobko (former deputy o f  Verkhovna Rada 
representing RUKH) as its Chairman and those supporting the latter (sm all K iev group, N ikolaev,
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Donetsk, N etyzhyn) broke with the Sam iilenko supporters (large Kiev group. Western groups) and 
held their own Zelenyi Svit Congress in Donetsk.
It is not for me to judge what should be the link between Zelenyi Svit and PZU. To a large 
extent Zelenyi Svit has facilitated this conflict itself, by on the one hand declaring at its Fist 
Congress in October 1989 that its intention was to set up a Green Party as the political w ing o f  the 
Green M ovem ent, while on the other hand being a largely non-hom ogenous group o f  
environm entalists as far as political allegiances are concerned. In the end, however, both Zelenyi 
Svit and PZU  have lost out from this struggle. To the extent the Green M ovem ent needed a 
political w ing to voice its concerns within the legislative bodies, it is equally true that the Green 
Party needed a strong green m ovem ent to conduct ad-hoc activities and gain public support for the 
very sam e issues that the party intended to address away from the streets and squares. The Green 
Party also needed a strong green m ovem ent to provide it with the necessary data and information 
to successfu lly  address these issues within the parliaments (although much insight was gained 
through deputies - cf. N ikolaev).
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From the outset the distinction between Zelenyi Svit and PZU  has been blurred. As noted 
above, PZU - unlike parties like RUKH, URP, the Socialists and the Commumsts - does not have 
strong local party groups, nor does it have strong party discipline or a good econom y. 
Consequently, not only PZU, but also Zelenyi Svit cam e to act as a political w ing o f  the Green 
M ovem ent, represented in local and regional parliaments through its own deputies. During local 
elections in 1990, Zelenyi Svit gained 37 deputies throughout Ukraine whereas PZU  form ally  
gained none (som e o f  those deputies elected were either sym pathetic to or even m em bers o f  the 
Green Paity) as PZU  was not form ally registered until 24 M ay 1991 - with a m embership o f  
3,193 What was more, due to the 1994 Election Law not favouring sm all, dem ocratic political 
parties for reasons mentioned above, it was easier for Zelenyi Svit as an association to put forward 
candidates than it was for PZU  as a party. Thus, all candidates who were members o f  PZU  and 
w ho stood for the parliamentary elections ran as independents - although their cam paign leaflets 
m entioned that they were members o f  the Green Party. F ollow ing the disastrous result o f  these  
elections (neither PZU  nor Zelenyi Svit succeeded in having any o f  their candidates elected), PZU  
decided to change its policies and prior to the local elections in June set up a K iev party group and 
nominated candidates for m ost o f  the K iev constituencies, hoping that this would make them more 
successful. On the w hole, though, the Green vote declined in the local elections o f  1994 as 
compared to those o f  1990. I have m yse lf sat through m eetings o f  the Mala Rada, which have
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Anna Bram well (1994), in her book ‘The Fading o f  the G reens’ ,^ argues that Green political 
parties in the W est are on the decline. She identifies two major reasons, by wh ich to explain this
 ^Anna Bramwell, The Fading o f the Greens (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994).
gone on for up to five-six  hours, and where any attempt at discussing environmental issues and 
Zelenyj Suit’s agenda have turned into nasty personal disputes.
A high level o f  disagreements and disputes seem to be a com m on feature o f  Green 
M ovem ents and parties also in Western Europe and are therefore not so surprising in them selves. 
The issue o f  dispute in Ukraine, however, is very different from that o f  say. D ie Grtinen in 
Germany. In Germany the question o f  whether or not a Green Party is required has been contested  
within the Green Paity by the fund is (fundamentalists) and the realos (realists), whereas in 
Ukraine, this debate has taken place within the wider Green M ovem ent. This can be partially 
explained from the fact that in Germany, political parties represented in parliament get funding 
from the state and also access to national TV and other publicity. Thus, although the deep 
ecologists w ho oppose the state as an anti-environmental institution do not necessarily favour the 
idea o f  a Green Party in that it becom es institutionalised into the very system  they are against, 
through its political activities - the realists are able to argue that the Green M ovem ent as such can 
only benefit from its existence, in that it provides funding for environm ental projects (deputies 
give 9/lO ths o f  their salary to the Party). The Green M ovem ent o f  Germany - although not all 
environm ental NG O s are form ally linked to die Grtinen - thus benefits econom ically  from a party 
that is better o f f  econom ically and enjoys the sam e - or maybe even a higher - level o f  public 
support than the m ovem ent does itself.
In Ukraine, on the other hand, no state subsidies are given to political parties. The fighting  
within Zelenyi Svit between groups favourable or hostile towards PZU  is thus not so m uch an issue 
o f  whether or not there is a need for a Green Party, but more one o f  finance and control - given  
that resources are scarce. Another feature typical to Ukraine, and which not only the Greens, but 
also other political m ovem ents and parties still to som e extent suffer from, is a lack o f  
understanding for tactics and coalition building. Everyone wants to be a leader and the idea that 
‘ if  you do not agree com pletely with me, then you are against m e’, is still prevalent. Personal 
am bitions maybe more than political am bitions are thus putting an additional strain on the Green 
M ovem ent.
9.1.4 The Decline of the Ukrainian Greens: Part of an International
Phenomenon? 4'ï
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phenomenon. Firstly, the Greens - at least in Germany - are not really ‘G reen’, but rather a group 
o f  radicals more concerned w ith other issues. Secondly, a key com ponent o f  the German G reens’ 
theoretical framework - the so-called ‘convergence theory’, which postulated that cap italism  and 
soc ialism  as practised in the Sov iet Un ion, would eventually converge, received a serious blow  
w ith the em ergence o f  the Eastern Greens. Ill-prepared for the collapse o f  the U SSR  and h ighly  
critical o f  the Eastern ‘solu tion’ to environmental problems; nam ely to introduce elem en ts o f  
cap italism , com pounded w ith the deaths o f  Petra K elly and Gert Bastian, the German Greens went 
into decline and brought Greens elsewhere in Europe w ith them.
Although it is tempting to draw general conclusions about the Greens as an international 
m ovem en t in decline, the reasons for why the Greens at least in Ukraine are loosing their support, 
are very different from those o f  W est European Greens. I have identified these reasons above. 
Paradoxically, one m ight argue that the W est European Greens in general and the German Greens 
in particular, have indirectly contributed to the decline o f  the Ukrainian Green M ovem en t by 
influencing som e members o f  Zelenyi Svit and thus causing conflicts with those favouring a more 
‘Ukrain ian’ approach to environmental problems. The W est European Greens m ight also have 
fuelled conflicts between ‘Ukrain ians’ and ‘g lobalists’ within the Ukrainian Green M ovem en t by 
cla im ing to represent Green values and having m onopoly on how to interpret the key concepts and 
principles o f  the international Green M ovem ent. Initially, the Ukrainian Greens were accused o f  
‘nationalism ’ and their solutions to Ukrainian environmental problems were not always endorsed 
in the W est. Although this changed (as seen in Chapter F ive, d iscussion groups were set up within  
the framework o f  the European Greens to d iscuss problems Greens in Eastern Europe and the 
former Sov iet Un ion were faced w ith), the damage w ithin the Ukrainian Green M ovem en t had 
already been done. A  more understanding approach towards the Greens o f  the former Sov iet 
Un ion and their problems im m ed iately after they emerged, could m aybe have if  not prevented, 
then at least reduced the tension between those w ishing to establish a Green M ovem ent and Party 
firm ly rooted in the international tradition and those favouring a more ‘Ukrainian’ approach.
Bram well also argues that a major reason w hy the Greens are in decline in the W est, is that 
other political parties have taken ‘on-board’ som e o f  the environmental policies o f  the Greens, 
thus reducing the need for Green Parties in the first place. Green groups, such as Friends o f  the 
Earth, which have spec ialised in lobbying, on the other hand, are do ing w ell. In Ukraine, however, 
such an explanation for the decline o f  the Green M ovem ent does not eas ily  fit. A s seen above, 
there has been a shift away from environmental issues in Ukrainian politics, the argument being  
that the environmental problem s can only successfully be solved w ithin a stable econom ic and 
political system , which has yet to be built in Ukraine. Thus, instead o f  co-opting the ideas o f  the 
Greens, Ukrainian political parties have temporarily distanced them selves from these ideas,
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arguing that Ukraine at the m oment are faced w ith more urgent econom ic and political issues, 
justifying a delay in solv ing the country’s environmental problems. Zelenyi Svit has not succeeded  
in making the transition from mass m ovem ent to lobbyist, partly due to conflicts w ithin the 
m ovem ent, partly due to the absence o f  a clear set o f  priorities and a strategy. Greenpeace 
Ukraine has taken over as ‘the’ Green M ovem ent in Ukraine, both in terms o f  cam paigns and 
lobby ing o f  Ukrainian authorities. The Green Party, rather than spend ing its time and resources 
lobbying - for wh ich there seem s to be som e potential (cf. survey conducted am ong Ukrainian 
M em bers o f  Parliament in 1994 by Hey wood, M iller and W hite) - are still in the process o f  
defin ing its own policies and staking out a strategy. A priority issue so far has been to m obilise  
support for the party and to gain access to local, regional and the Ukrainian parliament where 
dec isions are made. PZU’s failure to do so, m ight indicate that a shift towards lobby ing m ight 
yield more results at a tim e when political parties are generally not very popular am ong the 
Ukrainian public and the Green Party is short o f  resources. Lobbying - espec ially  If successful - 
m ight g ive the party more attention by the media and help rem ove the ‘press release’ im age it has 
acquired over the last few  years, wh ich, in turn, m ight also bring desperately needed votes to the 
Green camp.
9.2 Is the Ukrainian Future Green?
H aving assessed the impact o f  the Green M ovem ent so far, it is only natural to try to m ake som e
predictions for the future o f  the Greens. This future w ill depend not only on general political and
econom ic developm ents, but also to a large extent on internal developm ents both within the Green
M ovem ent and the Green Party. A t present, the econom y o f  Ukraine is in a dire state. Accord ing
to calculations made by the IM F/W orld Bank, it w ill take not years, but decades before the
econom y stab ilises and beg ins to grow. In the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian population is thus
likely to be preoccupied w ith financial worries. In the quest to bring new  investm ents and
industries to Ukraine, there is also the chance that violations o f  environm ental leg islation w ill be
handed lightly and that requirements to install em ission dev ices to curtail hazardous em issions
may not be enforced as rigorously as intended. A s seen above, consensus to secure Ukrainian
independence (and thus weaken its dependence on Russia) has already facilitated a reassessm ent
o f  Ukrainian nuclear power policies and a dec ision to build an o il terminal in O dessa - both issues
.opposed by the Greens since the late 1980s. To turn this trend and change the basic idea that 
environm ental issues can only successfu lly  be addressed w ithin a stable political and econom ic  
context to the idea that political and econom ic reform can only succeed i f  accom pan ied by
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environm ental reform, a powerful and united Green M ovem ent is required, not a weak and 
fragmented one.
A lthough the focus o f  this thesis has been Zelenyi Svit and PZU, EkoMisiia must also be 
taken into account when trying to identify future scenarios for the Ukrainian Green M ovem ent as 
such. A s far as I can see, this future w ill depend on the interrelationship between these three 
entities, and having this in m ind, it is possible to identify three future scenarios which w ill be 
d iscussed in som e detail below. I do, however, w ish to stress that given the many uncertainties 
regarding future political and econom ic developm ents in Ukraine, any future predictions must 
both be made and treated w ith great care.
9.2.1 Closer Relations between PZU  and the Green Movement.
Judging from the events o f  1994 on the Green scene, this may be the m ost likely scenario, lurii 
Sam iilenko, o f  the PZU, is now  Chairman o f  Zelenyi Svit, or rather o f  what remains o f  Zelenyi Svit 
fo llow ing the split in D ecem ber 1994. Although Zelenyi Svit has no doubt been weakened by 
losing Anatolii Zolotukhin and the N ikolaev Greens as w ell as local groups also in the East o f  
Ukraine (D onetsk), those groups that arranged an alternative Congress and now lay claim  to the 
name and the equipment o f  Zelenyi Svit are in a minority. Their claim s - which according to 
Zolotukhin have the law on their side - thus are not very likely to succeed. E ffectively , Zelenyi 
Svit w ill therefore continue to exist as an association predominantly o f  W est Ukrainian and Kiev 
Greens - although strong chapters still exist in Dnepropetrovsk and N ikopol (Zaporizhzhska AES). 
This ‘n ew ’ Zelenyi Svit, if  one may call it so, w ill be generally more favourable towards PZU  and 
w ill work much closer with the Party than has been the case so far.
Several members o f  PZU  have expressed the v iew  that Zelenyi Svit has no future - i.e. it 
served a purpose in the late 1980s, but from an organisational point o f  v iew  it w ill soon becom e an 
association o f  the past. The future, they claim , lay in a loose network o f  local/regional N G O s, and 
this network has now been established through EkoMisiia. In my v iew , however, the relationship  
between EkoMisiia and Zelenyi Svit is much more com plex than this. One must remember that 
whereas EkoMisiia was not even known am ongst all the chapters o f  Zelenyi Svit that attended the 
m eeting o f  Zelena Rada in K iev in early June 1994 (cf. survey results. Chapters Three and Four), 
it is even less known am ongst the general public. Zelenyi Svit, on the other hand, is w ell known  
through its string o f  successful cam paigns in the late 1980s/early 1990s. In polls featuring both 
Zelenyi Svit and PZU, the former have consistently scored one or two points higher than the latter - 
thus reflecting to som e extent the electorate’s general scepticism  towards political parties but also
.Si-
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its high level o f  trust in an association wh ich has actually done som ething to save the environm ent 
in Ukraine.
A t a tim e when people are less concerned with environmental issues and when there is 
consensus am ongst those parties represented in parliament that environm ental issues should be 
dealt with at a later stage, it would be politically short-sighted for the Greens to bury Zelenyi Svit 
at the expense o f  EkoMisiia. PZU  needs Zelenyi Svit not only for its equipment and K iev office, 
but also to gain political credibility. PZU  can gain votes by having a united Green M ovem ent 
behind it - and a M ovem ent which is more likely to support the idea o f  PZU  putting forward 
candidates for elections, rather than Zelenyi Svit doing so: in other words, a m ovem en t which  
accepts the Party’s claim to act as the political w ing o f  the Green M ovem ent. The take-over o f  
Zelenyi Svit by PZU, however, may in the end prove to be a double-edged sword.
In N ikolaev, for instance, Zolotukhin wrote a lengthy article in Radianske Pribitzhzhia prior 
to the presidential elections in D ecem ber 1990, supporting the candidacy o f  lurii Shcherbak. 
Privately, he w as against the idea o f  Shcherbak running for the presidency and he also did not like 
the idea that he w as standing as a candidate o f  the PZU. Although the PZU  in N ikolaev was never 
taken very seriously by the leadership o f  Zelenyj Mir, members o f  PZU  did participate in the 
m ovem ent. G iven the split-up o f  Zelenyi Svit, relations locally between Zelenyi Xv/Y-activists and 
PZU  members are likely to cool. This may affect the standing o f  PZU  in these areas.
The PZU  is generally weak in the areas represented by the ‘breakaway’ Greens. In these 
areas Zelenyi Svit activists are opposed to the Party since, as far as they are concerned, it is the 
M ovem ent which has done the work and the Party which is trying to benefit from its efforts. Both  
Viktor B ilodid and Anatolii Zolotukhin in interviews with the author in 1994 stressed that the 
G reens locally did not really need Zelenyi Svit centrally for any other purpose than being able to 
put forward candidates to the local elections as only all-Ukrainian associations/organisations held 
this right. Thus, whereas the N ikolaev Greens did not need - nor got - any help from K iev in 
conducting their campaign to save South Bug, Zelenyi Svit in K iev frequently referred to the 
struggle to save South Bug as one o f  its major victories.
Zolotukhin has in later years held a key position within the Green M ovem ent as the head o f  
the Alternative Energy Com m ission. Although this position has later been taken over by Anatolii 
Panov, w ho has also played a key role on anti-nuclear issues within the Green M ovem ent, it seem s 
that Zelenyj Svit is likely to suffer from the loss o f  w ell-know n activists, from w hose resources it 
w ill no longer benefit. Whether or not the split with ‘K iev’ w ill w eaken those groups w hich left, 
remains to be seen. Zelenyj Mir in N ikolaev has existed as a rather autonom ous m ovem ent within  
the m ovem ent since it w as set up, so there is no reason to think that its day-to-day work w ill be 
affected by last year’s events. The future for the Donetsk Greens, on the other hand, seem s
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Isom ewhat more uncertain. If it can maintain work ing links w ith the other Green groups that left 
Zelenyi Svit no great damage may be done. I f  not, however, it may be d ifficult to maintain its 
work. B ag in ’s group is small and operates in an environment that is rather hostile to the Greens. 
W ithout the back-up from K iev or technical support from ISAR via Zelenyi Svit in K iev, it could 
be d ifficult to maintain the m ovem ent in its present form.
I f  the split that took place in Zelenyi Svit has put a stop to personal conflicts and rows inside 
the m ovem ent, then the potential is there for Zelenyi Svit to regain som e o f  the strength it used to 
have. ISAR, Milieukontakt Oosteuropa and other Western organ isations offering grants and 
techn ical assistance are probably go ing to be more w illing to support the work o f  Zelenyi Svit i f  it 
sticks to its issues rather than being unable to act due to personal strife. What is more, many 
young people that I spoke to w hile in K iev had either left or were think ing o f  leaving Zelenyi Svit 
because they could no longer stand all the conflicts. Many o f  these people spent considerable time 
do ing voluntary unpaid work in the assoc iation’s K iev office. To gain the support o f  younger 
people, young activists are a must. This can be seen from the case o f  Greenpeace Ukraine, w hose  
activists are all young, and who manage to m obilise various youth groups for its cam paigns. As 
shown above, the average age o f  Zelenyi Sv i f s  activists is between forty and fifty years old - 
wh ich is considerably higher than for m ost Green M ovem ents in W estern Europe. Fresh ideas, 
enthusiasm and a dynam ic approach is needed, to revitalise Zelenyi Svit and g iv e  it a higher 
profile.
9.2.2 Equal Relations between PZU  and the Green M ovem ent
The second possible scenario is that o f  the Green Party and the Green M ovem en t reaching mutual
agreem ent on a relationship between them selves based on mutual respect and non-interference in
each other’s affairs. This is a scenario wanted originally by those groupings w ithin Zelenyj Svit
w ho were sceptical o f  PZU and also - at least officially  - by PZU  Chairman V italii K ononov.
Judging by the EkoMisiia Founding Conference, this v iew  also seem s to be predom inant am ongst
those Greens w ho jo ined the new  network. Such a relationship would be in line w ith that o f  Green
M ovem en ts and Green Parties in the W est. In cases where the PZU  and the Green M ovem en t
have v iew s that coincide, they would work together, whereas in other areas they w ould work
independently o f  one another.
A  prerequisite for harmonious relations between m ovem ent and party, however, is a strong
.party and a reasonably strong m ovem ent - financially as w ell as in term s o f  public support. A s  
long as the Law on Political Parties in Ukraine put so many obstacles in the w ay for political
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parties in terms o f  generating funds for their activities, the party is bound to seek the support o f  
environm ental groups and organisations. A s long as these groups are favourably d isposed towards 
the party (cf. Mama-86), this poses no b ig problem. If the m ovem ent is am biguous, though, as has 
been the case w ith Zelenyi Svit, problems w ill inevitably arise.
Another factor which further com plicates matters is, as seen above, the obstacles the 1994 
Election Law puts in front o f  sm all political parties w ishing to put forward their own candidates 
for national, regional and local elections. It is thus easier for political m ovem ents to put forward 
cand idates than it is for the parties and this may o f  course cause potential conflicts if  the Green 
M ovem en t (i.e. Zelenyi Svit) chooses to put forward its own candidates in areas where PZU  
candidates are running either as independents or as party representatives. Th is potential conflict is 
likely to remain in place as long as there is disagreement within the Green M ovem en t as to 
whether the party can leg itim ately claim  to be the political w ing o f  the Green M ovem ent. W ith 
Zelenyi Svit now being run by Sam iilenko and with the remaining activists being positively  
adjusted towards the PZU  this conflict o f  perceived interests w ill no doubt be reduced. Whether or 
not it w ill be com pletely eradicated w ill depend on how the breakaway Greens w ill relate to PZU  
in the future.
G iven the hostility expressed by these Greens towards PZU  before and also after the split o f  
Zelenyi Svit it does not seem  likely that the relationship between them w ill get better in the short 
term. W hereas the conflict between PZU  and groups w ithin Zelenyi Svit earlier w as confined to 
Zelenyi Svit, it now may becom e more v isib le to the general public as w ell, should the 
‘breakaway’ Greens decide to attack PZU  in public for the split o f  Zelenyi Svit. If  this happens, it 
is likely to do quite a lot o f  damage to the m ovem ent and also - maybe more so - to PZU. One o f  
the reasons w hy the Greens score so high in op inion polls is that people trust the Greens much 
more than other political m ovem ents and parties - for constructive action rather than political 
philandering. Should it becom e w idely known that also the Greens have fallen prey to personal 
am b itions and power struggles, this may harm the G reens’ standing w ith the general public.
I m entioned that an am icable relationship between the Green M ovem en t and Green Party can 
only be built provided that both party and m ovem ent are strong. D ue to current legislation, the 
Green Party is not likely to becom e any stronger in the near future. A s pointed out by numerous 
observers o f  the Ukrainian political system , public support o f  political parties remains low  - w ith  
only slightly under one third o f  the electorate expressing favourable attitudes towards the political 
parties and a majority favouring independent candidates. Th is is, as expla ined above, m uch due to 
the general lack o f  trust in parties and in politicians.
A s for the Green M ovem ent, the situation is som ewhat more com plex. Som e o f  the groups 
linked together in EkoMisiia although sm all, are quite resourceful (for instance Mama-86,
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Unicom) and have the potential to get further strengthened through assistance from ISAR and 
Milieukontakt. These groups do not aim at m obilising large groups o f  people against any .'A,'-,
environm entally hazardous projects, but rather lobby policy makers w ith facts and figures.
Unicorn, for instance, produces WEISE Newsbulletm on behalf o f  EYFA (H olland) - a bulletin 
wh ich is being distributed free in political circles, the costs o f  which are covered by EYFA. In this 
respect, som e o f  these groups are more similar to Western green groups, w hose main function is 
lobbying.
Zelenyi Svit, on the other hand, is as o f  today a weak m ovem ent, which has not yet managed 
to readjust itself - at least as a national association - to the changing political and econom ic  
realities o f  today’s Ukraine. There is no clear conception o f  how Zelenyi Svit should operate in the 
future and no strategy as to where m oney should com e from. U nless som e com prom ise can be 
found between Zelenyi Svit and breakaway Zelenyi Svit the struggle for the name and fac ilities o f  
Zelenyi Svit w ill continue. The m ost likely outcom e o f  this conflict is, as outlined in the section  
above, that the majority Zelenyi Svit w ill remain as Zelenyi Svit, whereas the breakaway m ovem en t 
w ill either try to organise itse lf  as an alternative m ovem ent, trying to attract other environmental 
N G O s to them selves, or d isso lve breakaway Zelenyi Svit and operate on their own, locally. It 
does, however, seem  likely that Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian organisation w ill be further 
weakened by this struggle - in the sense that efforts to m odernise the m ovem ent w ill be postponed  
prior to som e kind o f  solution being found.
Thus, although this scenario is the m ost likely one in the longer term, it seem s m ore likely  
that the first scenario is more probable in the near future - unless, as a result o f  the general 
political and econom ic situation (i.e. no amendments in legislation, no im provement in financial 
situation o f  Greens), P Z U s  and the Green M ovem ent’s situation does not improve and the Greens 
do not manage to turn the trend away from environmental issues becom ing a secondary issue 
towards a situation where the environm ent is treated on an equal footing with politics and the 
econom y - in which case a general w eakening o f  the Ukrainian Greens m ay take place.
9.2.3 An overall Weakening of the Ukrainian Greens.
This scenario - although not a pleasant one for either the Green Party or the Green M ovem ent - 
cannot be excluded. Current trends would seem  to support it, given that PZU  has exhausted its 
financial resources from the election cam paigns o f  1994, was not successful in having any MPs 
elected to Verkhovna Rada, Zelenyi Svit has split and environm ental issues are no longer perceived  
as being as important as they were only a few  years ago.
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H ow ever, there are w ays in wh ich this situation can be avoided. I f  PZU  can gain access to 
office  equipment, paper, etc. and if  the data-bank on the environm ent, about w hich party 
representatives have spoken for quite som e time, is eventually created, PZU  could try to influence 
dec ision m aking in parliament through lobbying - by providing M Ps w ith alternative data on 
issues being put on the parliament’s agenda. A s seen in Chapter Eight, the new  MPs are generally  
positive towards the Greens. This could prove a useful starting point for PZU  to make a political 
‘com eback’. W h ile not being a part o f  the parliament they do not risk d iscred iting them selves in 
the face o f  the electorate, w hile at the same tim e being able to say - should they be successful in 
lobby ing - that favourable decisions were passed by parliament due to external pressure from the 
Greens. The Greens have not been represented in parliament before but still influenced the 
political agenda in Ukraine through ad-hoc activities and lobbying. Even though it w ould have 
been desirable for the Greens to be represented in the present parliament in that so much 
legislation not directly dealing w ith environmental issues, but in one w ay or the other affecting the 
environm ent, is to be passed, this fact in itse lf does not have to be a d isaster for the Green Party. 
There is also the prospect - although small it may seem  - that the present parliament w ill change 
the Electoral Law and the Law on Political Parties, so that it w ill becom e easier to raise funds and 
easier to becom e elected (by means o f  proportional representation) at the next parliamentary 
elections. B esides, PZU  is represented in local, regional and oblast parliaments, and this is a good  
starting point in terms o f  making politicians better known to the electorate, build ing stronger local 
party groups and generally m ob ilise for the next elections.
A major problem facing not only PZU  but also Zelenyi Svit is how  to spread information 
about them selves. The newspaper Zelenyi svit is still running - but w ith reduced staff and w ith a 
limited number o f  issues (see Chapter Four). It has becom e a problem for PZU  to attract 
journalists to its numerous press conferences where the party’s v iew s on this or the other matter 
are presented. H owever, as was the case during the big Green m ob ilisation aga inst President 
Ku avchuk’s decree on the future o f  Ukrainian nuclear power, when PZU, Zelenyi Svit, Greenpeace 
and other environm ental groups pulled together (April 1994), a larger number o f  journalists as 
w ell as TV were present and the issue did get som e coverage in the press the fo llow in g days. 
Sim ilarly, Ukrainian TV did a feature story o f  the founding o f  EkoMisiia in M ay 1994. Thus, the 
potential to attract the attention o f  the m ed ia is there. H owever, a change o f  strategy m ay be 
required and this o f  course costs m oney. The press would be more likely  to cover round-table 
conferences on environmental issues, educational presentations o f  the dangers o f  nuclear power, 
chem ical pollution and the like, than it is to reiterate press releases and were not so w ell conducted  
press conferences staged by PZU. Such venues may be beyond P Z U ’s m eans at the moment, but 
m ay be used w ith som e gain in the future, should its econom ic situation improve.
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W ith regard to Zelenyi Svit the present situation may also be reversed. ISAR and 
Milieukontakt Oosteuropa do not only support Kiev-based groups and organisations. Thus, the 
breakaway Greens may very w ell be able to exist in terms o f  financial arrangements through 
grants and various equipment provided from abroad. In N ikolaev, for instance, som e success has 
also been made in terms o f  obtaining econom ic support from local benefactors (shareholder 
group). Similarly, the K iev office o f  Zelenyi Svit may also fare better once the conflicts com e to 
an end and activists can again concentrate their efforts around the environment. Zelenyi Svit has 
got the advantage o f  being well known and o f  having able activists, who have taken part in its 
w ork since the very beginning. A majority o f  those polled during the m eeting o f  Zelena Rada in 
June 1994 stressed the importance o f  education in improving the state o f  the environm ent in 
Ukraine. Several environmental ‘sch ools’ and other educational establishm ents have been started 
and there are m any people within Zelenyi Svit who have their own, h ighly original and interesting 
ideas on this issue.
EkoMisiia consists o f  small, relatively strong green NG O s, w hich have good contacts with 
W estern Green organisations and who are not likely to becom e weaker in the near future. These 
groups - through the obtaining o f  grants - are able to pay their m embers for the work they do, and I 
was told that this made it a lot easier for activists to give tim e and effort to the m ovem ent, as they
■did not have to spend tim e worrying about their personal econom ic situation - unlike unpaid 
volunteers. W ell-organised m ovem ents also find it easier to recruit new  members than did for 
instance Zelenyi Svit when disputes and quarrels were at their worst. And even m ore importantly, 
these groups have been rather more successful in persuading young people jo in  them. Thus, the 
situation is not as bleak as it might appear at first sight.
9.3 The Importance of Ecological Education in Strengthening the Green 
Movement in Ukraine.
I have now outlined three different possible future scenarios for the Green M ovem ent o f  Ukraine.
.W hich one o f  these - if  any - w ill in the end materialise remains to be seen. There is potential for 
a revival and strengthening o f  the Green M ovem ent if  it succeeds in lobbying on environm ental 
issues and for a second tim e m obilise the people against nuclear power, but there is also the 
chance that the Greens w ill fail to do so, in which case som e kind o f  decline seem s likely. To 
secure a long-term, strong and stable Green M ovem ent, however, a long-term strategy o f  
environm ental education to win the younger generations over must be adopted. Older m embers o f  
Zelenyi Svit have in private conversations said that their generation is a ‘lost’ generation in that it 
does not possess an environmental or ecological culture.
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In Chapter Eight surveys were referred to in wh ich the environment was pushed down the list 
o f  issues causing m ost concern am ong respondents, as the econom ic situation in Ukraine 
worsened. Polls covering only environmental issues do, however, show  that there is considerable 
concern am ong people w ith regard to the environment. And there is more concern am ong people 
living in the close vicin ity o f  nuclear power stations'^ and in the industrialised East than in other 
parts o f  the country. M oreover, people living in K iev are particularly concerned w ith the 
environment.
A survey^ published in Narodnoe khoziastvo Uki'amskoi SSR v 1989 godu (published in 
1990), for instance, gave the fo llow ing result:
Table 9.1 Oblast and Environmental Concern (in %)
See for instance, Woodstock Leaser Limited. Press Release: 10 Years after Chernobyl - Opinion of  
Ukrainian Elite. One in three think high chance o f repeat. 2 ,4 .1996, p. 2. The survey, conducted by the 
Ukrainian Surveys & Market Research (USM), indicate that concern is higher and more people are in favour 
of closing the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Central region, where it is located, than elsewhere in 
Ukraine: Only 35% in the Central region think Chernobyl should continue to operate, whereas 56% in the 
South and 57% in the West hold the same view.
 ^The survey referred to asked the respondents to rank a list of eight problems according to their seriousness. 
For Ukraine, the environment ranked third, after price increases and shortage o f food products. In heavily 
industrialised and polluted areas such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, the environment was considered the most important issue. This was the case also in Rivne, where there was considerable concern over the Rivne and 
Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations - the former situated in the oblast and the latter, in neighbouring 
Khmelnytskyi oblast. In Klmielnytskyi and Odessa, where campaigns against the KJimelnytskyi nuclear 
power station and the Odessa Nuclear Thermal Power Station had taken place, the environment was ranked 
second, after price increases. In Nikolaev and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where there were big nuclear power 
stations and the most active and successful Greens campaigning against nuclear power could be found, 
concern with the environment was not so high. The reason for this might be that at the time o f the poll, 
resolution No. 647 had just been passed in Nikolaev, thus limiting expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy 
Complex. The Nikopol Greens were also campaigning successfully against further expansion o f the 
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. In Chernivtsy, a large number of children fell ill with allopecia in 1989, 
thought to be caused by thallium poisoning (see Chapter Three). This no doubt explains the exceptionally 
high concern there with environmental pollution.
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Oblast Concern about the 
Environment
Ukraine 14.6
Dnipropetrovsk 18.8
Donetsk 12.4
Sumy 16.4
Luhansk 13.0
Poltava 11.9
Kharkiv 5.6
Zaporizhzhia 14.1
Zhytomyr 14.5
Chernihiv 13.2
Kiev oblast 13.1
Kiev 24.0
Vinnytsia 11.5
Cherkassy 19.7
Kirovohrad 8.9
Volynia 8.4
Lviv 12.7
Ivano-Frankivsk 13.3
Ternopil 19.0
Zakarpatia 7.2
Chernivtsy 39.6
Rivne 20.0
Khmelnytskyi 22.6
Nikolaev 11.5
Odessa 14.4
Klierson 18.6
Crimea 7.7
Based on data in Narodnoe khoziaistvo Ukrainskoi 
SSR V 1989 godu (Kiev, 1990), p. 14.
M oreover, a survey conducted in April 1990 by VTslOM, revealed that 57.6%  o f  the Soviet 
population was favourable to the environmental m ovem ents and w ould be ready to take part in 
their work. Only Societies protecting architectural and cultural m onum ents scored higher than the 
Greens, and the nationalist m ovem ents were w ell behind, with on ly  33.1%  support. O nly 1.3% o f  
the respondents were negative to the Green M ovem ent and only a sm all m inority had not heard 
about the Greens (14.0% ). Whereas only 1.7% o f  the respondents were m em bers o f  Green groups, 
as many as 25.7%  expressed readiness to participate in the activities o f  the Greens^.
M ore recently, SOCIS conducted a series o f  focus group discussions with the public regarding 
the environm ent and found that, although people are resigned to the fact that Ukraine sim ply  
cannot afford to c lose its nuclear power stations and does not have enough m oney to effectively  
address the country’s environm ental problems, the environment is an issue that causes concern.
 ^Bcecoio3Hi)iH fieiiTp OGmecmenuoro MtieiiHa no CouHajibHO-BKOiioMMiiecKMM BonpocaM iipn
BUCnC H rocKOMTpyAe CCCP (BlfHOM), 05mecroentioe Mneiine n UH<|)Dax. HiKbopMauHonHoe MSiianne 
BUHOM. nwnycK 9 (16), anpejib 1990. c. 7.
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■People are particularly concerned about nuclear power and more so than in other European 
countries, partly due to the Chernobyl accident and partly due to nuclear waste being shipped from 
W estern countries to Ukraine for storage. There is also considerable concern w ith chem ical waste 
exported from the W est to Ukraine^. The latter is an issue that Greenpeace Ukixüne has 
cam paigned successfu lly  on since 1994. A  survey conducted by the Ukrainian Surveys & Market 
Research in 1996 am ong members o f  the Ukrainian elite (M embers o f  Parliament, the Ukrainian 
Government, top managers o f  Ukraine’s m ost important enterprises and organ isations, 
representatives o f  mass m ed ia, academ ia, cultural and religious organ isations), found that high 
percentages feared another Chernobyl disaster. One third held the v iew  that nuclear power 
stations are dangerous and that ‘an accident can happen “any tim e, at any place” .^
Thus, although econom ic problems are causing people the m ost concern at the m om ent, this
does not mean that people are not worried about the state o f  the environm ent and about nuclear
power in Ukraine. The challenge to the Greens is how to ‘activate: and m ob ilise this concern and
bring the environment back on the country’s political agenda. A s seen in the previous chapters,
there is a set o f  thoughts about the environment both in the former U SSR  and in Ukraine, wh ich
together form an ‘eco-culture’ and wh ich not only contributed to the em ergence o f  the Green
M ovem en ts in Ukraine, but also elsew here (Russia and Belorussia), wh ich was used as a point o f
reference by Greens during their campaign, and to which people responded positively  and en
m asse (see Chapters S ix  and Seven). There is o f  course a large number o f  people w ho do not
share this reverence for the natural environm ent and who fail to see M an’s part in Nature as that o f
an equal to other species with which he interacts. But as the polls referred to above indicate, the
.general process o f  de-em phasising environmental issues which has taken place in Ukraine since  
1991 should not be regarded as an abandoning act.
A s shown in the previous chapter, referring to Mas lo w ’s hierarchy o f  needs, basic needs must 
be covered prior to people seeking to cover higher order needs. W hile Ukraine w as still part o f  the 
USSR, the state o f  the environm ent was such a basic need, given that plans to expand nuclear 
power in Ukraine despite the accident at Chernobyl, as perceived by the Greens and large 
segm ents o f  the Ukrainian population, posed a threat to the very existence o f  Ukraine’s territory 
and o f  the people living upon it. With Ukrainian independence and the possibility o f  buying safer 
nuclear reactors from the W est (cf. Kendii-reactor schem e suggested by Kravchuk) and with 
econom ic problems soaring, day-to-day survival becam e more important to many people - one 
survey indicated that m ost Ukrainians could not even afford to eat a meal in their lunch breaks. As
7Nikolay Churilov and Tatyana Koshechkina, ‘Public Attitudes in Ukraine’, in Richard Smoke (ed.), Perceptions o f Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe’s New Democracies 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 191-92.
* See Ukrainian Elite. One in three think high chance of repeat. 2.4.1996, p. 2.
seen above, however, the potential concern w ith environmental issues is still there. People are still 
keen that the physical environment be preserved for their children and grand children and they are 
worried about the link between environmental pollution and health.
Locally, for instance in N ikolaev, where people are still concerned with the future o f  the SB  
EK, Zelenyj Mir succeeded in having three o f  its representatives elected to the oblast parliament in 
June 1994. Although this is a reduction o f  six from the previous parliament, it is still - given the 
difficult econom ic situation - a reflection o f  people’s concern. I f  PZU  could develop a more 
com prehensive econom ic and political programme showing the link between the environm ent, the 
ecanom y and politics more generally, and convince people that im proving their econom ic  
situation is not incom patible with im proving the state o f  the environm ent, but on the contrary, 
w ould enhance econom ic reform, support could improve.
In the long run, however, no strategy can beat the need for environm ental education. There is 
still much ignorance concerning the direct links between pollutants, the natural environm ent and 
health in the population as such and although som e steps have been taken to introduce the 
environm ent as a topic at local schools in Ukraine, an enormous job  lies ahead. Various groups 
w ithin EkoMisiia and also Zelenyi Svit have started such work, approaching the issue in different 
w ays. W hereas Unicorn and Dytyna Dovkillia^ for instance are translating W estern materials into 
Ukrainian and using them to teach children respect for the environm ent {Milieukontakt 
Oosteiiropa, for instance, has developed an environmental education package that it provides free 
o f  charge to Ukrainian groups interested), often som e Zelenyi Svit m embers are teaching children 
the thoughts o f  Ivanov. Younger m embers o f  Zelenyi Svit who used to be active in the druzhiny 
prior to the em ergence o f  the latter and who are educated in the natural sc iences have a firm 
understanding o f  the ideas o f  Vernadskii. A s seen above, Zelenyi Svit is also in the process o f  
introducing old environmental rites like blessing trees to re-establish a link to the past as concerns 
the environm ent and the newspaper Zelenyi Svit has its own environm ental pages for children and 
grown-ups where old habits and w ays o f  coexisting with the environm ent are being re-explored.
In m y view , all these attempts at educating not only the children but also the older generation  
in the sphere o f  the environment are valuable. I do, however, particularly value attempts at 
rediscovering and passing on those elem ents o f  the past (philosophy, science, literature, religious 
rites and cultural habits) which have earlier been referred to as ‘eco-culture’ . The Green device is 
‘act locally, think g lobally’. A s shown above, traditional Ukrainian thinking on the environm ent is 
in no w ay inferior to that o f  W estern green thinkers - on the contrary - the ideas o f  Vernadskii on 
the ‘N oosphere’ in many w ays preceded such thinking, which has only in the last three decades 
taken o f f  in the W est, and in scope actually goes beyond many o f  these theories. I therefore see in 
this Ukrainian eco-culture a great potential not only for creating environm ental awareness am ongst
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the Ukrainian population, but also to fill the spiritual vacuum that the collapse o f  the U SSR  and 
the rejection o f  com m un ism  by which it was preceded, caused am ong large segm ents o f  not only  
the Ukrainian, but also other former Sov iet population.
Traditional thinking on the environment is not only a limited set o f  thoughts teach ing people 
to care about the state o f  their natural environment. It is also a thinking wh ich preaches respect 
and understanding for other people and how to live in harmony w ith o n ese lf and on e’s 
surroundings (i.e. a new lifestyle, based on a different outlook). Although the Orthodox Church 
and its attitude towards the environment is part o f  this eco-culture, its potential appeal also to non­
believers is obvious. In addition to spreading materials on this eco-culture, organ ising round­
tables, public lectures and classes, the Greens could work w ith schools, encourage the church to 
educate worshippers on the link between Man and Nature, and lobby the M inistry o f  Education to 
use these ideas as a basis for environmental education all over Ukraine. Western organisations 
like ISAR and Milieukontakt Oostenropa on the other hand, could possibly g ive grants for research 
to be conducted on topics like ‘Traditional Ukrainian thinking on the Environm ent’, research on 
V ernadskii’s concept o f  the ‘N oosphere’, on Skorovoda’s idea o f  the M icro and Macro Cosm os 
and Ivanov’s ideas. In this way, not only would w e as W esterners acknow ledge the great 
environm ental legacy o f  pre-Soviet Slav thinkers, but also enlighten ourselves by broadening the 
scope o f  green thinking in the West. This is not least important given that the Ukrainians are a 
proud people and many are not so happy with sim ply taking on ideas and receive assistance from  
the W est.
9.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, then, although the political and econom ic situation in Ukraine makes things harder 
for the Greens, and although the Green M ovem ent {PZU, Zelenyi Svit) is weaker now  than it was 
just a few  years ago, the Greens do have a role to play in Ukrainian society  and there are prospects 
for strengthening the m ovem ent in the future. The key to im proving not on ly  the situation for the 
Greens, but also the state o f  the environment lies in ecological education, i.e. in m aking people 
more aware o f  their own place in Nature as w ell as the value o f  a clean environm ent in itself. 
Then, as pointed out by Vernadskii:
B ryiue, n HUTeiicHBiioCTH n b  c . i o î k i i o c i ' h  coB[DeMemioH x c h : j i i h  
MeJioneK npaKTnsecKn :ia6i,mae'r, mto on cum m i3ce ‘ie,fi0BeMeci'B0. or 
KOToporo on ne MO)xei' dbiTb oirtejien, nepaspbiBno cBnsaiibi c 
6Moc([)epoM — c oniDeieaennoH Macrbio njianexbi, iia KOTopon o h m
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îKHiîyT. OiiM reo.iorHMecKM saKOFioviepiio c in isa iiy  c  ee M arepM aaw io- 
31 lepreTH'iecKOH crpyK T ypoft^
 ^r .n .  AKceiioB (cocrraBMTejib), - BaajiHMHP BepiiajiCKHH. OTKPbiTHa h cvabSbi (MocKoa. ’’ConpeMeiiiiHK, 
) ,c .  508.
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Appendix
The questionnaire below  was distributed to representatives o f  24 district and regional branches o f  
Zelenyi Svit during a m eeting o f  Zelena Rada (the Green Council) on 28-29 M ay 1994. Fourteen 
questionnaires were com pleted and returned - a response rate o f  58.3 percent. Approxim ately h alf  
o f  these were returned to m e during the session o f  Zelena Rada, whereas the other h alf were sent 
to m e in self-addressed and pre-stamped envelopes.
Although the response rate was not large enough to draw far-reaching conclusions about the 
Ukrainian Green M ovem ent as such, those groups which did respond were am ong the m ost active 
w ithin Zelenyi Svit. Geograph ically, the respondents can be categorised into four more or less 
equally sized groups: W est, South, Central and East Ukrainek thus allow ing for com parison not 
only between groups, but also between groups representing d ifferent geograph ical areas. A s w ill 
be seen below , a majority o f  the questions ineluded in the questionnaire were open-ended. The 
op in ions expressed by the different groups can thus be taken to reflect the v iew s o f  district and 
reg ional groups in Ukraine. I have made extensive use o f  quotations from my survey in Chapters 
Three and Four, contrasting and com plem enting these with opin ions expressed by Greens in K iev. 
Three o f  the respondents to this survey were wom en, whereas eleven were men. A lthough this is 
not a balanced sample, it reflects the leadership structure o f  the district and regional organ isations 
(all those responding to the survey were leaders o f  the groups they represented) and is still valid. 
A s concerns age, m ost respondents were in the age group 'late thirties through to m id-50s', again 
reflecting the age structure at leadership level o f  Zelenyi Svit.
To the best o f  m y know ledge nobody has prev iously surveyed district and regional Zelenyi 
Svit groups. M oreover, those works that already do ex ist on the Ukrainian Green M ovem en t tend 
to adopt a ‘K iev ’ focus o f  events. Thus, although the sample for this survey is rather sm all, it is 
still valid as expressing the opin ions o f  Greens throughout Ukraine and can be used to back up 
tentative conclusions about d ifferences between Greens in the W est and the East o f  Ukraine. 
A ttend ing several m eetings o f  Mala Rada in K iev gave me insight into the relationship between  
representatives o f  a number o f  regional groups. Informal conversations w ith Greens representing 
not only K iev were also useful in this respect. R esponses for the survey support m y understanding 
o f  the relationship between groups from the various regions and I therefore think m ak ing as much 
use o f  them as I have done, is justifiable.
The data from this survey have not been processed by the use o f  com puter softw are such as 
SPSS (quantitative analysis) or QRS NUD -1ST (qualitative analysis) as the sam ple is sim ply too  
sm all for any benefit to be derived from such an exercise. Several o f  the responden ts’ replies are 
quoted directly in the thesis, thus presenting the reader w ith unprocessed data, whereas other data 
is presented in tabular form.
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 ^ The following groups responded to my survey:
1) West Ukraine: Temopil oblast Zelenyi Svit, Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit (Zakarpatia oblast), Bukovina Zelenyi Svit (Chernivtsi oblast), Lutsk Zelenyi Svit (Lutsk oblast).
2) East Ukraine: Dnipropetrovsk oblast Zelenyi Svit, Horlivka Zelenyi Svit (Donetsk oblast). The 
Committee to Save the Azov Sea (Mariupol - Donetsk oblast).
3) Central Ukraine: Vinnytsia oblast Zelenyi Svit, Uman Zelenyi Svit (Cherkasy oblast).
4) South Ukraine: Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir, Dzarylgach (Skarovsk) and the Eco-Center (Kherson oblast), the Odessa Greens (Odessa oblast).
Survey Questionnaire
3. K to  uaiiiM MJienbi no B03pacry?
' t
II
üanH iae o 5  opranH 3a iiH M
1. Hasuaime namefi opraiiHsauHH:
2. KoHTaKTiiBiH aiipec, 'rejte(|)0ii, ({)aKc, aaeKTpoiiiiaji noma:
3. Korv-ia h kukhm o5pa30M Baiua oprann:?anM}i Giaaa C03aana:
4. rioMCMy Bti peiiiHan ee co3iiarb (H3-3a HepiioGuan n;ai no jipyruM npHnMiiaM)?
5. E ca n  Baiua opraiiMsauHii co3iiaaacb m  perHcrpaunH 3 e a e n o ro  CuMTa, to kuichm o6pa30M 
Bbi BCTynnaH b icouTaicT c (HiiMUHaTHBHOH rpynnofi) 3eaenbiM CnnroM?
5a. Ecjih Bauia opraiiMsanHH co3;iaaacb n o cae  peiTicrpanMH 3 e a e n o ro  C n n ra , 5biaa a n  ona 
co3;iana no HUHUHaTMBe 3e.nenoro  C b h t u ? noayMMaw aw Bbi KaKyio-nn5yjib novioiui) aJin 
C03aanHn BauieH opraiiHxinHH?
6. KaK OTiiocHJtacb KoMMyimcrHMecKaa FlapTua k co3aaiiHio w aefiTeabiiocTM nameA 
opraHH3auHM?
а. noaoacHTeabno
б .  ne M e m a a a  iiaM  p a d o T a x b  
B. M e iu a a a  naM p a ô o T a T i)
r. iieraTMBHO
r io  B03M05KH0crH, yTonnHTC noacaayA cra c b o io  no3nunio:
7. KaKMe y  nac Sbiaw oTHomeiinn k MCCTHbiM BaacrnM, k o6u iecrB y oxpaiibi npnpoabb k 
AOOHy (iipyacHiiaM)?
T aencT B O  
I  C K oabK O  y Bac n a e n o B ?
2 . r io  B03M03KH0cim, yTOMiiMTc, iioacaayACTa, cKoabKO npM5aH3HTeabno (b npoueirrax) M3 h a x  
a, >KenmMn:
5. MyacMMH
#
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Bocpacrb KoaHMecrBO b npopeirrax
iinace 20
20-25
25-35
35-45
45-55
crapiiie 55
4. CxoabKo MaeiioB BaiueA opraiiH^anMH Mvieior
a. yiiMBepcHTeTCKoe oSpaaOBaiiHe
5. Bbicmee odpasoBaime
B. cpeaiiee h c n e n A a a b i to e  o S p a s o B a n n e  
w a p y r o e  o S p a s o B a i in e
5. E c j i m  cpaBHHTb KoaMMecTBO MaenoB Bainefi opraimsauHM ceroaim c cavibiM Hanajio.vi, t o
а. 0110 ynaao
6 . o c r a a o c b  laK H M  ace 
B. 0110 B 0 3 p o c a o
б. noMCiViy, no uamcMy Mneniao, naencrno BaiueA opranHBanuM ynaao/ocraaocb TaKHM 
ace/B03pocjio?
7. KaKMM o6pa30M bit Moacexe npHBaenb k ce6e hobbix aaenoB aKTMBncroB?
Üeirreabnocrb BameA oprann3auHM
1. KaKHiViM BonpoGiMH HHTepecyeTcn nama rpyrina?
2. KaKMe ukumm bbi nponeaM nocae cosaauMn cBoeA oprauH3anMM?
3. ripoBoaMaH jih bbi coBiViecnio c ’’Kmcbom” (x.e. c pyKOBoacrnoM 3eaenoi"o cbhtu) KaKHC- 
iiMdyiib aKUHM? B caynae ecaM aa, to  icaKHe aKUMM?
4. rioayMMaM aM bbi Koraa-imSyab KaKyio-HMÔyab rioaep^Kicy Man noMomb M3 KHena?
EcaM aa, ro Kaxyio noMOiuB m no nbeA MiiHUHaTHBe?
EcaM iiei', oôpaTMaMCb jim bbi K oraa itHÔyaB b Khbb c npocbGoA OKasaiT naM noMomb? B
c a y n a e  0TKa3a, to KaKoA ornex  bbi noayMMaM?
5. CoTpyanHMaore/coTpyaiiHnajiH iw  bbi Koraa-iiHÔyab c apyxMMM (seaeiiBiMM) opranH3anMflMH?
а. 4a: C Km  bbi coxpyanMMaexe coxpyanMnaaM h no kxkmm BoripocaM?
5. Hex: Honeiviy bbi iim c kcm  ne co rpyanM naeie  coxpyanMnaaH?
б. C KaKMM BBipaaceiiMeM bbi 6oaee coraacHBi:
a. 3eaenbiA cbmx aoaacen Sbixb noaiiocrbio iiesaBMCHMBiM
6. BeaeiibiA cbmx aoaacen coxpyaiiMnaxb c xcmh opranM3auMnMM m c 'icmh aioabMM, icoxopbie
iioaaepacHBaioT ero BKOJiorMnecKHe neaH nesaBHCMMo or hx nojiMXHxecKMX
y6eacaenMH/B3ranaoB.
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B. 3e:ieiibiH cbht ao:i>Ken S .îhbko corpyajiHMaib c 0 3 7 ,  raie icaïc 0 3 7  BBJiaercii 
iioJiM'i'MMecKHvi KpbiJiOM Seaciioro cBura.
r. 3 e a e iii.iM  c b h t  a o a a c e i i  rioaaep>K H BaTb H a iiH o iia a -a ev iO K p a T H 'iecK H e cnabi, raie ktik givîoc 
caaBHoe, 3To nanHoiiaabiioe h sKoaorHMCCKoe BOBpoacaeiiMe 7KpaMHbb
C>riiQiuenHe 3C k 0 3 7
l  Kafc naeiibi B a m e n  opraimsauMM ornoctiaHCb k co.'ManHfo 0 3 7 ?
a. noaoacH'reabïio
5. B ocHOBiioM no;io>KHTeabiio
B. ncKO'i'opbie 6biaH Bo:io>Km’e;ibiio iiacrpoein.i. apyrne Gbiaw iiporHB 
r. n OCHOBMOM oipH iiaieab iio
a. OTpHuaxeabBO
2. Kaicwe aoa>KHbi 6biTb oTiiomeiiMa vieacay 3eaeiibi.vi Cbhtom h 0 3 7 ?
a. 6aM3KHe
5. iieHTpaabHbie
4 .  npH5aH3MTeabiio ckojibko aaenoB (b  npoueirrax) BamcH opraiiH3auMH anaînoTca 
oaiioBpeMeuHO aaenaMH 0 3 7 ?
B. MHiiHMaabiibie
3 .  C M H T aere a n  B ti nyac iib iM  vim  ^K eaaxeabH b iM  cymecrBOBanne OaprHM 3 e a e i ib tx ?
■'1
5. HyacaacTca a n  seaeiioe aBHaceiiHe b iioamHMecicoM (paaure b  Bwae 0 3 7 ? I
6 .  K aK  Bbi oueHbiBaexe paGoxy 0 3 7  no ornomeiiHio k 3eaenoMy CnHTy?
7 . K aK  Bbi o n e n b iB a e r e  a e a r e a b n o c r b  0 3 7  b noaM iT inecK O H  3k h 3hm  7K paM n ia?
OrpaTcrHH h MCToabi pa5orbi
1. KaKHC Meroabi Bbi H cnoabsyei’e b cBoen aeaTeabnocTH?
а. nHKempoBauHe
б .  MMTHiirH, a e M o n crp a u H H  
B. c5op  noanHccH
r. c r a x b H  b r a s e x a x  m a c y p n a a a x
a. B b ic r y n a e n H ii no  le a e n H a e n H io  m p a a n o  
e. K on ^ ep en u H M  h  K p y r a b ie  a 'o a b i
)K. p a S o x a  c  a e n y x a x a M H , r o c y a a p c ia e n n b iM H  op ran aM H  n a a c r H  (nanpH M ep, M M nr ipM poaoA )
3. a e n y x a x c K a n  p a 5 o x a
H. n p o x H B 0 3 a K o in ib ie  aKUMH (xaK  nasb iBaeM b iH  B K o c a d o x a a c ) , mxo5 m  n pH B aenb  k  ce 6 e  B nH M anne
H. a p y r o e  (yxoM HM xe, n o a c a a y A c r a  M M enno KaKoe):
2 .  EcaH cpanuHXb ceroannm nH e iviexoabi nanjeA aearoabnocxM  c rcMM MeroaaMM, no KOxopbiM 
Bbi paSoxaaH  b c u m o m  n an a ae  CBoeA jieaxeabiiocrH , xo Moacno CKa3axb, nxo onn
a . H3MenHaHCb
5. o c r a a H C b  xaKMMH a c e
EaiM Bcuii no ax o a  m oaiiiM vieroaw HBvienH.iHCb, cicaacHTe noacaayA cra  iiOMe.viy h kukhvi 
o5pa30M:
EcJivi aaiiiM Mexoiibi ne H3MenMai4Cb, ctcaacHTe noacaayA cra  iioneMy:
5 . CqwTaere a n  Bbi, n ro  nam H Meroabi nBaaioxca ao c rax o n n o  ailxpeK’rMBiibiMH?
а. a a
5. ne 3iiaio
B. lier
б. EcaA Bbi CBM'raere, mto naruM Meroabi ne nBaniorcn caMbiMM 3(|)([)eicrHBnbiMH, noneMy Bbi ne 
nanaaH paGoraxb no apyi’HM MeroaaM?
a. cpeacTB ne xnaraer aa/i axoro
6. KoaMnecrno aicxABACTOB neao crax o n n o  
B. ne XBaxaex oSopyaoB anna
r. caaGbie cbîism
a. apyrw e aprinmibi (yxoniiHxe, noacajiyA cra):
7. KaKMe Mexoaw paôoxbi S o aee  a^clieicxMBiibi ajni pemeiiMn aKoaoxMMecKMx npoOaeM n 
YKpaMiie ce ro an a?
a. nMKexMpoBaiiMe
5. MMXMiiPM, aeMonerpauMM 
B. c5 o p  iioanMceA
r. craxbM b ra sex ax  m acy p iiaaax
a. BbicrynaeiiMn no xeaenM3opy m paaMo
e. KOïKpepeiniMM m icpyrabie croab i
ac. p a5 o x a  c aenyxaxawM  m rocyaapcrBenubiMM opranaMM
M. aenyxaxcKan paSoxa
A. 3K oai6oxaac
K. apyroe (yxoniiMxe, noacaayAcra):
8 . K a K o A  a o j ia c n a  Gbixb c x p y K x y p a  y  S e a e n o r o  C iiM xa
a . nepxAKajibHOH
6. i"opM30ixraabnOM
YxoMHHxe, noacaayAci'a, cboio iiosahmio:
9. 4oBOjibiibi JIM Bb! ceroannm eA  crpyierypoA  3eJienoro  C nnxa?
а. aa
б. lier
EcaM Bbi neaoBoabiibi, b neM neaoeraxKM gxoA cipyKxypbi?
10. Eci’b MneiiMe, mxo renepb 3eaeHHA Cbmx, Kaic ’’sohxmk” aicoaorMnecKMX rpynri Soabuie ne 
nyacen: nxoSbi paGoxaxb 3$0eKXMBHo, 3eaenbie aoaacnw najiaanxb KOiixaicxbi apyr c apyroM
lia npniMyio.
Bbi
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a. coraacMbi
5. lie coraaciibi
YTOMHHTe, iioacaayHcra, cboio no3MUMio:
I I  CabiLuaaH aw bli o6 Bkovihchh? 
a. a a
6. iiex
E c a n  Bbi o iien cab im aan , xo kslk Bbi k jioPi miHUHaxMBOM oxiiocMxecb?
а. rioji03KHxejibiio
б. nePixpaabno
B. oxpHiiaxeabiio
12. Tom o^MC 3 e a e iio ro  CiiHxa b K nene bum  rtoMoraer? 
a. aocxynoM k wiHl)Oj)ManMH
5. CBB3HMH c apyxMMH OprailHBaUHBMM 
B. COBOraMH
r. oGopyaoBaiiHeM/aocrynoM rc oGopyaonaiiHio 
a- KaimeJBipcKOM noaepaccicoH 
ac. {[imiaiicoBOH noMombio 
3. ao66HiiroM  
M. iiMMCM lie noM oraex
13. Ecjih Bbi iie aonoabiibi paGoxoA oiIiHca 3eaeH oro  CsHxa, xo  kbk, no nanieMy Miieimio, 
MoacHO yaynniHXb paG oxy ocjiHca?
a. yaynmeiiMe CBnsefl c MeeiitbiMM opraiiHsauHnMH
6. Goabuie Kaapon
B. G oaiaue oGopyaonaiiHn 
r. Goabiiie a e n e r
a. a p y ro e  (yxoniiHxe, noacaayA cra):
14. Kaicwe nonpocbi jiBanioxcn caivibiMn raaBiibiMM aan 3eaenoro Cnnxa ceroann? YKa>KHxe. 
iioacaayAcra, cboh ripeanoaxeimn. nywepyn mx c 1 (caworo rjianiioro) no 11.
a . Bonpoc 0 naepnoA aneprexMKO 
G. sarpiiBneiiAe peic m 03ep 
B. 3arpn3neiiMe nosayxa  
r. 3arpn3 iieim e nono
a . ynoipeGaenne necxHiiHaon m naoxHMMKaxoB b ceabCKOvi xosnAcrne 
e. HMiiopx roKCHBiibix Bemea'B b YicpaMiiy A3 apyrnx crpan 
ac. 3KoaornnecKoe BocnuxaiiHe aexeA
3. oGmecrBeinian sKoaorHnecKan 3KcnepxH3a 
M. npanoBbie acneicxbi 3KoaorHM
A. oGpaGoxKa KOiinermMH cG aaanconoro  pa3BHXHJi YKpaMiibi 
K. a p y ro e  {yxonimxe, noxaayA cxa):
15. Ecrb MneiiAe, nro seaenoe anHxeiiAe n YKpaMiie iiaxoaHxai b rjiyGoKOM KpHSHce, Bbi
a. coraaciibi 
G. ne coraacHbi 
B. 3a rpyannexecb oxnexMXb
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3TOi'o nojioaceiiHîir
denviuTbi
1. E crb  a n  y  nac aeaeiibie aenyxaTbi b iviecniOM oG aacriiofi paae?  EcaH ecrb , cKOJibKO hx h 
KaK Bbi c  HHMH coTpyauHHaeTe?
2. Ecjih y aac iiex cbohx aeriyTaxoB, eci'b an aenyxajbi, c KoropbiMH bli M oxere 
coTpyaiiHMaTb?
3. 4oBOJibHbi JIH Bbi paSoTOH Beaeiibix b MecriioH oGjiacnioH paae?
а. a a
б. B ocnoBHOM aoBoaeii/aoBOJibiia
B. H aoBoaeii/aoBoabiia h ne aoBoaeii/aoBoabiia 
r. lie oneiib aoBoaeii/aoBOJibiia
a. B ocHOBiiOM lie aoBoaeii/HeaoBOJibiia 
e. lier
4 . Byaer jih aauia opraiimauna ynacrnoBaTb b Mecriibix BbiGopax 2 6  hioihi? E c a n  aa,
CKoabKO y  Bac KaiianaaroB b aenyxaxbi, KaKne y  nac npHopHTexbi h crpaxerHH?
' . j p '
I
16. EaiH :)e.ieiioe auMjKeiiMe iiaxojinTCd b kphshcpiovi coCTOnimH, lo  k;ik moaiio iilihth hb ;
I
(pHnaiicHDOBaiiHe
1. KaK Bbt (bHiiaiiCHDveTe cbqiq jieareabiiocrb? 
a. MaeiicKHe b3iioch
5 . (IiHiiaiicoBan a em ea b iio crb  (nepe3 Maabie npeanpHJiTHB nra.)
B. i ip o a a x a  CHMiîoaoB (iiaicaeriKH, siianKH, lu iaKaibi. nxa.) 
r. rpairrbi
a. iiHKaK: BTO GoJibuiaa npoGaevia
2. KaKMM o5pa30\i, no Baiue.viy MiieiiHio, v io x n o  yaynniHTb (|)HnaiicoBoe iioaoaceuM e nameH 
opraiiH3anMH?
3. KaK Bbi OTiiocHTCCb K TOMy, MTO B B ocaean ee  apeMu nponBHJiHCb Huocrpan iibie opranM3auHH 
(nanpHMep, MCAP, (Doua C oposa), KOTopiae roroBbi (jiHnancHpoBaTb aeirreab iiocrb  yKpanncKHX 
3eaeiibix, iiomomb c oGopyaoBaiineM , nxa.?
a. n o a o x H ïe a b iio
G. B npHiiHHne noaoxHxeabno, xoxn ecrb onaceiiHe b tom, nxo mu craneM BanncMMbiMM ox iinx 
B. xeaaxeab iio  noaynnxb rpanxu or yKpaMiicKHX cnoiicopoB, oanaico noica iiex 'raicoA
B03M0XH0CrM
r. oxpHiiaxeabiio
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dKoaormi h Kvai/rvpa
L 4 to lîbi noüMMaeTe noji Tep.viHiio.vi ’aKoaomnecKaa Kyjhrypa"?
2. BKaioMaer an repMHii ”3KoaornMecKaa icyaurypa” raie Me noinrrMH «aie iiauMonajibnaa 
icyabxypa h iiapoaiibie TpaawuHM?
а. aa
б. nex
B. 'ip y an o  cicasaxb
3 .  ICaKOBa Gbiaa y eac no3Hnna no naen BOBpaacaeimn yicpaMucicoH icyai/rypix, xpaaHnnA h  
yicpaHiicKOH nanMH b nepnbie roau aexieabnociM BauieH rpynribi?
а. 3xa Haeîi cbirpaaa Goauuyio pojib.
б. BTa iiaea cbirpaaa poab.
B. 3xa Haen cbirpaaa MajieiibKyio poab 
r. 3xa Haen cbirpaaa MMiiMMaabnyio po;ib 
a. axa waen naM ne Ka3ajiacb
4. Coraaciibi an bu co caeayiomeA xomkoh apeimn: sejienoe anuxeiiHe YKpaMnu B03HHKao
xojibKo M3-3a TepnoGuan
a. coraacen/coraacna
5. ne coraacen/ne coraacna 
YxoMiiHxe, noxaayücxa, cboio no3MUHio;
5. CxMi’ae i’e  m  nu, nxo yaynmenwe aicoaorHqecKOH oGcxanoBKH a YKpaHiie bosmoxiiü: 
a. 'l'oabKo nepe3 noanrMKy
6. B ocnoBiioM nepe3 BaMnime na noaHXHMCCKMe penieiiHfi KacaïoinMecn sKoaorHH
B. B ocnoBnOM npM aKoaoranecKOM BOcnHxanHM m BOcranonaeiiMM yKpauncKoA icyjibxypbi 
r. xoabKO npM BOCxanoBaeiiMM yKpamiCKOH icyabxypu
а. npn BocranoBaeiiHn ropaocxb ic yKpaHUCKoA iiauMH
e. xoabKo x o ra a , Koraa neaoBCK nyncxB yer c e 6 e  xobbhiiom cnoeA seMJiH 
X. ne 3iiaio, kbk axo Jiynm e caeaaxb
б. 4 o  cosaaiiMn CBoew opraiiMsanHM, nHxaan m  uu Koraa iinGyab npoMsneaeiiMn yicpaHiicKHX 
coBCi'CKHX BMcareaeü, rae penb uiaa o GepexnoM oxnonieiiMH k pMpoae?
EcaM aa, 3annfaMxe, noxaayA cra, naBBaiiMn axMX npoMsneaeiiHA.
7. CabiLuaaM jim Bbi o GopbGe pycocHx nncaxeaeA npoxMB npoeicxa nepeSpocicH cenepiibix [)eic 
naM o 6opb6e npoxMB Kanaaa Boara-TorpaA?
8. CauinajiH an bu o rioaoGiibix "aiciiMax" XBopnecKoA MiixeaaMrenMiiMM m ynenux b 
YKpaMiie?
9. CnMxaexe au nu, mxo aenxeabnocib nHGixeaeA b oGaacrw oxpanu npwpoabi n kbkoA -xo 
creneiiM cnocoGcrBOBaaa co3aaiiMio aeaenoro aBMxeiiMn b YtcpaMiie?
a. aa
5. nex
EcaM aa, xo b mom hx aacayra:
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10. 4.VM a:iH  ; in  nbi oG oxpane npHpoabi ao anapMH b TepuoGuae?
11. Ecan Bbi H irrep ecoB aaH C b  upMpoaooxpaiiiibiMM Bonpoaivin ao TepiioGbian. ro no icaKMM 
npMMMiiaM? M v iea n  an Bbi aocryn k k u k o h  imGyab m ikIiopvuuihm  b 3Tom oGaacru?
12. B Me.vi Ba iuH  ceroaiiaiiuiMe npoGaeMbi ora tiM a icy ra i o t  iipoGae\i, c  Koropbivin Bbi 
craaKHBaaMCb b CBoefi aeiiTeabiioci M b CCCP?
13. Ecjih cpaniiMTb B a i i iy  aeareabiiocTb b CCCP c aetrre:tbHoc:ibio b iieBaBHCMMOi'i yKpamie. ro 
rae aa.vi (Gbiao) aerae paGoraxb?
a. B CCCP
G. B ne3aBHCMvi0H YicpaHiie
B. lier pasiiMiibi: raic x e  c a o x iio  
r. sarpyaiBiiocb oiBexHTb
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The bibliography below  consists o f  two main sections - ‘primary sources’ and ‘secondary 
sources’. For reasons o f  clarity, I have listed Russian, Ukrainian, English and German source 
materials separately from one another. Som e o f  the documents and (newspaper) articles consulted  
for this thesis were either not dated and/or had no page number. N o date is indicated as (n.d.), 
whereas no page number is indicated as (n.p.).
Primary Sources
Archival Materials
The fo llow ing fonds were consulted in the Ukrainian State Archives for Public M ovem ents in 
K iev in the spring/summer o f  1994:
(Doin N o. 1, OJiHc' no. 3, cnpaBO N o. 233.
(Doiia no. 1, o h m c N o . 10, cnpaBO N o. 939.
onucb N o.lO , ^ en oN o . 1632. 
onwc N o. 10, cnpaBO N o. 2114.
(Dona N o. 1, oriMcNo. 2 5 , cnpano N o. 179.
cnpaBO N o. 2 4 1 4 . 
cnpaBO N o. 2 7 3 5 . 
cnpaBO N o. 3 0 8 4 . 
cnpaBO N o. 3 1 3 9 . 
cnpaBO N o. 3 1 4 7 . 
cnpaBO N o. 3 3 4 7 . 
cnpaBO N o. 4 3 -b.
(Dona N o. 1, OHHC N o. 32, cnpano N o. 2 3 3 .
cnpaBO N o. 2 4 3 . 
cnpaBO N o. 369 . 
cnpaBO N o. 3 7 2 . 
cnpaBO N o. 4 0 7  (I).
The fo llow ing files were consulted in the N ikolaev oblast State A rchives for Public M ovem ents in 
June 1994:
 ^ In Ukrainian ‘opis’ is written without the soft sign. Further, instead o f ‘delo’, the Ukrainians use ‘sprava’. 
Documents in the Archives in Kiev were partly in Ukrainian, partly in Russian. Where documents used 
appeared in Russian, they are referred to in the Russian terms.
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llariK a 30: Pe3o.niouHM m h th h fo b , coGpaiiMH xM reaeA , KoajieKiHBOB ripeiutpMfiTMH, 
oGmeCTBeiiHbix opranH3aiiHH o saiipemeiiMM cipoM xeabcrBe TanjaMKCKom m A aeivaiiiaponcK oro 
BoaoxpaiiHaHiA, 4 -5  GaoKOB lO Y  A 3C  h ap.
O anK a 65: O G paxeiiM a, BOSseanHH 3KoaorMMecKOH accouHauMH, xeaerpavibi ox x H x e a e n  m 
KoaaeKXHBOB ripeanpoarnH HHKoaaeBiuMiibi o 6  y r p 0 3 e  y iiH M x o x e n w a  l O a c u o r o  B y i 'a ,  
crpoH xeabci’Ba 4 -6  GaoKOB lOxiioyKpaMiiCKOH ABC m ap., 1 9 8 8 -9 0 .
riariKa 6 6 : TeKcru BiicrynaeiiHH no xeaeBHaenwio, aoKaaaoB MaenoB BA, nncbMa
Interviews
rpyaautMXca b santury npopoaix m pasyMiioro paBBorwa axoMiioM sneprexMKn.
In 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1994 I conducted a series o f  interviews with activists o f  Zelenyi Svit, PZU  
and other individuals related to the Green M ovem ent. The fo llow ing interviews are referred to 
specifically  in this thesis:
Bal, Evhen, Sosnovy i Bir, M ay 1994.
B ilod id, V iktor, luzhnoukrainsk, June 1994.
Dem ydenko, O. K iev, A ugust 1991.
Dzeverin, Ihor, K iev, April 1994.
Dudko, Sv iatoslav, K iev, 14 M ay 1994.
Haniukova, Iryna, K iev, 17 M ay 1994.
30 M ay 1994.
H lazovy i, Andrii, K iev, 18 August 1982.
30 April 1994.
Hrabovskyi, Serhii, K iev, M ay 1994.
Hrekov, Volodym yr, K iev, 24  April 1994.
Kabyka, O leksii, K iev, A ugust 1992.
Kliazan, V iktor, Sosnovy i Bir, M ay 1994.
K irilchuk, Ihor, K iev, 12 M ay 1994.
K olesn ik, Anatolii, N ikolaev, June 1994.
K ononov, Vitalii, K iev, August 1991.
April 1994.
Korbetskyi, Evhen, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 M ay 1994.
Korzheva, A lla, N ikolaev, June 1994.
Kurykin, Serhii, K iev, Summer 1992.
28 April 1994.
6 M ay 1994.
M cTaggert, David, K iev, 22 August 1991.
O leshchenko, V iacheslav, Verkhovna Rada, K iev, summer 1992. 
Orlov, Andrei, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 M ay 1994.
Panov, Anatolii, on bus to Zakarpatia, 9 April 1994.
K iev, 16 M ay 1994.
Pilchuk, N ikolaev, 7 June 1994.
Plachynda, Serhii, Ukrainian W riters’ Union, K iev, 23 M ay 1994. 
Sam iilenko, lurii, K iev, 6 M ay 1994 
Shapovalov, Sergei, N ikolaev, June 1994.
Slicherbak, lurii, K iev, August 1991.
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Susiova, Lidia, N ikolaev, June 1994,
Tverdostup, Rostyslav, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 M ay 1994.
Zolotukhin, Anatolii, N ikolaev, June 1994.
Zrezartsev, Borys, Ukrainian Peace Com mittee, Kiev, 12 May 1994.
Com m unications per letter/email referred to in thesis:
Letter from Ihor D zeverin, K iev, 15 January 1995.
O leksii Kabyka, K iev, 24 February 1993. 
Anatolii Panov, K iev, 3 February 1995. 
Anatolii Zolotukhin, N ikolaev, 15 March 1995.
Email from Antatolii Zolotukhin, N ikolaev, 27 August 1995.
18 October 1995.
Report from Dag Arne H 0 ystad on em ail, 5 July 1995.
I had numerous informal conversations with the above m entioned people and those listed below  
during field-work in Ukraine:
D em ydenko, Andrii 
D em ydenko, Tania 
H aviylov, Ihor 
Karavanska, Liubov 
M ikhalko
Preobrazhenska, Natalia  
Rim , Nadia  
Sioniina, Ania  
Tikhyi, Volodym yr
Original Letters
I w as given  access to Zelenyi M/>’s correspondence with various m inistries, departments and the 
Ukrainian and Soviet A cadem ies o f  Sciences. References to those letters quoted or referred to in 
this thesis can be found in the respective chapters.
Official Resolutions/Transcripts. Laws and Reports of Official Meetings
AjteKcauiiponcKHH nocejiKOPbiH coner iiapojiiibix iienvTciTOB. BQ3iieceucKHH paAoii.
FlHKOJiaeBCKafl oG jiacrb. H cnonuH TejibH biH  k o m h t c t . P e m e iiH e  o x  2 6 .0 9 .1 9 8 9  r  N o . 7 7 . ”0  
3amHxe peKH I Q x h l ih  B v r”.
Bo3necencKHH paHOUHbiA coBex napn;iubtx jienvxaxoB. I ll  cecctni X X III co3bma. peuieiiHe ox 21 
cenxafipii 1 9 9 0  r.
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/[oeHayiiumui ceccMx BepxoBiioro CoBp;ra yKpaMiicivOH CCP (oiiHiiaiiitcurbiü com»). 1 6 - 1 7  
(beBpajin 19 9 0  roaa. Greiioi paibHMecKHH orMer (Kmcb: no.:iHTM;wiaT yKpamibi. 1990).
3aKon YKpaiHCbKOi paiiniicbKOi co u ia - iic ix iM n o i Decnv5.:iiKH hdo o x o dobv  iiapKO iMiiiuboix) 
npH poinioro cepeiiOBHiua. (K hïb : BniiaBiiHUTBO T ic p a i i i a ”, 1991).
HcKQBoe BaBBjreime o BaiuHTe Mecm. iiocTOMiicrBa h aeaoBOH pefivrauHH iipejBipHBTHB (n .d .).
HHKQjiaeBCKafl oG jiacriiaa rocviiapcTBeiiHaa aji.vmnncmauHB. Par.iionirxenH e ii!)e;[craBbrm.iîi 
[ipe3naeuTa YKpannbi o C03;iaiiMH komhccmh no onpeae-Fieimto iiepeMini h oGbevioB paG or no 
coopvxeiiH iQ  luioTHiibi AjieKcaiuiPOBCKoro rM xpovaia b BannanTe viocroB oro iiepexojia. 
2 3 .4 .1 9 9 3 ,  N o . 194 .
HbiKOJiaeBCKHH oG.nacriiOH co b o t napojiiibix aenvTaroB. PemeiiHe o t  1 6 .1 0 .9 0 . 3 cocchh  21 
coBbina. r. HMKOJiaeB ”0  .BanpeineiiHH npo;tVBKH TaLiuibiKCKoro BO/ioxpaiiH.riHuia b pOKV 
lO xnb iA  Bvr.
" '0  peiijeuMH TpeTbOH h TpHuaiLiiaTOH crcchh 21 coBbiBa no Boitpocv ripoavBKH TaiibibiKCKOi o 
BOJioeMa-oxjiaiiHTejni IQ Y  ABC" (n .d .).
OciiOBaiiHe K npoeKTv nocraiiQBjreiiHa CoBMHiia CCCP "O aajibneHmeM cTPOMTe;B)CrBe 
oGbeKTOB IQ Y  3 K ” (n .d .).
riepeMenb MeponpHBTHH. iieoGxojiHMbix juni brziohhb GecnpojivBOMHoro pexMMa paGoTbi 
K )Y  A BC. 1 0 .6 .1 9 9 2 .
ripoTQKOJt coBeiiiaiiHB V 3aM npeiice/ia'rejia CoPMHiia CCCP tob. PaGena. Jl. 71. o r  4  a B rv c ra  
1 9 8 9  r.
n o c ra iio n a  rioJiHTGiopo U K  KIIY Bia 2 6 .V II .1 9 7 7  r., npoTOKOJiNo. 4 6 , § 11 ’TIpo 
iiepeneceiiiifi luiomajiKH a jia  G vaiB iiinT B a aTOMHOi ejieK T P O cram iii b lôjHMCbiciiiH oGjiacTH.
nocraiioBJieiiM e N o . 1 ot 1 9 .1 .1 9 9 1  r. ‘O  w epax no iiOBbUiieuHio 3aniiTeDecoBaiiitQcrim 
Mecriibix opranoB  h naceiieiiMB b pa3MemenHn iia hx reppMiopHH oGbeKTOn aiOMnoA 
aneproTHKH’.
npoTOKQJt CQBemaiiHB ‘3KOJTorHMecKHe H coLiHaJibHbie acnoKTbi B VTOMiiemiotvi npooKTo’ (n .d ,).
OpoTOKOJi coBeiitaiiHB no BonpooiM èHnancHpoBaiiHfi paGox b 1991 r. no  lO x i in -  
YKpaHMCKOMV 31 ieproKOMB.rieKcv. 6 .5 .1 9 9 1  r.
rtpoTOKOJi coneBjaiiHB no BonpocaM crpoHTejibcrBa oGbeKTOB IQ xno-Y K paH iicK oro  
3iiepr0K0MnjTeKca. r. ïO xnovK PaiiM Œ . 1 0 .6 .1 9 9 1  r.
PemeiiHe FIpeBHaHVMa HnKOJiaeBCKoro oGjiacTHoro coBexa N o . 17-11 o r  7 Hiona 1 9 9 3  r. ”0  
3aKJiiOMeiiHH npeyjcraBHxejieH HnKOJiaecKOH oGjiacxn. MJieiioB 3KcnepxiiOH komhchh ajui 
npoBeaeiiHB rocvaapcxB eitnoH  BKOJiorHxecKOH 3KCnepxH3bi yxoMiieiiiioro npoeKxa TaiujibiKCKoro
TA B C ”.
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TaiJiribiKCKOH F A B C , v. lO xuovicpaH ncK . 9 .8 .1 9 9 1  r.
BiojiJieTeiih BKOJiorHMecKOH AccoiiHauHH N o . 2 . ( n . d . )
1:
1
Y k b b  q  n e o T a o x u b iX  \ i e p a x  n o  paBPHTH io aT O v in on  a iiep reT H K n  h  co B a a iiH io  
H a e p n o -T o n j iH B o r o  KOM iiJieicca b Y K P aH n e. N o . 6 4 /9 4 . 2 3 .2 .1 9 9 4 .
Ykbb OpeBHaHVMa BepxoBHoro CoBexa YicpaHiicKoA CCP o5  OTBeTcrBeuHocim :ia iianvnieiiHe 
xpeGoBaiiMH pexH \ia DaaHauHoitnoH 6e3onaciiocrH. BaroxoBKv. nepepaGoxKv h cGi.ix 
paaHoaKXHBnoro 3arpii3iienHbix apoavKXOB nHxaiinfi. Upajimi VkpcU'Ihu, 2 .2 .1 9 9 1 , c .  3.
Ykb3 ’’FIdü iieBiaKJiaaiii saxcan luoao dübbhxkv axoMiioï eiieorexiJKM xa èoDMVBaiiiiH aaeniio- 
iiajiHBiioro iiMKav b Y icp a m iC N o . 6 4 /9 4 . reprinted by the N ew s A gency ‘E cho-V ostok’ and 
handed out at a press conference organised by a number o f  green groups on the prem ises o f  the 
Ukrainian Peace Com mittee in K iev, March 1994.
Original Documents and Resolutions - Zelenyi Svitr
P e 3 0 a i o u i a  2 - r o  3” i 3 a v  Y E A  ’B e a e n u H  C b I x ” FIdü K on crp vK X H B M icrii natiiHX a i  A..
3 0 .3 .1 9 9 1 .
3 b 1 x  npo B a a iQ X H i n a a x o a x e i t i i a  x a  BAxpaxH. K h ïb , 2 0 . 5 . 1 9 9 2 .
3 e j i e n a  i a e a  x h x h m e ! f n . d . l
n p o x o K o a  N o .  1 . 3 a c i a a n i m  e K o a o r iM H o r o  K a v O v  ’’ü i i i c r p ”. 2 4 . 1 1 . 1 9 9 0 .
ripoxoKOJT N l .  j a c i a a m i i i  se a en o ï n a a n  YEA "BeaeiiHA C b Ix ”. 3 1 . 3 . 1 9 9 1 .
P e 3Q JttoL iia I I  3 ' i 3 a v  Y K p a in c b K o i  e K O J i o r i q u o i  a c o u i a u i i  ”3 e a e iiH A  C b I x ”. C a o B O  a o  
c n iB r p o M a a n H .  ( n .d . )
C x e H o r n a M a  I l l - r o  3”i3 a v  a c o u i a u i i  ”3 e jte iiH A  C b Ix ”. 3 0 . 5 . 1 9 9 2  poicv. m . K h ïb .
sYKpaiHCbKa eKOJioriMiia a c o u i a u i a  ”3eaeiiHH C n ix ”, C xenorpaM a I l l - r o  3”i3 a v  a c o u i a u i i  ”3eaenHA C s i x ”. 3 1 .5 .1 9 9 2  poK V . m . K h ïb .
,Original Documents. Zelenyi Mir. Nikolaev-
I
 ^ I was given access to numerous files and documents at Zelenyi Svit’s office in Kiev. To list all o f  these 
documents is simply not possible for reasons of space. Below, 1 have listed those documents that are referred 
to in the text above.
 ^ Below I have listed those documents referred to in this thesis. Other documents also accessed are not listed 
due to limited space.
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Biojuereiib BKOJiomMecKOH AccouHauMH N o . 3 . 3 0 .1 1 .1 9 8 8 .
Only those documents referred to in this thesis are listed below.
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iloriO D iaiia  3anHCKa. r iD on osH U ii eK oaoriM U O ï a c o u a i t i i  M tiK oaaiBC bK oi o G jta cr i no 30- ;|f
KM 3Q ui naBKoao AEG. 1 6 .1 0 .1 9 9 1 . ;=S
3aMeMaiiHH k npoetcrv nocraiiOBaeuMB CoBMHna CCCP ’’Botipocbi crpoHTCJibcrBa oGbCK roB lOY - ; |
3K ” OT 7 aBrvcra 1989 r. |(
IOSociiOBaiiHe k peineiiHiQ ceccHH o G aacriio ro  CoBexa uapQaiibix aenvm noB  o  neoGxcoiMMnrrM 
npoavBKH TaiLiJtHKCKoro BOJioxpaiiMJiHiua b peKV IQxnbUJ Bvr (n.d.).
O ep ioa  iiiBpo3naav TopiioGHaii. 2 2 .5 .1 9 9 3 .
rïpono3Muii ao  KOMnaeKCuoi nporpaMH ”EiteprexMKa”. 1 7 .3 .1 9 9 3 .
Pe3QJiiQuia I I  3 'X 3 a v  peciivG aiK aiicbK oi eKOJioriM uoi a c o u i a u i i  ’’BeaeiiHH C b Ix . (d ra ft), 
ad d re ssed  to  V erk h o v n a  R ad a  and  sig n ed  by N ik o la e v  P Z U  (n .d .). A
Pe30JiiouHii iMMXHura-upoxecra x u r e a e A  HMKOJiaenacoH ofijiacrH  upoxHB cxpoMtejibcxBa 
AjieKcaiiapoBCKoro h KoucxauxMUOBCKoro noaoxpaiiHJiHiu ua ID xucm  B vre. pacuiupeim B 
MOitiHocreH IDxHOVKpanHCKOH A BC h cxpotxreabCXBa Bepe30BCKoro XHMKOMGtiiiaxa. r.
HuKoaaeB. 2 6 .1 2 .1 9 8 8 .
PemeuHC coGpauuB oGutecxBeuHOcxM HnKCJtaeBCKOM oGjiacxH. nocBJUueiiuoe m ecroH  roaoBiuHue 
ftepuoGbiabCKOH Kaxacxpotltbi. r. HuKOJiaeB, 2 5 .4 .1 9 9 2 .
PcuieitHe 5 - ro  oG aacxuoro  coGpauHU HHKOJtaeBCKOH oG aacruoH  oKoaoixiMecKOM accoiiHauHH 
”3eaeiibiH M h p”. 2 2 .1 2 .1 9 9 1 . Y i
’CecHB oG aacruol p aa u  napoaunx aenvxaxoBk (transcript) broadcast on oblast T V , 2 4 .1 1 .1 9 8 8 .  f
TamauubKa EEC-EA EC . 1 6 .1 0 . 1 9 9 1 .
Original Documents and Resolutions - PZU-
Bame saopoB ' a. YKPaiucbKa MeauMua rasexa. CneuiaabUHH bhuvck. B ix a a iA  Kqhoiiob -  
Kauanaax v iiapoaui aeuvxaxH BepxoBuol P a a n  YKpainA no E arapiucbKOMV bmGopmomv 
QKpvrv N o . 3 . M icra Kasbu (n .d .).
' I1 Gepe3iu! BhGqpm uapoaubix aeuvxaxiB Y tcpaiiiu . Kquouob. B i x a a iA  MAKoaaHOBiiM.
K aiiJH aax  v  i ia p o a u i aenvxaxM Y K p aiu u  no 3aai3UHMuoiMV bmGopmomv oK pvrv  N o .  7 M icaa Y
K m ebb . nepeaBbiGopua uporpaw a (n .d .). I
1
BiaKpMXHA a u c i' rioaixH M U oi PaiiH FI3Y a o  B epxoB noi PaitH i  rpoM aaaii Y K p a iu u  iitoao 
uHxarib aaep u o ro  po33Gpoeuua, m K h ib ,  1 4 .3 .1 9 9 2 . Y |
____________________________________________________________________________________  'lY
BmuhckcI 13 iipoTOKoav N l .  ^aciaanm i IIKP I W .  w. K h ïiî, 11 .1 .1992 .
KoHdiepeiiijjfl rtpo aaxHcr h k o c t I  xMTrn lyiaaosaGeaneMeiiHX nepcTB iiaceaeinm V ic p a iu H .
2 0 .1 .1 9 9 1 .
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3ac iiiam ifl uenTpajibuoi [coopaMBauiHiioi oaan n a p T ii  ^eaetiHx yicpaiuM (n.d.l. 
3aniia m y .  N o . 11-09. 3 0 .9 .1 9 9 3 .
3aBBa r i3y  b cdbbkv 3 iiacrnHMMH cnpoOaMM pocHHCbKoi vtepxaBH viaepaM'rH cBoe oco5.,tMBe 
HpaBO na apMHio KoaHimioro CPC ra pQ3BB3anv 3aco5aMH viacoBOi iiKboPMauii 
aiiTHVKPaiiicbKV KavinaiiHio. (n.d.).
3aaBa n3Y: ranSHiina aorHKa aaroMHCbicnx aoMOBJieiinoCTeH neae ao ypBrvBamni Yicpainn 
V BHCbKoro/noaHTMMiiv opGhtv PoccMM. PaAio VKpâïiiü, 2 1 :50 , 7 .7 .1 9 9 2 .
3aaBa ri3Y  iiioao riHxanb npHBaTH3anii a e p x a n tm x  iiiaiipHEMcrB. K o  B epxoB iio i P aan  
YKpaxim, 2 7 .1 .1 9 9 2 .
3aaB a FI3Y nioao  cripaMODaiiocri a iH  KaGHiiexv M iii ic ip iB  YicpaiiiH. 3 .1 2 .1 9 9 2 .
B anna rioaiTM M noi P a a n  O ap T ii 3 ea en n x  Y tcp a ïiin , 13 .3 .1992. IBaana FIoaiTHMHOi Paan I la p T ii 3eaennx YKpaiiiH. PaAio YKpalmu 21:10, 2 5 .6 .1 9 9 2 . g
Banna noaiT H M H oi P a a n  O a p T i i  BeaeiiHx Y K paiiiH  nioao (bopMVBanim iioBoro K aG nnerv  
M in  i c i  p i n , 2 2 .1 0 .1 9 9 2 .
Banna noaiTHM unx n a p x i l  Y K painH . 1.10.1993.
B anna llo a ix p a a M  OBY N o . 2 /1 4 . 13 .1 .1994 .
BanBaeitHe HapixiM B eaeiiux  YKpannbi KaKuomeecn oGoponnbix Bonpocon. K h c b . 4 .9 .1 9 9 1
I
Bnepnennn. 2 .9 .1 9 9 1 .
Bneonennn ao rpoMaann YKPainn, 1 2 .1 0 .9 3 . g
17
Bnepnennn OBY ao iipennaeuxa n vpnav YKpainH. 7 .1 2 .1 9 9 2 . Y
■ I
KoM enxap a o  sannw OBY nia 7 rpvann 1992pntcv. ;
,Jc
2 4  annnn nonxopni bhGoph ao BepxoBnoi Paan YKpaiiiH. Kananaax v aenvxaxH 
BepxPBHoi PaaH YKpaiiiH no UenxDajibtiQMV bhGopmqmv OKpvrv N o . 2 2 . m. K hebb . KvoHKiii 
CepriM InanoBHM (n.d.). f |
JliMHJibna KOMicin. H poxoK O Ji N o . 2 (1 0 .1 0 .9 2 ) Cbhcok j i e a e r a x iB . •if
ripoTQKQJi 3aciaanim  IleiiTpajiLuoi KoopaHnaniHuoi Paan FIBY. 1 2 .6 .1 9 9 3 . m. K h ïr.
Pe30JTiouifl 3 6 o p iB  it i iu ia T H B i io i  rpvRH no CTsopenmo O a p T i i  BeneiiH x YKpaïiiM  (FlBy) 
(n .d .) .
Pe3Q Jtion ia K oïK b ep en n ii FIBY 3 nan H onajibno i nojiHTHKH. m. K h ïb , 2 0 .1 .1 9 9 1 .
îMaiiicbecr r ia p r i l  Beaeiinx YKpaiiiH. adopted at the First Party Congress in i 990. Y
M iiiicrepCTDO locT H n ii YKpaiiiH. CniaouTBo npo p escrp an iio  N o . 2 3 4  (n .d ,).
Ha 3PaaKV ripo bh6oph-94. ,m. K h ï b  (Kh ï b : K h e b o - C bbt. apyic, 1994).
Hapaaa HBYKpaïiiH. K h ï b . 1 0 .0 8 .1 9 9 0 .
pTKpbiToe nncbMo H3Y k BepxoBnoviv Cobotv Pocchhckoh O eaepanHH ( n .d . ) .
H ortoaceiina npo ceK pexap iaT  n a p T i ï  Bejiennx Y K p aïn n  (n .d .). <7
,
HporpaMa B. KononoBa -  ne nporpaMa ’YeaettHx” YicpalnH. Hepeani. jpna nporpaMa 77
KanaHaaxa b aenvTaxH Bepxoniioï Paan Yicpaïiin no 7-qm v. 3ajti3nHMH0MV. bhGopmq.viv : ||
OKPvrv M. KnEBa. OctiOBui iiPHnnnnH i  xe3H ( n .d . ) .  7,
.7 '-
H porpaM a H a p x i l  SeaeiiH x Y K païH . npHHiiaxa vaanQBMHM xbisaoM  H3Y. 2 8 -3 0 . 1990.
HporpaMiiH npHiiiiHnM H3Y. 15 .7 .1990 .
H p o  nojiixHMnv crpaxeriio H3Y (n.d.).
HpoxoKoa 3aciaanini IJKP H3Y, m. K h ï b , bvjt. K ipoaa 5A . 1 8 .5 .1 9 9 1 .
HpQXQKOJt 36opiB in in ia x H B iio ï rpvnH H3Y, K h ï b . 1 8 .6 .1 9 9 0 .
OpoxoKOJi N o .  001 . 3aciaaiiiia npeacxaBUHKiB p er io n iu  H3Y. m. K h ï b . n ia  2 3 .1 1 .1 9 9 3 . 
OpoxoKOJi N l.  3aciaanini HKP H3Y tn.d.l.
OpoxoKOJi No. 1.3aciaanini HKP H a p x iï  3ejienHX YKpaiiiH B ia  21 jtHcxonana 1992 poicv.
Hpoxotcoji 3 a c i a a n n f l  HKP H3Y B i a  24 ic B ix n n  1993 p o K v . ;Y;
OpoxoKOJi N o. 1 jtiMHJibHQï K O M iciï I I I  3' ï3 a v  H a p x iï Bejtennx YKpaïUH n ia  11 
x o B x n i i  1992 p o ic v .
H p o x o k o ji Dinjenint Koncbepenniï paaHKajtbHoi ê p a K n iï H3Y TepnoniJtbCKOï oG jiacri |
( n .d . ) .
HpQXQKOJT N o . 1 ■ VMpeaHxejibnoro coSp ann n  XapbKOBCKoro oG iiacriioro  K.rTv5a napxwH 3ejtenbix 
YKpaHiibi. r. XapbKOB. 1991.
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.P e3oa iQ u in  K o iK bepeim ii l l a D T i ï  3e:ieiiHX Y im aïnM  .3 nyrraiib n a u io i u i . . i i3 a u i i  B c ix  
iiHanPHEMcrB iia Tep ixropii V K pa inH . 2 0 .1 .1 9 9 1 .
CvBepeiirtrei\ ^KOJioima vi noammica. 3RV. 1 2 .3 .1 9 9 1 .
ypoMHCTO nporoJiOLBVEMO c i b o p r i h p i  r i a p i i i  3 ea p B H X  VKHaliin ( n . d . )
fioMV 3671611 i  YKpalHH H6 3roiJni 3 vpa/iOM ( n .d . ) .
I was able to access m ost o f  PZ U ’s press releases for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. The fo llow ing  
press releases are spec ifically  referred to or cited in this thesis;
rip6c-p6Jii3 ri3Y, 2 4 .6 .1 9 9 3 .
rip6c-p6Jii3 N o . 1 2 -0 9 , 1 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 1 4 -1 0 ,5 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 2 0 -1 0 , 2 5 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 2 2 -1 0 , 2 9 .1 0 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 2 3 /1 0 , 3 .1 1 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 2 4 /1 8 , 1 6 .1 1 .9 3 .
N o . 2 6 -1 1 ,2 1 .1 1 .9 3 .
N o . 0 /5 1 -1 2 , 2 0 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 0 -5 2 /1 2 ,2 1 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 .
N o . 0 -9 2 /1 2 ,2 1 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 .
No. 39-02, 23.2.1994.
N o . 2 8 /1 , 2 8 .2 .1 9 9 4 .
n p ec-P 6Jii3  r ia p T ii 36JI6HHX YKpaiiiH moao riporojiomeiuia KnEoa 663 ' njiepHoio 3011010. 
2 3 .1 0 .9 2 .
np6C-P6JTi3 ujoao nuTainin npo P03nojtiJi MaAita xa  aKXHBiB CPCP. N o . 0 -7 . 2 4 .9 .1 9 9 3 .
np6C"06Jii3 "ao riHxanna nno hobhh bhGopmhh saicon xa bhGoph  ao BeoxoBiiol Paan 
YKpaiiiH”. 2 5 .1 1 .1 9 9 3 .
n p 6 c -P 6 .ii i3  a o  n ianH cam iB  xph c to pg iu ig i aoMOBJieiiQcxi npo J iiK B ia a u iio  a a e p n o i 3 6 p o i  b 
YKp a i n i .  N o . 3 /1 . 1 9 .1 .1 9 9 4 .
L etter N o. 17-10. 20.10.1993 to the C entral E lection Com m ission.
p630Juonin Kon(I)6P6[inii 0 3 Y . mo n ia G v a a c b  20  ciM iia 1990  n. b m. K h eb I. inoao  n o a i f l  n 
riepcbK iH  3 a x o n i .
CoBM6cxnoe 3anBJi6nH6 flapxHH B eaeiiux  FpvBHH. JIhxbli. Ytcpanubi. BcroiiHH ri /Ibhxohhii 
Beaeiibix ApvienHH tTGaMCH. œiixnGpb, 1991).
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BapKcipb A.A., KoTBUbi M.A., MeabiienMyK 3 .10 ., HKonaeii B.H. (cocraBMTe.:in), BKoaorHMRCKoe 
aaKOHQiiaxeabcrBQ cot03a CCP h MoaaaBCKOH CCP (KninHiien: Kapiai MoaaoBCmicKB. 1989).
rocyaapcrBeiiiibiH komhtct CCCP no oxpane npupoabi, Cocron im e npHpoanoH cpeabi n CCCP 
B 1988  roiiv (MoCKBa: Jlecnan npoMbiinaennoCTb, 1990).
rocyaap c i’BennbiH kommtct YCCP no oxpane npHpojibi, MHiiHCi'epcTBo aapanooxpanenHfi YCCP, 
Hn([)opMannoniibiH 6ioaaerenb (Khgb: anrycr, 1990).
rocyaapCTBeniibiM komotct YKpanncKOM CCP no oxpane npMpoiiu, Oxpana npHPoau -  aajiaaa 
Bcenapoinian (Khcb: HaaaTeabci'DO iioaHTHMecKOH aMTepaxypu Yrcpaniibi, 1987).
/ÎBeiia/inaTan ceccHB Beuxoniioro Conera YKpaHiicKon CCP (oaHiiaiinaTbiH cobub). 1 5 - 1 7
■77?
■ f
:
7Russian Language Documents
B BepxoBHbiH CoBCT YKpaHHCKOH M Coi03a CCP. containing 85 signatures (B ilodid o f  g
luzhnoukrainsk  Zelenyi Mir show ed me a w hole box filled w ith such petitions) gathered in June 
1988 in luzhnoukrainsk.
Bpewennoe coiaianieiiMe v iex av  npe3HiieirroM Coio3a CoBeicicMx CoimaancrHMecKHx
.7:;
I
PecnvOaHK h pvKOBoabiTeaaMH BbicntHx opranoB B.iacrH pecnvOaHic no aKoaorHMecKHM g
npofijie.via.M. TpeOviointiM coraaconannbix aeAcTBMü. b tom MHcae no npenvnpexiieiiHio m 
.ribiKBHiiauHH nocjieiiCTBHH 3KoaorHMecKHX 6eacrBMM (iipoeicr) (n.d.).
7i
r opGaneB, M.C., HBOpaiiiibie peMH h craxbH (MocKBa: toareabcrBO  noaHXMMecKOH .:iM'i’e])axypi,i,
1987), X. 1 -7 .
CocKOMcrax CCCP, Oxpana OKPVxatomeH cpeau m paiiHonajibnoe HcrtojBaoBaiiHe npHpo;nibix 
pecvpcoB B CCCP. CxaxHcxHxecKHH cSopiiMK (MocKBa: 0Hiiancbi h craxHcrnKa, 1989). ®
' 1rocvaapCTBemian nporpaMMa oxpanu oKpvxaiomeA cpeiibi h panHonaabnoro HcnojiirtOBanHB 7|
npHpoaiibix pecvpcoB CCCP na 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 5  roat.i h na nepcneKxunv ao 2 0 0 5  ro;ra (npoeKij, 
npiiBHTeJihCTBeimiÆ necnmK, /(o a e ,  c. 5 -19 . I"r
rocyaapcxBeiiHbiM komhtox YKpaHiicKOH CCP no oxpane npopoau, Oxpana npHpoabi b 
YKpamicKOM CCP (Kh6b; PexjiaMa, 1987). A
I
(fienpajra 1990  roaa. CxenornaifiHMecKMH oxnex (Knep: noJiMXMSiiax Yicpatinu, 1990). ■;:r
'I'
BaaBJieiiMe o co3JianHH üeMOKpaTHMecKom Koiirpecca (n.d.).
BaiiBJienHe vMacxiiHKon-vMpeimxejteA üeMKonrpecca o coio3iiom iioroBope m peibepeniivMe 
(n.d.).
KoMMionoKe o coBeinanoM npeaciaBMxenen KoMHxexoB h Komhccmh BepxoBiibix ConexoB 
pecnvfijiHK no BonpocaM 3KOJiorHH h pannonajibiioro Hcnojib30BanHn npHpoiiubix pecvpcoB. r.
KHniHiieB. 2 0 - 2 1  dienpajni 1 9 9 1  r.
'§
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■..7:g
KoimemiHfi rocvjiapcriieinioim pervaHpoBanHn 5e30HciciiQCTM h viipai3.:tenH;i iuiepnoR oxpaciixo  
V V K p a H iie . Fojioc YicpciUiM, 2 3 .3 .1 9 9 4 , c . 4 -5 .
Q63op CQcroniiMfl OKpyxaioLueA npHpoiiiioH cpeiiu n CCCP (MocKua: rniipo\ieTeoM3aaT. 1990).
Oxpana npHpoiiu b yKpaHiicicoH CCP. Environmental Control in the Ukrainian SSR (KweB: 
HBiiaxejibCTBO iiojiMXMMecKOH wiMxepmypbi YKpannbi, 1987).
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XapaKxepMCXMKa 3anopoxcbK oA  A 3C  (h3 VMexa) - document provided by Hanna Tsvetkova o f  
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N o . 12, 1990, G. 2 1 -2 3 , 4 1 -4 3 , 5 5 -7 1 .
O  neoxjioxiibix viepax PKOJiorHMecKOim o3itopoBaenMB crpaiibi (xe3HCbi iiporpaM\ii,i).
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CCCP, 1 5 .9 .1 9 8 9 , c. 27. I
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o6  vrojioBMO iiaKa3veMbîx napvnieiiHax npopoapoxpannoro BaKonoaaxenbcxna. I
riporoKOJi MCXBepxoro 3aceaantni MexnapjiaMenxcKoro gKOJiorHMecicoro Conera.
cocroBBinerocB 2 0 - 2 1  (tiespajui 1991 roaa b r. Krinmiiene.
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YKpaincbica PecnvOniKancbKa H apxin. Oporoaiymi aoKVivienxH (Kh ïb , 1991).
-
YMpejtHxejTbiioe coGpanne. 2 2 .9 .1 9 8 8 . I
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U k ra in ia n  L a n g u a g e  D o c u m e n ts
üeKJiapauin npo aepxaBHMfi cvBepen iTer yKpaiiiH (W ashington, D.C.: Sm oloskyp Publishers,
1990}.
3aK 0ii yKpaiHCbKOi P aaa iicbK oi C onia.aiC TH M noi Pecnv5:iiK H  iipo oxoporiv  iiaBKoaHiuiiboro 
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npHBOiiv iULibniQi p036vii0BH XMejtbMHnbKOï /Vro.vinoï E a e K T p o c ra im iï (n .d .).
■■YBnepnenim npeitcraBUHKiB ’Yejienoro pvxv” a o  i poMaaan YKPaïiiH - ü o p o r i  
CniBBiitMHBHHHKH. rPGMailBHH YKpaïiiH (n.d.).
BenenHH C bI x: HporpaMa (K h ï b . xoBxeiib 1 9 8 9  p.).
M a x ep ia jiH  a o  iiB aïuum nxoï c e c i ï  B eu x o n n o ï Paan Y icpaïiicb ico ï PCP. MeaHMni acneKXH 
e K o n o r ia n o ï  c H x v a n i ï  b YKpaïncbKiH PCP. 36ipnH K  craxHciHMiiHx noKaBiiHKin (Kh ï b :
1990).
HanoB, A., BenennA Pvx b  Y K p aïn i tn.d.Y
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a c o n i a n i ï  "BenennA C nix.
P im e m ia  ce K p ex a n iax v  a c o n i a n i ï  "BenennA C n ix ” n i a  1 5 .1 2 .1 9 9 0  3 ripriBonv aicrv  
K oiixpojib!iom eB i3iA noï KOMiCi ï .
CKanaaJt v OnaropoanoMV c i  Mener n i  (n .d .) .
ÿ
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l l le p O a K , lO ., M i x  p e c n v 0 jiiK a iM H  M a s 6 v x h  o in n o n D a n n a  v r o a a  3 ripoO neM  e K O J i o r i ï .
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